Vignolo, Massimiliano2019-09-252019-09-252009-01-15200618079792http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/172187I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made of concepts. Schiffer (2003) has presented a group of arguments against the Fregean model and advanced an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is twofold: (i) to counter each of his arguments sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic constituents of propositions; (ii) to maintain that the notion of pleonastic entity is not robust enough for claiming the existence of propositions.engWith permission of the license/copyright holderPhilosophyethicsMethods of ethicsPhilosophical ethicsArticle