Loading...
Richard Price's Contextualist Rationalism Susan Purviance (University of Toledo)
Price, Richard
Price, Richard
Author(s)
Price, Richard
Author(s) (Additional)
Illustrator(s)
Producer(s)
Contributor(s)
Contributor(s) (Other)
Editor(s)
Advisor(s)
Contact(s)
Data Collector(s)
Keywords
GE Subjects
Collections
Files
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Online Access
Abstract
The British Moralists of the Eighteenth Century have been divided into rationalists and empiricists on the question of how moral judgments are formed. But this is too simple: there are various sorts of rationalism proposed, as well as Moral Sentimentalists, who believe in some kind of moral sense of approval, and welfarist empiricists, who focus on happiness promotion. None thought that the views of another cast into doubt the existence of moral truth. Their disputes about moral principles evidenced an ability to conduct debates across large divides, their dialoguing with those in the opposite camp a good indication of their hope of convergence on truth. So too, educated persons who followed their debates invoking moral abstractions like "reason" and "happiness" did not doubt that we have well-formed understandings that support moral judgment. And so it is with many of us: theorists do not agree upon the principles, if any, that account for what the competent moral evaluator is doing when producing a sensitive moral judgment. But still, we are able to make competent moral judgments, and to recognize such judgments by others. But how should one interpret this characteristic confidence in moral judgment despite disagreement on principles? In light of the range of our present views on what moral truth might be, where it might be situated, or even whether it makes sense to posit such a thing, this supposing that there is such a competence seems risky. I will not attempt a general overview of all the possible ways of situating this assumption of competence in contemporary moral philosophy. But I will suggest two current interpretations that I find plausible. First of all, competence in moral judgment is consistent with Moral Particularism. Moral Particularism is the view that what is morally important to judgment is the particular arrangement of features in an instance of moral action. Competence in moral judgment, then, involves being able to take in this particular arrangement and apply moral categories to it in a competent way. Second, competence in moral judgment is consistent with Virtue Contextualism. Virtue Contextualism is the view that what counts as virtuous conduct cannot be expressed solely by general traits of disposition to act. Such general traits of disposition to act, or virtues, require the specification of a social context. Competence in moral judgment thus involves being able to take in the general traits as they are embedded in a particular social context. [1]
Note(s)
Topic
Type
Article
Date
2008
Identifier
ISBN
DOI
Copyright/License
With permission of the license/copyright holder