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New Routes

A JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH AND ACTION

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An eye on security



Peter Englund:
Iraq falling to pieces

Kevin Clements:
Terror is not the problem

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Whose security?

A provocative title of a revealing report published by the Brussels-based ecumenical network APRODEV. Is the war on terror really bringing security? If so, for whom – who is in focus? The rich or the poor? Take a look at these figures from the report:

International terrorism between 1998 and 2004 resulted in 28 000 casualties in Africa and Asia, compared to 5 000 in North America and Western Europe. Yet, terrorism accounts for only a tiny share of violence-related deaths, as 1 659 000 people died from violence in 2002, according to WHO.

Professor Kevin Clements, former head of International Alert, challenges the western governments in the leading article in this New Routes by asking:

“What would happen if all entire policy-making were judged by how well we treated the weakest and most vulnerable people in the world? Real security, human security, flows from placing the poor, marginalised and vulnerable at the heart of our development, security and peacebuilding policies.”

In a feature article based on his a visit to Iraq, wellknown Swedish historian and novelist Peter Englund reflects on the project called “Future for Iraq”. It is not one war, rather three, and a kind of dead-end street for the American troops.

Let me also point at the contribution by Lindsay Weber. She has looked at the new Canadian and Swedish foreign policies, both including the perspective of human security. One of her conclusions is that “the elements of conflict prevention and civilian protection must be prioritised as opposed to other elements that may be used to justify actions in the “war on terror”.

If you find it hard to be an optimist in terms of peacebuilding, do read the marvellous story about the Imam and the Pastor in Nigeria. We have mentioned this before, as both attended the Tools for Peace conference in Sweden a year ago. Here is the full story, written up by themselves. Very inspiring, to say the least...

A blessed 2006 and good progress in your work for peace!

If you want to support LPI, entering into its 21st year of peacebuilding, research and action, do visit our website (www.life-peace.org) to find out more about our work and how give a donation.

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Practice political jujitsu to promote human security

Terrorism is not the problem. The problem is political violence, says Professor Kevin Clements in this article, which is an abbreviated version of his keynote speech at a seminar arranged by Peace Team Forum, Sweden.¹ It should be questioned whether today's counter-terrorist policies are likely to generate stable peaceful relationships and wider levels of human security. The root causes of fear, militarism and separatism have to be dealt with in order to achieve political stability and security.

The global pursuit of security through threat-based deterrent strategies is counter-productive. It is counter-productive because these strategies do not deal with the primary sources of both direct and indirect violence and are highly unlikely to result in higher levels of global solidarity, genuine human security or an exhaustion of nonviolent solutions to problems before violence is contemplated. They also do very little to deal with fear and want. Furthermore, they are generating new forms of nationalism which threaten to undermine the progress made towards multilateralism in the 20th century. This neo-nationalism manifests itself in national selfishness and parochialism; in particular a reluctance to think in terms of the human interest and a bias towards thinking solely in terms of narrow self and national interests. Let me illustrate this with what I call the pain calculus.

Approximately 3,000 individuals died in the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. This was a tragedy and a shock to America. It made Americans realize that the most

powerful nation in the world was as vulnerable as every other state in the world to top down or bottom up political violence. While each one of these deaths was a tragedy, they do, however, need to be contextualized a little. Since 2001, 8,000–14,000 Afghan civilians and militia have died since the overthrow of the Taliban. It is estimated that 30,000 children die every hour of preventable diseases in the global South. 80,000 men, women and children have been killed in the Northern Ugandan conflict. More than 100,000 Iraqi civilians have died since the US invasion and occupation began. 2.2 million Africans died of aids in 2003, which amounts to 166,660 persons every month. Finally 3.5 million have been

killed, directly or indirectly, in Eastern Congo since 1985.

Each one of these statistics, like all those killed in the World Trade Center,

is a human being. Most came from caring, loving families. Each one represents a cruel truncation of human potentiality. Each one deserves both our sympathy and grief. Why is it, therefore, that citizens of the North are more likely to grieve for those killed in New York, Madrid and London than those killed in places such as Goma, Monrovia, Tangiers, Jakarta, or Amman? If we have a strong sense of species identity, each one of these deaths deserves to be mourned equally. Each one also represents unresolved problems that need to be dealt with if such deaths are to be avoided in the future.

So the very first thing we need to do to develop a culture of conflict prevention, capable of dealing with both direct and indirect violence, is to problematise the issue of terror and terrorism and challenge the current military responses to counter this threat. We need to ask whether counter-terrorist policies are proportionate to the problem and likely to generate stable peaceful relationships and wider levels of human security.

In relation to terrorist threat, for example, this current United States Administration is not even listening to its own advisors in relation to what sorts of programmes are likely to be most effective in preventing terrorist violence.

Terrorism, in this instance, is a particular crime of the unheard.

The 2004 United States Political Instability Task Force (drawn from the State Department and a number of national intelligence agencies), tried to

find significant correlates of terrorism and other kinds of political violence. Working with one of the biggest computers in the world, they crunched a huge amount of data and discovered four key variables, which were highly correlated to terrorism and other sources of political violence. These were the only variables that were significant in relation to terrorist threat. The four variables were as follows:

- Poverty, underdevelopment and mal-distribution of resources
- Weak regimes and poor governance
- Poor regional integration
- Bad neighborhoods, where there is gun trafficking, drug trafficking, human trafficking and so forth.



While these correlates are not “causes” of terrorism, it is clear that if they are not dealt with positively and effectively, it is highly unlikely that incidents of terrorism will substantially diminish. We can conclude from this study, therefore, that the trillions currently being spent on military expenditure are unlikely to result in any dramatic diminution of terrorist activity. On the contrary they may in fact even fuel it.

Most people in harmony

Terrorism is not the problem. The problem is political violence. Most of human activity is peaceful. Most people, most of the time live in harmony with each other, doing what they have to do in order to ensure individual and collective survival. There are always some people, however, who choose to pursue their political objectives through violent means. Some of these persons occupy positions of political power and choose coercive means to achieve their political objectives. Others do not have any political power and are, very often, grappling with severe challenges to their identity, or their right to exist (for example, as is the case in Palestine). Or they resort to violence as a way of coping with instances of deep humiliation, rejection, marginalization and exclusion.

For these people violence is a way of communicating grievance, generating fear and arousing a negative reaction in order to expand their struggle. Terrorism, in this instance, is a particular crime of the unheard. It is a crime in which the actor is saying through his/her own suicide or in the murder of others that, “They are willing to sacrifice their lives and take the lives of others in order that people and politicians will acknowledge their political agenda and/or their past suffering and humiliation.”

After the attack on the World Trade Center the United States and the world had a chance to ask what those particular terrorists were trying to say through that desperate action. While

there was some attention to their grievances, the dominant response from the United States was a radical division of the world into “saved” and “unsaved”, “evil doers” and “righteous” and a very vigorous assertion of state power and military solutions.

There were few attempts at this time to identify nonviolent alternatives to terror, terrorist threats and other types of violence. On the contrary, politicians have reasserted the primacy of the state as the major bulwark between order and chaos through appeals to patriotism and national solidarity. This appeal has resulted in a dramatic upsurge of xenophobic nationalism.

This is epitomised most graphically in the ways in which counter-terrorism is being used to justify political repression in a large number of countries, for example, Uganda, Kenya, Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, the Sudan, and the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia as well). Repressive legislation in all of these countries challenges the rule of law and undermines many basic human rights. When it is coupled with tactics of extraordinary rendition and “torture light”, it becomes particularly egregious and undermines normative principles that civil society groups and nations have spent many years developing. This is particularly worrying when such behaviour is committed by nations that are exponents of democratic principles with pretensions to international “moral” leadership.

The big alternative on the agenda is the rigorous promotion of *human security*.

“In the 21st century, all states and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom - by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. In an increasingly interconnected world progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

A Russian soldier on guard in Grozny, Chechnya - a sign of security or insecurity for the population? Photo: Pressens Bild

These are the words of Kofi Annan from his 2005 Policy Document *In Larger Freedom*. The document presents a long-term alternative vision to the short-term repressive response to terror and terrorism. It was supposed to frame a new political agenda for the world for the Millennium Plus Five Summit in the summer of 2005. It was and is a bold and holistic vision, both analytically and practically, and it provided very precise benchmarks for nations to aspire to.

US Ambassador John Bolton, on behalf of the US administration challenged and undermined this vision by tabling 750 amendments to the consensus document one week before the summit began. Those of you that have been involved in multilateral diplomacy know that it takes years to bring these agendas together. In a matter of a week John Bolton took the consensus document apart in order to assert US national interests. To add insult to injury he tried to persuade the rest of the world that these amendments were in the global interest.

The fact that the rest of the world could not prevent one country gathering its allies to dismantle a consensus document in this way highlights something about the dysfunctional nature of the United Nations. It operates as an organization of equals in a world of deep political and economic inequality. Those who are dominant exercise this dominance within the system, thereby sabotaging the capacity of the global community as a whole to ensure that its interests are accorded primacy.

Integration and peace dialogue

States are not by and large very good at promoting community and strong community relationships. In fact there is a debate within the literature about the precise nature of the relationship between state and civil society and whether it is possible to develop effective and legitimate state systems without a strong and robust civil



Please take your seats! There is a role for civil society in the promotion of international security. Photo: People Building Peace/GPACC

society based on strong local communities.

What is clear, however, is that the long-term structural prevention and short-term operational prevention of conflict both require a commitment to nonviolence and the promotion of a culture of peace rather than a culture of violence. This is why the current international political climate is challenging to peacebuilders.

The dominant orthodoxy of responding to security problems with potentially violent military solutions is dramatically reducing the numbers of nonviolent options available to both “track one” official and “track two”

continue to identify non-military responses to problems in order to provide official policy makers and CSOs with a way of expanding the firebreak between non-military and military solutions.

I want to reassert the central importance of the UN and regional organizations in the promotion and maintenance of international security and in the effective prevention of violent conflict.

Effective regional organizations and the United Nations can justifiably take some pride in the positive achievements of the past 15 years. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a lot of

In recent years, the United States and some of its allies have practiced what I call “a la carte” multilateralism.

unofficial actors. It is vitally important therefore that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Governmental and Inter Governmental Organizations

good news to report. The recent Human Security Report, for example, notes that there have been no attempted genocides since Rwanda.



Real security, human security, places the poor, marginalized and vulnerable at the heart of development, security and peacebuilding policies. Photo: LPI

The numbers of political crises are diminishing and the total numbers of wars have been declining. Despite preoccupations with terrorism and the imbroglio of Iraq, the world has become a more peaceful place. The Human Security Report identifies the UN as central to a good deal of this good news.

So when President George Bush and others say that UN has been ineffective, the evidence suggests otherwise. Over the last 15 years, there has been a six-fold increase in UN preventive diplomacy missions to stop wars starting, a four-fold increase in UN peacemaking missions to end ongoing conflicts, a four-fold increase in UN Peace operations to reduce recurrence of war, and an eleven-fold increase in the numbers of states subject to UN sanctions. All of these represent very positive achievements for multilateral organizations. Many of the positive

results have been achieved in collaboration with effective regional organizations.

Thucydides² says: "Large states do as they will. Small states do as they must." Small and medium sized states like Sweden, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, and Ireland need the UN (as do similar-sized states in the South). Large states can choose to work within the structures of the United Nations or not. Whether they do or not, will be determined by their own perceptions of their national interest. In recent years, the United States and some of its allies have practiced what I call "à la carte" multilateralism. They use the United Nations when it suits them and spurns it when it does not. This is one of the biggest challenges facing global citizens and state parties of the United Nations, namely how to ensure that the rules of the UN are negotiated by all and accepted by all.

The UN could not do half of what it does without all the efforts of Civil Society Organizations. All of the specialized agencies rely heavily on academics and CSOs for analytic advice and implementation. In dealing with the Pakistan/Indian earthquake for example, because of military impasse and logistic challenge, neither the armies of Pakistan or India were capable of delivering the emergency supplies needed immediately after the crisis. Instead Oxfam, Care and UNICEF were on the ground more or less immediately.

In the field of nonviolent peace-building we have to be particularly sensitive to the unique roles that each one of us plays in relation to the prevention of violence. Each one of our activities or choices has very particular sets of consequences, and we have to ensure that these generate positive peaceful outcomes rather than negative violent ones. To develop this sort of awareness means generating more sensitivity to the ways in which different types of political and economic arrangements generate violent conflict.

Development challenges

A lot of what we are doing and a lot of what passes as good policy in terms of promoting national security and national perspectives on peace and justice, for example, is a way of protecting power and privilege.

The three richest persons in the world have assets that exceed the combined gross domestic product of the 48 least developed countries. The world's 225 richest individuals, of whom 60 are American, with total assets of \$311 billion have a combined wealth of over \$1 trillion, which is equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the entire world's population. 30,000 children die each day of preventable diseases. These economic differences and the protection of wealth and status associated with them are, however, ultimately maintained by unequal

military power. The most graphic example of which this is that of the United States.

The US defence budget in 2005 is \$415 billion. This figure excludes the Iraq supplemental, which is expected to top \$90 billion this year. The 14 percent increase to this year's budget was \$49 billion, which is over half of what the entire world spends on Overseas Development Assistance of \$79 billion. The defence budget is larger than the combined total of the next nine biggest defence spenders. The US is responsible for 47 percent of the world's military spending of US \$1.05 trillion. This military inequality generates some deep pathologies, not least of which is a reluctance on the part of many countries to mount political challenges to the United States, even when it appears that its foreign or military policies are generating more instability than stability. It also helps explain why the US is able to bully the United Nations when it wishes.

Even here, however, there are some important anomalies. In relation to Sweden, for example, the Swedish military has a well-developed defensive posture against probable military contingency. It lacks a capacity to exert much offensive capacity against neighbours or countries that lie out of the Swedish sphere of influence. Yet Sweden is the largest per capita exporter of arms in the world and arguably generates different kinds of security dilemmas in countries that it exports to. It is important, therefore, when checking the militarism of the most powerful that we also raise questions about the intended and unintended consequences of more modest defence and military postures.

It is crucial to deal with the root causes of fear, militarism and separatism. There will be no political stability, nor cooperative and human security unless much more attention is paid to the ways in which development generates conditions conducive to structural stability. In particular it is vital that much

more attention be directed towards reducing the gross inequalities that divide the world. It is also vital that less developed countries are assisted to

produced some nuclear weapons – but threaten Iran which has not. The implication of this differential treatment is that if you wish to be

To practice political jujitsu we need to place the weakest citizens everywhere in the world at the centre of political decision making.

achieve all of the millennium development goals by 2015. These will only be achieved, however, if all the OECD countries establish clear timetables to achieve the 0.7 percent (preferably 1 percent) of Gross Domestic Product for Overseas Development Assistance and apply these to the pursuit of the goals.

Dealing with the root causes of underdevelopment, poverty and exclusion also requires stronger connections between the private and public sectors. Civil Society Organizations can play an extremely important role here in helping promote and broker more productive relationships and higher levels of corporate responsibility between the public and private spheres. But these need to be reinforced by support from regional and global organizations well.

While weapons of mass destruction were the pretext for war against Iraq, there has been very little progress towards their abolition on the part of the nuclear weapons' powers, and they remain the "ultimate terror weapon" in terms of their capacity to wreak large-scale indiscriminate destruction. The US and its allies have been sending deeply contradictory messages on this question. They have opposed potential proliferators like Iran and North Korea but accepted Israel, India, and Pakistan as de facto members of the nuclear club. They negotiate with the North Koreans – because they are assumed to have

taken seriously at an international level, then nuclear weapons are important.

Importance of hope

When one considers today's global challenges, it is easy to become quite pessimistic. It is imperative, however, that those who are committed to long-term peacebuilding do not succumb to this inclination. To do this we need to replace cynicism and despair with reality-based optimism. In the first place this means that a pre-requisite for dealing with violence is hopefulness. Secondly, it is crucial that we work on replacing mistrust with trust, in order that good can be achieved amongst human beings prepared to believe in the intrinsic goodness of most people. Thirdly, it is important that we operate from best-case assumptions. If we operate from worst-case assumptions or adopt a paranoid disposition to others, we will never be able to generate the right sorts of conciliatory gestures to break cycles of violence and generate creative options.

To practice political jujitsu we need to place the weakest citizens everywhere in the world at the centre of political decision making. States do not exist to serve the interests of the rich and the powerful. These groups can look after themselves. But we will not sleep easy in our beds at night until the African continent and African people are given much more prominence in global decision-making and their needs are acknowledged and met. Similarly the prospects for peace

and justice anywhere will remain remote, as long as the Middle East remains a suppurating sore. As long as Israel chooses to separate its future from that of Palestine and expresses its division with a physical wall Palestinian needs will remain unmet.

What would happen if all entire policy-making were judged by how well we treated the weakest and most vulnerable people in the world? Real security, human security, flows from placing the poor, marginalised and vulnerable at the heart of our development, security and peace-building policies.

As Nelson Mandela said: *"The common good ultimately translates in to a deep concern for those that suffer want and deprivation of any kind."*

I would like to finish with some ideas from John Paul Lederach's latest book *"The Moral imagination – the art and soul of building peace"*. He argues that peacebuilders, or those committed to nonviolent solutions to problems, need to generate new ways of seeing people, relationships, community and the world. There are four elements which constitute what he calls The Moral Imagination.

First of all, the moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in an inclusive and expandable web of relationships. This is critical to understanding something of the ways in which we are all connected with each other, or an affirmation of our essential interdependence. The Buddhists remind us that ignorance is an inability to see others and how our well-being is directly dependent on theirs. Lederach takes this a little further and asks how it feels to put someone we fear, as well as those we love, in our web of relationships. What does it do to our sense of self, for example to put Al Qaeda in our web? How does this challenge us and how do we work to ensure that those who might harm us have no reason for doing so? How do we imagine the worst that others can do to us and then respond

positively and affirmatively, so that this worst-case scenario does not eventuate? This capacity to imagine ourselves in an inclusive and expandable web of relationships is very powerful and suggests ways in which we might develop some new thinking about dealing with those who might do violence against us or others.

Secondly, the moral imagination requires the ability to sustain a problem solving curiosity that embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity. What we sometimes understand as either/or decision making. We have to overcome the tunnel-vision that goes with dichotomous thinking so that our perceptual and cognitive screens are wider and broader.

The third capacity that Lederach highlights is the fundamental belief in and pursuit of the creative act. What is creativity and how do we exercise it in responding to developmental and violent challenges. How do we develop creative leadership, that is, leaders who are not driven by political expedience but who will ask a more fundamental question, namely "What is the right thing to do?" How do we ensure that such leaders come into existence and are able to exercise creativity in responding to all the policy dilemmas that afflict us? How do we open ourselves to the creative acts that will have a transformative effect on relationships, removing their violent and enhancing their peaceful capacities?

Finally Lederach says there is a need for us to be courageous and to accept the risks in peacebuilding. This is absolutely vital if we are to absorb the suffering inflicted by others rather than inflict it upon others. To do this means confronting the meaning of pain and suffering and its role in modernity. Judith Butler argues in her new book *Precarious Life* that America got angry after 9/11, because they realized that they were not invulnerable, all-powerful and immortal as they had previously

thought. They responded to this recognition with anger, revenge and by unleashing suffering on others. In doing so they restricted their empathetic ability and their options. It is imperative, therefore, to underline that suffering is not the exception. It is the norm, and we need to figure out how to embrace it when and as it happens so we can be courageous in response. Nowhere is this more important than in peacebuilding, which requires a willingness to suffer rather than impose pain and suffering on others. It sounds a little counter-intuitive, but throughout history when individuals and groups have done this, miraculous things have happened.

Pocket Mantra

I would like to finish with a pocket mantra from John Paul Lederach.

- Reach out to those you fear
 - Touch the heart of complexity
 - Imagine beyond what is seen
 - Risk vulnerability one step at a time
- I cannot think of a better prescription for replacing fear with hope, impossibility with possibility, violence and revenge with nonviolence and inclusion, inequality and injustice with equality and justice, revenge with forgiveness and reconciliation, all of which are pre-requisites for dealing with the politics of violence.

Kevin Clements

¹ In July 2005 more than 900 representatives gathered in the UN headquarters, New York, for the *Global Conference From Reaction to Prevention*. The aim was to work on joint proposals for implementing a common agenda, *A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. As a follow-up of this conference, the NGO network Peace Team Forum in Sweden invited to a seminar in Stockholm on 26 October this year, on the theme *Agenda 2014 – Towards a Shift from Reaction to Prevention*. Keynote speaker was Professor Kevin Clements, Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.

² Greek historian from the 5th century. *Editor's comment.*

Human security and “like-minded countries”

This year the Canadian and Swedish Governments have articulated a foreign policies’ approach to the human security agenda, with similarities and differences. Together they can contribute to the global achievement of peace and security and learn from each other’s experiences.

The contemporary international system is engaged in a transition from state-led self-help behaviour to one that reveals a variety of new actors, issues and challenges, which are especially pertinent in the field of international peace and security. Indeed, a careful examination of the emerging international security environment reveals a multitude of emerging security threats, which are of common global concern.

This article is a comparative analysis of Canadian and Swedish foreign policies’ approach to the human security agenda, both articulated in 2005. It is an effort to uncover the similarities and differences that exist between the two foreign policy agendas in order to strengthen both. Indeed, opportunities exist for the Canadian and Swedish Governments to learn from each other and together contribute to the global achievement of international peace and security.

In the 21st century, changes in contemporary international affairs are propelled in part by the forces of globalization, which have produced a rapid increase in the number and influence of non-state actors accompanied by the simultaneous erosion of the traditional territorial base of the state. This has resulted in diminished state authority and legitimacy; although the state remains the most important actor in world affairs,

it is increasingly obvious that individual and supra-national levels of analysis must also be taken into account when analysing and formulating state policy. Furthermore, globalization suggests the existence of a trend towards complex interdependence and interconnectedness among all actors in the international realm, facilitated by increased transportation and communications technologies.

These combined changes and the emergence of new global threats such as terrorism have produced a debate on the relationship between issues of security and development in the context of the United States-led “war on terror”. It can be argued that the foreign policies of many states are distorted by a preoccupation with the issue of terrorism, which results in an overemphasis in terms of dialogue and the distribution of resources on

applied to political problems, and as a result, funds may be diverted from development objectives to support military operations aimed at combating terrorism¹.

Accordingly, the current trend of prioritising security concerns based on the militarily-defined goals of the “war on terror” is counterproductive. Human security policies effectively ensure individual safety and well-being for people in every country. This is conducive to the creation of a peaceful international system, because in an interdependent environment the achievement of security in other parts of the world ensures domestic security. Therefore, to borrow from the language used by critics of human security, the human security agenda is in the self-interest of all states.

Overcome individual insecurity

The concept of human security is more important both as a theory and as an organizing principle for state and non-state behaviour in the post-September 11th world. It is an alternative framework from within which emerging challenges can be addressed, offering a foundation for state policies aimed at the achievement of international peace and security.

Prioritising security concerns based on the militarily-defined goals of the “war on terror” is counterproductive.

narrowly conceived security concerns, potentially detrimental to long term development policies. Military as opposed to negotiated solutions are

In its broadest conception, human security maintains an explicit focus on providing for the basic needs and wants of people within states and societies



Swedish as well as Canadian governments embrace the concept of human security in their new policies but implementation must be carefully monitored. Photo: Peter Williams/WCC

in order to overcome individual insecurity. Fundamentally, it recognizes that individual safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security². Although the security of states is necessary to ensure the safety of a population, it is not sufficient to provide for the complete security of its citizenry. As well, due to the interconnected nature of contemporary security threats and interrelationships among actors, the safety of people in one area of the world is often necessary to guarantee the safety of people in another area.

The essence of the argument is that security is much more than the absence of a military threat. It "...recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that the forces of influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing"³. The human

security agenda aims to provide for the dispersion of freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity throughout the international system⁴. Thus, it broadens the focus of security to encompass a multiplicity of issues that highlight the mutually reinforcing relationship between political, economic and social determinants of individual and state security.

Halting and preventing conflict

In 2005, the Canadian Government released *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (IPS). It is a positive step forward, as it cites the Canadian Government's desire to reinvest in its international role and make a difference in halting and preventing conflict, as well as improving human welfare around the world⁵.

Within the priority area of building a more secure world, the IPS outlines three specific focus areas: countering global terrorism, stabilizing failed and fragile states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction⁶. The first and third of these areas relate directly to the execution of the "war on terror". However, the second is directly associated with human security. It is to be pursued through preventative action, long term development assistance, and integrated interventions.

To address emerging security threats, the IPS suggests cooperative action and a renewed focus on specific countries and conflicts within which the Canadian Government can engage in long term peacebuilding activities. This is to be pursued in conjunction with the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDG's)⁷.

The IPS further highlights five global responsibilities that demand attention: the “responsibility to protect”, to hold governments accountable for their treatment of the populace and to intervene if necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, the “responsibility to respect”, the “responsibility to build”, the “responsibility to deny”, and the “responsibility to the future”⁸.

The IPS includes a “whole of government” or “three D” approach that synthesises the three pillars of Diplomacy, Development, and Defence in Canadian Foreign Policy. This is encompassed within the concept of the “new diplomacy”, which is a framework for international policy-making that engages multiple departments and levels of government, and also supports networks of non-state actors in civil society⁹. Another central idea of the new foreign policy is the “new multilateralism”, which is an attempt to reform international institutions to increase their effectiveness and legitimacy¹⁰. Indeed, the Canadian Government often relies on international relationships and institutions in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.

Sustainable global development

In response to the changing international system, the Swedish Government has similarly committed to a gradual alteration of its security policy reoriented towards the prevention of conflict¹¹. Accordingly, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) established the Division for Peace and Security in Development Co-operation, which released a comprehensive policy in 2005 entitled *Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation*.

Explicitly based on the concept of human security, the overall objective of the Swedish 2005 policy is to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development in all policy areas. The specific goal of international development cooperation is to create the conditions to enable developing countries and poor people to improve

their lives and increase their security, guided by the rights perspective and that of the poor¹².

Moreover, international development

explicit yet relatively new component of Swedish Foreign Policy.

Second, the freedom from fear concept forms the basis of the

Security is much more than the absence of a military threat.

cooperation is pursued in conjunction with the UN Millennium Declaration and strong support for the MDG's, with special emphasis placed upon the development of a global partnership in order to pursue shared objectives¹³. Indeed, the Swedish Government advocates for the responsibility of the UN in the achievement of international peace and security¹⁴.

Overall, the new policy accounts for the safety of local populations through a focus on poverty reduction across the full range of Swedish Government Departments¹⁵. The Swedish Government has also adopted a “whole of government” approach to security and development, encompassing coherent policy efforts to prevent and manage conflict on the basis of an integrated approach¹⁶.

Different concepts

Both the Canadian and Swedish Governments embrace the concept of human security in their respective foreign policies; however, the pursuit of international peace and security through the application of the human security concept is characterized by

particular brand of human security embraced by the Canadian Government¹⁷. This follows from the idea that security is a prerequisite for development. Alternatively, the Swedish Government places poverty reduction at the centre of its policy, expressing an affinity for the achievement of freedom from want in order to ensure security. However, both Governments recognize that the concepts are mutually reinforcing.

Third, the Canadian and Swedish foreign policies are articulated within the context of different constraints and imperatives. For Canada, the most significant influence upon its policies is its geographic proximity to, and economic dependence on, the United States, acknowledged as a key motivating force made even more pressing by current US foreign policy. Yet, the possibility exists that certain issues in Canadian Foreign Policy have been co-opted by the “war on terror”. The Canadian Government prioritises combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to the detriment of issues such as conflict prevention and civilian

The elements of conflict prevention and civilian protection must be prioritised.

three significant differences. First, human security is an implicit yet pervasive component of Canadian Foreign Policy. In contrast, it is an

protection that form the fundamental basis of the human security agenda.

The Swedish Government is part of the European Union but does not

experience constraints of similar force, nor is its financial situation as constrictive. Yet, care must be taken that financial resources are not deviated

the tangible implementation of the agenda. The elements of conflict prevention and civilian protection must be prioritised as opposed to other

Care must be taken that financial resources are not deviated from development objectives to fulfil military operations.

from development objectives to fulfil military operations, and thus contradict the objectives of human security.

Despite these glaring differences, general similarities between the two policies abound. Both governments highlight conflict prevention as a core priority, as well as poverty reduction through the pursuit of the MDG's. A "whole of government" approach to foreign policy imperatives is also common to the policies of both countries. Additionally, the Canadian and Swedish Governments embrace multilateralism and global cooperation as the most appropriate means by which to combat emerging security threats, in the context of the current strategic focus on the role of the United Nations and the creation of a global partnership for development.

Tangible implementation

The foreign policies of the Canadian and Swedish Governments discussed in this article were both released in 2005. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether the inclusion of human security is simply an exercise in rhetoric, or if it will be implemented in practice. However, certain lessons can be extrapolated that may strengthen both policies in order to contribute to international peace and security.

First and most importantly, given the potential of the human security agenda to facilitate the achievement of international peace and security, the governments must explicitly articulate human security as a central organizing principle of their respective foreign policies and support this rhetoric with

elements that may be used to justify actions in the "war on terror".

Second, these pursuits must be allocated adequate financial support and political commitment. Funds devoted to the implementation of the human security agenda cannot be diverted towards activities that support the "war on terror". Policy coordination within the respective governments is essential. Therefore, an effective balance between the complimentary areas of security and development must be achieved.

Third, the governments must strive to promote adherence to the human security agenda in a multilateral context, with special consideration given to the activities of the UN. One potential area of cooperation is the UN Peace-building Commission, which has the potential to address conflict prevention and civilian protection. Multilateralism must not be viewed as an end in itself; rather, in an international system characterized by globalization and mutual interdependence it provides the means to mobilize international support for human security.

The foreign policies of the Canadian and Swedish Governments are an important indication of progress in the context of changes in the contemporary international system. However, the implementation of the human security agenda must be closely monitored to ensure that rhetoric is translated into practice in order to assure the achievement of international peace and stability.

Lindsey Weber

¹Lecture given by Kevin Clements, "Advancing Multilateralism in the Face of Resurgent Nationalism", October 26 2005. See also pp. xx in this issue of *New Routes*.

²Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First," *Global Governance*, Vol. 7 (2001), p. 20.

³Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership," *International Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring, 1997), p. 1.

⁴Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (The United Nations, 2005).

⁵Government of Canada, "Overview," *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy* (Ottawa ON: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), p. iii.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸Government of Canada, "Diplomacy," *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy* (Ottawa ON: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), p. 20.

⁹Government of Canada, "Overview," *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy* (Ottawa ON: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), p. 28.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹¹*From New York 2005 to Sweden 2014*, background for lecture given by Kevin Clements, "Advancing Multilateralism in the Face of Resurgent Nationalism", October 26 2005.

¹²The Swedish Government, *Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation* (Swedish International Development Agency, 2005), p. 1.

¹³The Swedish Government, *Shared Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development* (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003), p. 19.

¹⁴The Swedish Government, *Sweden's Global Development Policy* (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2004), p. 14.

¹⁵Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Sweden, DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations* (OECD/DAC, 2005), p. 1.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷Kyle Grayson, "Branding 'Transformation' in Canadian Foreign Policy: Human Security," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter 2004).

Iraq: Not one war but three

The Americans say it is not a war. Others say that it is not one war but three. What is going on in Iraq? Who and where is the enemy? Are the Americans liberators or aggressor?

Criminal violence in Iraq has exploded, fear and hostility among political groups have increased, and there is nothing holding the country together any longer. If it was a mistake by the U.S. to invade Iraq, it would be an even greater mistake to leave it now, says the author, who visited the country in September this year.

He is an American captain just over thirty, shaved square-shaped head, small eager eyes. He wears the army's sand-coloured camouflage uniform with a gun in his shoulder holster. We are sitting in his office in a Forward Operations Base south of Baghdad, Iraq. In the room is dusty, green army material, some M4-carbines, helmets, coffee cups, water bottles. The walls are covered with maps and memos.

A word that recurs frequently as he speaks is "frustrating". In his Middle West dialect it sounds like "fusstrating".

- It's frustrating. We can only focus on one thing at a time: either help the civilians, take part in the reconstruction. Or do what we are trained for, what we are really good at. We call it Kinetic Operations. Going after the Bad Guys.

- We are making some progress, especially in urban areas like Baghdad, where we start to build up relations. But my personal opinion is that we don't really reach people. Many of them are openly hostile.

In the background you hear the buzzing air conditioning, now and then drowned in the sound of helicopters landing or taking off some hundred meters away in the desert heat.

- I don't think Americans are very

good at understanding other countries, particularly not the Arab world. We came here with very high expectations that sound ridiculous when you think of it now. We heard that the Iraqis would meet us with a parade. The day when the parade would be held we had our worst firing. Nobody seemed to have foreseen the problems. It's frustrating.

Yes and no. There were people who anticipated the problems, but they were not listened to. There was even a plan what to do once Saddam Hussein had been overthrown, but it was ignored.

All warnings rejected

The project *Future for Iraq* was started as early as April 2002 by the US Foreign Ministry. It engaged 17 different American ministries and authorities and

the Pentagon rejected the project and its recommendations, as they did with some other reports that warned to expect difficulties. One of them came from the U.S. Army's Institute for Strategic Studies in February 2003, which in every grim detail warned what could happen: that the force intended to be used might be too small, that chaos might break out, that the Iraqis would not accept an American occupation in the long run, that the U.S. might well win the war but lose the peace.

But all this was rejected. Those who planned the war were not willing to give in to any facts or consider anything that would slow down or stop the rush towards an invasion of Iraq, which had been initiated by George W. Bush and the neoconservative clique around him. Instead, they believed the Iraqi businessman and politician in exile, Ahmed Chalabi, who for his own greed and influence was willing to say exactly what the authorities in Washington wanted to hear: Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. In Iraq, Chalabi had an underground army of tens of thousands of men, ready to take over. The invading troops would be met by cheering crowds, parades and candy.

None of this turned out to be true.

Chaos after the invasion

The U.S. soldiers I met in Iraq were

About 80 percent of all outbreaks of violence are sheer criminality, only about 20 percent have political motives.

240 Iraqis in exile from all ethnic groups and major political parties. The aim was to lay down the outlines for all aspects of an Iraq without Saddam. However,

unanimous. The invasion was smooth, easy and quick with small losses. The fact that the forces were underdimensioned was not noticed very



Ten times more soldiers have died after the "end of the war" than during the invasion... Today's task is to patrol a road that has been attacked ten times over the last months. Photo: Paul Hansen/Pressens Bild

much during the war itself; such is the enormous growth of power of the U.S. army.

As soon as the Saddam statue on the Firdos square in Baghdad had made its famous "dive" on 9 April 2003, just in front of all the foreign journalists at the Sheraton, and the regime had imploded, it was obvious that the U.S. did not have enough "boots on the ground" in spite of all categorical assurances by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. There were not enough people to close the wide-open borders, and al Qaida supporters and other Jihadists from abroad were soon streaming into the country.

Worse still, there were not enough people to maintain order. The looting and damage were partly spontaneous, partly obviously planned by the old regime, a kind of scorched earth policy

in case the war was lost. The regime's decision to release about 100 000 convicted criminals from the prisons, made before the outbreak of war, has to be seen against this background.

The chaos, the disorder, the uncertainty, the corruption and the runaway criminality has made the reconstruction in Iraq extremely difficult, at times impossible. About 80 percent of all outbreaks of violence are sheer criminality, only about 20 percent have political motives. The overwhelming majority of perpetrators for both of these types of violence are ordinary Iraqis. Enormous sums of economic aid have also been stolen, embezzled or just disappeared.

The build-up of Iraq is also "big business", where international firms have made enormous bargains, often for jobs that are badly done and in some

cases not done at all. In spite of both promises and large investments, the Iraqi oil industry has, for example, still not reached the production level that existed before the invasion for these reasons.

When people from the Baath party were removed from the former state apparatus, this quite clearly went too far. Tens of thousands of people were fired, who for the simple reason of advancement had joined the party, among them lots of teachers and medical doctors. The decision to dissolve the Iraqi army was also a big mistake, as this all at once made an enemy of hundreds of thousands of people, who furthermore have weapons and know how to use them.

In the build-up of the new political order in Iraq it was also a mistake to

stick too long to the old favourites in exile, not least the above-mentioned Chalabi – who soon appeared to have a microscopic support in the country – instead of engaging people who represented broad layers of the Shiite population. Another big failure was the inability to foresee, understand and meet the fears that had struck many Sunnis, now that they had lost their long-standing privileged positions. They are also horrified at the thought of an Iraq divided along ethnic borders. In the north and the south, the regions dominated by Kurds and Shiites respectively, there is oil. However, in the middle of Iraq, the region dominated by Sunnis, there is no “black gold”. A Sunni said to me: “Here is nothing. Only sand.”

“Counterinsurgency operations”

From the U.S. Government’s point of view what goes on in Iraq is not a war. Not technically. It reached its official end with the overthrow of Saddam. Instead the U.S. speaks about “counterinsurgency operations”. For the soldiers on the ground the difference is minimal. They are still paid as if there were a war. And they die as in a war. In reality, ten times more soldiers have died after the “end of the war” than during the invasion, which claimed the lives of 140 U.S. soldiers. Since then – in October 2005 – 1 787 soldiers have been killed¹ and about 14 000 wounded. All U.S. soldiers you meet in Iraq will tell you that the invasion in many ways was easier than the ongoing fight against an invisible enemy, in a country that is falling to pieces.

When the resistance against the Americans began, the rebels first ventured classical guerrilla tactics in attacks by firing at the Americans with AK-47’s, machine guns and antitank rifles. The problem is that the Americans are so completely superior when it comes to firing, movement and liaison that all battles almost inevitably end up in a disaster for their opponents.



Getting rid of Saddam and the local currency was far easier than the rest in “Future for Iraq”, a costly mistake with no end in sight. Photo: Craig Spaulding

The resistance they meet has also changed character during the last year. What is now dominating the war are the bombs. Some explode in the towns and mostly massacre innocent people – the majority who lose their lives in Iraq are ordinary, unarmed civilians, murdered in sheer acts of terror by other Iraqis or by foreign Jihadists. Bombs also explode along the roads, the targets of which are the U.S. military or the ever-onrushing convoys who supply them with maintenance.

Vietnam vibes

You can hardly follow an ordinary U.S. unit in Iraq without feeling vibes of Vietnam. There is the heat, the helicopters and the resources – the vast recourses! – and the enormous apparatus with all the machines, which fly and role and roar and rustle and rumble, imposing or terrifying, an apparatus in constant pursuit of an invisible enemy. But also an apparatus that partly chews idly, in spite of, or

because of, its magnitude, being trapped in something that it was not intended for or trained for. There are the questions and the confusion and the lack of understanding of these people, who just don’t let themselves be rescued, and the doubt whether they are really worth it. There is the idealism and the cynicism and the desire for revenge. There is the all but criminally rash analysis behind the whole enterprise. And there are the soldiers, all the soldiers with their homesickness, their weariness and their eyes that are much older than their faces.

Still, this is not a new Vietnam. Partly because the U.S. army is not the same. Then, the war was fought by a conscript army. Now it is a professional army, populated by professional soldiers, who, in spite of possible doubts, are still far more motivated than their fathers or uncles were 35 years ago. They do this because they want to, not because they have to. Besides, the technological superiority has, as mentioned, increased even more.

Iraq is a mosaic of ethnic groups, languages and religions, bunched up in a country that is partly an abstraction, with borders once drawn on a drawing board, by chance and big power mandate. It is a country that has been held together by pressure from two sides: on the one hand an unusually brutal dictatorship and on the other hand the promises of progress and modernisation, which the same regime depicted.

Now this unifying double pressure is gone. The country is, consequently, falling to pieces. The resistance movement, against which the Americans are fighting, is at least as divided as the country itself. A compilation I saw counts at least eleven different resistance groups. Discounting the Shiite organisations and concentrating on what is doubtless the core, that is, the Sunni groups, they can be divided into three blocs. The first secular bloc consists mainly of former Saddam supporters, people with a background in the Baath party or Iraqi nationalists. A second, religious bloc is made up of different types of Islamic groups. Then there is a third bloc, namely the foreign Jihadists with connections to al-Qaida.

In this context the Jihadists are the most spectacular part of the resistance movement, but also the most interesting. The other two blocs are far bigger. Estimations I have seen in Iraq speak of something between 12 000 and 40 000 full-time combatants, supported by maybe as much as 200 000 sympathizers who supply the combatants with information and hiding places. A large part of the financing comes from abroad.

But the rebellion is, as said, extremely divided. Not only is there animosity between these blocs but also within them. There is no joint national leadership, no comprehensive ideology, no common plan. Besides, the different resistance cells are well isolated from one another and are often populated by people who are related by kinship.

This makes them utterly difficult to get hold of, at the same time as it makes it very difficult for them to bring about any major co-ordinated actions.

Neither do they seem to have any illusions that they could defeat the U.S. militarily. However, the continual attacks could be described as some kind of slow motion Tet offensive², where not only the dead soldiers but also the chaos and the car bomb massacres aim at influencing U.S. domestic public opinion, to make it regard Iraq as a hopeless enterprise. Even if there are big and decisive differences between South East Asia then and Iraq now, the outcome of the conflict will to a great extent depend on how much pressure the rebellions manage to put on that big aching scar in the American psyche.

Not one war but three

The truth is that the war in Iraq is not one but three. One is going on between the U.S. forces and the foreign Jihadists, where both parties are happy to be able to use Iraq as a battlefield. This is the famous "war on terror". Another is the war of the internal members of the resistance against the foreign troops and their collaborators.

Then there is also a civilian war where Sunnis revolt against the government in Baghdad that is dominated by Shiites and Kurds. As far as I could see, for example when following a patrol during a night-raid against a village, people are far more scared of other Iraqis than of the Americans.

The U.S. also works hard to create Iraqi military, paramilitary and police units, who will contribute to the stabilisation of the country. However, there are lots of problems with these Iraqi units. Their armament is light, their maintenance is weak, the discipline falters, the work is highly dangerous and the payment bad. Besides, they are often infiltrated by militia and rebels, or recruited along ethnic lines and therefore not very reliable. An American I met, who was on a civilian contract

to train policemen in Mosul, made the judgment that 25 percent of his students were really rebels.

So in the worst case the Americans train people who in certain situations will turn their newly obtained guns and knowledge against the Americans themselves. And if the big civil war breaks out, these newly installed units will not be able to prevent it. Instead, they will probably take part in it, with heart and soul, being their militarily seen most effective constituents.

Almost everyone I met in Iraq also agreed that if the U.S. would withdraw now, this big civil war would break out immediately. So the demand for a quick and unprejudiced American withdrawal from Iraq is a cry that can only end in a catastrophe. The big American mistake in the first place was to invade Iraq. Another, at least as big, would be to just leave the country now, in this chaotic, confused, bleeding and broken state. There is just no simple way out of Iraq. As easy as it was to start the war, as difficult will it be for the U.S. to end it. A UN-officer, whom I met at a sunny but dusty military airfield during my journey into the country, laughed sadly at my question of when the U.S. retreat could start: "Do you even believe that our children will live to see that happen?"

Peter Englund

Translated by Kristina Lundqvist

The article was first published in a longer version in the Swedish daily paper Dagens Nyheter, 9 Oct., 2005.

¹ Since this was written, the number is reported to have exceeded 2 000. *Editor's comment.*

² In the Tet offensive (named after the Vietnamese New Year), the NLF and North Vietnam launched an offensive in January-February 1968 against the U.S. military bases but also against South Vietnamese towns. The result of the offensive was a difficult setback for the Communists, but still a victory on the psychological plane. In the USA, the Tet offensive started strong criticism against the war, both from the politicians and the public. *Editor's comment.*

The timeliness of justice and peace

Instead of enforcing and supporting each other, transitional justice and peacebuilding in post-conflict situations often seem to be on contradictory and divergent paths. The role of local actors on the ground in the build-up of a sustainable society is too important to be blocked by intergovernmental interests.

The exploration of the thorny issues of dealing with countries in post-conflict transition was the main objective with the conference *Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice: Creating Conditions for Peace, Human Rights and the Rule of Law*. It was held in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, on 24–25 October 2005. This particular conference brought together participants from governmental agencies, intergovernmental agencies, the United Nations, NGOs, academics and practitioners.

In effect, there was a tendency to emphasise those conflicts that have established a modicum of stability, whereas the more acute cases went largely unmentioned. Cases which are in the throes of dealing with the past and which have established Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are to the fore, such as Peru, South Africa and Guatemala. In general, and apart from some references to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Uganda and Darfur, African cases were absent on the agenda.

Despite this oversight, the thematic discussion was engaging and ventured into some tricky issues, particularly when it came to employing strategies for reconciliation and the somewhat contradictory issue of justice and peacebuilding. In that respect, the question of the timeliness of the intervention by the ICC in issuing arrest warrants for the primary leader of the

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Joseph Kony, and his accomplices in Uganda in the midst of delicate negotiations between the Ugandan government and LRA was raised.

The answer surely depends on which field you happen to work in. The overriding presence of a clutch of lawyers at the conference could only answer that the process for issuing these warrants was started almost a year ago and the ICC cannot possibly be expected to speculate on the situation a year down the road. This approach effectively endangers entire peace negotiations, as is the case in Uganda. Peter Onega, the chairman for the Uganda Amnesty Commission (UAC), a statutory body set up by the government to give a blanket amnesty to surrendering rebels, said the decision by the international court had left their work in "total confusion" and had effectively reversed the impact of the UAC to bring about a blanket amnesty for members of the LRA.¹

It is evident that the international community judges this to be a positive move to end impunity, but the effect on the long-term stability for Uganda is called into question. And what will happen when the international community diverts its gaze to other acute conflict zones after supporting the initial ICC indictment? This throws into light the divergent and

contradictory paths of justice and peacebuilding.

Prolonging trial

The problems and inconsistencies arising from this logjam are not easy to solve. While there is no doubt that those indicted in the Ugandan case are guilty of heinous abuses ranging from systematically slashing off limbs to forcing children to kill their parents, and should be brought to justice, it remains that international justice cannot really compensate for a reversal in the peace negotiations that may bring about a consolidated peace.

Sometimes, it is an inescapable fact that those members of the international community tend to be assuaged by these indictments and effectively and psychologically shut the lid on that particular conflict. We are filled with a sense of justice and closure, but the long road to peace for each country affected by interminable conflict and which received indictments, such as Uganda and Darfur in Sudan, has been made even more difficult than before.

What this conference brought to the fore was a clear delineation between those intergovernmental actors who elect to fashion their policies for fighting impunity in meeting rooms in the West and those, often local, actors on the ground embroiled in trying to find a peaceful and workable solution to the conflict and who see their work as part of a process towards this end. However, for the long suffering victims of these conflicts, it is the latter they most depend on when the international gaze has dimmed and those indicted are still on trial in years to come.

Shane Quinn

¹ Interview carried out by IRIN on 10 October 2005:
<http://www.irinnews.org/>

Incipient peace in the Horn of Africa

Speaking at a conference on peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts in Helsinki, Finland, in November, Kenyan career diplomat and chief negotiator in the Somali peace process, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, expressed hope. There are, however, many obstacles, and there is a need for big efforts by governments as well as civil society in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia.

The wind of change is blowing across Africa. Countries that have been in conflict are pursuing peace. Democracy and the rule of law are taking root in our continent.

Fourteen countries that have been at war for decades have had successful negotiations and are now at peace. Some have had multiparty elections. Given the number of countries in Africa – 53 – no year passes without one or two of them holding elections. During the last five years, thirty countries have held multiparty elections, and they were peaceful and successful. They may not have been fair in every case, but things have changed for the better.

The Horn of Africa has also been affected positively by the wind of change. As a region, we have had our share of problems; all seven countries – members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) –

now we are beginning to see a dim light at the end of the long night. Djibouti just held elections for a second term after three years of internal conflicts pitting the Isas against the Affars. At last Sudan is on a peace path, and as for Somalia, the foundation for peace has been laid down. There is also hope in Uganda, the unknown conflict, where the President has finally recognized that there is a problem that cannot be solved only by force.

Fragile cease-fire

After two years of fighting over the boarder dispute, Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to a cease-fire brokered by the President of Algeria under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)/African Union (AU). The presence of UN peace keepers has enabled the cease-fire to hold despite the recent unilateral action taken by the President of Eritrea, when he barred UN

in favour of Eritrea. Ethiopia did not accept the ruling, but a time will come when she will have to accept. Let us hope the Special Envoy of the Secretary General – the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada – will intensify his efforts to normalize relations between the parties.

Church leaders of the two countries have taken initiative to try and heal the rift between the two countries. Norwegian churches have been helpful. If the peace process is dormant, this may be an opportunity to revive it.

The Oromo Liberation Front issue is in the open, if one can believe the media. It has been reported that contacts at a high level between the parties have already taken place. Let us hope this was a preparatory meeting, which would allow genuine dialogue to take place. A patient peace midwife is needed in a situation of this kind where there is so much at stake. It is always effective if it is not too secretive and with only one facilitator. From our experience, a team is always better when it has the backing of the regional and international community.

Sudan out of the nightmare

Thank God, for Sudan seems to be slowly coming out of the nightmare – the longest conflict in recent times which engulfed the whole Horn of Africa. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed under the spotlight of the international community and the media in Nairobi on the 9th of January 2005. Those who had a chance to be there were reliving a historic moment, emotionally charged. It was difficult to hold back tears of joy but also of sorrow for the many who were not there, because they had paid the ultimate price to liberate their

Thank God, for Sudan seems to be slowly coming out of the nightmare.

have been affected by conflicts. All of the leaders except the ones in Djibouti and Kenya came to power through coups or by the barrel of the gun. But

helicopters from flying over contested territory. At least the parties agreed to go to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, where the ruling went

people. Now there is still the unfinished task ahead.

The catastrophic situation in Darfur hangs over the peace agreement and over all Sudan. Some of us have warned of the conflict brewing in the West, and also the East has been vindicated by what has happened. The government of Sudan insisted that the conflict was confined to the South, and this was accepted by the region and the international community. The UN acquiesced and dared not raise the issue.

But now one would be forgiven if one thought there is no other conflict in Africa but Darfur. There has been a long queue of diplomats and politicians taking their chance to have a “photo opportunity” in the region – that is what a cynic would say. Once again we wait with abated breath for the successful conclusions of the Abuja talks on Darfur. The people deserve nothing else but peace in order to return to their devastated homes. They will need our support for many years to come.

What about the CPA? So far, it seems to be on track: the national and regional parliaments are in place and so are the two cabinets. The South did not quite get the portfolios they had hoped for – finance or petroleum – both remain with the North. The start has not been that smooth.

If John Garang, the former leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), had been alive, would he have pulled it through? The loss of such a leader was a hard blow to the peace agreement and to Africa as a whole. Those who had the privilege to know him over two decades were amazed by his breadth of vision, not only for Sudan but the whole continent. He was passionate about African history, culture and environment. We were going to launch the Institute of Nilotic Studies together. He welcomed the idea of using demobilized soldiers in the rehabilitation and expansion of the forest cover in the Sudan. He was

fascinated by the possibility of setting up an institute of Sudanese languages, which would include Juba Arabic.

The most important future challenge in the Sudan is the CPA itself. Will all the parties commit themselves to the letter and the spirit of this document? The past experience with agreements does not give the people of Sudan too much hope. The only thing we can say to them is that this time there is a difference. The agreement was well negotiated with all the necessary guarantees. The South will have its own security arrangements under their own command. The government in the South will be financially independent of the North, unlike the case in the past.

They will have substantial resources from oil and other resources. However, not all oil rich countries in Africa have

done that well – if anything, oil has been a curse in some cases. The cancer of corruption and mismanagement can so easily set in. Given the substantive resources they will have, absorption will be a big problem and this could trigger social and political frustration and lead to unrest.

The security issue

Security will be a big issue. The South of the country and Sudan as a whole are awash with guns and unattached militia. The militia was made up of young men, who were recruited by the central government to fight against the SPLA. With the CPA they are supposed to be integrated in the Southern Army and security organs. This is not going to be easy, given the past resentment and the ethnic factors.



Ambassador Kiplagat, hoping for final peace in Somalia. Photo: Tore Samuelsson/LPI

Then there are Southerners who were not part of the SPLM or SPLA, and neither were they sympathetic to it. If anything, they were very critical of the movement and its leaders. They were not involved in the peace talks and therefore do not have deep commitment or allegiance to it. Many of them are important personalities who could cause political problems for the Southern leaders.

It is recorded that there are over a million South Sudanese in the North – the majority in and around Khartoum. Repatriating them is going to be a nightmare – just the sheer numbers is a nightmare. Many have settled well in the north and might have opted to remain there because of the facilities – schools, hospitals and financial institutions – that are not easily available in the underdeveloped South.

But with the riots that broke out with the death of Garang, these people must be having second thoughts. After all, northern merchants were forced to leave the South after their property was destroyed and lives lost. Lives were also lost in the north and property destroyed. Can these communities live together, given the latent pent up anger, which has accumulated over centuries? Sudan has to confront its racial problem. The issue of slavery must be put on the table.

In six years a referendum will be held, when the southerners are to vote if they want to remain part of Sudan or be an independent country. There is so much that needs to be done during the six years interim period. The North must make unity attractive. The word ‘attraction’ is important but loaded and might become a major issue of contention and interpretation. There must be a watertight agreement on specific, measurable requirements to enable an objective judgement to be made on whether unity is attractive or not. If left to stand as it is during the coming six years, the campaign for the referendum will be simply unity or separation.

Hope in spite of difficulties

There is also hope in Somalia despite the difficulties the government has been going through during its first year of existence. As we speak, the government is relocating into Somalia albeit not in one place. The President and the Prime Minister are in Jowhar, while the Speaker and about four ministers are in Mogadishu. The Parliament is divided between them – the majority in Jowhar. The institutions of government have not functioned properly.

The recent UN report on the arms embargo indicates that there is an increase of arms into Somalia. Pirating along the Somali seas has increased dramatically. There has been selective assassination of high profile personalities – a British journalist, a civil society leader, professionals and one parliamentarian. Islamic courts are gradually filling the vacuum created by the absence of an effective government. Such a picture is indeed bleak, and it may look as if Somalia is reverting back to the anarchy of the past.

Still, the Parliament is in place, the most inclusive parliament in the region, if not in Africa. The process of selection of Members of Parliament was meticulously done. First there was a distribution of seats among the clans. Authentic traditional elders were crucial in this process. The elders of a clan had to sit and negotiate for weeks and come out with an acceptable distribution of seats within the clan.

That part took months, but finally we got the list of distribution of seats. The last step was the final selection of Members of Parliament to represent the sub-sub clans. The elders, the politicians and the warlords in consultation with the community had to work and come out with an acceptable list. This was the most delicate and difficult stage – violence was on the surface, and there were some eruptions, though isolated ones. Finally we had the list of parliamentarians – 275 of them representing all clans, regions and 93 sub-clans – that was quite a feat.

From selection to elections, first of the Speaker and his deputies and finally that of the President. We had more than 56 presidential candidates, but the number dropped to 26 during the election day. We had to be meticulous in every stage to ensure transparency and fairness. The reason why I have gone into such detail about the process is to show that the basic institutions – Presidency, Cabinet and Parliament have the acceptance of the general public and those in the Diaspora, IGAD, African Union, Arab League, European Union and the UN. Recognition is not an issue for the Transitional Federal Government.

The problem of Somalia has had a direct and indirect bearing on the region. The failure or success of any agreement very much depends on the attitude of the region, that is, the neighboring countries within IGAD and the Arab States. This is an IGAD process – the countries took ownership and managed it. Their commitment was confirmed by the collective efforts they made and also their willingness to put substantial resources into the process. As you can imagine, the process was very costly for Kenya – hosting more than 400 Somali delegates for over two years was not cheap.

The international community has stuck it out with us, and now they are taking the lead in the process of implementation. They have set up a number of organizations such as a Coordination and Monitoring Committee, a Joint Planning Committee and a Rapid Assistance Programme. The first task to be done is the Comprehensive Needs Assessment in the whole of Somalia including Somaliland. The assessment will be launched soon under the leadership of the UNDP and the World Bank. The international community has not given up, and IGAD will be in a stand-by position, until Somalia has a stable government, guns are brought under control and government institutions are functioning.

Bethuel A. Kiplagat

Ethiopia-Eritrea: Cease-fire (dis)agreement

Tanks and troops are on the move to the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, causing deep concern that the fragile peace might once again turn into renewed warfare. The UN Security Council has been urged by the General Secretary to make its utmost to help find a peaceful solution. The international community should make a concerted effort to empower the governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa to address crucial issues of development, poverty and food security in their respective countries.

Pessimism is on the increase over the possibility of what some observers view as another border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But can this region afford another bloody war when it has just witnessed two crucial peace gains that sought to end years of violent civil strife in the Sudan and Somalia?

Asmara and Addis Ababa are reported to have increased their movement and military presence on the border buffer zones. There are reports of heavy movement of tanks and troops to what the UN describes as “the adjacent areas north of the security zone [in Eritrea] and on the Ethiopia side south of the security zone”. Accordingly, the border row has now intensified causing the deterioration of what was once termed a ‘stable’ situation to the current level, which is feared to be ‘tense and potentially volatile’. The Governments of the two countries have defended their respective deployment of troops towards the buffer zone.

Eritrea says the current standoff stems from Ethiopia’s unwillingness to respect a decision by an independent commission that established their common border in an agreement that ruled the judgement as “final and

binding”. It cites Ethiopia’s “continued presence in Badme [as constituting] forcible occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory”. Furthermore, it feels the UN helped to contribute to the deterioration of situation. Eritrea insists that “the United Nations has, through its inaction, provided an umbrella for the forcible occupation of our sovereign territories”. It claims that “the physical and psychological scars exacted by this deplorable and crippling situation, [that has] literally kept [the people of Eritrea] hostage for the last five years is too clear to merit elaboration”.

Conversely, Addis Ababa argues that its military move was “not a sign of belligerence, but a defensive move aimed at [protecting] the country’s sovereignty should Eritrea start up a full-scale offensive”. Addis Ababa says it wants the new border adjusted to avoid the splitting up of families, a concern it terms as “human geography”!

The counter-movements and fury statements are a clear indication that unless something tangible is done, the escalating verbal hostilities might possibly degenerate into an outbreak of renewed warfare between the two countries. It can be recalled that when Eritrea and Ethiopia fought over a disputed 1,000-

kilometre (600-mile) mostly a barren border land, an estimated 80,000 people were killed. It took heavy world pressure for the Horn of Africa nations to sign a peace deal in Algiers in 2000 that required them to accept a new border demarcation from an international panel. Many had hoped for the normalisation of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

“No-peace and no-war”

Unfortunately, the agreement, which Addis Ababa perceives as “a cease-fire agreement”, appears not to have realised many tangible results in the border demarcation. Although the establishment of the presence of the watchful United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Peacekeepers had helped to create a situation of “no-peace and no-war” border security, the war of words between Asmara and Addis Ababa continued with a harsh intensity.

Analysts and observers aver that when Asmara banned helicopter flights and imposed a streak of other restrictions on UNMEE troops monitoring the buffer frontier, it was making a strong statement of its resentment against major world powers, warning that the UN “will be as equally responsible as Ethiopia is for any renewed armed conflict and its consequences”.

The ban and restrictions have caused UNMEE to abandon nearly half of its observation posts. The situation has since rendered it impossible for UNMEE to carry out its mission effectively, including the de-mining exercise. The situation has moved UN General Secretary Kofi Annan to call upon the UN Security Council “to exert its maximum influence to avert a further deterioration of the situation and to ensure that the restrictions imposed on (UN peacekeepers) are lifted”.

"After years of frustrating stalemate, it would be imperative for the Security Council – as the principal organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security – to address the underlying causes of the stalemate in the peace process, including those relating to the Ethiopian position on the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission," Annan said in his letter.

The involvement of the UN member states in averting the possibility of another flurry border war cannot be over-emphasised, mainly for the following reasons. The involvement of the UN Security Council and the international community will help Asmara and Addis Ababa to resolve this particular border conflict and any other conflicts in accordance with observation of the rules and standards of international law. It will also help the

UN Security Council to reinstate the functions of the UNMEE operations.

The increasing counter-military presence along both sides of the buffer zones must be nipped in the bud. This is mainly because at its best, such heavy military movement and presence portend acts of military aggression. Along with this concern and the call for a redress to this border conflict, are perhaps the thorny internal issues that these two nations continue to grapple with. For this particular reason, there must be a deliberate effort by and from the international community to assist and help Asmara and Addis Ababa to redress their respective domestic wariness. Such concerted assistance can empower the governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa in tackling issues such as the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of development, the fostering and improvement of food production and food security, the enhancement of local, bilateral and global

commerce and trade, and the enhancement of people's access to resources.

But at its worst, the increased military presence at the border buffer zones could also be indicative of the impact of the dynamics of global politics on the internal affairs of these countries. Thus, the clamour by both parties for attention from the international community and especially from powerful nations on varied individual national concerns.

In as much as efforts must be asserted towards understanding and redressing the concerns that have partly contributed to the deterioration of the border crisis and partly affected the state of the domestic affairs of the two countries, care must be taken in the process so that the intervention would foster recent gains already made in the region including the peace agreements and the process of democratisation.

Basil 'Buga Nyama



The peace accord between Ethiopia and Eritrea signed in Alger in December 2000 - will it hold in spite of the growing tensions? Photo: Pressens Bild

Nigeria: From rivalry to brotherhood

In recent years, Nigeria has been plagued with alarming frequency by violence between its Muslim and Christian communities. One of the worst-hit regions has been Kaduna State. The cofounders and national coordinators of the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum of Kaduna in 1995 are two men with deep roots in the opposing communities, both of whom have turned away from violence and militancy action and instead embraced nonviolence, reconciliation, and the advocacy of peaceful relations between their communities.

Once they were bitter rivals, but now they consider themselves brothers. In fact, at one time, they each tried to have the other killed. James Wuye and Muhammed Ashafa are living proof that people can change, and that the urge for revenge can be replaced by an urge to foster reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. Pastor James Wuye readily acknowledges that he was a militant in his youth. For that, he paid a price – he lost his arm during this struggle of communal violence in 1992. Imam Muhammed Nurayn Ashafa was a militant as well. During that same eruption of unrestrained violence in 1992, he lost his teacher and two sons.

For both men, coming to terms with terrible loss forced reflection, and reflection brought transformation. “Both began to question the cost of violence and turned to the Bible and the Koran, where they found passages showing commonalities between Islam and Christianity and calling on believers to be peacemakers”, writes *Christian Science Monitor* reporter Mike Crawley

(2003). Yet, “when the pair first met face to face in 1995, distrust lingered. At the urging of a civil society leader, they agreed to try to work out some sort of understanding, and they say the resulting dialogue helped them to overcome stereotypes and misconceptions and gain respect for each other.”

They staged a public debate – no easy task in such a charged atmosphere – and this early effort at dialogue has since become an ongoing exchange through the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum. Each of them has made a quantum leap – from violent

youth leader to successful nonviolent mediator of Muslim-Christian conflicts. Now, they listen to the each other’s sermons. In fact, together they have

published a book, *The Pastor and the Imam: Responding to Conflict*, which examines the perceptions of Muslims and Christians about each other, explores the commonalities at the root of the two faiths – and the differences – and then describes the efforts, at first tenuous and later more confident, to forge a common effort to promote understanding between the communities.

Kaduna State is the seat of Nigeria’s northern elite, including senior military, religious, and traditional figures. Its population of approximately 3.5 million is divided more or less equally between Muslims and Christians. Kaduna has also, unfortunately, been at the epicenter of intercommunal conflict – conflict that has only worsened since the Kaduna state government’s declaration of its intent to introduce *shariah* law. This declaration sparked an outbreak of violence in late February 1999, and subsequent anti-Muslim reprisals in various southern towns, that left an estimated two thousand people dead, eighty thousand displaced, and many private homes and business premises looted and destroyed.

With its mix of ethnic and religious groups, Kaduna continues to be one

**Once they were bitter rivals,
but now they consider
themselves brothers.**

of the most conflict-prone states in the country. The various communities compete for a greater share of the limited socioeconomic resources and for politi-



Imam Muhammed Ashafa and Pentecostal Pastor James Wuye share the view that civil-society organizations can do a better job of defusing potentially violent situations than security forces. Photo: Tore Samuelsson/LPI

cal power, each feeling itself politically and economically marginalized. In that environment, religion is, in a sense, “perverted” as it is invoked in the political arena, and youth are exploited by those who seek to gain personally from the conflict.

Tensions and poverty

Ethnic and religious differences have been a source of tension throughout Nigeria’s turbulent post-independence history, which has been marked by decades of military rule. The third and most recent attempt at instituting democracy in the federal republic has been under way since 1999.

Pastor Wuye stresses that during the long periods of military rule, ethnic and religious tensions have tended to increase. Official appointments to federal posts have often been made on the basis of patronage as opposed to merit, which has favored Muslim northerners who have been quite

dominant in the Nigerian military. Thus, Christian clerics have preached against what they perceive to be injustice in the trend of federal government appointments under military regimes.

Another factor that has contributed to Nigeria’s ethnic tensions has been the country’s poor progress toward economic development. In spite of its abundant petroleum and natural gas reserves, the United Nations Development Program ranked Nigeria as 151st of 174 countries, evaluated in terms of human development. Imam Ashafa also notes that when the bubble that was Nigeria’s oil economy burst in the 1980s, there was an apparently related increase in ethnic conflict with religious undertones. In view of such linkages, observes Pastor Wuye, one can reasonably conclude that “most of the problems in Nigeria do not come from religion but economics and social conditions”.

Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye share

a view that civil-society organizations – such as the Interfaith Mediation Centre that they set up – can do a better job of defusing potentially violent situations in Nigeria than security forces. According to Pastor Wuye, the Interfaith Mediation Centre uses a multitrack approach to address issues of intercommunal violence. “We ‘deprogram’ people by making them aware of what the other side is thinking.”

The project that the two men launched, which consists of both the Muslim–Christian Dialogue Forum and the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, aims to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict and to contribute to an increase in the level of trust and tolerance between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna State. With trust, tolerance, and an absence of violence, reconciliation can begin through the development over time of collaborative relationships and cohesive peace constituencies in both communities. At the same time, as such reconciliation takes root, the communities’ capacity to resolve conflicts will also be enhanced.

Five specific objectives have been identified:

1. To reestablish relationships that have been damaged due to recurring violence over the last five years
2. To minimize the reoccurrence of violence amongst various groups in the community
3. To initiate programs and projects that require and encourage the involvement of Christians and Muslims (including dialogues, workshops, cultural events, and the establishment of a resource center)
4. To enhance interreligious relationships and cooperation within the state
5. To support and build the capacity of local partners who are involved in peacemaking

The center organizes a range of activities to bring together religious leaders, policymakers, technocrats, small-business owners and traders, grassroots participants including women, youth, and religious leaders, and other

stakeholders. The inclusion of women is especially important because of the role women play in educating children at home. Engaging youth is vital because it is youth, in fact, who are often the perpetrators of violence. (Nigerians, observes Pastor Wuye, tend to be fiercely passionate about their faith. For many Nigerian youth, religion is everything. He draws an important distinction – that one can be “religious” without being “godly”.) Because operators of businesses and traders have a vested interest in peace and stability in the community, they are viewed as valuable potential partners in the peace and reconciliation process.

Some of the activities that take place include programs focusing on dialogue among the various constituencies, intensive problem-solving workshops for women and youth groups, annual cultural events, capacity-building training programs for local community leaders and members of civil society, and programs designed to address the trauma that citizens have suffered as a result of the violence.

One of the most significant achievements of the center has been the drafting of the “Kaduna Peace Declaration,” which is an articulation of a common vision to put in place effective machinery appropriate for building and sustaining long-term peaceful coexistence between the Christian and Muslim communities. The document was carefully formulated so as to be broadly acceptable and realistic in its goals, and the potential signers were encouraged to review it together with their constituents. In August 2002, some twenty senior religious leaders signed the Kaduna Peace Declaration and declared that each year, 22 August would be observed as Peace Day in Kaduna State.

Criticized beauty contest

Since the signing of the Kaduna Peace Declaration, grassroots efforts to maintain peace have continued, but the challenges have remained as well. Any incident runs the risk of turning into a crisis. In November 2002, for example,

protests over a newspaper article connecting the prophet Mohammed to the Miss World beauty pageant caused much tension. Both Pastor

form the conflict in the region through rudimentary arbitration and mediation methods utilizing official Track One approaches – governmental agencies

Ethnic and religious differences have been a source of tension throughout Nigeria's turbulent post-independence history.

James and Imam Ashafa, in union with transformed religious leaders, drove around affected neighborhoods on a bus and arranged to have them appear on television to appeal for calm. The intervention only was made possible because of the commitments made in the Kaduna Peace Declaration, which was an important factor in containing a volatile situation.

Religious leaders who have signed the declaration are also credited with helping to control violence and vote rigging during elections at both the state and federal levels. In addition, they have, on numerous occasions, intervened in conflicts in the schools, when minor arguments threatened to turn into major incidents. Indeed, some instigators are intent on using schools as a breeding ground for religious conflict. To stem this tide, the Interfaith Mediation Centre, in collaboration with signers of the Kaduna Peace Declaration, has embarked on a program to provide conflict resolution training to religious instructors and secondary-school officials. The consultative approach of the center stands in stark contrast to the approach of the federal Nigerian government, which has attempted to achieve peace by viewing conflict, especially in Kaduna, as a question of law and order. This has systematically failed and attracted international criticism. On the other hand, at the state level, it can be said that the Kaduna state government has played a somewhat more constructive role. It has tried to trans-

and government-sponsored dialogue. Such efforts have changed the conflict's dynamics but not contributed to resolving it. Nonetheless, Kaduna State's efforts have been somewhat promising in view of the fact that the state has attempted to address the fundamental structural causes of the conflicts. This work has been informed by intensive research and consultation with local partners, especially the Kaduna Peace Committee, an organization with extensive knowledge of the conflict dynamics and issues at stake in Kaduna and the greater north, and familiarity with parties to the conflicts.

One other important result of the cooperation between Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye has been a successful initiative to bring together two warring communities of Plateau State, the nomadic Fulani cattle rearers and the native Beroms. To settle long-standing disputes, Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye arranged to hold talks and actively facilitated a mediation process. In 2003, the two parties made a start on engaging in a healing process and exploring pragmatic solutions to the conflict.

Successful mediation

Overall, Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye have successfully facilitated dozens of conflict resolution activities. Whereas their efforts were once confined to their hometown of Kaduna, they are increasingly working in other regions as well. Through its perseverance, the Interfaith Mediation Centre has

gathered the strength to break free from one-time interventions and extend its reach and influence across Nigeria. For Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye, it has been a long and difficult journey, from outright animosity to cautious steps to get to know each other – still holding much suspicion and mistrust – to trust and acceptance, and finally to cooperation. Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye have come to see, by engaging in dialogue, that they, as believers in their faith, are more similar than dissimilar. The greatest threat to peaceful coexistence, as they see it, comes not as a result of cultural or religious difference, but from ignorance of the humanity that binds people together.

“Erroneous perceptions affecting Christian-Muslim relationships have been a source of commotion and tears”, they write in *The Pastor and the Imam*. “They have bred assumptions, stereotypes, and suspicions. As long as we insist on passing judgment on others by the verdict of our perceptions, and refuse them opportunity to explain ... to us who and what they are, we are creating room for conflict in our inter-personal and interreligious relationships” (Wuye and Ashafa 1999:24).

The refreshing, if simple, discovery of the pastor and the imam is that they can draw strength and inspiration from the very faith that is so central to their lives, by looking to the messages of Jesus Christ and the prophet Mohammed, to eschew conflict and violence and instead pursue justice, love, and peaceful coexistence.

**James Wuye and
Muhammed Ashafa**

This article was first published as a chapter in the book *People Building Peace II, Successful Stories of Civil Society*, ed., van Tongeren, P., Brenk, M., Hellema, M., Verhoeven, J.: *The Pastor and the Imam: The Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum in Nigeria*, pp. 226-232. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2005

James Wuye and Muhammed Ashafa were among the speakers at the inter-religious Tools for Peace Conference in Sweden in 2005. See New Routes No 4/2004 and the full conference report at www.life-peace.org

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A Surprising Meeting of Minds

We both, in the past, had been involved in a war of words through various publications ... In these papers we expressed radical, provocative ideas from the stand points of our religions, on which we would refuse to negotiate for any reason. These uncompromising attitudes, in the past, had resulted in a tense atmosphere that did not allow room for dialogue or for any form of interaction between us. Everyone was trying to outwit the other. To the Pastor, the goal was total evangelization of the country, while for the Imam it was total Islamization. These were our positions before that fateful meeting and introduction.

Then we started talking, each of us carefully selecting his words. We were conscious that here were two “enemies” coming face to face for the first time, on a ground that was not conducive to flexing of muscles. But in our eyes, one could read hatred, anger and resentment, all covered with the cynical smiles that frequently flashed across our faces. Each was highly suspicious of the other.

To our very great surprise, as this discussion progressed, we were both startled by some discoveries. Hidden behind the turbaned Imam was a gentleman, not the violent man that the Pastor had assumed he was. Similarly, the suited Pastor was a bird of the same feather as the Imam. We found that we had a lot of things in common. From this, the idea of collaborative problem solving was initiated. At the end of that meeting we resolved to meet again to further harness this idea of responding to our conflicts.

From *The Pastor and the Imam* (Wuye and Ashafa 1999: 20)

Poverty and patriarchy worsen AIDS-situation

As of June 2006, the HIV/AIDS virus has been in existence for 25 years. No country has escaped it, but the poor world is struck much harder than the rich.

"The microbe is nothing. The terrain is everything." By quoting the French 19th century chemist Louis Pasteur, Michael Kelly, a Jesuit Father and an AIDS expert in Zambia, explains how poverty and the role of women are the two major factors that affect the situation of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Michael Kelly S.J. was invited by the Christian Council of Sweden to take part in the yearly event "The global week of the churches", where all churches in Sweden gather around an international theme. The Life & Peace Institute (LPI) is one of the ecumenical organizers behind it. This year the theme was the global campaign "Make poverty history", in which the UN's Millennium Development Goals are central and where Goal 6 focuses on the problems of HIV/AIDS in the world. One of the highlights of Michael Kelly's full schedule with different seminars was when he took part in a delegation of church and development agency leaders, who met with the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation.

24 crashes every day

Every year 3.1 million people die of AIDS, and far from enough is done about it. Michael Kelly compares it with the attention in the media when a plane crashes somewhere in the world and a lot of people die.

- HIV/AIDS is like a big airplane, with 300-350 passengers, crashing

every hour, every day, every year. Except that, at the same time, every hour, every day, every year there is a new airplane, a bigger one, with 400-500 passengers that takes off, explains Michael Kelly.

During the 25 years that have passed, the world has not managed to find a cure against HIV/AIDS. What the world has succeeded in is finding antiretroviral drugs that slow down the virus. Those drugs, in combination with good nutrition and a balanced diet, availability and accessibility of common medicine, a good medical and social infrastructure, and supportive, understanding care, will add a lot to the

quality to the life of an HIV-infected person. A problem is that usually at least one of the necessary components is missing.

A patriarchal world

According to Kelly, one of the most important challenges for the international community is to work with HIV/AIDS on the structural and public levels, and to put a special focus on women's and children's rights.

- We are very much involved in this in a justice dimension. We live in a patriarchal world, run by men for the sake of men, and we use women to help us. The most risky thing a woman in Sub-Saharan Africa today can do, if she wants to avoid HIV, is to get married. That is when she loses control over her own sexuality. HIV-rates are much higher among married women than among non-married, says Michael Kelly.

Speaking about the work done on HIV/AIDS by churches and Christian organisations, Michael Kelly is very clear about where he sees the most challenging part.

- The churches are doing well on health and medicine care. One fourth to one half of all the medical care in Africa is run by churches and faith based organisations. We are also heavily involved in education and taking care of orphans, says Kelly. But the weakest point of the churches

**HIV/AIDS is like a big airplane,
with 300-350 passengers,
crashing every hour, every day,
every year.**

achieving full credibility in their teaching about equality between the sexes, as long as we have inequality among ourselves.



Growing up with HIV/AIDS as a major global threat. After 25 years there is still no cure but 40 million victims. Photo: Magnus Aronsson/IKON

LPI and HIV/AIDS

During 2003, the developing countries in the world spent 4.7 billion US dollars on HIV/AIDS work. The same year, these countries' military spending totalled an amount of 956

numerous destructive factors between conflict and the spread of HIV/AIDS.

-Violent conflict creates conditions that are favourable to the spread of the disease, and at the same time the disease creates social conditions that are prone

near future. As an organisation working primarily in Africa, the part of the world that has been hardest hit by the epidemic, this is a very important issue for LPI to deal with, especially when it comes to adding an HIV/AIDS dimension to all the work that is already done in the field. With the Swedish International Development Agency, one of LPI's major donors, making the issue of HIV/AIDS a priority, LPI will have an excellent chance to increase its role on with respect to this problem.

**We live in a patriarchal world,
run by men for the sake of men,
and we use women to help us.**

Lisa Minnhagen

billion US dollars, or 2.6 billions dollars every day.

Susanne Thurfjell, Senior Programme Officer at LPI, sees the interplay of

to instability and conflict. Today LPI does not have any formal research or training on the issue of HIV/AIDS, but it is certainly in the pipeline for the

For more information about HIV/AIDS and Conflict, see New Routes No 2/2004, pp 10-11.

LPI News

Peace research in the Congos

As part of the ongoing peacebuilding programmes in Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville, LPI recently arranged meetings for national peace researchers. The symposium in Goma, DRC, in October included 19 topics that were presented by graduate students and critiqued by two discussants. The research topics were regrouped into three themes: Good governance, Religion in conflict and peace building, The role of women in peacebuilding.

The topics under governance included political culture and citizen participation, elections and electoral culture, the role of women in good governance, and good governance and conflict.

While the first part of the presentation was for the researchers and instructors, the second part included LPI partners and practitioners of peacebuilding. Finally participants were divided into five workshops and discussed further important points raised by the papers. The purpose of the minor studies was fourfold: To assist

universities and graduate students to engage in quality research – capacity building, to do some analyses on topics which are deemed to be root causes of conflicts in the area, to avail evidence-based information for partners/practitioners in conflict transformation/peacebuilding, and to identify some topics for further deeper studies.

The symposium was chaired by Professor Labana from Kinshasa University, while the Vice Governor of Kivu opened the symposium by expressing appreciation for the research done and his hopes for continued input by LPI in such academic pursuits.

The Congo Brazzaville seminar included ten papers. Unlike that in Goma, where students were engaged, this seminar was for the presentation of research results by scholars from mainly the national university. The topics discussed included the conflicts of 1959 and 1993/94, the conflicts of 1993-97, ethnicity, power and armed conflict, the role of the churches in the conflicts, conflict and democracy and the role of civil society, the organisation and functioning of civil society

in Congo and the role of women's organisations in peacebuilding.

LPI staff programme officer Jérôme Gouzou and research coordinator Tarekegn Adebo, who participated in the seminars, also had opportunities to discuss about the facilitation of future research and the need for improved communication. There is a need to finalise the studies following suggestions received during presentations and prepare them for compilation for various uses. In both places the need for a workshop on methodology was underlined.

Broadcasting peace agreement

The LPI Horn of Africa Programme is supporting Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) in the translation and broadcasting of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), over the main radio – Radio Juba. The programmes are recorded in the SCC radio studio. SCC has plans to translate the CPA into ten major languages, Acholi, Baka, Bari groupings, Didinga, Dinka, Lotuho, Ma'di, Moru, Nuer and Zande.

Reviews

Nicaragua: Many-sided description of a faithful community

Philip E. Wheaton: Faithful Community: Campesino Vision of the Kingdom of God, History of the Christian Base Community in Jiñocuao, Nicaragua (Comunidad Fiel en Nicaragua: Á Cristo entre los campesinos!), EPICA, Washington, 2005

This book attempts to depict the

historical development of the phenomenon that can be called the base group movement in Nicaragua. The author, Philip E. Wheaton, pastor in the Episcopal Church in North America, has during a period of fourteen years been living with a particular community group, which is characterised as “Comunidad fiel” (Faithful Community). Actually, the name of the group is Comunidad Cristiana de Base, in the village Jiñocuao.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part in the Spanish edition,

which also includes a preface, is entitled “Campesinos cristianos liberados de oppression”, translated to English: “Christian farm workers liberated from oppression”. (However, in the English edition this part has a different title; “The Sandinistas & the Transformation of Rural Individualism (1972-1989)”). The oppression concerns the dictatorship during the Somoza regime 1967-72 and 1974-79. On the 19th July 1979, “this famous date”, the majority of Nicaragua's inhabitants celebrated the victory of the Sandinistas, while

many in the countryside celebrated Somoza's defeat.

The first part also includes a description of the origin and development of the base group movement, mainly in the area of Chinandega in northwestern Nicaragua. This happens during a turbulent time, both politically and church-wise. Adding periods of drought, one can understand that many of the poor were under a lot of pressure.

Among the noteworthy events during the period the book covers, perhaps the visit of the Pope in 1983 is particularly remarkable. The leader of the Solentina community, Ernesto Cardenal, known as an author in many parts of the world, was elected by the government of the country to greet and welcome the Pope on its behalf, but was denied by the Pope to do this. Cardenal was the Minister of Culture, but a Catholic priest is not allowed to sit in a government. The event had negative consequences for the base groups – if the Pope does not approve of them, the rest of the Catholics would probably have to do the same.

There were many tensions indeed, especially towards the Catholic Church with its conservative hierarchy, which did not want to be bothered with the base group movement CEB (Comunidades Eclesiales de Base) or the corresponding movement CCB (Comunidades Cristianas de Base). According to the author, a crucial difference between the two is that the CCB-groups, often in the countryside, would like to change the world through their way of living, while the CEB want to challenge the larger congregations in the cities and the traditional liturgy.

The second part of the book has the title: "In the struggle to survive" (Luchando para Sobrevivir). In this part examples are given of many and big problems, of which poverty probably was the biggest, together with a regime which is not very interested in the welfare of the poor. As a consequence of this environmental problems, among

other things, arise due to extensive wood felling. The proposal of the Jesuits to change cooperatives to banks and a peculiar course of action was another example of complicated problems – the farmers had to write their names on an empty paper, otherwise risking to pay a much higher interest.

It took a while before I figured out the reason for the lack of consistency in the text; pages 261 and 262 had not been included in the printing and were consequently missing. Unfortunately, a matter of critical importance is now lost to the reader – whether the base group in Jiñocuaio should keep the basic cooperative idea of members with rights to make decisions, or to turn a cooperative organisation into a bank, and subsequently turn the members into bank clients. The latter is what some Jesuit priests from the Catholic Central American University wanted. Of course, this gave rise to much discussion.

The missing pages give reason to pinpoint some other things that would have been desired. A map of the area would have facilitated the understanding, since it is important to get an idea where an event takes place geographically. A list of acronyms, of which there are many, would also have made it easier for the reader. The book gives the impression of being written under pressure of time, which is certainly human, but yet, there is, for example, no text to explain the cover picture. In addition, many of the illustrations lack an explanatory text; to see photos without names or captions is frustrating. A last observation concerns the language; an unnecessary amount of errors disturb the reading experience.

A review can never do full justice to a book, even less to this book, which contains so many different values. This is the strength of the book, but perhaps also its weakness. It is difficult to get a grip of everything that the book speaks of, projects, events and the many personalities. Rather than a history book, it becomes a book of

remembrance. Nonetheless, those interested in the origin, development and future of the Christian base groups in Nicaragua can get much out of Wheaton's book.

Anders Ruuth

Translated by Jenny Svensson

African perspectives on security

The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture.

A Policy Advisory Group Meeting by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg. Johannesburg, South Africa, 11-12 December 2004.

A More Secure Continent: African Perspectives on the UN High-Level Panel Report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Seminar Report, Cape Town, 23-24 April 2005. The Centre for Conflict Resolution.

Two recently published reports by The Centre for Conflict Resolution highlight the issue of security in the African context. While the emphasis of the reports to some extent lies on different levels, the regional and the international, a commonality is the emphasis that is given to the broadening of the concept of security, from a traditional state-centred security to a more comprehensive human security.

The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture derives from a policy group meeting, which analysed governance and security under the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD). The report focuses on themes such as promoting democratic governance, strengthening Africa's security regime, Africa and external actors and Africa's evolving peace and security role. Above all, the report stresses the need to increase the AU's

capacity in dealing with security challenges. It notes that security challenges in Africa are mainly concerned with human security, such as the pressing issue of HIV/AIDS.

The role of civil society is seen as vital in strengthening the AU/NEPAD governance and security architecture. The report points out that regional organisations and sub-regional organisations in Africa have great potential, but also face many constraints in their work towards increased security. Consequently, it is underlined that the United Nations, the European Union and bilateral donors could do more.

The second report, *A More Secure Continent*, stems from a seminar that sought to give African perspectives on the UN High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenge and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. The aim of the seminar was to critically examine the report as well as to define Africa's major interests, and to create a strategy to implement the report's key recommendations. While the report from the seminar commends the High-Level Panel Report's stress to recognise not only traditional but also non-traditional global security threats, it also puts forward some criticisms. It argues that Western concerns overshadowed others in the High-Level Panel debates, and that Africa's special needs were not specifically dealt with in the following report.

For instance, it was noted that terrorism is seen as a main threat in the West, while the major threats in Africa are related to human security; poverty, disease (especially HIV/AIDS) and interstate and intrastate conflicts. The seminar also emphasised the important interconnections between development and security. While the High-Level Panel Report recognised the relations between African regional organisations and the UN, the seminar revealed that many Africans had expected this issue to be more important.

To conclude, the reports advocate quite a similar and broad approach on

security, where the regional as well as the international level is important. The reports provide good insight into some of the recent discussions about security from an African perspective, and offer enlightening reading both for those interested in contemporary Africa and for those involved in the wider security debate.

Jenny Svensson

Conflict Transformation for activists and scholars

The Life & Peace Institute is happy to inform its readers (or to remind some) about the publication of some important books on Nonviolent Conflict Transformation and Peace-building.

Pieces of the Puzzle: Keywords on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice. Edited by Charles Villavicencio and Erik Doxtader.

This book consists of several short essays that address some of the key terms, questions and dynamics of justice and reconciliation. The book is meant for activists and scholars and forms a practical guide that helps the reader to understand not only the social, political and cultural terms of transitional justice and reconciliation, but also the stake of democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction

Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook. Edited by Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers.

This is a publication of articles that have already been launched on the Berghof website (www.berghof-handbook.net). The intention is to give an overview of recent developments in the field of conflict transformation from the perspectives of practitioners as well as experts and academic analysts, from within and also from outside conflict zones.

The book gives practitioners and scholars concepts and theories, tools for analysis, methods and approaches, as well as techniques and activities of peace building.

The concept of conflict transformation used stresses structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of conflicts. It refers to both the process and the structure of moving towards a just and sustainable peace.

Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace. Experiences and ideas of Swedish Civil Society Organisations (CSO). Anna Åkerlund.

This book is published in a Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) Studies-series, which was made over a period of two years. It examines the work of 58 Swedish organisations, including churches, humanitarian agencies, organisations dealing with development issues, human rights, youth and adult education. They are involved in different kinds of projects or activities: advocacy, dialogue, education etc. and deal with trauma, democratisation, the defence and respect of human rights.

A project inventory as its point of departure, the study is also an attempt to identify the potential for Swedish CSOs to support the prospect for peace in areas of crisis and conflict. The study ends with 25 recommendations addressed to the Swedish Civil Society Organisations; but the recommendations are also of much value for all other organisations that perform activities directly or indirectly related to violent and armed conflict.

Claudette Werleigh

20 years of peace research and action out of Uppsala

Life & Peace Institute, based in Uppsala, Sweden, celebrated its 20-year anniversary in November with a series of seminars and an informal reception at the institute. Since its start in 1985, this international ecumenical institute has produced about 70 research reports and books.


Initially, LPI was mostly concerned with research and conferences about issues of peace and justice, but in the beginning of the 1990s it started to work directly with peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa. Through a combination of research, education and capacity building, the institute was able to play an important role in several peace processes. Most well known is the work in Somalia, where LPI took over the role of the UN as a key organisation in the local peace work.

Starting in 2000, LPI has also been engaged in peace work in Congo-Brazzaville and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It supports several local peace initiatives, mostly church-related and religious organisations as well as human rights organisations.

To build peace from below in the local context is the key to a sustainable peace process. In this work increased knowledge is an important factor. This is where the research comes in, and this is also what makes LPI an unusual and unique combination of theory and practice.

Celebrations in Bukavu

The anniversary was also celebrated by some 130 people in Bukavu, DRC. Among the guests were representatives of partners, authorities, NGOs, churches, universities and the media. Following a presentation of the history of the institute by resident representative Ylse van der Schoot, a video on the work in the Kivu provinces was shown. A panel discussion with the following eight representatives assessed the peacebuilding needs in DRC and the work of LPI: Didace Kaningini (Vice Gouverneur Sud Kivu), Ali Lutimba Omari (Ministre des Affaires Sociales), Koen Vlassenroot (Université de Gant), Odette Kibwana (SAFDEF), Alexandra Bilak (NOVIB), Eric Kajemba (Radio Maria, OGP), Mass Walimba (gouvernement DRRR), Aloys Tegera (Pole Institute).



LPI's trademark in research and action is the community-based bottom-up approach. Here illustrated by snapshots from Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and from the LPI head office in Uppsala, Sweden, celebrating 20 years of ecumenical peacebuilding. Photos: LPI