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Economic policy-making and parliamentary accountability in chile
Montecinos, Veronica
Montecinos, Veronica
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chile.pdf
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Abstract
"This study examines technocratic politics and the role of Congress in economic policy-making in Chile. For over a century, budgetary politics in Chile contained protracted efforts to depoliticize economic management and insulate policy decisions from congressional interference. The rise of technocratic elites preceded, and in some accounts, contributed to the democratic breakdown of the early 1970s. Under General Pinochet s rule, technocratic groups gained enormous influence to further remove economic management from political controls. The 1980s constitution so weakened the legislature that the current system has been labeled exaggerated presidentialism. 1 The center-left coalition that came to power in 1990 placed economic specialists in several top policy positions to signal the new democracy s commitment to policy efficiency, fiscal discipline and monetary stability. Although elections provide citizens with the opportunity to hold their representatives accountable, the loss of congressional policy capacities and the concurrent empowerment of technocratic elites are likely to undermine the stability of democracy. The electoral dimension of accountability is enhanced if Congress possesses the necessary resources to exercise its oversight functions, and has the authority to impose credible sanctions when government officials violate political or legal rules (Schedler at al., 1999)."(pg 3)
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2002
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With permission of the license/copyright holder