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## New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action [Vol 15, 1/2010]

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VOLUME 15

# *New Routes*

PUBLISHED BY THE LIFE & PEACE INSTITUTE

1/2010

A journal of  
peace research  
and action



## ... and peace on earth

**Grassroots  
peacebuilding in the  
Nuba Mountains**

**SOUTHERN SOUTH KIVU:  
A conflict-ridden corner  
of a vast country**

**COUNTING THE COST OF  
OUR DESCENT:  
Xenophobia in South  
Africa today**

**UNRWA 60 YEARS:  
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**CHANGE IN HUMAN  
SYSTEMS:  
From where to what?**

**THE GOTHENBURG PROCESS:  
Arms that kill – also  
when not in use**

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# NewRoutes

A journal of  
peace research  
and action

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## PEOPLE WHO DON'T GIVE UP

**A NEW YEAR AND A NEW DECADE** have begun, and many of us are filled with new intentions and inspirations, hopes and expectations. A look at the situation in the world is, however, not altogether encouraging. Protracted wars with no end in sight, natural or manmade disasters shattering people's already poor lives, the climate threat casting its dark shadow over the earth, and uncertain economic prospects add up to a rather gloomy picture – if one does not care to look for the gleams of light in the darkness. The ability of not giving up in spite of “everything” is probably humankind's greatest resource and the strongest incentive of hope.

This issue of *New Routes* contains a number of very readable articles that focus on ongoing, seemingly unsolvable conflicts, but also on people who do not give up, who gather the strength to go on contending for peace, non-violence and human dignity.

Five years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, the outcome of the upcoming referendum about the future of the country is very uncertain. Emiko Noma and Jennifer Freeman present a woman peacemaker, Zeinab Blandia, who, in her work among women, infuse hope in many people's lives.

The Gothenburg Process, where churches and faith based organisations express their concern about the increasing trade in arms, is entering its second decade. In this issue of *New Routes* you find an excerpt from a recently published book about this challenge, written by Peter Brune.

In their article, Margret Johannsen and Laura Ryseck depict how UNRWA has been working untiringly for 60 years among Palestinian refugees, in spite of criticism and limited resources, while waiting for an ostensibly distant political solution.

One of the most complicated, prolonged and devastating conflicts in the world is the one in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic Congo. An excerpt from a research report about the situation in southern South Kivu gives an idea of the many actors and issues at stake.

Don't miss the article about the xenophobia that has arisen in the aftermath of apartheid in South Africa, or the one providing a “lesson in change” in order to achieve peace.

A new year with new intentions – don't forget to renew your subscription to *New Routes*!

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*During the 22-year civil war in Sudan, the Nuba Mountains was split between different contending parties. This caused enormous suffering among the civilians, not least the women. One of them, Zeinab Blandia, during her displacement in Omdurman, founded the organization Ruya, with a vision of dialogue, understanding and restoration.*

## Grassroots peacebuilding in the Nuba Mountains

Emiko Noma and Jennifer Freeman

Analysts around the world are predicting doom for Sudan and the state of its peace process. The International Crisis Group bluntly asserts, "Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup. ... Unless the international community ... cooperate [sic] to support both CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] implementation and vital additional negotiations, return to North-South war and escalation of conflict in Darfur are likely."<sup>1</sup> The Africa-based Institute for Security Studies recently described the "simmering" situation of insecurity and impunity in Sudan, particularly in the oil-rich region of Abyei.<sup>2</sup> In advocating policy changes by the Obama administration, Enough Project Co-Founder John Prendergast insists it is "time to alter course in bold and specific ways in order to avert what could be the deadliest conflagration in Sudan's war-torn post-colonial history."<sup>3</sup>

While the outlook is admittedly stark, and as political leaders on all sides continue to maneuver for oil wealth, land and power, people like Zeinab Blandia from the Nuba Mountains have been building peace from the ground up – cultivating and rebuilding trust within and between communities bitterly divided during the civil war that ended with the CPA in 2005.

In Zeinab's home in particular – a region now encompassed in the state of Southern Kordofan – the 22-year war cut deep wounds into the people and societal and institutional structure. The Nuba people fought alongside the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) from 1985 until the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement was signed in 2002. But during the war, Greater Kordofan was split between government-controlled and SPLA-controlled areas, and the government in Khartoum

armed members of the Baggara tribe against the Nuba and SPLA.

The violence in the region affected women to extreme degrees. As UCLA<sup>4</sup> anthropologist Sondra Hale, a Sudanese expert, noted: "Nuba women were the focus of the government and of Arab militias in breaking down the family, deracinating through various means such as forced marriage outside the group, creating cultural confusion through forced relocation, and depleting the morale of the entire groups by sexually humiliating women."<sup>5</sup> The conflict in the Nuba Mountains displaced approximately one million people – including Zeinab herself in 1990.

"Changing the role of women from pawns in the war to ambassadors and makers of peace can be achieved through building their capacities and by organizing and uniting their voices to carry the message of peace to divided groups," says Zeinab. This is the impetus and drive behind the founding of her organization, Ruya, which means Vision. Though she was involved in women's empowerment and development projects in the Nuba Mountains as a young woman, Zeinab's peacebuilding work truly began in the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and sprawling city of Omdurman, on the opposite side of the Nile from the capital, Khartoum. There, the displaced from opposing sides of the conflict often became next-door neighbors, and Zeinab initiated dialogue between the varying groups.

### Help in IDP camps

After earning a master's degree in Gender and Development from Ahfad University in Khartoum and working for the Sudan Agency for Relief, Rehabilita-

### Women PeaceMakers tell their stories

The Women PeaceMakers Program at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice (IPJ) at the University of San Diego in California every year invites four women from conflict-affected countries around the world who have been involved in human rights and peacemaking efforts to participate in an eight weeks residency at the IPJ.

Women on the frontlines of efforts to end violence and secure a just peace seldom record their experiences, activities, and insights as generally there is no time, or, perhaps, no formal education that would help them record their stories. The Women PeaceMakers Program involves learning, teaching, and taking the time to narrate a personal unique story of peacemaking. There are programs in which the women share their experiences in their respective country and conflict setting with others. Through better understanding of an individual's experience, the program seeks to build greater cross-cultural understanding, and to document the challenges and successes of women who have been involved in peacemaking efforts.

In the fall 2009 Zeinab Blandia from the Sudanese organisation Ruya was one of four women peacemakers at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice taking part in their eight-week Women PeaceMakers residency.

tion and Development, Zeinab officially established Ruya in 2001 in order to aid and support displaced women living in Omdurman.

Sondra Hale, who has worked with Zeinab, noted after her visit to Ruya's office, "I was impressed that she was able to establish such a center, in the midst of a northern Sudanese city where there was so much hostility toward the Nuba internal refugees from the war, most of whom lived in IDP camps." To help the displaced, Ruya offered vocational training and job placement help, as well as self-help skills and trauma healing. Many women had been victims of various forms of violence, so Ruya of-

ferred them a place to gather, share their stories, and learn ways of coping and thriving.

The timing of the establishment of Ruya was auspicious, as the government and SPLA signed a landmark ceasefire agreement back in the Nuba Mountains the following year. Ruya opened an office in Kadugli, the capital city of Southern Kordofan, and Zeinab herself returned home from Omdurman after 12 years of displacement.

As Hale notes, “During the war, because of the scattering of people, the strategies of the government to turn one group against the other, and the general dangerous militarized state, many of the [traditional and indigenous] institutions had been destroyed or damaged and needed to be resuscitated in an atmosphere of trust.” Back in her home, Zeinab immersed herself in a rigorous study of the conditions of the women in Nuba, with the aim of building their capacity for trusting one another – and ultimately for peacebuilding.

The needs of women in the Nuba Mountains were different than the needs of Nuba women living in displaced camps, so after much study and consultation, Zeinab identified those common needs and the culturally and contextually appropriate methods for intervening to build that capacity. This led to the creation of Women Solidarity Fund Groups (WSFGs) to organize and develop the economic skills of women.

### **Solidarity groups**

To form the groups, Zeinab and her colleagues at Ruya first identified influential women in a community. They trained the women as WSFG leaders, teaching them the principles of the framework so that they could form their own groups. The principles are the following:

- Each group must have 30-35 members.
- There are nine prescribed monthly themes. The group chooses the order in which to address each issue.
- The members of each group must sign a contract committing themselves to the group’s guidelines for at least nine months.
- Weekly meetings are always hosted in one of the members’ homes, with each meeting ending with a draw to pick the next week’s host. Each week, members agree to bring a weekly contribution, such as a bar of soap, 250




PHOTO: PATRICIA ROGERS

*During her displacement in Omdurman, Sudan, Zeinab Blandia from the Nuba Mountains founded the organization Ruya (Vision) to encourage dialogue and understanding.*

Sudanese dinars, or half a pound of sugar. Five percent of the weekly total is carefully set aside for the groups’ savings; the rest is given to the host.

- The group elects and then trains women for the positions of secretary and treasurer.
- All members are bound to the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability and participation.

The framework is universal; the same principles and guidelines apply equally to all of Ruya’s Women Solidarity Fund Groups, which over the course of nearly a decade have grown to include 4,000 women in the states of Southern Kordofan and Bahr El Ghazal.

Zeinab describes a typical group meeting: “The topics that are brought into group discussions originate from daily lives and challenges, to stimulate intuition and learning from context. The groups use traditional coffee drinking women gatherings to debate and resolve ordinary and daily problems, to reflect on, recognize and appreciate their personal worth and value in the

community, as well as on ways to apply their learned skills and knowledge for intercommunity peace work and to the wider conflict. More importantly, however, these groups allow women a representative and united voice on community concerns.”

### **Painful memories and animated chatter**

One of the more recent projects of Ruya is known as “Women Bridging”. An excerpt from Zeinab’s biography, to be published in early 2010 by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice – where Zeinab was one of four Women PeaceMakers in 2009 – describes the project in detail:

Women’s Solidarity Fund Groups had sprouted throughout the mountains of Zeinab’s conflict fractured state. Watching the women banding together around her, Zeinab began to dream of these women crossing the deeply etched divisions between SPLM and government-controlled areas to know one another. Each village had suffered. Each community had been torn by the

political power brokers. Each family had been afflicted by the pain of two decades of conflict. There could not be lasting peace if they ignored the ache of these old wounds. What would it take for her people to heal?

The villages for the pilot exchange trip had been chosen carefully. Leaders from the WSFGs of Keiga and Kulba would meet in Kulba, before traveling south to Abu Hashim. There, they would be hosted for a day and a half with the WSFG of Abu Hashim before picking up its leaders and returning to Kulba. The sequence would be repeated in Kulba, then Keiga. Finally, they would all return to Kadugli for a two-day workshop to evaluate the exchange. ...

Over the fragrant dishes prepared by the women of Abu Hashim, the group and their guests began to relax. As their mouths savored the culinary traditions of this remote village, their tongues began to share the stories of their regions. The visitors learned the history of multiple displacements the women of Abu Hashim had suffered. They shared the bitter memory of their village being destroyed by government attacks on SPLM rebels and how, in the smoke-choked debris, they had fled, running north as far as Gadarif State. Day and night their feet plodded on,

“**People like Zeinab Blandia from the Nuba Mountains have been building peace from the ground up.**

farther and farther away from home – far enough to escape the fighting. The women across from them winced at the familiar stories of how, while they felt forced to flee, their children chose to stay, joining the SPLM. Meanwhile, their neighbors’ children joined the government’s fighters. Villages of families and friends had been transformed into enemies. When the government seized their village, pressuring them to return, they were directed to live beyond its parameters. Making a camp to ‘protect’ them in the valley, the government soldiers surrounded the crowded huts, while the villagers looked longingly at their destroyed homes on the mountainside. It had taken seven long years for the ceasefire and peace agreement to finally allow them to move 200 meters up their hillside.

As the meal drew to an end, some of the women from Abu Hashim were huddled in a private conversation. Then one of them spoke up. ‘Zeinab, some of us have decided our sisters from Keiga and Kulba cannot sleep at the Sheik’s compound this evening, when we have our homes here for them. We would like to host them tonight.’ The leaders from Keiga and Kulba looked to Zeinab. The women from Abu Hashim were already jostling to the sides of their guests. One had her hand on the women from Kulba. Another grabbed one of the women from Keiga’s shoulders, ‘Please, come with me!’ Jovially, two women came to grab Zeinab. Laughing, Zeinab surrendered. ‘We are in the hands of the women of Abu Hashim! If this is their decision, we must follow. We are their guests and how they host us is up to them!’ In fits of laughter, the guests were taken from their carefully prepared beds in the chief’s compound, back to the women’s huts.

Throughout the night discussions continued under the thatched roofs of Abu Hashim’s tuculs.<sup>6</sup> As the morning sun crested the mountain’s undulous horizon, the women gathered for breakfast. Zeinab looked around her at the weary women, animated chatter revealing the new friendships bonding them.

After breakfast, the visitors were led to the old school grounds. Amidst the rubble of the bombed buildings, basic rakubas had been assembled. Outside, children took lessons under the shade of the neem trees, wait-

ing for the day when a new school would be constructed. As the women entered the largest rakuba, they were greeted by a gathering of villagers in addition to the women in the WSFG. The whole village wanted to know the issues these women would be discussing.


The meeting was one of the most crucial parts of Zeinab’s plan. Together they listened to the host group share their experiences of the conflict. When

“**The displaced from opposing sides of the conflict often became next-door neighbors.**

it was time for the guests to respond, the community was able to learn how similar the experiences of other villages had been throughout the region. How the violence had affected villages they had only heard of with painful similarity. How the lines between SPLM-controlled areas and government areas were blurred, dividing Nuba communities on both sides in the same way Abu Hashim had been divided. Feelings of animosity and apprehension faded as the villagers heard their own words elicited from the mouths of strangers.

The meeting ran through the allotted time, into the late afternoon without anyone glancing at a clock. The lunch was long ready when the songs and dances of welcome finally concluded and the visitors were fed like family.


Finally, Zeinab reminded the women that they still had a long journey ahead of them that day. When the leaders from Abu Hashim returned from fetching their bags, they brought with them a parade of well-wishers. The entire community radiated pride that they had a



*Women meeting, bridging, sharing food, laughter, tears and fears – building trust and understanding.*

delegation travelling to Kadugli. For the people of Abu Hashim, the capital of the province was held in the same reverence as Khartoum. ...


[Back in Kadugli], together, the leaders discussed how to organize women around the issues that they heard dur-

 **Feelings of animosity and apprehension faded as the villagers heard their own words from the mouths of strangers.**

ing the exchange. They were convinced that the CPA was the political actors' commitment to peace, but that it was their responsibility to create the trust building that would foment real peace in their communities. They planned for ongoing communication, programs and exchanges between the three villages. They would go back to their groups and discuss the issues and see how their groups could support the women from their sister groups.

The most fervent recommendation of the groups, however, was that an annual exchange visit must continue! Throughout the year, Zeinab worked to garner support for the exchange, pushing the sites she wished to visit farther beyond the ceasefire lines. ... The following year it was 60 women. The trip expanded to 18 villages.<sup>7</sup>

The International Crisis Group, apart from their dire predictions for Sudan,

also noted in an October 2008 report on Southern Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains region, "The fate of peacebuilding in this front-line state will say much about the viability of Sudan's entire peace process."<sup>8</sup> Thankfully for the people in the Nuba Mountains – and in all of Sudan – they have women like Zeinab Blandia and her Women's Solidarity Fund Groups to push forward the people's version of peacebuilding in this front-line state. 

1 International Crisis Group. "Sudan: Preventing Implosion." 17 December 2009. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6438&l=1>.

2 Muna A. Abdalla. "Dying to Survive: Understanding Some of the Underlying Factors of Conflict in Abyei." Institute for Security Studies. 24 November 2009. [http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link\\_id=5&slink\\_id=9081&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=12&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=5&slink_id=9081&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3).

3 John Prendergast. "Stealing an Election in Slow Motion." 21 December 2009. <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/stealing-election-consequences>.

4 University of California, Los Angeles

5 Sondra Hale is co-editor of the book *Sudan's Killing Fields: Genocidal Violence in East Africa*, to be released by University of Michigan Press in June 2010.

6 A tucul is a round mud hut with a thatched dome roof.

7 From the publication "A View through the Mountains: The Peacebuilding Work of Zeinab Mohamed Blandia in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan," by Jennifer Freeman. Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice. University of San Diego. Available in early 2010 at [http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ijp/programs/women\\_peace\\_makers/publications/narratives/](http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ijp/programs/women_peace_makers/publications/narratives/).

8 International Crisis Group. "Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?" 21 October 2008. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5738&l=1>.



UN PHOTO/ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN

*Dialogue is not only about talking. Doing things together is a great way to create a spirit of community and understanding. Sudanese women prepare food for a large-scale party to receive an honoured guest.*

*The conflicts which are tearing apart the southern part of South Kivu not only pit somewhere between four and over a dozen armed groups against each other (not counting the various battalions of the national army, whether integrated or not) and involve more than five communities. They also tend to set 'native' communities against 'foreign' ones when it comes to control over land and power.*

Southern South Kivu:

## A conflict-ridden corner of a vast country

In January 2008 a big peace conference was held in Goma, the capital of the Province of North Kivu. Towards the end of this meeting, all major 'war lords' of North and South Kivu committed themselves to end the armed activities. As an outcome of the peace agreement, the so-called Amani programme was born to implement the agreements of the conference. However, the Amani programme became seriously threatened when fighting between the Congolese army (FARDC) and National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) resumed in August 2008.

Beyond the Amani programme, which focuses mainly on the disarmament of different militias, the underlying problems that make up the fundamental causes for the conflicts of southern South Kivu remain largely untackled. Deep seated disagreements continue to create opposition between the 'native' communities (mainly Bembe, Vira, Fuliiru, Nyindu, Bazoba, Babwari and Babuyu) and the 'foreign' ones (Banyamulenge and Burundi). They involve challenges related to the possession of land, issues of politics and identity, historical and contemporary aspects, and the interplay of local, national and sub-regional dynamics.

Today this opposition manifests itself through tensions surrounding three issues: the Minembwe territory (see below), the chieftaincy of the Burundi on the Ruzizi plain, and managing the seasonal migrations of livestock. Since identity-based exclusion remains a particularly pregnant issue between the different communities, the long-standing habit of turning to arms as a strategy for settling differences has ended up cre-

ating a real mafia-like alternative style of local governance, founded on armed violence.

### Fundamental causes still relevant today

The attempts to integrate 'foreign' populations into a 'native' social structure constitute the very foundations of the inter-community conflicts that continue to tear this region apart even today. Over time, the 'native' populations challenged the creation of the Burundi chieftaincy, while the peoples of Rwandan origin started demanding emancipation from the traditional 'native' powers. The Minembwe territory was created in order to guarantee the Banyamulenge both the appointment of their own traditional chiefs and greater possibilities for representation in provincial and national institutions.

The enduring and passionate outbursts that surround the establishment of Minembwe as a territory are clearly the best illustration of how the current state of affairs is connected to old problems originating from colonisation. The existence of this territory continues to encounter fierce opposition from the 'native' communities, where most of the prominent members have no hesitation in stating that they would be prepared to fight to protect their current interests in terms of land and customary power within Minembwe.

The issue of the Burundi chieftaincy on the Ruzizi is similar to that involving the Minembwe territory, with the difference that, in this case, it is the customary power of the Burundi that is challenged by the 'native' communities, and especially by the Bavira and Bafuliiru. The latter challenge the Burundi's

The two provinces South Kivu and North Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been the centre of the conflict resulting from the Second Congo War 1998-2003. The Kivu conflict is an armed conflict between the military of the DRC (FARDC) and several rebel groups. Until March 2009, the main combatant group opposing the FARDC was the rebel group National Congress for the Defence of the People.

This article is an excerpt from a research report produced by Life & Peace Institute-DRC's local partners Adepae, Arche d'Alliance and RIO, with the financial and technical support of the Life & Peace Institute. The full length report is available in French (original language) and Swahili on [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

right to exercise customary power over Vira and Fuliiru "ancestral" lands. For the Burundi, just like for the Banyamulenge at Minembwe, the most important matter is the recognition of their rights to freely manage the land they have occupied for decades. These two issues, which involve power, land use and identity, have led to the development of strong racist and xenophobic prejudices between the different communities in southern South Kivu.

Another aspect of the land problem pitting the southern South Kivu communities against each other is the distinction between livestock herders (Banyamulenge) and farmers (other communities) and the problems that arise in relation to the seasonal migration of livestock. At the start of the dry season, the Banyamulenge herders traditionally bring down hundreds of cattle from the highlands of Minembwe towards the lowlands occupied by Bembe and Fuliiru farmers, who often complain about the damage caused to their fields by the herds.

As this is a particularly important financial issue at the local level, Mai-Mai groups take advantage of the situation by levying illegal taxes on the passage of Banyamulenge livestock through Fuliiru- and Bembe-controlled land, or even by stealing cattle. In order to protect their herds from this form of banditry at times of migration, young herders have

## The Democratic Republic of Congo and its provinces



*South Kivu is a small province in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country bordering on eight countries. It is slightly greater than the combined areas of Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.*

started carrying arms and have formed a new grouping called Twigwanire, which is active since July 2008. This type of dynamic further increases tensions between communities, and encourages an attitude of self-defence. However, if properly managed and started only when the farmers have completed their harvests towards the end of the rainy season, these livestock migrations can provide excellent fertiliser for the lands, while also enabling the herders to take advantage of the rich pastures that the harvested fields can offer.

### Armed groups and mafia-like governance

The existence of armed militias living in the bush of southern South Kivu since the 1960s has led to a rebel culture in the society. This rebel culture has been reinforced by the resurgence of armed groups since 1996, causing considerable resistance to the establishment of state authority in the region. The resurgence of Mai-Mai groups since the Alliance of Democratic Forces for

the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) entered the DRC has in fact enabled the reappearance of a few of the major armed leaders of the 1960s on the local scene. Ever since 1996, these leaders have been continually organising their communities, and especially the young, to resist the “aggressor”.

Mobilising their whole community in this fight, the Mai-Mai catalyses the development of a social dynamic based entirely on armed resistance and self-defence and involving all social strata of the community – political and traditional leaders as well as simple farmers; women and children as well as men. This Mai-Mai culture does not even spare the spiritual side of things, leading local preachers to depict themselves as the new prophets of a rather particular theology of armed resistance.

In a situation marked by dilapidated, predatory state structures with no concern for the well being of local

populations, Mai-Mai groups have had no difficulty establishing themselves as the new holders of local power and have, during this time, rapidly gained control of the bulk of southern South Kivu’s economic resources. Through tax revenues levied on mining areas (gold, coltan and tin), on markets, on the road network and on the cattle migrations, the armed groups divided up the occupation of, and control over, local wealth

“ ***They would be prepared to fight to protect their current interests in terms of land and customary power*** ”

like true mafia organisations. Even though they justified their “parasitism” of resources with the war effort and the need for financial means in order to be able to keep their populations safe, the control over local riches was very often the motivation for fatal confrontations

either between the local armed groups themselves, or between the Congolese Armed Groups and the FARDC or the FDLR.

In addition, relations between all these armed parties shifted between collaboration and competition and regularly ended in overt clashes, depending on how interests were evolving at the given time. The fragile equilibrium which has been established between the

the command structures of the joint military operations, called Kimya 2, in South Kivu strengthened both the Mai-Mai groups' and the populations' opposition towards these operations. On the streets and on local radio, most South-Kivutians agreed that their President had sold their land to the Rwandans.

Other Mai-Mai groups have preferred to ally themselves with the FDLR and terrorise the rural populations through attacks and pillaging carried out in retaliation for the supposed support expressed by villagers for Kimya 2. On the humanitarian level, the outcome of Kimya 2 in southern South Kivu, as well as in the rest of the province, appears to be catastrophic, as populations are regularly targeted

by FDLR and Kimya 2 forces at the same time. In view of these contrasting developments, Kimya 2 runs a great risk of producing a new dynamic of fragmentation and reconstruction of alliances between armed groups in southern South Kivu. This is only the latest tragic episode in an endless number of sinister security nightmares that never seem to end.

#### Important sub-regional factors

Although the conflicts of southern South Kivu are primarily determined by local

issues and dynamics, the sub-regional dimension remains particularly important. The arrival of Rwandan Hutu refugees in 1994, the entry of the AFDL in 1996 and the Rally for Congolese Democracy war of 1998-2003, as well as the crossing of the Group of 47 in 2005<sup>3</sup>, are just a few of several key events that illustrate the importance of the sub-regional dimension and the strong connections between conflicts in southern South Kivu and the problems that exist in other countries within this sub-region. The absence of adequate border management and the failure to handle migratory fluxes allow room for the development of illegal trafficking, the existence of which the authorities is well aware, but which nonetheless continues to feed the conflicts in the Fizi and Uvira territories.

The presence of 53,000 Congolese refugees in Rwanda, 27,000 in Burundi and another 69,000 in Tanzania (UN statistics) constitutes a permanent destabilising factor in the sub-region generally, and in the Kivus particularly. Several thousands of these refugees originate directly from Fizi and Uvira, live in camps relatively near the borders of these two territories, maintain strong ties with their area of origin and keep themselves informed of all security- or other developments connected to the conflicts in southern South Kivu. These

**In order to protect their herds from this form of banditry at times of migration, young herders have started carrying arms.**

various armed parties is not only subject to economic interests, but also to political ones. With the aim of strengthening their position in current negotiations (under the Amani programme), some armed groups sought to gain visibility by extending their area of control to certain important centres or by staging real demonstrations of power by attacking the city of Uvira.

Each change in the existing power relations unavoidably provokes a response from the groups whose interests are challenged and, in a context where all parties are armed, new and often bloody confrontations ensue. Despite this competition, the groups do cooperate in some areas, for example arms trafficking.

#### Uncertain security developments

The surprising turn of events in early 2009 was not without consequence for the southern South Kivu context. The cessation of hostilities between the CNDP and the FARDC in North Kivu, the "accelerated" integration of parts of the CNDP and the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (a largely Hutu Mai-Mai group opposed to the CNDP), and finally the entry of Rwandan troops into North Kivu in order to initiate a joint FARDC/Rwanda Defence Forces hunt for the Rwandan Hutu rebels from the FDLR<sup>2</sup>, unleashed strong reactions from Mai-Mai leaders of southern South Kivu. They ardently denounced the entry of Rwandan troops into Congolese territory as a new war of aggression.

Later on, the prominent role played by former members of the CNDP in



MONUC, the UN force in DRC, has been present in the country for about ten years, striving to keep a peace that has never really been established. A Pakistani UN soldier on an armoured vehicle in Uvira, South Kivu.



*Lake Tanganyika and the Mitumba Mountains seen from South Kivu. The shore of the lake, which borders Burundi and Tanzania, is covered with barbed wire, a tragic sign of the conflictual situation.*

refugees often play a role in the conflicts of southern South Kivu, by assisting certain cross-border trafficking or by constituting a base for recruitment for armed groups.

The management of the Burundi and Tanzanian borders to Fizi and Uvi-

ties, who may even collaborate due to shared interests.

While there are over a dozen illegal border crossing points along the border stretches by the Ruzizi river and Lake Tanganyika in the Uvira and Fizi territories, the official crossing points are also subject to serious mismanagement on the part of the different customs services. This mismanagement goes beyond mere corruption: a wide-reaching network for the production and sale of false papers that serve as passports has been put into place by members of the customs service and extends right into the ministries.

Minerals, vehicles, stolen cows, hemp, arms and military uniforms are some of the goods that can easily cross borders either without the knowledge of customs services, or with their complicity, as the latter themselves play a part in the deregulation of the border control system. In addition, there can be collab-

oration between Congolese and foreign (FDLR and the Hutu rebel National Liberation Forces) armed groups, or even between Congolese and Burundi military, with the aim to organise this kind of trafficking on both sides of the border.

### **Challenges to and opportunities for peace**

Although the attempts to re-establish peace by the authorities, civil society and the churches have been particularly numerous over these last few years, the vast majority of them have turned out to be superficial and incomplete. Additionally, talks between community leaders or armed groups, have resulted in big promises, but have never been followed by concrete and sustainable efforts on the ground, notably due to a lack of appropriate follow-up mechanisms. In certain cases meetings have done more harm than good by further strengthening opposition and radical points of view.

“**Mai-Mai groups had no difficulty establishing themselves as the new holders of local power.**”

ra territories by the Congolese customs service constitutes another sub-regional and problematic dimension that influences the conflicts of southern South Kivu. The dysfunctionality of these services, as well as the absence of real border control, facilitates a wide range of illegal cross-border trafficking that directly involves armed groups, traders, customs officials and the authori-

Attempts to restore peace in southern South Kivu also come up against what the actors themselves have identified as




## **The official crossing points are subject to serious mismanagement on the part of the different customs services.**

serious difficulties, that is, the power of identity-based rejection, the lack of information within local populations, and the problem of restoring the state. Identity issues are in fact deeply seated among the actors in the conflicts of southern South Kivu, as witnessed by the ethnocentric rhetoric which prevailed in the pre-elective period in 2006 and which is sure to re-emerge at the next local elections. A partial solution to this problem proposed by local actors would consist

in putting in place a permanent framework for inter-community dialogue which would assemble the traditional chiefs and leaders of each community with the aim of defining, through a strictly inter-community perspective, paths to solutions for everyday problems encountered by all ethnicities.

Finally, the reestablishment of a public authority attentive to the well-being and safety of the population constitutes a significant structural challenge. Beyond this reestablishment, restoring a relationship of trust between citizens of southern South Kivu and the public authorities is also at the centre of this problem. Unless local actors are willing to renounce the alternative and mafia-like system of local governance, founded on ethnic belonging and the recourse to armed violence, there will be no effective and lasting reestablishment of state authority in this area.

The disarming of civilian populations should thus constitute a strategic priority with regard to this issue. 

*Translated to English by Nadia Alves*

1 Southern South Kivu (translator's note: commonly referred to as the "sud sud" in French but generally translated as southern South Kivu throughout this report) refers to the Fizi and Uvira territories.

2 At the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, contact between Congolese and Rwandan diplomats led to an agreement between the two Presidents regarding the need to neutralise Laurent Nkunda and his rebel movement, the CNDP, and to initiate joint military operations against the Rwandan FDLR rebels hostile to the Paul Kagame government. This joint operation, named Umoja Wetu and limited to North Kivu, lasted from the 23<sup>rd</sup> January to the 25<sup>th</sup> February and was extended by the Kimya 2 operations, this time carried out only by FARDC with the logistical support of MONUC.

3 In 2005, a group of 47 military Banyamulenge, who had either directly or indirectly played a part in the taking of Bukavu in June 2004 and had sought refuge in Rwanda since then, tried to cross the Burundian border with the aim of positioning themselves on the high plateaus of Minembwe.

## **Conflits locaux et connexions sous-régionales L'exemple de Fizi et Uvira (Sud-Kivu, RDC)**

Depuis novembre 2007, l'Institut Vie et Paix analyse – en collaboration avec ses partenaires locaux Adepae, Arche d'Alliance et RIO – les causes majeures des conflits qui opposent les communautés Babembe, Bavira, Bafuliiru et Banyamulenge dans les territoires de Fizi et d'Uvira au Sud Kivu, à l'est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). L'objectif de cette étude est d'amener les différentes communautés à partager une compréhension commune des enjeux à la source de la dynamique des conflits et d'identifier des actions appropriées de transformation non violente.

Les causes des conflits dans cette partie du pays sont structurelles et mettent en opposition les groupes ethniques, les groupes armés congolais et étrangers, certains chefs coutumiers, responsables des associations et des églises, élites politiques et militaires qui agissent de près ou de loin pour contrôler les droits de pacage, les sites miniers, les entités administratives et les taxes sur les marchés. Les massacres, la résurgence des sectes prophétiques, la présence des groupes armés congolais et étrangers sont autant de facteurs conjoncturels

qui entrent en jeu et amplifient les tensions sociales.

Une dizaine de groupes armés paralyse l'administration locale et se livre à des exactions à l'encontre des civils. Ces groupes développent aussi un réseau de trafic illicite d'armes à partir des pays voisins, à savoir le Burundi, le Rwanda et la Tanzanie. Les connexions à la fois locales et sous-régionales s'expliquent par la faiblesse de l'Etat congolais et la porosité des frontières. Par le biais de ce réseau, les armes ont été vendues aux milices ou aux civils pour désorganiser l'Etat, continuer le pillage des ressources naturelles et armer les ethnies les unes contre les autres.

L'étude examine ces rapports de conflictualité dans le passé et le présent, mettant un accent particulier sur le phénomène de militarisation des ethnies qui a pris de l'ampleur avec les récentes guerres en RDC. En plus, l'étude examine les différentes stratégies qui ont été appliquées par divers acteurs privés ou publics pour modifier le contexte de confrontation entre ethnies. Des efforts ont été menés mais la cohabitation pacifique entre communautés

demeure fragile et préoccupante. Pour contribuer à l'établissement d'une paix durable, l'Institut Vie et Paix a accompagné ses partenaires pour cerner les contours de la conflictualité et remonter à ses racines.

Sur demande des communautés, il est prévu en mars 2010 un dialogue intercommunautaire auquel participeront – en plus des représentants des communautés concernés mêmes – des personnalités influentes de la province du Sud Kivu et de la communauté internationale. L'objectif de cette rencontre est d'assister les communautés dans leur effort à trouver un terrain d'entente sur les actions appropriées autour des enjeux majeurs suivants : les conflits fonciers et administratifs, l'appui des communautés aux milices et le rôle des pouvoirs publics dans le rétablissement de la paix. Enfin, à l'issue de la rencontre, un cadre permanent de concertation devrait être défini pour suivre les recommandations faites lors de l'atelier.

*Sixteen years after the formal dissolution of the apartheid system in South Africa the country is shattered by xenophobia and, as a consequence, has developed an aggressive nationalism. Instead of directing their frustration at foreigners, communities need to organise themselves and, thus strengthened, present their unified claims to the government.*

Counting the cost of our descent:

## Xenophobia in South Africa today

*Athalie Crawford*

In May 2008, 62 people, including 21 South Africans, were killed, at least 670 were wounded, and over 100,000 people were displaced, their homes and businesses looted, destroyed or seized by local residents in a horrific series of

Currently, some 270 refugees have refused to leave the temporary camp at Blue Waters in the Western Cape and there is a legal effort ongoing by the city authorities to have them evicted. In Worcester in the Western Cape, a group of refugees are currently attempting to sue the Minister of Safety and Security for the failure of the police to protect them in 2008.

So, almost two years later, can we cautiously say that the xenophobia is over? Have we done the necessary work to prevent it happening again?

The short answer is no. Though there has not been a wave of violence comparable to the one in 2008, foreigners, in particular small shop owners, continue to be threatened, beaten and murdered. Last month, four foreigners were killed in the Western Cape, two of them burned alive in their shop.

### Anti-eviction campaign

In May last year a letter purporting to be from an entity called the Guguletu Business Forum was circulated to Somali shopkeepers in the Cape Town townships of Phillippi, Delft, Masiphumelele and Guguletu. It warned that these shops must be closed within a week, or their owners would face the consequences. Local businessmen complained that Somalis were buying up shops at ridiculously low prices as locals battled to keep afloat in the economic downturn, and that the Somalis seemed to be able to buy in bulk and thus undercut them. In the face of the continuing official denial of xenophobia – police continue to attribute threats and murders to criminal elements – activists

from the Guguletu Anti-Eviction Campaign took it upon themselves to try and mediate between the foreign shopkeepers and the local ones in order to stave off further violence.

At the time of writing it seems that the Anti-Eviction Campaign has succeeded in brokering agreements between the local shopkeepers and the Somali shopkeepers which include the following restrictions on Somali businesses:

- No Somali shop should be within 100 metres of a local shop.
- No Somali shop could charge prices lower than the local shops.

It is clear that such agreements are not made without a considerable amount of duress on the weaker party, and that consumer interests do not come into it. Local consumers supported the Somali businesses precisely because their prices were not as high as those charged by local businesses. This is seen by the locals as the Somalis taking the bread out of their mouths. (At first blush, these kinds of agreements bear a striking resemblance to the “deals” done higher up the food chain, which are currently being investigated by the Competition Commission, that is, price-fixing ...)

It is now common cause that despite the solidarity extended to black South Africans by the nationals of neighbouring countries during the liberation struggle, South Africans, post-apartheid, have developed an aggressive and chauvinistic nationalism. A study by the Southern African Migration Project in 2004 noted that this could be partly attributed to the ANC's efforts to build a new and inclusive sense of nationhood in the aftermath of apartheid. An unanticipated by-product of this process

### “South Africa's new democracy plunged into a terrifyingly dark moment.”

xenophobic attacks against black foreigners throughout working class areas in South Africa. We all became accustomed to the sight of foreigners, stunned and terrified, huddling miserably on the pavements outside police stations, with all that they had managed to save from their old lives crammed into plastic bags. South Africa's new democracy plunged into a terrifyingly dark moment.

After some months of living in temporary camps and shelters, assisted by NGOs and churches, the government decided that the refugees must choose to be repatriated, or re-integrated into the areas they had been driven out of. Thousands opted for repatriation, rather than face returning to the communities that had driven them out. Thousands more who chose “re-integration” found that little had changed in the attitudes of the locals.

A study by the Consortium for Migrants and Refugees in South Africa in May 2009 found that foreigners remained under threat of violence and that little had been done to address the causes of the attacks. They found that there was insufficient investigation or prosecution of the instigators of public violence and that there had been no adequate public government inquiry.

was an increased intolerance towards outsiders which manifested as violent hostility towards foreigners.

Significantly, a 2009 study commissioned by the International Migration Organisation<sup>1</sup> (IMO) has found that local leaders were deeply implicated in the instigation of xenophobic attacks. Though it concedes that lack of service delivery and an influx of foreigners contributed to the tensions in townships, there was a clear pattern of involvement by leaders in whipping up resentment against foreigners. As they observe, community leadership is often a lucrative affair in communities with high unemployment, and leaders were able to build their own credibility with struggling community members by deflecting anger onto the foreigners.

### Backward-looking nationalism

Oupa Lehulere<sup>2</sup> of Khanya College points to the role of Cosatu<sup>3</sup> in strengthening the perception that foreigners have no role here. Although apparently calling for the end of capitalist exploitation of poor foreign workers, Cosatu, he says, is in fact calling on the employers to dismiss foreign workers, rather than

calling on its rank and file to organise them, as would be the progressive internationalist position one might expect Cosatu to adopt. Again a progressive political position seems to have been subverted and corrupted by a narrow and backward-looking nationalism. (As a young trade unionist during the apartheid years, I can remember a similar argument being advanced against organising contract workers from the rural areas, that is, that they undercut settled urban workers.) Lehulere emphasises that there can be no turning back of the tide of foreign migration to South Africa, as long as it remains the hub of economic activity in Southern Africa. Clearly, any realistic plan must accept and include foreign migrants.

Lehulere asserts that the xenophobic attitudes which have taken root in working class communities can be attributed to the lack of progressive political organisation in the townships since the ANC came to power in 1994. The core business of the ANC leadership in the townships now, he says, is to organise opportunities for self enrichment. The politics of the tender now rules supreme. (Indeed, in the city of Polok-

wane there is now a suburb known as “Tender City” where the beneficiaries of government business have built their mansions.) This chimes with the findings of the IMO above which places local councillors and members of the civic organisation squarely at the centre of instigations to violence against foreigners.

Why then has this leadership not been brought to book? I would suggest that we look to what has been termed “the culture of impunity” that currently permeates South African society: if you can get away with it, it’s ok.

I remember reading an article in the newspaper at the time of the first xenophobic attacks in 2008, which quoted a young man who had looted the shops of foreigners in the Cape Town township of Masiphumelele, as saying that he had nothing against the foreigners and that they should return. The fridge and other items he had stolen had been confiscated by the police and so he saw no further problem. It was all over. It was as if an opportunity to enrich himself had come along and he had grasped it eagerly, but it had proved short lived and he was philosophical about it. If the police had not intervened – Masiphume-



PHOTO: WERNER BEUKES/SAPA

A man packs away his belongings while security guards dismantle tents in the background during the closure of a shelter for refugees in Germiston. The attacks against black foreigners in 2008 forced over 100,000 people to leave their homes.

lele was one of the few townships in the Cape where they seem to have effectively and energetically intervened to recover stolen property – he would gladly have held onto his illicit gains. There was no sense that he felt he had crossed any fundamental line of ordinary decent social behaviour in what he had done.

Take another example, a great deal higher up: South African President Jacob Zuma has successfully pulled out all the stops to avoid being put on trial for corruption. Many now believe that the National Prosecuting Authority's

appalling and lamentable lack of leadership in our government then, and now. It has also made plain the limitations of dependence on central government both to lead, and to provide. The lesson from this, I believe, is that communities must stop gazing passively at the central government as the father which will provide, and instead go back to the pre-1994 idea of organising or starving.<sup>4</sup>

Communities need to organise to establish what the needs are and how these can best be fulfilled in a way that respects human dignity and protects our increasingly fragile eco-system.

That means organisers going from house to house, street meetings, informing everyone, listening to everyone and making

decisions about the most basic issues. Organising means being able to discuss with the community at all levels and come up with a plan: where the school must be, the crèches, the community hall, the churches, the park, as well as the houses – the time-consuming, difficult, unglamorous work of democracy that has to be undertaken by members of the community itself, to come up with a real plan based on real needs.

This is how the progressive non-racial trade unions organised before 1994. Every worker had his or her say before consensus was reached – and that organised and democratic voice was crucial to establishing the democracy in which the ANC came to power. Many worker leaders at that time were illiterate and did not speak English, but they understood that unity is strength and that a divided workforce was a weak workforce whose voice could be shouted down by the employers. They understood negotiation from a position of strength.

### **A lasting basis for peace and security**

Once the community discussions have progressed and coalesced enough to produce a real idea of what is good, possible and sustainable and includes all who live in it without discrimination on any grounds, the community will be empowered to summon the government to negotiate for the necessary funds, training (for example, crash courses in building methods by the largely useless SETAS<sup>5</sup>) and expertise needed to assist them to do it themselves.

This, rather than gather in an angry mob and *toyi-toyi*<sup>6</sup> outside an unresponsive government office, demanding the houses and facilities which the government continues to promise but is unable to deliver. This, rather than wait for another twenty years for a tiny badly built house to be delivered by government's chosen BEE<sup>7</sup> construction partners. Lest the above analysis appear too extreme, let us remember that the current housing backlog in Cape Town is around 400,000, and as people inevitably migrate from impoverished rural areas to the city, this figure is unlikely to decrease.

If the great numbers of unemployed people can be organised into building their own communities, they will be invested in their communities. That is the lasting basis for peace and security: that everyone is invested in the integrity of the community. That community will not allow gangsters to invade schools they have built and destroy the future of their children. That community will not allow xenophobic violence to destroy what they have so painstakingly built.

For the government, it means learning to live with empowered communities rather than the howling and dangerous, but dependant, dispossessed. It means a certain loss of control, which the government will certainly resist, but nobody who saw the 2008 photos of police standing by while foreigners' houses were looted and burnt can possibly sustain the illusion that government was in any kind of control. 📌

## **“South Africans, post-apartheid, have developed an aggressive and chauvinistic nationalism.”**

highly controversial decision to preempt the court's prerogative of finding him innocent or guilty, by dropping charges against him, means that he never had any case to answer in the first place. This, despite the court's finding that he had had “a generally corrupt relationship” with convicted fraudster Schabir Shaik in the trial of the latter.

Mr Shaik, meanwhile, who was subsequently released from his fifteen year jail sentence on the grounds of imminent death from hypertension, is now frequently photographed playing golf and enjoying an active social life. Recently he has applied for a presidential pardon, which most commentators feel he is likely to receive. The words of the popular song perhaps describe it best: Nice work if you can get it.

### **The necessity to organise**

Given all of the above, how are we to address the painful and ongoing problem of suspicion, hostility and violence between foreigners and locals? At the Quaker Peace Centre, we believe that a lasting reconciliation between foreigners and locals must take place in the context of transformation, and that transformation must refer to the Bill of Rights which sets out the rights and responsibilities of every person living in the country, whether South African or not.

The culture of impunity and the culture of dependence are intimately linked, perhaps even two sides of the same coin. Our descent into xenophobic darkness exposed to plain view not only the culture of impunity, but equally the

1 Towards Tolerance, Law, and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign Nationals by HSRC 2009

2 “The xenophobia outbreak in South Africa: Strategic questions facing the new social movements”, paper by Oupa Lehulere 2008.

3 Congress of South African Trade Unions

4 “Organise or Starve – the History of the South African Congress of Trade Unions” by Ken Luckhardt and Brenda Wall, 1980. Publisher: Lawrence & Wishart

5 SETAS: Skills, Education and Training Authorities. (I am indebted to Martin Legassick for his suggestion of using the relevant SETAS to provide crash courses for the unemployed in building methods, being interviewed by Keketso Sechane on Heart 104.9 on 19.2.08.)

6 *Toyi-toyi*: a militant high-stepping dance originally associated with protests against apartheid.

7 Black Economic Empowerment

*In December last year the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, passed its 60th anniversary. Well-known for its humanitarian relief, the organisation has also been criticised for perpetuating the refugee problem as well as collaborating with terrorist organisations. In a refugee situation that still awaits a political solution, the agency sees itself as a provider of deeply needed crisis management services, not least since the Gaza war in the winter 2008-09*

## UNRWA 60 years: Humanitarian crisis management in an unsolved conflict

Laura Ryseck and Margret Johannsen

As a consequence of the violent conflicts triggered by the unsettled Palestine question since 1948, more than two thirds of the nine to ten million Palestinians living today are refugees, many of whom have been displaced more than once. The Palestinians constitute the oldest community of refugees worldwide as well as the largest group of stateless people. One third of the 4.6 million people registered with UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) as of 30 June 2008 live in one of the 58 refugee camps supervised by the agency,<sup>1</sup> which runs schools and health centres as well as distribution centres for food and other items of basic need for the refugees. The UN's mission, however, has not been without controversy.

The Gaza Strip has always been the most challenging of UNRWA's five areas of operation (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria), as approximately over three quarters of the population are refugees registered with the organisation. Further aggravating the humanitarian situation was the Israeli siege of the territory since Hamas seized power in the Strip in June 2007, and the Gaza War of late 2008/early 2009. The blockade not only placed strict curbs on imports of non-humanitarian but yet vital goods, but also limited the import of commodities for humanitarian assistance.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, the extraordinary problems that UNRWA has to cope with in the wake of the recent war<sup>3</sup> may for a while eclipse the challenges in other areas of operation. Still, the overall situation in the densely populated territory ought to

be put in context and seen in the light of developments that reach far back to the root of the refugee problem.

### Creation, mandate and funding

In the context of the military campaigns following the UN partition plan, the UN tried early on to provide for solutions to the resulting refugee question, with UN resolution 194 (III)<sup>4</sup> becoming one of the most quoted documents concerning the Palestine conflict. Of special relevance to the refugees was paragraph 11, which concedes to the refugees the general right to choose between return, naturalisation in the host country, or resettlement in a third country. Moreover, they were entitled to lay claim to the return of property or to respective compensation for incurred losses from the state hav-

ing caused the situation of the refugees.<sup>5</sup> The constantly raised claim of the refugees, as well as of the Arab governments, that Israel should let the refugees return has, however, always been rejected by all Israeli governments.<sup>6</sup> The reason is that Israel did not – and up until today does not – consider itself responsible for the fate of the refugees. According to Israel, they were rather victims of a war of aggression by the Arab states. Although this interpretation of the events of 1948 has been strongly contested by a number of Israeli scholars<sup>7</sup>, it serves Israel to reject all sorts of claims by the refugees who fled or were expelled, and it preserves its constitutionally defined identity as a Jewish state, which it fears would be endangered by a large number of returning refugees.



PHOTO: UNRWA

*In November 1947, the UN General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. 750,000 Palestinians fled the land that was to become Israel in May 1948, which led to a humanitarian disaster of immense proportions.*

On the other hand, the neighbouring Arab states which host the refugees reject their naturalisation and legitimise the refusal by referring to the “Right of Return” according to Resolution 194.<sup>8</sup> However, as a General Assembly resolution, it is non-binding under international law. Still, its continuous renewal gives resolution 194 the status of an internationally accepted directive for the settlement of the refugee problem.

To ease the humanitarian emergency situation of the refugees, the United Nations set up a fund for emergency assistance in November 1948. When it became clear that no quick solution to the refugee question would be implemented, UNRWA was officially created on 8 December 1949 to take care of the humanitarian needs of the refugees.<sup>9</sup> It is an institution formally subordinate to the General Assembly and serves to arrange support and work programmes for the Palestinian refugees. Only five per cent of its budget comes from United Nations funds, the remainder coming primarily from the US and the European Commission.

### Increasing number of refugees

In order to receive UNRWA assistance, the refugees have to register with the agency. As not every refugee automatically qualifies for assistance, UNRWA formulated a working definition of the term “Palestine refugee”, which has been specified over the course of the years.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the aspect of being in need of help is a basic condition for eligibility for assistance. Due to the inclusion of descendants since the mid-1960s<sup>11</sup>, and as a result of high birth rates, the number of refugees registered with UNRWA has continuously increased from 914,000 in the year 1950 to around 4.6 million today<sup>12</sup>.

UNRWA is a pure relief organisation. It is neither authorised to address political tasks such as coming up with or implementing a permanent solution with regard to the refugees, nor does it fulfil any international protective function concerning the refugees. This is of importance as the very existence of UNRWA excludes those refugees registered with it from protection under the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-

gees (UNHCR). Hence, the protection of the refugees in the operational area of UNRWA is mainly the responsibility of the host countries, which are dealing with this responsibility in diverse ways.

### Context and challenges

Due to the highly politicised environment, UNRWA is forced to engage in a “diplomacy of aid”<sup>13</sup>, being liable to the recipients of its assistance as well as dependent on host countries and the international donor community. Thus, in practice, the agency often found itself exposed to attempts by governments to manipulate or exploit it and had to fight for its independence, despite its international immunity, and a number of bilateral agreements with the governments of the host countries. Its work has often been obstructed, the staff harassed, and the claim for immunity of the locally recruited staff has continuously led to disputes.<sup>14</sup>

After the Six-Day War in June 1967, the responsibility of UNRWA was extended by the General Assembly to include also those newly displaced by the war. Additional relief efforts and



Two girls walk past a graffiti-strewn wall in UNRWA's Aqaba Jaber camp for Palestinian refugees, in the West Bank, located just outside of Jericho.

specific programmes to monitor the current conflict situation in the occupied territories were introduced after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacres of Sabra and Shatila as well as during the first (1987-1993) and the second (from 2000) Intifada.

The deep economic crisis in the Palestinian territories, caused by the second Intifada and the Israeli military operations, made it impossible for UNRWA to perform its tasks by exclusively drawing on its regular budget, as, due to the increasing number of registered refugees, the agency was already acting within severe financial restrictions. Between October 2000 and December 2006, UNRWA was not able to carry out more than a third of its vital services to

of continually delaying a peaceful solution of the conflict.<sup>18</sup> He argues that the relatively good supply to the refugees in the camps has prevented any integration into the societies of the host countries as well as further emigration of the refugees. Instead of serving as a stepping stone, the refugee camps have developed into lifetime homes for the refugees, followed by generations of refugee children.

Furthermore, the concentration in the camps has contributed to generating a refugee nation and to perpetuating resentments and feelings of revenge of the generation of 1948. According to the author, such an atmosphere makes the adolescent inhabitants of the camps receptive for recruitment in the fight against Israel.

Luttwak's provocative thesis may reflect the charm of realism, but it paints a very simplistic picture. It should not be

forgotten that UNRWA was created in order to serve as crisis management of a humanitarian catastrophe that has a political problem at its core. A solution of this political problem could not and cannot be substituted by UNRWA's humanitarian support.

Even without the existence of UNRWA, an integration of the refugees into the neighbouring Arab countries would certainly not have taken place to such an extent that the problem would have been solved by itself, as suggested by Luttwak. Only Jordan was willing, after immense initial problems, to integrate a majority of the refugees. In the other neighbouring countries it was more in the interest of the governments to keep the unsolved refugee problem alive as a "blazing wound" in the context of the Israeli-Arab antagonism. Without the support of UNRWA the humanitarian situation of the refugees would most probably have deteriorated, which would have led to even stronger resentments against the "originator" of the emergency situation.

Aside from criticism relating to the very existence and mandate of UNRWA, accusations have repeatedly been voiced that it collaborates with, or even gives cover to groups labelled as "terrorist organisations".<sup>19</sup> Allegations can also constantly be heard in the American public about how American taxpayers' money,

given to UNRWA, would indirectly finance Palestinian "terrorists", who would use UNRWA facilities for their purposes and that UNRWA would also



**UNRWA was created in order to serve as crisis management of a humanitarian catastrophe.**



**More than two thirds of the nine to ten million Palestinians living today are refugees.**

the refugees. The situation deteriorated even further in the course of 2007 and the emergency assistance in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was only half-covered by the financial engagement of the donor community.<sup>15</sup> Ten months after the Gaza War and due to a number of aggravating factors, amongst others the global financial crisis, UNRWA described its financial situation as one of "unprecedented gravity" with the result that the agency could "no longer meet its obligations under its mandate."<sup>16</sup>

### Criticism of UNRWA

Although it was the failure to reach a political solution that led to the constant renewal of the mandate of UNRWA, the organisation has been accused, since the end of the 1960s, of contributing to the perpetuation, or even aggravation, of the refugee problem through its continuing existence. These accusations do not just allude to a self interest of the organisation in perpetuating the refugee problem due to the high number of employees.<sup>17</sup> They go further by claiming that, due to the assistance for the refugees, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been kept alive to this very day.

One of the best known advocates of this thesis is Edward Luttwak, who in a famed article in Foreign Affairs accused UNRWA of contributing to half a century of Arab-Israeli violence and

employ members of Hamas.<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, when Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections, and especially when it took over control in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the agency faced a dilemma. On the one hand, Hamas achieved its victory in free and democratic elections. On the other hand, its legitimacy has been recognised neither by Israel nor by the international community. But since UNRWA has to act impartially and neutrally, Hamas turned into the "contact person" for UNRWA in the Gaza Strip, a cooperation that is not free from conflict and tensions, just as is the case with the other governments the agency has to deal with.

### Need for shift of focus

Despite all the problems, challenges and accusations that UNRWA has to face, it should not be forgotten that the relief organisation is only providing crisis management services, while a political solution to the refugee question is still indispensable, not just for humanitarian reasons but also because it continues to constitute a source of conflict as long as it remains unresolved.

It is not very likely that the legal claim of the Palestinians concerning the "Right of Return" will be accepted within the framework of a comprehensive settlement. However, a solution that does not care for the "Right of Return" in principle and disregards the element of freedom of choice will probably never be accepted as a just solution, either by the Palestinians or by the Arab world. As a return of the refugees to their 1948 areas of origin does not appear to be a realistic option, the notion of the term 'return' should be reconsidered.

In a broader sense, 'return' would have to include the unlimited and unrestricted integration of the Palestinian refugees in a new state of Palestine. On the Palestinian side, this would imply "replacing a tragic past with a hopeful future"<sup>21</sup>, i.e. orientating the quest for

a sustainable solution to the refugee problem towards future rights of security, citizenship, and the promise of a life with dignity, thereby removing deeply held beliefs about the right to return to a former homeland from the list of grievances to be addressed on the ground.<sup>22</sup>

This shift of focus on the Palestinian side, however, would also require a change on the Israeli side. By critically confronting their past and the role Israel played in creating the Palestinian refugee problem, Israelis would “work towards Palestinian sensitivities”<sup>23</sup> and pay tribute to the self-respect of the Palestinians who, if their sense of justice was addressed and their sacrifice recognised, could afford realism to take its course.

Whatever a final peace agreement will look like, without a solution to the refugee question there will be no basis for reconciliation and hence no sustainable solution. Therefore, UNRWA is needed to meet the legitimate claims of the refugees on securing their basic humanitarian needs. Even in the necessary process of empowerment of the Palestinian society the agency can take on an important role by laying the material groundwork for the political process to take place. 📧

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2 UNRWA, *Emergency Appeal 2009*, 30 November 2008, p. 10.

3 UNRWA, *Updated Quick Response Plan for Gaza: An Assessment of Needs Six Months After the War*, August 2009.

4 Released on 11 December 1948.

5 UN Doc. A/RES/194 (III) *Palestine - Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator*, 11 December 1948.

6 Only during the early 1950s, roughly 40,000 Palestinians were allowed to return to their areas of origin, benefiting from Israeli measures of family reunion.

7 Morris 1988; Pappé 2006. Although Morris does not hint at a master plan for expelling the Palestinian Arabs, this was the first time that the official Israeli narrative has been challenged from within. See also: Morris 2003.

8 Khalil 2009:19, 51.

9 UN Doc. A/RES/302(IV) *Assistance to Palestine Refugees*, 8 December 1949.

10 UNRWA, *Who is a Palestine Refugee?*

11 Adding the descendants was a particular concession to the host countries, which feared an end of assistance and an automatic solution of the problem as a consequence. See Schiff 1995: 53f.

12 The numbers are not based on a demographic census but on the registration of the refugees with the agency. See UNRWA, *Number of registered refugees*.

13 Talhami 2003: 147.

14 Schiff 1995: 7ff

15 UNRWA, *UNRWA Finances*.

16 UNRWA, *Note on UNRWA's financial situation*, November 2009.

17 A large majority of the 24,324 employees of UNRWA are Palestine refugees themselves. See UNRWA, *UNRWA Organisation*.

18 Luttwak 1999: 36-44.

19 Melanie Phillips, *A selective approach to facts*, *Spectator*, 27 January 2009.

20 For a recent example see James G. Lindsay from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Fixing UNRWA. Repairing the UN's Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees*, January 2009. For a response see Maya Rosenfeld from the Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, *Setting the Record Straight*.

21 Heller/Nusseibeh 1991: 87.

22 Bowker 2003: 3.

23 See “Interview mit Ilan Pappé am 29. Februar 2000, Haifa University”, in Joggerst 2002: 116-123 (120).



PHOTO: UNRWA

*In UNRWA's Aida Camp for Palestinian refugees, a young resident bikes past a bullet-pocked wall of UNRWA's School for Girls.*

*Different schools of thought in peacebuilding, like conflict transformation, conflict resolution and conflict management, are sometimes called 'theories of change'. The process of going from a state of violent conflict to one of non-violence or peace naturally implies change: change of mind, change of attitude and change of behaviour. For peacebuilders it is helpful to know the mechanisms behind these changes, but even more important to know how to bring them into practice.*

## Change in human systems: From where to what?

Michele Cesari

Over 60 years ago social psychologist Kurt Lewin laid down the foundations for understanding and influencing change in human systems.<sup>1</sup> The contemporary literature on change proliferates with a myriad of models, methods and techniques to be used – many prescribing “how to” recipes for change in organisations and communities.<sup>2</sup> Yet, most of them are still based on Lewin’s theoretical framework. The strength of his framework lies in a capacity to help us focus on the right kind of variables that need to be conceptualised in order to understand and influence change – i.e. the “things” we need to look at: 1) the force-field, 2) change as a process with three phases, and 3) the role of tension.

### The force-field

A *field* is a human system: it can be an individual person (e.g. your best friend), a group (e.g. a school class, a football team, the staff of a project), an agency (e.g. a Caritas agency, a local NGO), or a larger social entity (the community of a given village/city, the population in a region/state or a given identity group).

Inside the field, i.e. inside the system, *Driving Forces* (DFs) interact with *Restraining Forces* (RFs). These forces are essentially psychological phenomena. Driving forces are the motivations, attitudes and behaviours that stimulate movement toward a desired goal. Restraining forces resist change and work to maintain the *status quo*. DFs and RFs are likely to have different strengths and directions, and the system’s status is a result of their interaction. In other words, DFs push for change and RFs resist it.

If restraining forces are equal to driving forces the system is in equilibrium. Actually, Kurt Lewin speaks of a *quasi-*

*stationary equilibrium*. Why “quasi” and not just “stationary”? Because all systems undergo natural evolutionary changes, but these are different from planned and managed social changes. Natural evolutionary changes are the continuous learning processes that all the different parts of a system undergo to adapt to different environmental conditions. These evolutionary changes are not necessarily towards progress, they might also be regressive pejorative.<sup>3</sup> From the system’s point of view, “natural evolution is not necessarily progressive or benign”.<sup>4</sup>

For instance: a community in conflict with a neighbouring village might progressively come to the use of force and kill others as a result of its adaptation to the environment, but this should not necessarily be considered as progress as it might lead to retaliation, loss of human lives and the destruction of property and other negative consequences. This example might look trivial, but how many times have we seen communities clashing and attempting to destroy each other with great reciprocal losses as a result? How often have we experienced problems “evolving” into destructive conflict – into war?

Questions we should ask (ourselves) when we engage with a system to build peace:

- What are the Driving and Restraining Forces at work in this system/situation?
- How is our peacebuilding training likely to “play” with the forces at work in the system?

### The three phases of change

Successful change in human systems has three aspects<sup>5</sup> or phases:

This article is an excerpt of the paper *Building Sustainable Peace: Our Approach to Learning*. It looks at the other side of peacebuilding training: learning to build peace. It focuses on the learner and the learning process. Its purpose is effectiveness: it is a quest to understand how people learn in situations of conflict and what peacebuilders can do to support communities to more effectively engage in conflict. The ideas introduced reflect the conversations that characterised three meetings of Caritas Internationalis’ Working Group on Peace and Reconciliation in 2006 and 2007.

“Our Approach to Learning” has been written for development and peace practitioners, particularly for peacebuilding trainers and facilitators. It poses problems and questions and provides a framework for understanding and working on open-ended problem solving rather than on the provision of ready-made answers. It has been written with the aim of eliciting a dialogue between practitioners, academics and decision makers in the Caritas world and the larger community of agencies and people engaged in peacebuilding.

The full-length paper is found in pdf-format on [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

1. *Unfreezing*. The system in a “quasi-stationary equilibrium” starts unfreezing from the solidity of its equilibrium and opens up to what is new. Motivation to change makes unfreezing possible. This phase has also been described as “developing awareness of the need for change”<sup>6</sup> or creating the motivation to become different.
2. *Movement*. The system moves to a new equilibrium. Actions are taken that change or move the system to a new level.
3. *Refreezing*. This phase is composed of those processes that re-stabilise the system in its new equilibrium, contrasting with the forces that push to let it return to the previous state or just continue to change. Refreezing stops movement and consolidates the new status.



PHOTO: UN FLAKA KUQI

*A seemingly idyllic scene from the minority part of the town of Orahovac (Rahovec) in Kosovo, but Serbs and Albanians are unwilling to live in integrated communities.*

These three phases are sequential. For change to take place, a system will first unfreeze from the current equilibrium, then move to a new equilibrium and then refreeze in it. For example, let us try to imagine a project working on “tolerance building” in Kosovo after the 1998-99 war. The project works in ethnically cleansed communities: after the war the Serb population fled from many areas, with the exception of a few isolated enclaves within Kosovo.

Years after the war, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees are planning to return to their homes and are supported in doing so by international institutions and NGOs. But the Albanian communities have made it clear that “Serbs are not welcome” and they will do whatever they deem necessary to prevent them from returning. Clearly that could mean more violence. The international military force is ready to display whatever force is needed to protect repatriated civilians, even to the extent of having rural villages crossed with barbed wire and protected by heavy military presence for many years to come.

Let us try to see this situation from a change perspective, focusing only on the Albanian community – and simplifying, of course. The Albanian majority in communities where repatriation of Serbs is planned is “frozen” in its position. It does not want Serbs to come back and is ready for violence if that happens. This system is in a quasi-stationary equilibrium: resistance is equal to, or

stronger than, forces towards change. What does it take to help the system unfreeze? DFs have to become relatively stronger than RFs. What are DFs and RFs here? What prevents the system from changing?

From this perspective we can see that “providing more military protection” is not an answer, at least not the only answer. It only aims to prevent or contain violent actions, but it does not tackle the DFs and RFs.

Serb IDPs and refugees will be able to live in these communities only if this human system changes, that is, if Albanian communities unfreeze from their equilibrium and develop a motivation to change. Once that happens, this system can move to a new equilibrium where Albanians and Serbs accept that they must live together in the community and that the new situation will need to stabilise. It will need processes that prevent it from returning back to its original equilibrium. For us, the question then becomes, how can we influence this system to change? More generally, the questions one should ask when engaging in peacebuilding with a system are:

- What do we need to do in order for our peacebuilding training and efforts to support unfreezing, movement and refreezing?
- How do we support the development in people of the motivation to change?

- How do we influence the forces at work in the system we are working with?
- Who decides *how* to change?

### **Tension – fuel for the change process**

For change to take place Driving Forces must be relatively stronger than Restraining Forces. When that happens, the system can unfreeze and start changing. When DFs are stronger than RFs a *tension* is created. This is the fundamental ingredient for unfreezing:

*Tension is the fuel that powers the beginning of the change process.*

The concept of tension can also be referred to as *dissonance*. It is an inherent characteristic of every conflict and the essential element for an individual’s or social system’s development. Without tension there cannot be change and improvement. Tension is the essential element in a system’s capacity to grow and develop.

But tension *doesn’t feel good*. That is why systems may just try to avoid tension and maintain the *status quo* – even at the very expense of their own survival. A pattern of avoidance can become destructive for the system. For instance, when organisations promote executives based on their capacity to preserve the *status quo* and clamp down on forces promoting change, they fail to adapt to a changing environment. We also see communities who choose leaders that don’t see that their societies are changing and instead these leaders promote agendas inspired by conservation of traditional ways and values – “our way of living”. An inability to deal with tension might lead to a system’s breakdown, like when an organisation fails to meet its objectives, or when a community becomes profoundly divided and impoverished by destructive and protracted conflict. Incapacity to deal with tension can be closely associated with failure.

Many authors focusing on organisational learning assert that a useful construct for understanding a system’s ability to handle tension is its *tolerance for ambiguity, or the unknown*.<sup>7</sup> This is the ability of a system to deal with tension without simply rejecting it, but rather making it productive. This quality is also associated with creativity and the capacity to deal constructively with conflict. But, again, tension doesn’t feel good, it raises questions, elicits doubts, it gives

a sense of instability and it might raise the fear of loss. No wonder avoidance can become a pattern.

**The gap between present and future**

Tension is such a fundamental ingredient for change that modern studies and applications on organisational change have placed it at the centre of the stage. Beckard and Harris – who, up to date, have designed one of the most influential models for planning and influencing change<sup>8</sup> – have revised Lewin’s framework as follows:

CURRENT STATE → TRANSITION STATE  
→ DESIRED FUTURE STATE

One can see that that this is just another way of presenting Lewin’s three phases, using a different terminology. Instead of “unfreezing” we have “current state”, “transition” for “movement” and “desired future state” for “refreezing”. This is still conceptualised as a sequential process, but – here is the difference – Beckhard and Harris suggest that for planning and managing change we need to start from the third phase, from the “desired future state”. First, we need to develop a vision of what people, the organisation, the system, want for the future, where and how they want to be. Then we can move back to the present and assess the “current state”.

First we decide where we want to go, then we see where we are now. The gap between the current state and the desired future state generates the necessary tension for change to happen. This is the gap between how we are and how we want to be. It makes unfreezing possible, creating motivation to change.<sup>9</sup>

What matters for us is to notice that modern organisational learning and change theories consider tension – or dissonance – so important as to re-think the framework for change and learning around it. Thus, we need to ask ourselves: What role does tension have in our peacebuilding training? How do we act to generate tension within the group/s we work with? What do we do to generate tension? What makes it possible for the system to accept tension without simply rejecting it?

In summary, the key ideas presented here are the following:

- A force field is the sum of all psychological phenomena (or forces) that act in reciprocal interdependence in a system.

- These forces can be divided in Driving Forces (pushing for change) and Restraining Forces (resisting it).
- The interaction of forces within the system produces a quasi-stationary equilibrium.
- Successful change in human systems has three aspects:  
UNFREEZING → MOVEMENT → REFREEZING.
- For change to take place, Driving Forces must be relatively stronger than Restraining Forces – this makes unfreezing possible.
- When Driving Forces are relatively stronger than Restraining Forces, a certain level of tension is created – this is the fuel that powers change.

Most peacebuilding efforts are about helping people learn to deal differently with conflict. It is about helping people restructure their cognition of conflict, i.e. peacebuilding is about helping people to change. In this article we have introduced ideas and frameworks that respond to the question: How can we support and enhance the learning processes of people in conflict so that they respond more effectively to conflict and then generate change? We argue that the principles emerging here are relevant to our efforts to build sustainable peace. They need to become praxis.

*“All principles by themselves are abstract. They become concrete only in the consequences which result from their application.” John Dewey<sup>10</sup>*

1 Lewin, K., “Group Decision and Social Change”, in Maccoby, E. E., Newcomb, T., and Watson, G. (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, Austin: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947. Excerpts from this article are available at URL=<<http://www.crossroad.to/Quotes/brainwashing/kurt-lewin-change.htm>>. See also Lewin, K., *Resolving social conflicts; selected papers on group dynamics*. Gertrude W. Lewin (ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1948; and Lewin, K. *Field theory in social science; selected theoretical papers*. D. Cartwright (ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1951

2 For an exhaustive view on contemporary models and techniques for change in organisations and communities see Holman, P., Devane, T. and Cady, S., *The Change Handbook: The Definitive Resource on Today’s Best Methods for Engaging Whole Systems*, San Francisco: Berret-Koehler, 2007.

3 Schein, E. H., “Models and Tools for Stability and Change in Human Systems”, in *Reflections*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002, URL=<<http://www.energy8.eu/images/systemchange.pdf>>

4 Schein, E. H., *Ibid.*, p. 1.

5 Lewin, K., *Ibid.*; see also Marcus, E. C., “Change Processes and Conflict”, in Deutsch, M., Coleman, P. T. (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2000.

6 Lippitt, R., Watson, J., Westerley, B., *The Dynamics of Planned Change*, Orlando: Harcourt Brace, 1958.

7 Marcus, E. C., *Ibid.*

8 Beckhard, R. & Harris, R., *Organization transitions: Managing Complex Organisational Change*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1987.

9 “Visioning” exercises that are used frequently in workshops stem essentially from this rationale: creating a tension between the current state and the desired future state.

10 Dewey, J., *Experience and Education*, New York: Touchstone, 1997 (first edition published in 1938 by Kappa Delta Pi), p. 20.



*Driving forces and restraining forces in a quasi-stationary equilibrium. Gulls in tug-of-war over a piece of food.*

PHOTO: ANN OLSEN/SCANPIX

*A fellow parishioner of the author once said that “the churches could definitely do more in advocating a more responsible arms trade in the world”. The Gothenburg Process, initiated in 2001, is precisely about this: get the churches to ‘do more’. Huge sums are spent on high-tech material and advanced techniques, while the most marginalised people pay the price for this armament.*

## The Gothenburg Process:

# Arms that kill – also when not in use

Peter Brune

More than five million lives were lost due to the scourges of war in 1990-2000. We all know that armed conflicts, whether internal or international, force people from their homes, kill parents, force children to become soldiers and killers, destroy social networks, use mass violation as an instrument of war, etc. The casualties of conflict today are, to an overwhelming extent, civilian, increasing from a clear minority of war-related deaths in the first half of the twentieth century to 90 per cent by the mid-1990's.<sup>1</sup> But not only civilians are wounded and affected. So many soldiers, women and men, are traumatised for a life-time by their service on the battle fields.

In the aftermath of the end of the cold war there have been several attempts to restrict or prohibit specific weapons and there have been successfully targeted campaigns that have focused on specific dimensions of the legal production and sale of conventional weapons, i.e. the scope of the Gothenburg Process. The campaign to ban anti-personnel mines and the work to outlaw cluster munitions are good examples of this. Churches and ecumenical organisations have played an important role in both these campaigns.

Another tendency is to take more seriously the threat that armed violence constitutes for humanity. In the Geneva Declaration<sup>2</sup> the connection between the prevention of armed violence and development is highlighted, and a number of nations have committed themselves to increase the efforts in support of preventive measures.

Globally there is a quest for a more coordinated “behaviour” that can promote the development of guidelines also in the realm of the arms trade, and to some extent these efforts are built on ethical considerations. The most serious

and promising is the global initiative for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This process, initiated by a group of Nobel Peace Laureates, has been going on for some years and has been highlighted in the UN context in recent years. In a joint work by leading international civil society organisations (including church related organisations) in favour of an ATT, a number of principles have been compiled, on which a joint global agreement should be built:<sup>3</sup>

- The treaty must hold governments to account. It must be based on states’ legal obligations and other responsibilities.
- The treaty must be all-inclusive, that is, it must include all weapons, all types of transfer and all transactions.
- The treaty must be workable and enforceable.

At the UN General Assembly in October 2009 a strong vote in favour of establishing a timeline for the adoption of an ATT was reached, meaning that the process shall come to a conclusion through an international conference in 2012. It is still to be seen what the final version of the ATT will look like, but the process is on its way and it is very important that churches do not miss this important opportunity to make their voices heard.

### From the white to the black market

The trade in arms can be broken down into three general categories: the white, the grey and the black market. The white market is the transfer of weapons in accordance with national laws and international agreements. Sometimes the price, amounts and type of equipment are made public. But the white arms market can be manipulated, not least through using loopholes in regulations.

Thus the white market becomes a grey one, where the final recipient often is not identical with the purported recipient. This may be done by disguising, or even falsifying, an end-user certificate, or bribing an official in a third country to sign an end-user certificate but then allowing a shipment of arms to pass through another country en route to a third location. At the end of the spectrum is the black market where the gun running and smuggling occurs, often by specialised agents with access to effective networks worldwide. The very same agents may however also be involved in the grey or even the white market.

Departing from these three categories, one may have the impression that the white market is tightly controlled and transparent. Unfortunately this is not the case. Furthermore the white market cannot be treated separately from the black market. It is estimated that as much as 90 per cent of all illegal and illicit weapons have once started their circulation on the white market. They come into circulation on grey and black markets through thefts in military arsenals, through bribing policemen and military personnel to sell surplus weapons, through selling old second hand arms when new arms are being procured etc.

The richest and technically most advanced countries are the main producers. Seven of the eight G8 countries<sup>4</sup> are among the largest global arms exporters. The widespread reach of the global arms trade stems partly from the fact that the arms companies and national governments often have a unique relationship and are intertwined in different ways. Governments are not only authorising and controlling the arms trade, they are also, for political reasons, spending huge amounts of resources in promoting their sales.



PHOTO: CASAC

*Arms destruction is an important component in reducing the amount of firearms. The picture shows destroyed arms from Costa Rica, now placed in a peace monument.*

### **Military spending versus development**

In its 2006 report, the UN's global Development Programme emphasised the problem that military investments in poor countries often come at the expense of life-saving investments in clean water and sanitation. Pakistan is given particular attention since it spends 47 times more on its military than on water and sanitation, with 118,000 people in Pakistan dying of diarrhoea each year. In 2006, one of Sweden's largest arms exporters ever (the radar system Erieye) was given the go-ahead. The deal cost Pakistan about US\$10 billion, an amount 12 times Pakistan's yearly budget for water and sanitation. In this way, misdirected spending on arms may in fact indirectly kill the inhabitants of poorer countries. Thus the very existence of arms may kill without actually being used.

Military expenditures are about 15 times higher across the globe than the totality of all global development funds, including the whole UN system and

multilateral and bilateral agreements between nations and organisations. Armed conflicts and the use of arms have, of course, also had detrimental effects on development in direct ways. Vital resources of society are tied up for the care of victims of armed violence, e.g. in the health sector. It is calculated that in El Salvador 14.9 per cent of the nation's GDP is destined to cover costs related to armed violence, even though El Salvador is not involved in any armed conflict.<sup>5</sup> These resources could definitely be used in a better way, regardless of the suffering all this causes for the victims, their families and of social unrest in general.

Even if the effects of large arms procurement are more severe in the poorest countries, there are also middle income countries like Turkey which still struggle to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, such as reducing child mortality. This is partly due to the huge costs of its debts, which include a 15 billion dollar loan for the import

of arms.<sup>6</sup> It may be noted that Turkey was ranked as the top buyer of German arms exports during the decade 1999-2008, and among the three largest buyers from both France and the UK during the five year period 1999-2003.<sup>7</sup>

There are numerous examples of how richer countries have spent enormous amounts on weaponry that in the end turns out to be totally useless. But countries, with a large percentage of their populations living in extreme poverty, which buy expensive weapon systems, are a special case. This is an example of how poverty reduction efforts are neglected. It is even worse, if the inequality ratio between the citizens in these countries is high. It is also sad to see that well needed research resources are spent on developing new lethal tools, resources that could be spent on developing tools for food production, improved medical health care or energy saving technology. Besides the direct misuse, there are also ethical considerations concerning why public funds should be used for the de-

velopment of new arms. Compared with public interest and debate in the area of medical research, little focus is laid on the moral side of military research.

### Risky business

The more weapons there are and the better equipped armies are the higher will be the temptation to “solve” conflicts with violence and arms instead of striving for dialogue and political solutions. If the only tool you possess is a hammer, everything appears to be a nail. Both the licit and illicit trade in arms helps to equip those who choose to fight with weapons, thus tending to prolong and deepen the violent dimensions of a conflict.

The transfer of arms is a highly risky business. We will never be totally certain about where they end up and how they will be used. No one can guarantee that the weapons arrive at their destination or that they are not used in ways that violate human rights or international humanitarian law. No one can be certain that the present government will not be replaced tomorrow by a more hostile government using violence towards its inhabitants or threatening its neighbouring countries. It is even harder to guess what will happen with the weapons in 20-30 years time, when they may be replaced and sold to those who pay the best price in the white, grey or black markets. And once the arms leave the white and legal market, they may be recycled continually in the grey and black markets, always ready to be used by those desiring to commit armed violence.

The bigger the flow of arms, the more probable it is that actors who use them for warfare, criminal acts, human rights violations or the destabilisation of society have easy access to them. We must never forget that in the end it is the most marginalised people, often in the global south, that pay the price for the madness of vast amounts of armaments in the world.

*Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.*

Dwight D. Eisenhower, from a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. 📄

*This article is made up of excerpts from chapters 2 and 3 in the book The Gothenburg Process. Faith based advocacy for disarmament by Peter Brune, Life & Peace Institute, 2009. Chapter 2 is written in collaboration with Håkan Mårtensson, Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation.*

The book can be ordered from the Life & Peace Institute, see contact data on p. 2. Price: €8, \$11. It is also available in PDF format on [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

The Report from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ecumenical Conference within the Gothenburg Process that was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2007 has now been published. Edited by Peter Brune and Viktoria Isaksson, Christian Council of Sweden, 2009. The report is also available in PDF format on [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

- 1 [www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)
- 2 [www.genevadeclaration.org](http://www.genevadeclaration.org)
- 3 [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org)
- 4 France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Russia, Great Britain, Germany and the USA
- 5 [www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org), regional human development report 2009 on Central America
- 6 Shooting down the Millennium Development Goals, Oxfam Briefing Paper 120
- 7 [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org), arms transfer data




PHOTO: VIKTORIA ISAKSSON

*Archbishop emeritus KG Hammar in front of a roll-up at the first Latin American ecumenical encounter within the Gothenburg Process in Bogotá, Colombia, May 2009. KG Hammar is chairperson of the Swedish ecumenical coalition for the Gothenburg Process.*

# LPI News

PHOTO: LPI



*Runo Bergström, former Resident Representative at LPI's Brazzaville office (left), and Abdullahi Shirwa from Somali Peace Line in front of LPI's booth at the European Development Days in Stockholm, October 2009.*

## European Development Days

The fourth edition of the European Development Days (EDD) was hosted in Stockholm, Sweden, in October 2009. LPI was among the 1,500 participating organisations.

The EDD is a yearly event hosted jointly by the European Commission and the EU Presidency. A record number of 6,000 people from the development community came together on an equal footing in Stockholm. Delegates from 125 countries were present, including heads of state and leading world figures, Nobel prize-winners among them.

Located together with a number of Swedish-based organisations in the Sida pavilion, LPI was well placed and staff had many useful encounters. Almost all Uppsala staff attended the event and spent some time at the booth with the message: "Peace begins with Civil Society". Publications were sold or given out and LPI's journals found new readers. Over 40 persons signed up for the Horn of Africa Bulletin. Thanks to the visit of Mr Abdullahi Shirwa from our partner Somalia Peace Line in Mogadishu, we could give special attention to the Somalia peacebuilding programme.

The aim of the EDD is to make development aid more effective, to build a global coalition against poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Through frank and sometimes controversial debates on pressing issues, such as governance, poverty and environmental sustainability, the European Development Days provided good opportunities for sharing ideas and launching innovative partnerships.

## European Union

### Growth of peace advocacy work

The network of peacebuilding agencies in the Brussels-based European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) is growing. Three new agencies, Conciliation Resources (UK), The Glenree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (Ireland) and NGO Support Centre in Cyprus, were accepted at the General Assembly in Brussels in November 2009. The total membership is now 27.

LPI and several other member organisations were also represented at a workshop arranged by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)

in connection with the EPLO meeting. The aim was to discuss how this forum can complement EPLO's work and strengthen national advocacy for conflict prevention in the respective EU member countries. ECCP and the related global network Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict are also developing a major web portal for peacebuilding agencies.

## New research:

### Civil society and peacebuilding

In collaboration with the LPI, the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies in Geneva, held a one day seminar in Nairobi on 7 January to present findings from a global research study on civil society and peacebuilding that included 13 countries, among them a case study on Somalia in the Horn of Africa. The three-year research project was prompted by the rise in civil society peacebuilding initiatives that is not matched by corresponding assessment of their effectiveness and impact. The findings were presented by Dr. Thania Paffenholz and Dr. Ken



An outcome of LPI's work on the role of media in Congo Brazzaville is the establishment of a Congolese Media Ombudsman.

Menkhaus. Participants were drawn from civil society, governments and the international donor community.

### Transition process in Brazzaville

The Congo Brazzaville peacebuilding programme, which was initiated by LPI in collaboration with the Swedish Covenant Church, Sida, and a local resource group in 2001, has been closed as of 2009. This is in line with the earlier plan and decision to complete a transition process for the work and responsibilities. It is foreseen that former partner organisations and the Congolese Executive Committee, which have been instrumental in the programme since the very beginning, will pursue some relevant project activities, subject to funding. The planning and transition process has been severely hampered by the unfortunate death of LPI's Representative in Congo, Mr Seraphin Ngouma, in July 2009. In its implementation plan and request to Sida for 2010-2012, LPI has included a study on Lessons Learned in the Congo Brazzaville programme.

### LPI celebrates 25 years

The Uppsala-based institute for Life & Peace can sum up 25 years of peace-

building work. From a relatively humble start in 1985, LPI became engaged in numerous peace and justice projects, with particular emphasis on the combination of action and research. Over the years, just over 100 publications have been released, in addition to the periodicals *New Routes* (originally *Life & Peace* review) and the *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, which were born in the late 1980s. A publication time line reveals major themes and research series like *The Horn of Africa* series, *The churches' role as agents of peace and development*, *Women and nonviolence*, *NGOs and refugee repatriation* and numerous separate research reports, occasional papers and conference reports, e.g. *Tools for peace*, *the role of religion in conflict*. Dissemination has normally been limited and targeted.

In a special project 2003-2007, supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland, LPI provided a hundred universities in the global South, particularly Africa, with peacebuilding literature. Five major regional seminars were also arranged for students, teachers and civil society.

LPI's anniversary will be highlighted in various ways throughout the year but particularly in May when the international board of directors meets in Uppsala, Sweden. See [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org) for more information and to order or download publications.

### New funding received

LPI has received funding for its peacebuilding programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo from the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The grant of 500,000 EUR, which is for the second half of 2009 and 2010, was approved late 2009. The Church of Sweden provides support to LPI's peacebuilding programmes in 2010, with particular emphasis on Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. The German church-based organisation Bread for the World has provided continued support for the *Horn of Africa Bulletin* in 2010.

### Swedish churches support LPI

Parishes all over Sweden contributed to the work of LPI and The Swedish Fellowship for Reconciliation through a national collection on New Year's Day 2010. The peace collection has become something of a tradition in the Church of Sweden, although decisions are made on an annual basis. The two organisations expect to share some 600,000 SEK for use in their respective international peacebuilding work.



Packing and transportation of books was a large part of LPI's Publications for Peace Education project.

### A closer look at security

Due to its work primarily in high risk areas, LPI has embarked on a review of its security policy. Ewald Stals, a Belgian consultant with a background in Médecins Sans Frontières, is contracted to coordinate the policy formulation for security and crisis management. The project will result in a policy and useful tools that will be helpful also to other organisations working in similar situations. The project is funded by the Swedish Mission Council.



### Staff changes

#### Uppsala, Sweden

Catrin Rosquist has finished her contract with LPI as Ulla Vinterhav, Executive Officer, in January 2010 returned from her leave of absence. Jody Hend-

erson from the UK has been recruited as Programme Advisor and successor of Shane Quinn, who left LPI in October 2009 to join the Swedish Fund for Human Rights. Elin Göthe finished her contract with LPI in January and moved on to other tasks. Diego Galeano has completed a five months successful internship and returned to Argentina. Matilda Pearson is an intern at LPI's Communications Unit in spring 2010. As part of her studies in journalism she is engaged in the production of New Routes. Jenny Svensson has been appointed Director for the Programme Unit and Malin Brenk will work as Programme Advisor in the unit until the end of June.

#### Bukavu, DRC

Claude Iguma, a former technical advisor in the programme, has been

appointed Programme Coordinator, replacing Luc Meissner who finished his contract by the end of 2009. Alexis Bouvy has also finished his contract and left the Bukavu office and has been replaced by Professor Bosco Muchukiwa. The programme has welcomed a new intern, Sacha Petiot.

#### Khartoum, Sudan

Veronica Agali, a former consultant to the office in Khartoum, has been recruited as Administrator in the Sudan programme.

#### Nairobi, Kenya

Wangari Mwangi has been recruited for the Programme Manager position. Research and Analysis Advisor Yvonne Rowa finished her contract by the end of 2009.

## Reviews and resources


### What's in it for Africa?

*A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development. Edited by Southall Roger and Henning Melber Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal, 2009*

The competition over raw materials that the massive presence of China has unleashed is what is understood by the term "the new scramble for Africa" and is the main focus of this remarkable and well executed anthology. During the first, or old, scramble "Africa was sliced up like a cake, the pieces swallowed by five rival nations".

Now Africa faces a similar situation, but this time there are new actors. The editors point out that the term "new scramble for Africa" is contested, but stress the existence of a general understanding that Africa is being subjected to an historically distinct and new round of engagement with the new and old powers. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, of course, see Chinese and Indian presence not in terms of scramble, but in terms of conditions that can spark an era of African growth and renewal. Hence, the question that the anthology wants to shed light on is the extent to which the "the new scramble" can be seen as an opportunity for development.

The anthology contains sixteen well written chapters with a major focus on the role of external actors (global powers) on the African scene. Margaret Lee (chapter 4) argues that, through its trade policies, the EU is engaged in a new form of dividing Africa into four economic regions, with the intention of economic re-colonisation. The chapter on



corruption (chapter 13) is an example of excellent research, describing the ways in which corruption is introduced and maintained by foreign companies doing business in Africa. The Chinese (Melber, chapter 3) are increasing their presence daily, by offering terms that neither the EU nor the USA can match. India (Sanusa Naidu, chapter 5) is strengthening its position and role in the Indian Ocean Rim – a region that unites India and Eastern Africa. But perhaps the most important chapter is the one on South Africa and its role in the revival of some economic sectors of many African countries (chapter 11). The global competition over oil (Cyril Obi, chapter 8), the chapters on mining and transnational mining companies (chapters 9, 10 and 11), and the highly relevant updates on global competition over fishing and genetic resources (chapters 12 and 13) are all very interesting to read.

Is there a new scramble for Africa and, if so, what does it imply for African development? These are questions that are not given clear answers. Neither Roger Southall's chapter on the continuities and discontinuities between the first and the new scramble (chapter 1), nor the penetrating study of the marginalisation of African capitalism by Southall and Alex Comninou in chapter 14, succeeds in establishing a clearly discernible link between the first (old) and the new scramble. Therefore, the question mark in the title of the book is appropriate, and the prospects for development in sub-Saharan Africa remain daunting.

I believe a more comprehensive investigation into the conditions for growth and the consolidation of capitalism in Africa, an area preliminarily treated in chapter 14, might produce several insights on the relations between Africa and the rest of the world. But each and every article in the anthology is a relevant and up-to-date research input.

*Tekeste Negash*  
*Professor of modern history, Dalarna University*

### The struggle for freedom goes on

*The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea. Human rights and political development, 1991-2009, by Kjetil Tronvoll. The Oslo Centre for Peace and Human Rights, 2009*

When the struggle for freedom in Eritrea was new in the early sixties, I came to the country for the first time to work as a missionary in the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Living in different parts of the country, I could follow this struggle both in the lowland and the highland until 1975 when we, as foreigners, were evacuated.

The struggle continued until 1991, when the people of Eritrea as well as the international community with great expectations saw the leader of the liberation struggle, Isaias Afewerki, come into power. We had high hopes in him as he promised to lead his people on the path towards human rights and democracy. Today we find that the regime of this young nation is one of the greatest violators of human rights in the world.

The Oslo Centre for Peace and Human Rights has commissioned a report about the human rights situation in Eritrea today, seen from a historical and political perspective. The report is written by Dr Kjetil Tronvoll, Professor of Human Rights at Oslo University. He has followed developments in the Horn of Africa for a long time. In August 1991 he came as the first foreign researcher to access liberated Eritrea.

The report *The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea* differs from conventional human rights reports in that the author has adopted an analytical approach. It explains how and why the Eritrean regime has become one of the worst human rights abusers in the world.

Today Eritrea is also one of the most isolated countries in the world. The report shows how the dictatorial regime benefits from isolation. The president has proven to be a master in both isolating himself and his people. It is a most frustrating experience to see how the people of Eritrea have been subdued and silenced, unable to speak up about the oppression and brought into constant fear. This fear comes from the fact that the regime has been able to create the perception that being critical and expressing different opinions is regarded as treason.

That is why it is so important that this book now is available, at least for people living outside Eritrea; to break the silence and bring the facts into the light. The international community needs to be involved in the forgotten situation in Eritrea and the country must be brought out of its isolation. For the Oslo Centre it has been the aim to put Eritrea on the international agenda again with full force and "stop viewing it only as a destructive force in the region, but to create true concerns on the Eritrean people's internal human rights and humanitarian issues".

I hope that this balanced and, from my viewpoint, trustworthy report will lead to debate, not least among the Eritrean Diaspora, and create the necessary popular and public demands for accountability and respect for human rights. In an interview with the author of the report in November 2009, after its release, Kjetil Tronvoll advises Diaspora Eritreans as individuals and collectives to take a stand on the issues of human rights within their home country, and to unite in demanding changes in the country.

*Rev. Sture Normark*  
*Former missionary in Eritrea and Director for the LPI Horn of Africa programme 1987-2000*

### Conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction

*The Resolution of African Conflicts – The Management of Conflict Resolution & Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza. James Currey Ltd, 2008*

Democratic development has not taken root in many African societies during the past decades, failing to put an end to political, economic and institutional instability. As of today, several African countries are still struggling in a conflict transition process despite numerous attempts by internal and external actors to contribute to peace and stability in the region.

This publication discusses the current prospects and challenges in resolving conflicts and rebuilding post-conflict societies in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Mauritius. The edition consists of individual research papers written by African scholars who review and evaluate a wide range of conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery policies applicable to these countries.

The different case studies suggest that solutions to African conflicts and post-conflict strategies should be customised to African conditions, in conjunction with efforts to reduce poverty and inequality in multi-ethnic civil societies. It is argued that expanded regional security cooperation would diminish security threats like conflict spill-over, a characteristic of many African conflicts.

The contributors emphasise that democratic reforms and regulations should penetrate various layers of society: both national and sub-regional leadership, as well as economic, juridical and public institutions. These changes should support the existing institutional mechanisms and bring justice to victims of war crimes. Furthermore, civil society should be included in the political process to a greater extent, which would strengthen the relation between political institutions and civil society.

The studies provide valuable empirical findings that support the arguments presented in the research papers. However, the editors are cautious in drawing common conclusions from the individual study cases and introducing general principles of analysis. By developing the framework for analysis, this edition would gain greater academic maturity and therefore lay a firmer foundation for future studies in the field of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in African societies.

*Tiina Saksman Harb*

*Research Assistant at Ersta Sköndal University College*

### Lost in uncertainty

*The End of Certainty. Towards a new internationalism by Stephen Chan. London and New York: Zed Books 2009*

According to Baroness Helena Kennedy, as quoted on the cover of this book, one should “forget Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington; Stephen Chan is the public intellectual with his finger on the global pulse”. This is, in combination with the programmatic and ambitious title of this monograph, a strong incentive to read the book but also risks creating too high expectations.

Chan shows off a plethora of fragmented bits and pieces of philosophical, religious and artistic modes of thought and expression, combined with an analysis of segments of popular culture and the entertainment industry in different settings. This patchwork is seemingly an effort to approach the subject from an innovative angle. But it also creates confusion and risks to lose the reader.

It suggests a holistic effort to underline the basic argument for the ‘end of certainty’ and crooked lines of history (a strong point made with reference to the works of Isaiah Berlin and Paul Ricoeur, p. 167). But what is left at the end is a variety of threads not convincingly interwoven. A web of colourful, panoramic patches, it falls short of composing a common picture. Chan might argue that this is exactly the point he is trying to make. As he stresses in his preface: “The book is constructed like a meandering novel. Characters and points of thought disappear, reappear and are developed in unusual ways” (p. ix). But at the end of this journey it leaves readers like me with some helpless shoulder shrugging, confronted with what seems to be a post-modernist ‘anything goes’ approach, interspersed with anecdotal personal encounters by the widely traveled and read author. In that sense it is also a far too personal script, over-ambitious and egocentric.

His impressive display of knowledge at times also creates the visible limits to it. When, for example, he lists intellectuals assuming political office and mentions Léopold Senghor but forgets Vaclav Havel (p. 278). Less would most likely have been more. The author “wanted a book of imagination with a capacity to induce sobriety” (p. 251). An ambitious project, which I am doubtful he has accomplished. The Baroness obviously thinks differently.

*Henning Melber*

*Executive Director at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation*

### Peacebuilding and practical outputs

*Building Peace. Practical reflections from the field, edited by Craig Zelizer and Robert A. Rubinstein, Kumarian Press, 2009*

“War is not natural, nor is it inevitable.” From this starting-point in the foreword Zelizer and Rubinstein have made a very interesting attempt to show how the work of peacebuilding practitioners can achieve concrete, sometimes even measurable results. Questions about the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives are posed many times, and the cases selected for this volume give a hint of what can be done in that direction.


The origin of this book is a call for papers made by the Alliance for Peacebuilding. Practitioners involved with peacebuilding projects and programmes were invited to present their work on the condition that they had reached results in one of the following areas of peacebuilding:

- building relationships
- reducing and/or preventing violence
- building capacities
- disentangling aspects of an interlocking conflict
- creating institutions/processes to address conflict

Among the thirteen cases that were finally selected are: The Design of Dispute Resolution Systems for Settling Land and Property Conflicts in East Timor; Culture and Arts as a Means to Reconciliation; and Partners in Peacebuilding in Lesotho. Most of the examples come from Africa and Eastern Europe.

In chapter 2 the cases of Romania and Hungary and their internal ethnic issues highlight the importance of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) as a catalyst of the successful interethnic accord in these countries. The work done by PER throughout the years includes advocacy and mediation among government officials, civil society, members of the opposition and other leaders. It is interesting to see the role of media in this type of processes and how a journalist’s misunderstanding during the meetings almost led to a small crisis.

The next chapter, on Slovakia and the fostering of local, independent NGOs by Partners for Democratic Change, shows, among other things, the necessity of local ownership in order to promote a culture of peaceful conflict



resolution. The causes of non-resolution and non-compliance with mediated agreements are analysed from a Russian perspective in chapter 4.

Finally, this work reminds us about the fact that peacebuilding has no simple formula and that it needs time for results to be attained since it is a long-term work. The importance of local initiatives and ownership is also shown here, as well as the necessity to consider gender issues as an essential factor in any conflict resolution intervention.

The impression that peacebuilding as a field needs to work together with other related areas, like development and good governance, is strengthened after reading this book. It stands as a symbol of hope in a field that is sometimes unfairly criticised for lack of visible results.

*Diego A. Galeano  
Lic., NOHA Master in Humanitarian Action*

### UN instruments for human values

*Responses to mass violence – mediation, protection and prosecution. Edited by Henning Melber. Development Dialogue, no. 53, November, 2009*

The November 2009 issue of *Development Dialogue*, published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, focuses on the application of existing instruments within the UN system when it comes to mediating in conflicts, protecting civilians and upholding justice. These three subjects were discussed during a number of seminars and a panel debate in 2008 arranged by, or in collaboration with, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. The result is a compilation of different but very attention-grabbing texts from 14 contributors.

For example, Martti Ahtisaari, currently chairman of the Crisis Management Initiative, who previously led the Ache peace process and Kosovo status process, gives examples from the aforementioned processes and discusses the preconditions for successful conflict resolution.

Fiona Dove, Director of the Transnational Institute, explores the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect” and particularly highlights the hot sovereignty debate in relation to the practice of external intervention in order to protect civilians.

Further, I. William Zartman in his text, based on his long academic experience in the field of mediation, addresses the potential existence of a Scandinavian mediation style and at the same time reviews the fundamentals of mediation.

Hans Corell, PhD, former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel of the UN, devotes his text to the development of international criminal law and the achievements made so far. He concludes by bringing up the issue of who is to bear the responsibility to address impunity.

Another aspect of conflict is the tragic occurrence of sexual violence. Randi Solhjell, researcher at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, discusses the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo based on theoretical building blocks and analyses the issue at three different levels: individual, group and macro.

In addition to these notes about a few of the articles in the compilation, the complete issue brings the reader up to

date with the instruments within the UN framework aiming to achieve justice and increased protection, thus enhancing the striving for the fulfilment of Human Rights.

*Catrin Rosquist  
Acting LPI Executive Officer in 2009*

### Know your enemy – fight corruption

*Make corruption history, by Daryl Balia. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London, 2009*

Have you ever considered if political party funding is corruption? Or why it is that corruption violates human rights and increases poverty? If so, I am pleased to recommend the book “Make corruption history” by Dr Daryl Balia.

The book covers three main topics: understanding, controlling and confronting corruption. In the seven chapters of the book, the author provides the reader with the opportunity to study corruption further in relation to specific topics such as “ways and means of fighting corruption” or “Bribery and the Bible”. Insights, lessons learnt and experiences from South Africa are presented in one of the chapters.

One of the first ways of fighting corruption is to gain knowledge. Balia offers this to us in his book. He touches upon five approaches to understanding corruption (moralistic, cultural, functionalist, principal-agent theory, and the public choice model). Corruption is connected to the everyday life of human beings and our deeply rooted *quid pro quo* (‘something for something’) attitude. Corruption is a matter of attitude, Balia concludes.

In a walkthrough of what the Scripture has to offer regarding bribery, the question of “What can churches do?” is dealt with. Here he offers his advice on what our role as Christians and as a church might be in fighting corruption.

Balia offers many real life examples to contextualise the subject being explained or elaborated on. Adequate notes and references to each chapter are given for further study and reading.

The fight against corruption has one great weakness though: it only deals with the symptoms. But it is a fight that needs to be fought!


*Lars Kjær Knudsen  
Financial expert in the Department for Quality Assurance of  
Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of  
Denmark*

For further reading about the nexus between corruption and peacebuilding, see *New Routes* no 3-4.2009.

### SIPRI – for the 40th time

*SIPRI Yearbook 2009, Oxford University Press, 2009*

The Stockholm-based international institute for peace and conflict research (SIPRI), focussing particularly on arms control and disarmament, has provided its 40th global



overview! It is quite remarkable. As the Director Dr Bates Gill notes in the preface, a lot has changed in the world since 1969, but SIPRI has kept recording military expenditure etc over the years.

In the almost 600 pages of the 2009 edition there are no less than 2,532 contributors from more than a dozen countries. There are three themes: international security, armaments and disarmament, as well as vast amounts of related data and analysis. Global military spending, arms production and the arms trade went up in 2008 and efforts to stem nuclear proliferation made little progress.

Among the recent positive developments, Dr Gill notes the election of Barack Obama as US President and the fact that 94 states, including 18 NATO members, signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Human security is one of the important topics. In the opening chapter, Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng focus on the growing challenge of internally displaced persons and the state's responsibility to protect its populations.

*Tore Samuelsson*  
*LPI Communications Director*

### Fewer conflicts despite the war on terrorism

*States in Armed Conflict 2008. Edited by Lotta Harbom and Ralph Sundberg. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2009*

The 1990s saw more large wars and more people killed in combat and one-sided violence than the first decade of the new century. This is demonstrated in the latest edition of the annual report *States in Armed Conflict*, compiled by researchers at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP ([www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php](http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php)). However, the researchers find a worrying tendency towards a larger number of conflicts in recent years.

The publication from the UCDP analyses trends in organised violence and focuses especially on developments in armed conflicts and one-sided violence against civilians.

– Almost all of the large wars we have seen in the past decade are related to international terrorism. The struggle against terrorism influenced the actions of the Great

Powers already before 2001, but since September 11 several inter-state wars have been initiated and many civil wars have been intervened into by the stronger nations with the fight against terrorism as a stated motive, claims peace researcher Peter Wallensteen, who leads the Conflict Data Program.

*States in Armed Conflict 2008* reports that the decrease in the number of conflicts, which was registered in the first few years of the past decade, clearly ceased by 2004, at which point the number started increasing again. In 2003 there were 29 active conflicts, the lowest number since the 1970s. Since then, the number has slowly increased with each year, and in 2008 the corresponding number was 36. In other words, the number of conflicts in the world increased by almost 25 percent between these years.

While the number of wars in one year (conflicts resulting in at least 1,000 deaths in a year) earlier numbered over ten, this category only contained five cases in 2008. The conflict zones are those in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia.

The researchers also believe that efforts towards peace have achieved results, particularly in Africa, with important peace agreements in countries long beset by conflict, such as Liberia, Sudan and the Ivory Coast.

Africa and Asia are the regions which have been, and still are, hardest hit by violence against civilians. A cluster of countries accounts for the majority of this violence.

While violence against civilians in the rest of the world is dominated by non-state actors, governments in Asia and Africa are almost as involved in this type of violence as non-state actors, such as rebel groups. Democratic states are the least likely to use violence against civilians.

– This seems to be connected to the fact that both Asia and Africa contain states which are either weak or very authoritarian. It appears to be the case that the states most likely to use violence against civilians are those which are either very weak or very strong, says Ralph Sundberg, project leader for the UCDP.

The report is also available for free download at this link:

[http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP\\_pub/revisiting\\_one-sided\\_violence\\_UCDPno3.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/revisiting_one-sided_violence_UCDPno3.pdf)

### Violence still rules in Congo

**Congo's Curse**, 15:53 min (2006)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZd8RZnv2VU&feature=channel>

**Congo's Tin Soldiers**, 20:45 min (2007)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lo8c81xHLMw&feature=channel>

Although a few years old, these short documentary films are unfortunately still of current importance, as much of the depicted violence remains in the Democratic Republic of Congo today. The war is officially over, but the country's natural assets are a source of renewed conflict.

A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE STRUCK HAITI ON 12 JANUARY 2010. ITS DEVASTATING EFFECT CAUSED MORE THAN 200,000 DEATHS, INJURED 300,000 PEOPLE AND MADE ONE MILLION HOMELESS.

## *Prayer for Haiti*


*Compassionate One,  
our hearts cry out for the people of Haiti:  
for the millions affected,  
for lost loved ones,  
lost homes,  
and lost livelihoods.*

*Draw us together as your people  
to help in whatever ways we can.*

...

*As we work to bring relief and rescue,  
may the powers strive also  
to bring peace with justice to the people of Haiti  
so that they may live and be raised in fullness of dignity.*

*Fr. Claude Mostowik, President of Pax Christi Australia*



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