Zimmerman, Dean2019-09-252019-09-252009-01-15200818079792http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/172208No one has done as much as Eric Olson — in The Human Animal, numerous papers, and his most recent book, What Are We? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) — to chart the range of metaphysical positions one might adopt in order to resist the argument for animalism I will be discussing; and no one has so thoroughly tallied up their various costs and benefits. My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that would seem to infect the boundaries of human animals.engWith permission of the license/copyright holderPhilosophyethicsMethods of ethicsPhilosophical ethicsArticle