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“SENSIBILITY” AND “OTHERNESS” IN EMMANUEL LÉVINAS

ENRIQUE DUSSEL

I turned to Lévinas when I began to write *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana (Towards an Ethic of Latin American Liberation)* and it was Lévinas who gave me the opportunity to go beyond the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. Without abandoning the approach to liberation that I took in writing that text, I shall continue my argument from the "pulsional" perspective¹. As the phenomenological critic that he was, Lévinas' first approach to understanding otherness was to place himself systematically outside the straightforward gnoseological order² Unlike the study of the subject prior to him, his life was the reference situation for his own thinking of the other. A Lithuanian Jew, whose mother tongues were Russian and Hebrew and who acquired French as a student in Strasbourg and German in Freiburg, he lived the "experience" of live traumatic years in the Nazi French prisoner of war camp at Stammlanger. He was a *victim* of the Jewish holocaust in the heart of Modernity. He was a survivor who began his mature work as follows: "To the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations ... victims of the same hatred of the other man, of the same anti-Semitism."³

As a South American, I asked myself: When Lévinas spoke of victims of the same anti-Semitism, what did he imply about all those others who are not Semitic? In 1972, in Louvain, I got a group of students together to talk with Lévinas. I asked: "What about the fifteen million Indians slaughtered during the conquest of Latin America, and the thirteen million Africans who were made slaves, aren't they the other you're speaking about?" Lévinas stared at me and said: "That's something for

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you to think about." And so I continued to develop the Liberation Philosophy on which I had already begun to work.

At the end of the meeting at which I asked Lévinas my pressing question, he said to us: "I see all of you as though you were hostages." I didn't grasp what he meant. Shortly after that, while I was reading *Otherwise than Being*, I understood. As a group of young teachers and students, obsessed by our Latin American victims, Lévinas saw us as hostages in Europe; that is, Europe took us as hostages for our distant and oppressed peoples. I didn't know if he was insulting us by making this observation, but as I read *Otherwise than Being*, it dawned on me that it had been a vast, undeserved, and encouraging appraisal of us.

It seems to me that Lévinas the prisoner in the Stammlanger camp is a clear reference situation that must be kept in mind when reflecting on his idea of otherness. In prison, as a "hostage" for his persecuted people, he was aware of himself as guilty, because he had survived. Obsessed about his brothers, the victims, through his ethical-critical philosophy he bore witness to the evil of Being through which the other is closed out. In the experience of being a hostage, a substitution takes place. The hostage is an innocent, just person who "witnesses" the victim (the other). The victim suffers a traumatic action. The hostage suffers "for" the other. The theme of one who suffers persecution for the other (the multitude *rabim*) is treated dramatically in the four poems of the "Servant of Yahweh" in Isaiah 42: 1-53. The servant finds him/herself before a court as a ransom victim for the sake of the multitude. Among the people that are to be ransomed, there were two poles: my people who are par-

done and are an object of pity and the *multitude*, the undetermined, that which could be the object of the pardon. "My people" is the portion of the saved multitude; the multitude is the symbol of all humanity--present or future--who *could be my people*.⁴ We shall see this diachrony in due course going from the "multitude" (a mere contradictory social block) to the "people" (historical subject). The ethical question Lévinas analyzed is structured around several Hebrew words for the ideas of redemption, redeem, and ransom. To redeem refers to paying a ransom, buying the freedom of the slave, liberating him, saving the victim. In thinking of otherness, Lévinas puzzled out the relation between those who are "my people" and those who could be "my people." An ethics of responsibility is built between these two groups and between the hostage and the victim.

Sensibility

Lévinas explored differences in the experience of desire from the perspective of the hostage and from the perspective of the victim.⁵ I will discuss the idea of otherness by detailing the interplay between the meaning of desire and the action of the hostage in his or her concern for the victim. Lévinas situated himself in the place of the hostage who he understood to be a (gratified) member of the social system but who nevertheless is willing to receive the impact of an appeal for help from the victim. The hostage is not exactly in the place of the victim. That is, hostages enjoy the rewards of the social system of which they are members but also are able to face victims and heed their appeals for help. Out of his or her own satisfaction (i.e., the absence of need), the hostage responds to the victim.

This re-sponsibility (from *spondere* to "take something into one's charge" in Latin) towards the other comes before the taking of any decision. Responsibility, according to Hans Jonas,⁶ is an a posteriori responsibility for the life of the planet. In contrast, with Lévinas, we are dealing with an a priori responsibility since it places us in a position of having charge of the victim who unexpectedly appears before us. Victims appear before us: someone is begging, someone is injured beside the road, a street kid

is cleaning our car, we encounter a victim of repression, we meet a woman who has been brutally beaten, we speak with a student unfairly treated by the teacher. The victim is another whose accusing presence we can no longer "shake off" when it comes to our obligation to "do something" for that person. I can reflect on the encounter afterwards, turn away and forget about it, or do something concrete for him or her. These conscious decisions or acts are a posteriori. They come after the experience in which an accusing presence obligates us.

Is it rational to respond to an appeal for help? If we go on the understanding that the emotional, corporeal, and material worlds of pulsions, that is, a "life that is complacent in itself, that lives of its life,"⁷ in no way denies reason, we see rather that this life defines the limits of reason. Not everything is rational! Lévinas told us, and he was right—at least from the point of view of an Ethics of Liberation, which is liberation of victims and not of the satisfied. Heideggerian ontology, traditional phenomenology, the linguistic logics of sense-meaning, and even of intersubjective validity, are philosophies of the "satisfied"—whose satisfaction is an unacknowledged starting point and is taken unquestioningly as reality. To come face to face with the unsatisfied—the poor, the abused women—is to begin to wonder about this whole dimension which Lévinas opened up before us—a dimension that he opened up in ways different from those of Marx, Horkheimer, and Freud, although at bottom he agreed with them.

In the desire for the victim, Lévinas identified a shift in the hostage's experience in which happiness and desire separate from one another. For Lévinas, desire is an aspiration not conditioned by a previous lack. In a strange way he enters into the discourse on liberation with which I have been dealing when he wrote: The I exists as separated in its enjoyment, that is, as happy; it can sacrifice its pure and simple being to happiness. It exists in an eminent sense; it exists above being. But in Desire⁸ the being of the I appears still higher since it can sacrifice to Desire its very happiness. It thus finds itself above, or, at the apex, at the apogee of being by enjoying (happiness) and by desir-

ing (truth and justice). To Lévinas, desire moves above being and above happiness.

What more can be said of desire? In Lévinas, the desire of the hostage for the victim is a creative pulsion,⁹ that is, desire creatively causes something to emerge, but it lies beyond mere Dionysian instinct and is totally transcendental with regard to it. He wrote that the other, metaphysically desired, is not "Other" like the bread I eat. The metaphysical desire tends towards *something else entirely*, toward the *absolutely other*. As commonly interpreted, need would be at the basis of desire.¹⁰ But need is not at the basis of metaphysical desire when the term is used by Lévinas. Metaphysical desire is like goodness—the Desired does not fulfil it, but deepens it. Metaphysical desire is a desire without satisfaction in that it *understands* [*entend*] the remoteness, the alterity of the other.¹¹

Earlier I said that, in Lévinas, Desire moves above being and above happiness, that is, Desire is twice removed above Being. Let us assume that, as in the case of Nietzsche, Lévinas relied upon a conception of "happiness" as a state to be surpassed. In Nietzsche's case, desire is surpassed by "pleasure" (*Lust*), an idea that Lévinas thought was "narcissistic" and inadequate. In Lévinas, "Desire" is pleasure that is neither erotic nor narcissistic, but rather transcendental—"for-the-Other" (*pour l'Autre*). In the *Cantique des colonnes*, Valéry speaks of desire without defect (*désir sans défaut*). He is presumably referring to Plato who, in his analysis of pure pleasures, found an aspiration not conditioned by any previous lack. Let us take up this term "desire" again. We confront a subject inclined towards himself or herself. The subject is characterized by the tendency to persist in his or her being, and is one for whom, using the Heideggerian formula, his or her existence is essential to his or her existence itself; this is a subject also characterized by a concern with himself or herself, and who achieves in happiness his or her for-himself or for-herself. If Desire for the Other emanates from a satisfied being, in this sense, that is, from one who is independent and who does not want for himself or herself, then Desire, in the hostage, is founded on the need of someone who no longer has needs.

Or, to put it another way: The I endowed with personal life, for example, the atheist I whose atheism is without wants, surpasses itself in the Desire that comes to it from the presence of the other. This Desire is a desire in a being already happy. For this reason, "desire is the misfortune of the happy" but "misfortune" is intended ironically. The person summoned to responsibility by the other is plucked out of his or her tranquillity, peace, and security and is hurled into a risky adventure, beyond the quest for personal happiness. The adventure is a search for justice, for the sake of the Other. Justice for the poor, the widow, and the orphan, is unthinkable for Nietzsche amidst his Will to Power. In Lévinas this compelling, propelling Inclination -this pulsion towards justice- was his Will to Alterity. Desire marks a sort of inversion with regard to the classical notion of substance. When the victim (the other) appears before me, I am drawn powerfully toward the other and my spontaneity is challenged by the other's presence. It is in this sense that I am a hostage. Ethics is the name we give to this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the other. Just as "ontology ...reduces the other to the same," theory traditionally understood enters upon a course that renounces metaphysical Desire, renounces the marvel of exteriority from which that Desire lives. But theory understood as a respect for exteriority has a critical intention that does not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but rather calls into question the exercise of the same. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology.

So Lévinas proposed, on the one hand, a creative or alterative pulsion that returns to the Totality the pulsions of self-preservation or reproduction (the same, the egotistical psychism), and even those same Dionysian, narcissistic pulsions (the egotistical eros or mere constituted cultural need), and at the same time, on the other hand, he proposed a corresponding "critical reason." Eros is a window, but an ambiguous one, since in "the pri-

macy of the self," egoism, can be "narcissistic." Lévinas did not want to follow the path of narcissism. The sensibility that he proposed, this pulsion of Alterity, is an "exiting" (*Ausgang*) but a very different one from the Kantian, Enlightenment exiting. It does not only involve overcoming a pre-critical intellectual state of self-blamable immaturity,¹⁴ but also includes exiting from the irresponsibility of the insignificance of the other-by having "habitually" rejected his or her appeal. I suppose we might say that egotistical irresponsibility (a very different sensibility from that which Lévinas would promote) is the price to be paid for habitually rejecting the other's appeal.

Otherness

I think that if we are going to make Lévinas thought comprehensible, our point of departure should be a double scenario that would be defined by three moments of his life. To show this I will base my analysis upon two of his works: *Difficult Freedom and Otherwise Than Being*. Let us see how this phenomenological adventure with the other happened. Using his analytical apparatus, he reached some supremely fine distinctions, but, at the same time, showed the limits of this apparatus, especially where his philosophy of history and politics are concerned. I will outline aspects of his life that highlight what I will refer to as two scenarios representing certain aspects of his views on otherness.

The first moment of Lévinas' life, which takes us as far as 1961 (the moment of the first scenario), covers three major stages. The first is a preparatory stage, in Strasbourg and Freiburg, with Heidegger and Husserl, whose influence can be seen in his doctoral thesis.¹⁵ There is no question that the French translation of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*, which Lévinas published in Paris in 1931, inevitably plunged him into the question of "the Other."¹⁶ His preparation continued throughout the 1930s. In the second stage, we have the Second World War and his confinement in the prisoner of war camp, Stammlanger. In 1946 he turns to the material that appeared in *Time and the Other*¹⁷ in which repeated attempts are made to overcome the cognitive position, the "inten-

tion" of phenomenological knowing, the ontology of "individual being" (of the "self" in the world) in the face of an "I am"¹⁸ only facing the other, in the "face-to-face" (firstly as the erotic feminine). The third stage came between the war and 1961. During this third stage, in the development of his thought, the other breaks with one's selfness, one's aloneness. In 1947 he published *De l'existence a les existents* (translated in 1988 as *Existence and Existents*).¹⁹

Indeed, the first scenario, visible in Lévinas' *Totalité et infini: essai sur l'extériorité*, published in 1961 (*Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, translated by Alphonso Lingis in 1969), described as a starting point a "psychism" that precedes understanding in the Heideggerian world. In a moment which is *before* being-in-the-world, the pre-ontological *metaphysical* conditions of possibility are analyzed phenomenologically.²⁰ These conditions could be summed up as sensibility.²¹ Sensibility has to do with a pre-opening up to the world as a vulnerable, traumatizable corporeality, i.e., even before I meet the other I am prepared to open up to him or her. But this living, life-relishing sensibility which eats and dwells (residing in a home with safety and warmth) is constituted as an ethic by the face-to-face experience with the Other, so that its ethical sensibility arises from the "responsibility" before the face of the other.

After the Holocaust, responsibility for the other is shaped by the needs inherent in suffering. The other's demand upon me emerges out of that desperate condition of suffering. Out of its condition as a victim, the being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity, without my being able to be deaf to that appeal.

But the fact that the face of the destitute person can "appeal" to me is possible because I am "sensibility" a priori vulnerable corporeality. Sensibility is expressed as hospitality. The appearance of the other is not a mere manifestation but rather a revelation; its capture is not comprehension but rather hospitality. In the presence of the Other, reason is not representative, but rather listens sincerely to what is being said. The incomprehensible nature of the pres-

ence of the other is not to be described negatively. The formal structure of language announces the ethical inviolability of the other. The fact that the face maintains a relation with me by discourse does not range him in the same; rather the face remains absolute within the relation.

Reason and language arise out of the face-to-face relation with the other prior to representation. That is, "reason lives in language ...the first rationality gleams forth in the opposition of the face to face ...the first intelligibility, the first signification, is the infinity of the intelligence that presents itself (that is, speaks to me) in the face."²² But what we lend an ear to from the beginning is the way in which Lévinas posed the problem of asymmetry. As he said: "The presence of the face coming *from beyond the world* but committing me to human fraternity, does not overwhelm me as a numinous essence arousing fear and trembling. ...The other who dominates me in his transcendence is thus the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom I am obligated."²³ To Lévinas at least, the idea of asymmetry did not entail being overwhelmed by one's obligation to the victim. The will of the hostage is neither deficient, arbitrary, egotistical, nor speeding towards suicide. The other of the asymmetrical relation is a victim and therefore comes from above and appears as ethically superior to me due to his or her suffering. It is the asymmetry of the relation with the victim that obligates me. The will of the hostage, no matter what decision is subsequently made, feels the impact, finds itself now "re-sponsible" (as that which first and foremost finds itself taking care of the other). The will is free to assume this responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse this responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the other has introduced it. In the welcoming of the face the will opens to reason. The asymmetrical relation links the hostage to the victim. The asymmetry constitutes a hostage, who responds in welcome. The absolutely new is the other.²⁴ Lévinas concluded that the terror of reason enclosed within Totality, the reason of Modernity, is situated at the antipodes of the brave subject living for the other. Such a being confronts death out of pure courage and the cause for which he dies.²⁵ Lévinas' idea of sen-

ibility grew through his experience with Nazi heroic fanaticism. Likewise in South America, we lived through the heroism and fanaticism of the ideologues of Western Christian Civilization.

And so we come to the second Lévinas (1961-1974), with its second scenario. From 1963 onward he showed a clear command of the theme of the other who provokes an ethical movement in consciousness and through Desire disturbs the awareness of a coincidence of the Same.²⁶ He slowly began to develop new categories for the position of the hostage. In 1974 when *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* was published (translated in 1981 as *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*), the new scenario had already been sketched. Following Rosenzweig, Lévinas radicalized the situation he was using for his phenomenological analysis in terms of the exposure felt by the hostage. In a taxi, before a lecture in Louvain in 1972, I asked: "What does *exposure* mean?" And Lévinas, as though he were violently pulling open his shirt with both hands and ripping off the buttons to expose his chest, exclaimed: "It's like when one exposes oneself in front of a firing squad!" The new scenario is more dramatic than the first. In the second scenario there is a different perspective. The one who is appealed to is "persecuted" because of the other, i.e., the victim.²⁷ In the ethical relation, the one who is appealed to, and feels the obligation, is taken as a "hostage" and is "substituted" for the victim.²⁸ It is the old question of offering up one's own life to "pay the ransom" for the life of a slave. In the new scenario, we have the theme of the "redemption" for the other in the face of the power of the system, a System in which one "bears witness" to one's own "obsession" for the victim. The "third party" is an observer, but is also Power.

Responsibility²⁹ for the victim is prior to dialogue. It is a persecuting obsession in which an identity individuates itself as unique without recourse to any system of references, in the impossibility of evading the assignment from the other-without experiencing blame. The representation of self grasps the assignment. The absolution of the one who feels obligated and responds is neither an evasion nor an abstraction; it is a concrete fact. For under accu-

sation by everyone, the responsibility for everyone goes to the point of substitution. A subject becomes a hostage.³⁰ Obsessed with responsibilities and accused of what others do and suffer, the uniqueness of the self is the very fact of bearing the suffering and fault of another-persecution turns into expiation.

The point of departure for the hostage is a subjectivity that is sensibility expressed through pain. Pain is nudity more naked than all destitution, sacrificed rather than sacrificing itself, and bound to the adversity of pain. This existence, with sacrifice imposed on it, is without conditions. Subjectivity is vulnerable, exposed to affection, and is a sensibility more passive than any passivity: it is extreme patience. The hostage is exposed, exposed to expressing, and thus to saying, and thus to giving.

Pain marks the start of creation. Lévinas said: "How the adversity of pain is ambiguous!" His work on the relation between the hostage and the victim, in the presence of the third party, was not enclosed within a vulnerable sensibility that was the *conatus essendi*.³¹ The corporeal subject "exposes" itself before the Totality, the system, the third party, as being intimately tied to the other:² The hostage is , discovered, without intending or deciding, to be in "proximity" to the other through contact. For Lévinas, to be in contact is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, nor to suppress one's self in the other. In contact, the one touching and the one touched separate, as though the touched moved off and was already other, as though he or she did not have anything in common with the hostage. But now the *ethical* step as such is taken. All that has gone before has been preparatory. The other, i.e., sensitive carnality (like the psychic ego), appears on contact not only as face but as a victim. Here Lévinas reached the pinnacle of his contemporary thought:

The face of a neighbor that I meet in proximity signifies for me an unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract. It escapes representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality. ...The disclosing of a face is nudity, non-form, abandon of the self, aging, dying, more naked than nudity. It is poverty,

skin with wrinkles, which are a trace of it-
self.²³

He identified what had not been emphasized in Western thought. In describing the victim's destitution, he moved from statements of fact to normative obligations. For instance, he moved from "This victim cannot live in this system," as a statement of fact, to an articulation of the hostage's experience of obligation to the other. It is the obsession of the other, my neighbor, accusing me of a fault that I have not committed freely³⁴ that reduces the ego to a self on the hither side³⁵ of my identity, prior to all self-consciousness, and denudes me absolutely. I recognize in the face by which I am "captured," a "re-sponsibility," an "obedience," and an "obligation": Obedience precedes any hearing of the command. The other presents himself as an anarchic being that slips into me *like a thief* through the outstretched nets of consciousness. This trauma surprises me completely-this unheard command of obligation. This responsibility that puts us under an ethical obligation on behalf of the other, as victim, was described by Lévinas as follows:

We call prophecy this reverting in which the perception of an order coincides with the signification of this order given to him that obeys it. Prophecy would thus be the very psyche in the soul: the other in the same. ... An obedience preceding the hearing of the order the anachronism of inspiration or of prophecy is, for the recuperable time of reminiscence, more paradoxical than the prediction of the future by an oracle.³⁶

Conclusion

And so Lévinas spelled out the final content of his ethics as such: the one for the other as a re-sponsibility that obligates. And why? Wasn't he, who was to some extent the father of French post-modernism, guilty of a lapse of rationality? Not at all. Lévinas clearly showed the importance of the rational, but also untiringly showed its *origin* and *meaning*. Reason -rationality, intentionality, the order of being and the world, language, the said-arises from the context already described and eventually returns to it. The inten-

tion in Lévinas' work can therefore be defined as follows: In starting with sensibility, which is interpreted not as a knowing but as proximity, proximity appears as the relationship with the other, who cannot be resolved into "images" or be exposed in a theme.

The impossibility to reduce the other to an image or theme may seem unforgivable to a rationalist. But Lévinas has a positive yet critical view of rationality. Between the hostage and the victim appears the "Third Party."³⁷ In my case the Third Party was the Europe that held us hostage, those of us who comprised that small group of teachers and students from South America. The system, the Totality is justice (or injustice).

The ethical relation is born of responsibility for the other. To Lévinas, responsibility for the other through communication is the primary adventure of science and philosophy. It is a rationality of peace. Clearly we are now in an unexpected radicality. Re-sponsibility for the other obligates me to search in the prevailing system or Totality for the causes of the victimization of the victim, and this is the critical moment of ethics as such. Lévinas generalized this fact, going so far as to say that the world, consciousness--i.e., the whole order of knowing-is really an answer to this "obligating re-sponsibility":

The way leads from responsibility to problems. A problem is posited by proximity

itself, which, as the immediate itself, is without problems. The extraordinary commitment of the other to the third party calls for control, a search for justice, society and the State, comparison and possession, thought and science, commerce and philosophy, and outside of anarchy, the search for a principle. Philosophy is this measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-other of proximity, and is like the wisdom of love.³⁸

Marx showed that all capital is accumulated value. Lévinas wanted to show that everything "about truth,"³⁹ beginning with Heidegger and the institutions of all the historic systems, was in its ethical origin, an answer to the problem posed by the unjust pain of the victim. So now we have to take the final step. In a diachrony⁴⁰ of ethics we have to redefine philosophy itself. As Lévinas said:

Philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love ...and serves justice by thematizing the difference and reducing the thematized to difference ...philosophy justifies and criticizes the laws of being and of the city.⁴¹

I have said more than enough. The legacy of Lévinas will have much to tell us in the near future.

ENDNOTES

1. Pulsional conveys a relation characterized by a vital energy that impels and compels in an iterative way. In terms of alterity, it signifies a relation that throbs with a regular, alternating motion between one person and the other that obligates.

2. Gnoseological conveys a sense of secret knowledge, unavailable to the crowd or masses, that concerns itself with metaphysics and mystical knowledge. It is knowledge that requires special access. On the theme of the other prior to Lévinas, see Pedro Lain Entralgo, *Teoría y realidad del otro* (Madrid: Revista del occidente, 1961); Michael Theunissen, *Der Andere* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965); English translation: *The Other* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). See also such recent work on Lévinas as Mark Taylor, *Alterity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Richard Cohen, *Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Lévinas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Lévinas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

3. Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981).

4. Emmanuel Lévinas, *Time and the Other*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 94.
5. In this sense, for Lévinas, the instincts of self-preservation and even those of pleasure make up the I in its egotism, as "Totality."
6. Hans Jonas, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung* (Nordlingen: G. Wagner, 1982); English version: *The Imperative of Responsibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
7. Spinoza's *connatus esse conservandi*. See also Emmanuel Lévinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Montpellier: Fata Morgano, 1972).
8. Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay On Exteriority* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 62.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
10. "The same" is the totality, the system, the Heideggerian "world."
11. *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 42-43.
12. Lévinas writes subtly refuting Nietzsche: "Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power. It issues in the State. ...Universality presents itself as impersonal. ...The 'egoism' of ontology is maintained even when denouncing Socratic philosophy" (*ibid.*, p. 46).
13. Emmanuel Lévinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 85.
14. Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. By Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 54-60.
15. Lévinas' doctoral thesis was *Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: Alcan, 1930).
16. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction To Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), p. 91.
17. In the articles "La trace de l'autre" in *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: Vrin, 1967), pp. 187-202; "Phenomenon and Enigma," in *Time and the Other*, pp. 61-73; and "Language and Proximity," in *Time and the Other*, pp. 109-39.
18. *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*; p.196.
19. Emmanuel Lévinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978).
20. "Language and Proximity," in *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, pp. 109-39.
21. "Sensibility constitutes the very egoism of the I" (*Totality and Infinity*, p. 59)
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-01.
23. *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, pp. 157, 159.
24. The theme of "ransom" or the "payment to prisoner of war" in other words "redemption" is dealt with at

- length by Rosenzweig in Book 11I of Part II of the *Star of Redemption* (1921, vol. 11, pp. 152ff.). A persecuted "hostage" "or .prisoner" can offer himself or herself to "redeem" a victim. In this case the "just innocent" one performs a "substitution" for the Other. This is the scenario Lévinas has in mind.
25. *Totality and Infinity*, p. 306.
 26. "La trace de l'autre" and "Phenomenon and Enigma," in *Time and the Other*, pp. 61-73.
 27. Rosenzweig, *Star of Redemption*, p. 152.
 28. For a comparison with Rosenzweig see Cohen, *Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Lévinas*.
 29. *Otherwise Than Being*, pp. 14--15.
 30. *Otherwise than Being*, pp. 4S--49.
 31. Cf. Spinoza's *connatus esse conservandi*.
 32. *Otherwise than Being*, pp. 9, 53, 56.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 148. 34. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-26, 147, 157ff.
 35. *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 16.S-71.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
 37. The "third party" is an observer, but is also Power: "The third party is other than the neighbor. ...It is important to recover all these forms beginning with proximity, in which being, totality, the State, politics, techniques, work are at every moment on the point of having their center of gravitation in themselves, and weighing on their own account" (*Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, pp. 157, 159).
 38. It will be observed that Lévinas is sufficiently bold to turn twenty-five centuries of philosophy on its head: philosophy should not be "love of learning" but rather "sophophilia"- wisdom of love." For the sake of love the entire order of carnality, sensibility, pain, responsibility for the victim's pain, and only from that starting point "construction," because there is no "re"-construction of the new.
 39. *Otherwise than Being*, pp. 162-65.
 40. *Totality and Infinity*, p. 46.
 41. "A philosophy of power, ontology is a philosophy of injustice" (*ibid.*, p. 46).