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HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Analyses

- Kenya's internal displacement: impunity again?
- Darfur manoeuvring. Lest we forget the root causes

News and events

Resources

Kenya's internal displacement: impunity again?

Until recently Kenya was (mis)perceived as an island of stability in the troubled Horn and Great Lakes Region. The disputed presidential election of 27 December 2007 changed this; horrific violence occurred within a struggle between the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a struggle largely over Kenya's highly centralised state power. The government of Mwai Kibaki (PNU) manipulated the election results to stay in power and unleashed appalling police brutality against opposition supporters. For its part, the opposition led by Raila Odinga (ODM) used militias to systematically kill and displace PNU supporters. In turn, PNU militias counter-attacked, generating even more displacement across the country.

On 28 February 2008 after concerted efforts by former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan and many others and after over 1.000 people were killed and over approximately 600.000 displaced, a power-sharing agreement was reached between the two fighting parties. As part of this agreement the parties will split power between a President as head of state and a Prime Minister as head of government. Other elements of the agreement include a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission for parliament to establish as well as a Commission of Inquiry into the more recent violence. These are small hopeful signs that Kenya is moving back on the right path.

To understand the potential roadblocks and pitfalls ahead for Kenya, it is critical to analyse past cycles of violence and the lessons learned. While the country did not go through civil war as other African countries, it has experienced large-scale violence with the advent of multi-party politics starting in 1991. Ample evidence exists that multi-party politics without reform of a repressive state apparatus and weak rule of law actually created incentives for players within the dominant Kenya African National Union (KANU) party to use violence to "win" elections. This is indeed where Kenya's post-colonial internal displacement crisis started.

Displacement has ever since become part of electoral strategy. Strongmen politicians disenfranchise opposition voters and use the "liberated" land as patronage for supporters. This politic of displacement and hate subverts democratic politics by dividing communities and instilling fear and mistrust, which precludes multi-ethnic coalitions

and issues-based politics. It also leaves deep divisions, leads to economic destruction, exacerbates already unacceptably high poverty rates, aggravates environmental degradation and land problems and sets the scene for future violence as we saw in the last electoral cycle.

After many years of such violence in Kenya in the 1990s, around 400.000 displaced people existed by 2002 when a new National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) government headed by Mwai Kibaki came to power. The hope of many of the displaced was that with the old dominant and dictatorial KANU party defeated, the new government would start to address this humanitarian catastrophe and actively create solutions to long-term problems linked to the internal displacement in the country. Sadly, out of political expediency, NaRC folded into its coalition key perpetrators of the violence and thus effectively ignored the 1999 Akiwumi Commission Report that urged prosecution of these culprits. The Government also shelved the plans for a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission that its own task force recommended in 2003.

The current situation differs from the NaRC government years in a number of ways. First, with Kenya on the brink, unprecedented international and civil society scrutiny exists over the new power-sharing agreements. Secondly, investigations into the violence and a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission are a key and public part of the agreement. Thirdly, the scale of the displacement is such that it is impossible to claim as many NaRC government officials did that IDPs did not exist or numbered in the tens of thousands. Another difference is that Kenya has ratified the Pact on Security, Stability and Development formulated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR).[1] This creates an international obligation for Kenya to uphold the rights of the displaced codified in the Protocol on Internal Displacement in the Pact. This may provide more leverage in advocacy efforts.

Still reasons exist to be concerned. Indeed, we may see a repeat of the past including impunity for the perpetrators and neglect of the victims. First, international attention and focus wanes quickly. Secondly and most importantly, as the new government includes perpetrators at high levels on both sides of the PNU/ODM divide, a strong incentive exists to repeat past patterns of impunity. This would include running a Commission of Inquiry into the violence and then as with the Akiwumi Commission, delaying the report and failing to prosecute anyone, hoping that people "forget the past". Since the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission starts with injustices in 1963 it could equally take a long time before anyone gets around to the recent past. In the mean time, if Kenya's international obligations remain obscure and civil society fails to advocate vigorously enough for the displaced, then we will see neglect of the displaced and in fact a violation of their rights. This official forgetting would feed a climate of impunity.

President Kibaki's statement, recorded in *The Standard* on 13 March 2008, that the displaced should "return to their homes" and "that the violence that rocked the country was a thing of the past" is not encouraging. Kibaki's statement suggests that the approach will – once again – involve ignoring 1) the voices and concerns of the displaced themselves, 2) the enormity of the problems created in communities torn apart by the violence and displacement and in host communities and 3) the need for careful policy which adheres to international standards and legal obligations to the displaced. Such standards include providing the displaced with adequate security and alternatives to returning to places where they are likely to face emotional trauma and violence again.

Unless, this time civil society and reformist parliamentarians, with support from trans-national advocates for the displaced, strengthen their networks, policy capacity and voice and effectively exert pressure on the government, history is likely to be repeated. What this would mean is that political incentives to use violence and displacement will continue and in fact be reinforced by yet another round of impunity. We can then expect more violence in the next electoral cycle, especially by those rewarded this time round.

Fortunately, some strategies are available for those concerned with the displaced. First, the National IDP Network needs to be supported and strengthened to allow IDP voices to be heard and rights bolstered in both relief initiatives and policy. Secondly, civil society

should monitor investigations into the violence and generate their own. Where possible they should push for the continuation of travel ban and other sanctions on key culprits including ideally prosecution. Thirdly, parliament should pass key legislation against Hate Speech and also incorporate the IDP Protocol into national legislation as is required by their signing of the IC/GLR Pact. This would provide a legal framework for advocacy efforts and also serve the purpose of increasing awareness and debate about IDP Policy in parliament. This would make it harder for Kenya to move once again towards impunity and potential destruction, but the timeframe is short: one more electoral cycle.

Jacqueline Klopp
Assistant Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, NY

[1] The text of the Pact can be found at: *f http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/60ECE277A8EDA2DDC12572FB002BBDA7/$file/Great%20Lakes%20pact_en.pdf*

Darfur manoeuvring. Lest we forget the root causes

In 1996 at a meeting with the Sudanese Society in Uppsala, Professor R. S. O'Fahey, one of the foremost authorities on the history of Darfur, told his audience that "perhaps the southern problem will not take so long time to be settled, but the other more intractable one will be that of Darfur." At that time the Sudanese authorities described what was happening in Darfur as the "work of banditry". While some observers shared that view, at that time even the most pessimistic people could not have imagined the present political crisis and humanitarian catastrophe into which the Darfur region has descended. Historians like O'Fahey look into matters from a holistic perspective and discern the root causes of the crisis that lie beneath its symptoms. Today's problems in Darfur have already upset the political, economic and social systems back in history. Unfortunately, domestic and regional power struggles as well as political and military manoeuvring by all parties have, over time, turned the side-effects of the crisis, namely insecurity, ethnic and identity problems, into the main issues. Now some people consider these side-effects as the major sources of the crisis.

However, certain recent developments remind us of the root causes that have to be addressed without, of course, overlooking urgent matters such as the re-establishing of security and the stopping of bloodshed. In particular, observations and views expressed by the UN special envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, illustrate the international community's change of priorities and seriousness towards addressing the roots of the crisis. In December of last year he had an important meeting with leaders of the Fur tribe in the refugee camps – that are among the largest in the region – in a bid to persuade them to join the next peace talks. They agreed on the condition that they would be allowed to return to their land that was occupied by foreign elements and would receive proper compensations for the damage to their villages and loss of property. These leaders and the inhabitants of the camps are supporters of Abd al-Wahid M. Nur (Sudan Liberation Army/Movement – SLA/M), the faction leader who refused to join the peace talks and is now making the same demands. Later Eliasson called for the participation of representatives of the refugee camps in peace talks so that they could explain their demands, and also suggested the participation of the "Arab" tribes in the talks. Bringing the issue of land to the forefront with both the Fur and "Arab" tribes is, in fact, a crucial step towards tackling the primary structural economic issue in the region; specifically, what is known as the *hawakir* problem. In simple terms, *hawakir* refers to lands historically owned by a tribe albeit immigrant groups from other tribes were allocated pieces of land by the tribe's chief to stay in it and use it. These immigrant groups are traditionally conceived as "guests" by

the tribe that owns the land. This holds true for both the Fur tribe and the large "Arab" tribes in the southern part of Darfur, and became an established system of economic and social coexistence for centuries. Relations between farmers (the majority of them Fur) and nomadic tribes like cattle herders, particularly with regard to pasture and passages for cattle during certain seasons, were historically well regulated and conflicts were negotiated in tribal conferences.

Now, given the fact that the whole region has been left by the state to its traditional economy, and that in recent decades environmental factors and draughts have considerably contributed to the disruption of this traditional way of life in Darfur, a planned structural work to develop the region has yet to be done. Instead, however, political factors intervened in the *hawakir* old order when "guests" were given full rights to the land and outsiders were allowed to occupy the land of the refugees in order to create loyalties in the ongoing power struggle, which has indeed touched a sensitive cord in the historical pattern of life in Darfur. This political intervention practically began in the mid 1990s when Dawood Bolad from the Fur tribe and an active member in the Islamist organization, joined Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) and led military units into Darfur, but was defeated, captured and executed by the army. Another serious outcome of this political intervention was that it dealt a fatal blow to long-standing traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in the Darfurian multiethnic and multilingual society. This is one reason why the majority of Sudanese political parties, veteran politicians and tribal chiefs have for some time been raising the idea of convening a conference that brings together all parties in Darfur in order to discuss the crisis. The suggestions by Eliasson actually indirectly support this idea, which would be a very positive move if the international community put its weight behind it.

At least three factors support the feasibility of this conference. First, there are no big differences between the general demands raised by the rebels and the Sudanese political establishment including both the government and the opposition powers. Second, the common demands of the rebels for a just share of political power and of the country's economic resources have, in fact, been voiced by Darfurian political movements, such as the Darfur Development Front in the 1960s and the National Federal Party since the mid 1980s; the former, in particular, was opened to all Darfurians including the "Arabs". Therefore, despite the state of factionalism among the rebels, it could be possible, with some effort by veteran politicians from Darfur and other political parties, to unite them around their common demands and bring other non-military organizations to participate in the conference. Third, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) actually encompasses the rebels' demands and – despite certain reservations – it was accepted by the main political powers in the country and the rebels. This should facilitate reaching a common ground between all parties, particularly in view of the good relations between SPLM and both the rebels and the major political players in the country.

Mohamed Abusabib
Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University

NEWS

SUDAN

Abyei region remains source of conflict

At least 70 people were killed in clashes between Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) units and fighters from the Misseriya community in the oil-rich Abyei region on 1 March. Only a week later (on 9 March), fresh fighting was reported to have occurred between Arab nomads and former southern rebels. These

battles were only the latest in a series of incidents in the region straddling northern and southern Sudan. Tensions in the border region are related to the failure of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and the SPLM in the south to reach an agreement on the demarcation of the borders of Abyei. While the SPLM believes that the report of the Abyei Boundary Commission was final and binding, the NCP rejects it. Abyei's status was left unresolved in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Abyei is supposed to vote on whether to join north or south Sudan in 2011.

IRIN, Sudan Tribune, Reuters, Gurtong

Sudan's Episcopal Church has new head

The Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS) has elected Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul as its new head succeeding Archbishop Joseph Marona, who retired on 31 December 2007. Addressing the Synod following his election, Archbishop Bul pledged to work together with all people of God to build up the country and unite its people: "We should not be divided along tribal lines. We are Christians. We should lead our people in peace." The Archbishop-elect moreover declared his readiness to work with the Church's partners to rebuild the nation.

CISA (Catholic Information Service for Africa)

Catholic Diocese of Torit (Eastern Equatoria) tours Magwi County

In a press release following a tour in Magwi County to welcome returnees from exile and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, Bishop Akio Johnson Mutek voiced concerns over social conditions and conflict risks. During his tour, the main areas of concern expressed by the local authorities, aid agencies and the returning population were the shortage of water, insufficient food assistance and inadequate health care provision to returnees. People moreover expressed fear of insecurity related to the influx of large herds of cattle into the county from the north. Cultivation being the main source of livelihood in the area, a large number of cattle moving into the area means that conflict between cattle keepers and farmers is inevitable. Another problem is landmines and stockpiles of unexploded ordinances in schools and churches. The Bishop called on the Government, community-based organisations, donors and partners of the Catholic Diocese of Torit (CDOT) to treat these issues as a matter of urgency.

Press Release, CDOT, 6 March 2008

Sudan's national census to start on 15 April

The fifth Sudan Population and Housing Census will begin on 15 April and last for two weeks. The first all inclusive census for people of Southern Sudan since independence in 1956 is part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in which it was agreed that a census should be held ahead of elections and a national referendum to decide between self-determination or unity of Sudan. The Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation was mandated to carry out census activities in southern Sudan while the Central Bureau of Statistics in Khartoum is in charge of northern Sudan.

The political census holds significant importance to people of southern Sudan for the redistribution and sharing of power and resources between the north and the south. The census faces a number of challenges, which were discussed by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in early March. Technical and political challenges include inter alia lack of sufficient funds for public mobilisation and training of census enumerators, insecurity, and inadequate personnel to carry out the enumeration. Another critical issue is how the southern Sudanese Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) currently living in the north would be counted.

Sudan Tribune, Reuters, The Nation (Nairobi)

Sudan re-imposes censorship on newspapers

Sudanese authorities have re-imposed daily censorship of newspapers after the papers published reports accusing the Government of backing Chadian rebels, journalists and a security official said on 6 March. Sudan had eased press censorship after a new constitution put in place in 2005 guaranteed freedom of the press. According to journalists, security agents visit the newspapers every evening and take out what they deem to be sensitive material. The Government's step has further strained its already tense relations with privately owned newspapers.

Reuters

SOMALIA

Security Council extends authorisation of AMISOM

On 20 February, the UN Security Council (SC) authorised a six-month extension for African Union (AU) peacekeepers, known as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Though the force gets its mandate from the AU it also needs authorisation from the UN, partly to exempt it from an arms embargo on Somalia. By unanimous decision, the Council urged AU member states to contribute to the mission that so far only consists of 1.600 Ugandan and 200 Burundian troops out of planned 8.000.

Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) welcomed the decision, but emphasized that more needed to be done to restore peace and stability in the country. Abdi Haji Gobdon, a TFG spokesman, said "only a much stronger and robust UN force can make a difference to the Somali situation." The Somali Government and the AU had appealed to the SC to send a peacekeeping force that would replace AMISOM. However, SC delayed a response, awaiting a report by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on peacekeeping prospects in Somalia.

Somali civil society groups consider the extension of AMISOM "of little value". A civil society representative in Mogadishu told IRIN that the deployment of any force would not make a difference "as long as there is no genuine political process of reconciliation and dialogue."

Reuters, IRIN, UN News Service

Journalists face deliberate and systematic attacks

According to a recent Amnesty International report (see Resources), Somali journalists trying to report on the continuing conflict in the war-torn country face repression of the worst kind since the overthrow of the Siyad Barre Government in 1991. "The killings, arrests and death threats targeting Somali journalists are not just another unfortunate by-product of the conflict and general insecurity in Somalia – they are a deliberate and systematic attempt by all parties to the conflict to stem the flow of information out of the country," said Michelle Kagari, Deputy Director of Amnesty International's Africa Programme. Since February 2007 nine journalists have been killed. Death threats and arrests have forced at least 50 journalists to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.

Press Release Amnesty International, 3 March 2008

Prime Minister says he is backing broad-based reconciliation

The Prime Minister of Somalia's Interim Government, Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein, has called upon the country's various opposition groups to open a dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). At a press conference on 12 March he stated that the TFG would follow a two-tier reconciliation process. One phase of the reconciliation would focus on "community reconciliation" aimed at achieving a genuine reconciliation process that could settle conflicts among Somalia's competing clans. In the second phase the Government would pursue "political

reconciliation" with members of armed and unarmed opposition groups. He also said that President Yusuf fully supported this reconciliation process. The Prime Minister reiterated his stance that the Ethiopian army would leave Somali soil "only when Somalis make peace among them themselves."

Garowe online, IRIN

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

UNMEE troops relocate temporarily to Ethiopia

In recent weeks, UN peacekeepers stationed in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) inside Eritrea have started to relocate to Ethiopia due to a lack of fuel and food supplies. While Eritrea shut off fuel supplies in December, the Eritrean commercial company supplying rations to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) said in mid-February that it would no longer fulfil its contractual obligations. The Eritrean Government allegedly turned against the mission because of the perceived inability of the UN to enforce the decision of the independent Boundary Commission.

At an emergency session the UN Security Council (SC) condemned Eritrea's "lack of cooperation", held it responsible for the mission's safety, and demanded that it ends all restrictions. Asmara in turn dismissed the charges and accused UN peacekeeping officials and the Secretary General's office of making "unwarranted accusations" and "distorting the reality" of the UN mission. Furthermore, Eritrean's Foreign Minister accused the UN of instituting a deliberate smear campaign against his country.

In a special report to the SC (see Resources), UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged the SC to take up the border dispute, which could escalate in the Horn of Africa if left unresolved.

UN News Service, Reuters

ERITREA

Release of Evangelical Christians

Towards the end of February, Eritrean Security services released 35 evangelical Christians in the port city of Massawa after holding them in custody for six weeks at a local police station. All of the jailed Protestants were members of the Government-banned Faith of Christ Church. The 35 men and women had been worshipping in a private home on 6 January when security officials raided the house and arrested those present. A couple of days earlier, 10 members of the Full Gospel Church who had been incarcerated for five years in the Assab military prison were released on bail.

Eritrea outlawed its rapidly growing independent Protestant churches in May 2002, closing their buildings and banning them from meeting together even in private homes. Last week local sources also reported the death in prison of the leader of some 70 Eritrean Muslims jailed for more than two years for opposing the Government-installed mufti of Eritrea, Sheikh al-Amin Osman. Half of Eritrea's population are from an Muslim background.

Sudan Tribune

KENYA

Churches' role hampered by political and ethnic divisions

Church leaders have publicly acknowledged they were partisan prior to Kenya's December elections and were unable to mediate in the ensuing political crisis. Leaders – speaking under the umbrella body of the National Council of Churches of

Kenya (NCCK) – said they did not speak in one voice, could not agree on the way elections should be managed, and identified with their ethnic communities during the campaigns. The divisions were also carried forward after the elections.

The churches' shortcomings were also taken up by the World Council of Churches (WCC). Secretary General Rev. Samuel Kobia said in his report to the WCC's central committee on 14 February that "many Kenyan church leaders are polarised along ethnic and political lines, making their voices less credible and limiting their ability to claim a moral high ground." He also pointed to issues that were lurking below the surface for a long time, ready to boil over at a moment's provocation.

ENI (Ecumenical News International); Catholic Information Service for Africa

Kenyan churches welcome agreement to end post-election crisis

Church leaders in Kenya have welcomed the announcement of a power-sharing agreement between President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga as an important step in ending a two-month political crisis. Talking to Ecumenical News International (ENI) on 28 February, Rev. Peter Karanja, Secretary General of NCCK considered the agreement an important starting point for tackling Kenya's crisis: "Any agreement signed between the top portends goods and peace for the country. It is a framework for starting the work on the real issues."

ENI

UGANDA

Peace process between the Ugandan Government and the LRA

During the end of February and the beginning of March a number of agreements were signed between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan Government. The signing of the final peace agreement is now expected to take place on 28 March. The signing of the final agreement would then mark the beginning of a month's transition period, after which disarmament of the LRA should begin, according to a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration agreement that was signed between the parties on 29 February.

According to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annexure, signed on 19 February, a special division of the Ugandan high court shall be established in order to try individuals responsible for the most serious crimes during the conflict. This in an attempt to invoke the International Criminal Court (ICC) principle of complimentarity, as LRA leader Joseph Kony reportedly refuses to sign a final agreement until the arrest warrants placed on him by the ICC are dropped. Similar calls have also been raised from Kony and the LRA asking the Government of Uganda to approach the Security Council to request the ICC defer of all investigatory and prosecution procedures.

What is deemed to be a great step forward in the peace process is, however, somehow tainted by reports of continued clashes between the LRA and Ugandan Government troops, and attacks by the LRA on civilians in both Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Voices, such as that of the Executive Secretary of the Catholic Justice and Peace Council in the Ecclesiastical Province of Gulu, northern Uganda, are now asking the Government of Uganda and the LRA to ensure that the peace talks move faster and bear fruit.

New Vision, Ugandan Government Media Centre, Daily Monitor, Reuters, ST and USIP

ICC workshops in Ugandan Acholi sub-region

The International Criminal Court's (ICC) field Outreach Unit, in collaboration with the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) and a local NGO, concluded two workshops in the Pader and Kitgum districts of the Acholi sub-region on 15 and 18 February 2008.

Key themes included an explanation of the role and work of the ICC, the role and rights of victims, and how the Outreach information dissemination mechanism works.

The workshops attracted over 90 local leaders, including women drawn from 19 sub-counties of the Pader and Kitgum districts. These two districts are among the four areas of the Acholi sub-region that have suffered severely since the conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan Government began.

As well as local leaders, some Government representatives including the resident district commissioners took an active part in the deliberations. They pledged their continued support and commitment to assist in disseminating accurate information about the ICC, and urged the Outreach Unit to continue directly targeting communities at the grassroots level.

The ICC press releases

RESOURCES

GENERAL

The Responsibility to Protect

"Responsibility to Protect, the ICC and stopping atrocities in the world" (ENOUGH Strategy Paper # 13, February 2008)

John Prendergast and Lisa Rogoff explore what the initiatives of the Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court mean in reality, using the cases of Uganda, Sudan and the DR Congo.

www.enoughproject.org/reports/responsibility

"The Responsibility to Protect as an element of peace. Recommendations for its operationalisation" (Development and Peace Foundation, Policy Paper 28, December 2007)

Sabine von Schorlemer, Professor of International Law, European Union Law and International Relations, explores strategies for the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect.

www.sef-bonn.org/download/publikationen/policy_paper/pp_28_en.pdf

SUDAN

Sudan Peace and Democracy Watch

The Sudan Peace and Democracy Watch is a regular update by Omer Ismail on efforts to implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), to achieve a lasting peace for Darfur, and to promote the democratic transformation of Sudan.

www.enoughproject.org/sudanwatch

"Reclaiming Common Ground: Addressing Long-Term Challenges to Peace in Darfur. A consultation with members of the North American Darfurian diaspora community" (12-14 February 2008)

This briefing by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) summarises a discussion on issues related to the Darfur crisis among 30 Darfurians residing in North America, who were gathered together by USIP in collaboration with Concordis International and the preparatory committee for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).

http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/darfur_diaspora.pdf

Abyei matters

In his article "Why Abyei matters. The breaking point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement?" Douglas H. Johnson explores the history of the Abyei issue, how it was dealt with in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and what implications a failure to implement the Abyei Protocol could have.
In: African Affairs 2008, 107 (426), pp. 1-19

"Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis" (13 March 2008)

The latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group (ICG) describes how a crisis over the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) at the end of 2007 was settled, but notes that the underlying problems still threaten the deal that ended the generation-long civil war.
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5329&l=1

Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 14 February

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm

"Echo effects. Chadian instability and the Darfur conflict" (February 2008)

This Sudan Issue brief (published by the Small Arms Survey) explores the inter-relationships between the Chadian and Darfurian crises.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%209%20Chadian%20instability.pdf

SOMALIA

"Journalists under attack"

Amnesty International report on the situation of journalists in Somalia.
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR52/001/2008

KENYA

New International Crisis Group (ICG) report on the post-election crisis: "Kenya in crisis" (21 February 2008)

www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5316&l=1

"Kenya: The December 2007 Elections and the Challenges Ahead" (15 February 2008)

In this report published by the Congressional Research Service, Ted Dagne gives an overview of the crisis after the December elections.
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34378.pdf

"Kenya – containing a rebounding crisis" (ENOUGH Strategy Paper # 14, February 2008) by Gayle Smith.

http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/kenyacrisis.pdf

"Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya"

This paper by PhD student Sebastian Elischer analyses the role of ethnicity in shaping the character of Kenya's political parties and its party system since 1992.
www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp68_elischer.pdf

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (3 March 2008)

www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm

UGANDA

"With or without peace. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration in Northern Uganda"

Justice and Reconciliation Project Northern Uganda Field Notes, No. 6, Feb 2008.
www.justiceandreconciliation.com

Agreements between the Ugandan Government and the LRA (February 2008)

Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/accountability_reconciliation.pdf
TAnnexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/accountability_reconciliation_annex.pdf
The implementation protocol on participation in national politics and institutions
http://www.mediacentre.go.ug/uploads/Agenda%202%20protocol%20final%2022022008.pdf

"The scramble for cattle, power and guns in Karamoja"

This report by Darlington Akabwai (with Priscillar E. Ateyo) focuses on the Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda as an area of high demand for weapons, lack of law and order, and violent and increasingly brutal cattle raids predominantly carried out by armed male youth.
http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/TheScrambleforCattle.pdf

Article on the business of peace along the border between Kenya and Uganda

Dave Eaton: **The Business of Peace: Raiding and Peace Work Along the Kenya–Uganda Border (Part I),** in: African Affairs (London) 2008, 107, pp. 89-110.

Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 20, No.3, March 2008

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For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, *selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org*
For a link to HAB and more information see *www.life-peace.org*

Editorial principles
The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.