Loading...
PROBLEMS FOR ANIMALISM
Zimmerman, Dean
Zimmerman, Dean
Author(s)
Author(s) (Additional)
Illustrator(s)
Producer(s)
Contributor(s)
Contributor(s) (Other)
Editor(s)
Advisor(s)
Contact(s)
Data Collector(s)
Keywords
GE Subjects
Collections
Files
Loading...
n04_Zimmerman.pdf
Adobe PDF, 49.91 KB
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Online Access
Abstract
No one has done as much as Eric Olson — in The Human Animal, numerous papers, and his most recent book, What Are We? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) — to chart the range of metaphysical positions one might adopt in order to resist the argument for animalism I will be discussing; and no one has so thoroughly tallied up their various costs and benefits. My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that would seem to infect the boundaries of human animals.
Note(s)
Topic
Type
Article
Date
2008
Identifier
ISBN
DOI
Copyright/License
With permission of the license/copyright holder