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DEWEY’S METAPHYSICS OF MIND
Mendonça, Wilson
Mendonça, Wilson
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n3_mendonca.pdf
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In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’ theory of mind”. On a first approach, that doesn’t look very innovative to our contemporary materialist convictions. Indeed, Kim argues persuasively that a central claim of emergentism—concerning the irreducibility of emergent properties—is irremediably at odds with a view of mental causation that follows from some very plausible physicalist assumptions. This is “the problem of downward causation.” I intend to show that Dewey’s brand of emergentism actually allows an adequate reply to the very importantworry formulated by Kim.
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2007
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With permission of the license/copyright holder