Loading...
[Global Corruption Report 2007] Bribes,Punishment and Judicial Immunity
Dal Bo, Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Di Tella, Rafael
Dal Bo, Ernesto
Dal Bo, Pedro
Di Tella, Rafael
Author(s)
Author(s) (Additional)
Illustrator(s)
Producer(s)
Contributor(s)
Contributor(s) (Other)
Editor(s)
Advisor(s)
Contact(s)
Data Collector(s)
Keywords
Collections
Files
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Online Access
Abstract
"During the height of the Argentine crisis of 2002, amid crowds of furious protesters shouting ‘que se vayan todos’ (Spanish for ‘let them all go’) against a political class perceived as deeply corrupt and self-serving, the IMF requested that the country pass an immunity law for central bank directors. Since this would extend the protection already enjoyed by politicians from judicial investigations of misconduct to members of an institution at the centre of the country’s financial crisis, this appeared to be an incomprehensible proposal. In the timid debate that followed, it was argued that, while possibly detrimental to fighting corruption, such laws were necessary for the sound functioning of the financial system. For those seriously concerned with reducing corruption, however, this presents a legitimate question: Are immunity laws an obstacle in reducing corruption? The short answer we offer in Dal Bó et al. (2006) is that not only do immunity laws not hinder the fight against corruption, but that, under some conditions, they actually help. To understand this, we must first accept that influence is carried out not only through bribes and lobbying, but also through threats and punishment."(pg 302)
Note(s)
Topic
Type
Book chapter
Date
2007
Identifier
ISBN
9780521700702
DOI
Copyright/License
With permission of the license/copyright holder