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Safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process

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Stability or stumbling block for African democracy?

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A three layered approach to the prevention of electoral violence

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Elections – no quick fix for peacebuilding

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PEACE:
A way forward to peaceful elections

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New Routes

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Elections: Free, fair – and nonviolent?

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS are in many aspects seen as the basis for democracy and are mentioned in Article 21 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage ..." However, not least in politically unstable or post-conflict situations, tensions between contending parties may lead to outbursts of violence. Therefore, maybe "nonviolent" should be added to the often used phrase "free and fair elections"?

Still, a word of warning against an exaggerated trust in free elections would be in place. They are no panacea for the problems encountered in peacebuilding and development. With examples from Liberia, Morten Bøås in his article reflects on elections in a country where the war is over but peace has not yet come. This situation becomes especially volatile in multi-ethnic societies, where the outcome of the elections may result in increased marginalisation of one or more groups.

Examples of election-related violence and efforts to mitigate it are found in several of the articles in this New Routes issue. Paul van Tongeren and Jacob Brand-Jacobsen present the setting up of Infrastructures for Peace, which have improved the situation in a number of vulnerable environments.

Andrew Bradley and Sead Alihodzic, both from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, in their respective articles stress the need for actors at different levels to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process.

While multi-party democracy is winning ground in large parts of the world, some countries on the African continent emerge as, or remain, democracies with one-party dominant systems. Renske Doorenspleet and Lia Nijzink analyse the causes and consequences of this type of political system.

It is an interesting mental exercise to think of all the experiences of voting and elections among New Routes readers. Do you regard your right to vote as a privilege or a duty, or maybe as a combination of both? Do you take universal and equal suffrage for granted or does it have the excitement of a new phenomenon in your community? Would you agree that it is your responsibility as a citizen to express your opinion in free, fair – and nonviolent – elections?

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It is a well-known truth that democracy is not won once and for all. The same is indeed valid for free and fair elections. Without them no democracy can exist, but all over the world and at all times, the issue remains a challenge. The key to credible elections rests with political actors at the national, regional and international levels who must live up to their responsibility. In order to support and safeguard this obligation, the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security was established in March 2011.

Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security:[1]

Safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process

Andrew Bradley

A number of troubled electoral processes and their outcomes in recent years have challenged the credibility and sustainability of democracy, including the commitment of the international community to upholding democratic principles. While well-managed elections can lead to a peaceful transition of power, some elections have been flawed – fraudulent, violent, manipulated, or a combination thereof. Even well managed elections do not necessarily ensure a peaceful and equitable outcome. In some cases, national stakeholders fail to respect commitments and obligations they have undertaken. The international community often lacks a consistent and long-term approach in support of elections, or does not respond timely and effectively to potentially challenging elections.

The integrity of elections is often seen as a technical challenge that can be addressed by the sharing of best practices and knowledge, and the building of organisational and management capacities. However, it is a deeper challenge that requires political will – setting of political priorities and an appreciation of the importance of a credible electoral process in the building and deepening of democracy and in promoting development, peace, security and stability.[2]

Maintaining the integrity of the electoral process is first and foremost the responsibility of national stakeholders. Governments, political parties and leaders, legislatures, electoral management bodies, judiciaries, civil society, and the media all have roles to play in ensuring the integrity of elections. Most countries have made commitments to principles, which would, if respected, ensure credible electoral processes. However, these principles are not consistently implemented and/or promoted for a number of reasons, which can include, inter alia, lack of political will, insufficient technical expertise and inadequate international support.

As for the international community, there is a clear need for a more strategic approach: one which integrates electoral support with political will so as to ensure continued and sustainable democratic development globally. Not addressing this challenge will have serious consequences, especially undermining the integrity of elections and the erosion of public trust in democracy as a means to deliver security, stability, economic and social progress. The international community is often seen as prioritising political expediency and short-sighted security considerations rather than democratic principles. The results of not taking action may be as troubling for the international community as for countries under the burden of weak or ineffective electoral processes, or governed by political leadership of questionable legitimacy.

While elections themselves require a massive technical and professional effort, the starting point is political commitment. The key to credible elections rests with political actors at the national, regional and international levels.

Flawed elections around the world

There are many examples of troubled electoral processes around the world and in countries at every stage of development. In the 2010 presidential elections in Cote d'Ivoire, the incumbent did not want to acknowledge defeat at the ballot box and was eventually removed by force. In Afghanistan (2009 and 2010) electoral fraud was situated within a broader context of on-going conflict and less effective government. This has eroded trust in prospects for democracy, the international community's commitment to democracy, and the ability of a democratic regime to deliver security or improved development results.

Kenya's contested elections in 2007 led to widespread violence resulting in more than 1,500 deaths and 650,000 people being displaced in post-election violence. In Sudan (2010), amid a widespread election boycott by national actors and reports of high-level instances of fraud, the electoral assistance efforts of the international community were perceived by many to be ineffective.

The reaction of the international community to the result of the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 has both weakened the integrity of the electoral process and the credibility of international commitment to democratic principles and elections. In 2000, the

United States of America saw a presidential race, marked by technical flaws, that was ultimately decided by a judicial process.

The Arab Spring and the turbulent political change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have demonstrated that the popular demand (national actors) for democracy is a global phenomenon and not bound by region, ethnicity, culture, or religion. Prior to the popular uprisings that have brought about the recent changes, Tunisia and Egypt had both held elections. These elections were decreasingly meaningful and not taking into consideration the development and security contexts within which they were held. As a result, elections were regarded as illegitimate and/or inadequate expressions of the will of the citizens.

The challenges to authoritarianism in the Arab world and the need to consolidate democratic gains in the region, as well as the positive resolution of the stalemate in Cote d'Ivoire, have underscored the importance of elections for democratic governance. However, these examples are not sufficient, and too often, incumbents rig the elections, illicit funding or media bias distort the electoral process, and losing candidates refuse to accept the results. Where elections are marred in these ways, people lose faith in democracy and the political process, and human rights and security are put at risk.

Therefore, an active engagement with the broader constituencies of security and development is necessary in order to achieve the objectives of credible elections: peaceful political transitions delivering improved development, stability and security.

Global Commission on elections

In an effort to promote and protect the integrity of the electoral process, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Kofi Annan Foundation (KA Foundation)[3] have established the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security[4] in March 2011. The objective of the Commission is to develop, by September 2012, targeted and applicable policy recommendations for national as well as regional, continental and international organisations on how to best support the integrity of electoral processes. Through its work, the Commission aims to:

- Develop a compelling and comprehensive approach within which national and international efforts can successfully safeguard the integrity of the electoral process and support sustainable democratisation;
- Provide recommendations to national governments, institutions and civil society as well as international and regional organisations on how to collaborate effectively to translate the new approach into practice; and
- Promote, including at high political level, renewed national and international commitment in support of the integrity of electoral processes.

In developing the aforementioned recommendations, the Commission is expected to:

- Identify major challenges to the integrity of the electoral process in various situations around the world, and ways in which these can be adequately addressed;
- Examine the experiences and consequences of the engagement of the international community in electoral processes. To this end the Commission will analyse adherence to international legal and normative obligations undertaken by states, as well as issues of long-term commitment, consistency and unity in international approaches; and
- Determine the roles different stakeholders – such as the development, human rights, security and electoral communities – could play at various levels in order to ensure the integrity of the electoral process in broader contexts of peacebuilding, democratic transitions and sustainable development.

Focus on electoral integrity

To fulfil its mandate and mobilise political commitment, the Commission will be advocating a more central place for the integrity of elections on the international agenda as a means of promoting democracy, human rights, long-term stability, security and human development. This will take place through outreach to leaders of national governments, heads of international and regional organisations, other key policymakers and the general public.

The Commission is an independent body, and determines its own priorities and agenda. The Commission will also consider relevant issues beyond the more narrowly defined "elections administration", such as security planning, power sharing, peaceful transitions, and political commitment to electoral processes at national, regional and international levels. The work of the Commission is complemented by an advisory group[5], supported by a research director, and facilitated by a secretariat, hosted by International IDEA.

At its first meeting held in South Africa in March 2011, the Global Commission indicated that it will work to convince different stakeholders that elections with integrity matter not just for democracy, but also for security, human rights, and development. Key to the Commission's approach is ensuring that the international community applies political solutions to the political problems surrounding elections, rather than purely technical approaches. To this end, the Commission determined that there is a need to:

- Raise the costs for those who seek to rig and steal elections, and ensure that when elections take place, the potential for abuse and violence are reduced;
- Strengthen international commitment to the professional conduct of elections, including supporting high-quality, credible electoral monitoring;
- Bolster international support for stronger national capacity to run fair elections;
- Reduce the potential for abuse and election-related violence; and
- Build international consensus to stand firm in cases where parties try to steal elections.[6]

Challenges to electoral credibility

At its inaugural meeting the Commission agreed to examine, inter alia, the following eight challenges to the credibility of elections at the national level: 1) Elections in poor countries; 2) Elections in countries emerging from civil war (post-conflict); 3) Elections in ethnically divided societies; 4) How to organise democratic elections in authoritarian countries; 5) Elections in recently consolidated democracies; 6) Elections in established democracies; 7) Linkage between violence and elections; and 8) Relationship between elections and the quality of representation for women.[7]

At the international level, the Commission will focus, amongst others, on the following:

- How does the international community, including regional entities, engage politically with countries that held troubled and flawed elections?;
- Examination of the effectiveness of international electoral assistance; and
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of international election observation.

The Commission held its second meeting in Doha, Qatar, 21–22 November 2011, and continued to examine and assess the aforementioned matters within the framework of the elections, development and security nexus. Upon completion of the work of the Commission, International IDEA will identify and organise, in close cooperation with partners and stakeholders, follow-up activities to protect and promote the integrity of the electoral process based on the recommendations of the Global Commission.

Promotion of democracy

Over the last two decades, democracy made substantive advances in countries of all the regions of the world. However, it is also a fact that democracy does not exist, remained weak and/or even receded in many countries as a result of embedded autocracy, extreme poverty, and violent conflict.

Elections, a key element of democracy, remain a challenge. The integrity of the process is compromised when incumbents change constitutions in order to extend their hold on power, unconstitutional changes of governments take place, and dysfunctional power-sharing arrangements are concluded to avoid a democratic change of government, and thereby overturning electoral results that genuinely reflect the will of the people. Flawed elections and fraudulent outcomes are not only not dealt with by investigation and electoral dispute resolution mechanisms, but in some instances even accepted in the name of security, stability and finding a political compromise.

The alleviation of extreme poverty remains a priority for a number of countries, particularly in Africa. However, there is an obligation to promote the important inter-linkage between democracy and development, and to ensure that the poverty challenge is not used to negate the need for democracy. To this end, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the decision by the 14th African Union Summit (2010) to reject unconstitutional changes of government, are key steps to support democracy and promote the integrity of the electoral process. Other regions and countries should make similar contributions towards promoting democracy, including credible elections.

The Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security has a formidable challenge to obtain the commitment of all stakeholders and actors to protect and promote the integrity of the electoral process. Political will is key to the work of the Commission, which has a great potential to contribute to the promotion of democracy and its consolidation. A credible electoral process is a fundamental requirement for democracy.

Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of International IDEA.

1 Sections of this paper are extracted and derived from a draft version of the International IDEA Project Proposal on 'To protect and promote the integrity of the electoral process (PPIEP)', International IDEA, 2011

2 International IDEA, Elections, Incumbency and Power: Legitimacy through Integrity – Background Note prepared for the International IDEA Democracy Forum held in Accra, Ghana, 30 Nov-1 Dec 2010, p. 3, International IDEA, 2010

3 The Kofi Annan Foundation (KA Foundation) is an independent, not-for-profit organisation. Its mission is to promote better global governance and strengthen the capacities of people and countries to achieve a fairer, more secure world. To advance this mission the KA Foundation has developed programmes and partnerships in two main focus areas, Sustainable Development and Peace and Security. The Foundation also provides a number of services to support Mr Annan's mediation and conflict resolution activities.

4 Members of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security are Kofi Annan (Chair), Ernesto Zedillo (Vice-Chair), Martti Ahtisaari, Madeleine Albright, Louise Arbour, Vidar Helgesen, Festus Mogae, Amartya Sen, Javier Solana, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Hassan Wirajuda, Helen Clark (Friend of Commission), Lynn Pascoe (Friend of Commission), Rima Khalaf Hunaidi (Friend of Commission), and Stephen Stedman (Research Director).

5 The Advisory Group is chaired by International IDEA and comprised of representatives of global, regional and national bodies, as well as academics, practitioners and electoral experts. It will provide advice to the work of the Commission including the development of its report and recommendations and in consulting with stakeholders and partner organisations.

6 International IDEA, Press release on the launch of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security in Pretoria, South Africa: 4 March 2011, available at http://www.idea.int/news/press_release.cfm

7 International IDEA, 5th Global Electoral Organization Conference – Credible Elections for Democracy, Gaborone, Botswana, 7-9 March 2011, Conference Report, p. 22, International IDEA, 2011

Facts about IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organisation, based in Stockholm, Sweden. Established in 1995, it has a current membership of 27 countries, and regional offices in Africa, Asia and Latin America. International IDEA's mission is to provide comparative knowledge and experience derived from practical experience on democracy building processes from diverse contexts around the world, assist political actors in reforming democratic institutions and processes, and engage in political processes when invited, and influence democracy-building policies through the provision of comparative knowledge resources and assistance to political actors.

Waves of democratisation have not only crossed the borders of countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America, but have also reached large parts of Africa. Multi-party democracy is winning ground on the continent. At the same time party systems with one dominant party have emerged, and in some African democracies one-party dominance has prevailed in spite of the adoption of multi-party democracy. This contradiction has encouraged the authors to examine the mechanisms and consequences of one-party dominance in Africa.

One-party dominance:

Stability or stumbling block for African democracy?

Renske Doorenspleet and Lia Nijzink

Holding regular national elections has become an Africa wide phenomenon. On the one hand, elections can be viewed as a celebration of democracy on the continent. Yet, democratically elected leaders can also easily use their authority to justify oppression and restrict freedoms. Elections might be used to announce that democracy has been successfully established, while in fact they just strengthen the status-quo of a governing elite that has no desire to implement genuine long-term democratic reforms. Moreover, elections can lead to violent conflict when tempers flare in the run up to polling day or when election results are not accepted by one of the contesting parties. Thus, elections can exacerbate existing divisions. In fact, experts were worried that the adoption of multi-party democracy throughout the continent would lead to highly fragmented party systems because of existing ethnic divisions. However, this did not happen. In contrast, party systems with one dominant party emerged and in some African democracies such systems have since prevailed.

> ***Democratically elected leaders can easily use their authority to justify oppression and restrict freedoms.***

In our view, the question why some one-party dominant systems have endured over time, while others have not, is highly relevant to the broader political and public debate about democratisation in Africa. One-party dominant systems are assumed to be a problem for democracy on the continent (Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Schlemmer 2006). At the same time, they have emerged through the ballot box and can thus be seen as an expression of the will of the people. This apparent contradiction requires us to take a closer look at the trajectories of one-party dominant systems in Africa and the mechanisms behind them in order to better understand the challenges that one-party dominance presents for the development of democracy and good governance on the continent.

Surprisingly, research on this phenomenon has been scarce. There are not many studies devoted to the concepts, measurements, and explanations of party systems with one dominant party, let alone studies about one-party dominance in the African context.[1] That is why we decided to organise a series of conferences[2] aimed at discussing theories, concepts and measurements of one-party dominance and their application in the context of Africa's young democracies. These events brought together a number of leading experts from both European and African research institutions[3] to discuss party system development in Africa and explore the mechanisms behind and consequences of current patterns of one-party dominance on the continent.

The findings of our country experts, our comparative analysis and the outcomes of our rich deliberations will be published in two edited volumes: *Trajectories of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies: Why Some One-Party Dominant Systems Endure and Others Not* (Lynne Rienner 2012) and *Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Africa* (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). Here, we present a short preview of our main findings, which, in our view, are increasingly relevant to the policy goal of developing and deepening democracy on the African continent.

One-party dominance in African democracies

According to political scientists (e.g. Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999; Przeworski et al 2000), the existence of political parties competing for power within a framework that guarantees equal chances for all is one of the fundamental characteristics of a democracy. Political regimes that ban political opposition and competition among political parties for the votes of the people are not 'competitive' and consequently not democratic. In many African democratic systems, though, competition among political parties is allowed before, during and after the elections.

Competition is protected by law but limited in practice. There is no alternation of the party in power, and the likelihood of the opposition gaining control over government seems very small. Such systems are central in our project. We identify them by using the definition presented by Sartori (1976) as our starting point: one-party dominant systems are those party systems in which the same party wins 50 per cent or more of the seats in parliament in three consecutive elections.

To distinguish between different regime types, Freedom House collects data on both political rights and civil liberties across the world and classifies countries as free, partly free or not free.[4] In 2010, there were 17 African countries which, according to Freedom House, were not free: political rights in these countries were not guaranteed and civil liberties not safeguarded. Because we are interested in patterns of one-party dominance in African democracies we excluded these countries from the case selection in our project. The remainder of the countries on the continent can be divided into two groups: one group of 9 countries that can be classified as free, with high levels of political rights and civil liberties and another group of 22 countries that has been classified as partly free with generally lower levels of political rights and civil liberties.

Because we do not want to equate the Freedom House classification of 'free' with 'democracy' and because we do not want to limit our analysis to the top performers in Africa, we have selected countries from each group for inclusion in our project: *Ghana, Benin, Namibia, South Africa, Mali* and *Botswana* from the list of countries classified as free in 2010 and *Senegal, Zambia, Mozambique* and *Tanzania* from the top half of the list of partly free countries.

We have selected Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania because these countries display a pattern of enduring one-party dominance. In the first part of our project we focus on various mechanisms behind one-party dominance and seek to understand why some one-party dominant systems endure and others do not. Therefore, we compare some of the cases in which a one-party dominant system is firmly entrenched (South Africa, Namibia and Tanzania) with country cases in which an initial pattern of one-party dominance did not endure (Mali, Senegal and Zambia).

The second part of our project aims to examine how one-party dominant systems contribute to or threaten the development of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, it has a slightly different case selection and compares cases of enduring one-party dominance (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique) with country cases with other party system configurations, such as Ghana's two-party system, the highly fragmented party system of Benin and the Zambian party system which offers insights into how one-party dominance comes to an end.

> ***One-party dominant systems are assumed to be a problem for democracy on the continent.***

Table 1: **Freedom House Status 2010 (with political rights and civil liberties scores)**
The countries included in the authors' investigation (see above) are in bold.

Free	*Partly Free*	*Not Free*
Cape Verde – 1,1	Lesotho – 3,3	Madagascar – 6,4
Ghana – 1,2	**Senegal – 3,3**	Angola – 6,5
Mauritius – 1,2	Seychelles – 3,3	Congo-Br. – 6,5
Benin – 2,2	Sierra Leone – 3,3	Cote d'Ivoire – 6,5
Namibia – 2,2	Comoros – 3,4	Gabon – 6,5
S. Tome & P. – 2,2	Liberia – 3,4	Mauritania – 6,5
South Africa – 2,2	Malawi – 3,4	Rwanda – 6,5
Mali – 2,3	**Zambia – 3,4**	Cameroon – 6,6
Botswana – 3,2	**Mozambique – 4,3**	DRC – 6,6
	Tanzania – 4,3	Zimbabwe – 6,6
	Guinea-Bissau – 4,4	Swaziland – 7,5
	Kenya – 4,4	Guinea – 7,6
	Burundi – 4,5	Chad – 7,6
	Burkina Faso – 5,3	Equa. Guinea – 7,7
	Niger – 5,4	Eritrea – 7,7
	Nigeria – 5,4	Somalia – 7,7
	Togo – 5,4	Sudan – 7,7
	Uganda – 5,4	
	CAR – 5,5	
	Djibouti – 5,5	
	Ethiopia – 5,5	
	Gambia – 5,5	

Source: Freedom in the World website, see www.freedomhouse.org

Elections and dominant parties

According to our definition of a one-party dominant system, the dominant party needs to get a majority in parliament in three consecutive elections. Interestingly, the dominant parties included in our project not only meet these criteria but by far exceed them. Since their transitions to democracy, our five country cases with one-party dominant systems have all held four or more multi-party elections in which the same political party gained more than 50 per cent of the parliamentary seats.

In Namibia, the seat share of SWAPO (formerly the South West Africa People's Organisation, now renamed SWAPO party) has consistently been around 75 per cent with the transitional elections in 1989, when SWAPO gained 56.9 per cent of the seats, being an exception. In Tanzania, Chama Cha Mapinduzi shows repeated seat shares above 75 per cent, winning as much as 87.5 per cent of the parliamentary seats in 2000. In South Africa, the African National Congress has an equally consistent but slightly lower seat share of around two thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) in Mozambique shows a steady increase in its seat share. The party gained 51.6 per cent of the parliamentary seats in the first multi-party elections in 1994 and has since increased this to 76.4 per cent in the

last election in 2009. In Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party has won all elections since independence in 1966, with its recent seat share in the 2009 elections standing at 78.9 per cent.

Thus, dominant parties that have emerged in African democracies seem to outperform dominant parties in other parts of the world. With seat shares consistently reaching a 75 per cent threshold, dominant parties on the African continent seem well entrenched. In the first part of our project we seek to understand the mechanisms by which this happened. In the second part we look at what this means for the prospects of democracy in Africa.

Enduring and non-enduring one-party dominant systems

In our project we have been trying to find the factors that best explain why some one-party dominant systems in African democracies endure and others not. We do this by comparing two groups of countries: Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa, which are democracies with a one-party dominant system, on the one hand and on the other Senegal, Mali and Zambia, which are democracies in which a pattern of initial dominance has not endured. Only by comparing enduring with non-enduring cases can we discover what lies behind the different patterns of one-party dominance.

> ***A possible explanation for continued voter support might lie in the government's performance.***

We developed a theoretical framework for our comparison and have identified seven factors that potentially influence the trajectory of the party systems in our country cases. First, patterns of one-party dominance seem to be related to the historical background of the party systems in Africa's modern democracies and the history of the current ruling parties. Second, social cleavages such as class, ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions might be relevant as well. The position of dominant parties seems to be based on their ability to successfully transcend social cleavages and divisions in society – and attract voters from various social groups. A third factor might be the electoral system and the institutional arrangements for executive-legislative relations that make up the institutional architecture for a system's political competition. Political culture is a possible fourth influence. In many African polities informal relationships of loyalty and dependency between political leaders and followers seem to hinder political competition and create intolerance towards opposition and dissenting views.

It is clear that the dominance of the ruling party in African democracies with a one-party dominant system has its origin at the ballot box. Voters continue to vote for the party in power. Hence, a possible explanation for continued voter support might lie in the government's performance and another in the current or future access to state resources that it is providing. These are our fifth and sixth factor respectively. In

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/BASILE ZOMA

Hundreds of journalists from the national and international press swarm to cover presidential elections in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in October 2010. The United Nations mission increased its forces by 500 troops to provide continued technical, logistical and security support during the electoral period.

relation to the latter a so-called 'cycle of dominance' seems to be taking place: long-term victory allows a dominant party better access to state resources, thus increasing the opportunity for further electoral successes. Finally, international influences ranging from the actions of international actors to the role of international norms and the effects of diffusion and globalisation possibly play a role.

We cannot discuss all our findings here but would like to highlight two interesting observations that we made in our comparison of the two groups of countries. First, the predominant legacy in our countries with enduring one-party dominance differs from the predominant historical legacy in the countries where dominance did not endure. First generation political parties with roots in nationalist and liberation movements are more stable in their position as dominant party under multi-party politics, while the dominant parties with a history as pro-democracy movements seem to be more vulnerable.

Second, the two elements of institutional architecture seem to be of little influence. One-party dominant systems exist both in countries that run elections according to a majoritarian first-past-the-post constituency system and in those that use party lists based proportional representation. Similarly, one party dominance occurs in countries with presidential and those with parliamentary systems. What might be more influential is the combined effect of the different elements of institutional architecture, particularly on the position of the opposition parties. Also, a number of other aspects of the institutional architecture such as the legal framework for political parties and incumbency and succession issues seem to be more relevant to the trajectory of the various party systems.

Fragmented oposition

We have already observed that political competition in Africa's one-party dominant systems is constrained and limited. In a democracy, alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. The opposition plays an important role in holding the government to account; and there is a possibility of the opposition taking over government power. In a democracy with a one-party dominant system, however, the opposition is small, and often fragmented and toothless, which limits the strength of political competition, weakens government accountability and makes an alternation of the party in power highly unlikely.

In the small body of literature on one-party dominance, several other negative consequences are mentioned, such as 1) the freezing of social cleavages on the basis of which the dominant party came to power; 2) weakening of an independent civil society; 3) weakening of constitutional checks and balances; 4) resistance of the dominant party to change in political institutions out of fear of losing its dominant position; 5) creating political apathy and a loss of voter interest; 6) no clear distinction between party and state; 7) reinforcing big man tendencies, patronage, and clientelism; 8) eroding minority rights; 9) high chance of state of emergency; 10) danger of non-democratic change of power; and 11) increasing the risk of political violence.

> ***In a democracy with a one-party dominant system the opposition is small, and often fragmented and toothless.***

Without a detailed investigation, however, the factors above serve as points of discussion and speculation rather than analysis and facts. A thorough and comparative examination of how party systems with one dominant political party contribute or pose a threat to the development of democracy is the main aim of the second part of our project. It consists of a detailed description and comparison of four cases of one-party dominance (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique) on the one hand, and three cases with different party system configurations (Ghana, Benin and Zambia) on the other hand.

Interestingly, the initial findings show that there are important differences between the four cases with regard to the nature of the main threat that the system poses to the development of democracy. These differences seem to be closely related to the historical legacy of the dominant parties in question. In addition, the country cases with other party system configurations offer important insights into the broader relationship between party systems and the development of democracy and suggest how one-party dominance might come to end.

In conclusion, elections in African democracies do not necessarily lead to highly fragmented party systems. In contrast, in many countries party systems with one dominant party have emerged. Little research has been done to investigate the causes and consequences of those systems, so it is crucial to bring together influential and innovative experts in this field in order to gain more knowledge and share it not only with the academic world but also with the policymakers interested in the link between elections, party systems and democracy.

1 Important examples of existing research on one-party dominance are Pempel 1990; Giliomee 1998; Rimanelli et al 1999; Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Bogaards and Boucek 2010. However, these works are not based on systematic comparative research and focus mainly on established democracies in Europe. For more conceptual discussions on one-party dominance, see Bogaards 2004.

2 Two international conferences were organised by the Centre for Studies in Democratisation, based at the University of Warwick (U.K.), one in September 2010 and another in September 2011. The 2010 conference was organised in collaboration with the University of Cape Town under the auspices of a British Council funded South-North Research Partnership and entitled 'Law and Politics in Africa's One-Party Dominant Regimes'. The 2011 conference, entitled 'Party Systems and the Future of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa' was funded by the Department of Politics and International Studies of the University of Warwick.

3 For further information, see www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csd/

4 The data are derived from reports and scales of the Freedom House, see www.freedomhouse.org; http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=548&year=2010; and http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010

Electoral violence is an issue attracting increasing attention from practitioners and researchers. Broader approaches discussed and promoted today aim on one hand to limit technical deficiencies, minimise tensions and secure the electoral processes and on the other to minimise political incentives for resorting to violence.

Inspired by good practices developed by national and international stakeholders, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance has developed a 'three layered approach' for prevention and mitigation of election-related violence: Improved Electoral Management and Justice, Improved Electoral Security and Improved Infrastructure for Peace. This approach can be applied throughout different phases of the electoral cycle.

Improving the process:

A three layered approach to the prevention of electoral violence

Sead Alihodzic

The prevention and mitigation of election-related violence is increasingly attracting the attention of election and conflict practitioners and researchers. One can distinguish between two broad approaches. The first, promoted by national stakeholders and international electoral assistance and peacebulding organisations, aims to minimise technical deficiencies, distrust and conflicts in and around electoral processes, which may increase tensions and trigger violence.

The second approach, promoted by the political centres of power, aims to minimise political incentives for resorting to violence. There is also an increased understanding about how technical, structural and political factors interplay. For example, deficiencies in electoral processes, whether or not significant enough to determine the outcome of elections, may be used as an argument to reject the results and seek power, or demand a power-sharing deal. In conflict-prone societies where political mobilisation follows ethnic, tribal or religious divides and where political leaders and perpetrators sense impunity, violence may be seen as an effective tactic to enforce such demands.

In some cases – the Côte d'Ivoire 2010 presidential elections being one recent example – the incumbent figure will refuse to accept electoral defeat and use the state security apparatus to oppress political competitors and remain in power. The credibility of election results and determined political action, involving international verification of election results and diplomatic effort, may do little to prevent the occurrence of violence. Nevertheless, the epilogue of the Côte d'Ivoire episode stands as a good reminder that blatant disregard of the election results may come at a price. If a solid argument for disputing the credibility of election results does not exist, rejection of the results and resorting to violence may not ultimately pay off. Such actions can result in prosecutions at the International Criminal Court (as in Kenya) or international military involvement (as in Côte d'Ivoire).

Although the organisation of credible elections may not be sufficient to prevent election-related violence, it represents an important pre-condition for a peaceful outcome.

A three layered approach for prevention and mitigation

Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) from around the world have developed specific approaches and strategies to ensure that elections are implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner. The EMBs of India, Mexico and South Africa are renowned for their accomplishments. For example, the Indian 'Vulnerability Mapping Tool' is designed to address specific security challenges during the elections through increased collaboration between the EMB officials, Security Sector Agencies (SSA) and the judiciary. South African concepts which include conflict mediation and multi-party liaison committees are highly valued and replicated in other African contexts. The Mexican EMB, Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), is well known for the quality of its electoral planning and security methodologies. Mexican experiences are shared with peer organisations from around the world through the IFE's International Research and Training Electoral Centre. A number of other international and national organisations which work with elections have also developed specific tools and methodologies to prevent and mitigate election-related violence.[1]

Drawing inspiration from the rich practices developed by election, security, conflict and civil society practitioners, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has conceptualised a *three layered approach* for prevention and mitigation of election-related violence.[2]

The three layered approach refers to:

a. *Improved Electoral Management and Justice* points to specific electoral planning, implementation and dispute resolution strategies that can be used to avoid controversies and technical flaws in order to minimise the potential for outbreaks of violence.

b. *Improved Electoral Security* points to specific electoral security measures which can be undertaken by SSAs

throughout the electoral cycle to protect electoral actors, events, facilities and materials from violence.

c. *Improved Infrastructure for Peace* points to different strategies that can be used by other state and non-state actors to mobilise civil society organisations (CSOs), traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and other organisations and individuals with capacity to contribute in defusing election-related tensions.

This approach can be consistently applied throughout different phases of the electoral cycle, as outlined in the electoral cycle approach.[3]

The sections below provide a practical illustration of the concept. For each specific phase of the electoral cycle, a brief description of a three layered approach is presented, including some practical examples from around the globe.[4]

Figure 1: **Electoral cycle approach**

Legal and institutional framework

The electoral legal framework usually refers to the constitutional provisions, legislation, rules, regulations and procedures which govern the electoral system design, the formation of electoral institutions and bodies, and implementation of electoral activities. An inclusive, fair, concise and uncontested electoral legal and institutional framework constitutes in itself a milestone towards peaceful elections. Responsibilities, rules of engagement and coordination between the SSAs should also be detailed in relevant legislations which govern the work of the SSAs. Other state and non-state actors may play an important role in facilitating and contributing to public discussion towards the realisation of a national consensus on the legislative and institutional framework.

Examples: 1) Adoption of the proportional representation electoral system was seen as instrumental for ensuring peaceful elections in South Africa in 1997.[5] 2) The Indian Election Commission's Compendium of Instructions[6] includes directions for deployment of Central Police Forces during elections. 3) The South African Electoral Law (103A, insertion to the 2003 amendment to the Electoral Act, no 34, 2003) defines that the Independent Electoral Commission can resolve any electoral dispute, complaint or infringement of the code of conduct through conciliation or mediation.[7] 4) The Citizens´ Goodwill Task Force in Guinea-Bissau called on the expertise of international lawyers in analysis of electoral rules, thus contributing to a national debate on the electoral framework.[8]

Planning and preparation for implementation of electoral activities

Electoral phases are interlinked, and weakness in one phase can affect the integrity of the subsequent phase or the entire process. For example, delayed delimitation of electoral boundaries will delay registration of voters, which will further delay registration of political parties and candidates. Security challenges may change throughout different electoral phases. Therefore, it is important that electoral and security planning is timely, holistic and well-coordinated, and considers risks associated with different electoral phases and geographic locations. Other state and non-state actors that engage to promote peace and conflict resolution during elections should design their actions in accordance with the electoral calendar. Collaborative forums involving EMBs, SSAs and other state and non-state actors will provide improved situational and risk analysis.

Examples: 1) The EMB Mexico closely cooperates with the major national agencies and institutes including the army, navy, police, civil protection organisations, energy and water agencies and others through the Group for Strategic Facilities Coordination. The group coordinates operational planning and prevention/mitigation of conflicts in different areas, including electoral processes.[9] 2) A series of national dialogue meetings provided a platform to identify risks ahead of the 2011 elections in Uganda. The dialogues raised awareness about election-related violence and strategies to ensure peaceful elections.[10] 3) The Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment project in 2009, supported by the government, Action Aid and the Small Arms Survey, provided information on patterns of election-related violence during past elections. Such information helped to plan electoral security measures and to identify potential perpetrators of election-related violence.[11] 4) In Sierra Leone, traditional chiefs gathered for consultations and leadership workshops in order to define their role during the 2007 elections.[12]

Training and education

Electoral training is traditionally focused on the development of capacities of electoral staff to implement electoral activities. In the context of high risk

UN PHOTO/RICK BAJORNAS

At a polling station in Kirkuk, a voter's index finger is marked with ink on the day of Iraqi parliamentary elections in March 2010. Safe voter registration and identity control promote a peaceful and equitable outcome of elections.

elections, it may be important to enhance the awareness of SSAs, political parties, journalists, civil society groups and electoral observers about electoral procedures, roles and responsibilities, and electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Emphasis should be placed on conflict and violence prevention. Civic information and education campaigns must be far-reaching and sensitive to gender and minority issues. Specialised training for SSA personnel will strengthen their capacity to prevent and mitigate election-related violence. Non-state actors may train mediators for deployment in the high risk areas. They can also play an important role in supporting voter education and information by reaching out to excluded groups. In some contexts, those efforts may have a particular benefit for enfranchising women who may be less likely to participate due to perceived risks of violence and political prosecution.

Examples: 1) The South African EMB worked with the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy to train mediators of the 'conflict mediation panels' in conflict management skills, electoral legislation, codes of conduct and identification of dispute areas.[13] 2) The Bangladesh EMB and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have established collaboration with local imams to ensure that information on voter registration for 2007 elections reaches women.[14] 3) The Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence visited camps for internally displaced persons in the north of Sri Lanka to monitor how they were informed about the voter registration processes ahead of the 2010 elections.[15] 4) Ahead of the 2011 elections, the Ugandan Human Rights Commission organised a workshop for the national security agents on human rights in electoral processes.[16] 5) More than 300 journalists were trained before the 2010 election in Sudan about the electoral system and the need for conflict-sensitive journalism.[17]

Registration of voters and parties and accreditation of observers

Voter registration is prone to technical mistakes, including misspelled voters' names, voters' assignment to wrong polling locations, deceased people's names appearing in the voter register, and so on. Those problems are likely to initiate speculation on whether the incorrect details are mistakes or indicators of electoral fraud. It is also important to ensure that all eligible political parties and candidates have the opportunity to compete in elections and that all interested organisations are granted accreditation to observe elections. Security challenges during voter registration include providing safe environments for voter registration staff and facilities, and citizens' safe access to voter reg-

istration facilities. CSOs may register to observe voter registration processes and, together with other state and non-state actors, work with the EMBs in resolving and adjudicating registration-related conflicts.

Examples: 1) Following a history of contested and violent elections with voter lists being a very divisive issue, the EMB Bangladesh, supported by the UNDP, established an electronic voter register which included registrants' photographs, fingerprints and signatures. This project established credible voter rolls.[18] 2) Voters' credentials issued by the EMB Mexico are important to increase the accuracy of voter register and provide security against electoral fraud.[19] 3) The Election Law of Bosnia-Herzegovina bans persons indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity from registering as candidates and voters.[20] 4) The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in cooperation with the EMB Georgia and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, organised a conference where representatives from the media, non-governmental organisations, political parties, the EMB and the voter list verification commission discussed best practices for improving the voter register ahead of the 2012 elections.[21]

Electoral campaign

Political party campaigning may see aggressive and inflammatory rhetoric and violent incidents. One way to address those challenges is to introduce regulations and define sanctions against those who resort to such tactics. Security engagement during the electoral campaigning entails provision of security to prominent electoral actors, campaign events and vulnerable groups. Other state and non-state actors are well positioned to facilitate discussion and consensus on the code of conduct for political party campaigning, media behaviour and enforcement mechanisms. They may also play an important role in deflating tensions and conflicts arising from the inflammatory campaigning.

Examples: 1) Ahead of the 2007 elections in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UNDP conducted trainings of female candidates relating to campaigning skills, including a violence-free election campaign.[22] 2) The Mexican EMB and SSAs agreed that, for the 2012 local and federal elections, all candidates can request security protection. The EMB Mexico undertakes media monitoring to ensure that campaigning rules are adhered to.[23] 3) The Press Association of Guyana has laid forward a media code of conduct in 2006. Resistance by the media companies to sign the code was bridged by the pressure and support from the business community, peers and civil society.[24] 4) The monitoring undertaken by the Media Monitor Centre in Bosnia-Herzegovina focused in particular on hate speech and inflammatory language during the campaign period.[25] 5) The Colombian Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE) monitored media activities during the electoral processes in 2006 and 2010[26] and generated data and risk maps of electoral fraud and electoral violence to focus media reporting on critical districts.[27] 6) The Media Mediation Panel acted as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to address complaints on the fairness of electoral media coverage during the 2001 elections in Timor-Leste.[28]

Voting operations

Voting operations which experience problems may be fiercely contested. Therefore, continuous collaboration of all stakeholders in the process is essential. EMBs must ensure that the voting and counting processes are trusted. Complaints must be decreased to a minimum and resolved professionally. SSAs will play an important role in ensuring that voters, election officials and materials are protected from security threats. Other actors may provide valuable support by engaging in peace promotion, election monitoring, conflict mediation and violence mitigation.

Examples: 1) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe worked with the International Organization for Migration to ensure that Bosnian refugees would be able to vote from abroad.[29] 2) The Election Commission of India uses video cameras to record occurrences inside the polling stations at all times in order discourage malpractices and obtain records for deciding on complaints.[30] 3) Due to high tensions during the 2010 local elections in the Indonesian district of Poso in Sulawesi, a large number of police and military personnel were deployed to protect election materials, polling stations and electoral officials. These have been targets of election-related violence in the past. The police also prevented groups of supporters to clash in street fighting.[31] 4) In Guinea-Bissau in 2005, civil society peace brigades were deployed to work as unofficial observers and to defuse conflict arising at polling stations.[32]

Management and announcement of election results

Political parties, CSOs and international organisations will tend to observe highly contested elections. Contradictory reports and dramatic statements may deepen mistrust and feed the perception that official election results are not credible. It is important, therefore, that EMBs are able to demonstrate that the integrity of election results is preserved. This is achieved through open communication with all actors, transparent work and professional management of electoral complaints. SSAs must be prepared to provide security to all, including those who may protest over election results. The role of other state and non-state actors may be essential in pacifying tensions which arise in this phase. They can effectively prevent and mitigate violence through the network of peace activists working at the grassroots' level.

Examples: 1) To ensure transparency of result management during the 2006 elections and referendum, the EMB Bolivia provided copies of the polling station result forms to party agents and placed scanned forms on the internet.[33] 2) As the Guinean 2010 presidential election results were announced, the SSAs established curfews in towns where angry supporters threatened to attack people who voted for the winning candidate.[34] 3) Following the announcement of the Côte d'Ivoire's election results in 2010, the Sant'Egidio religious community established a hotline for citizens to report tensions and incidents so that local priests and imams could be informed and deployed to defuse conflicts before they spread.[35]

Post-electoral phase

The post-electoral phase is the time to analyse challenges faced during the last round of elections and initiate reforms to address weaknesses. It is also a period to focus more on the long-term approaches targeting structural factors which impact elections, such as poverty, social and political exclusions, gender-based discrimination and violence, disarmament and demobilisation, organised crime, human rights' violations and develop long-lasting national structures for peace.

Examples: 1) Following the outbreak of violence after the announcement of the 2007 presidential election results in Kenya, the Independent Review Commission was formed to examine the elections from various perspectives. Findings and recommendations were based on analysis of the legal framework for the conduct of elections, the structure, composition and management system of the EMB Kenya, its organisation and conduct of the 2007 electoral operations.[36] 2) Establishment of national infrastructure for peace has been important in containing violence during elections in South Africa, Ghana and Kenya.[37]

Towards enhanced collaboration

Well-organised electoral processes and proper management of electoral appeals will leave less space for electoral controversies and disarm those who seek justifications to resort to violence. Professional and conflict-sensitive security deployment during elections may deter violence directed against electoral actors, events, materials and facilities, and better protect vulnerable groups or individuals who may be particularly targeted due to their gender, ethnicity, race etc. Other state and non-state actors can create spaces for dialogue, build trust and strengthen social resilience to violence during elections. These three layers reinforce each other.

Critics may argue that these strategies give a mixed bag of results and, in the long run, will fail to change the conflict dynamics. However, elections cannot be put on hold until ideal conditions are created. In the meantime, the 'three layered approach' will contribute towards navigating electoral processes through the challenging array of social contexts, which in itself is an important dimension of state-building processes.

1 Some tools and methodologies are catalogued in IDEA's Johannesburg workshop report: 'Towards Global Framework for Prevention and Mitigation of Election-Related Violence', http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Towards_a_Global_Framework.pdf

2 The 'three layered approach' is conceptualised by the International IDEA as a prevention and mitigation module of International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool. The tool will be offered as a global public good in 2013.

3 The electoral cycle approach was developed by International IDEA and the European Commission as a visual planning and training tool that could help development agencies, electoral assistance providers and electoral officials to understand the cyclical nature of the various challenges faced in electoral processes. A 'three layered approach' relates to the version which distinguishes eight phases, see: http://aceproject.org/ero-en/images/the-electoral-cycle/view

4 The section headings reflect different phases of the electoral cycle, although the titles are sometimes phrased differently. Also, it is difficult to obtain genuine indicators which testify to the success of strategies used. Furthermore, some contexts where specific actions were undertaken have experienced violent outcomes. Nevertheless, those efforts remain inspirational and worth acknowledging.

5 Khadiagala, G., Mechanisms for Management of Electoral Disputes: A comparative Study of South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, and the DR Congo. Draft report for the AU, 2010, p. 3.

6 Election Commission of India, Compendium of Instructions, Model Code of Conduct, Volume 3, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/compendium/vol3.pdf

7 Ilona Tip, 'Do No Harm: Conflict Sensitive Election Design', 2009, in Ballots or Bullets: Potentials and Limitations of Elections in Conflict Contexts, Swisspeace Annual Conference 2010, Andrea Iff, editor, http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/Conference_Paper_2010.pdf

8 UNDP. Elections and Conflict Prevention: A guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming. New York: Democratic Governance Group/ Bureau for Development Policy, 2009, p. 40.

9 Manuel Carrillo, contributor to the article on behalf of IFE.

10 Uganda Human Rights Commission & Deepening Democracy Programme. 2010. Report on a National Conference on Prevention of Conflict in the 2011 Elections, 29-30 July, Entebbe.

11 Electoral violence in Timor-Leste: mapping incidents and responses. Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment. Brief 3. Geneva: TLAVA, 2009, p. 5.

12 UNDP. 2007. Paramount Chiefs Prepare for Electoral Campaign. http://www.sl.undp.org/4_media/Newsroom/paramount_chiefs_campaign.htm

13 Khadiagala, G., Mechanisms for Management of Electoral Disputes: A comparative Study of South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, and the DR Congo. Draft report for the AU, 2010, pp. 5-6.

14 UNDP, Elections in Bangladesh 2006-2009: Transforming Failure Into Success. Dhaka: UNDP, 2010, pp. 90, 105.

15 CMEV, Presidential Election Final Report, 2010, p. 6.

16 Deepening Democracy Programme. Towards Peaceful, Free and Fair Elections in Uganda, 2010. http://www.ddp.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133:towards-a-peaceful-free-and-fair-elections-in-uganda&catid=43:focus-on-partners&Itemid=121

17 Norwegian People's Aid http://www.npaid.org/en/News_Archive/?action=Article.publicShow;id=10288;module=Articles

18 UNDP, Elections in Bangladesh 2006-2009: Transforming Failure into Success. Dhaka: UNDP, 2010, pp. 62-63.

19 Manuel Carrillo, contributor to the article on behalf of IFE

20 Election Law of Bosnia & Herzegovina 2001, Article 1, 6.

21 IFES Organizes Conference to Address the Accuracy of Georgia's Voter List http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/News-in-Brief/2011/Dec/IFES-Organizes-Conference-to-Address-the-Accuracy-of-Georgias-Voter-List.aspx

22 UNIFEM. 2007. Press Release: http://www.sl.undp.org/4_media/Newsroom/UNIFEM_press_release.htm

23 Manuel Carrillo, contributor to the article on behalf of IFE

24 UNDP, Elections and Conflict Prevention: A guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming. New York: Democratic Governance Group/ Bureau for Development Policy, 2009, p. 43.

25 Carver, R., Bosnia: the Media Monitoring Centre. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2010. Online (18.10.2010) http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/media-and-elections/bosniame-diamonitor/view

26 Objetivos de la Misión Observación Electoral, 2010 http://www.moe.org.co/webmoe/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=143&Itemid=139

27 Objetivos de la Misión Observación Electoral, 2010 http://www.moe.org.co/webmoe/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=143&Itemid=139

28 Electoral violence in Timor-Leste: Mapping Incidents and Responses. Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment. Brief 3. Geneva: TLAVA, 2009, p. 6.

29 See case study: International IDEA. 2007. Voting from Abroad, Handbook Series. Stockholm: IDEA, pp. 163-167.

30 International IDEA, Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence. Johannesburg Workshop Report, 2010, p. 45.

31 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Elections. Asia Report (197). Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2010, pp. 18-19.

32 UNDP, Elections and Conflict Prevention: A guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming. New York: Democratic Governance Group/ Bureau for Development Policy, 2009, p. 41.

33 European Union Election Observation Mission to Bolivia, p. 29. http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/BO/reports/bolivia-constituent-assembly-election-and

34 Guinea 24, Il faut arrêter tout les commanditaires des violences post-électorales, 2010. http://www.guinee24.com/index.php?id=5&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4218&tx_ttnews[backPid]=4&cHash=a626f48146

35 France 24.La discrète médiation des « casques blancs » de Sant'Egidio, 2010. http://www.france24.com/fr/20101130-discrete-mediation-casques-blancs-santegidio

36 Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 http://www.dialoguekenya.org/report.aspx

37 Paul van Tongeren, Increasing Interest in Infrastructures for Peace, in Journal of Conflictology, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2011.

Elections are often seen as evidence that a conflict has come to an end and that a new era of peacebuilding and development will start. However, this is an oversimplified conception, far from reality with all its setbacks, caused not least by the lingering antagonism and division between opposing groups or former parties to the conflict.

With the recent elections in post-conflict Liberia as an example, this article presents obstacles to break, dilemmas to be solved, historical backgrounds to be considered, and measures to be taken in order to achieve, not only democratic elections but ultimately, good governance, justice and rule of law.

Liberia:

Elections – no quick fix for peacebuilding

Morten Bøås

Elections and electoral processes have become an integral part of international interventions aiming at peacebuilding and the restoration of state capacity and the rule of law. As such, elections in post-conflict countries are not only supposed to produce legitimate governments, but also steer countries previously embroiled in deep and bitter conflict onto the path of peace and reconciliation. This is the theory, but experience from recent elections in such countries suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Therefore, some critical questions must be asked concerning the consequences of conducting elections in post-conflict countries where social and ethnic cleavages from war still prevail.

Can elections alone under such circumstances lead to peace and reconciliation? Will elections, even if they produce a winner, be able to unite a fragmented society torn apart by war? On the contrary, elections under such circumstances may instead cement the cleavages that led to the war in the first place (see also Bøås 2008). This is not bound to happen, and can be prevented by the active engagement of a multitude of stakeholders working in concert, but this is still the exception rather than the rule in international interventions that still operate on the basis of a 'liberal peace' agenda. Unfortunately, the events that occurred during the Liberian presidential elections in November 2011 illustrate these points all too well.

Failed reconciliation?

The November 8, 2011 elections in Liberia were meant to mark the beginning of the end of the international peacekeeping operation in the country and the start of a new era. Liberia was supposed to handle the election itself and thus show how far the country had progressed since the UN arrived in 2003. In the end, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won a second term as the president of Liberia, but her victory may have come at a high cost both for her personal legacy and for the future of Liberia. Johnson Sirleaf was re-elected with 90.7 per cent of the votes. However, the voter turn-out in the second and decisive round of the Liberian presidential elections were as low as 36.8 per cent of the total number of registered voters. This means that the 2011 Nobel laureate Johnson Sirleaf is entering her new term as president on a mandate that is disputed by a good number of the Liberian electorate (see also Bøås 2011).

The reason for this is the low voter turn-out that was a consequence of the main opposition parties and their candidates asking people not to vote. Why did they call for a boycott? Was it because they were afraid they were going to lose and wanted to save themselves from the disgrace of defeat? Or, is the country simply much more divided than one was led to believe when hearing the Nobel Peace Prize Committee Chairman Thorbjørn Jagland's justification for awarding the Peace Prize to Johnson Sirleaf, in which he hailed her for securing peace and promoting economic and social development in Liberia.

Unfortunately, there is much to suggest that this is the case. Several of the cleavages from the civil war still remain as open poisonous wounds infecting Liberian society, or as the fault lines of an earthquake yet to come. The main opposition party, the Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC) may have come to the conclusion that they could not win the election, but they also knew they could weaken the legitimacy of Johnson Sirleaf and her Unity Party (UP). The question is therefore twofold: Why opt for such a destructive strategy and how could it succeed? The reason for this is first and foremost that Johnson Sirleaf in her first term in office (2006-2011) failed to overcome the political animosity between different ethnic groups.[1]

During the period 1980 to 2003 Liberia became synonymous with war, chaos and destruction as the country was fragmented by various militias fighting each other. There is little doubt that economic profit motives were important drivers of the war and the establishment of the militias involved. However, militia formation was also a consequence of is-

sues and tensions deeply entrenched in Liberian history. The Liberian conflict was not just one war. It was a series of local conflicts tangled up in each other, as Charles Taylor's rebellion in 1989 against President Samuel Doe's dictatorship pushed the Liberian state over the edge and into the abyss (Bøås 2009).

This 'nationalisation' of local conflicts created a 'logic of war' that dramatically affected the course of the war, the decision-making of individuals, and the subsequent militia formation (Bøås and Hatløy 2008). Thus, the Liberian civil war had a history that preceded the Liberian state, and it was the totality of this history that contributed to the shaping of the political environment of the 2011 election.

This environment was shaped by one key dividing line. On the one side were Johnson-Sirleaf and the Gio and Mano in the electorally-speaking very significant Nimba County that supports former warlord Prince Johnson, who finished in third place in the first round of the presidential elections. On the other side were Winston Tubman, the former football star George Weah and the Krahn of Grand Gedeh County.

Alliances around privileges

These alliances as well as cleavages are not new to Liberia but have existed for a long time. Prince Johnson and Johnson Sirleaf are old acquaintances from the late 1980s when they both briefly collaborated with Charles Taylor. In the second round of the 2005 presidential election, Johnson Sirleaf, then as now, had Prince Johnson's support, and the Gio and the Mano were opposed to the Krahn during the Liberian civil war. These cleavages and conflict lines are not only quite permanent, but also concern very basic political questions, such as access to land, rights to trade, and particularly which groups should have privileged access to the Liberian state and the spoils that this state creates.

The continued existence of these cleavages is, however, also a problem because it shows that not only are the boundaries of the civil war still evident in Liberia, but they also have a regional dimension. In fact, all these divisions are echoed on the other side of the border in Côte d'Ivoire. The most manifest evidence of this is the 170,000 Ivorian refugees that currently live in Grand Gedeh County together with their ethnic allies, the Krahn. This could potentially lead to further instability in both countries.

However, what one really should take note of is the permanency of the alliances from the 1970s and 1980s. This is in fact quite amazing. At the heart of the matter is the alliance between Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Prince Johnson which evolved, as so much else in Liberian politics, around the relationship between the Gio/Mano and the Krahn/Mandingo groups respectively. No proper reconciliation has taken place on this issue. The Krahn continue to fear the permanent dominance of a Gio/Mani (e.g. Nimba) block, whereas the Gio and Mano suspect that the Krahn still dream of a revival of the state of affairs under Samuel Doe, who was of Krahn origin. (After all, his tenure is the only taste of real power that the Krahn community has ever had.)

Many among the Krahn community still suspect that Johnson Sirleaf and her allies among the Americo-Liberians were the masterminds behind the killing of Samuel Doe in September 1990 and the war that followed, whereas the Gio/Mano fear that if Tubman/Weah comes to power, it will constitute a return to the Doe era. All this suggests that Nimba County for the foreseeable future will be a UP bastion (or support a party allied to UP) and Grand Gedeh County the opposite. In all of this, the Mandingo group is marginal, yet central, as it still holds some economic power and a remaking of the Mandingo/Krahn alliance from the 1980s cannot be completely ruled out.

It is at this stage that the Ivorian refugees in Liberia enter the equation, especially since the November 2010 presidential run-off elections in Côte d'Ivoire with the two candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara won the election, but Gbagbo refused to accept defeat and hung on to power until he was ousted through military force in April 2011.

Grand Gedeh County is, due to the relationship that developed during the war, predominantly pro-Gbagbo (their militia received support from Gbagbo) and thus 'allied' with their ethnic 'brothers' the Guere on the Ivorian side of the border, whereas the the Gio/Mano are predominantly Ouattara supporters and 'allied' to the Yacouba, their ethnic 'brothers' across the border. These seemingly almost permanent patterns of alignment in Liberia, in Côte d'Ivoire, and across the respective borders, are of uttermost importance, but unfortunately more or less totally ignored by the international stakeholders and the governments they sponsor in Liberia, and to a lesser extent in Côte d'Ivoire.

On the campaign trail

One thing that was obvious from the presidential campaigns in 2011 was that the UP was so much better funded than the CDC. In fact, in the second round the CDC had only enough money for a couple of days of low-key campaigning and had only managed to print a few primitive posters. They could not afford any glossy billboards, had almost no t-shirts to distribute and very little rice to hand out. Whereas the UP used helicopters that spread glossy leaflets from the air over Monrovia the last days before the run-off election, all the CDC could bring to the streets was a couple of broken old cars with bad speakers.

Thus, to the extent that the CDC campaigned at all it was as the 'underdog': as a grassroots movement arguably much more in tune with the ordinary poor Liberian, whereas it tried to present UP as an elitist party for the rich, the powerful and the international community. This was not necessarily a bad campaign strategy for an underfunded political party, and this also explains their constant criticism and the attention the CDC gave to the National Elections Commission. By making this kind of noise they kept themselves visible and managed to 'campaign' relatively cost-free through media headlines. Thus, at the very least, the CDC should be credited for putting up a competitive relatively 'peaceful' struggle against the Sirleaf-Johnson regime, and this is badly needed in Liberia.

Unfortunately, the CDC also in the end got so stuck on the idea of a boycott that they just had to see it through. Their boycott, which in the end led to a situation where Johnson Sirleaf was re-elected by a large majority of the voters, but with a very low voter turn-out, is not a harbinger of good news for Liberia. It exposes a country that is quite bitterly divided, along cleavages that go back to the war and in some cases even longer. No representative of the Liberian political class has any reason to be proud of this result, meaning that it is way too easy to blame an 'irresponsible opposition' for this, as some Johnson Sirleaf supporters in the international community have done. The CDC does not rule the country, it is Johnson Sirleaf who is in power, and therefore also the one the Liberians have given the mandate to cre-

UN PHOTO/ERIC KANALSTEIN

Knowledge about the candidates, insight into the electoral process and understanding of the voting terms will contribute to safe and nonviolent elections. Villagers read elections instructional material during pre-election sensitisation in Madikoma, Liberia, in order to be informed what the elections are all about.

ate a level of trust in the state and state institutions that would make election boycotts a thing of the past. The question is if she will make this her priority in her second term, now that she has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize?

No universal remedy

Elections have not only become an integral part of international interventions, but also objectives in themselves, as an election defined as successful also suggests that the international mission will soon be able to withdraw. The question that remains, however, is what actually happens to fragile post-conflict countries that conduct elections in a political atmosphere still very much under the influence of the context and cleavages of war. Such elections will, like any other elections, create winners and losers, but will they also bestow the winner with national legitimacy or just cement cleavages and perceptions from the past?

If we were to base our answer to this question on the experience from the Liberian elections, our answer would have to be the latter. Liberia has now been through two post-conflict elections and both have been won by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, but this does not mean that the country has entered into a new stage of peace and reconciliation between the groups that stood at the centre stage during the civil war. Rather the opposite has happened. While Johnson Sirleaf was handed the presidency on a silver plate, at the same time the cleavages were reinforced, as it came to her in the form of a disputed mandate

What this therefore suggests is not that we should give up on democracy, but rather that we must stop pretending that multi-party elections are some kind of magical wand that makes entrenched conflicts and cleavages vanish into thin air. The introduction of democracy and multi-party elections should still be a component of international interventions aiming at peacebuilding and state restoration, but it should no longer be seen as an objective in itself. It is first and foremost a means to achieve good governance, rule of law, poverty reduction and economic growth.

The introduction of democracy and the contest of multi-party elections can facilitate these objectives, but only if they are planned in tandem with approaches that are built on a solid analysis of the conflict and the cleavages that created it, as well as the measures that must be taken to bridge these cleavages and thereby create trust in a level playing field and an outcome that is integrative and does not lead to further exclusion.

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1 Liberia consists of 16 major indigenous groups of people, each possessing its own traditions, customs, religious philosophy, and languages and dialects. These are the Bassa, Belle, Dey, Gbandi, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Loma, Mandingo, Mano, Mende and Vai. In addition, there are also the Americo-Liberians that descend from freed slaves that established the Republic of Liberia and a small, but economically important Lebanese community.

Only in recent years, capitalising on experiences from violent as well as peaceful elections in different countries, has the need for measures to prevent electoral violence become obvious to the international community. The knowledge about the range of possible and necessary moves to prevent and mitigate outbreaks of violence is increasing, although much remains to be done. Local, regional and national actors need to engage in these efforts which, when successful, will strengthen democratisation and peacebuilding

Infrastructure for Peace:

A way forward to peaceful elections

Paul van Tongeren and Kai Brand-Jacobsen

"Elections are a major catalyst for democratic change but have an intrinsically conflictual nature. Elections make deeply rooted social conflicts more visible and thus have great potential for triggering violence. If such violence is ignited by the electoral process, or perceived to have been, the effects may have grave implications for human rights and local economies, and may create an inherent distrust in the credibility of democracy."

International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance[1]

Following violent elections in Kenya 2007 and the Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and peaceful elections in Ghana 2008, the international community, national governments and civil society actors are becoming increasingly aware of the need to place a greater emphasis on prevention of electoral violence. It is an issue that until recently has fallen through the cracks. Electoral support has focused on strengthening of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), voter registration and electoral monitoring, while peacebuilding and conflict transformation programmes have focused more on large-scale armed conflict or addressing the violence around elections after it has broken out.

This is beginning to change. An increasing number of publications from major agencies and organisations are making visible the spectrum of what can be done to prevent electoral violence, highlighting both successful and unsuccessful experiences. It is becoming clear that prevention of electoral violence is both possible and necessary. Some ingredients, such as an extended governance and electoral cycle approach, development of infrastructure for peace and strengthening local and national capacities, and joint planning for prevention can play a significant role in preventing and reducing electoral violence – and thereby strengthen democratic processes. Increasing awareness and understanding amongst local, national, regional and international actors on how this can be done, and strengthening synergies between those working in democratisation, electoral support, development programming, peacebuilding and conflict transformation can help. This article looks at how it can be done and presents an overview of key issues and experiences from the field.

Hallmarks of democracy, catalysts of violence

Elections have long been heralded as a hallmark of representative democracy. At their best they can be a mechanism enabling a popular input into choices of elected representatives and policies. In many cases, however, elections can also serve as 'triggers' for violence and widespread instability. A growing number of agencies and organisations – including the United Nations, the African Union, International IDEA[2], ACE[3], IFES[4], the Department of Peace Operations of PATRIR[5] and others – have begun to draw attention to the fact that elections have an intrinsically conflictual nature. They are structured processes of competition for control of political power.

In many countries, a key challenge to the governance and political process is that electoral competitions are a zero-sum game, the winner takes all. Election to public office offers livelihoods and privileges not just for the elected leaders, but also their party supporters, constituency, clan, faction or ethnic group. Losing carries unacceptable costs for both government and opposition. The incentives to resort to electoral fraud and violence are therefore high. The style of campaigning and rhetoric used by political party leaders and their supporters, as well as the media, can often fuel tensions, demonise opponents, and contribute to an environment in which violence becomes more likely – or is itself part of electoral campaigning strategies.

Elections may also make deeply rooted social conflicts visible and provide the opportunity for people to express other grievances – ranging from disputes over control of political power to control and use of resources, social justice, marginalisation, ethnic rivalry and many other possible grievances. Histories of past electoral violence, or low levels of trust in the electoral process and EMBs, are also strong factors increasing the likelihood of electoral violence. In areas where state security institutions have limited authority or where militias, separation movements, non-state armed groups, or criminal gangs are strong, the likelihood for violence around elections increases. Security forces that are not properly trained, or that may use excessive force in responding to demonstrations or

acts of violence, can also contribute to escalating or triggering violence around elections.

Cost effective prevention

Election-related violence can have severe immediate and long-term costs, from death and injury to destruction of infrastructure and loss of investment. Deep rooted social conflicts, polarisation and demonisation (along ethnic, regional, religious and other societal fault lines) may be deepened. People's faith in the democratic and electoral process may also be seriously challenged, and an environment of impunity and abusive leadership strengthened. Regional countries and economies are also affected as violence within a country has a negative impact on neighbours.

Kenya's leading business association assessed economic losses from post-election violence in 2008 as US $ 3.6 billion. In contrast, the 2010 constitutional referendum, plagued by similar inter-ethnic tensions, did not see any violence. A violence prevention effort identified and pre-empted nearly 150 incidents of violence. This effort cost only $ 5 million in comparison.

According to the Ghana Investment Promotion Council, foreign direct investment in the country jumped 90 per cent between mid-2008 and mid-2009. The intervening variable was the peaceful national poll in December 2008. The National Peace Council, supported by UNDP with approximately US $ 2 million, played a crucial mediation role in averting expected turbulence. Expectations of violence had depressed investment prior to the poll. The prevention of electoral violence is both possible and cost effective.

The cost of elections in countries transitioning from war can also be expensive – often in the tens of millions, costing US$ 10-20 per voter. However, the cost of a possible return to violence is much higher, and with smart, targeted measures, small efforts – including strengthening local and national infrastructure for peace – can often have a significant impact on preventing the return of violence.

Four case studies: South Africa, Guyana, Kenya, Ghana

In *South Africa*, prior to the elections of 1994, the establishment of Peace Councils helped prevent civil war. South Africa was one of the first countries to begin constructing an Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). This was a product of the National Peace Accord, signed in 1991 between the principal protagonists in the South African conflict. Their main objectives were to create trust and reconciliation between community leaders, to prevent violence and to resolve disputes. The violence in the country was escalating and without this Peace Accord between all main stakeholders, the fear was a further escalation of violence, leading to civil war and no peaceful elections.

In all 11 regions of the country, Regional Peace Committees were established and oversaw the establishment of Local Peace Committees in the towns and villages. All relevant stakeholders could cooperate at national, regional and local level in those councils in preventing violent conflict and building peace. While the Peace Councils were unable to prevent all violent incidents, it is widely agreed that the situation would have been far graver if they had not existed.

UN PHOTO/MARTINE PERRET

Special arrangements are needed to facilitate and safeguard the voting process in remote areas. An aerial view of a village, taken from a helicopter of the Independent Electoral Commission after picking up ballots from Watsu on the way to the compilation centre in Dungu, Province Orientale, during the 2006 presidential and legislative elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 2006 *Guyana* conducted its first ever 'violence free' election. This followed a challenging period in which political tensions were seen to escalate. Key factors in contributing to the prevention of electoral violence included the establishment of a Media Monitoring Centre and Code of Conduct for Media (supported by the Commonwealth Secretariat) and a broad-based Social Cohesion Programme (supported by UNDP) which included the creation of a national dialogue process, networks of mediators to help deal with local conflicts and ease tensions within communities both before and during the elections, and agreements among political parties. Both international and domestic assessments after the elections pointed to the key role these interventions had played in contributing to violence-free elections.

At the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, post-election violence broke out in *Kenya*. While the voting and counting of votes were peaceful, violence spread to many parts of the country after the announcement of the election results by the Electoral Commission. The violence claimed 1,300 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands. Far less violence was recorded in the districts where there was a District Peace Council than in those districts without such a council. The Peace Committees demonstrated their ability to manage inter-community conflict and to contain or prevent violence. Therefore, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008, following the post-election violence, recommended the establishment of District Peace Committees in all of Kenya's districts.

In *Ghana*, the National Peace Council played a major role at national and local levels in ensuring peaceful elections in 2008 and a smooth transfer of power through discreet meetings with stakeholders that defused considerable tension. The fact that the main religious leaders were part of the National Peace Council contributed to this result. The creation of dialogue fora between the Peace Councils and the Ghanaian society, including political parties, supported the practice of peaceful management of disputes in the country, which helped appease tensions during the 2008 elections.

These four cases are only glimpses, but they highlight the fact that prevention is possible. More in-depth study and analysis – both of successful and unsuccessful cases – is necessary. The following section draws from a Handbook on Prevention of Electoral Violence now being developed by the Department of Peace Operations of PATRIR. It presents 'good practice' steps that can help strengthen programming for prevention of electoral violence.

PHOTO: TUGELA RIDLEY/IRIN

Nigerians listen for the latest election news on their radios in Kano, northern Nigeria, in April 2007. Truthful and reliable reporting of election results are important in order to mitigate unrest and rumours that could lead to outbursts of violence.

Preventing electoral violence

Every election is unique, as is the context in each country. Policies and programmes for preventing electoral violence should be customised for the needs and context of each country and different regions and communities within a country. The following recommendations, however, are some good practice measures that can help prevent violence ahead of, during, and after elections:

1. Start early

The most important lesson highlighted by almost all practitioners and experts is start early. The context 12, 24, or even 36-48+ months before an election is often more conducive than the politically charged environment of an electoral period. Analysis, planning and measures for prevention of electoral violence should begin at least 24-48 months or more before elections.

Note: If this is not possible and elections are coming up in two weeks to six months, there are still many things that can be done, but experience shows that it is both wise and more effective to start early.

2. Use a Governance and Electoral Cycle Approach (24-48+ months)

Elections are not separate from the broader context of politics and governance in a country. Indeed they are central to them. In many countries, elections for different offices (president, parliament, local government) may also take place at different times. Early and standing preparation which engages with the overall governance process and strengthening of conflict handling capabilities is important – and preparations for one election can have benefits for the next, if reforms are followed through and sustained.

Reducing the likelihood of electoral violence can also be affected by measures such as electoral system reform, political party reform, constitutional reform, legal reform, etc. Going together with recommendation 1 (above), using a Governance and Electoral Cycle approach has three major benefits for those working to prevent electoral violence:

i. It starts earlier.

ii. It opens up for a broader range of measures, not only focusing on election-specific ones, but also dealing with the critical institutional and governance context in which elections occur.

iii. It increases the likelihood of national ownership and development of whole-of-government and national strategies for preventing electoral violence

3. Effective, early and joint analysis is critical. Scenario planning can help

Many of the factors which may contribute to electoral violence in a community/country can be identified months or years in advance. Root causes which give rise to grievances and triggers which may lead to the outbreak of violence can be mapped, identified and addressed/prepared for ahead of time. At least four key categories should be identified:

i. Structural cause of instability and root causes of conflict: for example, state capture by single ethnic groups, deep-seated inequalities between ethnic groups, regions, etc;

ii. Drivers of conflict and instability/violence: for example, hate speech (by political leaders or media), wide-spread access to weapons;

iii. Election-specific causes: for example, lack of trust in EMBs, delays in release of results, discrepancies between expectations or early returns and final results; and

iv. Conflict handling capabilities: for example, what capacities and competencies exist within a community/country to constructively handle these conflicts and prevent violence from breaking out or to handle/mitigate it if it does? Is there a national/state level strategy for peacebuilding and prevention? Are local peace committees in place? Does an effective early warning system linked to effective response capabilities exist?

Analysis should be carried out early and can even begin immediately after the last election: what happened, where did violence occur, how and why did it occur, how effective was the response, and what can be learned to help prevent violence in the next elections? It is just as important to include analysis of peacebuilding and conflict-handling capabilities (point 3:iv) as of what can contribute to conflict and violence. Using scenarios to map out different possibilities for what might happen before, during and after elections can also help stakeholders prepare and act proactively to reduce risk factors that can contribute to or increase the likelihood of violence, while improving and strengthening effective measures and capabilities for peacebuilding and prevention.

4. Infrastructure for Peace

I4P refers to building standing, trained and prepared capabilities within a community/country, the same way we have standing armies, standing health systems, standing school systems. One of the most consistent lessons in prevention and peacebuilding is that having standing and effective capabilities within a country significantly increases the likelihood of success. In South Africa, Guyana, Kenya and Ghana, standing capabilities in the form of peace committees, Joint Operating Centres, trained mediators, etc. all helped to address tensions and reduce or prevent cases of violence.

Mechanisms such as joint operating centres and peace forums/committees at the district, county/state and national levels can also help by bringing together key actors trusted, respected and mandated or seen as legitimate within a community to address tensions and conflict factors. A new global partnership between governments, the UN and civil society organisations is placing increasing focus on the importance of developing I4P. Another major benefit of this approach is that it roots effective conflict handling capabilities within communities, countries and cultures, and reduces dependence on external intervention and externally owned and driven approaches. This also increases the likelihood of early measures that are culturally appropriate.

5. Development of national strategies helps

Development of national strategies helps and should include all relevant ministries and state and non-state actors with mandates for elections, peacebuilding, or dealing with possible violence.

Many more measures and lessons exist, including:

6. Use of social media and media campaigns to raise people's awareness about the costs of violence, the impact it can have, and to promote national campaigns for violence free elections can help reduce the space and likelihood for violence and mobilise actors for peaceful elections;

7. A superb report on preventing and managing post-electoral violence in Kenya by George Wachira shows the value of engaging 'unexpected actors'. There is a broad constituency in any country that benefits more from peaceful elections than violence. This broad majority should be mobilised, empowered and activated for peaceful elections.

8. Training and preparation of police and security forces for nonviolent responses and responsible policing is essential. Escalation by security forces is a major factor in electoral violence.

9. There is now extensive experience in setting up effective early warning and critical incident mapping systems. These can help to identify possible drivers or risks of violence before violence breaks out – enabling effective peacebuilding and proactive prevention – and to map developing/unfolding situations, where conflicts and tensions are escalating, allowing for a rapid and appropriate response.

10. Prepare state and civilian peace capacities: From local peace teams to networks of mediators, prepare state and civil society capacities to engage both before and in case of violence.

11. Coordinate: Too often the work of different actors in peacebuilding and electoral support is disjointed and uncoordinated. Both national and international actors are placing increasing focus on improving coordination. Where this is done it has often contributed significantly to prevention.

Effective prevention of electoral violence

While it may not be possible to prevent all violence all the time, good planning, coordination preparation, and development of effective peacebuilding capabilities help. Those working with electoral processes and those working with peacebuilding and prevention need to do more to integrate prevention and peacebuilding into support for good governance and electoral processes.

Preparation of electoral observers (domestic and international) should be complemented with preparation for prevention and peacebuilding capabilities. Guides and handbooks for elections should include sections on preventing electoral violence, while pre-election analysis should always include analysis of risks of violence and what can be done. This is a growing field, and many actors – governments, UN, national and international organisations, donors – have an important role to play. The good news is: we know that it is possible. The task is now to do it.

1 International IDEA, Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election related Conflict and Violence, Workshop report, IDEA, 27-30 October 2009, p. 8.

2 Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

3 Administration and Cost of Elections

4 International Foundation for Electoral Systems

5 Department of Peace Operations of Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania

LPI News

New board of directors

LPI has a new international board of directors for 2012-2015. The number of members has been reduced from 15 to 7 thus making it possible for the board to meet five times per year instead of one. Provision is also made to form an International Advisory Council in order to invite additional resource persons and supporters of LPI's work.

Revd. Gustaf Ödquist, Sweden, has been re-elected as President of the board. He has substantial international experience working for the Church of Sweden in Southern Africa and the Middle East, as well as in the international department of the Church of Sweden, where he held various positions including peace and conflict issues. He is currently doing parish ministry in Gothenburg.

Dr Thomas Bamat, USA, is a sociologist and the Senior Advisor on Justice and Peacebuilding for Catholic Relief Services (CRS). He provides proposals for programming and evaluation support to staff around the globe, promotes the implementation of the CRS peace and justice strategy, and fosters effective networking and applied learning.

Revd. Myra Blyth, Great Britain, is Chaplain and Tutor in Pastoral Studies at Regent's Park College, in the University of Oxford. Her doctoral research is in the area of peace and conflict resolution and particularly restorative justice. Between 1988 and 2000 she worked at the World Council of Churches in Geneva as Europe Secretary and the Director of the Commission on Inter Church Aid. From 2000 to 2004 she served as Deputy General Secretary of the Baptist Union of Great Britain.

Sr Marie-Laure Dénès OP, France, is a Dominican sister of the Roman Congregation of St Dominic since 1994. Her academic background is in politics and theology. She has been Secretary General of the French commission for Justice and Peace of the French bishops' conference between 2004 and 2011. She has also been Secretary General of Justice and Peace Europe.

Revd. Vebjørn Horsfjord, Norway, has been assistant General Secretary of the Church of Norway Council on Ecumenical and International Relations and was between 2006 and 2010 General Secretary of the European Council of Religious Leaders, which is part of the global Religions for Peace network. He is now a research fellow and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oslo. His field of research is inter-religious relations and international Christian-Muslim dialogue.

Ms. Kati Jääskeläinen, Finland, has worked as Secretary for human rights and peace issues in the Church Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland 2004-2011. Her academic background is in international relations and international law. Her career includes positions as Acting Secretary General, Finnish League for Human Rights, Helsinki, project designer and project assistant at the University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science.

Ms. Alice Nderitu, Kenya, is a Commissioner in the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and a Transitional Justice Fellow of the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation. She spearheads work on education and mediation in the Commission and serves on the UN mediation roaster. She also worked at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, founding the Department on Human Rights Education. Prior to joining the Commission, she directed the Education for Social Justice Programme Fahamu, developing and running training courses on human rights and conflict prevention.

New Somalia publication: Creating space for fresh approaches

The LPI and the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame University, USA, have jointly published a book with seven reflections on peacebuilding in Somalia. This publication follows a series of conversations, arranged by the LPI team in Nai-

PHOTO: MAGNUS ARONSON

The new LPI board of directors recently had its first meeting in beautiful winter surroundings outside Uppsala. From left: Alice Nderitu (Kenya), Sr Marie-Laure Dénès OP (France), Vebjørn Horsfjord (Norway), Gustaf Ödquist, President (Sweden), Myra Blyth (UK), Kati Jääskeläinen (Finland) and Peter Karlsson Sjögren, Executive Director (Sweden). Absent: Thomas Bamat, USA.

robi in 2011, with Professor John Paul Lederach and six PhD students at the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University.

John Paul Lederach wished to provide his students with an opportunity to apply peacebuilding theories to a real context. LPI wanted to encourage creative thinking on policy options for Somalia; a kind of thinking out of the box by researchers. Among the challenging titles are:

- Addressing terrorism: A theory of change approach
- Al-Shabaab, part of the solution to the problems faced by Somalia?
- US engagement in Somalia: frames, missed opportunities and alternative options
- Criminalizing peace or containing violence?

The publication can be downloaded on LPI's website *www.life-peace.org/resources/publications/other-publications/* and at the Kroc Institute *http://kroc.nd.edu/*

LPI report from DR Congo on successful PAR process

In the southern-most part of the South Kivu province in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, conflicts linked to questions of identity, access to land and political rights between local communities have existed for decades. In the context of regional and national war since the early 1990s, those conflicts increasingly found violent expressions. The formation of local armed groups, claiming to represent the plight of their community, has reinforced the deep-seated frictions in cohabitation.

In order to contribute to transforming local conflicts in the Kivu provinces, the LPI supports local partner organisations in becoming centres for conflict transformation. One of the key approaches is the facilitation of constructive change processes through Participatory Action Research (PAR).

The comprehensive report *Au-delà des "groupes armés": Conflits locaux et connexions sous-regionales. L'exemple de Fizi et Uvira* is the result of a PAR-process carried out by the three local organisations Réseau d'Innovation Organisationelle, Arche d'Alliance and Action pour le Développement et la Paix Endogènes with financial and technical support of LPI.

The PAR-process, which was initiated in 2007, included numerous field visits and involved more than 600 participants from a wide-range of backgrounds, e.g. community members (also those delocalised), state and customary authorities, civil society representatives, refugees, members of armed groups and international actors. The final report at hand also integrated the comments raised by the communities throughout the research process.

After two and a half years of active involvement of all concerned actors in analysing the conflicts in this region, the different parties engaged in an inter-community dialogue in March 2010 on the key issues highlighted by the research, namely land conflicts, the population becoming increasingly militarised, their support to local armed groups and the local governance problems. The participants developed an action plan for addressing these issues.

In the follow-up, four inter-community committees were set up, covering different geographical areas in Fizi and Uvira territories as well as in Bukavu. They function as permanent frameworks for dialogue between different communities and have, so far, particularly focused on recurring, often violent, conflicts between farmers and pastoralists with regard to the seasonal movement of people with their livestock.

International student summit in Ethiopia

The Addis Ababa University Peace Club and the Life & Peace Institute organised an international Sustained Dialogue Summit in December 2011. Hundreds of students came together to brainstorm ways of sustaining the club's student-run activities.

LPI's programme manager Hannah Tsadik who organised the summit concludes: "The initiative is proof that something very small can grow and bloom and reach people all over the world ... that things can change for the better."

Professor Tarekegn Adebo, working for LPI and the Addis Ababa University, remarked on the peer-reviewed academic research being conducted within the Sustained Dialogue initiative: "This exercise is going to contribute to something serious on the theoretical level of that part of peacebuilding called impact assessment."

PHOTO: LPI

Sudan: North in the shadow of the South

LPI will arrange a series of open seminars in Sweden on the developments in the Sudan region. The seminars will be held in Uppsala and Stockholm in March-April and are organised in partnership with the Nordic Africa Institute.

The seminars aim to stimulate a discussion on the conflicts of Sudan,

which have been left in the shadow of the newly independent South Sudan. This will be an opportunity to gather Sudan experts and policy makers from the Nordic countries. One important topic will be the environmental aspects of conflicts.

Four seminars will be held in Uppsala and Stockholm. The first three are speaker seminars, while the fourth concluding seminar consists of two policy oriented panel discussions. Sub-themes for the respective seminars will be announced as speakers are confirmed. The seminars will be documented in a report with the working title *"Sudan: North in the shadow of the South"*.

During the series, a number of selected guest speakers representing the Sudanese civil society and academia will be presented. Adding to this, every seminar will present at least one Nordic speaker. The concluding event, to be held on the premises of the Swedish Parliament, will feature both Sudanese special guests and high profile representatives of the Nordic countries. Preliminary dates for the seminars are: 29 March, 12 April, 19 April and a date towards the end of April.

Staff changes

DR Congo:
Three new technical advisors have joined the LPI programme based in Bukavu: *Jean-Louis Nzweve, Eméry Mudinga* and *Oswald Muderwa*. Furthermore, there are two new interns as of 2012: *Maxime Richard* and *Justine Brabant*, both from France.

Sudan:
Nathalie Groom is replacing Jody Henderson as LPI's Resident Representative in Khartoum during her maternity leave, January-April 2012. New finance officer is *Souhair Moniem*.

Reviews and resources

Rich study on media and elections

Elections and the Media in Post-Conflict Africa: Votes and Voices for Peace? by Marie-Soleil Frère. Zed Books, 2011

Since the beginning of the 21st century, a large number of African countries have experienced pluralist elections, in many cases for the first time in decades. The polls, often organised in a post-conflict setting, are a test not just for the democracy of the country they are held in, but also for that country's freedom of speech.

Marie-Soleil Frère's Elections and the Media in Post-Conflict Africa: Votes and Voices for Peace? examines media's role in election contexts in no less than six Central African countries. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda have all organised elections in recent years, having experienced armed conflict in a near history. Covering the media sector in all six countries, the author looks at how the working conditions and dynamics surrounding the media are affected by the challenges posed by electoral tension.

Marie-Soleil Frère has done a tremendous research for the book. Not only has she covered all six countries in a systematic and thorough manner, she also examines the media's work in the respective phases, both outside and during the electoral period, including the campaigns and the election itself. The result is a rich study, with lessons relevant far beyond the countries at hand.

Frère is able to bring the study down to a concrete, tangible level, making the research easily applicable for policy purposes. With an almost anthropological approach, the book takes the reader close to the field, giving voice to African journalists. At the same time, it is a portrait of the everyday political dynamics in the six countries. The study is therefore strong both in breadth and depth.

The analysis that follows is sharp, rigorous and colourful. In addition to being systematic, it feels fresh and close to the subjects. As an unusually solid piece of research the book also functions as a guide or reference for scholars who want to cover the Central African media field.

Valter Vilkko
Programme Assistant, LPI

Systematic analysis and personal experiences from a researcher on peace and conflict

Peace Research: Theory and Practice, by Peter Wallensteen. London and New York: Routledge, 2011

In his book Peace Research: Theory and Practice, Peter Wallensteen undertakes a unique, historical and comprehensive overview of the field. It is historical because of the author's experience of the evolution and institutionalisation of the peace studies field first hand from its early days onward. His personal journey at the Uppsala University Peace and Conflict Research Programme is at the same time a testimony to the development of peace studies. The book is also a comprehensive review of peace research covering a wide range of topics.

The book is organised under five main parts. The first chapter offers useful insights into the intricacies of how a peace research programme has been developed and has become operational in research, teaching, and practice. The high points and challenges of running a peace research programme are often discussed among academics informally. Some of these challenges are shared by most peace and conflict resolution programmes around the world. Yet, in spite of these informal discussions, such challenges have hardly been written about by academics in the discipline so far, especially in a book of this sort.

How to link the macro and micro levels of analysis in peace research has always been one of the biggest challeng-

es. Wallensteen's book is an important reading in this sense. The second part deals with the question of war at the systemic level, using a comparative historical perspective. The next section, on conflict resolution, deals with more micro level analysis by, for example, looking at the role of agency in a chapter devoted to Dag Hammarskjöld's diplomacy. The book successfully shifts between the macro and micro levels. However, these chapters still stand out somewhat separately at the end, and how to integrate these different levels of analysis is still a daunting task for scholars.

In this part of the book the author relies on his many years of research to evaluate four models of major power politics: geopolitik, realpolitik, idealpolitik, and kapitalpolitik. Throughout this section, grand questions that have puzzled the international relations discipline, such as multilateralism vs unilateralism, are tackled with a peace research paradigm, using new terminology and a new perspective on correlates of war data.

The third part of the book deals with various conflict resolution issues and, unlike the first section of the book that leaves the state as a black box, delves into intra-state conflict dynamics at various levels. A remarkable chapter in this section is the one on conflict prevention. Wallensteen's proposed methodology on how to further research on conflict prevention provides a great insight for researchers and scholars working on this topic. The chapter on peace agreements is an overview of the author's research on peace agreements in intra-state conflicts.

The following chapters on sanctions and peace research are of great interest, especially to those working with international organisations and the UN. This part deals, i.a., with the critical question of how sanctions can be used more effectively and more constructively.

The last part of the book deals with Wallensteen's personal experience with academic peacemaking or what could be called Track Two diplomacy. These chapters are very different in nature and style from the rest of the book, which is dominated by data and systematic analysis. They are mostly anecdotal and have been written in a 'reflective practitioner' spirit.

All in all, this book is a great asset for any scholar working on peace research and conflict resolution. It covers a wide range of issues in the field from a systematic and historical-comparative manner. It should be added as the second volume next to a previously well-written book by the same author: "Understanding Conflict Resolution".

Esra Cuhadar
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Genocidal minds and deeds

Less Than Human. Why we demean, enslave, and exterminate others, by David Livingstone Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011

Germany's Genocide of the Herero. Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers, by Jeremy Sarkin. Cape Town: UCT Press and Woodbridge: James Currey, 2011

The Anatomy of a South African Genocide. The extermination of the Cape San peoples, by Mohamed Adhikari. Cape Town: UCT Press 2010

From barbarians to savages, vermin, gooks, dogs, baboons, cockroaches, rats ... The list of invectives denying fellow human beings the respect they deserve by degrading them to species below the human race is almost endless. Dehumanisation lowers the threshold and allows the elimination of others, considered sub-human, through an act of civilisation, so to say, a service to humanity, to protect it (meaning: us, i.e. those claiming to hold the power of definition) from the onslaught of the beasts.

Those who doubt whether this is an adequate assessment or rather an exaggeration are advised to read any of the three recently published books under review. *David Livingstone Smith*, a scholar in philosophy and psychology at the University of New England, provides a breathtaking panorama, with an impressive range and depth, of the history of dehumanisation. He challenges those among us, who believe they are immune to such manipulations: "Dehumanization is not the exclusive preserve of Nazis, communists, terrorists, Jews, Palestinians, or any other monster of the moment. We are all potential dehumanizers, just as we are all potential objects of dehumanization. The problem of dehumanisation is everyone's problem" (p. 25; original emphasis).

Smith offers explanations, but no solutions. As he concludes, dehumanisation has so far remained understudied and requires prioritisation on research agendas. The knowledge acquired, he hopes, might then help "to build a future that is less hideous than our past: a future with no Rwandas, no Hiroshimas, and no Final Solutions". If this can be done he does not know, "because nobody's ever tried" (p. 273).

Dehumanisation played out with horrible consequences since human history has been recorded. After the Crusades and the Conquista it took place most visibly in settler colonial societies in the American, Australian and African continents. The expansion into territories occupied by other people and their forceful subjugation bordering to elimination was euphemistically declared a "civilizing mission". Colonial undertakings included the will and intention to "exterminate the brutes" (a slogan coined by the German emperor Wilhelm II in his infamous "Hun speech" when dispatching soldiers to North China to mercilessly suppress the insurrection in 1901). The case studies under Southern African settler colonial rule are gruesome evidence of the consequences dehumanisation had for indigenous populations.

Jeremy Sarkin, a scholar in law and practicing attorney, deals with what is widely considered as the first genocide in the 20th century among the Herero (but also the Nama and other local groups) in today's Namibia. In late 2011 the first skulls originally brought to Germany for race related studies were returned to the descendants of the victim groups in Namibia, providing a reminder of an unclosed chapter in history. Sarkin, who was also adviser to the Herero in a hitherto unsuccessful reparation claim in US-American courts, seeks to document that the extermination order issued in 1904 was a deliberate act with the intent to destroy, officially endorsed by the emperor. Coming to terms with this past and its consequences until the very day remains an unresolved challenge in the absence of meaningful acts of reconciliation.

Mohamed Adhikari, who teaches history at the University of Cape Town, adds the often-ignored perspective of the

original population of Southern Africa, through a particular focus on the Cape region. Known widely under the term San or Bushmen, the first known inhabitants organised in small forager groups with distinct identities. They were often hunted like animals by invaders occupying their territories, most systematically by white settlers. Adhikari aptly called this process, which took place over decades and centuries, genocide in slow motion.

His study draws attention to one of the most decimated, marginalised and discriminated people. Merely surviving in destitution as impoverished farm workers or as noble savages on display in game reserves or as other objects of touristic attraction, they never received compensation or recognition. Adhikari ends by quoting an elder defined restitution, denied until today, as: "Land, water and truth" (p. 96).

While the cases from Namibia and South Africa document the lasting consequences in a historical perspective, Smith provides the overall context for the mechanisms at play, which assist in executing the systematic violence then and now. Shocking images from many parts of our world displayed by the media worldwide underline that this is not a mechanism of the past. Instead, the footage of different acts of barbaric violence discloses the mindset and deeds anchored in a form of dehumanisation, which paves the way to genocidal practices until this very day. While Taliban executing captured Pakistani soldiers in cold blood, at close range in front of running cameras, feeds Western resentment, the US-American marines urinating on the corpses of killed Taliban, revoking the revolting images from Abu Ghraib, are a reminder that our much praised Western civilisation also remains the cradle of modern barbarism.

Henning Melber
Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Research Associate with the University of Pretoria

Human rights and peacebuilding in search of a common agenda

An Unlikely Dilemma: Constructing a Partnership Between Human Rights and Peacebuilding, by Göran Gunner and Kjell-Åke Nordquist. Church of Sweden Research Series, 2011

The newly published book by Gunner and Nordquist is a welcome development intended to shed new light into the existing 'parallel worlds' of peacebuilders and human rights defenders. With my ten years of experience of grass roots and international protection and human rights work, I have now joined a peacebuilding organisation and have asked many of the questions that the authors do. As a human rights practitioner, I can testify that 'we' as human rights folks often don't really talk to 'them', the 'strange' peacebuilding crowd, as we speak in quite different languages about outcomes that are supposed to be extremely similar.

Prior to this book, I have not come across any significant publications that address this gap, so I was excited to run into this one. I appreciated that the authors clearly spelled out that a separate 'Human Rights Agenda' and a 'Peacebuilding Agenda' exist, and I was thrilled that the authors proposed a new 'Third Agenda' to interweave the two. With this in mind, I applaud the authors for choosing such a complex and strategic issue. The book offers some good reflections.

Nevertheless, the book did not meet my expectations. I found the logic difficult to follow. There is a lot of descriptive, often basic, information on both human rights and peacebuilding, and while there is no shortage of good reflections offered by the authors, in my view there is a lack of analysis. Reading the case studies was also a disappointment. After reading the first four, I was glad to run into something that drew my attention in the fifth one on East Timor. It was about an exchange that occurred between the East Timor leader Xanana Gusmao, who advocated "reconciliation first, then justice", and bishop Carlos Belo, who said: "justice first, then reconciliation". I was looking forward to seeing a comprehensive analysis on what happened, or could have happened and why, based on both alternative approaches. However, no helpful analysis followed.

Most disappointingly, I did not find any clearly developed concept for the 'Third Agenda' itself – that would have been really useful. Instead, many pages were dedicated to elaborating the 'livelihood agenda' and 'confidence agenda' which I did not find very clear.

I am now wondering: what if human rights are most useful as outcomes (norm-setting for how a real peace may look like), while peacebuilding is useful as a process? Many peacebuilding people that I know find it difficult to articulate what peace is and what its substantive dimensions are. On the other hand, I think that we, human rights people, at times may be too militant in fighting for the outcomes, and this is where peacebuilding experts could sometimes offer assistance by bringing a good process to this end. Of course, peacebuilding as a process would not always secure human rights objectives, but it should at least be tried. The Do No Harm principle and protection of human life should be primary considerations in both human rights and peacebuilding work. Sustainable peace that is based on human dignity should be our shared aspiration.

Igor Vorontsov
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PeaceNexus, Switzerland

The predicaments of children in conflict

Disarmament Forum: Children and conflict. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2011

More than one billion children under the age of 18 live in areas of conflict or emerging from war, while over 18 million children are refugees or have been internally displaced. Young people living in war and conflict stricken areas are not only less likely to have access to education and health. They also risk being recruited, voluntarily or by force, as child soldiers where they risk being killed, maimed, used as informants or sexually abused.

The UNIDIR Disarmament Forum's publication on *Children and conflict* discusses and highlights challenges, successes and complexities surrounding existing international legal frameworks, the modus operandi of international organisations, armed actors using schools as military bases, integration of young war-affected mothers, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

The authors and their contributing articles are well selected, as there is a healthy balance between theoretical framework and concrete examples from countries such as Liberia, New Zealand, Nepal and Sierra Leone. This variation demonstrates that the issue at hand clearly is not uniform and hence the responses and answers cannot be either.

Henrik Halvardsson
Programme Advisor
Life & Peace Institute

Arms trade continues booming

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook for 2010, Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, 2011

The annual United Nations Disarmament Yearbook for 2010, Part II, came out in the autumn 2011, supplementing the first part, which contains all the resolutions and decisions on disarmament made by the UN General Assembly. As usual, the second part of the yearbook goes through developments within the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation of both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction.

The latest yearbook shows that the arms trade continued booming in 2010. Global military expenditure continued to rise for the 13th year in a row and though the growth rate was much slower than in 2009, the world has now increased its spending since 2001 by 50 per cent. Another visible trend seems to show that the global economic instability in recent years has not affected the volumes of arms trade in any significant way.

The book also lists some of the main events and developments within multilateral disarmament. Especially noteworthy in 2010 were the signing of the New START treaty between Russia and the US in April for reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, the Convention of Cluster Munitions entering into force in August and the first meeting of states parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in November.

The Disarmament Yearbook is an essential reference book for any issues considering global disarmament. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs also maintains a webpage, supplementing the Yearbook with a quarterly electronic newsletter giving information on activities within the field of disarmament. The webpage, with a number of other disarmament related resources, such as treaties and agreements, can be found at www.un.org/disarmament

Valter Vilkko
Programme Assistant, LPI

Worrying trend: Increased external involvement in internal conflicts

States in Armed Conflict 2010. Edited by Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2011

The 23rd edition of the annual report of *States in Armed Conflict* has recently been released. The report contains, among other things, a global analysis of increasing external involvement in internal conflicts in the 1975-2010 time period, which may result in an intensification of the conflicts.

Ever since the end of World War II a majority of conflicts in the world have taken place within states. The fact that inter-state conflicts have become increasingly rare over time has had a positive impact on human security. However, in recent years researchers at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), based at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, have observed a worrying trend, in that external actors are to an increasing extent sending troops into internal conflicts.

"Research shows that this phenomenon is connected to the duration and intensity of conflicts, so of course it is an alarming development," says Lotta Themnér, one of the project managers at UCDP.

In 2010, nine of the thirty active conflicts involved troops from one or more other countries. Some well-documented cases are the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.

Professor Peter Wallensteen, director of the programme, believes that a willingness to intervene could instead serve to ameliorate a conflict, if used in a different way.

"We know that new weapons increase the intensity of hostilities and can also reduce the will to seek negotiated solutions. This research sends a signal to those who wish to work for peace: a targeted weapons embargo introduced at an early stage of a conflict can alter developments", says Peter Wallensteen.

Adapted from DPCR press release
Translated by Jakob Samuelsson

Sudan in focus of next New Routes issue

Since last summer's referendum voted for a secession of South Sudan as an independent state, the international community has closely followed the development in the region. What does the establishment of a new state mean to its inhabitants and to neighbouring countries? How does the secession affect the role of northern Sudan? How will the relations between the two countries develop? What will happen with the states on the border between Sudan and South Sudan?

With a starting point in a series of seminars on Sudan (see pp. 23-24), next New Routes issue will present a number of reflective and analytical articles about the two Sudanese countries. Each of the speakers at the seminars will be asked to write a summary of his/her lecture, and some of the articles will be based on these lectures. Other experts, academics and practitioners will be asked to broaden the picture with their contributions.

Watch out for New Routes no. 2.2012 which will be out in June!

New publications from LPI

Two new books have recently been published by LPI , and we are happy to introduce them to New Routes readers

Somalia: Creating space for fresh approaches to peacebuilding

Policy options discussed by decision makers inside and outside Somalia tend to overlook the local complexities and the potential for nonviolent conflict transformation that exist in the context. The LPI and the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame University, USA, have jointly published a book with seven reflections on peacebuilding in Somalia. This publication follows a series of conversations with Professor John Paul Lederach and six PhD students at the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University.

2011, 67 pp, ISBN 91-87748-95-9. Hardcopy: €15, $25 (postage included). Free download in PDF format from www.life-peace.org/resources/publications/other-publications/and http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/Somalia_book.pdf

Au-delà des Groupes Armés: Conflits locaux et connexions sous-regionales L'exemple de Fizi et Uvira (Sud- Kivu, RDC)

Adepae, Arche d'Alliance, RIO et Life & Peace Institute ici présentent le rapport de recherche portant sur les conflits intercommunautaires en Territoire d'Uvira et Fizi, Sud-Kivu, RD Congo. Le rapport est le produit d'une Recherche Action Participative. Un objectif de recherche était d'arriver à une profonde compréhension des causes des conflits qui opposent les communautés locales. Deuxièmement, la recherche voulait susciter l'intérêt des acteurs locaux à transformer ces conflits positivement.

2011, 158 pp, ISBN 91-87748-96-7. Hardcopy: €20, $30 (postage included). Free download in PDF format from www.life-peace.org/resources/publications/research-reports/serie-des-grands-lacs/

LPI AND ITS PERIODICALS

Life & Peace Institute, (LPI) is an international and ecumenical centre based in Uppsala, Sweden, that supports and promotes nonviolent approaches to conflict transformation through a combination of research and action, and hence contributes to the prevention and mitigation of violence as a precondition for peace, justice, and nonviolent coexistence.

The Institute's conflict transformation work is based on an understanding that conflict is a natural part of societies that has the potential for both constructive and destructive change. It also builds on the premise that peace can only be achieved through the active involvement of the communities in conflict themselves.

LPI's operational focus is on Africa, and more specifically on the Central Africa and Horn of Africa regions. In addition to the head office in Sweden, LPI has programme offices in Nairobi (Kenya), Bukavu (DRC), and Khartoum (Sudan) and staff working with the Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia.

LPI publishes two periodicals: the quarterly journal **New Routes** and the bi-monthly electronic newsletter **Horn of Africa Bulletin** covering the African countries of the Horn. Free online subscription to both periodicals.
Prices for hardcopy subscription to **New Routes**:
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