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Horn of Africa Bulletin

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Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin is a regional policy periodical, monitoring and analysing key peace and security issues in the Horn with a view to inform and provide alternative analysis on on-going debates and generate policy dialogue around matters of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily express the views of the LPI.

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About Life & Peace Institute

Since its formation, LPI has carried out programmes for conflict transformation in a variety of countries, conducted research, and produced numerous publications on nonviolent conflict transformation and the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding. The main focus of our work has been on Africa, with the Horn of Africa Programme being established and well-known in the 1990s, not least our work in Somalia. Other initiatives have been carried out in Congo-Brazzaville, Croatia, Sri Lanka and East Timor. We have strengthened the capacity of our civil society partners to address the conflicts in their own context, in some of the most difficult and war-torn countries.

Currently, we run conflict transformation programmes in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions in partnership with local civil society organisations and universities in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and the DRC. There is also a common programme including publications, policy work and methodology design based in Sweden.

EDITOR'S NOTE

In the past many studies have attested to the effect of Diaspora engagement in peace and security dynamics in the Horn. More recent literature has addressed the Diaspora's role as a source of investment and in the long run as an agent of socio-economic transformation and also the Diaspora utilization of new media both as a tool for political engagement and as a social space.

The Horn of Africa as a locus of migration flows has also generated its own Diasporas scattered around Europe, North America and the Middle East. The Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean Diasporas are key economic and political actors. These Diasporas have created networks and institutions which have extensive political and economic impact on the countries they originated from. Diasporas from the Horn of Africa have lobbied the governments of the countries they find themselves in to exert pressure on the politics and governments of their countries of origin. The Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean Diasporas have also channelled financial and other forms of support to political actors in their countries of origin. Diasporas have also often been tapped in a more tangible sense to contribute personnel for positions in the governments in their countries of origin.

It is clear however that there are critical gaps in the literature on Horn of Africa Diasporas. The literature often elides critical differentiation within Diaspora communities. It also essentializes the Diaspora and ignores the complexities and constantly evolving nature of Diaspora engagement and how it is socio-politically constructed.

The articles in the issue of the HAB were commissioned to address some of the perceived gaps in the literature. The authors of the articles have the benefit of long research engagement on issues of migration and Diasporas in the Horn of Africa region. Three of the articles in this issue focus on the experiences and impact of the Somali Diaspora. Markus' article is an interesting comparative discussion of the differential engagement of sections of the Ethiopian Muslim Diaspora and the Somaliland Diaspora. He underlines the critical importance of both the domestic and international contexts on the peace-building engagements efforts Diasporas. The cases he mentions of Diaspora engagement were 'success' stories but in very different contexts and with unexpected outcomes. The informative article by Nimo-ilhan Ali on the other hand focuses on a very different aspect of the perceived effect of Diaspora success and the paradoxical impact it has, in generating even more migration by Somaliland youth desperate to replicate the material success and heightened social stature of the Diaspora. Cindy Horst's article is a useful analytical take on the contradictions and gaps between the Diaspora's self-perceived 'messianic role' as political and economic saviours of their societies which is often resisted and viewed with suspicion by their compatriots who have remained home. Horst's article is a useful reminder that the very distance that the Diaspora have travelled (metaphorically speaking) and which is often interpreted as a mark of success and a source of both tangible and intangible resources, can have its own pitfalls, when Diasporas take on an outsized political and economic role.

The article by Nicole Hirt focuses on the evolution over time of the Eritrean Diaspora engagement with the politics and the Government of Eritrea. It also explores generational shifts of different waves of migration and their adoption of distinct socio-political stances towards the country they originated from

Interestingly while all of the authors shy away from reifying the 'Diaspora' i.e. a 'Durkeimian framing of the category Diaspora as social fact', the analysis in the articles takes the notion of

Diaspora as a given^[i]. This is an interesting insight into the tensions between a perceived desire to understand Diasporas as a social construct, a narrative and the reality of the Diaspora and its social, economic, political and cultural impact.

The articles in this issue of the HAB also point to interesting dilemmas and issues that policy makers at the national and international level concerned with the migration crisis and who wish to draw on Diaspora resources to mitigate socio-political and economic problems in the Horn, should pay attention to. The article by Nimo-ilhan Ali points to the dilemma posed by Diaspora success as a driver for further emigration and underlines the importance of paying attention to community attitudes and perceptions to reduce the flow of migration from the region. Markus' piece is a reminder of the complexity and the interdependence of factors that contribute to successful peace-building efforts by the Diaspora. Markus's article implicitly shows that the intersection of government policies and the international situation combine to create conducive conditions that enable Diaspora efforts in peace-building to have an impact. Cindy Horst's article shows that governments in the region in their bid to attract Diaspora investment and political support should design their efforts so that domestic socio-political attitudes and actors are not threatened.

^[i] Betts, Alexander. 2012. 'The Transnational Exile Complex: How to think about African Diaspora Politics'. Working Paper Series 88. Refugees Studies Centre: Oxford Diasporas Programme. Pg. 6.

Demessie Fantaye

Editor


The quest to become a “Qurbajoog”

By Nimo-ilhan Ali

Qurbajoog, a Somali word which loosely translates as ‘diaspora’, is a word that has gained prominence in the Somali language during the post-war era. The word *qurbajoog* is a combination of two separate words; *qurba* meaning ‘outside, abroad or overseas’ and *joog* meaning ‘stay’. In Somaliland, the word *qurbajoog* is almost exclusively used to identify a specific group of the Somali diaspora - those residing in the west such as Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand[1].

Qurbajoog is more than an identity marker; it has specific connotations and conjures specific images. In my recent research in Somaliland, I asked a group of university students to describe a *qurbajoog*. The answers provided were numerous, but the majority of the responses reveal that the diaspora enjoys high social esteem given the material and non-material contributions this group makes to Somaliland. They were also perceived as having relatively easy access to social and economic resources when they return ‘home’. Although the Somaliland diaspora in general tend to not stay permanently and are “revolving” returnees,[2] the number entering each year has increased over time and a few remain in the country (see graph below).

Graph 1: The yearly number of passengers from commercial flights entering the main airports in Somaliland



Source: Graph created by author using data from various reports by the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Development. The secondary axis corresponds with the ‘dotted’ line, which represents the difference between the yearly numbers of entrances and exits. These figures do not represent the ‘qurbajoog’ only. It is the total number of passengers that have entered and exited Somaliland using commercial flights and thus includes other diaspora groups as well as other passengers.

During discussions, a *qurbajoog* was understood in diametrically opposed sense from a *qolqoljoog* - a word used to refer to persons residing in the country. The first part of this word, *qolqol* or *qolqolka*, refers to a segment of the house, a ‘yard’ or a ‘small enclosed

space adjacent to the house'. A qolqoljoog thus refers to those residing in the country and implies those that are *inside* and who lack the social and economic resources associated with living *outside*. A qolqoljoog is therefore not similar to a qurbajoog. For one, a qurbajoog has been abroad, they are *wayo arag*-those who have travelled, seen and experienced many things – attributes that are highly valued in Somali society[3].

When students were asked what they thought were the main differences between a qurbajoog and a qolqoljoog, the answers provided were also numerous. However, two points cropped up repeatedly- a qurbajoog has a superior western education that allows him or her access to good jobs when at 'home' and is also equipped with a western passport that allows him or her flexibility in entering and leaving Somaliland. In addition to a host of other characteristics, these two features make the qurbajoog an important social and economic actor with significant influence in the social, political and economic spheres when at 'home'. These two characteristics were amongst the main features of a qurbajoog that Somaliland youth aspired to acquire.

Although the information provided by students was too general and ignored vital differentiation within this diaspora group, they captured the common perceptions held by young people in Somaliland about the qurbajoog. These perceptions, together with local factors, including the opportunities and constraints facing young people there, have been crucial in shaping youth ideas about social mobility. In fact, this combination has created a narrative about social mobility: to become successful in Somaliland one has to *leave* and *return* as a qurbajoog endowed with a western education and passport. The quest to become a qurbajoog is why young people embark on *tahriib* – a dangerous journey to Europe via the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean Sea.

This paper uses field data collected in Somaliland from January to October 2013 and from June to September 2015. The data used in this paper is largely qualitative and sought to capture the perceptions of young people about the constraints and opportunities they face, and the strategies they employ to navigate their environments. The paper is set out as follows: The following section briefly discusses the Somaliland youth, followed by an analysis of the two features embedded in the quest to becoming a qurbajoog – the quest for western education and a western passport. The next section discusses the utilisation of *tahriib* as a way to reach Europe and to realise the strategy of becoming a qurbajoog. The last section concludes the paper.

The Somaliland youth

Somaliland youth, similar to their counterparts in the other Somali regions, constitute the majority of the population[4]. Although this group at present has improved access to education across all levels compared to the period prior to the war, it continues to face significant social and economic challenges. First, over three quarters of young people are unemployed[5]. High levels of employment are however not limited to the youth population. The overall employment-to-population ratio in Somaliland stood at about 23 percent in 2012[6].

Second, socially, the Somaliland youth occupy an awkward position. Even though they

have been active in milestone events in the history of Somaliland,^[7] they have a limited say in the day-to-day affairs of Somaliland. The perception that young people are inexperienced, make rash decisions and cannot be trusted with important matters, is widespread. A popular Somali has it, *nin yari intuu geed ka boodo ayuu talo ka boodaa* which can be roughly translated as ‘a young man makes mistakes (as easily) as he jumps over a log’, captures this social perception. In politics, it was only recently that the age to run for district council office was lowered from 35 to 25^[8]. Youth often have to ask elders to be their *daamin* to ‘represent and vouch’ for them before they can be employed.


It would be incorrect to assume that young people in Somaliland are passive agents. Similar to youth in other parts of the world, Somaliland youths employ several strategies to navigate their environment and improve their social position. Through higher education for example, they now have degrees, something that elders often do not have – “*now I have a degree I can speak and people listen because they know I have the knowledge*” pointed out a university graduate^[9]. With their degrees, they also hope to find employment. However, given the intense competition for the few well-paid formal sector jobs, and the labour market’s preference of foreign education, they often are not successful.

Somaliland youth have formulated a strategy to overcome the challenges they face. This strategy involves leaving Somaliland and returning as a qurbajoog endowed with two important resources – a western education and a passport. Using migration as a strategy for upward social mobility is not unique to the Somaliland youth. Internal and external migration are strategies commonly employed by young people in other African countries^[10].

The quest for a western education

From the late 1990s, education provision in Somaliland across all levels has grown dramatically. This growth, which has mainly been driven by non-state actors, has significantly widened access to education (provided households can pay the fees) compared to the period before the war. The growth of education provision across all levels has however gone hand in hand with changing perceptions about the value of education being offered. For the university sector in particular, the initial growth from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s was highly welcomed, and households placed tremendous expectations on post-graduation outcomes. In 2013, over two-dozen universities were operating in Somaliland. However, as the number of universities continued to grow rapidly and chaotically, concerns about the quality of education on offer arose.

Graph 2: The number and distribution of universities across Somaliland



Source: Original map created by a cartographer at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. The author edited the map and added the content from field data. Each blue ball represents a university. A total of 28 universities were operating in Somaliland in 2013/2014. About 15 of these are in the capital city, Hargeisa.

The high expectations placed on post-graduation outcomes were gradually replaced by ambivalence, especially as opportunities after graduation became limited. Furthermore, the ambiguities regarding whether Somaliland degree certificates were recognised outside Somaliland also contributed to anxiety. By the beginning of this decade, a combination of limited state involvement in the higher education sector, coupled with the perceived low quality of education, gradually started to change perceptions about the value of university education. Increasingly, young people and their families began to see university education in Somaliland as *something to do whilst waiting for something else*. The excerpt below from a focus group discussion in Borama captures this dilemma.

My elder son recently told me, mother, I know I'm just starting university but I really do not see the point. All the older graduates are still sitting on their verandas doing nothing [...] my younger son who is finishing secondary school this year decided he does not want to study in this country. He said only people who study abroad are employed when they come back [...] there is no future in Somaliland^[11].

The uncertainties surrounding the benefits of university education in Somaliland is further accentuated by the high value attached to western degrees and other foreign degrees in the local labour markets. Employers systematically prefer holders of foreign degrees. Foreign degrees are perceived to be of superior quality and their holders are perceived to not only have a better command of the English language, but also supposedly better attuned to the western 'work ethic'. Although degrees from western countries are considered the 'best', employers also prefer all other degrees obtained outside Somaliland to those obtained in Somaliland.

The quest for a western degree as a motivation to become a qurbajoog can also be seen as a way for youth from less affluent households to respond to the perceived low quality

of the local education system. As young Somalis from better-off households are able to pursue higher education in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, India, Pakistan or Malaysia, they are not motivated to demand improvements in the local education system, while young people from poor households are left with a system that they can do very little to improve. The strategy to leave Somaliland and become a qurbajoog therefore provides an *exit* strategy for young people from poorer households. If successful this strategy not only provides access to western education, but may also allow lead eventually to a western passport, as discussed below.

The quest for a western passport

Somaliland youth also noted that obtaining a western passport was a crucial motivation behind their quest to becoming a qurbajoog. Having a western passport, they noted, would overcome perhaps one of the biggest obstacle to travelling legally outside Somaliland. It would also allow them the flexibility to move around and try their *nasiib* 'luck' elsewhere. A 23-year-old man who has recently graduated from university in Hargeisa noted during an interview:

"[...] I'm expected to work hard for my life and provide for my family and my relatives, yet I'm told this [*he draws an imaginary box in the air*] is the limit of your movements you can't leave Somaliland. How can a person make a living if he is not allowed to try his luck elsewhere when things here are impossible? It is not possible [...].[\[12\]](#)

As Somalia has in effect been without an internationally recognized government for over two decades, a Somali passport has not been a valid travel document for a long period of time. During this time the perceptions about Somalia being a 'failed state' and a haven for terrorists in conjunction with the 'War-on-Terror' discourse, has made travelling with a Somali passport incredibly difficult. Getting visas for legitimate purposes, such as education or visiting a family member outside the Somali regions, is often problematic[\[13\]](#). The continuing activities of Al-Shabaab have also made travelling within the East and Horn of Africa region extremely difficult for young Somalis in particular young Somali men. The situation for young people in Somaliland is even more ambiguous: although Somaliland declared its independence in May 1991, it is not internationally recognized and apart from Ethiopia, other foreign authorities do not accept Somaliland passports.

Apart from travelling limitations, the perception that those with western passports had greater access to better jobs is also pervasive. This was particularly associated with the heavy presence of qurbajoog in the humanitarian aid and development sector. Jobs in this sector are the most sought after due to the high level of remuneration they offer and the social prestige associated with them. It is however unlikely that having a western passport alone was sufficient to obtain a job in this sector. It is plausible that a combination of other factors, such as having a western education also play a role. However, it is might also be true that having an employee with a Somali passport make logistics difficult for international aid agencies, which tend to have their head offices outside the Somali regions.

Apart from having access to good jobs, young people also noted that having a western passport allows a qurbajoog, especially men, easy access to finding a spouse when at 'home'. Young men in Somaliland argued that it is not possible to compete with a qurbajoog when it comes to finding a spouse.

You spend a year or two talking to a girl. You think everything is going well then she marries a qurbajoog [...] it is always a qurbajoog. All girls in Somaliland want a qurbajoog because if they marry a qurbajoog they go abroad and get a passport [...] It does not matter the bad things they do [...] I know many girls that get married but the man does not come back to take them to Europe [...][14]

How do they leave?

In order for the strategy to become a qurbajoog to work, opportunities to emigrate have to be available. In the section above I noted how travelling using the Somali or Somaliland passport is incredibly difficult. To overcome this difficulty, young people in Somaliland are going on *tahriib* instead. *Tahriib* is an Arabic word that has been used in the Somali context to refer to the emigration of a large number of *young* Somali men and women (the majority are aged between 17 and 21) to Europe via Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya, and across the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. In Somaliland, the number of young people 'going on *tahriib*' is rising. Although accurate statistics are lacking, a recent UNHCR commissioned study estimated that some 500 to 3000 people cross the Somaliland/Ethiopia border each month en route to Libya[15].

Smugglers operating from Somaliland and throughout the route facilitate *Tahriib*. These smugglers operate a 'leave now - pay later' approach, which has removed one of the biggest constraints to emigration[16]. Any young Somali can, in effect, embark on *tahriib* without having to worry about paying the money upfront, or getting permission from their families[17]. The harsh nature of the route and the arrangement young people make with the smugglers, often leads to situations which can be categorized as human trafficking[18]. However, since *tahriib* is the only viable outlet to leave Somaliland, and since the costs associated with this journey are perceived to be relatively low (given the pay later approach)[19], *tahriib* has made the quest to become a qurbajoog a viable strategy for young people.

Conclusion

The widely held perception that qurbajoog are highly valued and respected within the society and enjoy greater access to social and economic resources when they return 'home', coupled with the social and economic constraints young people face in Somaliland, has led to the emergence of a strategy and narrative regarding social mobility for young people in Somaliland. The core of this this narrative and consequent strategy is the necessity to *leave* Somaliland and *return* back as a qurbajoog armed with a western passport and education. This strategy to leave Somaliland is facilitated by *tahriib* - a dangerous but only viable option for young people to reach Europe and realise their aspiration to become a qurbajoog. This is captured in a popular saying amongst the youth, *tahriibta maanta waa qurbajoog berito* 'those going on *tahriib* today are the

qurbajoog of tomorrow’.

Nimo-ilhan Ali is a Somali student currently pursuing her doctorate studies at the School Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London as a Mo Ibrahim Foundation scholar. She can be reached at: nimoali04@gmail.com

References

- [1] Although the Somali diaspora is not confined to the western countries and the size and impact of the near-diaspora residing in other parts of Africa, Yemen and the Gulf is significant, these groups of diaspora are not referred locally as qurbajoog. Instead, they are referred using a host of other words that tend to include the location or country of their residence i.e. *jaaliyaad carabta* referring to the Somali ‘community in the Arab’ countries.
- [2] Peter Hansen, “Revolving Returnees in Somaliland,” in *Living Across Worlds: Diaspora, Development and Transnational Engagement*, ed. Ninna N. Sørensen (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2007), 131–48.
- [3] C. Rousseau et al., “Between Myth and Madness: The Premigration Dream of Leaving Among Young Somali Refugees,” *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 30, no. 4 (1998): 385–411; Cindy Horst, “Buufis amongst Somalis in Dadaab: The Transnational and Historical Logics behind Resettlement Dreams,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 19, no. 2 (2006).
- [4] Officially a number of age-based categories are used to define the Somali youth: 15-24, 14 to 29 or 15 to 30. In reality though youth in the Somali society is determined less by age and more by specific life milestones that individuals achieve at different stages in their lives i.e. getting married.
- [5] SLMoP, “Somaliland National Development Plan (2012-2016)” (Hargeisa, Somaliland.: Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Development, 2011); SONYO, “Somaliland Youth Status Survey” (SONYO, 2011).
- [6] ILO, “Labour Force Survey Somaliland 2012: Report on Borama, Hargeisa, & Burro” (Nairobi. Kenya: Precise Trends Research & Consulting (PTR & C) & ILO, 2013).
- [7] For example the famous *Dhagax tuur* ‘stone throwing’ demonstration by young people in the early 1980s against the sentences imposed by the military regime on members of the Hargeisa group (See Bradbury, 2008)
- [8] Somaliland electro laws Article 33(4) amended by a presidential decree on 13 December 2011
- [9] Interview with a graduate of Amoud University, Borama August 2013

[10] T. Langevanga and K. Gough, "Surviving through Movement: The Mobility of Urban Youth in Ghana," *Social and Cultural Geography* 10, no. 7 (2009).

[11] Focus group discussion with mothers of university students. Borama 24th of July 2013.

[12] Interview with a recent university graduate. Hargeisa. July 2015

[13] A few young Somalis however do obtain scholarships to study in Turkey. In addition, young Somalis from better-off families also go to India, Pakistan, Malaysia to pursue higher education

[14] Interview with a 23 year university graduate. Hargeisa. August 2013

[15] Altai Consulting, "Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads. Mapping of Migration Routes from Africa to Europe and Drivers of Migration in Post-Revolution Libya" (UNHCR, November 2013), <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52b43f594.pdf>.

[16] Nimo-ilhan Ali, "Tahriib: Somali youth and the precarious journey to Europe. An investigation into 'tahriib' and its implications to families in Somaliland and Puntland," Rift Valley Institute, 2016 (forthcoming).

[17] Ibid

[18] RMMS, "Going West: Contemporary Mixed Migration Trends from the Horn of Africa to Libya and Europe" (Nairobi. Kenya: The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, June 2014).

[19] Although young people are aware that their families will have to fork out large sums of money at a later stage and are aware of widespread incidences of family having to stress-sale assets to raise this money, the fact that they themselves do not have to worry about this cost at the beginning of their journey, significantly reduces their considerations of the direct costs associated with tahriib. During discussions they often noted that their "relatives will pay" and their families will always find a way to raise the money.



AFRICA,SOMALIA

Somalia's hope for the future? The return of young Diaspora Somalis

By Cindy Horst

The Somali conflict has affected Somali citizens inside and outside the Somali region for over 25 years. While Somaliland and Puntland have enjoyed relative stability for more than two decades, conditions are much more fragile in south-central Somalia, and residents in many parts of the Somali region face considerable levels of insecurity still. In late 2012, however, the first permanent central government since the start of the civil

war was installed in Mogadishu. This increased expectations that south-central Somalia is transitioning towards greater stability and created hope amongst the Somali diaspora. Since 2011-2012, the number of people returning to south-central Somalia has increased considerably. While no statistics are available, full daily flights into Mogadishu offered by Turkish Airlines and the visibility of diaspora investments in business and real estate suggest that return to Mogadishu is now much more frequent than it was just a few years ago[1].

It is widely acknowledged that the Somali diaspora plays a central role in political-economic affairs while having socio-cultural impact inside the Somali region. Remittance inflows reach over 1.2 billion USD annually and have been extensively studied; in terms of, *inter alia*, the senders' motivations, their positive and negative impacts, and transnational relations between senders and receivers[2]. Similarly, their political role is immense and has received some academic interest, focusing on both contributions that increase conflict and those that try to mitigate conflict potential or work towards peace[3]. Another strand of literature has looked at the interlinkages of the Somali diaspora with development and humanitarian aid, as well as how donors encourage and support diaspora engagement[4]. While much of this political-economic influence plays out transnationally, it is increasingly crucial also to look at the impact of return. Some studies have been done on this over a decade ago in the case of Somaliland[5], but little is known about more recent returns to the region.

Based on a research project carried out by PRIO in collaboration with the Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota and the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), I would like to present some reflections on the role of return of young Somalis and their engagement in the region. I do not refer to 'return' in the sense of a final stop in a migration trajectory from a place of departure in the country of origin to a place of arrival in the country of destination and back. Rather, the reality of the Somalis we spoke to is better understood in terms of a transnational sense of civic engagement and belonging. Many of those we spoke to had engagements in, and experiences from, more than one national context. Those we spoke to talked about the vision they had to make a contribution at this particular stage of Somalia's history:

'Making changes and improvements to the city and to the lives of those who live here also means that you are contributing to peace and security. I want to be part of this' (Omar Hassan, returnee from Norway, Mogadishu)

Why go back?

Diaspora returnees frequently emphasize the sense of obligation and responsibility they feel towards their country of origin, indicating that they want to 'give back' or to 'contribute' to their 'homeland'. Young people especially, often also mentioned this in light of the competences and expertise they gained while living abroad. They feel a sense of responsibility because of being in a privileged position. At the same time, as Mohamud[6] argues 'the decision to return to Somalia may be motivated by a desire to contribute to the country's reconstruction, but is ultimately triggered by specific

opportunities enabling them to do so'. Indeed, another common motivation for return relates to career development opportunities. Our interviewees usually moved when specific opportunities arose, including a job offer, a business initiative or a political position. To some, their chances upon return are apparently limitless:

'Most exciting is the opportunity for growth and opportunity for employment... over 80, even 95 percent of development has already been achieved in other places where in Somalia it is the complete opposite as 85-95 percent of development has not been achieved. So for me, I see myself having the opportunity of becoming the Rockefeller or Kennedy of Somalia' (Ridwan Ali, returnee from Canada, Mogadishu)

At the same time, the reason for returning is also related to these young people contesting mainstream perceptions of their own futures in Norway and the USA. They feel they cannot make much of a contribution in their countries of residence, either because the system is well-functioning or because their own resources are not recognized.

'I knew that when it came to America, my contribution would be limited. What do I mean by this? Yes, my contribution is needed in America, but there are millions of people who have the same knowledge or are more knowledgeable than me that are already there. It has a system that has been in place and that has been working for centuries... When you look at my contribution here in Somalia it is really valuable and makes a difference'. (Mustafa Osman, returnee from Minneapolis, Mogadishu)

Somalia's hope for the future?

While thus, the role of the return of young diaspora Somalis in shaping Somalia's future is important to explore, it is crucial to realize that their understanding of making a 'real contribution' is contested locally. Those who never left Somalia challenge perceptions of belonging and who has the right to be civically engaged in Somalia and the idea that diaspora contributions are necessarily positive. This is often a reaction to the attitudes with which young Somalis return from the diaspora. Quite a few of our interviewees expressed viewpoints similar to the quote below:

'People in Somalia are creative and like to be active. They have energy, they have many organizations. They lack structure, experience and administration. They have the right energy, but they lack knowledge' (Axmed Yussuf, lives in Oslo, engages in civil society in Garowe)

With a large diaspora of potential returnees, Somalia faces both opportunities and challenges in the current phase of increasing stability. Those returning come back with visions of the ideal society, modelled by the political systems and societal traits that they appreciated in Europe and North America. Such visions may replicate modernization theory and its young believers face recognizable problems when describing realities in Somalia in evolutionary terms (where Somalia is simply 100 years behind the west). For obvious reasons, there is great resistance to such a worldview and the ideal future for Somalia it suggests. From this perspective there appears an intense contestation over

the future of Somalia, where young people (born and) raised in places like Oslo and Minneapolis envision Somalia as a place where they could live, if only certain things were different. They are willing to contribute to that change in an attempt to connect their own individual future with collective futures in Somalia:

‘it is hard to call this place my home although technically I know that it is. I feel disappointed with the government here. There was a time I was a nationalist. But there is tribalism here. There is no law and justice. If I can make the contributions that I want to here and things change, then it might very well become home’ (Jamac Moxamed, returnee from Minneapolis, Garowe).

Others have also observed this dissatisfaction with larger political structures among young diaspora Somalis in their research. Yet as Hassan[7] convincingly argues in the case of Somaliland, their position is often delegitimized precisely because of coming from abroad.

[P]eople educated in the west, if they go back to lead the country, they will be seen as stooges, puppets or spies, whatever you want to call them. Even if they might not be, Somali people will see that as the west manipulating their affairs and the fighting will continue. People should be empowered to decide what they want rather than imposing a rule over them, it would never work in Somalia (25 year-old Mursal, in Hassan 2014).

Multi-sited Embeddedness

Despite long-standing theoretical insights in anthropology and other fields, general conceptions of people’s political identity and belonging to a community are often still expressed in terms of ‘roots’ rather than ‘routes’ (Clifford, 1994, 1997) in countries of settlement[8]. Yet this rootedness is then challenged in Somalia, when the right of young returnees to contribute is delegitimized based on perceptions of external influence and manipulation.

If we do acknowledge the multi-sited embeddedness – both in the sense of belonging and acting – of young Somalis, we have to go beyond a focus on roots to understand the impact of routes on both their own and other people’s understanding of their role in Somalia’s future. This enables us to explore interesting aspects of their return to Somalia, as return allows young Somalis to compare contexts and this comparison may lead to contestations about Somalia’s future. As I have argued, seeing Somalia through a Norwegian or American lens, many young members of the Somali diaspora wish to contribute to radical transformations in Somalia’s political and social structures. At the same time, through their return they aim to reshape their own future to one where they feel they can make a ‘real contribution’ to society – albeit not the society they grew up in but the society their parents moved from. These developments represent a number of opportunities for Somalia’s future, which are important to explore. But they also denote significant challenges if questions on who has the right to belong to and participate in society are not addressed.

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AFRICA, ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA

Somali and Ethiopian Diasporas for peace compared

By Markus Virgil Hoehne

Diaspora frequently has been conceptualized as product of war or other devastations that led to flight and exile. The longing for 'homeland' and the will of people in exile to collectively keep their 'old' identity was seen as a key component of the concept. Recent literature (since the 1990s) has expressed doubts about this monolithic and simplified understanding of diasporas[1]. I wish to stress that diasporas exist only in the plural (i.e., Somali diasporas, Ethiopian diasporas) and are dynamic and flexible. Flight or migration also does not automatically lead to collective diaspora formation. Only if the will to identify with a 'home' outside the country of residence is strong among a certain group of people can diasporas emerge. In other cases, migrants may simply assimilate into the host society. Second or third generation immigrants are not always willing to keep the idea of another 'home' alive[2]. The continued existence of a diaspora also depends on the intergenerational transmission of this kind of identity in exile. All diasporas are products of what 'lies behind' in the country of origin as well of what were the conditions of travel or flight and particularly what was the situation upon arrival in the country of residence. 'Back home' as well as in the 'new home', conditions are ever changing, which again has an impact on diasporas[3]. Besides, regional or global political and economic dynamics such as the 9/11 attacks and the war against terrorism or oil booms or crises play a role in framing diasporic and transnational activities[4].

This article deals with Somali and the Ethiopian diasporas and their recent engagement for peace and stability in their places of origin in the Horn of Africa. People originating from both settings have a considerable migratory history in the region and beyond. Already in the 15th century AD Ethiopian monks migrated to Jerusalem and Rome to establish religious centres. Bahru Zewde et al. (2010) underscore, however, that 'these early migrations rarely arose out of situations of conflict. They were relocations that arose from the quest for religious redemption or in pursuit of knowledge.' [5] Somalis had established a presence in Aden across the Gulf of Aden in the 19th century; this presence was mostly economically motivated[6]. Only from the second half of the 20th century onward, did war, political oppression and natural disaster become the key matters in driving many citizens of both countries out of their homes. Worldwide, currently more than one million Ethiopians and one million Somalis live as refugees or

citizens of other states[7]. Top destinations include Sudan (for Ethiopians), Kenya (for Somalis) and for both groups the USA, Europe and the Arabic Peninsula. Due to a lack of systematic data collection in the countries of origin as well as in the countries of destination, accurate statistics are not available.

Diasporic Engagement

Until recently, diasporas were considered a risk factor concerning peace and stability in a country. Some argued that there was a significant relation between civil war in a country of origin and the size of its diaspora. More recently, diasporas were 'discovered' as development actors and even as peace-builders in their country of origin. Western, particularly European, governments sought to enlist diasporic actors in their efforts to bring stability and development to countries in the 'global south'[8]. Governments in the countries of origin realised that their diasporas constituted an important resource. Eritrea, for instance, established a diaspora tax. Other countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia and Somaliland opened diaspora liaison offices in their respective capitals. Politicians from the countries of origin 'tour' the diaspora in order to gain political and economic support or to motivate people to invest back home. It is only rarely, however, that the concrete effects of diasporic engagement have been studied ethnographically. In the following sections, I provide two examples drawn from Ethiopian and Somali diasporic engagement back home from a larger project called Diaspeace, which was funded by the EU between 2008 and 2011 and which involved ethnographic research in the region[9].

Ethiopian Muslims in the diaspora for social reform back home

Ethiopia is a multi-religious country. According to the official census of 2007, 43.5 per cent of the population are Orthodox, 33.9 per cent are Muslims with the rest belonging to other denominations. Traditionally, the country was dominated by the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church that had a close symbiotic relationship with the state. Muslims in Ethiopia were often viewed with suspicion. In the past Ethiopia was depicted by its rulers and the church as a 'Christian island in a hostile Muslim sea', referring to the tense relations with the Islamic-dominated neighbouring states (particularly Sudan and Somalia). Against this background, which produced the systematic marginalization of Muslims in Ethiopia, Dereje Feyissa (2011) described diasporic initiatives of Ethiopian Muslims in Europe and the USA to increase the profile of their Muslim compatriots back home and demand rights and recognition from the government in Addis Ababa[10]. The two key organisations were the Network of Ethiopian Muslims in Europe (NEME) and its counterpart in the USA, Badr-Ethiopia. Both organisations established close contact with homeland Muslim activists and sought to bring to the attention of the country's political leadership the concerns of Ethiopian Muslims. Apart from a very strong presence in cyberspace, representatives of NEME participated in various delegations to Ethiopia sent by a consortium of diaspora organizations, to foster the Muslim cause.

One of these delegations in 2007 explicitly focused on peace building in the area of religious tolerance and peaceful co-existence, aiming at making the Ethiopian national identity more (religiously) inclusive. The initiative enjoyed several successes. Over a

decade the Ethiopian *ulema* was divided between the so-called local Sufi and Saudi-related Wahhabi camps. The delegation moderated the polemical theological debate through the creation of an *ulema* unity forum where compromises were made to accommodate doctrinal differences. Second, the delegation also sought to reach out to the Christian establishments to foster inter-faith dialogue at a time when religious conflicts were on the rise in Ethiopia. Third, the diaspora activists framed their endeavour in the globally recognized rights language, citing the country's constitution, international conventions as well as drawing on their experiences of democratic practice in their host countries. This delegitimized calls for violent change espoused by some fringe radical elements within the Muslim community.

One key aim of the local and diasporic Muslim activists was the establishment of a new and stronger Muslim leadership in Ethiopia that would be able to bridge ethnic divides and represent Muslim interests in the country credibly. The exiting Majlis (Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council) had been strongly influenced by the state. Feyissa and Lawrence (2014) mentioned that in 2009 popular pressure had finally led to a change of the Islamic leadership. The new council, however, failed to generate legitimacy and become a representative and effective institution. Government interference in Muslim affairs increased (possibly also against the background of the rise of Al Shabaab to power in Somalia) from 2011 onward, when Addis Ababa sought to promote a particular group of 'moderate' Muslims called Al-Habash as the 'true' Ethiopian Muslims, which led to new tensions among Ethiopia's Muslims[11].

Stabilizing war-torn Somaliland through economic investments

Civil war began in northern Somalia in the 1980s. It culminated in the bombardment of the cities of Hargeysa and Bur'oo by the Somali national army in 1988. Eventually, the Somali government was toppled by armed opposition forces in the south in early 1991. Subsequently, southern and central Somalia descended into protracted armed conflict. In north-western Somalia, however, the Republic of Somaliland was declared as independent state. Local communities engaged in peace and state-building. Yet, until the mid-1990s Somaliland was essentially a volatile and still war-ridden place.

Against this context, Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim (2010) analysed two economic investments in Hargeysa, the capital of Somaliland that significantly contributed to sustainable peacebuilding in Hargeysa and beyond[12]. In the early 1990s, Hargeysa lay in ruins. Additionally, a new civil war between various groups raged in the town between 1994 and 1996. In May 1994, an engineer who originated from Hargeysa but had made his fortune in Kuwait decided to invest his savings in the construction of a major hotel in the north of the town. Construction was complicated due to shortage of material, funding limitations and the fighting in Hargeysa. But finally, on August 30, 1996, Maansoor Hotel was officially opened.

However, the situation in Hargeysa remained volatile. The whole south of the town was still in a situation of 'no war, no peace'. It was where the previous fighting had happened about the control of the airport, and where members of a particular clan resided who felt

marginalised by the government of Somaliland. Around 1998 a diaspora actor from the UK decided to build a major hotel near the airport. Initially, local community representatives sought to discourage the investor by stressing that he would be putting all his money into a deserted and insecure place and therefore lose it. But in 2000, the Ambassador Hotel opened and soon became highly profitable.

The construction of these hotels had lasting effects extending much beyond the immediate economic benefits accruing to the investors. Around both places, a wholly new infrastructure developed. Houses, shops and roads were built and the value of land increased dramatically in the wider areas around Maansoor and Ambassador. Both investments also created jobs directly (in the hotels) and indirectly (around them). More importantly, they gave people a stake in the local polity and an interest in continued peace. Menkhaus (1999) argued correctly that that large and visible investments by the diaspora 'are important not only for the jobs they create but also for the sense of confidence they build locally that wealthy diaspora members believe in the future of the area enough to make a major fixed investment there.'^[13] The construction of the two hotels created a balance between different parts of the town and different powerful groups.

Conclusion

Peacebuilding presupposes long-term commitment to a process and addressing the material and immaterial levels of a given conflict. It can be distinguished from other developmental and humanitarian activities because, 'it has the specific political aims of reducing the risk of resumption of conflict and contributing to the creation of conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.'^[14] Against this background, both examples mentioned in this article show the potential of diasporas from the Horn of Africa to contribute to peace in the region. Of course, as initially outlined, various structural factors (in the countries of origin, of residence, but also globally) enable or hinder diasporic engagement.

Looking at the conditions in Ethiopia and Somaliland, respectively in which the diasporic engagements occurred, it becomes clear that the general contexts were quite different. Ethiopia is a stable state with a long history of institutionalisation of politics. Government control is strong and opposition is frequently met with force. In Somaliland state institutions are rather weak and frequently, social capital counts for more than the positions individuals hold. Back in 2007, when the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora sought to reform Muslim organisations in Ethiopia and negotiate on behalf of Muslims in Ethiopia, it had to manoeuvre carefully. Within the country, it had to play the national card and clearly distinguish itself from radical elements in the Muslim community. NEME and Badr-Ethiopia also had to deal with the 'siege' mentality of the Orthodox Church; at the same time the government was incrementally creating a more regulated framework for civil society activism;^[15] additionally Islamists in Somalia threatened the stability of the region. NEME and Badr-Ethiopia also had to deal with a global situation after 9/11 in which transnational Muslim activism was viewed with suspicion. Nevertheless, they achieved some success in mediating between opposed sections of the Ethiopian *ulema*

and increasing the recognition of the legitimate concerns of Ethiopian Muslims.

In contrast, when the private economic investments to build Maansoor Hotel and Ambassador Hotel happened in Somaliland, government restrictions were minimal. The local setting was characterised by war and instability and massive lack of any kind of development. The commitment of the investors and social relations between them and local people proved central for the success of the investments. The absence of strong statehood and government regulations provided the moral and economic impetus for the investments in a non-recognized state, which comes with its own complications, e.g., concerning the ordering of construction materials from the international market or legal guarantees of property. The transnational activism of many Somalis in the 1990s was also not followed up by most external actors, since officially, Somaliland did not even exist and the international community concentrated on containing the disaster in the south. It was a time of domestic and transnational liberalism with all chances and risks upon those who engaged in it. Simultaneously, to become active, as the founders of Maansoor Hotel and Ambassador Hotel did, one needed to have pre-existing private capital. Most Somalis who had fled only after 1988 were not yet established enough abroad to engage substantially back home. A new period of diasporic activities with massive investments in hospitals, schools, universities, businesses and infrastructure began only in the late 1990s and early 2000s and up until today contributes massively to the economic development and the stabilisation of peace in Somaliland.

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- [3] Pirkkalainen, Paivi 2013: *Transnational Responsibilities and Multi-sited Strategies: Voluntary Associations of Somali Diaspora in Finland*. Unpublished PhD, University of Jyväskylä, p. 28.
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people living in exile and keeping up their version of their 'original' identity. Transnationalism concerns practices of individuals or groups within and between different nation states. Transnational belonging is not confined to national or ethnic containers. See: Glick Schiller, Nina; Basch, Linda; Blanc-Szanton, Christina 1992: 'Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration.' In: N. Glick Schiller, L. Basch, C. Blanc-Szanton (eds.), *Towards a transnational perspective on migration: race, class, ethnicity, and nationalism reconsidered*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, pp 1-24; Cohen, Robin 1997: *Global diasporas*, London: UCL Press.

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[7] The total population of Ethiopia is roughly 80 million; the one of Somalia is roughly 14 million; of course, there are also several million Somalis living as citizens in Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia who are not refugees, but belong to these states due to colonial partition. Still, the ratio of people abroad compared to those back home is much higher in the Somali than in the Ethiopian case. Gundel (2002) aptly characterized Somalis as a 'globalized nation'. See: Gundel, Joakim 2002: The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study. *International Migration* 40(5): 255-281.

[8] For a good overview of this debate, see Pirkkalainen, Päivi and Abdile, Mahdi 2009: *The Diaspora - Conflict - Peace - Nexus: A Literature Review*. Diaspace Working Paper 1 (online <https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/handle/123456789/36875>).

[9] For further details, see: http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/45861_de.html

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[14] Ramsbotham, Oliver, Hugh Miall and Tom Woodhouse 2003: *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: Blackwell/Polity Press, p. 195.

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AFRICA, ERITREA

One Eritrean Generation, Two Worlds: The established Diaspora, the new exiles and their relations to the homeland

By Nicole Hirt

At the time of Eritrea's independence in 1993, roughly one million Eritreans had fled the armed conflict with Ethiopia [1] and settled in neighbouring Sudan, in various Middle Eastern countries, Europe, North America and Australia. The vast majority of these Eritrean refugees supported the independence struggle from abroad, although political loyalties were divided between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which had initiated the struggle in 1961 and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which had dominated the liberation war from the mid-1980s on and led the country to independence.

In spite of an initial "liberation euphoria", only a small number of Eritreans returned from exile for good, while the vast majority chose to remain in their respective host countries. However, most Eritreans abroad maintained links to their homeland and considered themselves as part of a transnational community. The EPLF, re-named People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in 1994, took over the government, and one of its major efforts was to consolidate its control over the diaspora. It introduced a 2% rehabilitation tax levied on all Eritreans residing outside the country, and established community organisations in all regions with significant diaspora populations with the aim of controlling its citizens abroad [2]. Initially, most Eritreans in the diaspora volunteered to support their war-torn homeland financially, and when renewed war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998, many of them redoubled their efforts.

In the aftermath of the war, when President Isaias Afewerki crushed emerging internal dissent in 2001 by jailing prominent PFDJ-reformers who had demanded democratisation, the number of critical voices in the diaspora increased as well. However, the political opposition, which consists of more than 30 groupings has been weakened by rifts along ethnic, regional and religious lines and has so far failed to find a functional roadmap to facilitate regime change in Eritrea. The older generation's

political focus has always remained the independence struggle, and the rift between ELF and EPLF has continued with some modifications. The old ELF disintegrated by splitting into various sub-organisations, and many former EPLF supporters distanced themselves from the ruling PFDJ and formed new parties, most prominently the Eritrean Democratic Party[3]. Some PFDJ dissidents also engage in newly emerging political forums.

However, there are still many Eritreans living in the diaspora who have not distanced themselves from the autocratic regime that is ruling their homeland. The government has been successful in developing a narrative in which Eritrea is portrayed as a heroic nation struggling against the rest of the world in order to achieve independence and self-reliance, a fact which, according to the government's narrative, has triggered an international conspiracy in order to weaken the young nation. Other diaspora Eritreans have in turn engaged in civil society movements with the aim to counteract the regime's efforts to mobilize the diaspora for its goals, by committing themselves to shed light on the worrying human rights situation at home while striving for peaceful political change[4].

The Second-Generation Diaspora Youth's Long-Distance Nationalism

Since independence a new generation of Eritreans have been raised far from their homeland, but many of them still consider themselves as Eritreans, even if they have acquired their host country's nationality. As Lyons and Mandaville remark, long-distance nationalism often thrives in the diaspora, which can also be a breeding-ground for anti-democratic behaviour[5]. The PFDJ itself has actively tried to mobilise the diaspora youth abroad by establishing the Youth PFDJ as a mobilisation hub in 2004. This political youth organisation has developed a "festival culture" combined with seminars conducted by regime cadres that gives second generation diaspora youth the feeling of contributing to an important cause and motivates them to donate money for the regime. It tries to attract young Eritreans, some of whom are facing difficulties integrating into their host societies, where they feel like "second-class citizens".

However, in recent years the numbers of government supporters has declined due to various factors including rising international criticism of the regime and the imposition of sanctions on Eritrea[6]. In recent years various civic organisations have flourished in the diaspora, among them Human Rights Concern Eritrea and "Arbi Harnet" (Freedom Friday), a movement that tries to mobilise people inside the country to engage in acts of civil disobedience. Many younger diaspora Eritreans consider the traditional opposition parties as ossified and unable (or even unwilling) to bring about change, and accordingly some independent political movements have emerged in recent years. One of the most prominent is Eritrean Youth Solidarity for Change, one of the participants in the 2013-founded Bologna Forum that seeks to gather diaspora Eritreans from all walks of life and to present an open platform for pro-democracy advocates under the motto "Eritrean solutions for Eritrean problems[7]."

The pro-government as well as the opposition camp have regularly engaged in demonstrations to express their opinion about Eritrea-related UN policies. Following the imposition of targeted sanctions including an arms embargo in 2009, both government

supporters and opponents demonstrated in Geneva and other cities to express either their condemnation or their appreciation of this punitive measure, respectively. Similarly, the devastating report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights on Eritrea that was released in June 2015 and accused the government of possible crimes against humanity triggered both pro-government and anti-government demonstrations. While the regime opponents expressed their gratitude to the commission and encouraged it to take further steps to unveil human rights atrocities committed by the Eritrean regime, government supporters dismissed the work of the Commission altogether and called it an “unwarranted attack on the state of Eritrea[8].”

The New Exiles and their Ties to the Homeland

Inside Eritrea, developments have gone from bad to worse since the political crisis of 2001. In 2002 the government introduced a so-called development campaign as a reaction to the prevailing no war no peace situation with Ethiopia as a consequence of the latter’s refusal to implement the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)’s final and binding decision, which had awarded Badme, the border war’s bone of contention, to Eritrea. The duration of the obligatory military and national service was extended from previously 18 months to unspecified periods. Women between 18 and 27 and men between 18 and up to 50 years have since been forced to serve in the army or to perform civilian tasks for pocket money[9]. This has resulted in a state of social anomie where people are no longer able to perform socially expected tasks such as caring for their own spouse and children and for their elderly parents in the absence of a social welfare network provided by the state[10].

While high-ranking military officers and PFDJ cadres profit from the unpaid work of the conscripts on plantations and in PFDJ-owned construction companies, the regime has virtually delegated the task of feeding the population to the diaspora. This situation has triggered an accelerating mass exodus, and according to the UNHCR currently about 5,000 Eritreans are fleeing Eritrea every month illegally, because national service conscripts are forbidden to leave without exit visas. The majority end up in either Sudan or Ethiopia, but many are struggling to make their way to Europe, where Eritreans currently make up the largest group of asylum seekers after Syrians. These new exiles find themselves in a much more vulnerable position than the second generation diaspora youth. While they face arduous dangers en route to their destiny while passing through the Sahara desert, civil war-ridden Libya and the Mediterranean, they also face growing xenophobia in many European countries that feel overwhelmed by the rapidly growing numbers of refugees.

In addition, their government does nothing to alleviate their problems once they have left, viewing them as deserters who have failed to fulfil their national service obligations. Eritrean officials have been involved in smuggling and trafficking of their own citizens[11], and once they are abroad, they are made to sign a “letter of regret” if they are in need of consular services, in which they pledge to pay the 2% tax immediately and to accept any punishment the government deems appropriate upon their eventual return. However, the aim of these young refugees is not to return, but to live their lives

autonomously and to plan their lives far away from the tentacles of their government. By doing so, they are striving to reach the same status that the established diaspora enjoys, whose members are considered as “first class citizens” and are granted more rights than the people inside Eritrea and the refugees on the road^[12]. Only when they have settled and have become a source of financial largesse for the government, are they treated as citizens. It remains to be seen how the new exiles will position themselves in relation to the regime they fled. Having grown up in an authoritarian environment, few of them actually have opted for political activism. Exceptions are some university-educated Eritreans who left the country shortly after the 2001 political crackdown, among them lawyers, journalists and former government officials, who have since engaged in human rights advocacy, civil society movements and political forums.

Conclusion: Can Eritrea’s Diaspora Contribute to Peace in the Horn?

Eritrean youth are currently fleeing from a country whose government has embarked on a course of societal militarisation in order to counter (real or perceived) threats from its larger neighbour Ethiopia. The mass exodus of the Eritrean conscripts in itself can be interpreted as a powerful “no” to the Eritrean regime’s policies towards Ethiopia. More than a hundred thousand Eritreans have meanwhile found shelter in Ethiopia and some of them are allowed to continue their education and to integrate into Ethiopian society, which in the long run may contribute to the normalisation of relations between both peoples. However, some Eritreans in Ethiopia have joined groups committed to armed resistance against the Eritrean regime from Ethiopian soil, which so far has been largely ineffectual.

While the only option for those residing inside Eritrea is voting with their feet in the absence of any possibilities to raise their voice in a highly authoritarian environment, diaspora Eritreans have more choices, at least in theory. They could lobby international political decision makers to put pressure on Ethiopia to implement the EEBC’s boundary decision, which serves as a pretext for Eritrea’s militaristic policies. Alternatively they could, and some groups are indeed engaged in bringing about political change in Eritrea in the hope that a new government may engage in a constructive dialogue with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has tried to facilitate the consolidation of the political and civic Eritrean opposition movements by promoting the Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change (ENCDC), albeit without much success. And of course there are those diaspora Eritreans who support the hard-line position of their government and consider Ethiopia the archenemy.

In a nutshell, the young generation born inside Eritrea has made it impressively clear that they want to live in peace and are unwilling to participate in the belligerent policies of their government. Diaspora Eritreans, who are not directly affected by the indefinite military and national service, have so far not focused on lobbying for a solution to the stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia for various political reasons, and their influence on political decision-making inside Eritrea is extremely limited.

Therefore, it will be the task of the international community to pressure for a solution of

the conflict. European policy-makers are currently considering to support the Eritrean regime with fresh EU development aid in order to curb the youth exodus, which is unlikely to yield any tangible results unless a process of demilitarisation will be initialized. In order to advance into this direction, European policy-makers should resume efforts to pressure for a diplomatic solution and bring the two governments back to the negotiating table. Ethiopia's refusal to accept the EEBC decision and Eritrea's refusal to engage in any form of dialogue have been left unchallenged for too long by the guarantors of the Algiers Peace Agreement, which include the EU, the USA, the UN and the African Union.

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Resources

Assessing Anti-Corruption, Accountability, and Transparency Measures in South Sudan

This [policy brief](#) by the Sudd Institute provides important background and analysis as to the current state of measures in South Sudan against corruption and which seeks to ensure accountability and transparency regarding public resources. It provides valuable insights not only about the situation regarding corruption in South Sudan, but also sheds light on one of the factors that led to the civil war in the South Sudan and which conceivably could influence the future of the current peace agreement.

The Role of Media in War and Peace in South Sudan

This [policy brief](#) discusses in broad outlines the role of the media both new and traditional in the South Sudan conflict. The author places the incremental erosion of the autonomy and space enjoyed by the media after the outbreak of the current conflict in its socio-historical context. The brief is also informative regarding the ambiguous role of media in the South Sudan in framing the conflict and in the process perpetuating an atmosphere that fans the war.

The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power

This is a [new book](#) by a long time analyst and expert on the politics of the Horn of Africa, Alex de Waal. This extremely interesting and at the same time somewhat polemical work takes the 'political economy' of conflict model (popularized by Collier et.al) and applies it to the conflicts and sources of insecurity in the Horn. The work and its analysis could be critiqued for a crude economic reductionism, but at the same time is invaluable in terms of the light it sheds on one of the key drivers of conflict and insecurity in the region.