CULTURAL VALUES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Ntibagirirwa Symphorien
Department of Philosophy
University of Pretoria
nsymphorien@yahoo.fr

Abstract: *Neo-liberal economics is built upon the claim that the freedom to pursue one's self-interest and one's rational choice lead to economic growth and development. Neo-liberal economists and policymakers endeavoured to universalize this claim, and argue that appropriate economic policies produce the same results regardless of cultural values. Accordingly, developing countries are advised to embrace the neo-liberal economic credo for them to escape from the trap of underdevelopment. However, the economic success of South East Asia on the one hand and the failure of economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa on the other, are increasingly proving that the "economic" argument cannot be taken dogmatically: self-interest and rationality do not seem to be the only explanation for economic development. One other avenue being explored is the link between cultural values and economic development. I consider this link particularly in the African context, and argue that, although they cannot be taken as the sole factor, cultural values are crucial for economic development. For economic growth and development to occur, they need to be a substantiation of a people's values, such that even for foreign economic policies to be effectively implemented in a culture other than that which generated them, they must be appropriated by it.*

0. Introducing the issue

The neo-liberal economics is mainly based on the claim that the freedom to pursue one's self-interest as well as one's rational choice lead to a successful economic growth and development. Neo-liberal economists, planners and policymakers have tried to universalize this claim, and insistently argued that appropriate economic policies effectively implemented produce everywhere the same results independently of cultural values (see Olson, 1982; Hayek, 1978, 1949; Down, 1957). Some of these economists and policymakers often support their argument by the view that modern economics is based on mathematical methods that are universal (see Rosenberg 1992). And therefore, policies and principles of economic development that are derived from it are universally applicable irrespective of the culture in which they are applied. Accordingly, they suggested that developing countries should embrace the neo-liberal economic policies for them to escape from the trap of economic underdevelopment and poverty.

The economic success of South East Asian countries on the one hand and the failure of economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa on the other, are increasingly proving that the "economic" argument alone cannot be taken as a dogma: self-interest and rationality do not seem to be the only avenue for economic growth and development to take place in a given society. One other avenue to be explored and investigated is the link between cultural values and economic growth and development. I will investigate this link and argue that: even though they cannot be taken as the sole factor[1], cultural values are crucial for economic growth and development. For economic growth and development to occur, they need to be a substantiation of a people's beliefs and values. Accordingly, even for alien economic policies to be effective in a cultural system other than that which generated them, they have to be appropriated by it.

Accordingly the reflection evolves around the following three points: In the first point I question the link between self-interest and economic growth and development. In the second point, I review the principle of self-interest against its historico-cultural background in order to show that what achieves economic development is not the self-interest *per se* but rather

[1] For instance, in his *Cultural Factors and Economic Performance in East Asia and Latin America*, Jiang Shixue argues that "each culture has its own unique positive and negative components, but the positive ones cannot automatically create better economic performance in the absence of other necessary conditions like sound economic policies, effective institutions, favourable world economic situations, the right timing of a nation's entry into industrialisation, and political stability."

cultural beliefs and values that produced it. **F**inally, I try to show the necessary link between cultural values, economic growth and development, and then conclude.

I. Questioning the link between self-interest and economic growth.

The claim "the freedom to pursue one's self-interest leads to economic growth" comes from Adam Smith's reflection on how the wealth of a nation could be increased (Smith 1965). Smith believed that human behaviour is guided by self-interest. However, when one looks at the way the economic perspectives based on the principle of self-interest is failing in Africa, particularly with the Structural Adjustment Program of the 1980s on the one hand, and the economic success the South East Asia on the other, one cannot but wonder whether self-interest really leads to economic efficiency as neo-liberal economists and policymakers would make us to believe.

The idea of self-interest is apparently, if not obviously, in contradiction with the earlier ideas in his book, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1808) in which Smith developed the concept of sympathy considered to be the concern for the interest of the other. Sympathy requires the benefactor to suspend his own interest for the sake of the beneficiary. Although this altruism does not necessarily give Adam Smith communitarian credentials of the African or Oriental type, one may wonder whether the spirit of sympathy could not increase wealth in the same way as self-interest does, if oriented in economic matters. So that one can say that sympathy could lead to economic success just as self-interest does.

I am aware, as Smith would, that the motive to satisfy one's self-interest and the interest of others both come from the same human tendency to sympathise with self and with the beneficiary (Kharil 2001). However, in so far as the economic discourse of neo-liberalism lays much emphasis on self-interest rather than on the interest of the other, the centre of focus in neo-liberal economic ordering is self-interest. There are a number of issues that are raised here: Would people really achieve economic success, if they behaved in an exclusively self-interested way (see Sen 1987:21)? Even if economic success were to be achieved, to what extent can one really say that it is only the principle of self-interest that led to such a success? Do people really behave in an exclusively self-interested way in economic matters? Are there no other aspects that may serve as catalyst of economic success such that self-interest is but one of them or not even necessary? Armatya Sen has this crucial question: "the real issue is whether there is plurality of motivations, or whether self-interest alone drives human beings" in economic matters (Sen 1987:13).

This series of questions led Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux to explore the possibility of a *Humanistic Economics* as can be seen in their conclusive observation:

> *Where it has been acknowledged that human behaviour might have another dimension than self-interest, it has been decided that this part of the person is irrelevant to economics and therefore is outside the scope of science. … Such an exclusion is theoretically wanting, empirically questionable, a serious social mistake with unfortunate consequences (Lutz and Lux 1988: 102).*

As we shall see later, the idea of self-interest was boldly underlined at the time when the production of goods and services was being developed thanks to the development of natural sciences and their technological dividends especially in England. Furthermore this increasing production required larger markets which were being conquered in the new English colonies in various parts of the world. This seems to lead one to believe that the principle of self-interest may achieve economic growth and development only for those who can sell or buy and who actually have the means to do so. On the contrary it does not work for those who cannot buy or sell, and hence are excluded. According to Michael Todaro (1989:84), the principle of self-interest and the so-called invisible hand of the market that results from it often acts not to promote the general welfare, but rather to lift up those who are already well-off while leaving others behind. In the end the welfare for all aimed at is not achieved.

There is here a whole argument that runs counter to the ethical theory of utilitarianism, but I will not play on this field for the time being. But what Todaro seems to be saying is that for self-interest to work there must be other conditions that must be fulfilled. Thus I would go as far as saying that it is not just having something to sell on the market and having the means to buy but also one must have in oneself self-interest as a value, an economic value. The question is to what extent this is the case.

According to Armatya Sen (1987), in the case of the success of the free-market in Japan, there are empirical evidences showing that there were systematic departures from the self-interested behaviour in the direction of cultural values such as duty, loyalty, good will that played an important role in the Japanese economic success (cf. Lutz and Lux 1988: 84). Sen himself was drawing on the reflection of Michio Morishima (1982), a Japanese scholar who argued that what has played an important role in the Japanese economy is much more the Japanese spirit which is rooted in Shintoist and Confucian values. Nowadays it is being argued that the economic success in other South East Asian countries is also being achieved thanks to the same Confucian values (Granato, et al. 1996; Franke, et al., 1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Ziya Onis (1995) argued that, the East Asian economic miracle has been possible thanks to the developmental state provided by the Confucian heritage which emphasizes hierarchy and group solidarity. The group solidarity provides a ground for cooperation within the same East Asian society, while the hierarchical authority of the government provides the necessary infrastructure and means for the enterprises of its country to compete on the international scene.

Economists and policymakers who defend the philosophy of self-interest in economic growth and development argue that, in the case of Africa, the state has been an obstacle to self-interest and its success, and thus is a hindrance to economic growth and development. This argument is built on the debate between the libertarians defending the priority of the individual over the community, and the communitarians who defend the priority of the community over the individual. Hence those who believe that in Africa the state is an obstacle to the principle of self-interest and its economic achievements are the libertarians who argue that in the African culture, the community is hampering the individual freedom and responsibilities, and hence an obstacle to the individual flourishing. It is true that the community can effectively be a limit or an obstacle to individual freedom and responsibility; but it is equally true that the community can be a context in which the individual flourishes more than if one were left alone, particularly when the values which the community cherishes are harmonised with those which the individual cherishes for mutual advantage (see Mbiti,1970; Tshamalenga, 1985; Shutte, 1993; Gyekye, 1997; Sandel, 1982, 1996, Taylor, 1989, McIntyre 1981).

In the case of the Asian economic miracle, it has been observed that the state, far from being a handicap for the market economy that is thought to result from the principle of self-interest, played an important role in the economic development (Biel 2000:202, Dasgupta 1998, Onis 1995). Furthermore, even Latin America, the introduction of the neo-liberal principles in the 1980s required an authoritarian state to deal with opposition from the rent-seekers who had benefited from the structuralist import substitution policies.

Thus my point here is that it is possible to achieve economic growth and development with individual self-interest just as it can be achieved with the community-centred interest. If this were found to be the case, the traditional values of African communitarian society should be explored to see whether they may not be pregnant with economic potentials. In fact, the point of incompatibility between self-interest as the ground of economic growth and development and African culture has not yet been tackled as an issue. I should say that, seemingly, certain societies, especially the African one, have been misled by the link between capitalism and individualism built on the belief that self-interested individuals and the subsequent invisible hand of the market increase wealth.

The problem might not be the belief itself since it might work for some societies. The real problem lies in the tendency to universalize it as if it is the only possibility. As a result other avenues are neglected and undermined, especially for those countries which are historically, politically and economically dependent. The consequence is that the victims of this economic dogma find themselves confused about what values really lead to economic growth and development. And under the pressure of achieving this economic growth and development in the short term, they don't strive to make a difference which would be derived from the validation of their cultural beliefs and values if these are validated.

II. Viewing the principle of "self-interest" against its historico-cultural background: What achieves economic success is not the self-interest *per se* but rather the cultural beliefs and values from which it resulted.

If Smith claimed that the freedom to pursue one's self-interest leads to the increase of wealth for a nation, it is apparently because he was reflecting in a new cultural environment where the individual was henceforth sovereign. And indeed, the sovereignty of the individual was a new conception of the human being which came to the fore as a result of the intellectual and historical mutations of $17^{th}/18^{th}$ century in Europe. This means that the individual who became now the source of wealth of the nation was the product of a new cultural universe in Europe. Here are the salient characteristics of this new culture:

1. Human sovereignty: The first characteristic of the new culture is the human sovereignty over the natural world. This aspect is better describes by Klaüs Nurnberger, in his book, *Beyond Marx and Market* (1998:31):

> *No part of reality is forbidden ground for human investigation and utilisation. There are no uncanny forces, magical powers, divine beings or eternal principles which human beings must fear, respect, or obey. Human beings are masters over the world.*

This reality itself was henceforth discovered by means of investigation (empirical philosophy of John Lock and David Hume), penetrated by logical thought (Rationalist philosophy of René Descartes) and manipulated for desired result (technological advances). The implication of this was a culture which gives the human being a new way of looking at the world and affirming himself (Nurnberger 1998:31).

2. Individual sovereignty: This characteristic is, in fact, the implication of the first one and has been emphasized by a great number of philosophers. The first philosopher who underlined boldly the sovereignty of the individual is René Descartes with his famous principle: I think therefore I am. The implication of this principle was that from then on, the human being was the creator of his own self, his world, and depended on no one else except one's own individual self. John Locke is another defender of individual sovereignty. He argued that people are equal and that every individual has the right to self-preservation. This self-preservation goes with personal property. Every individual has a property in his own person. Locke shares his thought on the sovereignty of the individual with Thomas Hobbes, although this latter viewed the individual from a negative perspective as it can be seen in his principle: Man is a wolf against man. Yet this does not prevent him from sharing with Locke the view of the individual as an atomic unit sufficient unto oneself, interacting with others primarily in the pursuit of their self-interest (Ingersoll and Matthew 1991:37-8). Another important figure in the defence of individual sovereignty is Kant. The idea that lurks behind Kant's categorical imperatives is that the individual is the starting point of universality.

Finally, that the individual is sovereign means that the society plays a second role. That is what Jeremy Bentham affirms when he views the community as a fiction and a collection of individuals and that no objective social interest exists except individual interest independently of fictitious society.

One may summarise the different views on the individual as follows: The individual who was now defined by reason (the thinking thing) became the source of not only morality (Kant's categorical imperatives), but also of every aspect of life: Political life (democracy as a political system of equal and free individuals), social life (the individual could now act unconstrained by the society and the hierarchical authority), religious life (the individual is no more defined by any divinity), moral life (against Aristotelian teleological definition of human act), and economic life (one's self-interest and rational choice increase a nation's wealth) (cf. MacIntyre 1981).

3. Freedom: The new culture insists on freedom of individuals to organise their own lives, alone or in cooperation with others. According to Klaüs Nurnberger (1998:30), freedom goes with the virtues of taking bold initiatives and using all one's gifts and talents for self-determination, self-realisation and self-responsibility. Freedom is associated with personal choices, self-fulfilment and personal initiatives. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume argued that all people possess the freedom necessary to secure their natural rights, that is, the rights that are not subjected to any other authority other than the human being himself. This freedom is the necessary means to pursue one's ends.

4. Private property: The fourth salient feature of the culture that fuelled the classical economy is the emphasis on private property which goes with self-interest. Private property is viewed as an expression of human potential and an indication of human creativity (Ingersoll and Matthew 1991:39). According to Jean Jacques Rousseau, there is a link between freedom and private property: private property is an instrument without which one's freedom cannot be secured. Linked with private property is the whole notion of self-interest which has been emphasized by Hutchison, Hume, Tucker, Furgeson, Mandeville, and in a particular way Adam Smith (See Haney 1921).

5. Materialism: The materialist outlook of the new culture can be seen from two important aspects, namely a new sense of value and labour. According to Jerry Bentham, the human being is governed solely by the hedonistic principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. And the utility maximising is the only standard of evaluation. He further argued that money is the most accurate measure of the quantity of pain or pleasure a human being can be made to receive (as in Heney 1993:93). Accordingly, the valuation of what is good or bad, profitable or not, pleasure or pain, rests solely on the subjective judgement of the individual with money as the measure of welfare (Bentham 1954:437-8). Such a notion of value is also connected with the individual and his self-interest. In effect, Bentham argued that the best judge of value or interest is the individual.

Materialism can also be seen in the instrumentalisation of labour. The traditional belief in labour as an important social resource and the means by which a society advances, was rejected. Accordingly, David Hume argued that everything in the world is purchased by labour, and that our passions are the only cause of labour. Jeremy Bentham argued that the love of labour is a contradiction in terms. From the utilitarian point of view labour is not undertaken for the benefit of those performing the labour but for those hiring labour power to generate exchange value. Workers must be bribed to expend effort through payment of wages. Even Adam Smith tended to limit productivity to tradable commodities to the extent that even people themselves are viewed as other commodities.

6. Reason: The new culture emphasized reason as the regulator of everything. It is said that when individuals use their reason and industry in the pursuit of personal gain, everyone in the society gains. Economically, the role of reason is to instruct people on how to secure these desires most efficiently (Ingersoll and Matthews 1991:38). However, from the contractual point of view, the role of reason is to deal with conflicts which arise because self-interest leads people to desire the same object. Reason is thus used to discover ways by which their self-interests may be better served.

This new cultural outlook was so fascinating that it tended to be universalised to other societies to the point that their cultural beliefs and values (henceforth viewed as traditional) came to be considered economically worthless. Indeed, this has become a background against which the underdeveloped nations are viewed and advised for their economic growth and development. In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, modernisation theorists argued that, for underdeveloped nations to achieve economic growth and development, they have to take the same road that modern societies took (see Rostow 1960, cf. Weber 1971).

One major feature of these beliefs that goes with self-interest as a principle of economic growth is rationality. Self-interested producers and consumers mindful of economic growth and development are presupposed to be utility and profit maximizers who respond rationally and efficiently to market signals. Rationality is thus the central characteristic of the self-interested economic man, and consists in the logical applications of economic means to attain particular economic ends. The human being becomes that being whose economic behaviour conforms to the dictates of reason. This feature is emphasized by various theorists who treasure the neoclassical economics. Bill Gerrard (1993:52), for instance, argues that the axiom of rationality is the cornerstone of modern economics. Economic behaviour is interpreted as the outcome of optimizing choices by rational economic agents. Daniel Hausman (1992: 278) posits that "much of the methodological distinctiveness of economics stems from the remarkable fact that a theory of rationality lies at its theoretical core". Ann Cudd (1993:102) argues that the rationality is the capacity inherent primarily in individuals, and these agents act to maximise their subjectively given utility.

The consequence of all this is that most of the societies of the south, particularly in Africa South of the Sahara, came to neglect unduly their cultural beliefs and values arguably because they lacked the potentials and the rationality peculiar to the modern economics. But this neglect is more a result of the complex of economic powerlessness felt by some societies that their beliefs and values are economically barren without exploration. For instance, Etounga Manguellé, in his celebrated *L'Afrique a-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'ajustement culturel?* (1990), argues that Africa needs a programme of cultural adjustment that would transform its mentality to one which is consistent with values in the rest of the world. Of course, it is not clear what those universal values are that he is referring to.

Axelle Kabou (1991) is also convinced that, although they never appear on the long list of official causes of underdevelopment, African cultures and mentalities are the main obstacles to development. Effectively it may be true that some cultural practices may inhibit economic development. A communal, paternalistic outlook can hamper the spirit of creativity, initiatives and innovation. Much emphasis on family ties is often the source of nepotistic behaviour linked to incompetence. But Manguellé and Kabou seem to be biased to the point of considering only the negative aspects of African culture that effectively have an impact of economic development. Yet the communal outlook thought to be an obstacle to creativity and initiative is also the ground of economic cooperation. In effect, the extended family, for instance, is, indeed, the nucleus for a cooperative spirit and self-help. Moreover, the family could be the source of the value which consists in considering and protecting the goods and the services of a company as one's own. Paternalistic behaviour can be the source of authority that a manager needs to lead his company. At the same time, this paternalistic behaviour does ignore the traditional sanction on leadership to ensure accountability (cf. Asante 1991:69). This leads me to the last point: the necessary link between cultural values, economic growth and development.

III. Cultural values, economic growth and development: the necessary link

The claim I am trying to establish so far is that economic growth and development is a product of the validation or substantiation of peoples' cultural beliefs and values. There is a link between what one believes and what one lives (*passage du cru au vécu*)[2]. In other words, as Asante (1991:68,) puts it, "it is the totality of the values, norms, attitudes, beliefs of a society which shapes its social, political and economic organisation and inculcates a general feeling towards development."

It is true that, as some scholars such as Manguellé and Axel Kabou have been arguing in the case of Africa, some mentalities and attitudes can effectively be obstacles to economic growth and development. One may refer, for instance, to those mentalities that tend to limit people's production to their immediate consumption with little or no conception of the long term.[3] One can also refer to the fact that some religious faiths do emphasize detachment from material goods and wealth. But those mentalities cannot take priority to the fact that people produce for their subsistence or produce to acquire what they do not produce; this being the starting point of economics. Neither can they take priority on the fact that people produce and exchange as part of their self-realisation or self-actualisation and self-transcendence. This is the case irrespective of whether the culture of such a people is individualistic or communitarian. Thus, Messay Kabede (1999) argues that,

[2] For a more extended reflection on the point, one could refer to my article "Le miracle asiatique": qu'apprendre de de l'expérience asiatique du développement, in *Ethique et Société,* Vol.3, No.1 :19-34

[3]This point could be deepened especially when dealing with the concept of time in the African context. For instance, John Mbiti (1970) argues that in traditional Africa, there are only two dimensions of time: the present (*sasa*) and the past (*Zamani*). The consequence of this conception of time would lead one to believe that planning for the future is rather speculative. If this were the case, then it would be difficult to talk of planning of economic development (Nyang 1994). However Mbiti was obviously mistaken since in all Bantu languages there is the future tense as well. And the Kikuyu culture of which Mbiti is part is not an exception.

> *The depiction of development in terms of mere satisfaction of needs rather than validation of beliefs largely explains the underdevelopment of Africa. By not being a program of corroboration of beliefs, development fails to be animated by a competitive, insatiable, and creative spirit* (Kabede, 1999).

Michael McPherson (cited by Samuels, 1990) argues that economics itself is part of a cultural milieu. The cultural milieu, in large measure, endows economic goods and activities with meaning and presents people with the matrix of constraints and opportunities within which they develop themselves.

Besides these theoretical arguments, a good number of empirical studies carried out on some Western and Oriental countries seem to go along with the claim that economic growth and development is a validation and substantiation of people's beliefs and values (see the empirical studies of Granato, et al. 1996; Franke, et al., 1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). For instance Grenato, et al (1996) used econometric techniques to empirically establish that cultural and economic factors play a complementary role. Wong Siu-Lun (1988) investigated the impact of family on the organisation of Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong and found that the family and paternalistic management have a positive impact on economic growth and development. Richard Franke, et al (1991) employed cultural samples of 18 to 20 countries and established that the economic growth rates for the periods of 1965-1980, 1980-1987 are explained by people's cultural values especially in the case of China (cf. Harrison & Huntington, 2000; Porter, 2000; Huntington, 1998; Inglehart, 1997; Swank, 1996; Granato, et al. 1996, Franke, et al. 1991, Ling & Shih, 1998).

However, although I am arguing that there is a necessary link between economic growth and development and cultural values, I am equally aware that the cultural values are not sufficient unto themselves to achieve economic performance. Rather I am arguing that cultural values cannot be ignored in the economic development process of a given society in so far as culture does affect people's behaviour and attitudes towards economic aspects such as production, consumption, economic relations with others inside and outside a given society, savings, investment, work ethic, education (see Shixue, cf. So and Chiu 1995:8).

Conclusion

The above analysis and reflection drive home the point that it is misleading to try to universalise the values of self-interest and rationality as the only ground of economic growth and development. Indeed, the intention behind this paper is to raise awareness on the importance of cultural beliefs and values as an important factor, one of the root-sources of economic development, particularly in Africa. So far little or no attention has been paid to the cultural factor in Africa's economic development. Cultural values in Africa have been mostly perceived negatively in economic matters both by African economists, policymakers and planners themselves and the consultants of the international institutions and western donors. As a consequence, there is a tendency to shift away from them, even from those values such as solidarity and cooperation which, nowadays, are important in today's economic business. Much attention is concentrated on the claim that appropriate economic policies (mostly neo-liberal policies) achieve necessarily economic growth and development. My reflection is rather an invitation to political leaders, economists, policymakers and planners to concentrate much effort on creating a political and socio-economic environment in which culture can catalyse economic growth and development

Bibliography

Asante, K B 1991. *African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative strategies.* Ibadan: Spectrum books.

Biel, R. 2000. *The New Imperialism: The Crisis and Contradictions in North/South Relations*. London: Zed Books.

Dasgupta, B 1998. *Structural adjustment, Global trade and the new political economy of development.* New York/London: Zed books.

Downs, A 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Frank, A G. 1975. *On Capitalist Underdevelopment.* Bombay : Oxford University Press.

Franke, R.H et al. 1991. Cultural roots of economic performance : A research note. *Strategic Management Journal*, vol.12, p.165-173.

Granato, J et al. 1996. The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development : Theory, Hypotheses and Some Empirical Tests. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol.40, no.3, p.607-631

_____________ 1996. Cultural Values, Stable Democracy, and Economic Development : A Reply. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol.40, no.3, p.680-696.

Gyekye, K. 1997. Tradition and Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harrison, L.E & Huntington, S.P (eds). 2000. *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress.* New York: Basic Books.

Hayek, F.A., 1978. *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A., 1949. The Meaning of Competition, in F.A Hayek Individualism and Economic Order**,** Londres : Routeledge and Kegan Paul (1959), pp.92-106

Huntington, S. P. 1998. *The Clash of Civilization and the Remarking of the World Order.* Carmichael: Touchstone Books.

Hoselitz, B.F. 1960. *Theories of economic growth*. Glencoe: The Free Press.

Ingersoll, D E and Matthews, R K 1991. *The Philosophic Roots of Modern Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism.* New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Kabou, A 1991. *Et l'Afrique refusait le développement*. Paris : L'Harmattan.

Katie, W 2005. *Theories and Practices of Development*. London/New York: Routledge.

Khalil, E.L. 2001. Adam Smith and Three Theories of Altruism. *Louvain Economic Review*. Vol.67, No.4, p.421-435.

Kebede, M.1999. Development and the African Philosophical Debate.
http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/afro.htm *(4 April, 2007)*

____________.2004. African Development and Primacy of Mental Decolonization. *Africa Development*, vol.29, no.1, p.107-129.

Ling, L.H & Shih, S.Y 1998. Confucian With Liberal Face: The meaning of Democratic Politics in Post-colonial Taiwan. *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 60, No.1, p.55-82

Lutz, M A & Lux, K 1988. Humanistic economics: The new challenge. New York: The Bootstrap Press.

MacIntyre, A 1981. *After Virtue.* Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Manguellé, E.D. 1991. *L'Afrique a-t-elle besoin d'un programme d'adjustement culturel* ? Paris: Editions Nouvelles du Sud

Mbiti, J. 1970. *African religions and Philosophy.* New York: Doubleday.

Mehmet, O. 1995. *Westernizing the Third World: The Eurocentricity of economic development theories.* London/New York: Routledge.

Morishima, M.1982. *Why has Japan 'succeeded' ? Western Technology and Japanese Ethos.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ntibagirirwa, S 2006. Le Miracle Asiatique: Qu'apprendre de l'expérience Asiatique du développement. *Ethique et Société*, 3(1) :18-34 ;

Nurnberger, K 1998. *Beyond Marx and Market.* Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publication.

Nyang, S.S. 1994. The Cultural Consequences of Development in Africa. In *Culture and Development in Africa*. Edited by I. Serageldin and J. Taboroff (eds.). Washington, DC: World Bank. p. 429-446.

Olson, N 1982.*The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

Rosenberg, A. 1992. *Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rostow, W.W. 1960. The *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sandel, M 1982. *Liberalism and the limits of Justice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

________ 1996. *Democracy's discontent: America in search of Public philosophy*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Shixue, J. Cultural factors and Economic performance in East Asia and Latin America. On line http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/las/studies/pdfs/jiang.pdf

Shutte, A 1993. *Philosophy for Africa*. Cap Town: University of Cap Town Press.

Smith, A 1808. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. 2 vols. Edinburg: Bell & Bradfute

________1965. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Edited by Edwin Cannan, introduced by Max Lerner. New York: Modern Library.

So, A and Chiu, W.K 1995. *East Asia and the World Economy*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications

Stigler, GJ 1975. Smith's travel on the ship of the State, in A S Skinner et Wilson T (eds), *Essays on Adam Smith.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Taylor, C 1989. *Sources of the self. The Making of moral identity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tshamalenga, N .1985. Language et socialité. Primat de la Bisoité sur l'Intersubjectivité. In *Philosophie Africain et Ordre social*. Edited by Faculté Catholique de Kinshasa. Kinshasa: FCK. p. 59-81.

Weber, M. 1971. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* London: Unwin

Ziya, O 1995. The Limits of Neoliberalism: Towards a Reformation of Development Theory. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 29(1):97-119.