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# Interfaith Dialogues in Indonesia and Beyond

## Ten Years of ICRS Studies (2007–2017)

Leonard Chrysostomos Epafras (Editor)



**Interfaith Dialogues in Indonesia and Beyond**

*Ten Years of ICRS Studies (2007-2017)*



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Leonard Chrysostomos Epafras (Editor)

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*Siti Syamsiyatun*



# PREFACE

*Siti Syamsiyatun*<sup>1</sup>

I am delighted and deeply thankful that the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS), in collaboration with Globethics.net, is able to publish this important book written by eight of ICRS's alumni: mas Leo, mbak Nina, mas Jerson, mas Ferry, mas Joko, mas Faqih, mas Benny dan mbak Mega. This book could be seen as a living witness, combining testimonies of a number of our graduates who continue to develop their intellectual rigours beyond their formal learning at ICRS. I see this publication by our alumni as one of the best gifts and blessings for ICRS in celebrating its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary, although with a little delay in its release. These nine alumni of ICRS were among the first persons to believe in and be impacted by what ICRS had envisioned and developed back in 2006; and they remain, showing their love to ICRS and maintain their sweet relations. Thank you for the dedication of all contributors!

ICRS was founded by many people with clear visions, aspirations and big dreams from various institutions, for cultivating positive strength and constructive conversations between religion and science for better humanity and the world. After long constructive discussions, ICRS was founded by the three finest universities in Indonesia: Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga (UIN Suka) and Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (UKDW),

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<sup>1</sup> Apart from her permanent position as Associate Professor in Islamic Studies at Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Siti is currently entrusted as Director of ICRS, a member of Globethics.net Board of Foundation and Program Executive of the Globethics.net Indonesian Regional Programme.

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represented by their Rectors. ICRS is proud to be supported by UGM is the oldest university in Indonesia, and amongst the largest state-owned universities across the country. It is religiously-neutral and has been widely celebrated for its excellence in the social sciences and humanities. UIN Suka is also the oldest Islamic university in Indonesia, known for excellence in the area of Islamic studies. UKDW is among the best Christian universities in the country and is noted for its established theological school. Thus ICRS is capitalizing from these pools of academic expertise and excellence from these three universities which have different religious affiliation backgrounds and a diverse strength of study fields.

With its vision to become an outstanding, internationally respected and locally rooted graduate program, research centre and community engagements in inter-religious studies, ICRS opened its door for first doctoral students in September 2006. Few of the contributors of this book—notably mas Leo, mas Jerson, mbak Mega and mas Ferry—were the first students who believed in us and enrolled. Ten years from its inception, ICRS has admitted more than 80 students coming from 14 countries, and has proudly educated 30 doctors, of which nine are contributing to this book.

In addition to providing a doctoral program through the Inter-religious Doctoral Study Program administered and accredited through the Graduate School of Inter-disciplinary Studies at Universitas Gadjah Mada, ICRS strengthens and widens its research wing. After establishing, ICRS has conducted several research projects, and produced numerous books and other publications resulting from these research projects and conferences. Instances of ICRS publications that are supported by Globethics.net are *Dealing With Diversity; Religion and Dakwahtainment; Religion, Public Policy and Social Transformations in Southeast Asia: Managing Religious Diversit; Ethics in Religious Social Interaction; Keragaman yang Menyatukan, Etika*

*Bisnis: Perspektif Agama-agam and Anti Corruption Religiosity and Ethics.*

I hope this collaboration between Globethics.net and ICRS for disseminating ethical leaderships and social praxis will continue and thrive for promoting respect, understanding, cooperation among people of different faith, nationality, age, ethnicity and for all in general.

Finally, I'd like to thank the Globethics.net team in Geneva and Indonesia for agreeing to publish this book volume; to mas Leo for coordinating this post-doc intellectual journey; to all ICRS alumni who dearly presented a special gift to ICRS' 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary in the form of this beautiful writing. Please enjoy reading this book!



## INTRODUCTION

### Interfaith Dialogues in Indonesia and Beyond Ten Years of ICRS Studies (2007 -2017)

*Leonard C. Epafras*

Religious Studies as an academic discourse is not a new feat in Indonesia. Aspects of Religious Studies have been studied under different flavours of courses, such as comparative religion in Islamic schools, theology of religions (*theologia religionum/teologi agama-agama*) in the Protestant and Catholic theological seminaries, and as philosophy, sociology, and anthropology of religions within the sphere of social sciences, cultural studies and humanities, mostly operated in the non-confessional higher education institutions.

Retracing the discourse steps, it was in 1960s, the “father of Religious Studies,” Abdul Mukti Ali, initiated the establishment of the Faculty of *Ushuluddin* (freely translated as Comparative Study of Religions),<sup>1</sup> firstly in the State Islamic Institute (IAIN – *Institut Agama Islam Negeri*) Yogyakarta, and later throughout all IAINs and Colleges of Islamic Studies (STAIN – *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri*) throughout the country. His position as the Minister of Religious Affair

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<sup>1</sup> Khairah Husin, “Peran Mukti Ali Dalam Pengembangan Toleransi Antar Agama Di Indonesia,” *Jurnal Ushuluddin* 21, no. 1 (2014): 102.

(1971-1978) accelerated this process and the system itself preserved in the State Islamic Universities (UIN – Universitas Islam Negeri up until the present day.<sup>2</sup>

Mukti Ali's initiative on the establishment, the full-fledged "Religious Studies" in Indonesia, has multifold bearings, i.e. the reformation of Islamic educational system and endorsement of the concept of inter-religious harmony.<sup>3</sup> While his concept on it was derived from his understanding of Islamic justice, in particular in the relationship between Islam and other religions,<sup>4</sup> politically it was part of the project of "inter-religious harmonious life" (*kerukunan hidup antarumat beragama*) policed by the New Order administration.

Between the years 1970-2000, the administration endorsed this project in keeping the stability of the state, maintaining national development processes and control over the discourse and meaning of "religion" (associated with the Indonesian's term "*agama*").<sup>5</sup> In the larger context, Ali also encouraged the Indonesian sociologists to touch upon religion as a subject of sociological research, under the banner of "religion and society" (*Agama dan Masyarakat*).<sup>6</sup>

In practice, as observed by Amin Abdullah, the concept of "inter-religious harmonious life" was often understood in apologetic attitude, as "each religion wants to demonstrate that it is the most harmonious or

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<sup>2</sup> Suhadi, "*I Come from a Pancasila Family*": A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era (Zürich: LIT Verlag Münster, 2013), 37–38.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 38; Husin, "Peran Mukti Ali," 104.

<sup>4</sup> Husin, "Peran Mukti Ali," 104–5.

<sup>5</sup> Michel Picard, "Introduction: 'Agama', 'Adat', and Pancasila," in *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali*, ed. Michel Picard and Rémy Madinier (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 3ff.

<sup>6</sup> Damianus Hendropuspito, *Sosiologi agama* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius & BPK Gunung Mulia, 1983), 21.

tolerant.”<sup>7</sup> The promotion of religious harmony was seen as a top-down, managerialist understanding of religion<sup>8</sup> engaging religious elites.<sup>9</sup>

On the Christian theological side, the construction of contextual theology is the closest to the development of the discourse of Religious Studies. Contextual theology established by Christian theologians, notably Emanuel Gerrit Singgih (Protestant) and Johannes Banawiratma (Catholic), marked the shift in Indonesian Christianity to value local religious experiences. In a nutshell, contextual theology is a critique of the “Western” Christianity as a universalistic theological view that could not entirely be applied in the post-colonial world: such as Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. They endorsed the theology that recognized the “context” and constructed theology along with it, and addressed pressing issues in Indonesia such as poverty, ecological destruction, inter-religious relationships, social injustice and gender inequality.<sup>10</sup> In certain theological schools, such as in the Duta Wacana Christian University, contextual theology become the leitmotif of a bulk of theological courses, such as biblical theology, practical theology, church history, hermeneutics and theology of religions (*theologia religionum/teologi agama-agama*).

Other religious-based higher education institutions such as the College of Hindu Dharma (for Hinduism) and the College of Buddhism, while they offered education in their distinctive traditions, elements of Religious Studies in terms of inter-religious understanding appeared as

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<sup>7</sup> M. Amin Abdullah, “An Analytical Perspective in the Study of Religious Diversity: Searching for a New Model of the Philosophy of the Study of Religions,” in *Religious Harmony: Problems, Practice, and Education*, ed. Michael Pye et al. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 55.

<sup>8</sup> Myengkyo Seo, *State Management of Religion in Indonesia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 90.

<sup>9</sup> Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80.

<sup>10</sup> Emanuel Gerrit Singgih, *Doing Theology in Indonesia: Sketches for an Indonesian Contextual Theology* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2003); Seo, *State Management*, 84.

well, at least within the state-compulsory course of Pancasila education (*Pendidikan Pancasila*).

With the advancement of anthropology in the 1990s, sociology and psychology of religion were introduced in Indonesian academic circles. But were nonetheless simply an “introduction of religion,” and were not an “objective paradigms in religious studies.”<sup>11</sup>

The post-Suharto era (1998 until the present day) brought forth the development of a more focused Religious Studies program. And it seems that the binding term of “Religious Studies”, as a term in itself and as an inter-disciplinary character, only came in this period.

A full-fledged Religious Studies program, as self-governing discipline, appeared in 2000 by the establishment of the Center for Religion and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) in the non-confessional Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) which offered Master programs. The initiative was developed with the formation of the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS) in 2006. ICRS is a consortium of three universities, i.e. Universitas Gadjah Mada, Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University (UIN Suka), and Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW), all of them resided in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

ICRS can be considered a culmination of a long concern for the academic response to the increasing inter-religious complexity in the post-Suharto era (1998 onward), and the dream of closer inter-confessional cooperation and collaboration in the academic circle. Post-Suharto Indonesia is facing many challenges: numerous inter-communal and inter-religious conflicts, public policy issues, house of worship disputes, religious blasphemy and violence, and the increasing of

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<sup>11</sup> Suhadi, *I Come from a Pancasila Family*, 39. An edited volume and translation into Indonesian from a book edited by Peter Connolly, *Approaches to the Study of Religion* (1999), enlisted seven approaches, i.e. anthropological, feminism, phenomenological, philosophical, psychological, sociological, and theological [*Aneka Pendekatan Studi Agama* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002)].

intolerance stance including the politicization of religion, radicalism, terrorism, and a complicated cyber-religious expression.<sup>12</sup>

Responding to those problems could not depend upon structural and security approaches, which often leads to a “fire brigade” approach. However, it needs a broader approach, including the penetration of the social, religious, theological problem underneath any inter-religious tension. The establishment of CRCS and ICRS could be located at this juncture, i.e. to provide an explanation for the current religious issues, providing recommendation, and developing the inter-religious understanding and discourse. The combination of religious based institutions, viz. UIN Suka and UKDW, and non-confessional UGM in managing ICRS, allows not only the dialogical atmosphere of inter-

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Listia, Laode Arham, and Lian Gogali, *Problematika pendidikan agama di sekolah: hasil penelitian tentang pendidikan agama di Kota Jogjakarta, 2004-2006* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Interfidei, 2007); Hairus Salim, Najib Kailani, and Nikmal Azekiyah, *Politik Ruang Publik Sekolah: Negosiasi Dan Resistansi Di SMUN Di Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta: CRCS dan LKiS, 2011); Zainal Abidin Bagir et al., “Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama Di Indonesia 2012” (Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), UGM, 2012); Suhadi Cholil et al., *Politik Pendidikan Agama, Kurikulum 2013, Dan Ruang Publik Sekolah* (Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies, 2014); Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf et al., *Politik Lokal Dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada Dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik Dalam Konflik Keagamaan Di Sampang, Bekasi, Dan Kupang* (Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), UGM, 2015); Halili et al., *Dari Stagnasi Menjemput Harapan Baru: Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan Di Indonesia 2014* (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2015); Halili and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *Politik Harapan Minim Pembuktian: Laporan Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan Di Indonesia, 2015* (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2016); Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, eds., *Islam Dan Radikalisme Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005); Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *Wajah Para “Pembela” Islam: Radikalisme Agama Dan Implikasinya Terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan Di Jabodetabek Dan Jawa Barat* (Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2010); *Dari radikalisme menuju terorisme: studi relasi dan transformasi organisasi Islam radikal di Jawa Tengah & D.I. Yogyakarta* (Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2012); Leonard Chrysostomos Epafras, “Religious E-Xpression among the Youths in the Indonesian Cyberspace,” *Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi* 13, no. 1 (2016): 1–18.

disciplinary, but also a clear message to the world of the possibility of cooperation among different religious tradition.

In significant point, however, is that Religious Studies is not native of Indonesia. It came from the “Western” academic tradition, hence it bears its legacy in its development. Religious Studies as an independent academic discipline was current in the 1960s in North American universities. It is also known as Comparative Religion, Science of Religion, even historically it went under the name History of Religions.<sup>13</sup>

Except probably among some academicians from the Evangelical Christianity theological schools, some Indonesian scholars in different degree of expressions tend to contrast the practices of constructing Religious Studies in Indonesia and in the “Western” academia. The “West” is portrayed in general focused on historical, comparative, and phenomenological.<sup>14</sup> Those are the consequence of its historical genealogy.

Though there were several precedences, religion as a scientific endeavour was formally proclaimed by a German-born British Indologist, Friederich Max Müller. In a public lecture delivered on February and March 1870, in the Royal Institution of the Great Britain, London, he introduced the notion of “science of religion” (*Religionswissenschaft*). As he puts it, “In beginning today a course of lectures on the *Science of Religion* – or I should rather say on some preliminary points that have to be settled before we can enter upon a truly scientific study of the religions of the world – I feel as I felt when first pleading in this very place for the Science of Language” (original

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<sup>13</sup> Russell T. McCutcheon, “What Is the Academic Study of Religion?” (Department of Religious Studies, University of Alabama, August 18, 2012), 1, <https://rel.as.ua.edu/pdf/Aboutreligion.pdf.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Mariasusai Dhavamony, *Fenomenologi agama*, trans. Antonius Sudiarta (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1995), 32–42.

italics).<sup>15</sup> Through further explanation he admitted that the “unique” position of religion among the people’s heart as a “sacred subject” must not be reduced to a scientific discipline, he on the other hand saw the opportunity to elevate religion based on religious toleration.

This concern was picked by earlier European scholars that maintained non-normative judgments and non-evaluative comparative method in dealing with non-Christian religious systems.<sup>16</sup> The observation was follows: “[t]o compare in a non-evaluative manner means that one searches for observable similarities and differences and then theorizes as to why just these similarities and why just those differences.”

Even so, in the later development, particularly among the liberal-leaning academic centers in the North Atlantic context, Religious Studies was often criticized as none other than “a liberal form of theology,” endorser of “religious relativism,” and further as another chapter of “Judeo-Christian” imperialism.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, it tends to fall into the “logical structural” explanations, which looking away from faith, and burdened by Christianity bias, which distanced itself from other religious traditions.<sup>18</sup>

There is furthermore, a hesitant move, even resistance, to transform the Religious Studies into a scientific-sanction discipline, which Donald Wiebe dubbed as “a failure of nerve.”<sup>19</sup> Religion in this regard is not

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<sup>15</sup> Friedrich Max Müller, *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1882), 3–4. Daniel Pals, *Nine Theories of Religion*, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1.

<sup>16</sup> McCutcheon, “What Is the Academic Study of Religion?,” 1.

<sup>17</sup> Criticism as registered by Edward Dutton, “‘Anthropology-Lite’: An Education Perspective on the Ideology of Religious Studies,” *Religion & Education* 37, no. 2 (2010): 129–45.

<sup>18</sup> Ursula King (1984, 137), quoted in Abdullah, “An Analytical Perspective,” 57.

<sup>19</sup> Donald Wiebe, “It’s Never Been Better: Comments on the Current State of the Science of Religion,” *Religio* 20, no. 2 (September 2012): 173–92; William E. Arnal, Willi Braun, and Russell T. McCutcheon, eds., *Failure and Nerve in the*

considered as belief and religious precepts, but as a subject of the study of humanity—the study of the human aspect of religion in connection with other aspects such as social organization, politics, culture. Hence, Religious Studies have a strong association with social justice, gender issues, culture, memory, history, theology, hermeneutics, ethics, minority belief, and so on.

The Fundamental questions are then, why do Religious Studies in Indonesia? Why doing Religious Studies at all? In the country with a long history of religious encounters, and with an impressive diversity of religious traditions and expressions, it seems only natural to do Religious Studies in Indonesia. Or isn't it?

To understand it, there are some caveats on doing Religious Studies in Indonesia. As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia is neither a theocracy, nor a secular country (though she claimed herself a religious state). In normative way, it means that religion became the part of the sources of the politics of social integration, often in complicated way as the meaning of “religion” and “social integration” are contested. In the state foundation, *Pancasila* (Five Principles), believe in the Oneness of divine being is the first principle. It is secured by the constitution that honouring the diversity of religious expression.

In a concrete way, it means religion is a source of spirituality for the majority of Indonesians, the basis of cultural expressions, and often at times immersed into political practice. It is the elephant in the room, through one in which cultural, social and political aspirations are devised through.

“Religion” has been defined mostly from the perspective of the state, and significantly in a way from the (Sunni) Islamic perspective. And it is understood differently by respected religious traditions, in the inter-religious and intra-religious settings. The consequence is that the dyadic

discourse of monotheism (read: Abrahamic traditions) and non-monotheism, state and religious authority of the definition and academic voices, remained in the mental operation on the backdrop.

Three decades ago Talal Asad already warned that “a transhistorical definition of religion is not viable.”<sup>20</sup> Meaning to say that the meaning of “religion” as the subject of a study is contested and highly contextual, and implicitly demand an approach beyond the “Western” bias. The call for it is extremely challenging. The Indonesian higher education system constructed upon and developed from Dutch colonial system, and later on from other “Western” educational systems. However, the long history of religious interaction in the area (Southeast Asia) among religions and local beliefs, brought forward a frontier condition in which competition and conciliation is part of the game. Pluralistic arrangements remain a pervasive feature of Indonesian religious landscape, providing a space of manoeuvre for Religious Studies.

An Indonesian intellectual endeavor is a constant product of negotiation among institutions, cultural upbringing, religious conviction and affiliation, and others. Without necessarily claiming that Religious Studies scholars in Indonesia are all religious persons, many scholars take religion seriously either as a personal preference or living within respective religious tradition. Many of them are confessionalists and also activists in their religious institutions, and even being themselves a part of the religious leadership and authority in their respective community. This condition shapes a rather unique landscape for doing Religious Studies. The smooth flow between religious, academic, and other social spaces allows scholars to get involved deeply with religious issues at the grassroots level. But on the other hand it might be a liability

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<sup>20</sup> Talal Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” in *A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion*, ed. Michael Lambek (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 116–17. The section of this book is from his celebrated work, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (1993 [1982]).

in the development of critical scholarship and/or development of a new theory of Religious Studies.

Those even more challenging since in Indonesia the public discourse on religion tended to fall into some of Ivan Strenski called as *six common clichés* in portraying religion, i.e. religion is by definition good (first cliché) and bad (second cliché); a matter of beliefs, feelings, and experiences, rather than rituals and practices (third cliché), and anchored in believing in God (fourth cliché); it is private and “deeply personal” (fifth cliché); and lastly, the separation of religion from power and politics (sixth cliché).<sup>21</sup> These clichés and tendencies in many ways appeared in the public rhetoric and influenced the product of Indonesian scholars. They often pushed back the complexity of religion and religious expression, for example in dealing with the relationship between religion and violence.

Within the framework of a highly centralized national education system, Religious Studies is just “another discipline.” This in turn complicates the dynamic of the discipline, notably at the post-graduate level since the educational system may relate to the labour market. The main market of this program usually absorbed into the following post: teacher of religion (from the elementary to the higher education institutions), teacher of specifically Religious Studies program, non-governmental and civil society organizations (NGO/CSOs) activists, social science researchers, civil servants, and other posts. Religious Studies program hence has a complicated relationship with the “commodification” process of Indonesian education, notably in the higher education system, that there is a “race” when offering graduate programs to the public. While on the surface it might be seen as the development of scientific studies, further scrutiny might reveal a complicated picture. Competition of the study program, partly as an

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<sup>21</sup> Ivan Strenski, *Why Politics Can't Be Freed from Religion* (Chichester, U.K. ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 11ff.

effect of liberal regulation – not necessarily systematic – on establishing a study program, and the “over-supply” of the graduates of Religious Studies and its akin programs, which demand proper channelling.

The emergence of the discourse of “religious radicalism” in public mind challenged Religious Studies to provide “solutions.” Such a demand is indeed justifiable but misses the larger issue at hand. Religious Studies, like any other humanities discipline, and as understood by ICRS, is not prescriptive by nature. It provides what is called an upstream solution, by providing an education to the religious leadership, academician, and researcher. However, on the other hand it is also considered “elite” and “socially expensive” if Religious Studies as a discipline that merely satisfies and pursues the *Verstehen* and *Erklären* paradigms of knowledge. It has to say something to the society itself. It has “a vital role to play in public affairs,” and Religious Studies scholars are themselves “public intellectuals,”<sup>22</sup> and are demanded to be “socially relevant.”<sup>23</sup>

Religious Studies in ICRS is owed to the established social sciences, notably Anthropology and Sociology. It is in line with the argument that basically Religious Studies is an anthropological enterprise, nonetheless not as a sub-division or branch of anthropology.<sup>24</sup>

In Indonesian academia, Religious Studies could also be described as a cutting edge process of experimentation as: e. g. the Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station (cf. Leonard C. Epafras, in this volume).

It came to pass that religion in Indonesia was portrayed as a source of moral orientation and generator of social capital, like in the United

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<sup>22</sup> Russell T. McCutcheon, “A Default of Critical Intelligence? The Scholar of Religion as Public Intellectual,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 65, no. 2 (1997): 443–68; *Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), xi.

<sup>23</sup> See the critics of this tendency by Wiebe, “It’s Never Been Better,” 187.

<sup>24</sup> McCutcheon, “What Is the Academic Study of Religion?,” 1.

States.<sup>25</sup> This condition might be seen as a social strength, but at the same time there is a certain odd perception of this phenomenon, especially from the perspective of minority belief communities, such as Ahmadiyya, Shi'ism, new religious movements, and derivation of tribal beliefs. The latter might be threatened by interpretation of religiosity and moral posture in public space, which at times came from the dominant understanding of it. The state regulation on religious blasphemy (notably PNPS No.1/1965) tended to be implemented not toward any act and rhetoric against religion, but toward the alternative perspective of the mainstream understanding of certain religions. This is evidently appeared in the anti-Ahmadiyya and anti-Shi'ite campaigns from certain section of Muslim communities.

The condition is furthermore complicated with the growing intolerance in society. The understanding as such appeared in the physical breach suffered by them, which at times the state apparatus did not step forward to defend them. Religious Studies is an academic (and symbolic) space for discussing the condition of minority groups that provide political advocacy, and the rhetoric of tolerance in regards of this. In many institutions, such as CRCS, and ICRS, the outcome of the research on tolerance and anti-discrimination societies are produced as a political advocacy to the public policy-makers.

On a theoretical level, Religious Studies can be defined either as a formation of knowledge about religion or as an understanding of religion(s).<sup>26</sup> The former is seeing religion as “a human phenomenon,” while the latter is encouraging the students into certain degrees of

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” in *A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion*, ed. Michael Lambek (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 512–22; Alan Mittleman, “Introduction,” in *Religion as a Public Good: Jews and Other Americans on Religion in the Public Square*, ed. Alan Mittleman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 6; John Esposito, Darrell J. Fasching, and Todd Lewis, *World Religions Today*, trans. Ayu Yudha et al. (Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo, 2015), 5.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Wiebe, “It’s Never Been Better,” 180.

literacy, and social responsibility and sensitivity. Upon the model of scientific discipline that Toulmin proposed of three models: *compact, diffuse, and would-be disciplines*,<sup>27</sup> Wiebe categorized science of religion as “diffuse in character” since it is “largely because the scholars involved refuse to countenance the possibility of the study of religion as a single-valued pursuit and to distinguish and isolate these intellectual concerns from activities of other kinds.”<sup>28</sup> In Indonesia it is seemingly championed to the second option: that more than providing the understanding and explanation of religion, the scholars and students are encouraging to immerse themselves into the social problems equipped with the knowledge and experience processed in the academic of Religious Studies. CRCS, ICRS and some faculty of Religious Studies in Islamic academia and theological schools in Indonesia, besides providing a classroom setting knowledge formation, they are offering the field excursion to religious sites and communities in the hope of providing a stimulating experience with the real religious issues on the ground.

A Religious Studies program conducted in ICRS is not necessarily entirely operated by “Religious Studies scholars.” The element of the latter mostly supplied by the professors from Islamic Studies, which as earlier mentioned, the Comparative Religion Program (*Ilmu Perbandingan Agama*) already settled. The rest are coming from (Christian) Theology, Sociology, Anthropology, Cultural Studies, Political Science, Philosophy, History and others. Those indeed brought with them their own social, religious, and academic premises to the fore, hence defining Religious Studies as an inter-, cross-, and multi-disciplinary program.

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<sup>27</sup> Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *Human Understanding: Part I - The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts*, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 360.

<sup>28</sup> Wiebe, “It’s Never Been Better,” 180.

Some examples of this development are offered in the courses and researched by ICRS. The course of Religion and Contemporary Issues always consisted of relevant issues and concerns such as religion in public sphere, religion and citizenship, etc. Starting in 2016, the course of History of Religions in Indonesia is taking a more thematic approach of the study by incorporating memory, gender, minority belief, and media issues into the syllabus, moving beyond the chronological-laden historical perspective. There has been a significant shift, within the development of the study of History of Religions, to give more space for feminist, postcolonial, and regional approaches.<sup>29</sup>

The present book is a commemorative volume of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of ICRS (2006-2016). It consists of nine articles written by alumni of ICRS, of which are examples and samples of the themes and concerns that both the current and former students of ICRS worked with in their dissertations and other research projects. To push it little bit, many are reflecting a fraction of the larger concerns in doing religious studies in Indonesia. “Interfaith Dialogues in Indonesia and Beyond” demonstrates the latest phase of a longer process of establishing the discipline in the region. The final phrase “and Beyond” has a burden on its own. The only non-Indonesian article is a story and theological reflection on the peace process between the Philippines government and the Muslim freedom fighters in Mindanao, written by Jerson Benia Narciso, a Professor of Theology from the Central Philippines University. Regardless of the two non-Indonesian alumnae of ICRS to date (the other is from Singapore) only the article of Narciso can be included into this volume within the time frame. Which means Indonesia and beyond serves a further perspective beyond Indonesia to learn from

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. Giovanni Casadio, “History of Religions [Further Considerations],” ed. Lindsay Jones, *Encyclopedia of Religion* (Detroit, etc.: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), XV: 10041-10047.

the closer territory to Indonesian context, Mindanao, in the southern Philippines.

This, however, is justifiable as there is a shared concern, notably the tension between separatism and the central government, and the complicated relationship between Christianity and Islam in the region. One of the celebrated research projects coordinated by ICRS, i.e. the nine-country collaborative research on religion, public policy, and social transformation in Southeast Asia (2013-2016), which included prominent educational and research institutions in ASEAN countries plus the United States, accentuated the affinities of concerns (but also diverse experiences) in each country in the region. Hence, learning from each other is always rewarding.

The twenty-four dissertations produced in ICRS thus far, might give a sense of the scope of how Religious Studies has developed. Those including the topics on mysticism, inter-religious peace initiatives, history of Catholicism, women agency in Wahhabi community, religious (Islamic) discourse of MWHAI (Muslim-living-with-HIV/AIDS-in-Indonesia), forgiveness in the post-conflict context, philosophy of religion, Muslim identity among an islander community, intertextuality reading of the story of Habil and Qabil, religion and disaster, discourse of a minority belief, arranged marriages, practice of lifestyling among the religious people, contextual theology, inter-religious education, and others.

Against the aforementioned spectrum, the eight articles in this book indeed are not exhaustive examples. As mentioned earlier, Jerson B. Narciso provided lessons to learn from the somewhat Indonesian context, Mindanao, in the southern Philippines.

Nina Mariani Noor discusses a pressing issue of minority belief in Indonesia, notably among the Ahmadiyya women. Ahmadi women have suffered complicated discrimination as the members of a minority group in Islam—and being women. Indonesia is overwhelmingly a Sunni

Muslim country, so much so that lately it is not conducive for some Islamic minority groups such as Shi'ites and Ahmadiyya.

Ferry Muhammadsyah Siregar touches upon the issue of hermeneutical tradition in three *pesantrens*. The value of his presentation lays on the critically importance of *pesantren* in the history of Islam in Indonesia and also on the establishment of an educational system. While there are different kinds of *pesantrens* offered Islamic education, in the former days non-Westernized literature, notably Arabic literature for approaching religious texts and larger connection of Islamic world was also provided. In the present days, some of these views could be considered as a force of counter-culture, against the Western cultural domination.

Mega Hidayati explores the common concern in Islam and Christianity upon the contextual problem of Indonesia, i.e. poverty. This comparative view allows us to see the universal concern and distinct response of the two religious traditions. Hidayati remains cautious to make a claim of the comparable understanding of the two, but maintains a hope for the mutual benefits of the learning and working together to eradicate poverty.

Poverty is one of the issues with the religious conduct of charity. This is the main concern of Joko Wicoyo who explores the Catholic church initiative and discourse of charity in the Archdiocese Semarang. He traces the church initiative – as the realization of social teaching of the church – since 1984 and its projection to 2020 that revolved in the notion of the church as the representation of communion of believers. He also investigates the theological development and apprehension of it during the period.

Gender remains a contested territory in the Indonesian religious landscape, notably among the Muslims. Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir touches this complicated issue and proposes a fresh approach of Hadith's interpretation in order to establish a firmer base for gender

justice, in particular for Muslim women. He drew and learnt from a Muslim jurist, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa (1924-1995), to establish his argument.

Benny Baskara, a faculty member of the Faculty of Cultural Studies, Halu Oleo University, touches upon the cultural production and consumption, in particular of digital culture, and its relationship with religious expression and mobilization of religious message.

A rather new area of exploration in Religious Studies is the digital world. The article of Leonard Epafras explores the discourse of the prevention of inter-religious conflict materialized in the project of the Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station (IIWS). IIWS is an exploration of digital intervention upon socio-religious issues such as inter-religious conflict. In the article, Epafras investigates the promise and limit of the discourse but emphasises the possibility of such a system to be realized in the future.

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# A HERMENEUTICS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT IN MINDANAO<sup>1</sup>

*Jerson B. Narciso*

## 2.1 Introduction

The armed conflict in Southern Philippines has continued for more than four centuries and is considered one of the world's "longest" and "bloodiest" running armed conflicts to date.<sup>2</sup> It is also known as the "largest and most persistent armed conflict in Southeast Asia."<sup>3</sup> The conflict has affected not only the people in Mindanao but also the entire Pilipino society. It resulted in the destruction of properties and livelihood, the displacement of thousands of families, the deaths of thousands of combatants from both sides, and innocent civilians including women and children killed in the crossfire.<sup>4</sup> It also contributes significantly to the political and economic instability of the country.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The article was first published in *Melintas*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2014): 133-153.

<sup>2</sup> *The Philippines Free Press*, May 27, 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Andrew Tan, "The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao," in *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: World Scientific; Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), 98.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> For example, United States Institute of Peace remarked that "[T]he governments of Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,

The conflict has a long historical root that goes back to the Spanish and American colonial rules and the Muslims' continuing struggle for autonomy and self-determination in Mindanao. The struggle for self-determination of the Moro people has its origin in their aspiration for freedom and independence from Spanish and American rules and is fed by the perceived failure of the state to address their continuing experiences of impoverishment, social and cultural discrimination, and political injustice. The widespread and persistent government military offensives in Mindanao supported by American troops in the name of "war on terror" gives rise to more violence and armed conflict.

Since the outbreak of war between the government troops and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early 1970's, the Philippine government has maintained its strong militaristic and integrationist approach in resolving the conflict. The peace process has always been derailed by charges and countercharges of ceasefire violations that result in the usual collapse of peace agreements between the Philippine government and Muslim liberationist groups, and in the change of government's policy from negotiation to total war against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).<sup>6</sup>

Muslim combatants and paramilitary groups such as the MNLF, MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Groups (ASG) also continue with their militant activities against the government. Capitalizing on the

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and the United States periodically issue advisories that restrict travel of their citizens to Mindanao and Sulu because of security concerns" ("The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines" (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, January 2005), 12n8).

<sup>6</sup> For instance, Santos notes that from 1996 to 2000, the government and the MILF entered into a total of 39 peace agreements, joint communiqués, acknowledgments, and resolutions. However, throughout this period, no resolution was reached on substantive issues raised by the MILF (see Soliman M. Santos, *Dynamics and Directions of the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations* [Davao City, Philippines: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 2005], 6).

frustrations of Muslims brought about by their continuing marginalization, militant Muslims have adopted a more aggressive and radical stand against government policies and actions. The government is also viewed by Muslim militants as a threat to the Muslims' struggles and aspirations for independence and self-determination. They believe that their rights and existence are being denied by the government; that they have no control over their destiny, and they can be destroyed any time. With that, they are likely to escalate radicalism as they struggle to protect themselves and to pursue their rights in aggressive ways.<sup>7</sup>

## **2.2 Biblical Concepts of the Kingdom of God**

The theme, "kingdom of God", is central to the Biblical message. Biblical scholars are in agreement that the term is pregnant with meanings and there are varied ways of interpreting the concept based on some very specific contexts.<sup>8</sup> For the purposes of this study, three aspects of the interpretation of the biblical concept of the Kingdom of God are being emphasized as follows:

### **2.2.1 Theo-political**

First, the kingdom of God is conceived in the Bible as a theo-political reality. The kingdom describes the very nature of God as King (*melekh*) and Ruler over His people. While the specific term 'Kingdom of God' is "virtually absent from the Old Testament,"<sup>9</sup> this does not

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Walter Brueggemann, *Isaiah 40-66* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998).

<sup>9</sup> Recent studies have provided answers to the issue of the "absence" of a direct phrase, "Kingdom of God" in the Old Testament which raises the problematic question of how this metaphor was made prominent in the New Testament particularly in Jesus' understanding of the Kingdom of God which is so central to his teachings and mission. One example of these recent contributions is Bruce Chilton's *A Galilean Rabbi and His Bible: Jesus' Use of the Interpreted Scripture of His Time* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1984) and;

negate the fact that the notion of the kingship and reign of God is present all throughout the Old Testament as expressed repeatedly in the phrase, “the Lord reigns.”<sup>10</sup> In fact, God’s kingship is a dominant and recurring theme in the Hebrew Scriptures.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the basic concepts behind the metaphor “Kingdom of God” are undoubtedly present in the Old Testament.

In the New Testament usage, “Kingdom” is the usual translation of the Greek *basileia*, signifying the king’s being, nature and state. Like the *melekh* in the Old Testament, one could find the close affinity of king and kingship in the meaning associated with kingdom. A separate partition between this two interrelated terms if not impossible will definitely destroy the essential meaning of each word. The kingdom is the expression of the King’s dignity and power in the territory he rules.<sup>12</sup> In modern Greek, “kingship”, “royal dominion,” or “reign,” are present in *basileia*. What the Old Testament canons have (Hebrew and Aramaic originals and the LXX, including the Rabbinic writings) like the kings dignity and power predominating in *melekh* is also true in the New Testament.<sup>13</sup>

Israel’s nomadic times as tribes and how God accompanied them in their struggles, later with their Exodus from Egypt and the Mt. Sinai

“Regnum Dei Deus Est,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 31, no. 3 (1978): 261–70. In his study of the Isaiah Targum, i.e., the Aramaic paraphrased translation of Isaiah, Chilton discovers that in several Isaiah texts (e.g., 24:23; 31:4; 40:9; 52:7) the Targum actually uses the exact phrase, “Kingdom of God” (see Willard M. Swartley, *Covenant of Peace: The Missing Peace in New Testament Theology and Ethics* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2006], 15–16).

<sup>10</sup> Swartley, *Covenant of Peace*, 15.

<sup>11</sup> Examples of which include: Exodus 15:18; 1 Samuel 8:7; Psalms. 24:7-10; 47; 48:1-2; 74:12-14; 84:3; 93; 95-99; 145:1, 12-13; Isaiah 43:15; 44:6.

<sup>12</sup> Gerhard Kittel, G. W. Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1964), 579.

<sup>13</sup> Adolf Deissmann, *The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul*, trans. William Ernest Wilson (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1923), 108ff.

event molded her concepts about God as Ruler and King.<sup>14</sup> This shows the close affinity between the concept of God's kingship and the experience of God in Israel's history which is very critical to the Hebrew understanding of God's character. Israel's series of experiences of Yahweh's intervention from times past up to the revelation of God's name through Moses have contributed a lot in their particular comprehension of Yahweh as King later on.<sup>15</sup> Yahweh's revelation of His name as the Great "I AM" was understood in His Being and His working, as a name that denotes action that brings about goodness and blessings to His people.<sup>16</sup>

In the entire history and experience of Israel as a nation, God as the ruling King is affirmed as the ruling Lord,<sup>17</sup> and an All-embracing One.<sup>18</sup> Yahweh's Sovereignty acted with power of which the Old Testament writers were amazed, leads them to portray Him as the hope and comfort of the weak and marginalized. God is described as the One who has passion for justice and for the liberation of those in bondage, and this image is reflected in the Exodus accounts and the rest of the Pentateuchal and prophetic witnesses to the event.<sup>19</sup>

In many instances, God as King is portrayed as one who cares for the humbled poor and the oppressed (*anawim*).<sup>20</sup> The *anawim* is set against

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<sup>14</sup> George Raymond Beasley-Murray, *Jesus and the Kingdom of God* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1986), 17.

<sup>15</sup> Horst Dietrich Preuss, *Jahweglaube und Zukunftserwartung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968), 15ff.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Ludwig Köhler, *Old Testament Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957), 143.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Buber, *Kingship of God*, trans. Richard Scheimann (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 58.

<sup>19</sup> Noriel C. Capulong, "The Bible in the Context of the Filipino Life and Faith Today" (Genaro Diesto Jr. Memorial Lecture, Iloilo City: Central Philippine University, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> The term *anawim* is often associated with the afflicted, the humbled, oppressed, lowly, subjugated and the poor. The root word is "*anah*" which means, the oppressed. For complete reference, see Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 19:10 and Deuteronomy 15:11.

the wicked (*reshaim*), the oppressors who possess wealth and power and all those who take advantage of the vulnerability of the poor.<sup>21</sup> The appellation “King” was applied to Yahweh on the basis of the saving events that Israel experienced and attributed to Yahweh. The notion came to see Yahweh as the one who had dominion or lordship over it and its history.<sup>22</sup> This concept of Yahweh’s dominion over Israel was later on expanded to cover all peoples and nations.<sup>23</sup>

### ***2.2.2 The Kingdom as God’s Salvific and Liberative Act in Human History***

The Exodus event is one striking and central historical event in the life of Israel which shows God’s liberating activity in the world and His special concern for the poor and the oppressed. The sufferings and oppression that the Israelites had suffered in the land of Egypt is described in the early chapters of the book of Exodus: repression, humiliations, slavery, forced labor and alienated work.<sup>24</sup> Thus, exodus had to be remembered and re-enacted in the cult and tradition of Israel as the central theme of liberation and a powerful testimony of God’s liberating character.<sup>25</sup> The exodus event is also regarded as “the heart” of the Old Testament story and is pivotal for the rest of the Old Testament history and the faith that it witnesses to.<sup>26</sup>

God’s gratuitous liberating act in the life and experience of Israel was to be honored and remembered faithfully by commitment and acceptance of the requirements of the covenant initiated by God and accepted by Israel. This commitment concerns not only fidelity to the

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<sup>21</sup> Psalm 37:11.

<sup>22</sup> Jon Sobrino, *Jesus in Latin America* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 42.

<sup>23</sup> Jeremiah 10:7.

<sup>24</sup> Exodus 1:10-11; 5:6-14; vss. 11-14; 13:3; 20:2.

<sup>25</sup> Jorge V. Pixley, *On Exodus: A Liberation Perspective* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), xiv.

<sup>26</sup> Janzen, “Exodus” in E. A. Martens and Willard M. Swartley, *Believers Church Bible Commentary* (Logos Research Systems, 2000).

one true God, but also a commitment to social obligations that must be observed among the people of the covenant. These social obligations are regulated in particular by what has been called the right of the poor.<sup>27</sup> The gift of freedom from bondage in Egypt and the Promised Land, and the gift of covenant in Sinai and the Ten Commandments<sup>28</sup> are therefore “intimately linked to the practices which must regulate, in justice and solidarity, the development of Israelite society.”<sup>29</sup> In view of the fact that Yahweh is a Liberator God, the Israelites were commanded to become guardians of justice and defenders of the weak and the oppressed.

To the Israelites, exodus was always an event that reminds them of Yahweh’s gracious liberating act in human history and gives them the assurance that the God who delivered them out of bondage in Egypt will always be a liberator and savior God who will save His people from all forms of oppression and enslavement.<sup>30</sup> This living reminder is enshrined in the basic premise of the preamble of the Ten Commandments, “I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage,”<sup>31</sup> and in the Hebrew tradition of celebrating the Sabbatical and Jubilee Year,<sup>32</sup> which refer to favors done to the peasants, the poor, the slaves and the oppressed.

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<sup>27</sup> Deuteronomy 15:7-8.

<sup>28</sup> Pope John Paul II refers to the Ten Commandments as laws that “constitute the indispensable rules of all social life” (see “Encyclical Letter *Veritatis Splendor*, 97 AAS85,” 1993, available in, [http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_enc\\_06081993\\_veritatis-splendor.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html)).

<sup>29</sup> Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (Makati: Word of Life Publications, 2004), 16–17.

<sup>30</sup> Gustavo Gutiérrez, *The Power of the Poor in History: Selected Writings* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983), 111–24.

<sup>31</sup> Exodus 20:2. Note: All direct Biblical quotations are taken from the New International Version (NIV).

<sup>32</sup> Jubilee year celebrated the end of the week of sabbatical years or the end of seven, seven- year periods of time. Just as the Sabbath indicated the end of a week of days, the sabbatical year signaled the end of a week of years and the jubilee ended a week of sabbatical years. The jubilee was celebrated every fifty

Scholars generally agree that the central theme in the life, ministry, and teaching of Jesus is the kingdom of God.<sup>33</sup> His parables are frequently introduced “explicitly or implicitly” as examples of the kingdom.<sup>34</sup> The beatitudes include numerous references to the ethical requirements of the kingdom. The Lord’s Prayer welcomes the advent of the kingdom and Jesus’ answers to human questions are often couched in kingdom language.<sup>35</sup> Debates on what exactly Jesus meant by the kingdom has continued down through centuries until the present. However, it appears clearly that Jesus’ vision of the kingdom echoes the vision of Isaiah. Centuries before Jesus, Isaiah was projecting his dream of a salvation to come. Quoting the prophet Isaiah in the gospel of Luke, Jesus summarizes his identity and mission in these words:

*The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.*<sup>36</sup>

The mission of Jesus is to proclaim the Kingdom of God—the coming of final and definitive salvation. Like Isaiah, Jesus proclaims that the arrival of the kingdom is salvation and that the kingdom has the decisive connotation of liberation. This liberation was demonstrated in the words and deeds of Jesus: “blinds recover their sights, captives released, lame walk, hungry were fed, and the dead were being brought back to life.”

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years and Sabbatical year was celebrated every seven years. For a detailed and complete explanation of the meaning of jubilee see Robert North, *Sociology of the Biblical Jubilee* (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1954).

<sup>33</sup> John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1972), 23.

<sup>34</sup> Swartley, *Covenant of Peace*, 15.

<sup>35</sup> For a more elaborate discussions on the analysis of Jesus’ understanding of the kingdom see Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Theology and the Kingdom of God*. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969).

<sup>36</sup> Luke 4:18, 19.

Jesus' mission statement i.e., proclaiming liberty and announcing the favorable year of the Lord reechoes the language of the Old Testament Jubilee year.

The kingdom of God is the transformation of an evil and oppressive situation. Jesus proclaimed and demonstrated the kingdom of God in the midst of those who were despised by society and segregated from its life.<sup>37</sup> He spoke against economic structures that created and perpetuated hungry masses. He fought against an elite aristocracy –the chief priests of the temple hierarchy, wealthy landowners, merchants, tax collectors, teachers of the law who out of their extravagance have reduced the masses to poverty and indignity.<sup>38</sup> Many of the parables of Jesus were directed against abusive landowners who took advantage of the poor farmers who were gradually losing their small piece of land because of their debts. Tax collectors and estate owners took possession of the land of peasants who continued to accumulate outstanding debt. Often the peasant family would end up trapped in the plot, working as day laborers for the wealthy and absent landholders.<sup>39</sup>

### ***2.2.3 The Kingdom of God is Universal and Inclusive***

The eschatology of Israel is the result of her awareness of God moving in history.<sup>40</sup> This dynamic understanding of God's active participation in human history involves not only the history of Israel but of the whole humankind. It involves not only the liberation and restoration of Israel but of all those who are afflicted and oppressed.

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<sup>37</sup> Jon Sobrino, *Spirituality of Liberation: Toward Political Holiness* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1988), 47.

<sup>38</sup> Donald B. Kraybill, *The Upside-down Kingdom* (Scottsdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1978), 83.

<sup>39</sup> André Trocmé, *Jesus and the Nonviolent Revolution* (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1973), 87–88.

<sup>40</sup> Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), II: 99-107.

Amos prophesied of the imminent return and restoration of the exiles to their homeland. But the prophet added a new twist and challenge to the old exclusivistic claims of the Exodus traditions. He brought in a much broader consciousness and spoke in a radically inclusivistic tones of the experience of freedom and restoration as an event that is experienced not only by the people of Israel but by all those whom God has favored with a blessing of a new land and freedom from deprivation.<sup>41</sup> God is a God who is not to be exclusively claimed by Israel for themselves alone. Yahweh is a God of the nations and other peoples who were oppressed and exploited. God's presence is boundless and universal: "Heaven is my throne, and earth my footstool. Where will you build a house for me? Where shall my resting place be? All these are my own making and these are mine."<sup>42</sup> Thus, there was a significant move from an exclusivistic, narrow nationalistic perspective to a much broader faith perspective and attitude that includes consideration of other peoples, a consideration of their own struggles, their own histories, and their own traditions.

The Exodus event in this respect becomes a thematic key towards a more inclusive, more accepting faith perspective that became very important in Israel's attempt to reconstruct her faith relationship with Yahweh. Exodus in that sense was just one among other Exoduses God has conducted with other peoples. This universalistic view of God's liberative act is best expressed in the following prophetic declaration of Amos:

*"He who builds his lofty palace in the heavens and sets its foundation on the earth, who calls for the waters of the sea and pours them out over the face of the land--the LORD is his name. Are not you Israelites the same to me as the Cushites? declares*

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<sup>41</sup> Amos 9:7.

<sup>42</sup> Isaiah 66:1-2.

*the LORD. Did I not bring Israel up from Egypt, the Philistines from Caphtor and the Arameans from Kir? “<sup>43</sup>*

The universal and inclusive character of the kingdom of God goes against absolutism and exclusivism that sets one religion superior than the other and thereby promote antagonism, hatred and division among different peoples. Here, the Biblical concept of the universal and all-embracing nature of the kingdom of God provides a foundational basis for an inclusive, accepting, and redeeming attitude that should characterize the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao.

Traditionalist theology maintains the narrow concept of the reign of God as synonymous or identical with the church or Christianity. A careful study and analysis of the meaning of the Kingdom of God however casts serious theological questions on “whether ‘God’s reign should be limited to the hope of Israel, and in its historical realization in the world, to Christianity and to the church.’”<sup>44</sup> Or, should it be understood in a much wider sense to include “others?” in view of the biblical witness that the reign of God is a universal reality “which extends well beyond the confines of Christianity and the church?”<sup>45</sup> “If God’s Kingdom is inclusive and universal, how do Christianity and other faith traditions relate respectively to live out the values of this universal kingdom? Do Christians and the others belong equally to the fulfilled reign of God?”<sup>46</sup>

Karl Rahner has expressed the same conviction that God’s kingdom is not confined within the limits of Christianity and the church: that the different religious traditions contain “supernatural, grace-filled elements,” and that other faith traditions and communities are also

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<sup>43</sup> Amos 9: 6, 7.

<sup>44</sup> Jacques Dupuis, *Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1997), 332.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

“members of the Kingdom of God already present as a historic reality.”<sup>47</sup> In spite of their different religious peculiarities, “people of faith already belong together to the Reign of God and are already in communion in the reality of the mystery of salvation even if there remains between them a distinction at the level of the “sacrament”, that is, the order of mediation of the mystery.”<sup>48</sup>

Dupuis believe that the words “communion” and “sharing” characterize God’s Kingdom, that the reality of the reign of God is “already shared together” by different faith traditions in mutual exchange, and that Christians and others “build together the Reign of God each time they commit themselves of common accord in the cause of justice, each time they work together for the integral liberation of each and every human person, structures and systems, and especially for the liberation of the poor and the oppressed.”<sup>49</sup>

### **2.3 Implications of the Biblical Concepts of the Kingdom of God to the Problem of Armed Conflict in Mindanao**

Here, we see that a contextual reading of the biblical text provides an operative framework within which Christians could make sense of the meaning of the kingdom of God in the current socio-political and economic situations in Mindanao. If the kingdom of God means God’s rule which is characterized by justice, freedom, equality and peace as chronicled in God’s continuous liberative activity to free His people from dehumanizing powers, then, what does it mean to proclaim and participate in the kingdom of God in the midst of socio-economic and political inequalities in Mindanao?

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<sup>47</sup> Karl Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in *Theological Investigations* (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), V: 115-134.

<sup>48</sup> Dupuis, *Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism*, 346.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

How does the biblical concept of the theo-political character of the kingdom of God which describes God's compassionate rule and righteous governance relate to the struggles of the marginalized Muslim communities in Mindanao? Is God's rule present in the struggles of the Bangsamoro people for freedom and self-determination in Mindanao? If God is on the side of the weak, the poor, and the oppressed as revealed in the way He manifests Himself in the lived-experiences of His people, then, what is God doing in the midst of social, political, cultural and economic injustice in Mindanao? If the kingdom of God refers to His liberative acts all throughout human history with different peoples at different times and places, then, what does it mean to proclaim the peaceable kingdom of God in such a historical milieu where unjust political and economic order exist such as in Mindanao? These are crucial questions that we should seriously consider if we are to make positive impact in the Mindanao peace process. If God's Kingdom is inclusive and universal, how do Christians and other faith communities relate respectively to live out the values of this universal kingdom? Do Christians and the others belong equally to the fulfilled reign of God?

Based on the biblical message, I believe that building the kingdom of God in the context of Mindanao means proclaiming and living out God's compassionate rule and righteous governance, to work for the establishment of an equitable socio-economic order. It means, working for the emancipation and liberation of the poor and transforming evil in all its forms. To affirm the universality of God and His kingdom is to affirm that He is present in every human condition and that God is concerned about the whole human family regardless of race, culture and creed. This principle promotes the idea of acceptance, openness and complementarity which means, Christians and Muslims in Mindanao are supposed to acknowledge their unique differences with a sense of

acceptance and respect,<sup>50</sup> and never use them as a ground for discord but an opportunity to compliment and cooperate with one another for their common good.

One vital question is where does the church locate itself in the current socio-political and economic crises in Mindanao? Is the church on the side of the poor, or, has it become (as it was in the past) a legitimizer of the status quo and oppressive social order?

Certainly, the contributions of the different religious organizations in the Mindanao peace process should not be overlooked or undermined. Small scale livelihood projects, financial assistance to displaced families in times of war, “peace zones”, “peace sanctuaries”, peace-building programs, interfaith dialogues, position papers and calls for a negotiated peace agreement between disputing parties are important and have served their purpose. However, in as far as how these programs have addressed vital issues of equitable distribution of land and other resources, wider participation of the marginalized masses in the political processes, and the establishment of a just social order in Mindanao, remains uncertain. As it appears, there is still much work to be done in terms of finding concrete steps and solutions towards the improvement of economic and political conditions in Mindanao.

## **2.4 Ministry Recommendations**

If Christians believe that their duty is to proclaim and help build the kingdom of God in which there is love, justice, peace, and compassion for the weak and the powerless, how are they supposed to translate this

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<sup>50</sup> Harold Coward asserts that respect for other religious beliefs is the true basis of tolerance. Tolerance doesn't mean giving up one's critical awareness. It could mean honest constructive criticism and learning from one another (see in M. Darrol Bryant, *Pluralism, Tolerance and Dialogue: Six Studies* [Waterloo, Ont.: University of Waterloo Press, 1989], 15).

conviction into concrete plan of action/s that will contribute towards peace and development in Mindanao?

Given the current socio-economic, cultural and political injustice reigning in Mindanao, this study recommends the following political agenda (based on the above interpretation of the kingdom of God) for genuine and lasting peace in Mindanao:

#### ***2.4.1 Economic Transformation***

The conflict in Mindanao has its roots in the socio-economic marginalization of the Moro people. Their economic displacement is largely a historical outgrowth and the cumulative effect of a long process of discriminatory laws, policies, and programs, including development programs. The most visible sign of displacement of the Moro people including other indigenous and minority groups in Mindanao has something to do with their rights to land. The historic discriminatory land policies and legal statutes favoring Christians and large scale multi-national agriculture and mining corporations during the American colonial rule and the Philippine Government's policies of resettlement of Christians to Mindanao had resulted in a slow but sure abrogation of traditional Moro property rights and their eventual marginalization from mainstream economic growth and development.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Historically, there has been an array of land laws dispossessing the Moros of their culturally identified property rights. This began with the Land Registration Act 496 of November 6, 1902 under the American Colonial Administration which required registration and titling of all lands occupied by private individuals and corporations. It fundamentally declared null and void past existing Moro and Lumad indigenous land tenure arrangements. This was followed by the April 4, 1903 Act 718 nullifying all land grants from Moro Sultans or Datus and chiefs of non-Christian tribes without prior government authority and consent. The Philippine Commission subsequently passed Public Land Act 926 on October 7, 1903 permitting each person to acquire a homestead land of 16 hectares and every corporation to claim titled land of 1,024 hectares. Two decades later, this Act was amended by Act 2878 expanding homesteaders to 24 hectares and specifying for non-Christians the right to acquire land not exceeding 10 hectares. On November 7, 1936, the Land Act was again amended through Commonwealth Act 41 reverting from 24 to 16 hectares for Christians

Statistics show that in spite of the government's comprehensive land reform program, millions of people especially the marginalized and poor Muslims in Mindanao remain landless. In many parts of Mindanao, vast tracks of land are owned by multinationals and super rich who dominate the economy and making the poor poorer.<sup>52</sup>

The state of land distribution in the Philippines shows that land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a very few people. Statistics show that 45 per cent of the country's agricultural land is owned by only five per cent of the total landowning families. Another document pointing to the glaring inequality of land ownership notes that roughly 80 per cent of the total cultivated land is controlled by only 20 per cent of the landowning families. Not only do few landowners own large tracts of lands, they also possess the most fertile lowlands. Multinational corporations such as, DOLE, Del Monte, and United Fruits utilize more than 80 percent of the country's most fertile lowlands for export crops.<sup>53</sup>

In this particular context, peace in Mindanao would mean, inclusion of key issues of reparations, economic redistribution, and land reform. The economic displacement of the Moro people must be at the center and not the periphery of the peace and development challenge in Mindanao. Peace-building program in Mindanao should first and foremost, address the land problem. Current development approaches of assisting minority Muslims with micro projects such as livelihood programs, community assistance, rehabilitation projects for victims of war and other dole out economic approaches are mere palliative since

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and further reducing homestead rights from 10 to 4 hectares for non-Christians (see Philippine Human Development Report, quoted in World Bank, "Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao" [Pasig City and Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003], 9).

<sup>52</sup> Lily F. Fetalsana, "The Holy War Concept in the Conquest Traditions in Joshua 1-11 and Judges 1:1-2:5 and Its Implications for Liberation Movements in the Philippines" (South East Asia Graduate School of Theology, 1999), 128-63.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

they do not address vital issues and the real roots and causes of poverty in Mindanao. Concrete steps are to be done to break the chains of oppressive economic structures through the implementation of genuine land reform program.

To address the issue of landlessness which significantly contributes to poverty among the Muslim masses, the Philippine government needs to legislate laws to regulate and limit the size of the family holding of land and in the process implement land redistribution program to cater to the needs of the landless masses in Mindanao. No peace can occur in a situation where big and powerful land lords continue to dominate the economic and political sphere at the expense of the weak and the poor. Addressing the problem of economic marginalization in Mindanao also requires that the government should create laws and implement inclusive and far reaching economic programs that are accessible to address the economic well-being and dignity of the poor and the marginalized. Laws and policies need to be established to prevent and penalize abusive and exploitative economic practices, and ensure the protection of the poor and the oppressed, provide equal economic and political access, establish mechanism for consultative and participatory leadership where the marginalized could take part in the decision-making process to determine their future and destiny.

#### ***2.4.2 Socio-Cultural Transformation***

Another important issue that must be addressed in relation to the search for peace in Mindanao is the continuing socio-cultural marginalization of the Moro people. Stereotypical negative concepts of Muslims as “savage”, “uncivilized”, and people of “inferior race” that has been institutionalized since colonial era, and has been reinforced by subsequent Filipinization program of the Philippine government has not ceased to disturb and affect significantly Christian-Muslim relations in Mindanao. Despite the Muslims’ resistance, the central government

insists on its integrationist policy which seeks to mainstream minority Islamic and other indigenous cultures into the majority Filipino culture. Muslims find themselves at odds with what constitutes the “national identity” of the majority lowland Christian population who in their view had been assimilated into the cultures and ways of the two major colonial regimes.

The inculcation and imposition of the majority Filipino culture is interpreted by many Muslims as an attempt to eradicate Moro culture and identity. The Moro people have been longing for the recovery not only of their lost causes but also the restoration of their dignity and worth as a people. Equitable sharing of wealth, political and social justice are the recurring themes that Muslims in Mindanao have been clamoring for up until now. Conflict resolution or transformation in Mindanao is the process of addressing these causes and working with those concerned to redefine relationships and bring about a change in the conflict context.

To address the problem of conflict in Mindanao, a culture of peace and mutual recognition of both Islamic and Christian values and culture, has to sink deep into the social fabric where cultural openness, social unity and pursuit of peaceful means to resolve conflict is appreciated and practiced by all. Social and cultural reforms are one of the key ingredients of lasting peace and development in Mindanao. Without them the issues that underlay the breakdown of peace and social order will continue to exist. Peace and development in Mindanao needs a sustained effort at social justice, good governance, and corporate social responsibility. To achieve mutual respect and appreciation between and among Muslims and Christians in Mindanao, relationship building across sectoral, social, cultural and religious divides is of primary importance.

Solution to the Mindanao problem is anchored on the creation of a national consciousness sensitive to cultural diversity. This means, the

government and the majority Filipino populace must recognize the value and distinctiveness of Moro cultures and identities. Consequently, it also means that the government should adopt culturally-sensitive policies that seek to honor and preserve Islamic cultural heritage. The government must through its Department of Education (DepEd) and Commission on Higher Education (CHED), review and effect changes in the history curriculum in so far as the history of Islam in the Philippines is concerned, to correct negative images of Muslims and emphasize positive and unique cultures and values that they share towards peace and development.

The government also needs to formulate laws and policies that promote cultural understanding and ethnic awareness. Giving Muslim Mindanao autonomy and addressing their socio-economic problems are not enough. Their cultural identities must be recognized and accommodated by the state. The Moro people must be free to express these identities without being discriminated against in other aspects of their lives. In a nutshell, cultural liberty is a human right that must be enjoyed by the marginalized Moro masses—and thus worthy of state action and attention.

#### ***2.4.3 Political and Structural Transformation***

Political domination and marginalization, graft and corruption, clan and patronage politics, and fraudulent electoral systems which perpetuate traditional political elites in power remain to be one of the major causes of conflict and violent confrontations in Mindanao. The government has failed to make concrete political actions to address the aspirations of the poor and marginalized majority Muslim masses. Instead, it caters to the whims and caprices of Christian and Muslim powerful elites who are taking advantage of their positions at the expense of the weak, and therefore, privileging only the dominant segment of society. The dominance of the powerful and the

marginalization of the poor and powerless has been the pattern of relationship that characterizes the Philippine society.

The pacification and demobilization approaches employed by the government which seeks to address the conflict by cooptation of leaders and followers through the offer of positions, or livelihood, or integration has left the deeper roots of the conflict unaddressed. Obviously, power and resources are concentrated in the hands of a few political elites while the masses (mostly Muslims) are being pushed to the periphery of human existence. Philippine politics has been reflective of extensive patron-client networks wherein access to political power is greatly dependent on one's loyalty to those who already wield it. Once in office, politicians are often able to perpetuate themselves in power, and as soon as their term limits end, they easily move on to occupy some other positions. This results to only a few political dynasties competing for political power leaving the weaker segments of society powerless.<sup>54</sup>

The ties of traditional Muslim elite leadership with the central government has kept the marginalized Muslims' struggles unaddressed and deprived them of their right to self-determination. It has been noted by a number of analysts that the same traditional local elites amass contemporary political power in the form of elected positions by entering into a political economic bargain with the national political elites to barter Internal Revenue Allocations (IRA) from the central state treasury in exchange for delivering votes and security for the competing national and local political actors.<sup>55</sup>

Exercise of absolute authority by traditional political elites are made possible not only by political patronage from the national government,

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<sup>54</sup> Wadi Julkipli, *The Moro Struggle and the Tenets of Islam in the Philippines* (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 2008), 149.

<sup>55</sup> Joel Samuel Migdal, "The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination," in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, ed. Joel Samuel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7–36.

but also by “laws and regulations permitting the arming and private funding of civilian auxiliaries to the army and police; lack of oversight over or audits of central government allocations to local government budgets; the ease with which weapons can be imported, purchased and circulated; and a thoroughly dysfunctional legal system.”<sup>56</sup> The question is how can the government prevent the emergence of overly dominant political clans and warlords who set their own rules and use their power to exploit and oppress the weak and the poor?

Precisely, the Mindanao problem is a political and structural problem. Thus, it requires a political and structural solution as key dimension. No significant changes in so far as addressing the problem of conflict in Mindanao can take place unless policies change; and for these change to happen, the country’s politics must change toward more participation, involving especially the marginalized sectors in making decisions that affect them. Any social, economic, and political strategy that attempts to effectively address problems of conflict in Mindanao will have to be comprehensive, inter-sectoral, communal, and participatory.

It has been observed that, despite numerous development projects and financing programs that have been channeled through different government agencies since early 1970s to solve the problem of poverty in Mindanao, the economic and living conditions of the Moro people has not significantly changed. This was mainly because of defective bureaucratic structures that were known for their graft and corruption.<sup>57</sup> Obviously, social intervention and economic development devoid of appropriate and viable political structure is insufficient.

Concrete steps should be done to minimize (if not totally eliminate) rampant graft and corruption practices both in the higher and lower

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<sup>56</sup> International Crisis Group, *The Philippines: After the Maguindanao Massacre*. (Jakarta; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009), 1.

<sup>57</sup> Raymund Jose Quilop, “The Uneasy and Costly Road to Peace in Mindanao,” *Panorama*, March 2000, 21.

echelon of the government. This requires stricter and fuller implementation of anti-graft laws and their corresponding punishments as well as creation of preemptive structures such as “Graft watch” composed of highly credible representatives coming from the government, civic, business, political and religious sectors. The establishment of anti-graft measures is important not only to prevent corrupt and anomalous practices in the government, but also to ensure protection of the economic interests of the poor and the marginalized and to pave the way for economic progress.

The government also needs to develop massive and sustainable grassroots based programs of peace and development by establishing mechanisms that would enhance and ensure peoples participation, by initiating continuous and regular public consultations involving the poorest of the poor, the indigenous people, the women and the youth, and by making concessions not with the political elites but with the Moro masses who are the actual victims of oppression and marginalization in Mindanao.

God’s will is peace, love, hope and justice. The situation of unpeace in Mindanao brought by the continuing oppression and marginalization of the weak and the poor is radically opposed and incompatible with the biblical vision of a just, humane and peaceful community where persons live with peace and dignity. This biblical vision must come in contact with the socio-cultural, economic, and political realities reigning in Mindanao.

In a nutshell, the peaceable kingdom of God as understood in the context of Mindanao, provides political and theological basis for asserting a notion of peace and justice, the content of which are defined in concrete socio-political, cultural and economic terms. There is a direct link between the theoretical concept of God as Liberator and Defender of the poor and the political, economic, and social injustice in Mindanao. This calls for moral and political responsibility to act

responsibly on behalf of justice and freedom and to work towards the establishment of a just political, social and economic structure which is in harmony with the divine vision of a peaceable kingdom.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Martin Luther King Jr., *The Measure of a Man* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 9.

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# **THE AHMADIYYA MINORITY AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN INDONESIAN**

An Insight on the Ahmadi Women's Experience

*Nina M. Noor*

## **3.1 Introduction**

In the recent political situation in Indonesia, there is a growing trend of bringing back the issue of religiosity, especially in Islam. It can be seen from the growing number of *Perda Shari'ah* (Shari'a regional government regulation) in some areas like Aceh and Cianjur. This trend, in fact, calls some responses, both supporting and opposing.

On one hand, the *Perda Shari'ah* makes Muslims feel freer to conduct their religious activities and also express their religious identity through their appearances and events. On the other hand, it tends to subjugate minority groups outside Islam, like Christians and other religious followers, and also inside the Muslim community itself like Ahmadiyya followers.

Ahmadiyya in Indonesia has been accused of being a deviant and heretical sect in Islam; it is even accused of committing defamation to Islam. As a result, most mainstream Muslims have condemned

Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. In June 2008, consequent to increasing pressure on the State, a regulation was signed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Attorney General and minister of Religious Affairs named *Surat Keputusan Bersama* (SKB)<sup>1</sup>, which restricts Ahmadiyya for promulgating their teachings.

As a result of this SKB, Ahmadiyya followers have found it increasingly difficult to actualize themselves as Ahmadi (the term used to identify people who join in the Ahmadiyya movement), their religious identity. Furthermore, their identity as Ahmadi also sometimes brings about difficulties in their social interactions with other people.

Ahmadi women, like their Ahmadi male counterparts, see their Ahmadi identity as a crucial means of identification and face equal difficulties after the issuing of SKB.

In this paper, I attempt to explore how Ahmadi women preserve their identities in the Indonesia nation state context and the way they negotiate their Ahmadi identity after the issuing of SKB, which prohibits the Ahmadi from spreading their teachings. What I mean by identity negotiation here is the process in which a person lives out their religious convictions while compromising with society at large regarding the meaning of his or her identity.

### **3.2 The Ahmadiyya Movement**

In this section I will briefly explain about the Ahmadiyya faith. The Ahmadiyya was founded by an Islamic scholar named Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian, North India in 1889. Ahmad declared himself as the promised Messiah or the Mahdi for Muslims.<sup>2</sup> Since the prophet

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<sup>1</sup> SKB was issued on June 9<sup>th</sup> 2008 after some attacks to Ahmadiyah headquarters in Parung Bogor and some Muslims mainstream groups demanded the government to liquidate Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia.

<sup>2</sup> Sheikh Abdul Hadi Awang and Akber A. Choudhry, *Who Are Ahmadi Muslims?* (Maple, Ont.: Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at, Canada, 1993), 9–16.

Muhammad is considered as the last prophet for Muslims, mainstream Muslims see the followers of Ahmadiyya as outside of Islam.

The differences between mainstream Muslim and Ahmadis are based on the interpretations of the Qur'an. One of the major differences is the declaration of the Ahmadiyya's founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as the "second coming" of Jesus Christ. Ahmadis believe that Jesus Christ did not die on the cross but escaped to Kashmir India and lived there until old age.<sup>3</sup> The other differences are Ahmadiyya has a single worldwide leadership under a Caliph as opposed to regional and local leaders of mainstream Muslims.

The headquarters used to be in Qadian till 1947 but when there was separation between India and Pakistan they were moved to Rabwah, Pakistan. Due to the persecution in Pakistan, the headquarters was moved to London UK when the fourth Caliph (Mirza Tahir Ahmad) made an exodus to UK in 1984. Now, it is still in London under the fifth Caliph (Mirza Masroor Ahmad).

Around the world, the Ahmadiyya Movement now has built over 10,000 mosques, over 500 schools, and over 30 hospitals in more than 170 countries. It has also translated the Holy Quran into over 60 languages. It also propagates teachings of Islam and the message of peace and tolerance through several medias. It has a twenty-four-hour satellite television channel without commercial break called Muslim Television Ahmadiyya (MTA), the Internet and publication. It also has an independent charitable organization, Humanity First, which serves people in disaster areas.<sup>4</sup>

In terms of worship, the Ahmadis follow the five pillars, like other mainstream Muslims. They vow the same shahadat, do sholat the same

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<sup>3</sup> The detail story on Prophet Isa according to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad can be found in Syafi R. Batuah, *Nabi Isa dari Palestina ke Kashmir* (Jakarta: Jema'at Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 1999).

<sup>4</sup> The official website of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is <http://www.alislam.org>.

as other Muslims do, pay zakat, and perform their *hajj* in Mecca also. Therefore, actually, there is no difference at all between Ahmadi and mainstream Muslims in terms of their obligations as Muslims.

From the explanation above, we can see that Ahmadiyya movement is an international religious organization with all its members who embrace Ahmadi identity.

### **3.3 Literature Review**

There have been some studies on Ahmadi women relating to their identities. Trianita finds that the Ahmadi identity for Indonesian Ahmadi women has become their source of strength and confidence, particularly when faced by challenges from other mainstream Muslims and dealing with hostility from their Ahmadiyah counterparts.<sup>5</sup> For example, in 2005 the headquarter in Bogor was attacked while they were holding an annual gathering (Jalsah Salanah). The oppression forced upon the Ahmadi due to their identity has established high levels of solidarity. However, it also excludes them from the Muslim community.

The hostility toward the Ahmadis in Indonesia is also present in Pakistan, where the Ahmadiyya community is also considered a non-Muslim minority outside of Islam and is therefore prohibited from practicing what Muslims practice in public spaces; if they do so they have to deal with the law, usually meaning that they will be sent to the jail.

Ahmed-Gosh, who studied Ahmadi women in California, USA, argues that the Ahmadi women who mostly come from Pakistan, negotiate their faith and their lifestyle “through the acquiring of formal

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<sup>5</sup> Winy Trianita, “Women’s Agency in Religion: The Experience of Ahmadi Women in Indonesia” (Thesis, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2009).

and cultural education in whichever culture they reside.”<sup>6</sup> The strategy adopted by Ahmadi women in United States is in response to the circumstances after 9/11 event, that produced a tangible anti-Islamic climate. It seems that their new nation-state forces them to compromise their identities in order to preserve their faith and survive.

Similar to Gosh, I see identity in the context of the nation state. Hastings argues that identity in the context of the nation state, people are seen as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state sense belongs. The state’s sovereignty is inherent within the people, expressive of its historic identity. Ideally, the borders and character of the political unit are in balance with a self-conscious cultural community.<sup>7</sup>

In examining Ahmadi women in Indonesia, there is a clear obligation to compromise the visibility of their identity in order to be in line with the nation state’s rules and regulations. In the case of Ahmadi women in California, they utilize education as a tool for themselves to negotiate with unpleasant situation which discriminates against Muslims. They also use their identity to distinguish themselves between mainstream Muslims by assuring that they love peace.<sup>8</sup> However, there is a significant difference between Ahmadi women in Indonesia and those who are in the United States. Ahmadi women in Indonesia are mostly Indonesian origin while Ahmadi women in California are immigrants from Pakistan or India.

### **3.4 The Ahmadiyya Movement in Indonesia**

In talking about Ahmadi as an identity in Indonesia, we have to trace back the coming of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. Ahmadiyya Qadiani was

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<sup>6</sup> Huma Ahmed-Gosh, “Ahmadi Women: Reconciling Faith with a Vulnerable Reality,” *Journal for International Women’s Studies* 8, no. 1 (2006): 50.

<sup>7</sup> Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3.

<sup>8</sup> Ahmed-Gosh, “Ahmadi Women.”

first brought to Indonesia through two students, named Abu Bakar Ayyub and Ahmad Nuruddin, from Sumatra who came back in 1925 from Ahmadiyya's school in India. They graduated from Sumatra Tawalib school then led by Haji Rasul in Padang Panjang before they went to India. This shows that Ahmadiyya in Indonesia was brought by Indonesians themselves.<sup>9</sup>

They then established the Association of Indonesian Ahmadi. In 1925, the second caliph of Ahmadiyya sent a muballigh, namely Rahmat Ali, to Indonesia where he spread Ahmadiyya teaching in Tapaktuan giving rise to the Ahmadiyya Movement in a very short time.<sup>10</sup>

In terms of living as citizens in a nation state, however; all Ahmadi in the world are obliged to obey the laws of the state in which they live, even when the state is oppressive to them (like in Pakistan). Therefore, Ahmadi in Indonesia also fully obey any rules and regulation applied in Indonesia.

Relating to the SKB, which prohibits them to promote their belief and teaching to society, Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia tries hard to obey this restriction by reducing activities related to mission and *tabligh*.<sup>11</sup> The national board always reminds their members to obey this SKB and they change their way of *tabligh* by not spreading their faith to other people directly, but by showing good behavior as good Muslims. Consequently, nationality comes before their religious identity. This concept on nationality and religious identity led me to do research on a specific community, which is Ahmadi women in Yogyakarta.

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<sup>9</sup> Iskandar Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005), 172–75.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 169–84.

<sup>11</sup> *Tabligh* is an activity of giving information about Ahmadiyya faith like about Jesus Christ's second coming to people outside Ahmadiyya community.

### **3.5 Methodology**

The main data gathered in my research is from a questionnaire I gave to 10 Ahmadi women and informal interviews with some Ahmadi women in Yogyakarta. Their ages range from 17 to 55 years old and they hold different position in their organization. In addition to this, I also conducted a “participant observation” in which I collected data from observation in activities done by the community.

In my questionnaires, I asked the participants about their familiarity with SKB, the impacts of SKB to their religious activities and their strategies in declaring their Ahmadi identity since the issuing of SKB.

To make the results more balanced, I also did a quick survey of some Ahmadi men by giving the same questionnaires to see their experiences of their Ahmadi identity. I will later present and compare this data.

### **3.6 Research Position**

Since I am an Ahmadi woman, I posit myself as researcher and also as an insider. As a researcher I place myself at a distance to look objectively at my findings. However, my own identity as an Ahmadi woman can also enrich my findings. My own experiences in dealing with some circumstances, particularly in relation to my identity, are notably valuable since in some ways there parallels between my own experiences and other Ahmadi women’s in Indonesia. That being said, there are some differences too.

### **3.7 Preserving Ahmadi as a Religious and Communal Identity**

From my participant observation, I found that Ahmadi identity is basically a religious identity for women who join Ahmadiyya movement. This Ahmadi identity is embedded with their other identities,

like ethnicity, sex, and profession, which distinguish them from mainstream Muslims. This identity also obliges them to obey all rules and regulations in Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, like paying *chandah*<sup>12</sup> and other financial obligations (“*pengorbanan*”)<sup>13</sup>, being active in all Ahmadiyya’s activities, wearing a veil, and getting married with an Ahmadi man.

Ahmadi as an identity is part of their personal identity and also their communal identity. As found by Trianita, being an Ahmadi is a source of pride and confidence. They are proud to be Ahmadi to be distinguished from other mainstream Muslims. This identity also gives the Ahmadi strength when facing the persecution and violence that has become more frequent since 2005. Moreover, their identities establish a strong sense of solidarity among the Ahmadi. They will help each other and support their Ahmadis fellows if they are subjected to violence. For example, when Ahmadis in Lombok were expelled from their home in 2005, some of their children were taken care by Ahmadis from West Java in order provide a better quality of life and education. If there is a mosque that is attacked or destroyed by mainstream Muslims, the news will spread fast among the Ahmadiyya community. It will be announced in Jum’at prayers and the community will commune together to pray and sometimes slaughter a goat as “*tolak balak*”.

Preserving identity is an essential goal and challenge in order for the Ahmadi religion to survive in the future for Ahmadi as a minority group. Ahmadi women play a significant role in this matter by having a duty to educate their children to grow up in the Ahmadiyya faith. In terms of formal education they usually send their children to any school that they think is good for their children. But they usually pay attention more to

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<sup>12</sup> Chandah is money that Ahmadi should pay to Ahmadiyya. It is about 1/16 to 1/3 from their income. They can pay monthly or seasonally depending on their regularity of getting income.

<sup>13</sup> *Pengorbanan* is in the form of submitting some amount of money and actively participating in religious activities.

religious education. They bring their children to the mosque to join activities conducted in their community and they will always remind their children that they are Ahmadis.

To do this task, Ahmadiyya has a *tarbiyat* (education) agency available to for all. *Lajnah Imaillah*<sup>14</sup> has also tarbiyat agency. This tarbiyat agency is responsible for maintaining their members' knowledge on Islam and Ahmadiyya faith. They usually hold religious activities like learning to recite and discuss the Qur'an. This agency will monitor members' religious activities and report it monthly to the National board of *Lajnah Imaillah*.

Another way of preserving their Ahmadi identity is through the *Ristha natha* program, which arranges and makes a match for Ahmadis who are ready to get married. This is important since Ahmadis are minorities in Indonesia, and there exists the rule that they have to get married to another Ahmadi. The situation frequently arises where an Ahmadi man is married to a non-Ahmadi woman and vice versa. Consequently, some members are becoming less active in Ahmadiyya and because of this their children are not getting involved in Ahmadiyya. This ristha nata program helps their member to find couples among their own community to keep their Ahmadi identity.

### **3.8 Identity Negotiation: Between Religion and Nationhood**

As I have mentioned before, for Ahmadi women, identity as Ahmadi is not merely personal identity but also communal identity. These women are proud to be Ahmadis and they will show their identities without any difficulties when they are inside their community. However, in fact, most of them do not live close to each other in one area. Indeed, they live amongst mainstream Muslims who, as the majority, see them

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<sup>14</sup> *Lajnah Ima'illah* is women's wing organization in Jemaat Ahmadiyah.

as different and sometimes treat them harshly. Therefore, they rarely can declare their Ahmadi identity in wider society for the sake of their safety. Furthermore, since the issuing of SKB, they have to obey that SKB by stopping their missionary activities. From my interviews, however, participants shared that SKB actually does not affect their religious activities significantly. In practise, they still can practice their daily religious activities, and also weekly or monthly in the mosque. They only face difficulty when they want to organise an event that involves many members from a larger area like from Yogyakarta province. In 2009, the Ahmadi community held an annual gathering for members from all around Yogyakarta branches. To gain permission from the local government, they named the event “family gathering of *Majlis taklim Arief Rahman Hakim*” rather than “*Jalsah Salanah Yogyakarta*”. The event was actually the same as *Jalsah salanah* that was held in Bogor, which was attacked by *Gerakan Umat Islam* in June 2005 and caused the issuing of SKB in 2008, but it only covered Yogyakarta area.

On a the national level, when *Lajnah Imaillah Indonesia* wants to hold meeting with their members like *Majelis Syura*<sup>15</sup> or *National Ijtima*, in booking place to hold the activities in meeting halls or hotels, they usually do not declare their Ahmadi identity. They usually use a “*Jamaah Pengajian*” term that is common for mainstream Muslims and also more acceptable.

That kind of strategy, by hiding their Ahmadi identity, shows their effort to show obedience to the state’s rule and also their intention to avoid possible attack to their community. It seems that in these circumstances, hiding their Ahmadi identity is not a big deal for them as long as they can hold their religious activities. It is supported by my informant’s statement: “not telling our Ahmadi identity when we hold a

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<sup>15</sup> *Majelis Syura* is a national deliberation to discuss programs that have been done in the previous year and plan the next programs in the following year.

religious activity that involve many Ahmadi members is better, because the most important thing is that we can hold our religious activities without any disturbances”.

Relating to obedience to SKB, Ahmadi women tend to do it as careful as they can. If people do not know that they are Ahmadi, they will keep silent. However, when people ask about the Ahmadiyya faith and teachings, they will answer that if they tell them, it means they violate SKB. One of my respondents, for example, told me of a conversation happened between a group of Ahmadi women and chauffeur. At that time, Yogyakarta Ahmadi women would join Ahmadiyya activities in Purwokerto and they would rent a car and a driver. When the driver arrived at the Office of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Yogyakarta in Kotabaru, he realized that it was a Jemaat Ahmadiyah office. He then asked these Ahmadi women what they will do in Purwokerto. They told the driver that they were going to have an Ahmadiyya gathering. Then the driver asked about the differences between Ahmadiyya and Islam mainstream. They answered that there are many similarities with other Muslims in terms of Muslim obligations. There is only a matter of difference in the interpretation of the Quran which commonly happen among Muslims (and within other religions). The driver wondered why Ahmadiyya were attacked by mainstream Muslims and accused of being infidels. Ahmadi women answered that they cannot answer those questions since it is part of what is banned by SKB. Furthermore, from the participants' answers on their feelings towards the SKB, most of them said it does not influence their faith as Ahmadiyah and that the SKB does not influence their freedom to practice their religious activities. Only two of the 10 persons claimed that it influences their freedom. However, they also stated that they do their religious activities like what they did before the issuing of SKB. Indeed, their practices are in line with SKB's order.

These perspectives and feeling also come up from Ahmadi men that I interviewed. They do not find any difficulties in doing their religious activities both personally and communally.

In showing their Ahmadi identities to society, particularly when they interact in Muslim mainstream society, from my questioners and interview, I can categorize it in three categories. In the first category, some of participants confidently declare their Ahmadi identity on the first encounter. They do it since they are raised in strong Ahmadiyya faith and most of their family members are also Ahmadi. Furthermore, they also hold important position in Lajnah Imaillah organization like chairwoman or *muballigh*'s<sup>16</sup> wife. Interestingly, some young girls who are still in university also stated they place their Ahmadi identity in first place before other identities after the issuing of SKB. One of them even said that SKB made her "braver" to reveal her Ahmadi identity. Furthermore, the SKB raised awareness of the Ahmadiyya among Indonesian people and as a consequence many people are seeking the information about Ahmadiyya. In the second group are Ahmadi women who reveal their Ahmadi identity only if the situation forces or allows them to do so (for example, the Ahmadi women in a taxi that I have mentioned above). Ahmadi women who include in this group are university students, professionals like teachers, lecturers, nurses and doctors. This group constitutes the biggest portion among others. One of my participants said: "People in my neighbourhood and workplace already know that I am an Ahmadi, so that I've not got any difficulties in showing my identity. However, when I interact in a larger society in which people do not know my Ahmadi identity, I rarely introduce myself as an Ahmadi in first introduction. It is because, for me, it does

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<sup>16</sup> Muballigh is ahmadi religious leaders who are responsible for teaching their community and spreading ahmadiyya faith to others. They are fully paid by Ahmadiyya and they have to be ready to go wherever the headquarters order.

not make sense to say my Ahmadi identity if there is no importance to say it”.

The third group is Ahmadi women are those who rarely or even never declare their Ahmadi identity. It is because they mostly interact with mainstream Muslims in their everyday activities and they tend to hide their Ahmadi identity to keep them safe in society. Some who are included in this group are housewives and senior high school students.

When I came to my question on how they identify themselves based on their multiple identities, there were three women out of ten who place their Ahmadi identity in the first place before other identities, five women place it after their professional identity, and two women do not state their Ahmadi identity at all. These results are in accordance with their attitude in declaring their identity when they interact with mainstream Muslims.

Compared to their female counterpart, Ahmadi men tend to be braver in showing their Ahmadi identity, particularly in their workplace. One of the male Ahmadi participants said that he is even called by his colleagues as “Mr. Imam” (the leader of *sholat*) since he never wants to be “*makmum*” (the followers in *sholat* prayer) when he does his *sholat* in his workplace. When there was a congregation (*pengajian*) in his workplace, the spokesperson talked about Ahmadiyya in negative sense, and Mr. Imam corrected him and declared that he is an Ahmadi.

Moreover, when the SKB was issued, one of my Ahmadi male participants said that one of Ahmadi man in West Java calls the SKB as “a gift from the state, it is a proof that the government loves Ahmadiyya”. The other man considers the SKB as “*Surat Kelakuan Baik*” (Certificate of Good Behavior), meaning that only Ahmadi who have good behavior in Indonesia. Actually it is kind of joke as a self-defence.

These more positive responses from Ahmadi men shows that Ahmadi men tend to be more positive and brave in dealing with difficulties they face because of their Ahmadi identity.

### **3.9 Concluding Remarks**

Indonesia, is a plural society, the State should treat its people equally regardless their ethnicities, religions or race. Therefore, in the context of nation state, every citizen has responsibility to maintain the harmony by obeying law, rules and regulations applied in the state. However, they can still hold their identities tightly. Their citizenship identity is Indonesian, but their other identities are varied.

The Ahmadi women community as a part of Indonesian community realize their obligation as citizens and try hard to follow the law applied in Indonesia although sometimes the law that was issued is to restrict their activities. From my research, we can see that identity, particularly religious identity, sometimes brings about difficulties for them in interacting with other people in the context of nation state. In order to deal with that difficult situation, they negotiate their Ahmadi identity by adjusting with the context or situation. Although sometimes they have to hide their Ahmadi identity, they think it is fine long as they can observe their religious ritual without violating the law.

After looking at the strategy of Ahmadi women in adjusting their identity with recent political situation in the context of Indonesian nation-state which places them in difficult situation, I think further research needs to be conducted concerning other minority groups, such as Mormonism or Jehovah's Witnesses in Indonesia, because those groups also face similar oppression like the Ahmadiyya, but they do not experience hostilities from wider society.

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## RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND ACTIVISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Case Study of Salafism and Salafi Movement in Indonesia

*Ferry M. Siregar*

### 4.1 Salafism in Contemporary Indonesia

The term ‘salafism’ portrays a movement that attempts to return to what its adherents see as the purest form of Islam, that which was practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and the two generations that followed him. In practice, this means the rejection of unwarranted innovations (*bid'a*) brought to the religion in later years. The formation of those variations seems influenced by the political reality in Indonesia and Middle Eastern countries, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen as stated by Shaikh Abdurrahman Abu Bakar, a Muslim scholar (*ulama*), that the Salafi movement is a political phenomenon, not a religious one.<sup>1</sup>

There are some prominent scholars of Salafism. They include Muhammad Nashiruddin al-Albani, and Muhammad bin Shalih al-Utamin, as well as several men who are still actively teaching: Rabi' ibn

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<sup>1</sup> Ferry Muhammadsyah Siregar, “Salafism in Indonesia: Case Study of A Salafi Pesantren in Yogyakarta” (Third Singapore Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: Asia Research Institute-National University of Singapore (ARI-NUS), 2008).

Hadi al-Mudkhali, Shalih bin Fauzan al Fauzan; and one scholar based in Yemen, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab is considered as the first figure in the modern era to push for a return to the religious practices of the salaf as-salih or "righteous predecessors". He worked on a call to return to what he believed were the practices of the early generations of Muslim. His works (especially *Kitab at-Tawhid*) are still widely read by Salafis around the world today, and the majority of Salafi scholars still reference his works frequently. After his death, his views flourished under the generous financing of the House of Saud and initiated the current worldwide Salafi movement.<sup>2</sup>

Besides, one of the other leading figures of Salafism is the former Grand Mufti Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz whose complete name Abu 'Abd Allah Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al-Baz. He was born in the city of Riyadh in Dhul-Hijjah 1330 H/ 1909 CE. He memorized the Quran in his early age and then he acquired knowledge from Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Latif Aal-Shaykh, Salih ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Aal-Shaykh and Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal-Shaykh who, in his time, was the Mufti of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Baz accompanied and learned from him for about ten years. Thus he gained his religious education from the family of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Baz was appointed as a Justice and he worked for fourteen years in the judiciary until he was deputed to the education faculty. He remained engaged in teaching for nine years at Riyadh Islamic Law College, Riyadh Religious Institute. Then he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Islamic University in Medina. He was also appointed President of the General Presidency of Islamic Research, *Ifta*, Call and Propagation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He also held the position of Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.

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<sup>2</sup> Khaled Abou el-Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 79; Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia."

Ibn Baz had undertaken a number of charitable and other activities, such as his endless support for *da'wa* organizations and Islamic centers in many parts of the world, the establishment and supervision of schools for teaching the Quran, the foundation of an organization that facilitates marriage for Muslim youth, and the popular radio program in which he discussed many current issues and answered questions from listeners as well as providing fatwa if needed. Ibn Baz was a speaker both in public and privately at his mosque.<sup>3</sup> Like his books, his lectures and sermons were numerous and revolved frequently around the situation of the Muslim world. In the 1990s, he issued a fatwa allowing the deployment of non-Muslim troops on Saudi Arabia soil to defend the Kingdom from the Iraqi army.

Ibn Baz was among the Muslim scholars who stood against regime change using violence. He called for the obedience of the people in charge of power except if they order something that goes against God. He condemned the Terrorist bombings of Riyadh in the strongest terms. In his career as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, he attempted to both legitimize the rule of the ruling family and to support calls for the reform of Islam in line with Salafi ideals. His influence on the Salafi movement was huge. Most of the prominent judges and religious scholars of Saudi Arabia today are former students of his. He has been respected by salafi adherents from all-over the world, including Indonesia.

Ibn Baz even sent his student, 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd Allah al-'Ammar to meet Muhammad Natsir, the former prime minister and the founder of the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia to propose the establishment of institute, later known as the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Knowledge) in early 1980. Through the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, it opened a new branch in

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<sup>3</sup> Saudi Gazette, "Biography of Sheikh Bin Baz," *Saudi Gazette*, May 14, 1999.

Indonesia. Natsir welcomed that idea. The hosting place is Jakarta, the capital of Republic of Indonesia. This Saudi's university branch was agreed by Natsir then followed by facilitating the project. It helped to strengthen Indonesia in Islamic studies and also gave far more Indonesian students access to academic facilities available in there.<sup>4</sup> The LIPIA and the DDII then became the supporting institution for disseminating Salafi teachings.

In the LPIA, a split happened and spread in that campus between the purists of the salafi movement and those who were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) of the Egypt in the 1990s. It was because the Brotherhood implemented Hassan al-Banna's concept of a movement aimed at the transformation of Muslim societies and based on the construction of model community. It was built up from small groups (*usrah*, literally "family") of ten to fifteen people who would choose to live under Islamic guidance. In fact, the basic methodology of the purists and the Brotherhood activists was almost identical. Both of them strongly emphasize on education and recruitment. Both used *daura* - training program in Islamic studies - to draw in more followers and increase their Islamic knowledge. In the view of the Purists, the Brotherhood corrupted Islam by accommodating the *bid'a* in the interests of achieving political goals. The Purist assumed that by tolerating deviants, the Muslim Brotherhood was undermining the Islamic principles of faith.

In the Internal Salafis, this clash was getting worse between Ja'far 'Umar Talib and Yusuf Baisa.<sup>5</sup> Baisa stated in one of his religious sermons in the Al-Irsyad Mosque that Salafi Da'wa should adopt management system of Muslim Brotherhood, the wisdom of Tablighi Jama'at, and knowledge on Islamic theology of salafi figures. Talib

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<sup>4</sup> Aay Muhamad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: ideologi dan praksis politik kaum muda Muslim Indonesia kontemporer* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), 173.

<sup>5</sup> Husein bin Muhammad Bin 'Ali Jabir, *Menuju Jama'atul Muslimin: Telaah Sistem Jamaah Dalam Gerakan Islam* (Jakarta: Rabbani Press, 1999), xviii.

rejected this idea and then accused Baisa as part of Sururi group. The conflict was escalating and Talib then established the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah (The Communication Forum of the *Sunna* and the Community of the Prophet). This forum initially was held after the religious sermon series which responded to the decreasing of Islamic religiosity and the increasing of Democracy and other non-islamic views. In the its development, the Laskar Jihad was established by this Forum. This Laskar Jihad aims to support the doctrine of Jihad in the name of God.<sup>6</sup>

Some salafi Figures of the FKASWJ itself criticized Talib's Laskar Jihad. Talib was accused of being deviant from Salafi Principles for some reasons. Those are because the Laskar Jihad is paramilitary and political in character, (2) Talib was allegedly having intimate relation to the Indonesia National Figures, (3) the Media widely covered the Talib's activities. This clash divided FKASWJ into two group. Salafi Jihadi of Talib and Salafi Purist of Umar Sewed, Lukman Ba'abduh and other senior Salafis. This Purist Salafi Group often regarded the other salafi as Sururi, Hizbiyya and Ihkwani. This group has the website [www.salafy.or.id](http://www.salafy.or.id) and the magazine *Syariah*. While the Non-FKASWJ group, Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz and the others have the at-Turots network. They published Periodical *As-Sunnah* and *Aunur Rafiq* published the magazine *Al-Furqon*. Yazid Jawwas, Abdul Hakim Abdal and the others had built close relation to *As-Sofwah* Foundation Networks. Yusuf Baisa preferred to have close relation to *Al-Irsyad* Networks.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia."

<sup>7</sup> International Crisis Group's Report, *Indonesia Background: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Do Not Mix*, 83 (Brussel: International Crisis Group, 2004).

## 4.2 The Emergence of Salafism

### 4.2.1 *The Institute of Islamic and Arabic Science – LIPIA*

*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA), The LIPIA's current address is at Jalan Buncit Raya, South Jakarta. It was initially founded by Saudi Decree No. 5/N/26710 as the Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (the Institute for Arabic Teaching.<sup>8</sup> In effort to intensifying its campaign for Wahhabism, LIPIA introduced program sending the prospective students to continue their study at Medina Islamic University and the Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University in Saudi Arabia. Through this program, more than thirty of its graduates could continue their study at those two universities every year.<sup>9</sup>

The first LIPIA students included men who have become some of Indonesia's best-known salafi leaders, such as Abdul Hakim Abdat, Yazid Jawwas, Ainul Harits, Ja'far Umar Talib, Yusuf Utsman Baisa and so on. Many students became Muslim preachers (*da'i*), on university campuses, among other places, and there was a particularly strong relationship between LIPIA and outreach activities on the campus of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.<sup>10</sup> LIPIA's influence on the spread of the Salafi movement was already huge in terms the numbers of graduates. By 2008, it was estimated that LIPIA had produced closer to more than 5,000 graduates.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> LPBA, *Prospektus Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab* (Jakarta: LIPIA, 1985), 8.

<sup>9</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006), 49; Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia."

<sup>10</sup> Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: 20 Tahun Gerakan Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 206.

<sup>11</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia."

### 4.3 The Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia – DDII

Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) was established in 1967. It became the institution for the spread of Salafism. DDII's influence was gotten through the international contacts of Mohamed Natsir who was a leading figure in the Indonesian independence movement, a former prime minister, and former head of the Masjumi party that was banned by late Soekarno's regime in 1960. Once Masjumi was banned, Natsir turned to finding ways to promote Islam through non-partical ways and DDII was his choice. He became vice president of the Karachi-based World Muslim Congress (*Mutamar al-Alam al-Islami*) in 1967 and a member of the Jiddah-based World Muslim League (*Rabita al-Alam al-Islami*) in 1969.<sup>12</sup>

Natsir saw three major targets of Islamic *da'wa* activities: *pesantrens*, mosques, and university campuses. In 1968 a training program aimed at university instructors who themselves were graduates of Muslim student organizations was held. The program began with 40 instructors from universities in the Bandung area who assembled at a dormitory for Muslim pilgrims in Kwitang, outside Jakarta. In 1974, DDII began a more systematic campus-based initiative called Bina Masjid Kampus.<sup>13</sup> Bina Masjid Kampus became influential in 1978, when the Soeharto government closed down university political life which was later making the campus mosques became a refuge for would-be activists.

DDII became the main institution in Indonesia for distributing scholarships from the Saudi-funded *Rabita* institution to study in the

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> A. M. Lutfi, *Bang Imad: Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Dakwahnya* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002); Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia."

Middle East.<sup>14</sup> DDII was also encouraging the translation of works by Salafi scholars into Indonesian. Over the next decade, DDII helped distribute Indonesian translations of books by such writers as Hasan al-Banna, Yusuf al-Qardawi, Sayyid Qutb, the Muslim ideologues of Egypt and A'la Maududi of Pakistan. The Salafi intellectuality of the late 1970s and early 1980s on university campuses, together with Saudi's scholarships to study in the Middle East created the way to Salafi recruitment in Indonesia throughout in the next decades.

#### **4.3.1 *Pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah: A Salafi Pesantren***

*Pesantren Ihya'us Sunnah* is a pioneer for other *Salafi Pesantrens*. This *pesantren* has actively sending the students and the alumni to districts to preach. From this *da'wa* activity, centers of *Salafi da'wa* movement in various regions in Indonesia emerged. In 2000, tens of *Pesantrens* were established in the *Pesantren Ihya'us Sunnah* networks such as *Pesantren al-Madinah* in Solo, *Minhaj as-Sunnah* in Magelang, *Lu'lu wal Marjan* in Semarang, *Diya'us Sunnah* in Cirebon, *Ihya'us Sunnah* in Bandung, *as-Sunnah* in Makassar, *al- Atsariyah* in Temanggung, *Ittiba'us Sunnah* in Sukoharjo and in Magetan, *Al-Salafi* in Jember, *Ta'zimus Sunnah* in Ngawi, *al-Bayyinah* in Gresik, *al-Furqan* in Cilacap and in Pakanbaru, and *Ibn Qayyim* in Balikpapan. Besides the above mentioned *Pesantrens*, some *Pesantrens* also are established recently such as *Difa'u 'anis Sunnah* in Yogyakarta and *Ibn Taymiyah* in Solo. Those *Pesantrens* are generally headed by the alumni of *Ihya'us Sunnah* Degolan sent by Jafar Umar Talib to study in Yemen and study with Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadhi'i (Wahib, 2008: 4-5; Siregar, 2014).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, "DDII Brochure" (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> A. Bunyan Wahib, "Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad," 2008, 4-5, [http://jowofile.jw.lt/ebook/files5/Gerakan%20Dakwah%20Salafi%20Pasca%20Laskar%20Jihad\\_txt.txt](http://jowofile.jw.lt/ebook/files5/Gerakan%20Dakwah%20Salafi%20Pasca%20Laskar%20Jihad_txt.txt); Ferry Muhammadsyah Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders in the Study of Tafsir in Indonesia: Case Study of Three Pesantrens in

One of the main figures of *salafi da'wa* is Ja'far Umar Talib, the founder and the organizer of Pesantren Ihya'us Sunnah in Degolan Sleman, Jalan Kaliurang KM 15 Yogyakarta. Ja'far Umar Talib studied in Pakistan, joined mujahideen in Afghanistan, and learned at the *Madrasah Dammaj*, Yemen. In *Madrasah Dammaj*, Ja'far Umar Talib explored Islamic studies, especially *Manhaj Salafi* under the guidance of Sheikh Muqbil b. Hadi al-Wad'i who later became the most influential teacher of Ja'far Umar Talib's knowledge on *manhaj Salafi*. Ja'far was born in Malang, East Java in December 1961, and a descendant of a religious Yemeni-Madurese family. His father, Umar Thalib, is an activist of al- Irshad (the modernist Muslim organization of Arab descendants discussed earlier), and a veteran of the famous November 10, 1945 "War of Surabaya." The quality of Ja'far's leadership was the result of three related lines of education: informal education he received from his father, formal school education, and non-formal education such as his involvement in the *Salafi-Wahhabi* movement in Pakistan and his experience as a holy war fighter in Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup>

Ja'far began his formal education at the *Pesantren Al-Irshad* (a boarding school) run by his father in Malang. He continued his studies at the Religious Teacher Education (*Pendidikan Guru Agama*, PGA) run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, also in Malang. After graduating from PGA in 1981, Ja'far went to *Pesantren Persis* in Bangil, East Java, to continue his study of Islamic knowledge. He spent only two years in Bangil because he was dissatisfied with the teaching-learning process. He moved to Jakarta and studied at Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA), or the Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic, an educational institution: funded by the Saudi

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Yogyakarta from Sociological and Exegetical (Tafsir) Perspective" (PhD Dissertation, Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS), 2014).

<sup>16</sup> Saiful Umam, "Radical Muslims in Indonesia: The Case of Ja'far Umar Thalib and the Laskar Jihad," *Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies* 6, no. 1 (2006): 15; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

Arabian government. He studied there for three years but left the institute without completing his study after he was involved in disputes with one of his lecturers. In 1986 Ja'far received a scholarship from the Saudi government to continue his studies at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan.<sup>17</sup>

He spent less than two years in Salatiga, Central Java, as the director of the Al-Irshad Islamic School, before again leaving for North Yemen in 1991. In Yemen, Ja'far widened his knowledge on *Salafi* teachings by studying with Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i. Sheikh Muqbil is known as the leading figure of *Salafi* Islam in Yemen. Supported by the conservative Islamist *Islah* party, he is active in implementing *Salafi* teachings. In addition to Sheikh Muqbil, Ja'far also learned *Salafi* teachings from prominent Saudi scholars, such as Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani and Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah bin Baz, when he performed the *hajj* pilgrimage.<sup>18</sup> Ja'far became so fascinated with *Salafi* teachings.

In 1993, Ja'far came back to Indonesia. Having widened and deepened his knowledge of *Salafi-Wahhabi*, Ja'far is committed to spreading *Salafi* thoughts in Indonesia through *da'wah* and education. Therefore, he did not return to the al-Irshad school, which he previously managed, but built a new *Pesantren* which he called *Ihya'us Sunnah* (Preserving the Prophet's tradition), in Degolan, about 15 kilometers north of Yogyakarta. Ja'far wants to disseminate *Salafi thoughts* among young Indonesians in this educational institution. It is not surprising that the books he uses are by *Salafi* scholars, such as *al-Usul alThalathah* (Three Basic Principles), *Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid* (Explanation on Islamic Theology), both written by Muhammad ibn

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<sup>17</sup> Umam, "Radical Muslims," 15; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

<sup>18</sup> Muhammad Sirozi, "The Intellectual Root of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia. Ja'far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background," *The Muslim World* 95 (January 2005): 97; Umam, "Radical Muslims," 15; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

Abd al-Wahhab, and *Al-Aqidah al-Wasitiyyah* (the Middle Path Ideology), by Ibn Taimiyah. These three books are intended to strengthen students' knowledge about basic Islamic ideology and theology, as interpreted by *Salafi* scholars.<sup>19</sup>

In 1994, Ja'far Umar Talib and his followers built a school named Pesantren Ihya'us Sunnah located in Degolan Kaliurang, approximately 16 kilometers in the north of Yogyakarta. This pesantren was built on the ground with the width less than 300 m<sup>2</sup> which was rented for ten years, around a small mosque called Masjid Jamilur Rahman, or now Uthman bin Affan Mosque. In 2000, this school had 70 students aged seven to seventeen years old. Some of them were students who lived in villages around the *Pesantren*. The students are divided into three groups based on their age. For this learning activity, Ja'far Umar Talib recruited Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, one of LIPIA alumni who finished his study from a *halaqa* of Islamic study center in Saudi Arabia under the guidance of Muhammad bin Salih al-Uthaimin.<sup>20</sup>

Ja'far is also involved in the *Salafi* network in Indonesia connected with both the Yemen and Saudi Arabian *Salafi* network. Among the most important members of the network is Umar as-Sewed. This *Salafi* network is different from other *Salafi* groups, such as Al-Irshad whose school in Salatiga was managed by Ja'far in 1989-1991. While Ja'far and his network refer primarily to Yemeni and Saudi *ulama*, the *Al-Irshad* network, led by Yusuf Baisa, refers to Kuwait scholars, such as Sheikh Abdurrahman Abd al-Khaliq. The two factions compete with each other in claiming to be three most authoritative *Salafi* group in Indonesia. Ja'far and his group seem to have

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<sup>19</sup> Umam, "Radical Muslims," 15; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

<sup>20</sup> Wahib, "Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad," 4-5; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

overshadowed Yusuf. In fact, the mass rally in February 1999 was partly to show Ja'far's greater influence in contrast to al-Irshad's network.<sup>21</sup>

For the *da'wa* outside the pesantren, Ja'far often gave religious lectures and sermons at discussion groups known as *halaqa* (study circle) which had sprung up since the 1980s among university students in Yogyakarta. As this city has many universities, there are a very large number of young people living there. Some are eager to learn and deepen their Islamic knowledge while studying sciences at the universities. Due to his mastery in religious knowledge, Ja'far was quickly popular and influential among the university students. Ja'far built up the network of university students while undertaking his *da'wah* activities. It was after a few years, Ja'far was preoccupied with teaching and disseminating *Salafi* thoughts to his students in the *Pesantren* as well as being involved in the *Salafi* network *da'wa*.<sup>22</sup>

Islamic theology (*Aqida*), especially Wahhabi doctrine, is the main subject studied in the salafi pesantren. Students are taught the works such as as *al-Qaul al-Mufid fi Adillat al-Tauhid* (the Useful Opinion on the Evidence of the Oneness of God), which is the summary of the *Kitab al-Tawhid* (the Book on the Oneness of God) by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, *al-Qaul al-Sadid 'Ala Kitab al-Tauhid* (the Right Opinion on the Book of the Oneness of God) by Abd al-Rahman al-Su'udi, *al-Usul al-Thalatha* (the Three Principles) by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, *al-'Aqida al-Wasatiyya* (the Middle Faith) and its commentary *Sharh al-'Aqidah al-Wasatiyya* by Salih Ibn Fauzan 'Ali Fauzan, *Nubdha fi al-'Aqida* (Fragmentation in the Faith) by al-'Uthaimin, and *Minhaj al-Firqa al-Najiyah* (Method of the Saved Sect) by Muhammad Jamil Zainu.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> International Crisis Group's Report, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Do Not Mix*, 12–15; Umam, "Radical Muslims," 15.

<sup>22</sup> Umam, "Radical Muslims," 15; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

<sup>23</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; Siregar, "The Role of Religious Leaders."

Because of many subject taught in the class in Arabic, student are taught Arabic in various aspects. The Pesantren used such works as *al-Nahw al-Wadih* (Distinct Basic Grammar), *al-Amthila al-Tasrifiiyya* (Arabic Morphological Samples), *Qawa'id al-Sarf* (Principles of Morphology), and *al-Balagha al-Wadiha* (Distinct Rhetoric). In the subject of Fiqh, The Pesantren teaches *Usul Fiqh* (Islamic Legal Theory) and *al-Usul min Usul al-Fiqh* (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) by al-'Uthaimin and *al-Waraqat fi Usul al-Fiqh* (the Letters on Islamic Legal Theory) by 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini. There is are also other works such as *Taysir al-fiqh* (the Simple Version of Fiqh) by Salih Ibn Ghanim al-Sadlan, *Minhaj al-Muslim* (Method of the Believer) by Abu Bakr Jabir al-Jazairi, and *al-Mulakkhas al-Fiqhiy* (the summary of the Fiqh) by Salih ibn Fauzan al-Fauzan. The Salafi Pesantren also teaches such works as *Usul al-Tafsir* (Principles of the Qur'anic Exegesis) by al-'Uthaimin and *al-'Aysir al-Tafasir li Kalam al-'Ali al-Kabir* (the Simplest Exegesis on the Words of the Eminent Supreme) by Abu Bakr Jabir al-Jazairi. In subject of Hadith, it teaches such works as *al-Arba'in al-Nawawiyya* (al-Nawawi's Forty Prophetic Sayings Collection) by Imam al-Nawawi and its commentary by Salih al-Shaikh, *Mudhakkarat al-Hadith al-Nabawi* (Treatise on the Prophetic Tradition) by Rabi' al-Madkhali, and *Darurat al-Ihtimam bi Sunan al-Nabawiyya* (Solicitude for the Prophetic Traditions) by 'Abd al-Salam Abi Barjis Ibn Nasir 'Abd al-Karim.<sup>24</sup>

The *Pesantren* also offers special programs for university students. Called *Tadrib al-du'at* (Training for Preachers) and *Tarbiyat al-Nisa* (Education for Women), these programs last from three months to one year. The *Tadrib al-Du'at* is designed to produce preachers ready to conduct *da'wa* activities. The subjects taught consist of Islamic theology, Qur'anic exegesis, Prophet's Traditions, Islamic History, Islamic Law, Ethics, And Arabic. The *Tarbiyat al-Nisa* is addressed to

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<sup>24</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

women and aimed at forming their personalities to suit Wahhabite doctrines. In this program, its participants study Islamic theology and Islamic jurisprudence, besides imbibing a number of instructions on behavior, fashion, gender relation, and methods for taking care of husbands and children. In the subject of Da'wa, it teaches *Da'wa al-Du'at* (Islamic Missionary Guidelines for Muslim Preachers) by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jauziyah and *al-Da'wat ila Allah* (Islamic Mission in the Name of God) by 'ali Hasan al-Halabi al-Athari.<sup>25</sup>

#### **4.3.2 What Makes This Pesantren Become Salafi**

The pesantren is characterized by the availability of (1) Pondok, a dormitory where santri (pesantren students) stay; (2) Mosque where prayer and other Muslim rituals are conducted; (3) Kitab Kuning, Islamic handbook written in the Arabic alphabets teaching; (4) Santri, students of a pesantren; and (5) Kyai, the owner, leader and teacher of a pesantren. Based on characteristics of where the santri stay and teaching and learning method used, a pesantren can be distinguished into three types, namely (1) the traditional pesantren where the santri stay in dormitory and uses traditional method of teaching and learning; (2) the pesantren kalong where the santri stay in neighboring areas and uses traditional methods of teaching and learning; and (3) modern pesantren, where the santri stay inside or outside the pesantren and a modern curriculum is used in this type of pesantren.<sup>26</sup>

In the history of Islamic education in Indonesia, the modern pesantren is said to be the first institution to create the principles for reforming Islamic education within the pesantren system. The modern pesantren designed to provide education able to respond to challenges faced by the Muslim community amidst changes in the socio-cultural life in Indonesia in the modern-day period. Modern pesantren are

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<sup>25</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

<sup>26</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

different from traditional ones in many respects. The difference lies especially in the system of education. Secular subjects are taught in modern pesantren. Introduction of modern values into this Salafi Pesantren has brought about changes in regard to the importance of Islamic knowledge itself. This salafi Pesantren stance makes the school quite different from a traditional pondok pesantren. It enables to equip its students with wider knowledge, skills, and worldview would enable them to take up many types of employment. This also means they can take their religious knowledge back into mainstream society to help build a stronger community.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to introducing a new system and learning method, grade system, textbook, and non-religious subjects in the curriculum, this Salafi Pesantren also functioned as the medium to disseminate the ideas of Salafism. It became the basis of creating new Muslims familiar with the spirit of modernism and progress, which had become a dominant discourse in Indonesia. Here the socio and religious dimension of this pesantren can be clearly identified. Different from the type of pesantren that only provided classical religious learning and a kyai-centric system, this pesantren provided a new religious perspective to respond to modernity. This pesantren also functioned as the fabric of the ulama (Muslim scholar). This Salafi Pesantren also attempted to create new Muslims who could master either religious or secular knowledge as well as various life skills needed by the changing community. This pesantren can be identified itself as a modern educational institution in contrast to a traditional pesantren. One aspect of this modernization can be seen in the classical system. In the classroom, students study and learn just like students of madrasa and other public schools do. They are also able to engage in various activities such as organization training, life skills, arts, sports and other social activities. The pesantren system ranges from small local kindergartens to boarding schools at the junior and senior

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<sup>27</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

high school levels. Supplementary Islamic instruction is given in the evening to students from local elementary schools. The curriculum is largely Islamic, although the school is also required by the state to teach secular courses. This pesantren was one that was ideologically closest to the Salafism. Like the Salafism itself, it developed and contributed to a more 'puritanical' attitude.<sup>28</sup>

This pesantren are based largely on Salafi ideological beliefs. The presence of this kind of pesantren is closely related to the rise of Salafism in Indonesia. From a religious doctrine perspective, these groups follow the earlier Salafi figures such as Ahmad ibn Hambal, Ibn Taymiyah, Muhammad ibn Wahhab whose ideas were absorbed and developed by later salafi figures such as Wahhabi and other Salafi scholars. The doctrines of Salafism as developed by those figures have become the main references for this pesantren. This Salafi Pesantren is run on the basis on contextualization of Salafi religious beliefs. Another important characteristic of this salafi Pesantren is that it applies the model of literal interpretation toward religious texts. As a result, they have a distinct physical appearance. For instance, males wear *ghamis* (an Arab garment for men) and have long beards, while females wear jilbab and veil covering all parts of their bodies except for the eyes and hands.<sup>29</sup>

Based on the three models of Indonesia Pesantrens mentioned above. It is assumed that In contrast to the traditional pesantrens that belong to the Nahdhatul 'Ulama, this Salafi Pesantren is comparatively modern in character, as they adopt the classical system and modern subject. Based on my observation, however, there are also Salafi Pesantrens applying NU's traditional pesantrens system. Something that make those different with others is that Ideologically, the Salafi Pesantren are close to Wahhabism as official ideology rooted in Saudi Arabia. To some extent,

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<sup>28</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

<sup>29</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

they resemble the pesantrens developed by Indonesian modernist muslim organization, including the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis. Their curricula primarily focus on the teaching of Arabic and Islamic studies focusing on theology and jurisprudence. In this paper, the salafi pesantren has close relation to the salafism and its networks which are growing up in the Middle East.<sup>30</sup>

## **4.4 Indonesian Salafism: Characteristics**

### **4.4.1 Missionary Activity**

Salafis believe that Muslim society must first be Islamized through a gradually evolutionary process including education (*tarbiyya*) and purification (*tasfiya*) before the comprehensive implementation of the *shari'a* can be realized. To reach this goal, the Pesantren is committed to *da'wa* activities (from the Arabic root *da'wa*, to call, which generally refers to the proselytizing that is incumbent upon every Muslim), participating in the establishment of *halqas* and *dauras*. *Halqa*, literally meaning "circle," is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which an *ustadz*, a teacher or preacher. Gives lessons based on certain books and his participants sit around him to hear and scrutinize his lesson. It is distinct from *daura*, literally meaning "turn," which is a type of workshop held for a period ranging from one week to one month. During which its participants gather and stay in one place and follow all the designed programs.<sup>31</sup>

### **4.4.2 Puritanism**

Wahhabi doctrines in the study of theology is the main subject studied in the salafi pesantren. Student are taught such as works as *al-Qaul al-Mufid fi Adillat al-Tauhid* (the Useful Opinion on the Epidence of the Oneness of God), which is the summary of the *Kitab al-Tawhid*

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<sup>30</sup> Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia"; "The Role of Religious Leaders."

<sup>31</sup> Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, 32; Siregar, "Salafism in Indonesia."

(the Book on the Oneness of God) by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, *al-Qaul al-Sadid ‘Ala Kitab al-Tauhid* (the Right Opinion on the Book of the Oneness of God) by Abd al-Rahman al-Su’udi, *al-Usul al-Thalatha* (the Three Principles) by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, *al-‘Aqida al-Wasatiyya* (the Middle Faith) and its commentary *Sharh al-‘Aqidah al-Wasitiyya* by Salih Ibn Fauzan ‘Ali Fauzan, *Nubdha fi al-‘Aqida* (Fragmentation in the Faith) by al-‘Uthaimin, and *Minhaj al-Firqa al-Najiyah* (Method of the Saved Sect) by Muhammad Jamil Zainu as mentioned above.<sup>32</sup>

The Salafis opposed any form of innovation in Islam, and called for a return to Islam's roots. The very core of this doctrine is Tawhid. It means that accept and believe in the oneness of God and His absolute authority. This tawhid has three branches. These are *tawhid al-asma wa al-sifat*, *tawhid ‘ubudiyya*, and *tawhid rububiyya*. The *tawhid rububiyya* is to believe that Allah is the Creator of all things and sovereignty over believers belongs to him. The *tawhid ‘ubudiyya* teaches that a true servant of Allah has to single out Allah in all acts of worship and He alone should be worshipped with complete loyalty. The *tawhid al-Asma’ wa al-Sifat* is to believe in God’s names and attributes mentioned in the Qur’an and the valid Sunnah.<sup>33</sup>

The way of life of the *Salafi pesantren* has marked trend in Islamic activism in Indonesia. Even while displaying their distinctive identity and their ambition to return to what they called “pure Islam,” as practiced by the *‘al-Salaf al-Salih’* (Pious Ancestor), they adopted a stance of apolitical quietism. The prototype of these communities to a large extent resembles what Oliver Roy<sup>34</sup> refers to as neo-fundamentalism, which he defines as a revolutionary Islamic movement that attempts to re-islamize society at the grassroots level without being

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<sup>32</sup> Siregar, “Salafism in Indonesia”; “The Role of Religious Leaders.”

<sup>33</sup> Siregar, “Salafism in Indonesia”; “The Role of Religious Leaders.”

<sup>34</sup> Olivier Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 25.

formed within an Islamic state. He contends that this phenomenon arose from the failure of the Islamism, a modern political Islamic movement that claims to re-create a true muslim society by creating a failure of political Islam.<sup>35</sup>

#### **4.4.3 Anti-Democracy and Anti-Westernism**

In the perception of Salafi, Islam is the key to oppose against democracy in the Western form in general and rejecting man-made laws in favor of the principle of Divine Law in particular which is perceived as a sacred doctrine. Power derived from human beings rather than from Allah is an obvious heresy or *Kufr*. In recent years, the question of the legitimacy of elections became more controversial as more and more Muslims living in Indonesia too questioned the religious legitimacy of participating in the elections. Books on this topic, especially those opposing participation of Muslims in democratic processes, are now translated by Salafi scholars and groups into English. In addition to that, many Salafi groups view democracy not only as a heresy, but also as an integral part of the new “Crusader” campaign of colonialism (*al-Hamlah al-Salibiyyah al-Jadidah*) and the historical conspiracy against the Muslim world.<sup>36</sup>

The West appeared to be a thing producing injustice, hegemony, and destruction. The Salafis also define what happened in Indonesia from the perspective of global conspiracy theory. They argue that Indonesia has long been the target of destruction by the enemies of Islam because it is the largest Muslim country in the world, with a potential to challenge the hegemony of Zionists and Christian Missionary international forces. They claimed that these enemies of Islam have succeeded not only in perpetrating their evil plans through economic sabotage, the manipulation of human rights rhetoric, and other activities aimed at

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.; Siregar, “Salafism in Indonesia.”

<sup>36</sup> Siregar, “Salafism in Indonesia.”

setting in motion the reformation process that in inflaming riots, turmoil, and communal conflicts in various regions in Indonesia.<sup>37</sup>

In Indonesian political life, the exclusive tendencies of the Salafis propel them to acts with religious motivations against the government policies. For instance, the Salafis refuse to participate in the general election for a number of different reasons: (1), the general election is part of democratic systems, and it is absolutely opposed to Islamic shari'a; (2), the vote of a Muslim and a non-Muslim is equal, whereas a Muslim's vote should be higher; and (3), vote of male and female is considered equal whereas in Islam, the vote of one man is equal to that of two women. This arguments show the differences between Salafi social and cultural categories from those of the state's.<sup>38</sup>

## 4.5 Conclusion

There are direct influences of Middle East Salafism networks to the indonesia' salafism. There are also many variations in salafism as well. The formation of those variations seems influenced by the political reality in Indonesia and Middle Eastern countries, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The directional influences of Saudi salafism to Indonesia pesantren come from the intellectual networks through Middle East universities, funding agency and personal donation. DDII's establishment in 1967 became the way for the spreading of Salafism. DDII's influence was gotten through the international contacts of Mohamed Natsir who was a Muslim leading figure in the Indonesian independence movement. DDII became the main institution in Indonesia for distributing scholarships from the Saudi-funded *Rabita* institution to study in the Middle East (DDII brochure, 2004). DDII was also encouraging the translation of works by salafi scholars into Indonesian.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

Besides, the LIPIA introduced program sending the prospective students to continue their study in Saudi Arabia. The LIPIA students included men who have become some of Indonesia's best-known salafi leaders such as Abdul Hakim Abdat, Yazid Jawwas, Ainul Harits, Ja'far Umar Talib, Yusuf Utsman Baisa and so on. Many students became Muslim preachers (*da'i*). This Saudi's university branch was also agreed by Natsir then followed by facilitating the project. It helped to strengthen Indonesia in Islamic studies and also gave far more Indonesian students access to academic facilities available in Saudi Arabia. The return of the LIPIA graduates who had completed their studies in Saudi Arabia marked the birth of the emergence of Wahhabi-Salafi generation in Indonesia. Among them are DDII Cadres affiliated to salafi group. They assumed that people had not been applying pure Islam because of negative impact of modernization.

The term *Salafism* originated from Arabic word *salaf*. Word *Salafi* was used by early Islamic scholar. It means righteous predecessor and pious ancestor. In Islamic terms, it is generally used to refer to the first three generations of Muslims; the Sahaba, the Tabi'in, and Tabi' al-Tabi'in. These three generations are looked upon as examples of how Islam should be practiced. The meaning of salaf also pertains something that happened in the past then developed to become Islamic *mazhab* that takes the sayings and behaviors of the prophet Muhammad and his companions in the past as the fundamental basis for its teachings. In the next development, the term 'salafism' describes a movement that seeks to return to what its adherents see as the purest form of Islam, that practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and the two generations that followed him. In practice, this means the rejection of unwarranted innovations (*bid'a*) brought to the religion in later years. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab is considered as the first figure in the modern era to push for a return to the religious practices of Salafism.

The characteristics of Indonesian Salafism can be seen as a religious movement having puritanism, missionary activity, and anti-Westernism. Its distinctive identity and ambition is to return to what they called “pure Islam.” Its main concern has to do with the purity of *tawhid* (Islamic monotheism). It concerned primarily with the purity of the faith and the related moral integrity of individuals. In their view of social reality, beside Christian Missionaries, the West appeared to be a negative thing. They argue that Indonesia has long been the target of destruction by the enemies of Islam because it is the largest Muslim country in the world, with a potential to challenge the hegemony of Christian Missionary international forces.

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# **THE POOR AND POVERTY - COMPARING ISLAMIC AND CHRISTIAN VIEWS**

*Mega Hidayati*

## **5.1 Introduction**

Throughout the history of human beings, poverty has always existed. Poverty is a social phenomenon which has serious consequences. Human beings have been struggling to find a solution, but they have found many difficulties not only related to the solution of poverty, but also to the definition of poverty itself. Word Bank, for instance, defines poverty as follows: "Poverty is concerned with absolute standard of living of part of society the poor in equality refers to relative living standards across the whole society". Based on this definition, the World Bank decides two international absolute poverty lines that is \$1.08 (USD) per head per day for low income countries and \$2.15 per head per day for high income countries. Many researchers have disapproved both poverty lines. One of the objections is that the lines are too low and they do not include health care-needs. The researchers found that out-of-pocket payments for medical needs is one of the significant factors in determining a poverty line. The cost for health care-needs is unpredictable and may cause financial problems in a household, and also lead to poverty for middle class families. A failure to recognize the variation in health care-needs costs can result in a wrong interpretation

of the real accurate poverty line at all times and in different countries. In addition, the failure of including health care-needs costs also brings an obstacle for us to monitor the aim of milieu development at ending poverty. Nevertheless, the researchers emphasize that the World Bank has not included health care-need costs in determining the line of poverty standard.<sup>1</sup>

The above description shows that the difficulty in defining poverty is due to the role of many external factors in poverty, therefore the meanings of poverty vary according to context, time and place. For that reason, according to Majid Rahnema, who did an exploration on poverty, to define poverty is an impossible task.<sup>2</sup> Rahnema continues, saying that the main sources of a lot of confusion on poverty are ‘a human predicament and particular mode of living’ and ‘a passive condition of material precariousness or economic destitution attributed to a series of lacks.’ In other words, the poor are always described as an object.

As also aforementioned, the poverty has brought many problems in human life. Poverty, for instance, can possibly motivate individuals toward criminal actions such as killing, stealing, robbing, and other act of violence. In addition, according to Susan Rice, in her article “The Treat of Global Poverty,” poverty potentially increases a risk of conflict; therefore, poverty also emerges and spreads transnational security threats.<sup>3</sup> For instance, since opportunities to get a job in develop countries are easier, immigrants increase in those countries and sometimes they enter illegally. Besides, this emerges competition in getting job between native people and immigrants.

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<sup>1</sup> Eddy van Doorslaer et al., “Effect of Payments for Health Care on Poverty Estimates in 11 Countries in Asia: An Analysis of Household Survey Data,” *The Lancet* 368, no. 9544 (October 2006): 1264–1357.

<sup>2</sup> Majid Rahnema, “Poverty,” 2001, 2, <http://www.pudel.uni-bremen.de/pdf/majid2.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Susan E. Rice, “The Threat of Global Poverty,” *The National Interest*, Spring 2006, 81, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-threat-global-poverty-349>.

Nowadays, the problem of poverty leads people to realize that they are responsible for the solution. People believe that they need to work together to eliminate poverty. This phenomenon encourages religious leaders to understand and to find a solution from their religious point of view, as found by World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD):

*“Many religiously inspired people are making increasing effort not only to contribute to practical improvements in the lives of the poor, but also to try to understand the nature and causes of poverty, and to analyze the values and goals of development programmes.”<sup>4</sup>*

This paper explores a religious understanding on poverty comparing Christian and Islamic dialectics. The first section of this paper discusses the poor and poverty from Christian and Islamic perspectives. The second section explores the moral foundation that possible change toward ending poverty. The last section examines possible solutions for Christians and Muslims to work together through interfaith dialogue and movement.

## **5.2 The Poor and Poverty**

As other religions, Christianity and Islam emphasize caring for the poor. Both in biblical and Quranic texts, we hear God’s commitment to help the poor and we also see examples of Jesus and Muhammad help the poor. In Bible, Deut 26:5 describes that God acted to eliminate an economic oppression and slavery. As Ronald J. Sider mentions in his article, “A Biblical Perspective on Stewardship,” God corrects

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<sup>4</sup> The World Faiths Development Dialogue, “Poverty and Development: An Interfaith Perspective | SGI Quarterly,” *SGI Quarterly*, January 2001, 3, <http://www.sgiquarterly.org/feature2001Jan-2.html>.

oppression and liberates the poor.<sup>5</sup> In addition, according to Sider, the Bible shows how a mistreatment of the poor destroyed one nation, Israel (Luke 7:11, 17).<sup>6</sup> In the Islamic tradition, God emphasizes that people who believe in God will take care of the poor. “This was he that would not believe in God most high, and would not encourage the feeding of the indigent” (Qur’an QS. 69:33-34). God is very angry with the people who do not take care of the poor (Qur’an QS. 89:17-18). Moreover, many verses from Qur’an and the Islamic prophetic tradition emphasize the significance of helping the poor through *zakat* (obligatory alms), *shadaqah* (dole), *infaq* (charity) (e.g. Qur’an QS. 9:60, 3:39, 2:271, 89:17-20, 76:8).

Emphasizing the importance of helping the poor does not mean that the two religions are only for the poor. Both emphasize that good news is for all human beings (Jesus’ Gospel is for all, Islam is *rahmatan lil alamin* (‘mercy for the world’). Christianity stresses that the poor should be aware that the good news was for them (Lk. 4: 18-19). Sider found that Jesus identifies himself with the poor and convinces people that ‘helping a person is like helping the Creator of all things with a loan’ (Sider, 2006:803).<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, Jesus invites the rich to take care of the poor (Matthew 19:21) because God hates the injustice and the neglect of the poor that is often practiced by the rich (Luke 5:3-5). The invitation for the rich to help the poor is also found in Quranic verses and the Islamic prophetic tradition. The Prophet Muhammad emphasizes that the poor are indeed close to stop believing in God (*kafir*) since poverty can potentially lead people to do wrong deeds such as stealing, robbing, killing, etc. Thus, the rich have to help the poor in order to prevent the poor from doing wrong deeds. Besides, giving a part of wealth in terms

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<sup>5</sup> Ronald J. Sider, “A Biblical Perspective on Stewardship,” in *On Moral Business: Classical and Contemporary Resources for Ethics in Economic Life*, ed. Max L. Stackhouse (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1995), 802.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 803.

of *shadaqah*, *zakat*, and *infaq* to the poor is also related to the rich purification of property (Qur'an QS. 5:95, 5:89, 58:4, 9:103).

According to Rahnama who wrote an article of 'poverty,' the fact that both religions put a lot of emphasis on the poor leads some believers to interpret that living in poverty is God's ways. The following texts show this: "the Christ blessed all the poor who lived their predicament with dignity", "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for the rich to enter the kingdom of God". The prophet Muhammad said that "poverty is my glory."<sup>8</sup> These quotations are questionable and debatable in terms of source and originality. Rahmena quotation of the prophet Muhammad, for instance, comes from *Zuhhad* community in Ali el Hindi Era, *tezkiyetu'l-Mevduat*, 1399. In the history of the Muslim society in the Middle East, there was a group who preferred to live in poverty and avoided to get the benefits of the world. This group is called "*zuhhad*" and it has influenced the Islamic world in terms of Sufism. Many sayings were produced by *zuhhad* community such as "Poverty is my honor and I am proud of it;" "Poverty is more ornamented for the believer than bridle on the face of the horse and whiteness of forehead of the horse;" and "Poverty is my favor."<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile, in Christian community, the tendency to live in poverty is found in several communities such as Franciscan, Ordo Carmel and OCSO orders.

Beside the emphasis caring for the poor, both Christianity and Islam also encourage the believers to work. In Christianity, work is regarded as a part of the good creation that God blessed. In Matthew 25:14-30, Jesus talks about talent by using a parable in which the talent is a gift from God. Human beings are expected to be servants and the servants are workers. Meanwhile, the Bible states in Colossians. 3:23-24 and Ephesians. 6:5-7 that a worker should return their work to God. God

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<sup>8</sup> Rahnama, "Poverty," 2.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Osman Güner, "Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought: Is It Virtue of Captivity?," *Studies in Islam and the Middle East* 2, no. 1 (2005): 1-12.

himself has shown how to work by his act of creating the world. According to Leland Ryken, one of the authors *On Moral Business*, this is one of theological reason of work. Work is not only a blessing but also the effect of the fall.<sup>10</sup> Thus, God commands to work so obvious, but *Christianity Today* magazine found that the church has paid more attention to the guidelines for correct human sexual behavior than the mandate to work, in fact the dangers of the distortion of sexual behavior and work are the same.<sup>11</sup>

Islam encourages Muslims to get property by applying two principles. First, people must use legal means to gain income and property. Second, the spending of income and wealth should be legal and for the common good. Osman Güner, in his article “Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought: Is it Virtue of Captivity?,” found that the prophet Muhammad also indicates the importance and the holiness of working.<sup>12</sup> Islam encourages people to gain property (Qur’an QS. 7:32; 3:14) and it is imperative for everyone to work and have enough property. Güner continues, the work is regarded as a valuable effort and an act of worship.<sup>13</sup> In Qur’an QS. 62:10, God commands Muslim to disperse through the land to seek God’s bounty after praying and in Qur’an QS. 53:39 God reminds us “That man can have nothing but what he strives for.” Meanwhile, the prophet Mohammad states that a person does not eat anything better than he earns by himself (Reported by Bukhari).

Based on the above description, Christianity and Islam view that human beings need to be active and to create a relation with other people and the world through work. Nevertheless, the world of work cannot be

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<sup>10</sup> Leland Ryken, “Work as Stewardship,” in *On Moral Business: Classical and Contemporary Resources for Ethics in Economic Life*, ed. Max L. Stackhouse (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1995), 86.

<sup>11</sup> Christianity Today, “CT’s Views on Key Issues,” *ChristianityToday.com*, September 2005, <http://ct/2005/september/>.

<sup>12</sup> Güner, “Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought,” 3–4.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

easily understood as it is rapidly changing. Thus, it is too simplistic to say that people become poor because they do not want to work as most capitalists speak.

From the position of the poor in Christian and Islamic teachings described above, how do the two religious traditions regard poverty? In Islam, the issue of poverty is found more in hadith than Qur'anic verses. Qur'an mentions *fakr*, *fakir*, and *fukara* (plural form) 'the poor,' twelve times and two of them are related to spiritual poverty. Thus, ten verses talk about material poverty mentioning helping, protecting and sheltering the poor. Meanwhile, many hadiths focus on poverty and the poor in their relation to *zuhd* (the ignorance of the world life) and *rikak* (giving sensitivity to the heart). In addition, Güner found that from the hadiths, poverty is mentioned in terms of commendation and loathing.<sup>14</sup>

According to Michael Bonner, the writer of "Poverty and Economics in the Qur'an", from the beginning of Islam, poverty has been central and important.<sup>15</sup> In addition as Güner states, poverty is not seen as a virtue, on the contrary, it is viewed as a serious social problem with negative consequences. Therefore, poverty must be alleviated and Islam provides some suggestion for the solution.<sup>16</sup> One of the solution according to Ajaz Ahmed Khan and Helen Mould, the writer of *Debt and Islam*, Islamic teachings encourage Muslims to fight against inequality and to commit themselves to the effort of eradicating poverty and the root causes of inequality.<sup>17</sup>

In the Bible, the subject of poverty touch through several perspectives, some of them apparently contradictory. The Bible in Sirach 40:28-29 says that "My child, do not lead the life of a beggar, it is

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>15</sup> Michael Bonner, "Poverty and Economics in the Qur'an," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 3 (2005): 392.

<sup>16</sup> Güner, "Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought," 1.

<sup>17</sup> Ajaz Ahmed Khan and Helen Mould, *Islam and Debt* (Birmingham: Islamic relief worldwide, 2008), 4.

better to die than to beg. When one looks to the table of another, one's way of life cannot be considered a life." In Luke 6:20, it is said "Blessed are you who are poor, for yours the Kingdom of God. According to Leslie J. Hoppe in his article "The Bible on the Poor," the 'opposite' texts are really related to the historical context of Jesus period. Hoppe continues, the former is the advice for the son of wealthy while the latter is addressed to the poor.<sup>18</sup> Hoppe wrote "The Bible holds up the ideal of a community-based economic system founded on mutual support and equal access to the means of production. It demands that social interaction reflect justice and equity and condemns all economic exploitation as an affront to God's will."<sup>19</sup> Thus, poverty is a creation of human beings.

One of the problems faced by religions in eliminating poverty is the application of religious mission. In his article "Preaching on Issues of Poverty and Justice," Marvin A. McMickle, for instance, describes how poverty and justice issues are overlooked by preachers, pastors and church people who are busy focusing on issues of congregational life.<sup>20</sup> In fact, in the Bible Luke 16:19-31, there is a useful parable regarding the poverty issue. McMickle emphasizes that the parable is about an economic difference within society. It is about rich people who really realize that their neighbor is poor, but they do not react. The parable is about community that is truly aware poverty exists but they take no action. Therefore, there is the urgency to eliminate preachers who are more interested in earning "profits" than in being "prophets."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Leslie J. Hoppe, "The Bible on the Poor," *Clergy Journal* 82, no. 6 (2006): 3.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Marvin Andrew McMickle, "Preaching on Issues of Poverty and Justice," *Clergy Journal* 83, no. 6 (2007): 11.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-13.

### **5.3 Moral Values as a Foundation for Change**

As all religions, talking about the poor is inseparable from justice issues. In Islam, according to Khan and Mould, based on Qur'an QS. 4:35 and QS. 5:8, social justice has three aspects: fair and equitable distribution of wealth, provision of basic necessities of life to the poor and the needy, and protection of the weak against economic exploitation by the people who have power.<sup>22</sup> Khan and Mould emphasize that "Islam encourages believers to be the voice for the poor and marginalized (Qur'an QS. 69:33-34; 89:17-18) asking believers to feed the poor and provide charity."<sup>23</sup> These principles are significant in Islam. Qur'an QS. 107:3 states that people do not really following the Islamic teachings when they do not take care of orphans and do not give food to the poor. In addition, the prophet Muhammad says: "he who sleeps on a full stomach whilst his neighbor goes hungry is not one of us" (reported by Bukhari and Muslim).

As mentioned before, in Islam issues of social justice are related circulation of wealth or sharing (Qur'an QS. 59:7; 9:60). The method of sharing is based on setting rules of obligatory giving and voluntary giving as well as on ethical and moral principles. In the case of debt, for instance, people in debt accept *zakah* (obligatory charity). In addition, God promises that people who are willing to forgive debt (Qur'an QS. 2:280) will get blessing in their life. Hadith reported by Muslim: "If anyone would like Allah to save him from the hardships of the Day of Resurrection, he should give more time to his debtor who is short of money, or remit his debt altogether." Khan and Mould view that there is a clear reason to cancel unpayable and unjust debts of the world's poorest countries from the perspective of ethics and morality.<sup>24</sup> In Islamic values related to circulation of property such as prohibiting

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<sup>22</sup> Khan and Mould, *Islam and Debt*, 3.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

interest (Qur'an QS. 2:275-276) or usury (Qur'an QS. 3:130), *zakah* is the most significant value to prevent wealth from being accumulated only among the rich (Qur'an QS. 59:7).

The same as in Islamic teachings, the biblical response on poverty is not merely charity but also justice. God calls for equal justice for the poor in court (Exodus 23:6) and for paying more attention to widows, orphans and strangers (Exodus 22: 21-24). Invitations to help the poor are found more in Luke, such as "Sell your possession and give alms" (Luke 12:33), "give to everyone who asks you and if anyone takes that belong to you, do not demand it back" (Luke 6:30). In other words, in Luke, calling for a sacrificial sharing to the poor is imperative. According to Walter E. Pilgrim in his book *Good News for the Poor; Wealth and Poverty in Luke-Acts*, the principle of "one-half to the poor" that appears in Luke is "not as a new legalism but as the type of discipleship-response which is consistent with the call of Jesus." He continues that "good news to the poor" in Luke-Acts is a message for the poor to have hope that there is a way out of their suffering and deprivation.<sup>25</sup> Meanwhile, for the rich, Luke emphasizes that wealth is God's gift which should be used mainly to help the poor. Wealth must be distributed in order to create equality and justice thus the gap between the poor and the rich would be abolished. For Pilgrim, from the understanding of Luke Acts, there are two important points: (1). each community should commit together to have no poor among them and (2). Each community should strive for the spirit and practice of equality, so that class distinctions and discriminations based on a social status are removed.<sup>26</sup>

From the above description, it is clear that Christianity and Islam base virtues as a principle of sharing. Therefore, it is not surprising

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<sup>25</sup> Walter E. Pilgrim, *Good News to the Poor: Wealth and Poverty in Luke-Acts* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Pub. House, 1981), 165–166.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 168–170.

when World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) reports that Christians and Muslims stress that the absence of virtues not only create poverty but also contributes to a continuation of poverty. Poverty is a question of moral and practical issues. If Christians and Muslims want to develop their lives in truly following their religion, they have to realize that ending poverty is about spiritual and moral progress which means “a dynamic process where the focus is on being more rather than on having more.”<sup>27</sup>

#### **5.4 Contribution to Solutions on Ending Poverty and on Interfaith Dialogue**

To summarize, there are several important points. First, Christianity and Islam view poverty as a serious problem which needs effective solutions. To discover effective solution, both religions stress the significance of helping the poor. Second, Christianity and Islam also emphasize the inseparable relationship between poverty and justice issues. Both Christianity and Islam explain that people must fight for justice for all human beings. Many examples of injustice occur in human life, and a deep gap between the poor and the rich is one of them. To eliminate this gap, Christianity and Islam put emphasis on wealth circulation or sharing: obligatory and voluntary giving or charity. Third, in viewing the current problem of poverty, Christians and Muslims believe that the problem of poverty is caused by the absence of virtues. They are convinced that the absence of virtues creates poverty and causes poverty to continue in human life. In other words, human beings need spiritual and moral progress in order to eliminate poverty. From these points, how do Christianity and Islam contribute solutions on ending poverty?

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<sup>27</sup> The World Faiths Development Dialogue, “Poverty and Development,” 11.

In understanding poverty, World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) states that several important ideas arise, namely the nature of the poor is heterogeneous, poverty is complex, the historical characteristics of the poor and the social settings have to be examined, and uniform solution for ending poverty is not the proper way.<sup>28</sup> Since the nature of poverty is heterogeneous, we cannot give the same solution for different areas or countries. The complexity of poverty brings no single answer for the causes of poverty and the solution ending it. Poverty issues are also related to other issues such as political, social and historical issues. Because the causes and the nature of poverty are different and complex, we have to examine historical and social settings. This examination helps us to understand poverty comprehensively based on certain cases and places where poverty exists. Finally, the fact that poverty is different and complex in nature leads to no single solution. We will find that a solution for one case of poverty in specific area is not suitable for other places. Based on this fact, to answer previous questions is not simple. Although WFDD found that uniform solution is not a proper step in ending poverty, our discussion in previous sections shows that from Christian and Islamic perspectives, there is one of universal solutions: the presence of virtues. If Christians and Muslims truly believe with their religious teachings, virtues will be present in their behaviour such as they commit to help the poor, they convince themselves ending poverty is their responsibility, they have sensitivity to others' suffering, they care for their neighbor lives. The virtues, certainly, are not present suddenly, they need to be educated and maintained. Therefore, educational aspect is really important; Christians and Muslims have the responsibility to apply the virtues in their lives and to educate their children with the virtues. With keeping these points in minds, can Christian and Muslim walk together in eliminating poverty?

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

Some people believe that similarities in Christian and Islamic teachings in regard to poverty can be considered as a common ground between the two religions. For this reason, Christians and Muslims need to come together in the efforts of eliminating poverty effectively. This also can be viewed as a subject for Christian and Muslim dialogue. The dialogue between the two religions is not aimed to talk about theological differences but about practical life issues and actions to eliminate poverty. Can this kind of dialogue work?

Before closing this short discussion, I want to view at glance an interfaith dialogue of life suggested by Christian Liberation Theology. According to Clodovis Boff, Leonardo Boff, and Paul Burns, in their book *Introducing Liberation Theology*, “liberation theology was born when faith confronted the injustice done to the poor.”<sup>29</sup> Liberation theology views the poor as oppressed and made poor by *others*. In building its theology, liberation theology applies socio-analytical mediation, hermeneutical mediation, and practical mediation. In the socio-analytical mediation, liberation theology uses a dialectical explanation to stress that poverty is oppression. Through the hermeneutical mediation, liberation theology shows that the struggle of fighting the oppression is relevant to the Biblical texts and this becomes a social teaching in the church. Through the practical mediation, liberation theology decides actions to overcome the problem of poverty.<sup>30</sup> From those mediations there are two main steps in liberation theology, that is: 1. people should come to a process of conscientization. Discovering the causes that make them poor is important to organize themselves into movements and act in coordinated fashion, 2. faith reflects on liberating practice: making common cause with the poor and working out the gospel of liberation.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Leonardo Boff, Clodovis Boff, and Paul Burns, *Introducing Liberation Theology* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 3.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 24–37.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 3–9.

Based on the above principles, liberation theology offers a dialogue of life. According to Dwight N. Hopkins in his article “A Black American Perspective on Interfaith dialogue,”<sup>32</sup> one of the reasons for Christians to engage in dialogue is the international economy of monopoly capitalism. Therefore, he suggests that:

“dialogue begins by recognizing not institutional organization, church tradition, or doctrines, but by seeing people and their physical bodies, where they are and how they live out their faith in their total commonplace being [...] Thus we must see and hear and feel faith as a total way of life for the poor. Because most of the world's poor speak their faith, [...] interfaith dialogue has to be sensitive to the language of oppressed people”.<sup>33</sup>

Hopkins believes that attention to 'how people carry out their ordinary lives of survival' will help interfaith dialogue.<sup>34</sup> From this points, we can say that for liberation theology the first place to have dialogue with other religions is daily problems especially poverty. For this reason, people who engage in dialogue must have a sensitivity to the language of the poor. Unfortunately, Hopkins does not provide explanation of what the categories of language of oppressed people are. Are there categories of the language of oppressed people? How does dialogue look like if we use this language? Can the oppressed people suffering from different aspects of poverty have the same language?

Let us relate the dialogue suggested by Christian Liberation Theology to Islamic issues. As above exploration, *Zakah* (alms) is obligation for rich Muslims, and beside *Zakah*, Islam encourages the believers to do *Shadaqah* and *infaq* (charity). In many areas and

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<sup>32</sup> Dwight N. Hopkins, “A Black American Perspective on Interfaith Dialogue,” in *Living Stones in the Household of God: The Legacy and Future of Black Theology*, ed. Linda E Thomas (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 172.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

countries, we found committee that manages *Zakah*, such as *Zakah* Foundation of America, *Zakah* foundation of India, BAZIS (*Badan Amil Zakat Infaq Shadaqah*) Indonesia. Muslims believe that *Zakah* is the solution for ending global world poverty. Based on this fact, several questions arise concerning the dialogue of life between Christian Liberation Theology and Muslim, such as can Liberation Theology consider Islamic solution or suggestion for a poverty case, or vice versa? Can Muslims consider that Liberation Theology has full-value related to the solution of poverty, or vice versa? Can Liberation Theology accept the solution which based on Qur'anic consideration?

However, to come together is not easy. Many questions still need further explanation, such as although Christianity and Islam seem to have many similarities, do both religions have the same concept of poverty? Are both religions in the same page when they are talking about poverty? Do Christianity and Islam give the same solution for the poverty in practical steps? If their solutions are different, can people see that other religious teachings, for instance, have a good solution for eradicating certain cases of poverty? If Christians and Muslims believe that their religious teachings are the best in understanding of poverty as well as providing its solution, what kind of dialogue can they offer? Thus, Christians and Muslims have to realize that conflict is likely to happen when people 'push' their own solution of poverty. However, although it is uneasy, to come together is need in our pluralistic world and the above questions are the challenge for Christians and Muslims to work together and to find the best and concrete answer to the problem of poverty.

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# PASTORAL GUIDELINES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SEMARANG 1984-2020

Establishing a Civilized Culture of Charity

*Joko Wicoyo*

## 6.1 Introduction

This article explores Pastoral Guidelines (hereafter “PG”) of the Archdiocese of Semarang (*Arah Dasar Keuskupan Agung Semarang*): 1984-2015 and the Blue Print of the Archdiocese of Semarang (*Rencana Induk Keuskupan Agung Semarang*, hereafter *RIKAS*): 2016-2035. Archdiocese of Semarang is an archdiocese located in the city of Semarang, Central Java, Indonesia. Its ministerial coverage is including the vicarages of Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Kedu, Purwokerto.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> It is a condensed form of: (1) Volume commemorating the 70th anniversary of Archdiocese of Semarang (Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Buku kenangan 70 tahun Keuskupan Agung Semarang*. [Semarang: Keuskupan Agung Semarang, 2011], 63). English translation is from the author; (2) Floribertus Hasto Rosariyanto, “Wajah Gereja Keuskupan Agung Semarang, Sebuah Upaya Penelusuran Sederhana Surat-Surat Gembala Mgr. Suharyo 1997-2009,” in *Gereja yang melayani dengan rendah hati: bersama Mgr. Ignatius Suharyo*, ed. Emanuel Martasudjita (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009), 21–26.; (3) Gregorius Budi Subanar, *Menuju gereja mandiri: sejarah Keuskupan Agung Semarang di*

archdiocese was established and named as the Apostolic Vicariate of Semarang on June 25, 1940, received the mandate from the Apostolic Vicariate of Batavia. It was transformed into the Metropolitan Archdiocese of Semarang on January 3, 1961.

Thanks to the service and hard work of Father Frans van Lith, a Dutch priest, Catholicism has been established in Semarang and Central Java since 1896. He was not only taking care the spreading out Church's message, but also took advantage to study the culture and customs of Javanese.<sup>2</sup> He moved to Muntilan, far southern of Semarang, in the hamlet of Semampir in 1897. He was renowned for his ability to synchronize Roman Catholic teachings with that of *Kejawen*<sup>3</sup> in order to extend the acceptance of Christianity among the Javanese societies. Initially his effort to spread Catholicism did not produce a satisfying result, but through perseverance, the result of his effort bore fruit. A surprise turn of events occurred in 1903 when Sarikrama, a Javanese, his father-in-law, a hamlet chief, and three of the latter's staff members came from the Kalibawang area to meet Jesuit Father Franciscus van Lith in Muntilan and told him that they wanted to become Catholics. The five men were baptized on May 20, 1904, at St. Anthony Church in Muntilan, Central Java. Barnabas Sarikrama and his father-in-law then introduced Catholicism to other people in Kalibawang. Pope Pius XI

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*bawah dua uskup, 1940-1981* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Universitas Sanata Dharma, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> Subanar, *Menuju gereja mandiri*, 47.

<sup>3</sup> *Kejawen* is spiritualism movement based on local roots of Javanese philosophy. It is not institutionalized religion, it is more about cultural lesson and way of life, which could be adopted by any follower of formal institutionalized religion. The basic lesson of *Kejawen* is totally surrender to God as the source of everything (*Sangkan paraning dumadi*) and living harmoniously with all living and non living things of this universe (*Memayu hayuning bawono*). The derivative of both lesson could be derived from any religious lesson or moral teaching. The Javanese love to do fasting as movement to sense the ascetic (*Laku pasa*) and solitary meditative act to sense the personal space with self (*Laku tapa*) (see Petir Abimanyu, *Mistik kejawen: mengungkap rahasia hidup orang Jawa*, 2014).

recognised Sarikrama's work by awarding him the *Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice* papal medal. Sarikrama was the first Indonesian to receive the pontifical medal of honor.

Thanks to their efforts, more people from *Kalibawang* embraced Catholicism. On Dec. 14, 1904, a group of 178 Javanese were baptized at *Semagung* hamlet, between two trees called "*Sono*" by Father Franciscus van Lith. Bishop Edmundus S. Luypen, Apostolic Vicar of Batavia (1898-1923) and Jesuit superior, regarded the baptisms as a clear sign of the fruitfulness of Father van Lith's evangelization method. Since that baptized event, the place that is nowadays called Sendangsono, which is located in Muntilan, Magelang District, Central Java, near the border of Yogyakarta Special Province and Central Java Province has become the place for pilgrimage. What Father Franciscus van Lith baptized a group of 178 Javanese is perceived as the birth of the Catholic Church among the Javanese people because this location became the first place of the baptism of the 178 Javanese people who embraced Catholicism for the first time.

Realizing the differences in cultural situations between Batavia/West Java and Central Java, and for the sake of Catholic Church development, Pope Pius XII established the Apostolic Vicariate of Semarang as a diocese on August 1, 1940. A diocese is the district or viewed under the pastoral care of a bishop. It is divided into parishes. In the structural Catholic Church hierarchy, a diocese is an administrative territorial unit administered by a bishop. It is also referred to as a bishopric or Episcopal area, though strictly the term Episcopal refers to the domain of ecclesiastical authority officially held by the bishop, and bishopric to the post of being bishop. The diocese is the key of geographical unit of authority in the form of church governance known as Episcopal polity. After establishing the Apostolic Vicariate of Semarang as a diocese, Pope Pius XII appointed Albertus Soegijapranata its apostolic vicar. He was the first native bishop of Indonesia, who is well known for his

motto, “Be 100 percent Catholic, and 100 percent Indonesian.” He led Archdiocese of Semarang for 24 years (1940-1963).

Soegijapranata made a lot of changes which were related to the performance of Indonesian Catholic Church. The period after independence was still a dark period for the Vicariate Apostolic of Semarang.<sup>4</sup> There were still many problems which had to be faced like bad condition of the missionaries after their release from Japanese camp; tension among the religion members, mostly missionaries because of different opinions about the independence of the new country or leadership of apostolate activity; the mission buildings which had been destroyed during the war and some building which were occupied by the new authority; pastoral care of the faithful; and some other problems like the lack of Christian knowledge for the Catholics, the weakness of the Catholics in the faith and in the spirit since they were childhood and other serious problems, those were poverty and illiteracy.

Related to bad condition of the missionaries, Soegijapranata maintained Major Seminary Saint Paul Yogyakarta as a means for formatting intellectual and spiritual formation of the native priests. This was necessary as the priest would become the representative of the bishop to teach, to sanctify and to lead the faithful. The commitment of Mgr. Soegijapranata to the intellectual formation of the native priest was expressed in the program of sending native priests to do advanced studies. Soegijapranata had to confront different opinions about the independence of the new country which was divided into two groups: those who agreed and those who did not agree with the independence of Indonesia, Soegijapranata supported the independence of the new country. Therefore, the spirit of nationalism was his concern from the time he had decided to support the independence of Indonesia. Even

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<sup>4</sup> Gregorius Budi Subanar, *The Local Church in the Light of Magisterium Teaching on Mission: A Case in Point, the Archdiocese of Semarang-Indonesia (1940-1981)* (Rome: Pontificia università gregoriana, 2001), 176–92.

since the beginning to be a priest, Soegijapranata had decided to serve the nation as completely as possible, and at the same time, he devoted his life to serve God.<sup>5</sup> That is why even as a bishop, he invited the Catholics to integrate the two values of Christianity and nationalism. That is why he is well known for his prominent motto, “Be 100 percent Catholic, and 100 percent Indonesian.”

Associated with pastoral care of the faithful and some other problems related to nationalism and Catholicism, Soegijapranata called for the faithful to recover them through establishing organization, collecting books, arts and deeds, liturgical ceremonies, and families’ duty to the children, fighting against the effects of the war, and calling people not to be egoists. Through his efforts, it is clear that at least there was strategy to give pastoral service for the faithful through intellectual formation, organization, family, catechesis, sacraments, and art.

Archbishop Soegijapranata, SJ passed away on July 22, 1963 at the Sisters of Divine Providence convent in Steyl-Tegelen, Netherlands. As the policy of the Indonesian President, he was buried in the Giri Tunggal hero cemetery Semarang, Central Java, under the nationally ceremony on July 30, 1963. A year later, the Indonesian government declared him a national hero and a title as military general. He led Archdiocese of Semarang for 24 years (1940-1963). The successor of Albertus Soegiyapranata was Archbishop Justinus Darmayuwono.

Justinus Darmayuwono led Archdiocese of Semarang for about 18 years (1963-1981). He was elected as Semarang Archbishop on June 26, 1967. He became the first Indonesian Cardinal. During his leadership, Archdiocese of Semarang was divided into four Episcopal Vicariates: those were Semarang, Kedu, Surakarta, and Yogyakarta. Cardinal Darmoyuwono died on February 3, 1994 and he was buried in Muntilan, Cenral Java.

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

After Cardinal Justinus Darmoyuwono passed away, Archdiocese of Semarang led by Mgr. Julius Darmaatmadja, SJ. He led Archdiocese of Semarang for 12 years (1984-1996). He developed pastoral care of Archdiocese of Semarang based on Pastoral Guidelines of 1984-1990 and 1990-1995; He explicitly formulized the pastoral direction of Catholic Church based on the PG of 1984-1990 and 1990-1995. He focused his pastoral care of Archdiocese of Semarang as the Church of which spirit involved deeply in the joys and hopes, the sorrow and anxieties of the women and men of this age, especially those who are poor or any way oppressed, the sorrow and anxieties of the followers of Christ as well.<sup>6</sup> He was installed Cardinal and moved to Jakarta to replace Jesuit Archbishop Leo Soekotjo.

After Mgr. Julius Darmaatmadja left Semarang, Archbishop Ignatius Suharyo Hardjoatmodjo,<sup>7</sup> a Diocesan priest, had led Archdiocese of Semarang from April 21, 1997 to November 12, 2009. He continually developed pastoral care by socializing Pastoral Guideline of 2006-2010 and empowering the people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang to be accustomed with Pastoral Guidelines in implementing their faith in their life activities in pluralistic society. Inspired much by Second Vatican Council, Ignatius Suharyo Hardjoatmojo empowered and encouraged Archdiocese of Semarang to realize itself to be the Church as the life communion of community where the faithful gather together to see vision of their Church by introducing the mental model of Catholic

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<sup>6</sup> Rosariyanto, "Wajah Gereja," 22.

<sup>7</sup> Ignatius Suharyo Hardjoatmojo was born on July 9, 1950 in Sedayu Yogyakarta, ordained as Priest of Archdiocese of Semarang, January 26, 1976, appointed as Archbishop of Semarang, Indonesia, April 21, 1997, Ordained the Archbishop of Archbishop of Semarang, Central Java, Indonesia August 22, 1997. January 2, 2006 he was appointed as Military Bishop of Indonesia, and July 25, 2009 he was appointed as a Coadjutor Archbishop of Jakarta, Indonesia. On November 12, 2010, he succeeded as the Archbishop of Jakarta and the Chairman of Indonesian Bishop Conference (Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia-KWI).

Churches in Archdiocese of Semarang that is “the church as an event” (“*Gereja sebagai peristiwa*”).<sup>8</sup>

The Church as an event can be verbalized in a very simple term: “If Christians gather inspired by their faith and they work cooperatively in empowering the marginalized that is the Church. If Christians gather inspired by their faith and they work cooperatively in facilitating clean water for the poor that is the Church. The Church is not a religious institution which has its good organizational structure, but the Church is living.”<sup>9</sup>

In 2009 Ignatius Suharyo was moved to Jakarta to replace Jesuit Archbishop Cardinal Julius Riyadi Darmaatmaja, SJ who was retired. His successor was Mgr. Johannes Pujasumarta. He had led Archdiocese of Semarang from November 12, 2010 to November 10, 2015. He passed away in November 10, 2015.

During his leadership, he asked Catholic people of Archdiocese of Semarang to strengthen the spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood with their neighbors.<sup>10</sup> He wanted Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang to live peacefully among their pluralistic society. He asked the Catholics to develop the spirit of distribution with their neighbors, to take care of with the people who are helpless, voiceless, suffer, marginalized and who get many problems of life because of injustice treatment. By exercising the spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood, the

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<sup>8</sup> Rosariyanto, “Wajah Gereja,” 20.

<sup>9</sup> “*Kalau dibicarakan secara sederhana dalam konteks hidup kita sekarang, kita dapat berkata begini: kalau orang Kristiani berhimpun dengan inspirasi iman, untuk bersama-sama berusaha memberdayakan masyarakat yang tersisih, itulah Gereja; kalau orang Kristiani berhimpun dengan inspirasi iman untuk mengusahakan tersedianya air bersih, itulah Gereja, bukan pertama-tama Gereja yang organisasinya teratur rapi, melainkan Gereja yang hidup*” (quoted in Floribertus Hasto Rosariyanto, *Bercermin pada wajah-wajah keuskupan Gereja Katolik Indonesia* [Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2001], 303).

<sup>10</sup> Dewan Karya Pastoral Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Nota Pastoral Tentang Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 2011-2015: Gereja Yang Signifikan Dan Relevan* (Muntilan: Pusat Pastoran Sanjaya, 2011), iv–vii.

existence of Catholic Church becomes relevant and significant for its surrounding society.

## 6.2 Spirit of Second Vatican Council

The Second Vatican Council<sup>11</sup> brought a big renewal change which includes theological, liturgical and pastoral aspects for Archdiocese of Semarang. The Second Vatican Council is a Copernican revolution which includes the Eucharist as the center of the Church and its ecclesiology.<sup>12</sup> Influenced much by the Second Vatican Council, especially the Canon Law of the Second Vatican Council: *Lumen Gentium*<sup>13</sup> and *Gaudium et Spes*,<sup>14</sup> Cardinal Justinus

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<sup>11</sup> It is also known colloquially as *Vatican II*, addressed relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the modern world. It was the twenty-first Ecumenical Council of the Catholic Church and the second to be held at St. Peter's Basilica in the Vatican. It opened under Pope John XXIII on October 11, 1962 and closed under Pope Paul VI on December 8, 1965. Preparations for the Council took more than two years, and included work from 10 specialized commissions, people for mass media and Christian Unity, and a Central Commission for overall coordination. These groups, composed mostly of members of the Roman Curia, produced 987 proposed constituting sessions, making it the largest gathering in any council in church history. (This compares to Vatican I, where 737 attended, mostly from Europe.) Attendance varied in later sessions from 2,100 to over 2,300. In addition, a varying number of *periti* (Latin: "experts") were available for theological consultation—a group that turned out to have a major influence as the council went forward. Seventeen Orthodox Churches and Protestant denominations sent observers. More than three dozen representatives of other Christian communities were present at the opening session, and the number grew to nearly 100 by the end of the 4th Council Period. It closed under Paul VI on December 8, 1965 (Robert Hardawiryana, *Dokumen Konsili Vatikan II* [Jakarta: Dokumentasi dan Penerangan KWI & Obor, 1993], v–xvii).

<sup>12</sup> Subanar, *The Local Church*, 246.

<sup>13</sup> *Lumen Gentium* is a Dogmatic Constitution on the Church which solemnly promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on November 21, 1964 and one of the principal documents of Second Vatican Council which consists of eight chapters. Chapter I is about the Mystery of the Church, Chapter II: On the People of God, Chapter III: On Hierarchical Structure of the Church and in Particular on the Episcopate, Chapter IV: The Laity, Chapter V: The Universal Call to Holiness in the Church, Chapter VI: Religious, Chapter VII: The

Darmojuwono<sup>15</sup> as Archbishop of Semarang who joined in the fourth session of Second Vatican Council caught insight that *Gaudium et Spes*

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Eschatological Nature of the Pilgrim Church and Its Union with the Church in Heaven, and Chapter VIII: The Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God in the Mystery of Christ and the Church and an Appendix from the Acts of the Council (Hardawiryana, *Dokumen Konsili Vatikan II*, 65–158).

<sup>14</sup> *Gaudium et Spes* (*Ecclesiastical Latin: Joy and Hope*) is the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. It is one of the four Apostolic Constitutions resulting from the Second Vatican Council. The document is an overview of the Catholic Church's teachings about humanity's relationship to society, especially in reference to economics, poverty, social justice, culture, science, technology and ecumenism. Approved by a vote of 2,307 to 75 of the bishops assembled at the council, it was promulgated by Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965, the day before the council ended. As it is customary with Catholic documents, the title is taken from its incipit in Latin: "*Gaudium et spes, luctus et angor hominum huius temporis, pauperum praesertim et quorumvis afflictorum, gaudium sunt et spes, luctus et angor etiam Christi discipulorum...*" "The joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted, are the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well" (Pope Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes* [*Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*] [Washington: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1965]; Michael J. Walsh and Brian Davies, eds., *Proclaiming Justice & Peace: Papal Documents from Rerum Novarum through Centesimus Annus* [Mystic, Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1991], 157–220).

<sup>15</sup> He was born into a Moslem family, the third of six children of the Suradikara family. His father was the chairman of Kliwonan village in Godean, Sleman, Yogyakarta. He finished his Elementary school in his village, then in 1931 he went to the *Normaalschool* at Xavier College, Muntilan. In 1932, he was baptized in Muntilan at the Xavier College. Graduated from the *Normaalschool* at the Xavier College in 1935, Darmojuwono went to the Minor Seminary in Yogyakarta. In 1941, he entered to the Major Seminary in Yogyakarta. During the Japanese occupation (between: 1942-1945), he studied Philosophy together with other seminarians in Yogyakarta. He was ordained on May 25, 1947 by Mgr. A. Soegijapranata. After his ordination he worked at the Minor Seminary in Ambarawa and in Ganjuran, Bantul, Yogyakarta. At the same time, in 1948, he became the parish priest of Ganjuran, and in 1950, he became the parish priest of Klaten, Central Java besides he was a military chaplain. In 1952 he had baptized his father. In 1954 he studied Missiology at the Gregorian University in Rome. Before leaving for Rome, he baptized his mother. Thereafter he became the parish priest of Purbayan, Surakarta, Central Java. On August 1, 1962 he became the parish priest of Cathedral Randusari, Semarang. At the same time he was the Vicar General of Archdiocese of Semarang, and on December 23, 1963 he was elected as Archbishop of Archdiocese of Semarang. He was consecrated as the Archbishop of Semarang on April 6, 1964. In the Consistory of June 26, 1967, he was created a Cardinal by Pope Paul VI, and given the titular Church of

(The Church in the Modern World) was the most important Catholic Church's documents. He wanted to socialize some important values of those documents in Archdiocese of Semarang. He wanted to promote the concept of the Church "*gereja yang mengummat, mandiri dan bersahabat*" (the Church which is immersed among the people in societal life, independent and full of friendliness)<sup>16</sup> which manifests in faith, hope and charity in a concrete situation, while that Church is still aware of being a part of the universal Church. He concerned deeply to realize the Church of the poor which is inspired by the core values of Catholic Social Teachings which took care of some matters related to lifting life and dignity of human person, solidarity, subsidiary, distribution and preferential option for the poor and vulnerable.<sup>17</sup> He wanted to scrutinize some important document of the Catholic Church's social tradition through the "signs of the times" in the light of the Gospel.

Since the beginning of his episcopate, Cardinal Justinus Darmojuwono was deeply expressed by the development program of the Indonesian government.<sup>18</sup> The Cardinal had desire to unite the dynamics of his Archdiocese to the dynamics of the nation.<sup>19</sup> He said: "In

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the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary at via Lata, Roma a deaconry elevated *pro hacvice* to a presbytery title. During his episcopate, the Cardinal became the President of the Indonesian Bishops Conference from 1964-1979. He joined in the fourth session of Second Vatican Council. He became the bishop of the Army from 1964-1984. On July 3, 1981 he resigned his pastoral governance of the Archdiocese. Since October 31, 1982 he became a parish priest in a new parish, Santa Maria Fatima, Banyumanik, Semarang. He died on February 3, 1994 (Subanar, *The Local Church*, 235-36).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 247.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 248-55.

<sup>18</sup> See TAP MPR No. IV/MPR/1978, *Tentang Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (Broad Guide Lines- the Decree of MPR (The Indonesian People Assemmlly), No. IV/MPR/1978 *about Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (State Broad Guide Lines) which illustrate short, middle and long term (one year, five years and twenty five years ) of the State Broad Guide Lines of the development of Indonesia which cover the concept of the development in *IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM* which stands for ideology, politics, economy, social and cultural matters, and security defense.

<sup>19</sup> Subanar, *The Local Church*, 284.

accordance with the dynamics of the nation in a development program to find their identity and their ability to strive for self-sufficiency among the other nations, the faithful have also an ideal to strive for self-sufficiency.”<sup>20</sup> He formulated this strong will clearly in his letter commenting on the five year Development Program of the Indonesian Government by saying:”While we work with all our capacity, in the spirit of serving the state, society and all the people, as the realization of our obedience to God, let us unite ourselves in one group as the group of the development for the success of the five development program to realize the ideal of the just prosperous society, simultaneously to glorify God.”

Inspired much by five development program of the State Broad Guide Lines of the Indonesia government, the Cardinal was eager to establish and issued Pastoral Guidelines for Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang. The aims were to direct and encourage the disciples of Jesus Christ in Archdiocese of Semarang possess mature faith by understanding deeply the core values of Catholic Social Teachings (hereafter CSTs)<sup>21</sup> then exercising their faith in their daily life activities. Those values of CSTs which the Cardinal wanted to socialize are honoring the fundamental dignity of each human being, declaring the Church’s solidarity and subsidiary to both those who suffer and to those who would comfort the suffering in their society. Those core values should be appeared in various messages, but never

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<sup>20</sup> A pastoral letter of Advent of Cardinal Justinus Darmoyuwono dated December 15, 1972 in (ibid., 285).

<sup>21</sup> CST is a body of doctrine developed by the Catholic Church on matters of poverty and wealth, economics, social organization and the role of the state. Major lessons of CSTs are: The Dignity of the Human Person, the Dignity of Work, the Community and the Common Good, Rights and Responsibilities, Option for the Poor and Vulnerable. Solidarity and Care for Creation. But according to Pope John Paul II, the foundation of CST rests on the threefold cornerstones of human dignity, solidarity and subsidiary (Edward P. DeBerri and James E. Hug, *Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret*. [New York: Orbis Books, 2005], 18–34).

neglecting the basic principle that is the Eucharist which becomes the centre of the community. The form of pastoral care should be concentrated in families which become the pillars of faithful life of society. There are four aspects which became the concerns of Cardinal Justinus Darmojuwono to represent Catholic Churches in Archdiocese of Semarang. They are the churches of the People of God, the Church of the poor (LG 26), and the Church which is based on the families (LG 11), and the Church as communion (LG 22).<sup>22</sup>

Preserving from previous narrative description, there some important things which can be outlined to describe the role of Cardinal Justinus Darmajuwono, in the context when he was the Archbishop of Semarang.<sup>23</sup> They are (1) his active participation in the process of Second Vatican Council which inspired and encouraged him to introduce and apply the core values of the constitutions and decrees of Second Vatican Council in Archdiocese of Semarang; (2) His efforts to socialize some important values of Second Vatican Council in Archdiocese of Semarang by promoting the concept of the Church “*gereja yang mengummat, mandiri dan bersahabat*” (the Church which is immersed among the people in societal life, independent and full of friendliness) which manifests in faith, hope and charity in a concrete situation, (3) His deeply concern to realize the Church of the poor which is inspired by the core values of Catholic Social Teachings which took care of some matters related to lifting life and dignity of human person, solidarity, subsidiary, distribution and preferential option for the poor and vulnerable, (4) His enthusiasm to apply the concept of Five Year Development Plan (*Pembangunan Lima Tahun, PELITA*) based on the ideology of Pancasila as the form of pastoral guidelines for Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang. He was the leader of the Indonesian Catholic Church which had just started to increase the native

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<sup>22</sup> Subanar, *The Local Church*, 246–48.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 235.

clergy and native religious members in the process of the indigenous self-sufficiency, *Indonesianisasi*.

## **6.3 Pastoral Guidelines**

Up to 2016, the Pastoral Working Council on behalf of Archdiocese of Semarang has already issued seven Pastoral Guidelines (PGs). Those are PG of 1984-1990, 1990-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and 2016-2020.<sup>24</sup> Those seven Pastoral Guidelines (1984-2020) have four similarities. Those similarities are (1) their structures; (2) the characteristic of the church which will be enacted; (3) the ideal faith which will be expressed and carried out in society; (4) the quotation of the verse to end the structure of Pastoral Guidelines.

### **6.3.1 Structure**

Structurally, those six PGs are interconnected tightly each other. As a running system, every period of PG has similarities. Those similarities are (a) the ideals and the matters of concern which become the characteristics of each period of PG which should be continuously struggled, realized and implemented by Archdiocese of Semarang and Catholic communities in Archdiocese; (b) the matters of concern which

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<sup>24</sup> Dewan Karya Pastoral Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 1984-1990* (Semarang: Keuskupan Agung Semarang, 1984); *Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 1990-1995* (Semarang: Keuskupan Agung Semarang, 1990); *Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 1996-2000* (Semarang: Keuskupan Agung Semarang, 1995); *Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 2001-2005* (Semarang: Keuskupan Agung Semarang, 2001); *Nota Pastoral Tentang Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 2006-2010* (Muntilan: Pusat Pastoran Sanjaya, 2006); *Nota Pastoral Tentang Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 2011-2015: Gereja Yang Signifikan Dan Relevan*; *Nota Pastoral Tentang Arah Dasar Umat Allah Keuskupan Agung Semarang 2016-2020: Membangun Gereja Yang Inklusif, Inovatif Dan Transformatif Demi Terwujudnya Peradaban Kasih Di Indonesia* (Muntilan: Pusat Pastoran Sanjaya, 2016).

become priorities of every PG and are developed accordance with the local situation and culture in order to be pervasive (*merasuk*) in societal life where Catholic communities live; (c) the paradigm of pastoral work which becomes the strategy of the implementation of the ideal faith which its highlight makes the faithful integrally enlightened, involving women and men, empowering the communities of hope, developing co-operation with all those of goodwill, preserving the integrity of creation and (d) the closing which quotes the verse from Philippians 1:6.

### **6.3.2 Characteristics**

The characteristics of the Church of Archdiocese of Semarang can be perceived from the following discourses:

- a. The people of God<sup>25</sup> which is becoming the subject which will be enacted, achieved, and become the role mental model of Archdiocese of Semarang; Pastoral Guidelines of Archdiocese of Semarang: 1984-2020 were the general pastoral directions of Archdiocese of Semarang and the verbalizations of the mental models of Archdiocese of Semarang which has been stored in the long memories of its Archbishops who have been much influenced by Javanese culture of Central Java and Yogyakarta's society. They are the verbalizations of the core values of Catholic Social Teachings, Second Vatican Council, and the Gospel. The objectives of PG of 1984-2020 are guiding and directing the Catholic people of Archdiocese of Semarang to walk in the right

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<sup>25</sup>“*Umat Allah*.” This discourse appears: (a) seven times in PG of 1984-1990 (once at the first part: Ideal, twice at the second part: Matters of Concern, four times at the third part: Hierarchy Leadership..., and once at the fourth part: Continuing the resent development; (b) once at PG of 1990-1995: the first paragraph; (c) once in PG of 1996-2000: at the first paragraph; (d) twice in PG of 2001-2005: at the first and the third paragraph; (e) four times in PG of 2006-2010: once at the first, second, third and fourth paragraph; four times in PG of 2011-2015: once at the first, second, third and fourth paragraph, three times in PG of 2016-2020: once in the first, second and fourth paragraph.

track in implementing their faith after they have succeeded in “*necep sabda Dalem, neges karsa Dalem, and ngemban Sabda Dalem* (listening and welcoming the words of God, contemplating and discerning the God’s Will, and exercising and implementing the words of God). Their faith become more mature, responsible, missionary and committed in implementing their faith in pluralistic society. PG of 1984-2020 is a means of exercising and implementing Archbishop’s authority and power. PG of 1984-2020 are powerful guidance which are aimed to reinforce and empower the faith of Catholic people to become dynamic in implementing their faith which has been enacted from their consciousness towards lifting the life and dignity of human person, solidarity, subsidiarity, distribution and preferential option for the poor and vulnerable accordance with local situation and culture without ignoring the sign of the time in pluralistic society. PG of 1984-2020 becomes powerful shield of the Catholics of Archdiocese of Semarang in defending the spirit of nationalism and Pancasila which have been declining days by days.

Furthermore, PG of 1984-2020 is the verbalization of the ideals of Archdiocese of Semarang which focuses in proclaiming the Church as an event, and the words of God which manifest in faith, hope and charity in the context of Indonesian Churches: *Gereja yang mengummat, mandiri, bersahabat dan murah hati* (the Church which engages with societal life activities, independent, full of friendliness and generosity). PG of 1984-2020 are the verbalization of the ideals of Archdiocese of Semarang which represent the Catholic Church as the Church of the poor, the Church of the family, the Church of communion of communities which are inclusive, innovative., transformative and open in dialogues, and the Church which is preserving the integrity of

creation. PG of 1984-2020 is dynamic Pastoral Guidance which verbalizes the new paradigm of life of Catholic people of Archdiocese of Semarang that is establishing “the new habit” in their ways of thinking, feeling, behaving and conducting in fighting against corruption, violence and environment destruction in order to establish the civilized culture of charity in Indonesian society which is prosperous, humanistic and faithful.

One becomes a member of the people of God is not only by a physical birth, but by being “born a new,” a birth “of water and the Holy Spirit that is by faith in Christ, and Baptism” (John 3:3-5). In Christian theology, Holy Spirit is believed to perform specific divine functions in the life of the Christian or the church. The action of the Holy Spirit is seen as an essential part of the bringing of the person to the Christian faith. The new believer is “born again of the Spirit.” The Holy Spirit enables Christian life by dwelling in the individual believers and enables them to live a righteous and faithful life.

- b. Fully mature faith with local situation and culture, significant and relevant, inclusive innovative, and transformative become the matters of concern of PG of 1984-2020; Fully matured and missionary faith which is pervasive in society which is depicted for the first time in the first paragraph of the formula of PG of 1984-1990 becomes ideal goals and mental model which should be achieved by the people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang as their highest achievement and as the Archdiocese which belongs to universal church. Those are depicted clearly in the texts of PG of 1984-1990. It elaborates that being pious, Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang should have four dimensions of life: fully matured faith, responsible, committed and possessed missionary faith and the faith which is pervasive in society. It can be outlined that text of PG of 1984-1990 which is verbalizing

“fully matured faith, responsible, committed and possessed missionary faith and the faith which is pervasive in society”, has already presented the mental model of Archdiocese of Semarang. The people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang has already exercised this mental model which has been stored in their long-term memory since Justinus Darmojuwono (1963-1981) who proposed that ideal after his arrival from attending the fourth session of the Second Vatican Council. He had caught insight *Gaudium et spes* (The Church in the Modern World), *Lumen Gentium*, the values of CSTs, and the Gospel as well as the development of the local situation and culture of the Indonesian society.

Having matured and missionary faith which emerged from the understanding the notion of the core values of Catholic Social Teaching, Second Vatican Council and Gospel consciously led them (the people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang) have powerful power and high encouragement to spread their experiences of living and staying with Jesus. This narrative description is the result of analysis of applying the concept of power.<sup>26</sup> Power is exercised rather than possessed. It is actualized in action and activities in togetherness, even like a battle where the participant should compete each other for winning the battle. The effect, then, spread in unlimited areas. In this sense, power cannot be localized. It occurs in whatever social relations between one and another. In other word, the people of God in Archdiocese of Semarang are ready to spread the Gospel (good news). It implies that missionary faith encourages the people of God to work together with whoever is open and ready to spread out the Gospel and to whoever is closed is ready to spread out the

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<sup>26</sup> Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 26.

rightness, sacredness and goodness. To whomever whose faith is secured is encouraged to develop their faith stronger. Having missionary faith, inclusive, innovative, and transformative the disciples of Jesus should realize towards their duties to spread out the Gospel and become the witness of the life of Jesus in their societies and being an apostle of temperance. The form of being an apostle of temperance can be very responsible and committed in: (a) teaching the Gospel, (b) develop and encourage others to be good, right and sacred, not to be tempted to do bad things and (c) can influence their societal environment more humanistic, friendly and love each other based on the Gospel in order their faith is relevant and significant for their surrounding society. All of these elements are depicted strongly in the first part/paragraph of Pastoral Guideline of 1984-1990.

- c. Developing the communion of communities<sup>27</sup> of the disciples of Jesus Christ, which is inspired by the Holy Spirit<sup>28</sup>, in realizing the Kingdom of God<sup>29</sup> that is liberating which its implementation is based on the consciousness of preserving the integrity of creation, uplifting the dignity of human person, involving actively in creating a new habit and overcoming corruption, violence, and environmental destruction.

Those religious discourses describe that the typical characteristic of the church or the mental model which will be established and developed by Archdiocese of Semarang is the church which has been led by Jesus, guided by the Holy Spirit in the course of arriving at the Kingdom of God and as the disciples of Jesus

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<sup>27</sup>“*Pengembangan persekutuan paguyuban-paguyuban.*” This discourse appears twice. It is expressed at the second paragraph of PG of 2001-2005 and at the first paragraph of PG of 2006-2010.

<sup>28</sup>“*Roh Kudus.*” This discourse appears twice. It is in the texts of PG of 2001-2005, and in PG of 2006-2010.

<sup>29</sup>“*Kerajaan Allah.*” This discourse appears once in PG of 1996-2000; once in PG of 2001-2005; twice in PG of 2006-2010.

Christ as the communion of communities of either the members of the Indonesian society or the Indonesian Catholic Church which wants to enact the Church of the poor (LG 26), the Church which is based on the families (LG 11), and the Church as communion of communities (LG 22).

The people of God is a discourse which is becoming the subject which will be achieved, and become the ideals of Archdiocese of Semarang that wants to realize itself as Archdiocese of the people of God who are faithful in the line with local situation and culture; fully matured faith, responsible and committed, independent; missionary faith to those who are open ready to promulgate Jesus/Gospel, to those who are closed, ready to promulgate the truth, righteousness and sacredness, and to those who are faithful attempting to promote them to become good people whose faith is pervasive in society, rooted in societal life inspired by Christian spirit/values in realizing the Kingdom of God.

### **6.3.3 Ideal Faith**

The ideal faith of the people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang was described for the first time in PG of 1984-1990. Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang who possess missionary faith should be responsible, committed, and independent; it is described that the people whose characteristics are open are ready to promulgate Jesus/Gospel, and to those whose characteristics are closed, are ready to promulgate the truth, righteousness and sacredness, to those who are faithful attempting to promote them to become good people whose faith is expected to be pervasive in society, rooted in societal life and inspired by Christian spirit and values. That ideal faith is affirmed and preserved by PG of 1990-1995. It is stated that: “Archdiocese Semarang, in line with the development of the local situation and culture, wish to fully and

more closely follow Jesus Christ in responding to and proclaiming His good news of salvation”. If PG of 1984-1990, the meaning of ‘faith’ is not fully described; on the other hand, in PG of 1990-1995, the meaning of ‘faith’ is described more clearly: “more closely to follow Jesus Christ in responding to and proclaiming His good news of salvation”.

That ideal faith is repeatedly stated more firmly in PG of 1996-2000 by formulating the ‘ideal faith’ as follows: “The people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang in line with the development of the local situation and culture wish to fully and more closely follow Jesus Christ in responding to and proclaiming the Kingdom of God through their full faith and opening themselves and experiencing His divine presence either in all prayers, deeds, or daily events.” This description is narrated that faith as a divine experience will encourage people to express and realize it.” It describes clearly that formula of ‘faith’ shows the consequences “more closely to follow Jesus Christ” and opening themselves and experiencing His divine presence either in all prayers, deeds, or daily events; faith as a divine experience becomes their power and encourages them to express, realize, exercise and implement it in their daily life activities. This ideal faith is sharpened in PG of 2001-2005. It is depicted in the first paragraph: “The people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang, guided by the Holy Spirit, are striving to follow Jesus Christ in proclaiming the Kingdom of God that is liberating.

Following Jesus Christ means opening ourselves and experiencing His divine presence either in all prayers, daily events and participating in His mission. This narrative describes that the people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang are challenged that following Jesus Christ fully is not only done by guided the Holy Spirit but they must open themselves, and experience His divine presence either in all prayers, daily events and participating in His mission. Holy Spirit is becoming

“Divine Power” and must be realized to be their consciousness in exercising and implementing His God’s Will in their daily life activities. PG of 2006-2010 formulates “the ideal faith’ is similar with the formula stated in PG, 2001-2005, but there is an additional formula in realizing the Kingdom of God, by defining: “The people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang, guided by the Holy Spirit are striving to become communion of faith communities of the disciples of Jesus Christ in realizing the Kingdom of God that are liberating (Luke 4:18-19). By realizing the Kingdom of God means having a good relationship with God, uplifting the dignity of human persons, and preserving the integrity of creation.”

After perceiving from the previous description of PGAS of 1984-2015 which have been issued since 1984, it can be summarized that PGAS of 1984-2015 have similarities in formulating the formula of “ideals”, that are directed to the ideals of Archdiocese of Semarang. Archdiocese wants its people of God to acquire faithful faith in the line with local culture; fully matured, responsible and committed, independent, and pervasive in society, rooted in societal life inspired by Christian spirit and values. Archdiocese of Semarang wants to establish the faith of community of communion in the line with universal ideals of human beings and become “the salt and the light” of the world guided by the Holy Spirit, in realizing the Kingdom of God that are liberating and surrender the success of their work to God, as God who has begun the good work among them will continue to complete it (Philippians 1:6). This closing reminds the people of God who succeeded in carrying out their duties from proud attitude. In carrying out their duties successfully they are reminded that there is power which helps them succeed, that is God. It is not the people, but God who will continue to complete it (the work of the people of God).

## 6.4 Establishing Civilized Culture of Charity

Archdiocese of Semarang ended PG of 2011-2015 by issuing Pastoral Note for People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang 2016-2020, Establishing the Church which is inclusive, innovative and transformative for the sake of the realization of Civilized Culture of Charity in Indonesia (“*Nota Pastoral Arah Dasar Umat KAS 2016-202, Membangun Gereja yang Inklusif, Inovatif dan Transformatif demi Terwujudnya Peradaban Kasih di Indonesia*”).<sup>30</sup> This PG of 2016-2020 is the first part of *Rencana Induk Keuskupan Agung Semarang (RIKAS) 2016-2020*, the Blue Print of the Main Body of Archdiocese of Semarang, 2016-2035 which was established and issued to be a coincidence with (*bertepatan dengan*) The Year of Merciful Jubilee (*Tahun Jubileum Kerahiman Allah*) on 8 December, 2015. Archdiocese of Semarang wants to begin its new history by determining its will to exercise the Blue Print of the Main Body of Archdiocese of Semarang (*Rencana Induk Keuskupan Agung Semarang or RIKAS*): 2016-2035. *RIKAS* will become the Pastoral Guideline for the next 20 years to welcome the year of 2033, the Greatest Jubilee, in commemorating 2000 years of crucifying Jesus.<sup>31</sup>

*RIKAS* is a strategic pastoral plan of the People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang, and it is as a means of Pastoral right tract of Archdiocese of Semarang to realize the mission of Catholic Church. *RIKAS* is a kind of the discernment of the People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang in realizing the Church as a communion of faith community, hope and charity which its centre is Jesus.<sup>32</sup> *RIKAS* is a starting point to mark the new history of Catholic Church in its long course which has been built hand in hand with the history of Indonesia,

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<sup>30</sup> Dewan Karya Pastoral Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Nota Pastoral 2016-2020*.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

especially in its involvement with societies of Central Java and Yogyakarta. Archdiocese of Semarang wants to show that its existence and the involvement of Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang are still relevant and significant for the Indonesian society. Catholic Church as the communion of faith community, hope and charity wants to work hand in hand with the Indonesian society which will revitalize the core values of Pancasila in the era of globalization which science and technology influence much the life of Indonesian society.<sup>33</sup> People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang want to be inclusive, innovative and transformative. They are willing to work together with all people and never give up to empower themselves by welcoming all good things. They want to be very adaptable with all changes in all aspects of life in order to be better.<sup>34</sup> They want to develop themselves to be smart, powerful, and having missionary faith and building dialogues among communities of faith, especially in the group of families and their surrounding neighbors, and other different communities of faith. They want to develop the spirit of civilized culture of charity to empower the helpless, voiceless, powerless, poor, marginalized and disable in order to make them be more prosperous, humanistic and faithful. The People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang are asked to be the agents of social changes.<sup>35</sup> They are asked to realize the spirit of mission in four ways; those are saying prayers, giving alms, sacrificing and being a witness.<sup>36</sup>

People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang as the disciples of Jesus are also asked to take a part in their sacred duties to spread the good news (the Gospel) about the Kingdom of God (Mark 1:16; Luke 7:22) by being the agents of social changes. St. Paul describes the Kingdom of

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<sup>33</sup> This narrative is expressed in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Guideline.

<sup>34</sup> Dewan Karya Pastoral Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Nota Pastoral 2016-2020*, 3.

<sup>35</sup> This narrative is expressed in the third paragraph of the Guideline.

<sup>36</sup> Dewan Karya Pastoral Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Nota Pastoral 2016-2020*, 6.

God as it is, “For the Kingdom of God is not a matter of eating and drinking, but of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit” (Romans 14:17).

The first principle is righteousness which can be spelled out as justice in Christian teaching. Justice can be understood as the right relationship which leads to better life relationship with God, among human beings and all God’s creations. Those relationships are based on taking care for others who are suffering and becoming the victims of injustice. The second is peace. In Christianity, peace can be understood as the good atmosphere in all aspect of life. Every person can develop his or her talent, will and activity in peaceful atmosphere, without any hatred. Every person can live and work hand in hand in peaceful situation without any threat. The third is joy. It is the essence of God’s grace which becomes the first priority and it is paid attention by God. Therefore, the Kingdom of God involves the concrete life of the dignity of human beings.

#### **6.4.1 Vision and Mission of RIKAS<sup>37</sup>**

The vision of *RIKAS* is the realization of civilized culture of charity in Indonesian society which is prosperous, humanistic and faithful, whereas the missions of *RIKAS* are: (1) developing life quality of the Catholics, especially the Catholics who are poor, powerless, voiceless, helpless, marginalized and disables. Most of them are famers, workers, fishermen, and small class enterprises; (2) developing participation of the faithful (*umat*), either female or male in struggling public policies which are just and civilized, preserving environment as a good place for living together and preserving local culture and wisdom; (3) forming

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<sup>37</sup> Dewan Karya Pastoral Keuskupan Agung Semarang, *Rencana Induk Keuskupan Agung Semarang 2016-2035: Menyongsong Yubilium Ter-Agung 2035, Terwujudnya Peradaban Kasih Dalam Masyarakat Indonesia Yang Sejahtera, Bermartabat Dan Beriman* (Semarang: Keuskupan Agung Semarang, 2015), 31.

sustainable faithful and integrated formation which is smart, powerful, missionary and diagonal; (4) establishing comprehensive and integrated education of which vision and mission are based on the core values of Pancasila, the philosophical and moral principle of the state; (5) developing and encouraging cooperation with all levels in society and in all aspects of society which are related to social welfare, the dignity of human persons, and faith.

#### **6.4.2 Strategy<sup>38</sup>**

To make those missions are successful, there are many strategies to carry out. First strategy is developing the charisma and talents of the faithful, either their intellectual, emotional, spiritual or physical aspects, regardless of their gender. Second strategy is developing cooperation among the laymen, religious leaders and priests in categorical and territorial levels. Third strategy is paying attention to pastoral family which is concentrated on the age level and special groups. Fourth strategy is empowering church service units by encouraging them to possess the spirit of solidarity, independence, subsidiary, and decentralization. The fifth strategy is employing completely the riches of inter intellectuality, technology, and infrastructures in managing the services of the Church. The sixth strategy is employing and empowering sources of academics, finance, organization and culture. The seventh strategy is developing cooperation with others in all aspects of life, in all aspect of level in society either in home or foreign counties, and eighth strategy is empowering the spirit of Indonesian by developing the spirit of pluralism based on the humanism, and social justice according to the core values of Pancasila, the philosophical and moral principle of the state.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 31–32.

**6.4.3 Implementation**

*RIKAS* will become the Pastoral Guideline for the next 20 years, started from the beginning of 2016. *RIKAS* is a strategic pastoral plan of the People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang, and it is as a means of Pastoral right tract of Archdiocese of Semarang to realize the mission of Catholic Church which covers Vision, Mission, Strategy, Inspirations, Prediction, Outcome, Milestones, Assumption, Risks and Taglines.<sup>39</sup>

The following is the plan of the outcome of Roadmap of *RIKAS* 2016- 2035:

ROAD MAP I 2016-2020	ROAD MAP II 2021-2025	ROAD MAP III 2026-2030	ROAD MAP IV 2031-2035
An inclusive, innovative and transformative Church	A mystical and a politically informed Church	A happy, inspiring, and a prosperity promoting Church	A civilized, charitable, prosperous, humanistic and faithful Church

**6.5 Closing Remarks**

After discerning the analysis of Pastoral Guidelines of Archdiocese of Semarang 1984-2015 through description, interpretation and explanation which start from Pastoral Guideline of 1984-1990 and finish in Pastoral Guideline of 2011-2015, it can be concluded that:

1. Pastoral Guidelines of Archdiocese of Semarang (PGAS) of 1984-2015 are the general pastoral directions of Archdiocese of Semarang. PGAS of 1984-2015 are the mental models of Pastoral Care of Archdiocese of Semarang which have been stored in the long memories of Archbishops and as a means of Archbishops of Archdiocese of Semarang in exercising and implementing their

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

authority and power through their pastoral care. The Pastoral Care focuses in proclaiming the Church as an event, and the Words of God which manifest in faith, hope and charity in the context of Indonesian Churches: *Gereja yang mengummat, mandiri bersahabat dan murah hati* (the Church which is immersed among the societal life, independent, full of friendliness and generous), and Catholic Church which represents the Church of the poor, the Church which is based on the family and the Church as the communion of community. PGAS of 1984-2015 are the results of the consciousness of the Archbishop of Archdiocese of Semarang in perceiving the core values of CSTs, the Second Vatican Council (hereafter SVC), and the Gospel. They are verbalized in well defined directions in implementing the faith of Catholic people in pluralistic societal life accordance with local situation and culture inspired by the core values of SVC, Catholic Social Teachings (CSTs) and the Gospel. PGAS of 1984-2015 are the real pictures of the dynamic progress of the ideals of Archdiocese of Semarang and Catholic people's faith which is developed dynamically accordance with local situation and culture and their consciousness towards lifting life and dignity of human person, solidarity, subsidiary, distribution and preferential option for the poor and vulnerable. Their deep consciousness towards universal values makes their missionary faith to be more mature, responsible and committed in exercising their faith. They become powerful power to promote the truth, righteousness and sacredness to other people in order to become good people whose faith is pervasive in society, rooted in societal pluralistic life inspired by Christian spirit or values. PGAS of 1984-2015 become powerful shield of the people of God of Archdiocese of Semarang in defending the spirit of nationalism and Pancasila which is declining days by day in the era of globalization when

information technology and sciences influence much the life of the Catholics. These make the Catholic Churches in Archdiocese of Semarang establish and develop themselves and their Churches to be the churches of communion of faith communities which are inclusive, innovative, transformative and open in dialogues.

2. Because PGAS of 1984-2015 contain dynamic religious discourses, the core values of Second Vatican Council (SVC), Catholic Social Teachings (CSTs), the Gospel and have important role, relevance and significance for the life of Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang, Pastoral Guideline which was enacted for the first time in 1984 is reviewed, evaluated and issued every five years. The aim is to reinforce and empower the faith of Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang to be more mature, trustworthy convicted and having high self confidence in every place, whether they are in the Church, in street, in the working place or among others to show their good way of living and sources of securing the faith of Catholic adherents. They are relevant and significant to become the simple, practical and ethical Pastoral Guidelines for Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang. They are enriching and reinforcing the faith of Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang that has been assumed still insufficient in exercising their sacred duties in the era of globalization which is full of challenges and struggles in all aspects of life. PGAS of 1984-2015 are relevant because their existence is meaningful and having high compatibility with local situation and culture. PGAS of 1984-2015 verbalize the core spirit of the dynamic and powerful faith of the people of God in Archdiocese of Semarang. PGAS of 1984-2015 guide and direct people of God in Archdiocese of Semarang to walk in the right track in implementing their faith after they have succeeded in

“*necep Sabda Dalem* (listening and welcoming the words of God), *neges Karsa Dalem* (making contemplation and discerning God’s Will), *ngemban Dhawuh Dalem* (exercising God’s Will). They have been enriched by their deep consciousness towards the deep understanding of Gospel, CSTs and local situation and cultures which have been planted, watered and maintained tightly deep in their hearts as soon as they were baptized in the name of the Father, in the Son and the Holy Spirit. Being more faithful, it is enriched and empowered by being the members of the communion of faith communities of the Disciples of Christ and by attending Eucharist habitually, listening to the reading and homily to get spiritual experience and finally it becomes powerful capital to exercise their fully mature and trustworthy faith in their daily life activities in their pluralistic society.

3. To empower the faith of the People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang, Pastoral Working Council of Archdiocese of Semarang, issued *Rencana Induk Keuskupan Agung Semarang or RIKAS: 2016-2035* at the beginning of 2016. By issuing *RIKAS*, Archdiocese of Semarang wants to begin its new history in establishing civilized culture of charity in Indonesia especially in Central Java and Yogyakarta. *RIKAS* will become the Pastoral Guidelines for the next 20 years. *RIKAS* is a strategic pastoral plan of the People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang, and as a means to realize the mission of Catholic Church which is inclusive, innovative and transformative for realizing the civilized culture of charity in Indonesian society, which is prosperous, humanistic and faithful. *RIKAS* is a kind of the discernment of the People of God of Archdiocese of Semarang in realizing the Church as a communion of faith community, hope and charity. Archdiocese of Semarang wants to show that its existence and the involvement of Catholic people in Archdiocese

of Semarang are still relevant and significant. *RIKAS* verbalizes the new paradigm of new life of Catholic people in Archdiocese of Semarang in implementing their mature, responsible, missionary faith in realizing the civilized culture of charity in Indonesian society which is prosperous, humanistic and faithful.

## 6.6 References

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## SEEDS OF GENDER EQUALITY WITHIN ISLAM

Abū Shuqqa's Approach to Hadith on Women's Liberation

*Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir*

### 7.1 Introduction

Over the past three decades feminist and progressive Muslims have severely criticized the hadiths as sources of patriarchal Islam and dismissed them from their project of gender equality. On other side, contemporary clerics still utilize the hadiths to perpetuate traditional interpretations of Islam that conceptualize the ideal female Muslim identity as completely invisible from public domain. However, many other scholars seem uneasy with these discriminatory interpretations without disregarding authority of Hadith. They prefer rather to circumvent the seemingly harsh element of literal meanings of the hadiths and attempt to find out an ethical message to draw a conclusion in a friendlier interpretation to women.

In line with this interpretative approach to the hadiths is the work of 'Abd al- Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa (1924-1995), *Tahrīr al-Mar'a fī 'Aṣr al-Risāla* (The Liberation of Women at the Time of the Prophecy, 1990). This work came out in early 90s of Egypt that witnessed a considerable number of books bringing conservative tendency against

women; calling them back to home, forbidding them from work, banning them from politics, and imposing an ideal model of a sex segregated society.<sup>1</sup> This work is the biggest collection of the hadiths that has ever been written to deliberately criticize those conservative interpretations and to provide inspiring interpretative examples that later influence many Islamists to hold more favoring position to women's rights.<sup>2</sup>

## 7.2 Abū Shuqqa: A Moderate Scholar

Abū Shuqqa is “moderate scholar” who uses religious interpretations to revise and redeem internal conditions of Muslim. Born in 1924 in Cairo, he received a traditional religious education from mosques close to his house. He graduated from the Fuad First University, the former of Cairo University, from the Department of History. He was impressed and influenced by the reformist thoughts of Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Ḥasan al-Bannā (1928-1949), Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākīr (1892-1958), Muḥammad al-Khiḍr Ḥusayn (1876-1958), and Muḥib al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (1886-1969). He also read western philosophy and admired French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) and German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He worked in Qatar and had a chance to live in Kuwait. He moved back to Cairo in 1974 and died in 1995.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mūnā Abū al-Faḍl, *Al-Mar’a Al-‘Arabiya Wa Al-Mujtama’ Fī Qarn; Taḥlīl Wa Bibliografiya Li Al-Khiṭāb Al-‘Arabī ḥawl Al-Mar’a Fī Al-Qar Al-‘Ishrīn* (Dimashq; Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 2001), 120–122.

<sup>2</sup> Muḥammad Salīm al-‘Awwā, *Al-Islāmīyūn Wa-Al-Mar’ah* (Al-Manṣūrah: Dār al-Wafā’, 2000), 13–14; Jenny Berglund, “Global Question in the Classroom: The Formulation of Islamic Religious Education at Muslim Schools in Sweden,” *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 32, no. 4 (2011): 505–508.

<sup>3</sup> On his biography see Wail Mirza, “Qirā’a Fī Kitāb Taḥrīr Al-Mar’a Al-Muslima Fī ‘Aṣr Al-Risāla Li Al-Ustādz ‘Abd Al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa,” *Majalla Al-Rashād*, December 1997; al-‘Awwā, *Al-Islāmīyūn Wa-Al-Mar’ah*; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, “‘Abd Al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa; Rajul Mabādi’ Wa

During his settlement in Kuwait, in 1967-1973, Abū Shuqqa set up a publishing house and establishing the International Journal “al-Muslim al-Mu’āṣir”. In this Journal, Abu Shuqqa conveys his ideas about the magnitude of the crisis experienced by the Muslims’ thought. The crisis, according to him, was due to stagnation in blindly holding the past tradition and excessive hatred against Western civilization. He also launched a critique of Islamic movements which began to grow, tending to be exclusive, focusing mostly on trivial moral issues, and paying attention not to the development of knowledge which is a prerequisite for the progress of a nation. Unlike major trends of Islamic movements, to Abū Shuqqa, a great attention should be paid to intellectual rather than moral crisis, and to cultural rather than political problems.<sup>4</sup>

In Cairo, Abū Shuqqa joined a group of thinkers and professionals known as advocates of moderate Islam (*al-wasaṭiyya*). In 1981, along with lawyer Kamāl Abū al-Majd and, he formulated a manifesto of “contemporary Islam” (*al-Islām al-Mu’āṣir*).<sup>5</sup> In this manifesto, Islam is regarded as basis for reconstruction of a new Islamic civilization. It encourages Muslims to take lessons from a wide range of knowledge and experience given by modern civilization in all fields, social, political and economic. The current democratic system, in general, is part of the Islamic value. Positive law in Egypt largely does not need to be replaced because it is in conformity with the spirit of the Islamic law. All citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women are equal in the eyes of

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Qiyam La Rajul Makāsib Wa Maṣāliḥ,” in *Naqd Al-’Aql Al-Muslim* (Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Qalam, 2001), k–kh; Riḍā ‘Abd al-Wadūd, “‘Abd Al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa Wa Tahṛīr Al-Mar’a Fi Aṣr Al-Risāla,” *Haṣād Al-Fikr*, November 2003, 109–114; Ashraf ‘Īd al-’Antabaly, “‘Abd Al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa: Riḥla Jihād Fi Al-’ilm Wa Al-Tarbiya,” *Ikhwanwiki*, n.d., accessed March 5, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> ‘Abd-al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa, “Khawāṭir ḥawl Azma Al-’aql Al-Muslim Al-Mu’āṣir,” *Al-Muslim Al-Mu’āṣir*, 1974, 12–28; ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa, “Khawāṭir ḥawl Azma Al-Khuluq Al-Muslim Al-Mu’āṣir,” *Al-Muslim Al-Mu’āṣir* 1–2 (1975): 41–74.

<sup>5</sup> Ahmad Kamāl Abū al-Majd, *Ru’ya Islāmiyya Mu’āṣara: I’lān Mabādi’* (Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Shurūq, 1991).

Islam. Their civil rights, then, must be guaranteed by the state constitution.

### **7.3 Gender Equality within Islam**

The only book published during his life is the *Tahrīr* favoring women's rights and advocating gender equality. The main elements of his interpretation can be identified in four themes: the humanness of women; a non-segregated society as an ideal Muslim community; the active agency of women in public activities; and mutuality and reciprocity in all matters related to spousal relationship, including sexual intimacy.

He suggests that his work is a form of liberation of women in Islam that differentiates from and redeems conservative interpretation. In his account, liberation is to free women from burden of oppressive and discriminatory interpretations, substituting with more promoting teachings of Islam toward humanity of women and equality of gender relationship. However, though Abū Shuqqa is very critical against the conservative interpretation, he is not part of progressive movement for gender justice within Islam.

Unlike the progressives, Abū Shuqqa still opines that women are primarily at home, but they should have equal rights to education, economics, social, and politics. In order to make wider opportunities for women to enjoy their rights in the public, men are encouraged to do domestic matters at home. Men and the entire society are also, according to him, obliged to provide comfortable conditions through which women may enjoy their activities in public.

Although he still agrees with basic rules of marriage of the traditional interpretation, the nature and tone of Abū Shuqqa's presentation is different. Cognizant of the potential abuse of husband's authority within traditional concept of marriage, he emphasizes on the

purposive principle of the rules, which in turn eclipses the shape of male authority. He argues further for importance of imposing the principle of partnership in reestablishing new interpretations on marriage. For this reestablishment, the notion 'helping each other among the spouse' is the most obvious moral injunction that forms new shape of marital relationship in his interpretation. This principle is brought in every stage of the journey of marital relationship, since proposal of marriage until repudiation.

He calls for reasonable minimum age of marriage and requires girl's consent for marriage. It regulates practice of polygamy and divorce under supervision of the judge in order to assure that women's rights are not violated. He opines that women and the whole family should be consulted before practicing polygamy in order not to harm them. Generally, he attempts to ameliorate the functioning of the family through curbing men's abuses of their authorities, particularly divorce and polygamy, and men's neglect of their duties, especially support of wife and children. In term of sexual desires and needs, Abū Shuqqa sees that women and men are both the objects and the subjects in the same time one to another. In this regards, he opines that female genital mutilation (*khitān*) is harmful and forbidden in Islam.

Thus, in general, Abū Shuqqa's interpretation does not aim at the root of unequal gender relations, but it has shed misconceptions about women prevalent among many Muslims and offers a more reciprocal relationship between sexes. Thus, his interpretation is not progressive as it still maintains traditional division of gender roles and his egalitarianism does not allow and does not encourage the maximum participation of each member of society. He attempts to be in the middle way of "moderate" between the conservative and the progressive Muslims.

## 7.4 Hadith as Source of Interpretation

Abū Shuqqa's project on Islamic gender equality is established on the revivalist element referring back to Qur'an and Hadith. Unlike some reformist Muslims who attempt to disregard and lessen authority of Hadith on their project of Islamic reformism,<sup>6</sup> Abū Shuqqa relies most of his work on the Hadith. For his concern is mostly interpretation, Abū Shuqqa does not make any discussion on the issue of authentication. He just follows judgment of texts as valid (*ṣaḥīḥ*), fair (*ḥasan*), and weak (*da'īf*) hadiths made already by classical scholars such as al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dawud, al-Turmudhī, and Ibn Ḥajar, and even by contemporary cleric Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī.

Indeed, in the *Tahrīr*, there are many sources on which Abū Shuqqa bases his interpretation to advocate his notion of gender equality (*musāwā*). They are verses of Qur'an, texts of Hadith, classical scholars' comments on a hadith being discussed, facts of the past history relate to the subject, opinions of the classical and contemporary scholars on an issue being discussed, as well as expert's analysis on the context of contemporary social changes. However, texts of the Hadith literatures are primary sources in the *Tahrīr* while the others are complementary.

There are 2,697 hadiths referred by Abū Shuqqa in the *Tahrīr*.<sup>7</sup> The most of this number is coming from the two sources, the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī and the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, as it reaches up to 2,117, or 78.49 %

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<sup>6</sup> See Daniel W. Brown, *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>7</sup> Personally I registered those amount of 2,697. The issue is rather about locations and organization in the *Tahrīr* where Abū Shuqqa referring the hadiths in his interpretation. Many hadiths are repeated more than once and in my accounting each repeated hadith is treated as a single hadith. I also considered other narrative as single hadith that incorporated by him into the main hadith quoted. But when he referred to a long hadith, which he broke it into fragments, I considered it one quotation of hadith. Moreover, if he referred to certain opinion of an authority such as Ibn Ḥajar to clarify the meaning of a hadith in question, and the authority further associate it with other hadith/s, these hadiths are not considered by me.

of the total hadiths of the *Tahrīr*. He quotes also 212 texts from collections of the Four Sunans; Abū Dāwud, al-Turmudhī, al-Nasa’ī, and Ibn Mājah. It is about 7.86 % from the total. The rest is 368 texts, or 13.64 %, quoted from many sources out of the Six Books (*al-Kutub al-Sittah*) and from different genres, *hadīth*, *tafsīr*, *fiqh*, *sīra*, *ṭabaqāt*, *tārikh*, and even *taṣawwuf*.

## **7.5 Interpretative Approaches to Hadith**

The whole attempt of his interpretative approach to the hadiths is, first of all, characterized with his acknowledgement of male biases within prevalent traditional interpretations, thereby, seeking strategies of centering women, particularly by mainstreaming the notion of partnership, mutuality, and reciprocity. He also acknowledges that the field research on women is very important to reproduce contemporary interpretations of the hadiths on gender issues.

There are at least five methods observed in the *Tahrīr* in approaching the hadiths for gender equality. First, he includes experiences of the female Companions as religious authority to which Islamic teachings on gender relations should refer. These experiences, according to Abū Shuqqa, represent the origin prophetic guidance on gender relations. He names these experiences as “practical and applied ḥadīths” (*al-ahādīth al-‘amaliya al-taṭbīqiyya*) on relationship between men and women in diverse aspects of life.<sup>8</sup> He also attributes prophetic guidance (*hady al-nabī*) to the deeds of ‘Āisha, Umm Ḥarām, and Zaynab bint Jaḥsh.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, he alludes that there are *Sunna* of the Prophet and of the early women of Islam.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> ‘Abd-al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa, *Tahrīr Al-Mar’a Fī ‘Aṣr Al-Risāla; Dirāsa “an Al-Mar’a Jāmi’a Li Al-Nuṣuṣ Al-Qur”ān Wa Ṣaḥīḥay Al-Bukhārī Wa Muslim* (Al-Kuwayt: Dār al-Qalam, 1990), I: 28.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, I: 28–31.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, II: 35.

Second, he treats Qur'an and Hadith as united texts which have a coherent meaning. He enjoins them in formulating the prophetic guidance of gender equality and justice. If a hadith is, as long as authentic, found contrary to the principle it should be read in multiple meanings until it becomes coherent to the principle. This contradicting text is not subject of dismissal. It should not be implemented in contrary sense against the principle too. Rather, it needs serious attempt of continuous questioning to dig up meaning that is truly coherent to the principle. Having this approach, a hadith can be interpreted in the light of Qur'an, such as a hadith that bans female leadership. A verse of Qur'an also can be interpreted within practices of the Prophet, such as the verse on wife beating.

Third, he reorganizes the hadiths in newly themes of chapter headings in which women are become visible, knowledgeable, having good characteristics, and shown as active participants of domestic and public activities. The familial life is also presented in much more favorable to perspective of partnership between women and men. All of these themes are observed in the chapter headings of the hadiths in the *Tahrīr*. This approach to the hadiths is known in classical scholarship as *tarjamah al-abwāb*.

Fourth, being Arabic as gendered language and that stories are mostly structured in male expression, he calls to "hermeneutics of equality" to include women as the subjects. This hermeneutic operates in two indispensable features, wakening consciousness of discriminating context of the text and moving to that of "equalizing" understanding of it as well. Having this, he counters the traditional hermeneutics that puts onus only to women to be responsible of everything regarded as religious deviation. He calls to balance the meaning by means of centering women in the stories of the text.

Of the hadith that "Many amongst men reached (the level of) perfection but none amongst the women reached this level except Asia,

Pharaoh's wife, and Mary, the daughter of 'Imran'"<sup>11</sup> for instance, Abū Shuqqa introduces very creative and inspiring interpretation.

He explains this hadith that the nature of being elevated into religious perfection (*al-kamāl*) is initially embedded in both men and women. He clarifies that the little number of noble women stated in the report above is not because they are women, but because the society where they live encourage them to have other duties considered as not part of "religious perfection", such as having pregnant, giving birth, rearing child, and taking care of all familial matters. In such condition, women are not prepared by the society to be elevated into the state of religious perfection. He urges to open spaces, equally, to women as we do to men for this elevation into the perfection. He also proposes "such female activities" to be considered religiously possible elevator through which one may reach her perfection. We will not see noble women otherwise.

Fifth, he suggests the principles-based reinterpretation of the conflicting and problematic hadiths (*mukhtalaf wa mushkil al-aḥādīth*) on gender issues. In Islamic scholarship, conflicting problematic hadith is often defined as an accepted hadith that apparently contradicts to the principles or other authoritative text, so it needs serious attempt to avoid from its literally alluded understanding. In the *Tahrīr*, on the ground of the principle of human dignity, independency, and responsibility of women, Abū Shuqqa makes interpretative attempts of problematic hadiths; by limiting the scope of meaning only for certain context not for generalization, taking the metaphorical meaning, focusing on the main message that ethically binds Muslims, and applying the inclusive meaning of other subject in partnership.

The famous hadith of al-Bukhārī: "*After me, I have no left fitna [trial or affliction, etc.] more harmful to men than women*"<sup>12</sup> is explained by

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<sup>11</sup> Muḥammad ibn Isma'īl al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī* (Al-Qāhira: Jam'īyya al-Maknaz al-Islāmī, 2000), II: 672, hadith no. 3447.

Abū Shuqqa that temptation is not exclusively coming from women. Since many texts prescribe possibility of temptation by members of family, wealth, social status, and many others, emphasizing on women is obviously oppressive and discriminatory. Abū Shuqqa regrets that female temptation is often exaggerated by many conservatives to restrict women from activities that initially are lawful in Islam.

## 7.6 Conclusion

Linda Clark (2003) regrets the progressives neglecting the Hadith and letting it harvested by the conservatives, while reinterpretation of it is still possible for gender equality. Here as above discussed, Abū Shuqqa applies approaches to have meaningful interpretation of the hadiths for Muslim women living in this modern era. Moreover, I suggest that through the approaches to the hadiths, four strategies of centering women are observed in the *Tahrīr*, i.e. centering women in the stories of Hadith; appreciating domestic role of women; dissolving bodily and spiritual acts as both regarded as parts of religious experiences; and dissolving private and public activities.

In conclusion, the *Tahrīr* has instigated on how the hadiths can be the basis to claim necessary social recognition of Muslim women's roles in both private and public spheres. Since Hadith remains important for religious experience of modern Muslims, Abū Shuqqa's approach to Hadith greatly deserves appreciation and discussion through which equal relationship between women and men can be advanced in their contemporary daily lives. Yet the extent of his egalitarian Islam is debatable, his *Tahrīr* provides Hadith-based hermeneutical spaces to counter prevailing traditional patriarchal interpretations of Islam.

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, III: 1064. See also the hadith in IHN, 21.

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## RELIGION ON SMS

### Phenomena of Islamic Prayer (*doa*) on SMS

*Benny Baskara*

#### 8.1 Introduction

Nowadays, advertisements in media for Islamic prayer (*doa*) offered by SMS, - usually daily prayer (*doa harian*) by certain *ustadz* (Islamic religious figure), can easily be found. This kind of advertisement will intensively proliferate in the special period or moments in Islam such as Ramadan or fasting month. Considering that in Ramadan, Muslims will be “more religious” than in other months, this advertisement will be more intensively displayed.

It should be admitted that the advancement of technology is really helpful and beneficial for us, but it also can change our habitual actions, including religion. Religion can employ and benefit from technology as a means to distribute and spread its values and teachings. Even religion and technology can be intertwined, forming a strongly-bound combination that Susan George (2006) called techno-religious unity. She formulated the notion of unity of religion and technology based on her view of the similarities between religion and technology in the sense of transcendence, meaning, and human construction. Both religion and technology deal with the effort to transcend human life across our

present boundaries and possibilities, to search for the essential meaning of human life, and—to some extents—both of them are considered as part of the construction of human beings, themselves.

Moreover, the advancement of technology itself can produce, or reproduce, another reality often called “hyper-reality,”<sup>1</sup> “simulacra,”<sup>2</sup> or “post-reality.”<sup>3</sup> The digital era also produced “cyberspace”, another space considered as a “virtual world”. All aspects of our life can be reproduced in this kind of reality, including religion. We live in the cyberspace realm—including our religious behaviour—and it will change and become a realm of “cyberspace religion”.

The differentiation of the term “religion on” and “religion in” when it is related with cyberspatial realm was first introduced by Karaflogka when she discussed religion and cyberspace.<sup>4</sup> What she meant by “religion on” cyberspace refers to “information uploaded by any institutionalized or non-institutionalized religion, church, individual or organization, which (information and the uploader) also exists in the off-line (real) world.” “Religion in” cyberspace can also be called cyberreligion. It is defined as “a religious, spiritual, and/or metaphysical expression, which is created and exists exclusively in cyberspace, where it enjoys a notable degree of virtual reality.” Based on those definitions, then, here “religion on SMS” is used to depict the religion that will be observed (that is Islam) as it exists in the “real world” and not merely as a cyberspace religion that only exists in virtual reality. However, more or less, Islam also employs the advances of technology to provide

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<sup>1</sup> Umberto Eco, *Travels in Hyper Reality: Essays* (London: Picador, 1986).

<sup>2</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, trans. Phil Beitchman (New York City, N.Y.: Semiotext(e), Inc., 1983).

<sup>3</sup> Yasraf Amir Piliang, *Postrealitas* (Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Anastasia Karaflogka, “Religion on – Religion in Cyberspace,” in *Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular, and Alternative Futures*, ed. Grace Davie, Linda Woodhead, and Paul Heelas (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2003), 191–202.

information and spread its teaching, in this case by the employment of cellular technology with SMS (Short Message Service).

In the contemporary era of globalization and free markets, everything can be considered as a commodity to be commercially used in the marketplace, to be sold or to be bought. Even the marketplace is created when a new invention or advancement can be considered as a commodity, or commodification. Everything and every aspect in our life can be commoditized in the free market era, including knowledge, information, technology, service, and also religion. Greg Fealy clearly portrayed the phenomena of the commodification of Islam in Indonesia.<sup>5</sup> According to him, various kinds of products carrying “Islam” as their label such as Islamic banking, Islamic insurance, Islamic share index in stock exchange, Islamic books, magazines, and newspapers, and also the use of digital media technology, such as Islamic-themed ringtones and screensavers. Other examples include Islamic cyber-preaching and spreading Islamic teaching (*dakwah*) in the form of internet websites, television broadcasts, CDs and other media, including cellular SMS.

However, in the view of Geertz, religion itself is already a symbolical realm, something that he called “really real.”<sup>6</sup> His definition of religion is “a system of symbols ... formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with an aura of factuality that ... seem uniquely realistic.” His definition indicates that religion itself is a “constructed symbolic reality” that exists beyond the true reality. It is then related to the concept of “hyper-reality” or “simulacra”, although in a different context, but at least it shows that the

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<sup>5</sup> Greg Fealy, “Consuming Islam: Commodified Religion and Aspirational Pietism in Contemporary Indonesia,” in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 15–39.

<sup>6</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

“reality” beyond true reality is possible and it is created based on true reality itself.

Several questions result from the brief descriptions mentioned above. Can religion and religiosity really operate in cyberspace or a virtual world? Does religion match the characteristics of another reality described by various theoreticians or philosophers? Is there any relationship between religion in another reality and the concept of religion as a symbol and the other reality itself? The aim of this paper is to describe the phenomena of Islamic prayer on SMS in view of three concepts about “another reality” by three theoreticians (Baudrillard, Eco, and Piliang) above, and seeks to connect the description with Geertz’ concept of religion.

## 8.2 Overview on Cyberreality

The great transformation in the beginning of this millennium was the formation of a new world as a result of the advancement of science and technology. In this new world, various kinds of definitions and understanding about what is called reality are created. In this new kind of reality, signs no longer represent reality, representations are no longer related to the truth, and information no longer contains objectivity. This world is the new world that has been built based on the various kinds of distortions of reality, free-playing of signs, deviations of meaning, and pseudo-meaning. The birth of this new world marked the metamorphosis of human beings into the condition of what is called *post-reality*. The post-reality condition is the condition where the principles of reality have been surpassed, or beyond its principles, in the sense that it was taken over by its substitutions that were created artificially by the advancement of science, technology, and art, which also deconstructs conventional assumptions about “the real.”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Piliang, *Postrealitas*, 53.

According to Yasraf A. Piliang, the term “post-reality” offers open space for interpretation. The term “post” itself can mean “opposed to”, “separation from”, “discontinuity of”, “rupture”, “turning point”, “something beyond” or “surpassing.” However, in this sense, he used the term “post-reality” to describe the condition of the taking over of the reality itself by something that before it was called non-reality. On the one hand, through the advancement of science and technology in creating artificial reality, the post-reality world offers various kinds of new experiences, exploration, and exciting panoramas that never happened before. On the other hand, artificial reality also pulled out what had been called natural reality before, such as the inclination of human beings to the aura, originality, and exoticism of nature, cultural heritage, and spiritual forces that had been the fascinations of life. Then, when those natural realities disappear and are taken over by artificial reality, man will be trapped in the isolation of artificial reality that is the reality of all that is superficial, immanent, and ostensible. Man cannot seem to go back to natural reality, cultural richness, and the deep of transcendental experience.<sup>8</sup>

The description of the new world leads to ontological questions about being and reality. Ontology as a subject deals with questions about being, existence, world, and reality. But what is the reality in the new world when everything is merely a realm of representation? That’s what is called an image. The ontological effort to understand this reality cannot be separated with the understanding of image in its relation to the world and reality. The essential problem behind phenomena of the modern world is the situation that reality itself was overwhelmed by images created by man. Images become reality, even becoming man’s worldview. The role of science and technology change the face of the world, even changing and controlling man’s worldview itself. This is the phenomena called “ontology of image”, which means that “being” in the

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

world is occupied and overwhelmed by its image or representation, and in a world that is overwhelmed by ontology of image, the representation itself is considered as “the real.”<sup>9</sup>

Images, therefore, are considered as living beings. Images can change, develop, and transform. Images also have their own history. Images have birth, maturity, death, and even rebirth. The development of information and technology constructing images even changed the view and definition of image itself. Images, then, are unified with the technology that created them. With such a condition and development of images, a new discipline has emerged called “imagology”. Imagology deals with the development of images and the creation and technology of imaging in radio, television, video, internet, satellite, surveillance, and holography which creates the world in which existence depends. Imageology then deals with the creation and employment of images, in order to create the *image of reality*, which in the end it can be considered as *reality itself*, but actually is no more than a phantasmagoria.<sup>10</sup>

One of the most obvious examples of image as hyperreality is holography, which is described by Umberto Eco.<sup>11</sup> Holography is a wonderful invention of laser technique which can display images similar to reality. Holography can display colorful representations in more than three dimensions. Just look at the light box and then a miniature of the object is displayed. When the view is shifted, details of the object can be observed which is impossible based on the real law of perspective. Holography is well-proliferated in America—the place where Eco visited to observe it—the country that Eco thought very obsessed with realism. In this country, for a reconstruction to obtain credibility, it must have the most iconic characteristic, perfect imitation, or the “real copy” of represented reality.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 84–85.

<sup>11</sup> Eco, *Travels in Hyper Reality*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 1–2.

The effort for reconstruction in full-scale—with the same material and color, even gives more shine, gloss, and protection from weaknesses. It—also means that in receiving historical information, it must accompany the aspect of reincarnation. Constantly, all of them depict the average imagination and taste of Americans; that the past must be preserved and celebrated in the form of authentic full-scale copy, philosophy of eternity as a duplication. It dominates the relation with the self, the past, history, and the present. To describe everything considered as “real”, all things must seem “real” also. Absolute reality, at last, will be identified with absolute falsity. Absolute non-reality will be displayed as the present reality. The purpose of the reconstruction is to provide a “sign” that at last it will be forgotten. In this sense, the sign played a role to be “something”, to remove a distinction from its referent, a replacement mechanism not toward image of the event, but toward its “plaster cast”. In other words, toward its imitation. The reason for this “traveling to hyperreality” is to give an example of how Americans long for the real thing and to reach that goal, the absolute falsity must be created. When the borderline of the game and the illusion become blurred and falsity is enjoyed as a “contentment situation”, then it will raise the “*horror vacui*”, or the “horrible emptiness.”<sup>13</sup>

The “reality” beyond reality itself was investigated by Jean Baudrillard, and he called it “simulacra” (simulacrum in the plural form). He stated three orders of appearance, including counterfeit, production, and simulation. Only simulation he called “pure simulacrum”, which does not duplicate others as models, but rather duplicates itself and only this kind of simulation can be included in hyperreality. Hyperreality then is a true product of simulations, because simulation does not need representation. Representation needs

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 30–31.

something outside to refer. Simulation does not refer to something outside itself, it refers to itself.<sup>14</sup>

His explanation of phenomena “beyond reality” lead to the field of radical and complex thoughts about reality, which he called “extreme scene”, where everything develops, grows, and proliferates with high speed and thus is able to transcend all boundaries. With the advancement of technology, reality can be simulated and the model can surpass its reference which creates “artificial reality”. Facts are no longer reality because facts exist beyond reality itself and that existence also surpasses the concept of existence itself. Our concepts and knowledge, therefore, are no longer appropriate to understand these phenomena. Baudrillard offers the solution with the knowledge he called “pataphysics”. He describes this knowledge as “imaginary solution, that is the knowledge of simulations or hypersimulations of something exact, true, and objective, with its universal law.” “Imaginary solution” means the processes of making “something unreal” (illusion, fantasy, etc.) and creating its simulations as an artificial existence in an artificial reality.<sup>15</sup>

In the globalization and free market era, everything can be commodified, or considered a commodity, to be sold in the market, including whatever things and events that happened in another reality. Everything in the cyber world can be sold and consumed—including religion—even though there are still questions about “real or not”, but the transactions really do happen and huge amounts of money are spent in this “virtual” market. As Greg Fealy stated, growing religious consumption can be seen as a consequence of modernization, urbanization, and globalization.<sup>16</sup> The ‘consumption’ of Islam as a religious commodity is now widespread and has significant economic and cultural effects. Based on his research, however, the

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<sup>14</sup> Baudrillard, *Simulations*, 11.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>16</sup> Fealy, “Consuming Islam.”

commodification of Islam reflects rising religiosity in Indonesian society and the growing consumption and prominence of Islamic products drives further Islamization. Thus, commodified Islam is both a product of and a causal factor in accelerating religiosity. The more they do so, the larger the market for Islamic commodities, the more sophisticated those products become and the more Islamized consumption pattern become normalized.<sup>17</sup>

Religious behavior is one field that has undergone dramatic change as a result of globalization and modernization. The common response to establish identity is to pursue new sources of moral guidance and succor through religion. This pursuit is increasingly being conducted along marketized lines as religious consumers search for new identities and personal meaning in the spiritual marketplace. In this spiritual marketplace, products are sold to clients rather than imposed on them. Personal choice rather than institutional or cultural loyalties or norms drives this market. This situation favors innovative religious entrepreneurs who are able to develop market niches that address shifts in consumer taste and the desire for novel religious products. However, this also leads to volatility in religious consumption because believers always try to seek out a new trend of products.<sup>18</sup>

In contemporary Indonesian Islam, many characteristics are clearly evident in the operation of the religious marketplace. Those involved in selling Islamic products have fashioned their products to meet customer demand. Many of these products and services meet personal convenience, accessibility, and immediacy. One of the products that is also related to the use of high-end technology and cyberreality is Islamic content SMS service. There are several examples of Islamic SMS, such as Yusuf Mansur's *Kun Fayakuun SMS*, *SMS Obat Hati* of Ustadz Jeffry (Uje), and Arifin Ilham's *RomantIslam SMS*. The other examples

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

are screensavers featuring Arabic calligraphy and silhouettes of mosques, subscriptions to receive daily prayers or *zikir* messages, or selected stories of the Prophet's history. The marrying of Islam and prosperity is also common in this multimedia offering. Two key messages are often found: first, that Islamic teachings endorse the acquisition of wealth, provided it is done responsibly; and second, that pious behavior can help Muslims prosper. Islamic consumption and status, therefore, are closely intertwined in high-end marketing.<sup>19</sup>

Several years before the discussion of another reality as virtual, hyper, or cyber reality come to the fore, Clifford Geertz considered religion itself as the other reality, a symbolic reality.<sup>20</sup> His definition of religion is "a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." He pointed out that the term "symbol" is usually used for anything which signifies something else, used for an explicitly conventional sign of one sort or another, and is confined to something which expresses in an oblique and figurative manner that which cannot be stated in a direct and literal one.<sup>21</sup>

He continued to cultural patterns, which he defined as systems or complexes of symbols, the generic trait which is of first importance that in order to become extrinsic sources of information. Cultural patterns are "models" that are sets of symbols whose relations to one another "model" relations among entities, processes in physical, organic, social, or psychological systems by "paralleling", "imitating", or "simulating" them. The term "model" itself has two senses, "model of" and "model for". "Model of" reality means the manipulation of symbolic structures,

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 29–30.

<sup>20</sup> Geertz, *The Religion of Java*.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 90–91.

which bring them parallel with the pre-established non-symbolic system by expressing their structures in synoptic form as to render them apprehensible. “Model for” reality means the manipulation of the non-symbolic systems in terms of the relationships expressed in the symbolic under whose physical relationships are organized. Cultural patterns are “models of” and “models for” reality and have an intrinsic double aspect giving meaning, that is and objective conceptual form, to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves.<sup>22</sup> Here, it implies that religion is part of cultural patterns, so that religion can be considered as “models of” and “models for” reality.

He even addressed that religion itself, as a symbolic realm, is not “really real”. The sense of the “really real” religious perspective rests upon the symbolic activities of religion as a cultural system and is devoted to produce, intensify, and render itself inviolable by the discordant revelations of secular experience. It is about the imbuing of a certain specific complex of symbols, of the metaphysic they formulate and the style of life they recommend, with a persuasive authority, which, from an analytic point of view, is the essence of religious actions. In rituals, for example, the world as lived and the world as imagined are fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms and those turn out to be of the same world producing that idiosyncratic transformation in one’s sense of reality.<sup>23</sup>

However, no one, not even a saint, lives in the world of religious symbols all the time and the majority of men live it only at moments. It is also considered a paramount reality in human experience. The dispositions which religious rituals induce thus have their most important impact, from a human point of view, outside the boundaries of the ritual itself as they reflect back to color the individual’s conception

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

of the established world of bare fact. Religious belief has usually been presented as a homogenous characteristic of an individual, like the place of residence, occupational rule, kinship position, and so on. But religious belief in the midst of ritual, where it pervades the total person, transporting, so far as one's concerned, into another mode of existence, and religious belief as the milestone, then remembered reflection of that experience in the midst of everyday life, are not the same things. The recognition and exploration of the qualitative difference between religion pure and religion applied, between an encounter with the supposedly "really real" and a viewing of ordinary experience in the light of what that encounter seems to reveal, therefore will take us toward further understanding.<sup>24</sup>

According to Geertz, the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve, for an individual or a group, on the one hand as the source of general and distinctive conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them, as model *of* reality, and on the other hand is of rooted, distinctive mental disposition, as a model *for* reality. From these cultural functions flow its social and psychological functions. The tracing of the social and psychological role of religion is not a matter of finding correlations between specific secular social ties, but more a matter of understanding how men's notions of the "really real" (and the dispositions these notions induce in them) color their sense of the reasonable, the practical, the humane, and the moral. The study of religion is an analysis of the system of meanings embodied in symbols and the relations of this system with social and psychological process.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 119–21.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 123–25.

### 8.3 Islamic Prayer on SMS

To obtain data for this paper, it was necessary to register with one provider that has a service on SMS *doa*, in this case 3433, by typing REG<SPACE>DOA and sending to 3433. The period of registration is ten days. One SMS prayer was received each day. After ten days of being registered, the following ten SMS prayers were obtained:

**Day 1 :**

Prayer for getting a pious wife and children :

*Rabbana hablana min azwajina wa dzuriyyatina qurrata a'yunin waj'alna lil muttaqina limaman.*

(Oh my God, give us from our wives and our descendants what makes us happy and let us be leaders for pious people)

**Day 2 :**

Prayer of children to their parents :

*Allahumaghfirlii waaliwaali dayyaa warhamhummaa kamma rabbayaani saghiraa.*

(Oh my God, forgive me and my parents and give them mercy as they raised me when I was young)

**Day 3 :**

Prayer for goodness in the world and hereafter:

*Rabbana aatinaa fiddunyaa hasanah wa fil aakhirati hasanah wa qinaa 'adzaa bannar.*

(Oh my God, give us goodness in this life, and goodness in hereafter, and keep us away from the torments of hell)

**Day 4 :**

Prayer for release from hard problems :

*Allahuma lakal hamdu wa ilaikal musyaka wa antal musta'an.*

(Oh Allah, only for You all thanks, and only to You our complaints and You are the only Helper)

**Day 5 :**

Prayer when starting to study :

*Rabbi zidnii 'ilman warzughnii fahman.*

(Oh my God, increase my knowledge and give me full understanding)

**Day 6 :**

Prayer for health and well being :

*Allahumma 'aafinii fii badanii, allahumma 'aafinii fii sam'ii,*

*allahumma 'aafinii fii basharii.*

(Oh Allah, keep my body healthy, keep my hearing healthy, and keep my seeing healthy)

**Day 7 :**

Prayer when starting to eat :

*Allahumma baariklanaa fii maa razaqtanaa waqinaa 'adzaabannaar.*

(Oh Allah, bless what You gave us and keep us away from the torments of hell )

**Day 8 :**

Prayer after finishing eating :

*Alhamdulillahiladzii ath'amanaa wa saqoonaa wa ja'alanaa muslimiin.*

(Thanks to Allah who gave us food and drink and let us become muslims)

**Day 9 :**

Prayer when looking at bad things :

*Alhamdulillahillaahi alaa kullihaalin, Rabbi a'uudzubika min haali ahlin naari.*

(Thanks to Allah in all conditions, my God I am asking for Your protection from the condition of the people of hell)

**Day 10 :**

Prayer when entering the toilet :

*Allahumma innii a'uudzubika minal khubutsi wal khobaaits.*

(Ya Allah, I am asking for Your protection from male and female demons)

The prayer was delivered in Arabic but written in the latin alphabet, not Arabic alphabet, with the explanation of the purpose of the prayer. It will help any Muslim who cannot read Arabic. All prayers received are Islamic daily prayers, because they are regular prayers that have to be mentioned in daily activities.

In Islam, there is a concept that Islamic leaders, or at least the more pious persons, are considered as closer to God than lay Muslims. Their request to God expressed in *doa* also had more attention and grants by God rather than lay Muslims. The SMS *doa* then, more or less, can be considered as the way for lay Muslims to ask for help from the leaders or the more pious persons—usually considered as Islamic teachers or *ustadz*—to pray for them, because their request has more opportunity to be granted by God, even in the form of SMS. In this case, lay Muslims cannot meet face-to-face with the *ustadz*, so the cellular technology (specifically SMS) can serve as a medium for them to get-in-touch with the *ustadz*, and they can request the *ustadz* to pray for them.

The second possibility is that lay Muslims do not know what the daily prayer mentioned in their daily activities is simply because they are ignorant or maybe are newer Muslims that just recently embraced Islam (*muallaf*). They want to obtain knowledge about daily prayer and they ask the *ustadz* to show them what kind of daily prayers must be mentioned in their daily activities. In this case, SMS can be a medium for religious learning, a kind of “distance learning” between *ustadz* and his pupils, because they cannot meet each other face-to-face. With the medium of SMS, they can receive knowledge and guidance from *ustadz* about daily prayers.

## **8.4 Religion on SMS or Islam as Cyberreality**

The phenomena of Islamic prayer on SMS can be categorized as “religion on SMS” or “Islam on SMS” or “Islam on cyberspace” from

the categorization by Karaflogka (2003) about “religion on” and “religion in” cyberspace. Here the phenomena of SMS can be considered also as cyberreality provided by cellular technology, because its “reality” transcends beyond the boundaries of time and space. The term “religion on” cyberspace means the information uploaded by any religion which also exists in the off-line (real) world, while “religion in” cyberspace is created and exists exclusively in cyberspace, without any existence in the real world. Islamic prayer that is sent and delivered by SMS is part of Islamic teaching that also exists in the real world, not merely a “virtual religion”. Islam, in this case, can employ the advancement of technology to spread its teaching more widely, across the boundaries of time and space, in this case by using SMS or cellular technology.

However, in light of Yasraf A. Piliang’s view, Islamic prayer on SMS is not only a phenomenon of “Islam on cyberspace”, but it is the phenomenon of “Islam in post-reality.”<sup>26</sup> It means that the phenomena of Islamic prayer on SMS is different from, separated from, or beyond—Islamic prayer, Islamic teachings, or Islam as a religion in general—in the real world. Islamic prayer on SMS is the “reality” that exists beyond or surpassing the reality of Islamic prayer in the real world. Therefore, it can be said that Islamic prayer on SMS is the “post-reality of religion” or even “post-religion” and “post-Islam” itself.

The notion of post-reality cannot be separated with ontology, especially the notion about reality and being. The existence in post-reality is the reality of image or representation and the ontology of image is called imagology. In the view of imagology, the phenomena of Islamic prayer on SMS is an image, copy, or representation of the Islamic prayer itself, which is not a “true” being but only a representation. Furthermore, in the post-reality, images and representations can even occupy or overwhelm the “real being” itself, so

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<sup>26</sup> Piliang, *Postrealitas*.

that the phenomena in post-reality are considered the reality itself. In this case, Islamic prayer on SMS, as an image or representation, can be considered as the “real thing”, or “real prayer” that can overwhelm the real Islamic prayer itself which must be chanted and mentioned personally.

This is similar with Eco’s concept about hyperreality where images and representations as reconstructions of reality give even more impressions than reality itself so that it makes one more comfortable.<sup>27</sup> In this case, Islamic prayer on SMS can even give more impressions than the real Islamic prayer. In the hyperreality, absolute reality at last will be identified with absolute falsity, because absolute non-reality displayed as the present reality, entails two possibilities: being enjoyed as a “contentment situation” or raised the “horrible emptiness”. In the concept of Baudrillard, phenomena “beyond reality” are called perfect simulacra or simulations, which create extreme scene and virtual reality.<sup>28</sup> The creation process is called “pataphysics”, which means that processes make “something unreal” by becoming objective facts and creating its simulations as artificial existence in artificial reality. Islamic prayer on SMS, then, is a product of “pataphysics”, the artificial reality created from the real Islamic prayer.

In light of the three concepts above, the phenomena of Islamic prayer on SMS is a form of post reality, hyperreality, or perfect simulacra. The real thing is Islamic prayer (*doa*) itself that must chanted or mentioned in Muslims’ daily activities. Islamic prayer on SMS is the copy, image, or representation of Islamic prayer itself in cyberreality. However, images, representations, or everything that in essence are “not real” become reality itself. In this case, Islamic prayer on SMS in the end can be considered as the real Islamic prayer itself.

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<sup>27</sup> Eco, *Travels in Hyper Reality*.

<sup>28</sup> Baudrillard, *Simulations*.

If we look at the essence of Islamic prayer, it must be chanted or mentioned on certain occasions, with certain attitudes, and with certain comprehensions. Compared with Islamic prayer on SMS, it is not needed to do all those things. Once the SMS *doa* is received, it can be read easily in whatever situation, time, and place. Without any further consideration or comprehension, SMS *doa* can be easily read after they are received. When images and representations are considered as reality itself, then, in this case, SMS *doa* be treated as *doa* itself. Muslims then felt that they already “doing prayer” (*berdoa*) simply after they have read SMS *doa*, even without appropriate occasion, attitude, and comprehension as in the real prayer doing. Reading SMS *doa*, then, is considered similar with doing prayer itself.

Islamic prayer on SMS can be considered also as prayer SMS sent by certain *ustadz* for the receiver. Then, by received an SMS *doa*, the receiver can feel that the *ustadz* is praying for them. It has more guarantee because the prayer was sent by *ustadz* for them and it means that the prayer has more chance to be granted by God. On the other side, SMS *doa* can be considered also as a means for learning. Some Muslims want to know what *doa* must be chanted or mentioned for special occasions or purposes. By receiving SMS *doa*, the receiver can learn from *ustadz* what *doa* they want to know without making direct contact face-to-face with the *ustadz*.

Islamic prayer on SMS in recent times is considered a more practical, beneficial, efficient, and easy way to do prayer, especially for those who do not have access to the real situations or requirements. SMS *doa* is a better solution for them to do prayer or to learn prayer; otherwise they won't get any access or knowledge on the prayer itself. They will get even more comprehension and contentment when they receive SMS *doa* rather than allocating more time, energy, and cost to meet *ustadz* directly to learn or to ask to pray for them. In this virtual era, modern people have different tactics and strategies for satisfaction

and contentment compared with old people.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, this is exactly what “virtual reality replaced true reality itself” means.

Geertz described religion as symbols or models; model of and model for, reality, so that it is not the true reality itself. The reality of religion is in the symbolic forms. However, in virtual reality, the model, or the image itself is transformed to be reality itself. There are no models or symbols, because they already create their own reality. What is to be modeled, represented, or to be imaged, is the reality itself. Therefore, the reality of religion is a “symbolic reality in virtual reality”. When we read a SMS *doa*, it is a symbol of hope, wants, religious satisfaction, and confinement in the form of words or chanting. Then, with the advancement of technology, it is transformed into a text or message that can be sent via cellular phone called an SMS. But if we look at the content, its substance is still considered a *doa*, a symbol of religiosity, but in the more developed form. The substance of the *doa* does not change, but it is delivered in the form of SMS.

Nowadays, in the commercial era, everything can be considered a commodity to be sold in the market, including products of technology and even religion. In this case, religion on SMS is one example of the commoditization of religion combined with high-end technology. Modern people can be considered religious enough, or at least they are satisfied, when they have consumed “religious products”. One of them is an SMS *doa* described by Fealy (2008) as one religious commodity preferred by consumers. If we can think deeper, what, exactly, do they “buy”, “produce”, “read”, or “pray”? It is merely virtual things. It cannot be touched, felt, or sensed, but it is accepted and sells well because the consumers are well-satisfied with them, even with religious things such as SMS *doa*. This is exactly the point when a virtual thing becomes the real thing.

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<sup>29</sup> See Fealy, “Consuming Islam,” 32–33; Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 49, 53–54.

## 8.5 Conclusion

Islamic prayer on SMS can be considered as the “reality beyond reality”, or according to the terms of Yasraf A. Piliang, Umberto Eco, and Jead Baudrillard are post-reality, hyperreality, simulacra, or virtual reality, respectively. However, because of the advancement of technology, everything in virtual reality is a copy, an image, or a representation of everything in reality, and in the end is considered as reality itself. With this view, then Islamic prayer on SMS, as an image or a copy of the real Islamic prayer, in the end will be considered as the prayer itself. People can then replace doing real prayer with reading the SMS *doa* they received. People can also feel that the *ustadz* has already prayed for them via SMS and they can learn from *ustadz* who sent them the *doa* without making direct, face-to-face contact.

Islamic prayer on SMS can also be called “symbolic reality in virtual reality” in the concept of Geertz about religion as system of symbols and as a model of our model for reality. Because in virtual reality, symbols and models are creating reality and symbolic reality becomes reality itself. Islamic prayer on SMS then becomes the reality that symbolizes people’s hopes, wants, and confinement. Islamic prayer on SMS can also be considered as a commodity in the market era nowadays because of the commoditization of religion. With regularly consuming Islamic prayer on SMS, people felt satisfied, both economically and spiritually, because they felt that it already fulfilled their needs and wants. From the producers’ side, Islamic prayer on SMS as a commodity can also produce a significant profit for them.

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# **RELIGIOUS CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE INDONESIAN INTERFAITH WEATHER STATION<sup>257</sup>**

*Leonard C. Epafra*

## **9.1 Introduction**

It goes without saying that in the last twenty years the world has been increasingly stricken by melancholia. It testifies the increasing threats of global terrorism, inter-communal conflicts, communicable diseases, social uprisings, inter-state tensions, natural disasters, environmental devastations: we are living, as contended by Gabe

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<sup>257</sup> This article has been presented in the 7<sup>th</sup> International Graduate Students and Scholars' Conference in Indonesia (IGSSCI), organized by Universitas Gadjah Mada Graduate School, Yogyakarta, November 4 – 5, 2015. Some parts of this paper is based on the earlier draft prepared and presented in the first IIWS Focus Group Discussion (FGD) on December 1, 2014, Yogyakarta. It is part of the action research project entitled Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station (IIWS), organized by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies, coordinated by Dr. Dicky Sofjan (ICRS). Other team members are Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf (researcher, ICRS) and me as one of the researcher; Elis Zuliati Anis, MA (treasury and administration, ICRS); Hendrikus Paulus Kaunang, MA (monitoring officer coordinator monitoring officer for Yogyakarta area, ICRS), Gunawan Primasatya (Monitoring Officer, Poso, Central Sulawesi), Muhammad Ihsan Harahap (Monitoring Officer, Makassar, South Sulawesi), and Agus Firmansyah (Monitoring Officer, Jakarta), Marianus Sandy Jehabut (Programmer and Website Developer), and Putu Hendra Semadi (Programmer and Website Developer).

Mythen, in a “runaway world”<sup>258</sup>, part of a globalized, networked and tribalized society<sup>259</sup>.

Indonesia is no different from other countries in attempting to keep its head above the water. Series of social and natural disasters are inflicting this country. In recent years, especially in the aftermath of historical watershed that kicked the legs of the New Order’s scaffold in 1998, Indonesia had undergone a critical transition.

A new celebrated era – *Era Reformasi* (Reformation Era) – has been bringing a new social space, but the era has been also the beginning of the subsequent social tensions and unrests. Some of them are simply an extension of the unresolved problems that during the New Order administration was strongly subdued. Some other appeared in new forms of politics of space and of Othering, such as “*politik aliran*” (ideological/religious-based politics), the emergence of hardline religious groups, and transnational religious discourse, which to a point chipped in for the domestic tension among religious groups.

Besides, the intra-/inter-communal, intra-/inter-religious tensions that already claimed thousands of lives, the pitfalls came from the government discriminatory policy, which on many occasions materialized on the street in violence act against “undesirable” elements of society, such as religious dissidents and minority groups.

Observing numerous inter-religious conflicts since the beginning of Reformation Era illustrated the vulnerability of social interaction, to which some of them was much of discomfiture of the state apparatus, as in some cases it even parts of the problem. In cases such as dispute on the legality of house of worship, religious defamation, intra-religious tension, Shari’a law establishment, domestic violence, communal violence, and other cases, state apparatus contributed significant number

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<sup>258</sup> Gabe Mythen, *Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society* (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004), 1–2.

<sup>259</sup> Cf. Paul James, *Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back in* (London and Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006), 13.

in the involvement of the violence act.<sup>260</sup> This in the end only emphasizes the limitation of the state control of social interaction and highlights the importance of drawing larger support from civil society to take a part in the resolution of these complicated issues. To say the least, a linked-and-matched initiative is in a great demand to connect all social stakeholders.

Against the above backdrop, numerous initiatives to cope with social tension have been put forward. Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station (heretofore, IIWS) is one of the initiatives introduced by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (heretofore, ICRS). IIWS is an applied research that the main objective is to explore the possibility of preventing inter- and intra-religious tension and conflict in Indonesia. It is, furthermore an academic exploration and practical inquiry of an early warning system that included the social analysis and the possible digital technology intervention on socio-religious issues.

The present paper is a theoretical analysis of the discourse of “conflict prevention,” its relationship with IIWS initiative. Since I myself is part of the program as a researcher, the paper is also my critical reflection upon this engagement. The frame of discussions is revolved around the notion of risk society and other issues such as conflict prevention and pre-emption, and the crowd sourcing. In this, I will address a number of questions: What are the challenges in implementing an early warning system such as IIWS against the complex social context of Indonesia? To what degree a digital technology could help preventing and mitigating intra- and inter-religious conflict in Indonesia? As methodology and academic inquiry, does IIWS a confirmation of the notion of “risk society” as proposed by

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<sup>260</sup> Suhadi Cholil, “Isu Utama Dan Pola Kekerasan (Pengalaman Laptah CRCS UGM 2008-2012)” (PPT, Workshop IIWS, ICRS, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2014); Institut Titian Perdamaian, “Intensitas Kejadian Konflik Kekerasan Komunal Tahun 2010-2011” (PPT, Workshop IIWS, ICRS, Yogyakarta, December 1, 2014).

Ulrich Beck and others? What is the options available for IIWS that could deprive the sceptre of that “risky” society?

## 9.2 Risk and Prevention

The string of terms distilled in the “Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station” is pregnant with meanings and it can be considered as the surface of stratified layers of more profound concepts and understandings to delve into. The string is related to the notions of “community” and “society” as the basic understanding of “interfaith community.” The “weather station” is connected to the notion of “risk” and “danger” as to “prevention,” “preemption,” and “mitigation.”

Risk is not synonymous with catastrophe or disaster; it foregrounding the catastrophe. By perceiving it, is a way people make sense the past catastrophe and anticipating the future one. Perception of risk is a formation of knowledge, an imagination and a projection of the future occurrences and possibilities, no matter it came from the instinctual mechanism (based on complex memory process), rigid calculation, or divine sanction. “Risks are always future events that *may* occur, that *threaten* us.”<sup>261</sup> It is an abstraction of what constitutes danger, threats, and the implicated subject (for whom). In other word, constructing risk is manufacturing/ defining/ thematizing the future uncertainties.

Risks, dangers, insecurities, threats, and the catastrophes itself are always part of human condition and history. Since the early humanity, never was the world free from large and small scale of catastrophes, wars, pestilences, hungers, and other miseries. However, in the modern days the risks are escalated, unprecedented in human history, such as global terror, transnational risks, and also the emergence of human-

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<sup>261</sup> Ulrich Beck, *World at Risk*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2009), 9, original emphasis.

/technological-induced catastrophes, such as chemical carcinogen, chemical pollution, nuclear radiation, greenhouse effect, Internet cracking, millennium bug. These are part of radicalization of modernity: “we face the amounted risks not because we are less modern, but because we are hypermodern.”

How those dangerous events and risks perceived is part of social organization, socially and culturally constructed.<sup>262</sup> The perception of risk as an anticipation and/or estimation of likelihood of harm are running in a complex system of beliefs and related to our self-image, of our cultural perceptions. There is a selective process of how culture defined “danger” and “risk.”<sup>263</sup> Furthermore, Dorothy Nelkin observes that “[N]arratives of risk are pervaded by concepts of accountability, responsibility, liability, and blame.”<sup>264</sup> As a result, the perception of risk is not innocence, and its implications involve politics, ethics and morality.<sup>265</sup> Cultural filter is also structuring the order of the self and the Other. This may explain why certain conflicting news attracts more attention than others and drew different responses. There is a democratization of infliction and dramatization of risk imagery, i.e. contagiousness beyond borders, to which it makes the image of risk of one disaster more visible than other.

This modern stage of risk society is also bringing another specter that is the social injustice. Given the power relations of global society,

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<sup>262</sup> Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); Dorothy Nelkin, “Foreword: The Social Meanings of Risk,” in *Risk, Culture, and Health Inequality: Shifting Perceptions of Danger and Blame* (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003), vii–xiii; Beck, *World at Risk*.

<sup>263</sup> Douglas and Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture*, 186.

<sup>264</sup> Nelkin, “Foreword: The Social Meanings of Risk,” viii.

<sup>265</sup> Barbara Adam and Joost van Loon, “Introduction: Repositioning Risk; the Challenge for Social Theory,” in *The Risk Society and beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, ed. Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost van Loon (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE, 2000), 1.

risk is instead a socially constructed and staged phenomenon through and through in which some have the capacity to define risk and others do not. The class divide runs between those who have the power to define their self-produces risks and those who are exposed to, or at the mercy of, risks over which others decide. This risk-based difference increasingly overlays, aggravates or replaces the old class divisions as the original and intrinsic form of inequality. Thus risk is another word for power and domination.<sup>266</sup>

Tolikara case that drew national and international attention two years ago is an example of such dramatization of risk imagery and social injustice in a risk society. The incident was taken place in Papua but the echo reverberated in other parts in Indonesia, since it touched the most sensitive issue in Indonesia, religion. IWS monitoring officers in Sulawesi (Makassar and Poso) reported the increasing inflammatory social media replication messages – mostly in negative tone – and possible mass mobilization, only few hours after the incident. This accentuated the unpredictability of the public mood that could worsen the situation and broaden the conflict beyond the incident site. Among numerous social problems in Indonesia appeared in media during the period, Tolikara stood prominently because it is a reflection of the unresolved problems: radicalization and politicization of religion in public sphere, hidden inter-religious tension, the marginalization of Papuans within Indonesian developmentalism, but also it displayed the resilience of some civil society groups in coping with provocative agenda.

Despite its dreadful nature in the people mind, risk provides to us “windows into how societies express and define themselves”<sup>267</sup>. It is an opportunity to manage the uncertainty and pragmatically, a way to test a

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<sup>266</sup> Beck, *World at Risk*, 142.

<sup>267</sup> Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany, *Risk: A Very Short Introduction*, Amazon Kindle (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

policymaking and to promote a moral reflection. “Only in retrospect does it become apparent that the calculability of risks has a moral basis”<sup>268</sup>. Hence, risk is related not only to danger, threat, and catastrophe, but to chance and opportunity. Thus, the discourse of risk is productive, expansive, and transformative. It also reflective in the sense that is to cope with decidable future in the present, it balances those danger and chance.<sup>269</sup>

In the increasingly dangerous world, partly as the consequence of modernity as the earlier part arguing, the act of preemption and prevention is never more important. This is no by any means a new human enterprise. Since early of civilizations, seers and prophets predicted the coming dangers: flood, volcano eruption, even the coming of alien invaders. This, however, never been so seriously taken in the present day in the increasing conflict and other security threats<sup>270</sup>: the cliché “better safe than sorry” prevailed.

The notions of “prevention” and “preemption” as academic categories are mostly derived from military experiences and strategies, as we learnt about “preventive” and “preemptive” wars<sup>271</sup>. The application of the notions on the interfaith weather station is therefore need to be refined in carefully wrought employment.

Taking the example of war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11, Michael Walzer, an American political philosopher made a distinction between “preemptive” and “preventive” wars exercised by the United States government, both in negative tones. He challenged the reflexive tendency of the meaning of preemption in a war as a self-defense act

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<sup>268</sup> Beck, *World at Risk*, 14.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>270</sup> Alan M. Dershowitz, *Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 2ff.

<sup>271</sup> David Rodin and Henry Shue, “Introduction,” in *Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification*, ed. Henry Shue and David Rodin (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2ff.

against the enemy for the reason of the clear and present threat.<sup>272</sup> Preventive war, Walzer argued “presupposes some standard against which danger is to be measured.” The problem is that “the standard” is entirely in the realm of perception and little to do with the immediate threat. It is arguably, based on the idea of a “balance of power.” This kind of war is necessary simply because of the presumed condition of imbalance that justifies the war: “the enemy has begun the process and/or it is [getting] stronger than us.” Accordingly, the preemptive strike is meant to gain the “former” balance. The perception is obvious in the United States Department of Defense’s definition of preventive war, i.e. “a war initiated in the *belief* that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk.”<sup>273</sup> The element of “belief” is significant in defining certain condition is a threat for a future balance of power.

The other side of the some doctrine on the preemptive military initiative, the National Defense Strategy’s paper published by the United States Joint Chief of Staff stated that “[t]he *potentially catastrophic impact* of an attack against the United States, its allies and its interests may necessitate actions in self-defense *to preempt* adversaries before they can attack.”<sup>274</sup> Here again we hear the amplification of taking the threat as part of the “belief” on it and this is the prime example of risk as institutional construction.

Along with that the idea of preemptive strike is dealing with the presumed “sufficient threat.” This is as displayed by Walzer, another

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<sup>272</sup> Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 146ff.; *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 74ff.; see also the critique of David Rodin, “The Problem with Prevention,” in *Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification*, ed. Henry Shue and David Rodin (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 113–70.

<sup>273</sup> Quoted in Rachel Bzostek, *Why Not Preempt? Security, Law, Norms and Anticipatory Military Activities* (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 4, my emphasis.

<sup>274</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*, 221, my emphasis.

complicated issues since provocation by the enemy is not necessarily an intention to engage war.<sup>275</sup> “[P]reemption is not an accurate description of what ... is threatening,” he further induced.<sup>276</sup> He critically assessed that the Iraq War was not a preemptive war, since it is beyond imagination that Iraq is an immediate threat for American national security. It is “preventive, not preemptive – it is designed to respond to a more distant threat.”<sup>277</sup> Hence, according to him preventive means a measure taken to address a distant threat, while preemption means cheating a momentum to outstrip the other party by taking the preeminence position over it. Both are a move from the traditional understanding of self-defense. It is no more a reactionary policy, it is proactionary.

In certain sense the response of the Bush’s administration toward the 9/11 tragedy by initiating the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 could be framed as well in the “traumatic framework,” in which the former Cold War is part of the equation. In the United States history, the Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor in August 1944 set the precedence of this military response on terrorism in the American home ground – the other was Mexican-American War (1846-1848). In the pre-Cold War era, preemptive strike is considered immoral.<sup>278</sup> Nonetheless the post-World War II and the emergence of the Cold War with its nuclear deterrence, the notion of prevention and preemption was found its footing and later on became the basis for the United States political thinking and military doctrine.

How both concepts of preventive and preemptive become useful notions for a non-militaristic context, in the interfaith context? The perception of “balance of power” as a precondition of both initiatives could be an important point of departure for IIWS to proactively detect

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<sup>275</sup> Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 80–81.

<sup>276</sup> Walzer, *Arguing about War*, 146.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, original emphasis.

<sup>278</sup> Rodin and Shue, “Introduction,” 2f.

the changing interfaith interaction atmosphere. While it is true that the perception is not necessarily the threat itself this perception is important as the threshold for moving to another stage of threat condition: to recognize the potential of vicious circle starting to initiate.

A quick observation among the survivors of inter-communal and interfaith conflicts in the aftermath indicated a tendency to praise the harmonious relationship among the conflicting parties in the antecedent period leading to the conflict. While this sentiment largely simplifying the complicated interaction in the pre-conflict period, the feeling upon the importance of “social balance” is a significant feeding for the initiation of preventive and preemptive measures. For the understanding of social balance, it gives at least double opportunities to handle the incident, i.e. to begin prevention and/or preemption initiatives, and to seek a new “social balance,” at least the category understood by the implicated parties.

Lastly, the “traumatic frame” might also be a feeding element in preventing the escalation of conflict. Beneath the conflicts in Indonesia laid the graves of “traumas” indwelled the mind of many victims and perpetrators. From this a future conflict might be a catalyst of those unfinished business. It is important to recognize this dormant monster and to take necessary initiatives.

### **9.3 IIWS: Preventing Conflict in the Post-Secure Era**

Stated in the IIWS Concept Paper, in a more refined and elaborated account, the main objectives of the IIWS are the following:<sup>279</sup>

- To build an early warning system on interfaith relations in Indonesia in order to mitigate the problem of increasing religious conflicts.

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<sup>279</sup> Dicky Sofjan, “Prototype System on Indonesian Interfaith Weather Station” (ICRS, 2014).

- To build awareness and enhance sensitivity among government officials at the central, provincial and local levels as well as civil society activists to help prevent the spread of intra- and inter-religious conflicts.
- To sensitize and help develop the capacity of relevant government authorities, notably those in the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare and Ministry of Religious Affairs on how to prevent conflicts, and increase peace dividends.
- To develop new theories, concepts and techniques on interfaith relations using time series data and geographic spread analysis.
- To further explore the utilization of social science automation in the study of religion, interfaith relations and religious conflicts.

Those objectives demonstrated that initiative such as IIWS is admittedly within the discourse of risk society and working within mostly such logic: IIWS is a reflection of the past trauma and the future danger. Furthermore, dealing with prevention and pre-emption in IIWS put the academicians, scientists, and government authorities in a privilege positions to “define” risks. This determines the risk knowledge that should be presented as objective, unambiguous, with highest degree of certainty, and lastly, quantifiable: a risk has to be quantifiable in order to be defined in a technological system. The initiative such as IIWS is constantly haunted by the ambiguity of modernity.

On the other hands however, it is a manifestation of human desire to overcome their condition, including their risky condition by taking it as a chance and opportunity to imagining a better society that inter-religious tension is relatively manageable. To push the imagination further, there is a non-“structuralist” elements need to take into account that will be explained below, in which if properly addressed, gives a window of breath away from the cursed of modernity qua risk society.

Besides those ambitions, essentially IIWS is meant to contribute to the social transformation and to enhance social remedial capacity of the

civil society. The choice of “Interfaith” in IIWS name is simply to limit the scope of the implementation of the prototype, i.e. intra-/inter-faith qua intra-/inter-religious interaction. The restricted scope is not to restrict the identification of social tension on the social site as oftentimes impossible to discriminate and to classify as it transcends categorization: a categorization of a tension as an inter-religious tension rather than other social tension is purely for the sake of analytical purpose, not to limit the level of responsibility.

The comparison with and the employment of the metaphor “weather station” is suggestive. Like a weather station, it functions to forecast the condition of inter-religious/interfaith interaction: whether it is favorable, in tension, in dispute, or heading to conflict. In a distressed condition the station will raise a red flag and the information will be immediately rendering to the relevant social stakeholders, such as law enforcement, security apparatus, government officials, public figures, journalists, etc. to help them to take a necessary measure to mitigate the tension, or else to prevent it if possible. In a favorable condition the station will not go into hibernation but became an information center and a hub for the interfaith activities that ameliorate social cohesion (see Fig. 4 below). While in the ideal condition the warning should come from the public, or the “crowd”, in the IIWS prototype, it is represented by appointed monitoring officers.

Beyond a tool of mitigation and preemption, IIWS is a discourse to understand the larger issue of inter-religious interaction and of society at large. As a discourse it resisted the entirely instrumentalist approach of the procedural regime in dealing with “social pathology.” Though indeed there is amenable to this approach, it may give undue importance to security approach. Hence, IIWS is thought to be more than a diagnostic tool to the social problem.

A social engagement such as IIWS is compelled to learn from the social site and at the same time seeking transformation and induce a

version of social fabrication. Moreover, the disposition is expecting to harness the relationship between action and institution.<sup>280</sup> On the other hand, as stated in the above objectives, it has to be admitted that general public remains convinced that the state (read: bureaucracy and policymakers) is supposed to be the initiator and guide to “the intelligent action to solve social problems,”<sup>281</sup> regardless in many occasions failed to maintain impartiality. This aspiration accentuated the importance of the state apparatus as part of the resolution of social problems. Hence, an initiative such as IIWS virtually is dancing between the policymakers and the policy-implicated parties, between state system and the public.

Secondly, IIWS is an intellectual space that allowing a further meditation of human condition and social arrangement, either by acknowledging the monstrosity of humanity as “a giant destroyer machine”<sup>282</sup> as appeared in numerous inter-religious and social conflicts, or as the peace-seeking, social integrating creatures.

Thirdly, IIWS is also an initiative that recognizes existing initiatives, in the local and national levels, and imbibes it whenever necessary. IIWS by any means is not the only and the first initiative in mitigating inter-religious conflict. By law, the task of preventing and mitigating social conflict rests upon the shoulder of the government, in particular the security and law enforcements. The legal framework for this activity is the Law No. 7 (2012) on Social Conflict Resolution, and the Regulation No. 2 (2015) as the operational framework of the Law. Security apparatus by definition has all necessary measures, techniques,

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<sup>280</sup> Anthony Giddens, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 30.

<sup>281</sup> Mark Bevir, *Governance: A Very Short Introduction*, Amazon Kindle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

<sup>282</sup> Karlina Supelli, “Epilog,” in *Memahami Negativitas: Diskursus Tentang Massa, Teror, Dan Trauma*, by F. Budi Hardiman (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005), 195; cf. Robert A. Rubinstein, “Collective Violence and Common Security,” ed. Tim Ingold, *Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 984.

and technologies to realize the Law's mandate to prevent and mitigate a social conflict, including inter-religious conflict.

A number of religion-nuanced conflicts in the post-Reformation endorsed numerous local initiatives to cope with the problem. CEWERS (Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System) by Institut Titian Perdamaian, SNPK (*Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasaan Indonesia* – National Monitoring System of Violence in Indonesia) by The Habibie Center in cooperation with Department of Social Welfare, and CEWER by Partnership for Governance Reform. Earlier, in the late 1990s, there was an initiative to capitalize the inter-communal conflicts in the world. Administered by the Center for International Studies and the Department of International Relations at the University of Southern California, Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) the project is “a prototype electronic database focused on enhancing the production and sharing of information across and among peacemakers in the multiple nodes of decentralized networks, linking researchers to the different societal levels at which today's conflicts, as well as conflict management and violence limitation activities, are organized.”

While sharing with the main goals of the aforementioned initiatives, IIWS is distinct in its focus on the *prevention* of an inter-religious conflict, no more on the post-factum analysis like others. Furthermore, it is distinct because of the digital technological implementation of preventive measures through the web-based information system and mobile app to provide a more engaging and user-friendly information system. The pervasive penetration of digital technology in Indonesia, notably the mobile communication – the mobile subscriptions are already exceeded Indonesian population – gives a way to the technological embrace among many people, including the people in conflicting areas.

In term of software and mobile apps, surely IIWS is not the first implementer. Ushahidi, as the kernel and platform for IIWS system is an

open system that has been around since 2007 and has been implemented for different initiatives such as Afghanistan general election, Syrian refugees' information system, disaster relief, and so on. Hence, IIWS is unique in the sense of the implementation of this solution in inter-religious relationship and in its Indonesian context.

In a longer term, IIWS will embrace the public in dealing with interfaith interaction. The former top-down approach in dealing with social problems could not stand anymore. A greater participation from the public to create resolution is seriously taking into account. To this the notion of "crowdsourcing" is put forward. Crowdsourcing is considered as "a means of organizing and coordinating the labour of individual human beings."<sup>283</sup> As the name implied, the main actor of this engagement is "the crowd." Ushahidi is an example of what so called crowdsourcing "paradigm." IIWS based on the belief that people – the crowds – have all good intentions to maintain social cohesion. IIWS considering the individual as an actor and a social capital that will carry out the real field agent as the flag-waver of the weather station.

However, the idea of crowdsourcing is not as transparent the term claimed. The emancipation of the "crowd" into this position is far from easy. Philosopher, statesmen, religious authorities, aristocrats, and other elites never so easily give up their dominant position to the "crowd." The crowd is irregular and not easily to herd to certain ideal, and for the present concern, the inter-communal and interfaith tension, the darkest face of this is in the form of violence act that took the "crowd" as corporeal means. According to the French writer Elias Canetti, crowd is active, living and a conscious entity.<sup>284</sup> It cannot be reduced to an amorphous body and category as against other more "orderly, controllable" entities such as security apparatus, people, even society.

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<sup>283</sup> David Alan Grier, *Crowdsourcing for Dummies* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012), 10.

<sup>284</sup> Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, trans. Carol Stewart (New York: Continuum, 1981).

On the other hand, crowd is also mysterious and unpredictable, so the crowdsourcing could also display “the foolishness of crowds” by the discrepancies and senselessness performance commit by the participants.<sup>285</sup>

Dealing with inter-religious interaction is immediately immersed into the complexity, paradox, and multidimensionality the case at hand. Yet more, in a conflict situation there is no cut-and-dried solution that any well-defined elaboration could not put forward successfully. As the common phrase “experience is the best teacher,” and further emphasized by Dietrich Dörner, a German social psychologist in which he asserts based on numerous studies and problem-solving models that the most appropriate way in dealing with complex problem is oftentimes the product of long experiential process rather than of scholastic intricacy: it is “the hallmark of wisdom rather than genius.” The practitioners knew best in dealing with certain conflicting situation than the academicians. In this point Dörner pointed out the importance of learning system to educate the concerned parties to refine sensitivity to the problems.<sup>286</sup> Hence, lastly, IWS can be considered as a learning system, a “cybernetics” system that grows along with the interfaith dynamics. It learns from the context, from the best practices elsewhere, and from the relevant technology.

IWS is managed by a team that consisted of ICRS’ researchers, staffs, and non-ICRS team members, consisted of ten people. The program time frame is between October 2014 and September 2015. There are four testing sites, i.e. Jakarta, Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi, and Central Sulawesi in which IWS posted its monitoring officers. Those monitoring officers render regular reports to the central coordination in Yogyakarta.


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<sup>285</sup> Jean-Fabrice Lebraty and Katia Lobre-Lebraty, *Crowdsourcing: One Step Beyond* (Hoboken, NJ: ISTE Ltd/John Wiley and Sons Inc, 2013), 97ff.

<sup>286</sup> Dietrich Dörner, *The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations*, Amazon Kindle (Basic Books, 1996).

IIWS provides a prototype of an early warning system in two modes of presentation: web-based information system that functioned as a dashboard of the “weather” map (see Fig. 1 and 2), and mobile app for the monitoring officer to report to the central coordination in Yogyakarta. As mentioned above, at the kernel of the web-based dashboard and mobile app is Ushahidi open-source software that ran on top of Google Android and Apple iOS platforms (see Fig. 3).


*Fig. 1 – IIWS Dashboard model*



Tab. 1 – *Simplified grading and metaphors*<sup>287</sup>

	Structural Data	Event data	Escalator/de-escalator
Status 5 (Stormy): Violence	Polarization, violence (massif/limited)	<b>The incidents, events that become input data for IIWS system</b>	<b>Agencies, conditions related to the event that become the factor of escalating/ de-escalating incidents. It becomes the input for IIWS system, and recorded into the IIWS Database as structural data</b>
Status 4 (Rainy): Crisis	<b>Polarization, intimidation</b>		
Status 3 (Drizzly): Dispute	<b>Differences</b>		
Status 2 (Cloudy): Active peace capacity	Peaceful relationship but less responsive		
Status 1 (Sunny): Responsive peace capacity	Peaceful relationship, responsive		

Fig. 2 – *The implemented IIWS Web-based Dashboard*



<sup>287</sup> Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, "Model Early Warning IIWS" (IIWS, 2014).

Fig. 3 – IIWS Mobile app





Fig. 4 – The working flow of IIWS



The IWS system working flow is quite simply, as earlier has been summarized (see Fig. 4): in non-incident condition, and at the most conducive social interaction, in which most societal elements endorse social integration, IWS system will mark it as “Sunny” condition in the IWS Dashboard (see Tab. 1). If there is a tension, monitoring officer would report the on-site situation through IWS mobile app (see Fig. 3) to the central coordination (HQ). HQ will clarify and verify the incoming information, the tension will be closely monitored by the monitoring officer within a period of time to identify whether the tension escalate/de-escalate. Clarified and verified information will be appeared in the IWS Dashboard (Fig. 1 and 2) and became an input for the relevant stakeholders, e.g. police force, religious leaders, etc. to take a necessary measure to prevent further escalation. IWS Dashboard will dynamically report the update “weather” condition in its respective map.

There are two kinds of indicators being processed in IWS: structural indicator and event indicator. Structural data is referring to the historical data of preceding incidents, and revealing the patterns, actors, victims, and violence history. The event indicator is the data related to the momentum of conflict. Both indicators help the identification of the conflict trigger and accelerator, and to predict the possible tension in the future.

Simple and straight forward, that is probably the first impression of IWS system. The challenges and discrepancies in building such system however, is enormous. Technologically speaking, building a system like IWS is manageable. The main challenge is not on the technological side, but on the content and methodology: grading moods upon certain condition and incident and transform it into proper weather metaphors is truly challenging. In the following are refined issues in dealing with grading and categorizing.

- Risk and danger are matters of perspective, and thus it holds social, cultural, and political implication.<sup>288</sup> Hence, there always contested understanding of is the meaning of risk and the way to prevent it. This is apparent during the earlier investigation in which the meaning of inter-religious tension is different among the four test sites. During the testing period, Poso (Central Sulawesi) generated the most reports from the monitoring officer. As the place of the bloody inter-religious conflict between 1998-2000, along with longer history of conflict, grading the social tension in Poso is much more rigorous than other places since there are layers of tensions as the residual effects of the past tension that precipitated traumatic experiences. Repercussion might be followed by quantifying this situation in IWS Dashboard in which Poso area would under constant drizzling (dispute) or rainy (crisis) status.
- An indication in the conflicting area such as Poso above, some elements of security force is involved in the escalation. On the other hand, there is no civil society elements that powerful enough to make a balance on reporting. This complexity might also have included the local political dynamic, in which incidents are often taking place before the end of the annual budget reporting. How such condition could be reflected in the IWS Dashboard?
- Based on the earlier researches<sup>289</sup> the conflicts oftentimes are taking place in the level of district and sub-district, hence makes it difficult to transcend it to the level of “weather station” grading.

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<sup>288</sup> Cf. Adam and Loon, “Introduction: Repositioning Risk; the Challenge for Social Theory,” 4.

<sup>289</sup> Ahnaf et al., *Politik Lokal Dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada Dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik Dalam Konflik Keagamaan Di Sampang, Bekasi, Dan Kupang*; Bagir et al., “Laporan Tahunan 2012.”

- Determining the level of alertness, level of social vulnerability is very difficult in terms of understanding the actors and the nature of the conflicts. Is it hate speech, threat, and intimidation can be quantified as data feeding to the system?

## 9.4 Conclusion and Prospect

To address properly the above reflection is one of them through the taking of the technological intervention as a process, and to a degree, a social practice in itself. If this is truly materialized, then the risk, as metaphor and discursive entity, became something that is evolving throughout the testing process and implementation of application. Through these activities, the “risk” and “risk prevention” became another social skill, technological application, and a culture that cultivate a new discipline and practice. In other words, the engagement should take a rule of reciprocity (rather than reflexivity) of the risk as perceived by the implied society, as academic definition, and as the metaphor evolved in the technological practicing. This could not deny the very fundamental nature of risk that it is ambivalence and indeterminate. The only hope through this mode of knowledge production and technological-induced solution is the learning process among the whole element of society, the stakeholders of social integration.

Moreover, there is strong moral duty, emphatic drive (*homo empathicus*),<sup>290</sup> collaborative sensibility and consciousness, and social responsibility elements, beyond structural and instrumental approaches, on the success of the implementation of IIWS system. The late coming of digital technology into Indonesian society may also give a blessing in disguise – despite probably temporal – in which that IIWS could depend

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<sup>290</sup> Cf. Jeremy Rifkin, *The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism*, Amazon Kindle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 297ff.

on the traditional social structure to enable a more comprehensive mitigation to the interfaith conflicts.

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## EPILOG

### ICRS and a Decade of Promotion of Inter-Religious Studies 2007-2017

*Siti Syamsiyatun*

When ICRS (the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies) was founded in 2006, very few people believed in what this Consortium was envisioning. Many were skeptical about its sustainability, and others just couldn't believe—let alone understand—what it hoped to do. A Consortium comprised of an Islamic university, a Christian university and non-confessional, or multi-religious public university was something unimaginable during the time when religious identity had emerged rapidly due to the *Reformasi* era in Indonesian politics after decades of suppression under the New Order administration. This is not to suggest that interfaith or inter-religious interaction or relations was absent in Indonesian communities; quite the contrary. Indonesian people of different faith or religions have long lived side by side and mingled in their daily lives and activities: in neighbourhood, in schools, in offices, in markets, in cinemas, on beaches and other public facilities and space. Seminars and conferences on issues related to interfaith and inter-religious relations are often organized by universities, NGOs, FBOs, or government offices. However, it was uncommon, perhaps unheard of at

the time, to form a formal structure of institutions in which people of different faith work together toward the same goals. Thus the ICRS which is formed officially by three universities with different religious affiliations and academic strengths was established. The universities are the Islamic university, Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (UKDW) and Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), which is a state-owned, religiously neutral university.

Most Indonesians consider religion very important for their lives, both private and public; and so the state has observed and adopted that feeling of being attached to religion by sanctioning Indonesian state philosophy, constitution and regulations with religious values. Thus ICRS was founded to advance the study of religion in the contexts of inter-religious and intercultural conversation and exchanges, and to include the perspectives of social sciences and humanities in the discussion and study of religions, in addition to theological and doctrinal approaches. The signing of MoU of the three universities –UGM, UIN Sunan Kalijaga and UKDW was done on the 6 October 2006 by Rectors Prof. Sofian Effendi of UGM, Prof. M. Amin Abdullah of UIN Sunan Kalijaga and D. Budyanto of UKDW. Together they developed a Doctoral program in Inter-religious Studies.

The Doctoral program in Inter-Religious studies has been officially administered through the Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Studies, at Universitas Gadjah Mada, and began admitting students in September 2007. In ten years, as of January 2017, ICRS has admitted more than 80 students, coming from more than 13 countries, such as Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, India, South Korea, Bangladesh, Egypt, Libya, Gambia, Sierra Leone, USA, Poland, Serbia and Columbia. Indonesian students consist of Acehnese, Minangese, Malay, Dayaks, Javanese, Sundanese, Floresian, Mollucan, Torajan. In August 2011, the Inter-Religious Studies (IRS) program was accredited by the National Body of University Accreditation and received 'B' status, but

we later improved our performance and in 2015 the IRS Study Program was reaccredited and eventually received 'A' status from the National Body for University Accreditation. Until recently, we have educated more than 25 Doctors, many of whom are working as teaching faculty at various universities, while others serving as religious leaders (e.g. imam, priest, pastor), researchers or politicians.

Apart from offering regular courses for doctoral degrees, which is a structured 4 years learning process including writing and defending the dissertation, ICRS also conducts research and provides community services and engagements. Some of the research projects are completed, and most of them have been published in the forms of journal articles, edited volumes or books, and published in cooperation with the Globethics.net Foundation. Here are examples of our research publications:

- Embracing Merapi with Faith (2011)
- Spirituality and Merapi Disaster Relief (2011)
- Resurgence of Religions in Southeast Asia (2012)
- Character Building in Support of Keistimewaan Yogyakarta (2012)
- Ethics in the Contemporary World's Challenges (2013)
- History and Cultural Encounters of Shi'ism in Southesat Asia (2013)
- Gender and the Production of Knowledge (Television and Dakwahtainment) (2014)
- Religion, Public Policy and Social Transformation (Managing Diversity; Women, Religion and Identity; legal Pluralism and Women in Indonesia, Women, marriage and Leadership, Youth and Cyber- Religion) (2014-2017)
- Religion and Social Justice (1-Social Imaginaries in Indonesia; 2-The Politics of Minoritization, 3-Jewish Minority and Citizenship in Indonesia) (2015-2017)

In the area of community engagements and services, ICRS students and faculty have organized a number of yearly Interfaith Youth Peace Camps (IYPC) in different cities across the country. The IYPC was initiated with only students from Universitas Gadjah Mada, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga and Universitas Duta Wacana—the founders of ICRS, nowadays the IYPC has attracted more broader academic communities from many campuses around Indonesia. Another notable community services that ICRS has provided for more than five years is free access to an electronic library for students and the general public. This endeavor is made possible through the support from Globethics.net Geneva, which also sponsored the publication of this book. To celebrate our 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2016 last year, ICRS planted 1000 sengon trees at the slope of Mount Merapi, in order to improve the water springs that had been affected by the past Mount Merapi's eruption.

After seeing some of results of our study and research programs, more institutions and individuals have been attracted to build cooperation and give assistance in many different ways: they provide scholarships for students, research funds and travel or mobility grants. ICRS also receives major funding from the Ford Foundation, the Henry Luce Foundation and the United Board. The program has attracted many people and institutions and received supports from a number of individuals, institutions and funding agencies.

ICRS has received and hosted visiting professors and scholars from many international universities and institutions, and has exchange students and faculty too, such as with Duke University, Yale University, Georgetown University, George Washington University, Boston University, Temple University, GTU Berkeley, Hartford Seminary, Union Theological Seminary, National University of Singapore, Universitas Kebangsaan Malaya –IKMAS, Ateneo de Manila, Chulalongkorn University, Pranasatra University, National University of Vietnam, Myanmar Institute of Theology, International Christian

University, Japan, Leiden University, Radboud University in the Netherlands, Vienna University, Pontifical Institute for the Study of Arabic and Islam, University of Calgary, Monash University, Oxford University, University of Edinburgh, University of Peking, Shanghai University, Hong Kong Chinese University, and others. ICRS has also received students who came to ICRS for a semester or two months during 'a summer program' which is held annual during the months of June-August.

Currently ICRS enlarges and strengthens its cooperation and networking with various institutions and agencies, state owned and private, national and international. Here are a few of the examples: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Research and Higher Education, Ministry of Information and Communication, Indonesian Embassy/ Consulate General in Brussels, Helsinki, Vatikan, New York, Los Angeles, Sofia, Budapest, Paris, others. Apart from UGM, UIN Suka and UKDW, ICRS has worked in partnership with many different Indonesian national, Muslim, Christian, Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist universities and institutes, such as IAIN Antasari, IAIN Mataram, UIN Jakarta, UIN Bandung, UNJANI, PSHD Denpasar, UIN Sumatera Utara, Universitas Ahmad Yani Bandung. ICRS has been engaging foreign embassies and Institutes, notably US Embassy, Austrian Embassy, Iranian Embassy, Sadra International Institute, Dutch Embassy, French Embassy, PASIAD/ Fathullah Gullen Movement, Australian Embassy, British Embassy, New Zealand Embassy, KAICIID and Globethics.net who are based in Geneva, Switzerland.

In October 2015 the MoU between Universitas Gadjah Mada, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga and Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana for strengthening ICRS as a legal entity was renewed. Since then ICRS as a *Perkumpulan* was legalized by the Indonesian Minister of Law and Human Rights. In near future ICRS plans to enhance its

resource mobilization and build an endowment fund to ensure the sustainability of ICRS and its programs, and also to improve its quality of deliverance. ICRS welcomes assistance of any kind, be it funding or an invitation for cooperation in areas of common interests.

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