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The Problem Of Normativity In Contemporary Legal Theory [Swiss Philosophical Preprint Series.No -85]
Del Mar, Maksymilian
Del Mar, Maksymilian
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Philosophie.ch_85.pdf
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Abstract
This paper examines the problem of normativity in contemporary legal theory, paying particular attention to the relationship between the conception of the problem and related explanations of behaviour. The first part of the paper shows how the problem of normativity, conceived of as a matter of determining how legal norms function as reasons for action, is linked to an explanation of behaviour that is posited or assumed to be capable of being guided by reasons. More importantly for the purposes of the paper, the first part also shows the problem of normativity plays a certain function (called here a ‘thought-context’) thanks to which a theorist can, e.g., evaluate lawmaking and adjudication practices (Timothy Endicott); scrutinise the reasonabless of norms (John Finnis); critically examine the circumstances under which law is authoritative (Joseph Raz); or make distinctions between certain kinds of phenomena that influence conduct (H.L.A. Hart). The second part of the paper offers the sketch of an alternative relationship between a conception of the problem of normativity and an explanation of behaviour. The general aim of the paper is to endorse an engagement with the works of others that pays attention to the relationship between problems and explanations, and to the implications of any one way of drawing that relationship for images and practices of theorising.
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2009
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With permission of the license/copyright holder