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Teoria dell’errore e ‘stranezza’ ontologica (Error Theory and Ontological 'strangeness')
De Mori, Barbara
De Mori, Barbara
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Abstract
The paper critically examines the metaethical position of J.L. Mackie as regards its influences on the recent debate, starting from the so–called error theory, through his treatment of scepticism and queerness. The aim is to clarify how we can assume an antirealistic position in ethics, believing that there are no objective values and that ‘morality has to be invented’, and to evaluate the force of the arguments of Mackie, by focusing the attention on the important – and often neglected – influences on his thought of J. Locke, D. Hume and, particularly, E. Westermarck, with his epistemological and anthropological attitude to ethical enquiry.
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2005
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With permission of the license/copyright holder