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## Leadership and Legitimacy in Muslim India:

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## **Leadership and Legitimacy in Muslim India: An Analysis of Quaid-i-Azam and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad**

Himayatullah Yaqubi\* and Iftikhar Ahmad Yusufzai\*\*

### **Abstract**

*In this brief article an attempt has been made to revisit the Indo-Pak Freedom Movement with special reference to the role of Quaid-e-Azam & Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Both started out their political struggle as staunch advocates of Hindu-Muslim unity with a view to accelerating the realization of independence of India. However, there was marked difference in their approach & that difference was that Quaid's struggle was committed to protect the interests of the Muslims. This stance eventually gravitated him towards Muslim League. On the other hand, Maulana Azad was committed to the concept of Indian Nationalism and was not concerned to safeguard the future of the Muslims of the sub-continent. And this stance gravitated him towards the Congress. History vindicated the Quaid as being more perceptive & sincere to the cause of Muslims whereas Maulana Azad got disillusioned from Hindu leadership with the passage of time.*

**Keywords:** Quaid-i-Azam, Abul Kalam Azad, Leadership, Legitimacy

### **Introduction**

The 1857 War of Independence proved to be a turning point in the course of history of the Muslims of India. The defeat in this war at the hands of the colonial British government not only formally terminated their rule in India but also put an end to all their illusions which were attached with their glorious past. The period immediately after the war brought miseries and disappointments for the Muslims. They were easy targets of

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the revengeful policies of the British. The new rulers substituted English for Persian and Western education for traditional learning which deprived the Muslims of their positions of influence and authority which they had enjoyed. The doors of civil and military services were closed to them<sup>1</sup>. This was a period of deep demoralization and despondency for the Muslims of India. “The Mutiny cut them adrift from their old moorings, economic and political ... they found themselves wholly unprepared to take their rightful place in the new dispensations and adjustments which were rapidly coming into existence as a result of the impact between the Western and Eastern ideals, political and social institutions.”<sup>2</sup> The Hindus were the first to adjust themselves to the changed circumstances by adopting Western education and ways of life.

In 1885 they established All India National Congress to serve as a bridge between the British Government and the people of India, which had the blessings of Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy of India, and other English officials. The aims, objectives and program of the Congress were actually meant to promote political and economic interests of the Hindus in the garb of Indian nationalism. Sir Syed, among the Muslims of India, was the first to chalk out a way for the Muslim of India. He thought that only by inculcating the Western ideals of life and government into the minds of younger generations of India could the Muslims of India be extricated from the slough of mental despondency and economic depression into which they had fallen after the Mutiny of 1857. By those ideals he meant patriotism and liberty of thought which could be achieved through the education of the Muslim youth in the English language and on Western lines<sup>3</sup>. He advised the Muslims to refrain from joining the Congress and to be loyal towards the British Government, a policy which, he thought, was suitable from the point of view of

protecting the interests of the Muslims of India in that period of despondency. He established different institutions and associations for the uplift of the Indian Muslims.<sup>4</sup>

The end of the 19th and the dawn of the 20th century let loose a trail of so sweeping events at the Indian and world levels from which the Muslims of India could not remain unaffected. In these circumstances Muslim India produced two leaders of extra-ordinary talents who played the most important role in the making of Muslim India in the following decades. One was Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the other was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. They had different, and in many respects opposite, trends, attitudes, views and approaches towards political problems of India and the place of Muslims in the broader context of India.

Numerous studies have been conducted in which the leadership qualities of both these two Muslim leaders has been explained and evaluated. These studies are so far written on one sided approaches with least details of the evolution of these leaders on the Indian scene. Their emergence was not however without legitimacy among the Muslim masses who were the best observer of the then Indian political impasse. In this paper an attempt has been made to study these two leaders and in juxtaposition to each other. The role of the Quaid-i-Azam as the staunchest proponent of Muslim nationalism in the last decade of the freedom struggle and that was Maulana Azad as an ardent supporter of Indian Nationalism will be especially highlighted. At the end an analysis will be made to find out the direction of politics of both these leaders. Further it will be dealt with that how the realistic and objective views of the Quaid-i-Azam which got full support of Indian Muslims, resulted in the creation of Pakistan.

### **First Phase: 1905-1920**

Muhammad Ali Jinnah started his political career from the platform of the All India National Congress in 1905. Being a constitutional frame of mind, he had abhorrence for violence and anti-constitutional measures as a means to achieve political objectives and he chose to tread the path of statesmen like Dada Bhoy Naorozji, G K Gokhale, and Benerje<sup>5</sup>. Earlier, as a student in England, the young Jinnah had played an important role in the election campaign of Dada Bhoy Naorozji for a seat in the House of Commons. From that time on, the Grand old man looked upon the young student as one who had a great future in Indian politics<sup>6</sup>. In his earlier political career he was a staunch Indian nationalist. It was Jinnah who had attacked the Agha Khan Deputation to the viceroy Lord Minto at Simla on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1906. In this regard his critical letter was published in a magazine *Gujrati* of Bombay in the issue of October 7, 1906.<sup>7</sup> The Calcutta session of the Congress of 1906 was very important in the history of Congress. It was presided over by Dada Bhoy Naorozji with Muhammad Ali Jinnah as his secretary. It was at this session that for the first time the demand for self-government in India was made from the platform of a political party<sup>8</sup>.

In 1906, All India Muslim League was founded with the aims and objects of promoting interests of Muslims community, forging friendly relations between Muslims and other communities, and creating feelings of loyalty among the Muslims of India for the British Government. Jinnah did not take any interest in Muslim League politics in its initial years because it seemed to him that its approach to politics was communal, not national. Within a few years, the Muslim League began to approach political problems in a more revolutionary manner, in keeping with the spirit of time<sup>9</sup>. In September 1913 a Muslim League

delegation, consisting of Maulana Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hassan, visited England to bring to the attention of the British public the Cawnpore Mosque incident. Mr. Jinnah was in those days in England in connection with a long holiday there along with Gokhale. Maulana Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hassan approached him to get him enrolled as a member of the League. He consented on the understanding that his joining the Muslim League would not prevent him from continuing to be a member of Congress and that his loyalty to the Muslim League and Muslim interest would in no way come in to the way of his loyalty to the larger national cause. He had attended the meetings of All India Muslim League Council in 1910, 1911, and 1912. He had already emerged as a leader of all India level and the Muslim League looked up to him for advice and guidance, although he was not a formal member of the Muslim League. It was mainly due to his efforts that the Muslim League at its Lucknow session in 1913 changed its policy objective from loyalty to British Government to the “attainment under the aegis of the British Crown a system of self Government suitable to India through constitutional means...”<sup>10</sup>

This new orientation brought about a complete transformation in the approach of Muslim India to the political problems of that period. They adopted *sawraj* as their political goal which has been adopted by the Congress in 1906. The Muslim League leaders emphasized the necessity of complete harmony between the Hindus and Muslims for the realization of their common objective of independence. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, due to his important position in both the Congress and Muslim League, was in a position to act as a bridge between the two parties. He saw in the new political environment an opportunity to convert the friendly feelings between the Hindus and Muslims into a solid political

alliance. As a first step towards the realization of this goal, he succeeded in getting the two parties to hold their annual sessions of 1911 in Bombay at the same time, despite the machinations of the British Government against this move. The seeds of discord and disagreement between Mr. Jinnah and Lord Willingdon, the then Governor of Bombay and the future Viceroy of India, were sown at this time and by this incident<sup>11</sup>. In this meeting Jinnah moved a resolution which advocated the setting up of a League committee which, in consultation with other political parties, should draw up a scheme of political reforms which, while fully satisfying Muslims and protecting their interests, would take India onward on its march to independence.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, then an active member of Muslim League, was one of those delegates that made a forceful speech in support of the resolution. And finally this resolution was unanimously adopted. In similar manner, the Congress appointed a committee to collaborate with its League counterpart for the above-mentioned purpose. The Quaid at various forums, including the Congress and Muslim League, stressed Hindu-Muslim Unity for the realization of independence for the country. The outcome of his efforts was the famous Lucknow Pact of 1916. It is from such initiatives that earned for him the admiration of all the communities. It is due to his untiring efforts in this accord that impressed so many politicians at that time. Gochale gave Jinnah the famous title of the ‘ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity’. The two parties put forward a joint set of demands which, if fully recognized and implemented by the British Government would have brought virtual independence for India. Jinnah made great effort for making leaders like Tilak; agree to the issue of separate electorates.<sup>12</sup> For protecting Muslims’ political interests, the two parties agreed on separate

electorates and weightage in the provinces where they were in minority. This was a big achievement for the Muslim League. This Pact considerably influenced the shaping of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. This was a spectacular demonstration of the growing political consciousness in India. The British Imperialists could no longer put forward the argument that Hindu-Muslim disunity was a hurdle in the political advancement of India. There was so much political pressure on the British authorities, through internal agitation, that in 1917 they declared that more reforms were coming soon. There were even rumors that the Congress and League were about to launch a joint Civil Disobedience Movement to accelerate the advent of reforms.<sup>13</sup>

The years 1918 and 1919 were very turbulent in the history of British India since 1857. In order to cope with the situation and strengthen the hands of bureaucracy in face of the rising seditious activities in the country, the Central Legislature of India passed repressive laws known as the Rowlett Act. Quaid-i-Azam lodged a strong protest against the passage of this Act, and resigned his seat in the Central Legislative Assembly. On 13th April, the Jallianwala Bagh incident occurred which left 400 of Indians dead and over 1,200 wounded, who were protesting peacefully against the repressive policies of the British Government. Quaid-i-Azam vehemently condemned these acts of repression and called for greater Hindu-Muslim unity against the British Imperialism. He was also critical of the Western Powers' attitude towards Turkey, who were bent upon disintegrating this defeated Muslim power which was also the seat of Muslim *Khilafat*. He raised his voice against these injustices of the British Government from the platforms of the Congress, Muslim League, and Home Rule League. He stressed Hindu-Muslim unity for the resolution of these issues and the realization

of the goal of independence. During the War period, he had refused to cooperate with the British and their war efforts because he wanted a solid promise from the British Government with the effect that they would grant self-Government to India within a specific period of time, which the British Government was not ready to concede. Gandhi had cooperated with them, in this respect, without extracting any pledge from them.

In May 1919 Quaid-i-Azam was sent to London by Muslim League to lead a delegation to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, with a view to getting the latter to appoint one Muslim delegate to the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. The Muslim League feared that the British Government would repeat their policy of 1917 when S. P. Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner, and not any Muslim, had been appointed to represent Muslim India in the Imperial War Conference. Although, Jinnah vigorously represented the Muslim case to Lloyd George, the latter did not respond positively to his pleadings. Montague and the Maharaja Bikaner represented India at the Peace Conference<sup>14</sup>. Turkey was dismembered among the European Powers, but no one in the Conference raised his voice against it to air the sentiments of the Muslims of India.

During this period Gandhi had dominated the Indian political scene and taken control of the Congress, Home Rule League, and the Khilafat Conference. The Quaid-i-Azam did not agree with the methods of civil disobedience and non cooperation adopted by Mr. Gandhi for the realization of his political objectives. The Quaid argued that these methods, besides creating dissensions among Indians, would cause chaos and disorganization among the inexperienced youth and the ignorant

masses. Due to this reason, he resigned from the Congress at its Nagpur session in 1920.<sup>15</sup>

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was emotional, fiery and revolutionary by nature. He started political career at the end of the first decade of the 20th century. In his early political career he was a Muslim nationalist than Indian nationalist. His program for Muslim awakening is a landmark in the history of Muslim nationalism<sup>16</sup>. His Muslim nationalism was characterized by pan-Islamism. When Azad started his weekly *Al-Hilal* in July 1912, most of the Muslim press was imbued with the spirit of pan-Islamism, a trend which had appeared as early as 1817. This was due to the influence of Jamaludin-Afghani, who visited India during that time. Maulana Azad paid glowing tributes to Afghani in the issues of *Al-Hilal*. Some event of importance such as the 1908 Constitutional Revolution in Turkey, the Balkan War, and the War of Tripoli further strengthened the spirit of pan-Islamism in India. In *Al-Hilal* Azad projected the entire Muslim World as a single unit with Turkey as its heart<sup>17</sup>.

He had also connection with Bengali Revolutionaries and was impressed by their activities. He lamented lack of interest and aloofness on the part of the Muslims toward such activities, and eulogized the Hindus for being in the forefront of the struggle for freedom.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps, it did not matter for him that those revolutionaries of Bengal were actually determined to get the British to withdraw the decision of the Partition of Bengal. They had full support of the Congress and other Hindu organizations. In its spirit that movement was more anti-Muslim than anti-British. He considered the problem of India as a part of the world-wide tussle between Islam and Western Imperialism. He supported any move that rose against Western Imperialism. Hindu-Muslim problem

in the context of India did not have any importance for him. He exhorted the Muslims to rise side by side with the Hindus against the British for the liberation of the country. He believed without compromise in two things: Islam and freedom. And he would accept dilution in neither case.<sup>19</sup>

In this phase of his political career he indulged in preparation of violent rebellion and had connections, besides Bengali revolutionaries, with Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hassan, Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi and the tribes dwelling on the north-western frontier. He was convinced of utility of violent rebellion for attainment of independence.<sup>20</sup> He ascribed passive attitude of the Muslims towards the freedom moment in India to the loyalist policy of Sir Syed.<sup>21</sup> During this phase he exhorted the Muslim to chalk their way for themselves and not to imitate the Hindus blindly. He reiterated the Muslims again and again that instead of fearing the Hindu majority, they should create confidence in themselves, and not to care how the majority community behaved with them. He was one of the staunchest exponents of Hindu-Muslim unity.

The Khilafat Movement and later on the Non-Cooperation Movement led by Mr. Gandhi brought Maulana Azad closer to the Congress. From this time onwards the color of Indian nationalism began to get prominent on him. When he was released from Jail in 1919, the Khilafat Movement had already been started. Due to the turbulent situation in India and with a view to launch a large scale movement for the independence of India, Gandhi expressed his intention of starting a Non-Cooperation Movement against the British. In February 1920 when Gandhi announced his Non-Cooperation program all leaders present on the occasion expressed their reservation, except Maulana Azad, who enthusiastically supported Gandhi on this question.<sup>22</sup> Now he began to

stress Hindu-Muslim unity with more vigor and enthusiasm along with preparing the Muslims to give sacrifices for the cause of Khilafat. He was arrested from Ranchi and it was during his internment that he wrote his celebrated work the *Tazkira* and monumental commentary of the Holy Quran, *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*.

To Maulana Azad all the religions of the world teach the same truth and its roots are the same. In every time and in each country all the prophets of Allah spread the same message among the masses. It was due to these views of Azad which antagonized majority of the Muslims. They saw in him a person who challenges their traditional belief regarding religion and prophets. Besides Maulana's association with the Congress further agitated Muslims as Congress was perceived as an anti-Muslim organization.<sup>23</sup>

In his address to the Khilafat conference, the Maulana used to say that the Khilafat issue revived the issue of India. The Muslims could have succeeded in getting the Khilafat issue resolved without any help from other communities of India. But the problem of India would have remained un-resolved. For this purpose a stirring on the general level was required. The Khilafat issue fulfilled this object.<sup>24</sup> On the question of the Hindu-Muslim unity he said that it had not arisen as a result of the Khilafat movement. It was essential for its own sake. He said that he had, some ten years back, told the Indian Muslims to perform their obligations as Indians. The Muslim could not perform their religious obligations in India unless and until they got united with the Hindus. If the Prophet of Islam could unite with the Jews of Madina against Quaraish and form one national polity, why should the Muslims of India not unite with the Hindus of India to form one nation? Islam did not prevent the Muslim of

India from entering in to covenant with a nation which had not committed aggression against Muslim and occupied their lands.<sup>25</sup>

Maulana Azad's views on Hindu-Muslim alliance were not based on realism. The Muslim thought that the Congress would help them on the question of Khilafat. Hindus, on the other hands, wanted to utilize Muslim sentiments for their own objectives. They believed that Turkey would never become a power again. They freely expressed their sympathy with a cause they believed to be a lost one. But when Turkey emerged strong out of this struggle, the hostile feelings of the Hindus began to assert themselves. Gandhi's sympathy with the Muslims feelings was genuine but most of the Hindus did not agree with him. The result was a strong reaction against his policy. The *Shuddhi* and *Sanghatan* movements started among the Hindus which later on greatly antagonized Muslim masses.<sup>26</sup>

In 1924, Maulana Azad was elected president of the Congress due to his unflinching trust in the leadership of Mr. Gandhi and his whole hearted efforts to make Congress popular among the Muslims. Another factor was that in those days Hindu-Muslim unity of the days of the Khilafat had been shattered, rested as it did on unsound foundations, and replaced by mutual distrust and suspicions. Maulana's elevation to the post of the Congress president was meant to stem this tide.

From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that both Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad struggled for the liberation of India from the British rule. But their approaches and methods were different. Moreover, to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, along with freedom for India, Hindu- Muslim settlement and protection of Muslim interests was also a burning passion. But Maulana did not give any importance to this second objective. That's way, when history unfolded

itself, and the Hindus showed their true nature in subsequent years by refusing to agree to the legitimate right of the Muslims, the Quaid got more and more disillusioned with the Congress, while Maulana Azad stuck to his guns and remained in its fold till last. This will become clear from the second phase of the political careers of these two Muslim leaders.

### **Second Phase- 1924-47**

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had fully immersed himself in the Congress, while the Quaid was fully entrenched in the Muslim League. But the latter had not yet given up the hope of bringing the Hindus and Muslims closer to each other for the sake of liberating India from the British rulers. He wanted this unity to come through harmony of interests of these two communities, instead of merging the Muslims in the ocean of majority Hindus. In those days there was a period of rising in communal disturbances in India. Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad sought an interview with Mahatma Gandhi, and requested him to come out openly in favor of the restoration of communal harmony but his response was not encouraging.<sup>27</sup>

In November 1927, the British Government appointed a commission with Sir Jhon Simmon as its chairman, to report on India's future constitutional progress. This commission was known as Simon Commission which did not have any Indian member, a section of Muslim League led by the Quaid-i-Azam, and Congress boycotted it. The boycotting parties convened an All Parties Conference in February 1928, which appointed a committee to determine the principles for India's constitution. The report of this committee, known as Nehru Report, was in many respects unjust to the Muslims' interests. The only concession to the Muslims was that it recommended full provincial status for the

NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan, and separation of Sindh from Bombay to form a new province, the last one subject to a few qualifications. In other respects Muslims' interests were treated in a very vague and harsh manner. There were to be no separate electorates for the Muslims. It recommended reservations of seats for the minorities in proportion to their population. But there were to be no reservation of seats for any community in the Punjab and Bengal. The result of this would have been to reduce the Muslim majority in these two provinces to a minority, since adult suffrage was yet far off, and, on a franchise restricted by property and educational qualifications, Muslim voting strength would have been far below of Muslim proportion of the population... Hindu superiority in wealth and in strength of political organization, and their preponderance in the administration would have tilted the balance against the Muslims still further.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the Committee proposed a strong center dominated by Hindus with residuary powers which went against Muslims' demand for provincial autonomy. According to Sikandar Hayat, Maulana Azad supported the much maligned Nehru Report claiming that the Report protected Muslim rights and indeed was the 'best solution' of the Hindu-Muslim problem.<sup>29</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam proposed three amendments to make this Report acceptable for the Muslims: one third representations for the Muslims in the Central Legislature, Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal on the basis of population for ten years, and residuary powers to be vested in the provinces, not in the center. But these amendments were rejected by the Hindu majority. Upon this Maulana Muhammad Ali convened an All Parties Muslim Conference on 1st January, 1929, under presidentship of the Agha Khan. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad did not

attend this meeting in which Muslim point of view was forcefully presented.<sup>30</sup>

The harsh truth that there was no place for Muslims' interests in the Congress, and that it was, for all practical purpose, a Hindu communalist body, was becoming clear more and more with every passing day. In 1929, Maulana Muhammad Ali approached Mr. Gandhi when the latter was contemplating about launching a civil disobedience movement against the British. Maulana Muhammad Ali pleaded for a Congress-Muslim agreement with a view to uniting both the communities in an irresistible struggle against foreign rule. Gandhi did not respond positively. Earlier, Doctor Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari had tried to convince Gandhi to secure the cooperation of Muslims by arriving at some understanding with them and had received a cold response.<sup>31</sup> The Congress leaders wanted the Muslims to blindly follow their line without getting any guaranties for the protection of their rights. With a view to protecting Muslims' interests the Quaid-i-Azam, in 1929, put forward his famous Fourteen Points as a charter of minimum demands of the Muslims. He told both the Hindus and the British Government that no constitution for India, in future, would be acceptable to the Muslims unless and until it was in accordance with these Fourteen Points. The demands contained in these points had the support of all Muslim community. Here too Maulana strongly opposed the argument of Jinnah.

The Government of India Act 1935 was passed by the British Parliament with Congress and Muslim League showing strong reservations. In 1937 elections to the Provincial Assemblies were held under the new constitution. The Congress got majority in seven provinces including the Muslim majority province of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Except the promotion of Urdu language and script and

separate electorates for the Muslims, there was nothing in the Muslim League program to stand in the way of Hindu-Muslim cooperation.<sup>32</sup> The Muslim League extended its hand of cooperation towards Congress for the formation of coalition governments in the provinces. But this offer of Muslim League was turned down by the Congress by offering humiliating conditions which the Muslim League rejected in toto. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a member of the Congress High Command, communicated these terms and conditions to Khaliqzaman, the Muslim League representative in the UP Assembly. Maulana Azad was the main figure who took part in the preparation of that humiliating document which proposed that the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in United Provinces will cease to exist. Khaliqzaman writes in his book *Pathway to Pakistan* that Maulana Azad at the end of document added a short note: It was hoped that if these terms were agreed to and the Muslim League group of members joined the congress Party as full members that group would cease to exist as a separate group. In the formation of the Provincial Cabinet it was considered proper that they should have representatives.<sup>33</sup>

The Congress Ministries refused to take oath unless and until the Governors ensured that they would not use their especial powers which mostly related to protection of the rights of minorities. The imposition of *Bande Mataram* as the national anthem, the *Vidhya Mandir* Scheme of education, Hindi as the national language, foisting Congress flag over government buildings and offices, and discrimination against the Muslims were such acts which manifested the Hindu color of the Congress and its bias against the Muslims. The Muslim League left no stone unturned to highlight the Congress atrocities against the Muslims and to bring them to the notice of the British Government and the outside

world. The Quid stressed that Muslims were a force in India and had to be reckoned with. Maulana Abul Kalam rejected Muslim allegations regarding Congress accesses and atrocities. He proclaimed:

*Every incident which involved communal issue came up before me. From personal knowledge and with a full sense of responsibility, I can therefore say that the charges leveled by Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League with regard to injustice to Muslims and other minorities were absolutely false.*<sup>34</sup>

In 1939, when the Congress Ministries resigned, the Muslims, all over India, observed a Day of Deliverance at the call of the Quaid-i-Azam. By the dawn of the fourth decade of the 20th century the contradictions between the Muslim nationalism and Indian nationalism and the identification of Maulana Azad with the Hindu nationalism had become quite clear. The harsh experience of the Congress ministries and the atrocities committed upon the Muslims there-under had made it clear that constitutional safeguards for the Muslims within the framework of united India, dominated by the Hindus, meant nothing for the Muslims. So, they began to think in terms of separation. They refused to admit that they were a community. They asserted that they were a separate nation. While addressing the annual session of the All India Muslim League in 1940 in Lahore, the Quid-i-Azam, explaining the separate nationhood of the Muslims, said:

*Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality... The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry nor inter dine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life are different ... They have different epics, their*

*heroes are different, and they have different episodes, very often the hero of one is the foe of the other, and likewise their victories and defeats overlap...Muslim India can not accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu Raj.*<sup>35</sup>

The same year Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was elected President of the All India National Congress at its Ramgarh session. As opposed to the Jinnah's unequivocal statement of Muslim nationalism in the Muslim League Session, Maulana Azad's address reflected his sentiments of Indian nationalism. In this address Maulana Azad said that the eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. He further said that in matters of language, dress and customs Hindus and Muslims had become one. In his views revival may be a necessity in religion, but in social matters it is a denial of progress. He said that Thousand of years of joint life has molded us into a common nationality ... we have become an Indian Nation united and indivisible.<sup>36</sup>

In the above mentioned Lahore session of the Muslim League the famous Lahore Resolution, which later on came to be called the Pakistan Resolution, was passed which called for the division of India between Muslims and Hindus. This was not the first time that a scheme for the division of India had been passed. Prior to it several schemes with regard to the partition of India had been put forward by different personalities.<sup>37</sup> But in 1940 it was for the first time that Muslim League adopted it as its official policy. Muslim nationalism had come to full maturity and now demanded a territory of its own. This was a turning point in the history of Muslim nationalism. The Muslims, all over India, began to gather round the Muslim League banner with an unprecedented

enthusiasm and vigor which became a source of tremendous strength for their leader, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

From 1940 to 1946 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was president of the Congress. It was a very critical period in the history of Muslim India. Congress needed him in order to show to the world that congress was genuinely a nationalist party in which Muslims were so secure that one of their religious scholars was its president. But Jinnah called him a “Show Boy of the Congress”. The Muslims in the Congress circles objected to these remarks of the Quaid-i-Azam. But this was a fact that Maulana Azad was helpless in important matters such as Hindu Muslim question. During his tenure as Congress president he was bound to follow the commands of the permanent super-President Gandhi. And Maulana was not in the position to challenge Gandhi because he was aware of the fate of dissidents like Nariman of Bombay, C. R. Das, Subash Chandra Bose of Bengal and many more. His position in the Congress circle became clearer when the Congress passed the rebellious resolution in July 1942 rejected the Cripps Proposals. When Maulana tried to explain that the resolution is not an ultimatum to the Government, Gandhi rebuffed him and retorted: There is no question of one more chance.<sup>38</sup> In August 1945, he wrote a confidential letter to Mr. Gandhi in which he expressed his concerns over growing communalism and fears in minds of the Muslims of India. He stressed for settlement of Hindu Muslim question. In this respect he gave some suggestions to Mr. Gandhi. But his suggestions were turned down by Gandhi and he was told to remain silent in this matter.<sup>39</sup> Being Congress President, he was powerless. This was despite the fact that he was Indian nationalist from the core of his heart and had left no stone unturned in persuading the Muslims of India to join the Congress. Again the Congress high

command rejected his plea regarding the interpretation of Cabinet Mission of 1946. In July 1946 he was no more President of the Congress. Although the Muslim masses did not respond to his calling, a sizeable section of the ulema of Deoband responded to his claim that their interests would be safeguarded under a united India and that they should repose full confidence in Indian nationalism.<sup>40</sup>

Maulana Azad represented the Congress in its negotiations with the Cripps Mission, in the Simla Conference, and with the Cabinet Mission as well as with the Muslim League. From the Muslim League side the Quaid-i-Azam was the sole spokesman and chief negotiator with full authority and confidence from his nation and party. The idea which, later on, was formulated into the Cabinet Mission Plan, had been initiated by Maulana Azad.<sup>41</sup> This Scheme called for a three tier federation and three groups of provinces with a Center having three subjects as system for India. The Muslim League and the Quaid-i-Azam approved it only in name and made such interpretations of this plan which amounted to its rejection. Maulana Azad sincerely wanted this plan to be implemented because only in this way could India remain united. But he was powerless before Nehru and Gandhi, the real wielders of power in the Congress. Had this plan been approved and implemented in its letter and spirit, the unity and integrity of India would have been maintained and the Muslims would have got their rights within the framework of a united India. But the follies of the Congress leaders did not let it happen. Maulana Azad has himself blamed the Congress leadership for the failure of this Plan in his autobiography.<sup>42</sup> The failure of this Plan resulted in the division of India and the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, one may say that Indian nationalism and Muslim nationalism existed side by side and flowed parallel to each other. Indian nationalism was, for all practical purposes, Hindu communalism. All exponents of Indian nationalism were virtually communalist and biased Hindus. Whenever any issue with regard to conflict of interests between Muslims and Hindus rose, the Congress leaders openly sided with the Hindus. The Quaid-i-Azam was, in early years of his political career, an ardent supporter of Indian nationalism. But at the same time he was not oblivious of the interests of the Muslims. The passage of time showed him the real nature of the Congress and Indian nationalism, so, he drifted towards Muslim nationalism till he became the most ardent Muslim nationalist. But Maulana Azad remained Indian nationalist till last and stuck to his position, regardless of what was the attitude of the Congress and the Hindus towards the Muslims. He was of the view that Muslims should merge their political identity with the Hindus. He believed that the community would prosper by losing its national identity, if it did not make conscious efforts to preserve itself, it would invite no hostility and no attack; it had only to let the majority forget that it existed to ensure a continued and unchallenged existence for itself. The Muslim masses were the best judges of the circumstances. As Sikandar Hayat observed that his association with the Hindus in general and Congress in particular was perceived by the Muslim masses as 'betrayal of the Muslim cause'.<sup>43</sup> They opposed the views and politics of Abul Kalam Azad, despite his erudition and scholarship, whose message did not appeal to them, and supported Western educated Jinnah because his message was wholly in accord with logic and circumstantial evidence. In the end, it was Muslim nationalism which triumphed.

## End Notes

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<sup>1</sup>W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (Calcutta, 1945) p. 161. Also see Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), p.5, Khalid bin Saeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1858-1948* (London, 1968) pp. 12-14.

<sup>2</sup>Presidential Address of Justice Sir Syed Wazir Hassan to the 24<sup>th</sup> session of A.I.M.L held at Bombay, April 1936, in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan: A.I.M.L Documents.1906-47* Vol. I, (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), p.242.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid; p.242.

<sup>4</sup>For a detailed study of the life and services of Sir Syed see Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali, *Hayat-i-Javaid* (Lahore: National Book House, 1982).

<sup>5</sup>G.Allana, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah – The Story of a Nation*, (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd. 1988), p.61

<sup>6</sup>Ibid; p.61

<sup>7</sup>A.G Noorani, *Jinnah and Tilak: Comrades in the Freedom Struggle* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 87.

<sup>8</sup>G.Allana, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah – The Story of a Nation*, p. 63.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid; p.71

<sup>10</sup>Ibid; p.74

<sup>11</sup>Ibid; pp.77-78

<sup>12</sup>Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2009), p. 95.

<sup>13</sup>G. Allana, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah – The Story of a Nation*, p.95

<sup>14</sup>Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.63.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid; pp.70-72

<sup>16</sup>Hafeez Malik, *Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p.269.

<sup>17</sup>Syed Saiyidian Hameed, *Islamic Seal on India's Independence: Abul Kalam Azad – A Fresh Look* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.57.

<sup>18</sup>Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p.6.

<sup>19</sup>M.J. Akbar, *Nehru- The Making of India* (Viking, 1988), p. 91.

<sup>20</sup>Abdurraziq Maleehabadi, *Zikr-i- Azad* [Urdu] (Lahore: Maktaba Jamal, 2006), p.160.

<sup>21</sup>Makhmoor Saeedi, “Maulana Abul Kalam Azad aur Secularism” in Dr. Khaleeq Anjum, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: Shakhsiyat aur Kaarnamey*, Edi. [Urdu] (Lahore: Tayyab Publishers, 2005), p.234.

<sup>22</sup>Syeda Saiyidian Hameed, p.95.

<sup>23</sup>Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah And the Creation of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 159.

<sup>24</sup>Abul Kalam Azad, *Khutbaat-e- Abul Kalam Azad*, (Lahore: Islamic Publishing House, nd), p.45.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid. pp. 47-53.

<sup>26</sup>Syed Shareefuddin Pirzada, p.47.

<sup>27</sup>Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qurashi, *Ulema in Politics* (Karachi: Maarif Ltd., nd), p.296.

<sup>28</sup>Ch. Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, nd), pp.21-22.

<sup>29</sup>Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader*, p. 159.

<sup>30</sup>Ishtiaq Hussain Qurashi, *Ulema in Politics*, p.300.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p.303.

<sup>32</sup>Ishtiaq Hussain Qurashi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1993), p. 54.

<sup>33</sup>Chaudhury Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 153. Also see Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence*, p. 219.

<sup>34</sup>Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader*, p. 159.

<sup>35</sup>Syed Shareef Uddin Pirzada, pp.337-38.

<sup>36</sup>Mushir Ul Haq, *Muslim Politic in Modern India 1857-1947* (Lahore: Book Traders, nd), p.113.

<sup>37</sup>K.K.Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Books Service, 1986), pp.56-60.

Ibid; p.56.

<sup>38</sup>Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader*, p. 162.

<sup>39</sup>M.Farooq Qurashi, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad aur Quom parast Musalmanoon ki Siyasat* [Urdu] (Lahore: Akhleeqaat, 1997), pp.253-55.

<sup>40</sup>Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qurashi, *Ulema in Politics*, p.328.

<sup>41</sup>H.V. Hudson, *The Great Divide- Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.143.

<sup>42</sup>Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, pp.164-67.

<sup>43</sup>Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader*, p. 162.