陈, 真2019-09-252019-09-252012-05-312004http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/185680按照西方哲学家一般的理解，只有符合行动者的个人利益的行为对行动者来 说才是合乎理性的行为。这种意义上的理性叫做“精明理性”。然而道德的行为常常包含利他 主义的因素。相当多的西方哲学家极力想证明道德与精明理性总是一致的。笔者认为这是不可 能的。这是因为道德的价值基础和精明理性的价值基础是不可通约的，即无法客观比较的，故 当它们相冲突时，我们无法从逻辑上客观地证明道德的理由总是优于精明理性的理由，反之亦 然。当道德与精明理性相冲突时，我们究竟应该怎么做？笔者认为最好的办法只能是求助于具 有反思精神的公众舆论或理性反思的共识。然而这种共识依然不是完全客观的，我们依然没有 纯客观的标准决定我们最有理由做什么。 [A puzzle about morality and prudential rationality is that we want to always act both morally and rationally (i.e., prudentially) but sometimes we cannot. Many contemporary Western philosophers try to solve the puzzle by showing that morality and prudential rationality are always consistent or showing that one is always superior to the other, but, as I shall argue, this is impossible. I try to show that the incommensurability between the grounds of moral reasons and agent-relative reasons makes objective comparison between the powers of the two kinds of reasons impossible. Therefore we cannot prove that morality and prudential rationality are always consistent or that one is always superior to the other. If we still want to determine what the agent has most reason to do when the two sorts of reasons conflict in a particular situation, what we can do, at most, is to appeal to reflective public opinion, which is justified by intuitions of the majority of the rational people in a community who really understand the relevant situation. ]chiWith permission of the license/copyright holdermoralityprudential rationalitypractical reasonvaluesincommensurabilitypractical rationalityethicsMethods of ethicsArticle