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Muslim Localizing Democracy

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Muslim localizing democracy:¹ a non-*pesantren* village in Madura as a preliminary study²

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Abstract

The political dynamic of village in Indonesian New Order has two faces. On one hand, it is conditioned by the feudalism of village's leader which is monopolized from one generation to other generations. On the other hand, religion can be an alternative to challenge this feudalism. I explore this condition through an examination of the role of *kalebun* (the village's leader) and *kiai* in a non-*pesantren* village in Madura, Indonesia. In Madura society, *kiai* and its *pesantren* take important role in the process of Islamic institutionalization. Yet, in this case, the absence of *pesantren* enforces the *kiai* to be counter-balance of the feudalism of the *kalebun*. And, the *kiai* claims that this counter-balance is on behalf of democracy. This article concludes with a discussion of the requirement of democracy in

¹ This first draft of the paper was presented in the 2nd International Conference, October 6-8, 2009 under the theme of *Islam, Democracy and Good Governance in Indonesia*, held by Training Indonesian Young Leader, Leiden University in collaboration with State Islamic Institute Walisongo, Semarang, Central Java.

² The most of data in this paper has been taken from my ethnographic book, *Kiai Langgar and Kalebun: A Study on Contestation between Cultural Brokers in a Non-Pesantren Village in Madura, Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Graduate School, UGM, 2009.

"Islamic" local politics as well as in search of good local governance in post Indonesian New Order.

Dinamika politik desa pada masa Orde Baru menghadapi dua realitas antagonis. Di satu sisi, pemerintahan desa dimonopoli oleh generasi tertentu yang melahirkan rezim feodal. Seorang Muslim, di lain sisi, berpotensi menjadi elan vital perlawanan terhadap feodalisme tersebut. Tulisan ini berupaya menggali dua kenyataan tersebut melalui analisis kepemimpinan *kalebun* (kepala desa) dan kiai di sebuah desa non-pesantren di Madura, Indonesia. Pada jamaknya, dalam masyarakat Madura, kiai dan pesantren memiliki peranan penting dalam proses institusionalisasi Islam. Namun, dalam studi ini, ketiadaan pesantren, membuat kiai (dengan langgarnya) berusaha membendung arus feodalisme *kalebun*. Sebuah temuan menarik bahwa perlawanan sang kiai tidak atas nama Islam, tetapi demi tegaknya demokratisasi di desa.

Keywords: *Madura; Non-Pesantren; Democracy; Kiai; Kalebun*

Introduction

In 1895, some *kiais* of Prajan provoked the Madurese to fight against Netherland colonial power who governed in Sampang, Madura. The Netherland ended this fighting with a battlefield that killed twenty Madurese and injured twelve others. From this event, Prajan becomes a symbol of rebellion toward the colonial power.³ This Prajan event is a proof of the *kiai's* important role in struggling colonial feudalism in the past time.

It was surprised that the *kiai* of Prajan was *kiai langgar* instead of *kiai pesantren*. *Langgar* is a small private "mosque" within a *tanean lanjang* (Madurese family houses). A *kiai langgar* usually heads a *langgar*, whereas a *kiai pesantren* has and heads one or more *pesantren*.⁴

³ Kuntowijoyo, *Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura 1850-1940*, Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002, 337-345, 592.

⁴ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World: Ulama of Madura*, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Press, 1990; Torkil Saxebøl, "The Madurese Ulama as Patrons", *Dissertation*, University of Oslo, 2002.

From this reason, the Prajan case reminds me to pay more attention to the role of *kiai langgar* in Madurese social structure.

Although recent studies on Madura have depicted the *kiai langgar*, however they subordinated the *kiai langgar* under the *kiai pesantren's* position.⁵ It opens two possibilities on the *kiai langgar's* position. First, the *kiai langgar* is the former *kiai pesantren's* pupil. Second, the *kiai langgar* is an honorable people who have indigenous (spiritual) power. Madurese call it "mak kaeh".⁶ In addition, this subordination was caused by the absence of *kiai langgar* from having *pesantren*.

In Madura, one village has one *pesantren*. Furthermore, through the *pesantren*, the *kiai pesantren* do structuration within social structure of surrounding villages. In the *pesantren*, the *kiai* teaches his *santris* with Islamic teaching, such as reading Quran, Islamic jurisprudence and Sufism. Because the *santri* comes from the surrounding villages, having graduated from the *pesantren*, they live in their village with implementing Islamic teaching educated by the *kiai*.⁷ The *santri* maintains their respect to the *kiai pesantren*. In doing so, this respect is a social capital of the *kiai's* power.

Beside the existence of Islam and *pesantren*, in some Madurese villages there exist *blater* people. Put it simply, the *blater* is a village bandit. Even though the *blater* is in opposition of the *kiai pesantren*, they make a relationship in such case as village leader election.⁸ It

⁵ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*; Torkil Saxebøl, "The Madurese Ulama".

⁶ Torkil Saxebøl, "The Madurese Ulama", 72-74.

⁷ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*; Torkil Saxebøl, "The Madurese Ulama"; Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *The Pesantren Tradition: A Study of the Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of the Traditional Ideology of Islam in Java*, Temple: Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1999; Pradjarta Dirjosanjoto, *Memelihara Umat: Kiai Pesantren-Kiai Langgar di Jawa*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1995.


⁸ Abdur Rozaki, *Menabur Kharisma Menuai Kuasa: Kiprah Kiai dan Blater sebagai Rezim Kembar di Madura*, Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2004.

shows that besides Islamizing his village, the *kiai pesantren* take a significant role in the process of democratization in his village.

What about the *kiai langgar*? Based on my fieldwork, the absence of *pesantren* enforced the *kiai langgar* to structuring his village through optimizing his *langgar* for teaching Islamic values. According to the *kiai langgar*, this action is a part of democratization in his village. In this paper, I analysis this democratization process in detail.

In the following sections, I describe the condition in which the *kiai langgar* do structuring democratization in Gapurana village. This village has been governed by a feudalist *kalebun*. To fight against the power of *kalebun*, the *kiai langgar* spreads Islamic values toward the Gapuranese people. Here, I elaborate this contestation in the case of claiming *langgar* become mosque. In the last section, I analyze this phenomenon in the context of democracy with arguing that Islam needs democracy to fight against feudalism.

Gapurana



Based on administrative territorial, Gapurana is part of Sumenep Regency, Madura, East Java. Sumenep lies in the eastern edge of Madura islands. This regency occupies two different characteristics areas. The first is Sumenep *daratan* (mainland) consists of eighteen sub regents, while the second is Sumenep *kepulauan* (sub-archipelago), consists of nine sub regents. Gapurana is one of the Sumenep *kepulauan* areas as a part of Talangoh sub regent.⁹

In fact, it is a unique potential that Gapurana locates in Poteran Island. This area plays a transitional spot that marks Sumenep *daratan* and that of the *kepulauan*. The unique of Poteran correlates to the modernity that has influenced areas in western of Poteran Island (Madura mainland) as well as the eastern of Poteran Island. Kalianget, in the western of Poteran, for example, has been a transitory area to other islands such as Borneo, Banyuwangi and Celebes. Moreover, Pagerungan in the eastern of Poteran is often called as "the small Surabaya" since its oil mining activities and production has brought the community dwellers into well-being.

The geographical performance of Gapurana also has influenced the push and pull of people's belief. When for the residents of Sumenep *daratan*, in which the *pesantren* institutions that spread in almost all villages in the area influences the making process of people belief; the eastern side of Poteran Island has been dominated by local belief, especially Sapudi. On the other hand, Gapurana compiles the contestation between the two, Islam and local belief. Indeed, this could not be separated from colonial precedent in the Dutch colonialism era.

⁹ See <http://www.sumenep.go.id>

Kiai: a past perspective

The Sumenep palace, however, has been a very influential force in shaping social structure and culture in Madura, particularly Sumenep. Observing from archeological aspect, the Sumenep palace and *Asta Tinggi* (the grave of Sumenep kings) as well as the building of *langgar* (small mosque for family) are so close with the models used in family *pura* (worshiping place) in Hindus' tradition, it opens possibility that Hindu religion has used to be influential in this area.¹⁰ It is strengthened by the tradition of *mamaca* (reading Mahabarata and Ramayana scripture), *tayuban* (local dance), strong believe in the ancestors, and the use of *primbon* as life guidance which are still part of people in the region's daily practice.

If we traced back to history of the Majapahit kingdom, many Madurese prominences have influenced its establishment. It suggested that Hindu has strong influence on Madurese belief. Put as the example, Arya Banyak Wedi or Arya Wiraraja (1269-1292) who was the founding father of the Majapahit kingdom then ascertained the belief on Buddha-Siwa as the state religion. It seems that economical reason persuaded the rise of Majapahit-Madura relationship that associated to salt trading as the main commodity of this island.¹¹

We can see the relationship between Majapahit and Madura as central and peripheral link. That is why when Islam overtakes Majapahit, the impact had also affected Madura. It is the stream of islamization over the Sumenep palace. A number of *wali* (saints), such as Sunan

¹⁰ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 7; Paul van der Veur (transl.), "Van den Berg's Essay on Muslim Clergy and the Ecclesiastical Goods in Java and Madura: A Translation," *Indonesia*, Vol. 84 (October 2007), 127-159.

¹¹ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 6; Huub de Jonge, "State and Welfare in the Late Colonial Period: The Madura Welfare Fund (1937-1941)", *AJSS*, Volume 32, Number. 1 (2004), 91-104.

Ampel, Kudus, and Sunan Giri has undertaken this process.¹²

There were at least two factors underlying the success of islamization process in Madura. The first was the making of strong bond between the *kiai* in Demak and Madura, which fostered the conversion process of the palace elite's belief into Islam. For an example was the marriage of the last *sultan* (king) of Demak's daughter with the prince of Pamadekan, Sampang, Madura.¹³ The marriage raised royal descendants who understand religion, which then called *bindara*. The second was the existence of positive connection between *rato* (king) as the royal elite and *kiai* as the local elite who live within the community.¹⁴

The question in turn is can we say that the positive correlation between the *rato* and the *kiai* is a positive effect of the islamization process? It needs to consider that before the coming of Islam, there was a big gap between the Sumenep palace and the local *kiai*. On one hand, the kingdom was a house for the aristocrats as bourgeois social group. On the other hand, the *kiai* was "rural religious leader" who has active role in religious education,¹⁵ at the same time has concerned about empowerment for welfare of the community.¹⁶

In the process of religious education and social improvement, the *kiai's* role closely relates to the institution of the *pesantren*. The *pesantren* is like a kingdom for the *kiai*. At the same time, it is a house of education for the society. Hence, the process of institutionalization of education constructs the society to respect and pay sympathy to the *kiai*. In

¹² Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 9.

¹³ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 9.

¹⁴ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 12-13.

¹⁵ Luc Nagtegaal, "The Legitimacy of Rule in Early Modern Madura", in Kees Van Dijk, Huub de Jonge and Elly Touwen-Bouwsmas (eds.), *Across Madura Strait: the Dynamics of an Insular Society*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995, 49-66.

¹⁶ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 9-12.

other words, quoting Mansurnoor's statement,¹⁷ "*Kiai* in modern Madura enjoy high prestige and wide popularity among the population."

To sum up, the islamization process in Madura connected to people empowerment efforts. The coming of Islam, on one hand, made the *rato* to realize his role as a guardian of society. Hence, the *rato* should be grateful to the *kiai*. On the other hand, the separation between the secular *rato* and the religious *kiai* was then disappeared. Moreover, at present, the position of the *rato* is also undertaken by the *kiai*' descendants.

In the process, the relationship between the *rato*, although he comes from the *kiai*' descendants, and the *kiai* in local village level, still bear a gap. The existence of the East Indies Trade Company (VOC) triggered this phenomenon through implementing the tax system and the greed characteristics of the royal families that have widened the disparity.

The *kiai langgar* of Gapurana

Kiai langgar is a term used to call a religious leader in a big family of the *tanean*. One or more prominent the *kiai langgar* usually are appointed as a *kiai* of village whose obligation to lead the village mosque. It needs to explain that the village mosque is a prayer place for which the local Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian *Ulama* Council) has legalized it. On the other hand, the *langgar* is a prayer place established by a big family of the *tanean*. How to distinguish the two is that the mosque legally used to as a place to conduct the Friday praying (*shalat Jum'at*), while the *langgar* is not.

The *kiai langgar*, in this research, is a descendant of the first Islamic preacher in Gapurana. The same as his father, the *kiai* also attempted to spread Islam in this area. There are at least three strategies used

¹⁷ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, *Islam in an Indonesia World*, 45.

by the *kiai* to teach Islam. First, he along with his two brothers taught Islam to primary school children either how to read Quran or basic knowledge of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). Second, he leads *yassinan* (reading verse of *yassin*) for the men and *dhiba'an* (reading Muhammad's history) for the women once a week. In these two programs, the *kiai* delivers advice about good and wrong deeds in Islam. Third, he resists against local rituals and beliefs that oppose to Islamic norms, like *tayuban*. The last, he conducts the Friday prayer (*shalat Jum'at*) in his *langgar*.

Before the coming of state "secular" education in this village, thanks to the efforts of the *kiai langgar's* father, Gapuranese people have been familiar to Islamic education. For them, reading Quran and learning *fiqh* has been more important than the "secular" education. It is important to note a conversation when the *kalebun* suggested Sahun's (75) daughter to go to school. Responding her advice, Sahun hide his daughter to his dry field, saying to his daughter, "*tak kera dadi apa keya, ngaji bhai, abajang, ngare' bhai, sopaje kenyang*" (what did you expect what you are to be, just read Quran, just reap, in order to full your stomach).

Kalebun in the colonial era

VOC has successfully occupied east Madura when the process of separating the Mataram kingdom took place in 1705. Because of the intervention of VOC, Mataram was divided into Kartasura and Jogjakarta. In turn, as a "reward", the king of Kartasura gave Pamekasan and Sumenep to VOC. This reward was based on the following agreement, "*Yang Mulia dengan ini secara resmi menganugerahkan dan memberikan negara Sumenep dan Pamekasan yang terletak di bagian Timur (sic) pulau Madura ke bawah perlindungan VOC*" (The majesty herewith

officially award and give the country of Sumenep and Pamekasan which lie in the eastern side of Madura island under the privilege of VOC).¹⁸

VOC gave autonomy "self-government" to the Sumenep palace. However, VOC obligate the palace to send the tax to Java, such as the contingency tax (*pajak kontingen*). This taxation force the Sumenep to propel "80 *koyan* (1 *koyan* around 10 litter) green soybean, 700 *pikul* (1 *pikul* around 13 kg) coconut oil, 30 *pikul* siwalan sugar, 20 *pikul* high quality of cotton string the same as the sample they gave earlier, 30 *pikul* dried meat, 1000 dried fish".¹⁹ This taxation system has influenced the process of power structure partition in the Sumenep palace.

Because of hard job in gathering the tax, VOC gave commissioner of Sumenep palace a large amount of land as reward, called *apanage*. Through this *apanage* system, VOC gave the commissioner authority to take the tax from laity people, besides the obligatory tax from VOC. On the other hand, the low official (*pejabat rendahan*) have only given *bengkak* (small field), a narrow dry field land.²⁰

The taxation system has changed the ruling structure among people. In the beginning, because of housing model based on the system of *tanean lanjhang*, there was no exact organizational structure in the villages. This organizational process was quite hard to apply, since *tanean lanjhang* used a pattern of grouping. The housing system grouped into certain cluster based on the extended family system. This cluster usually place in the middle of family dry field. When the commissioner was gaining control of the land, even those which lies in the hinterland, they had reformed the organizational system of society

¹⁸ Huub de Jonge, "Pembentukan Negara Dengan Kontrak: Kabupaten Sumenep, Madura, VOC dan Hindia Belanda, 1680-1883" in Huub de Jonge (ed.), *Agama, Kebudayaan dan Ekonomi*, Jakarta: Rajawali, 1989, 8.

¹⁹ Huub de Jonge, "Pembentukan Negara", 9-14.

²⁰ Huub de Jonge, "Pembentukan Negara", 9-14.

(*tanean lanjhang*) in order to gain tax more easily.²¹

The ruling elite of the kingdom, in turn, officially appointed the *lurah* (governmental head of village) whose task to ensure that people do serve those who have *apanage*, for example in wood cutting, and gathering grass to feed the cattle of the commissioners. Besides the *lurah*, there was also a traditional leader whose job to take the tax from people. The traditional leader was in fact a leader in one *tanean lanjhang* who has used to lead ceremonial and rituals, called *kalebun*. The commissioners did not appoint this leader, thus his social status is lower than that of the *lurah*.²² Conversely, at present, the *kalebun* is used to refer to the title of village head officer, which is prestigious both as ritual and as social leader.

The *kalebun* of Gapurana

The *kalebun* of Gapurana is *kalebun* of posterity (generated from one descendant to the other). The current *kalebun* is the fifth generation, whereas the first *kalebun* might have lived around 120 years ago. The local community had appointed him, as the fourth *kalebun* told me:

Waktu itu, siang hari, kakek buyut saya seperti biasa pergi mencari rumput. Saat mengambil rumput yang telah dipotong, tiba-tiba sekelompok warga mendatangnya. Rupanya, mereka meminta kakek buyut saya untuk jadi pemimpin mereka. Kakek saya mau, tapi dengan syarat, keturunannya akan terus dipilih menjadi kalebun. Warga menyetujuinya, dan sampai sekarang, alhamdulillah, semua keturunannya masih menjadi kalebun.

At that time, my grand grandfather as usual was going to grassing. After he gathered all the grass he cut, many people came, asking

²¹ Huub de Jonge, "Pembentukan Negara", 5-10; Kuntowijoyo, *Perubahan Sosial*; Latief Wiyata, *Carok: Konflik Kekerasan dan Harga Diri Orang Madura*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002.

²² Elly Touwen-Bouwisma, "Kepala Desa Madura: dari Boneka ke Wiraswasta", in Huub de Jonge (ed.), *Agama, Kebudayaan dan Ekonomi*, Jakarta: Rajawali, 1989, 138-144.

him to be their leader. He agreed with a condition, that his descendants would replace him as the *kalebun* after his death. The people agreed, and until now, thank God, all his descendants are still hold the position.

When election time of the village leader comes, the *kalebun* cited this story repeatedly. Moreover, the *kalebun* has kept the *celurit* (the Madurese traditional sickle) of the first *kalebun*, which is used to campaign. The *kalebun* claims that the authorized power over Gapurana lies on the hand of the lord of this *celurit*. In brief, from only a story, the narrative is presently become a political tools to legitimize power.

The second until the fifth *kalebun* politicize the belief on the *celurit* as the philosophical basis of their governmental policy. They believe that ruling is similar to cut grass using the *celurit*, meaning the ruler has to be able to cut the disturbance of meadows to keep the crops. Because of this ruling model, people feel fearful to the *kalebun*, particularly the third and the fourth *kalebun*, because the two *kalebun* governed by dictatorship model.

The first four *kalebun* were men, however the fifth *kalebun* is a woman. The interesting thing about this fifth is that she is not a direct descendant of the *kalebuns*. She is the wife of the fourth *kalebun*'s son (*numpang katera'an*). The son of the fourth *kalebun* can not be elected as *kalebun* since he has already been a civil servant.

From generation to the next generation, the *kalebun* of Gapurana have been supporting the tradition of *tayub*. In Madura island, Gapurana have been known as the field of *tayub* (*ladang tayub*), because *tayub* would be held in this village on *nimbere'* season (dry season). *Tayub* is recognized as representative of *kalebun*'s tradition.

***Tayub*: a *kalebun*'s tradition**

Tayuban is an art performance which always be presented in all wedding ceremony in Gapurana village. The Gapuranese people claim this village as "*ladang para tandak*" (the field of *tayub* dancers). The season of *nimbere'* (west) is a yield season for *tandaks* (*tayub* dancers), since at the season many people held wedding ceremony. For the only next year ceremony, the *kalebun* has listed 48 families that will hold this big ceremony. When I was in Gapurana, one who held the ceremony was Mat Tiken (65 years old).

There are four sequential series in a wedding ceremony. The first is *melekan* (stay up all nights), which is held thirty days before the wedding. The family and relatives of the ceremony owner gathered in his house talking about the planning for the wedding, or just drank the coffee. The second is *taruban* (Madurese temporary structure/ grandstand for wedding), where people gathered to stand the *tarub* (stage). This agenda is held three days before the ceremony. The third is *berasan* (giving rice to the wedding organizer), held one day before the day. The women come to give three *gantang* (around 10 kg) of rice. In this session, crowded musical was played. Gapuranese called it the music of man. The fourth is *resepsi* (wedding reception), which is the main agenda. In this occasion, *tayuban* is played as a favorite performance for the Gapuranese villagers.

The wedding stage is as large as football field. Two third of the arena used as the reception place, the rest is used as kitchen which is in the backside. The organizer designs the stage in such a similar to a palace. They divide the space into two rooms within it. The first is the room for the bride couple and women, while the other is used for *tayub* stage where men sitting around the stage. All the guest visitors sit cross-legs on the floor.

That morning, the wedding ceremony in the house of Mat Tiken was held at 09.00 a.m. The agenda was begun with some formal talks and introduction agenda, which was cited in a song by a *gelandang* of the agenda, was meant to wait the guests also. This agenda lasted in about four hours. The invited-men attended by dressing in cap on top and *sarong* to replace the pants. While the women dressing in long clothes and silk dresses with head cover. When the mealtime came, the men who did not want to have dance with *tandak* should go outside, watching the agenda from the distance; on the other hand, those who want to dance, they should prepare themselves with 50.000 up to 500.000 rupiahs and then they give it to the *tandak*. The Gapuranese people call it *nyawer*.

On 12:00 am., the *gelandang* who earlier had been singing while sitting, now standing and going up to the stage. The *gelandang* introduced *tandaks* who were there, then brought them to the wedding owners who sit in front of the door welcoming the guests. Two of the *tandaks* sat on the left and right side of the house owners. In that occasion, the *tandak* were Ahwani and Suhadie, the most popular *tandak* in Madura.

The *gelandang* was then teasing the house owner, hanging the hands of the two *tandak* and holding them on his neck. The *gelandang* asked the wedding owner to kiss the *tandaks*, yet his face was blushing. Giving some ten thousand, the wedding owner was in turn held by the *tandaks* to the stage. The main performance just began.

Along with the two *tandaks*, Mat Tiken and the *gelandang* sang a song. They sang the song entitled "*Sri: Kapan Kowe Bal!*" (Sri: when do you go home) in Madurese version. After a while, the guests who wanted to do *nyawer* (giving money ex gratia) walking up to the stage. Standing around the *tandaks*, those people were dancing, at the same time giving some thousands rupiahs until the song was end.

After a song was finished, the guests sat back. Some minutes later, the *tandaks* showed their action, they walk around the men seat. Suddenly, a *tandak* gave her shawl on the *kalebun's* husband neck. He paid ten thousand rupiahs, and then went up to the stage with the *tandak*, dancing, and giving her money once again up to one song ended up. The more prestige the one on the stage owned, the more people did *nyawer*. The performance lasted on 4.00 pm, after about fourteen songs were played.²³

Mosquing the *langgar*

The *kiai langgar* attempts to re-establish his father *dakwah* (proselytizing) efforts. However, the absence of the *pesantren* makes him find it hard to spread the knowledge about Islam in Gapurana village. It is likely that the existence of *Madrasah Ibtida'iyah* (Islamic school in the primary level) as a medium to reproduce Islamic teaching cannot block the negative effect of *tayuban*. For this, the *kiai* establishes actions to resist to the situation.

The main resistance was getting out from the village mosque board. As I already mentioned, the village mosque is the valid mosque which was appointed by MUI to held Friday prayer, and all activities to celebrate Islamic days. To organize the village mosque, *kalebun* appointed some Muslim prominences of Gapurana. *Kiai langgar* was one of them and one of the main boards. When he got out the leader of main board was then lead by *kalebun* herself.

Steeping out of the mosque boards, *kiai langgar* declared his *langgar* as mosque. He invited the community around his *langgar* to pray Friday prayer there. If the Friday prayer in the village mosque hardly

²³ Compare to Robert Hefner, "The Politics of Popular Art: Tayuban Dance and Culture Change in East Java", *Indonesia*, Volume 43 (April 1987), 75-94.

participated by women, Friday prayer in the *kiai langgar's* is the opposite. The Friday prayer participants are dominated by women, children, and elderly people.

The village mosque followers (*jama'a*) could not accept the declaration. *Kalebun* tried to invite the local Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) to solve the problem. In a meeting which was attended by the mosque boards, MUI dan *kiai langgar*, MUI asserted that the declaration was invalid. All prayers the people performed in it were also unaccepted. The basis of MUI statement was Imam Syafi'i's argument, should not there two Friday prayers held in one village with a close distance.

Kiai langgar disregarded this pronouncement. In the name of democracy, he argued that it was his rights to hold a Friday prayer, since all the requirements were fulfilled, those who attend the prayer more than forty people. Up until now, he still conducts Friday prayer in his *langgar*.

This accomplishment provoked the people's anger. Some mosque's *jama'a* reminded the old people who were going to *langgar*. A number of youngsters even planned to burn the *langgar*, yet it was not committed until now. *Kalebun* decided to keep silent.

On behalf of democracy: lesson from the -*kiai langgar*

The argument of democracy which *kiai langgar* has asserted is an interesting point. On the one hand, *kiai langgar* wants to contend the ritual of *tayuban* which brings many bad effects with the triumph of Islamic structuration process which is true according to him. On the other hand, *kiai langgar* tries to show that the narration of Islam in Gapurana is not one, which could not be monopolized by the Islamic village mosque only. Democracy, hence, gives an alternative Islam as an option besides the mainstream Islam in Gapurana.

The Islam of *kiai langgar* was also a tool to obstruct the feudalism stream of the *kalebun* in Gapurana. As I mentioned earlier, the *kalebun* of Gapurana is chosen by posterity (generated from one descendant to the other). This long structuring process of *kalebun* in Gapurana made the generation of the *kalebun* as *rato*. *Rato*, in Madura social structure, is the descendants of the royal palace that should be honored.²⁴ On the other side, the mosque Islam, in this point, is the backing power of the *kalebun* of Gapurana. For that, those who pray in the mosque are also supporters of the *tayuban* rites which economically troubled the people of Gapurana.

The case of *kiai langgar* also convinces that politics is a struggle to set the process of democratization.²⁵ Democracy by this definition is a process. As a process, democracy is always in the condition that happening-in-progress. Thus, democracy is a process to struggle for a change.

Mosquing the *langgar* to blockade the negative stream of *tayuban* implied a process of hermeneutical democracy in Islam. If Islam needs democracy, and democracy requires secularism, the process of Islamic democracy goes hand in hand with secularism. This supports the thesis of Nader Hashemi, "... a secular consensus often emerges as a result of an engagement with and a transformation of religious ideas toward politics."²⁶ In the case of *kiai langgar*, the transformation process of mosquing the *langgar* is a local politics initiation to block the *tayub*.

The *kiai langgar* democratization, in the one hand brings a positive result because it can defend the stream of feudalism, and gives good

²⁴ Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, "Rato and Kiai in Madura: Are They Twins?", in Kees Van Dijk, Huub de Jonge and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (eds.), *Across Madura Strait: the Dynamics of an Insular Society*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995.

²⁵ Goenawan Mohamad, "Demokrasi dan Disilusi", in Ihsan Ali Fauzi (ed.), *Demokrasi dan Kekecewaan*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 2009.

²⁶ Nader Hashemi, *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

alternative to local governance. On the other hand, it raises an ambiguity. The ambiguity is because the democratization of the *kiai langgar* will be trapped in the process of Islamisation while forget the process of humanization.

Even though it is happened on the village level, the *kiai langgar* could be a picture of micro democratization in Indonesia. Collusion, corruption, nepotism and other feudalism cultures are often solved by Islamic values. Unfortunately, these were not followed by the process of objectifying Islamic values for humanity. However, it often offers Islam as the solution from the ideological side only, like building Islamic caliph in Indonesia or implementing *sharia* in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The governance system of Indonesian New Order has influenced the system of villages in Indonesia. Gapurana is one of many examples. Put is simply, this system characterized by the word "feudalism". Corruption, collusion and nepotism are the negative effects of this feudalism.

On the other hand, Islam can be an alternative to resist this feudalism. However, Islam needs democracy to do this. Democracy is needed to prevent Islam trap into the new feudalism, because democracy requires the dynamic struggle to get justice.

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