Mendonça, Wilson2019-09-252019-09-252009-01-15200718079792http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/172200In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’ theory of mind”. On a first approach, that doesn’t look very innovative to our contemporary materialist convictions. Indeed, Kim argues persuasively that a central claim of emergentism—concerning the irreducibility of emergent properties—is irremediably at odds with a view of mental causation that follows from some very plausible physicalist assumptions. This is “the problem of downward causation.” I intend to show that Dewey’s brand of emergentism actually allows an adequate reply to the very importantworry formulated by Kim.engWith permission of the license/copyright holderPhilosophyethicsMethods of ethicsPhilosophical ethicsArticle