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ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND POLITICS  
IN POST SUHARTO INDONESIA: A STUDY OF  
*PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA*  
(PKS, THE PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY)

BY

NOSTALGIAWAN WAHYUDHI

A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirement  
for the degree of Master of Human Sciences  
(Political Science)

Kuliyah of Islamic Reveal Knowledge and  
Human Sciences  
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Malaysia

AUGUST 2012

## ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the issue of contemporary Islamic revivalism and politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, with special reference to the role of *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party). It studies the origin of the party, its ideology, structure and political platform; and explains why they had changed in post-Suharto Indonesia. Based on Douglas C. North theory of ‘transactional cost world’, the study argues that the dynamics of the Indonesian democratic political environment have determined the strategy of PKS. Political constraints create transactional politics that triggered the party to adjust its ideology and structures to the prevailing political needs in order to increase its electability. The discourse maintains that, *firstly*, the revivalist party has roots in Indonesian politics and takes lessons from the experience of two Indonesian Islamic organizations, namely *Sarekat Islam* (Muslim Union) and *Masyumi* (The *Shūrā* Council of Muslim Indonesians). *Secondly*, the party has an ideological linkage to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. *Finally*, in order to maximize its electoral appeal, the PKS adjusted its ideology and structure to the needs and interests of the core electorate. It shifts its ideology to the centre of political spectrum as an inclusive nationalist-religious party, which is close to the character of a catch-all party. On the other hand, it still maintains the character of a mass party by embracing Islam through the Muslim Brotherhood’s cadre system.

## خلاصة البحث

تتناول هذه الدراسة قضية الإحياء الإسلامي وسياساته في عهد إندونيسيا مابعد سوهارتو، مع تركيز خاص على الدور الذي لعبه حزب العدالة (PKS) في هذه الفترة. ويتضمن ذلك نشأة الحزب، إيديولوجيته وبناءه، كما تحاول إيضاح التحوّل الذي طرأ على الحزب في إندونيسيا ما بعد سوهارتو. وبناءً على نظرية دوجلاس س. نورث، فإنّ قيمة التعامل التجاري العالمي وديناميكية المناخ الديمقراطي والسياسي في إندونيسيا هي التي حدّدت استراتيجية حزب العدالة (PKS). إنّ الكواكب السياسية تخلق نمطاً من التعامل السياسي يدفع الحزب إلى تعديل إيديولوجيته بما يتماشى مع الاحتياجات السياسية الراهنة، وذلك حتى يزيد من فرصه في الفوز في الانتخابات. تؤكد الدراسة أولاً: أنّ هذا الحزب الذي يدعو إلى الإحياء الإسلامي له جذور في السياسة الإندونيسية هذا بالإضافة إلى أنّه يستهدي بتجارب منظمين إسلاميين في إندونيسيا هما الإتحاد الإسلامي (Sarekat) ومجلس شورى مسلمي إندونيسيا (Masyumi)، ثانياً: للحزب علاقة بالإخوان المسلمين في مصر. أخيراً، ومن أجل مضاعفة رصيده الانتخابي، عدّل الحزب من إيديولوجيته وبنيته حتى يتواءم مع احتياجات ومصالح المتحمسين من جمهور ناخبيه. لقد حوّل الحزب إيديولوجيته إلى مركز الطبقة السياسي كحزب قومي وديني منفتح على الجميع مما يجعله يُتصّف بـ "حزب الكل" وفي الجانب الآخر مازال الحزب يحتفظ بشخصيته الجماهيرية بتبنيه للإسلام على نسق كادر الإخوان المسلمين.

## APPROVAL PAGE

I certify that I have supervised and read this study and that in my opinion; it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Human Science (Political Science).

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## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.

Nostalgawan Wahyudhi

Signature .....

Date .....

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA

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**ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND POLITICS IN POST SUHARTO INDONESIA:  
A STUDY OF *PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA*  
(PKS, THE PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY)**

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Date

*This thesis is dedicated to all Muslim Ummah and  
my precious family: Diana, Fatih, Aisha and El-Din.*

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Praise be to Allah, Lord of the universe, and  
peace and prayers be upon His final Prophet and Messenger.*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| ABRI/TNI    | The Indonesian Army   |
| AKP         | Justice and Development Party of Turkey   |
| Bapilu      | Electoral Strategic Division  |
| BEM         | Student Representative Council  |
| BKPM        | The Investment Coordination Bureau  |
| BMKI        | Indonesian Campus-Mosque Supervision  |
| BMP         | Basic Movement Philosophy   |
| BPUPKI/PPKI | The Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence                    |
| CSIS        | Centre for Strategic and International Studies                                  |
| DDII        | Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council  |
| Dema        | University-Student Council ( <i>Dewan Mahasiswa</i> )                           |
| DI/TII      | Islamic State (Darul Islam)/The Indonesian Islamic Army                         |
| DPC         | Sub-district Leadership Council ( <i>Dewan Pimpinan Cabang</i> )                |
| DPD         | Local Leadership Council ( <i>Dewan Pimpinan Daerah</i> )                       |
| DPP         | Central Board ( <i>Dewan Pimpinan Pusat</i> )                                   |
| DPR         | Indonesian Lower House  |
| DPRa        | Village Leadership Council ( <i>Dewan Pimpinan Ranting</i> )                    |
| DPRD        | The Local's Lower House   |
| DPTP        | Leadership Council of the Central Board ( <i>Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat</i> ) |
| DPW         | Regional Leadership Council ( <i>Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah</i> )                   |
| DS          | <i>Sharī'ah</i> Assembly ( <i>Dewan Syariah</i> )                               |
| FIS         | Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria  |
| FSI         | Islamic Study Forum   |
| FSLDK       | Coordination Forum for Campus Preaching Assembly                                |
| FSPPI       | Communication Forum of Islamic Parties  |
| Golkar      | The Functionary Group Party   |
| HMI         | Islamic Student Association   |
| HMI-MPO     | Islamic Student Association-The Organization Saviour Council                    |
| HNW         | Hidayat Nur Wahid   |
| HTI         | Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr Indonesia  |
| IAIN        | The State Islamic Institute   |
| ICMI        | Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association                                      |
| IIRO        | International Islamic Relief Organization                                       |
| ISDV        | <i>Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging</i>                               |
| JI          | Jamaah Islamiyah  |
| JIL         | Liberal Islamic Network   |
| KAMMI       | Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union  |
| KNIP        | Indonesian National Committee/Lower House                                       |
| KNPI        | Committee for Indonesian National Youth   |
| Komji       | The Jihad Command ( <i>Komando Jihad</i> )                                      |
| KPU         | The Indonesian General Election Commission                                      |
| LDK         | Campus Preaching Assembly   |
| LIPIA       | Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies of Ibn Saud University                  |
| LMD         | The Training for the <i>Da'wa</i> Activists                                     |

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| LSI           | Indonesian Survey Bureau                                       |
| Malari        | The Incident of the Fifteenth January                          |
| Masyumi       | The <i>Shūrā</i> Council of Indonesian Muslims                 |
| MMS           | The Deliberation Assembly Meeting                              |
| MNP           | National Order Party of Turkey                                 |
| MPP           | Advisory Assembly Board ( <i>Majelis Pertimbangan Partai</i> ) |
| MPR           | People Consultative Assembly                                   |
| MS            | Deliberation Assembly ( <i>Majelis Syuro</i> )                 |
| MSP           | National Salvation Party of Turkey                             |
| Mukernas      | National strategic Meeting                                     |
| Munas         | National Congress  |
| NGO           | Non-Government Organization                                    |
| NII           | Indonesian Islamic State                                       |
| NKK/BKK       | The Normalization of Campus Life                               |
| NKRI          | Republic of Indonesia  |
| NU            | Nahdhatul Ulama  |
| Opsus         | Special Operation ( <i>Operasi Kusus</i> )                     |
| PAN           | National Mandate Party   |
| Parmusi       | Indonesian Muslimin Party                                      |
| PAS           | Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party                                    |
| PBB           | Moon-Star Party  |
| PD            | Democratic Party   |
| PDI-P         | Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle                           |
| Persis        | The Islamic Union  |
| Perti         | Indonesian <i>Tarbiyah Islamiyah</i> Movement Party            |
| PHI           | Indonesian Pilgrim Committee                                   |
| PI            | The Indonesian Association ( <i>Perhimpunan Indonesia</i> )    |
| PII           | Indonesian Islamic Student                                     |
| Pilkada       | Local elections  |
| PK            | Justice Party  |
| PKB           | National Awakening Party                                       |
| PKI           | Indonesian Communist Party                                     |
| PKS           | Prosperous Justice Party ( <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> )  |
| PNI           | Indonesian Nationalist Party                                   |
| Polri         | The Indonesian Police  |
| PPP           | Development United Party                                       |
| PRRI          | The Indonesian Revolutionary Government                        |
| PSII          | Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party                                 |
| Sarekat Islam | The Muslim Union   |
| SBY           | Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono                                       |
| SDIT          | Integrated Islamic Schools                                     |
| SI            | Sarekat Islam  |
| SM            | Student-Senate   |
| SU-MPR        | General Meeting of the People Consultative Assembly            |
| TRP           | Regular Cadre's Meeting ( <i>Taklim Rutin Partai</i> )         |
| UMNO          | United Malays National Organisation                            |
| UUD 45        | The Indonesian Constitution 1945                               |
| WAMY          | World Assembly of Muslim Youth                                 |
| Wilda         | The Regional Authority   |

## TRANSLITERATIONS

|   |    |   |    |   |    |   |    |    |   |
|---|----|---|----|---|----|---|----|----|---|
| ء | '  | خ | kh | ش | Sh | غ | Gh | ن  | N |
| ب | B  | د | D  | ص | ṣ  | ف | F  | هـ | H |
| ت | T  | ذ | dh | ض | ḍ  | ق | Q  | و  | W |
| ث | Th | ر | r  | ط | ṭ  | ك | K  | ي  | Y |
| ج | J  | ز | z  | ظ | ẓ  | ل | L  |    |   |
| ح | ḥ  | س | s  | ع | ʿ  | م | M  |    |   |

| Short Vowels |   |
|--------------|---|
| ـَ           | a |
| ـِ           | i |
| ـُ           | u |

| Long Vowels |   |
|-------------|---|
| ا + ـَ      | ā |
| ي + ـِ      | ī |
| و + ـُ      | ū |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Islamic revival and politics are important features in post-Suharto Indonesia. The new democratic euphoria of the country has shifted the Islamic revivalists' strategy openly into forming political parties. The emergence of *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party) in July 1998 highlighted this phenomenon.

The origin of the PKS went back to the *Tarbiyah*/Education movement (*Gerakan Tarbiyah*), which was motioned as an underground movement (*al-Da'wa al-Sirriyyah*/secretive call) during the strict Suharto's order.<sup>1</sup> The *Tarbiyah* activists, basically university students who customarily met at the university *masjid* (mosque), routinely networked themselves into *halaqahs* or *liqa'* (study circles), each led by a *murabbī* (senior mentor). Institutionally, they had a Campus Preaching Assembly (LDK) in various universities. Nationally, they were linked to the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) that was formed to conduct the 1998 Indonesian reformative movement. They led demonstrations, accompanied the Indonesian reformative father (Amien Rais), toppled Suharto's authoritarianism and declared the birth of the Justice Party (PK) in August 1998 which became involved in the 1999 Indonesian elections and attained the seventh position in the polls by gaining 1.36% of the Indonesian vote and 7 seats in the Indonesian Lower House (DPR). Even though

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<sup>1</sup> After the 1978 student protest, Suharto suppressed and banned large student associations by applying the NKK policy (normalization of campus life away from any political activities) which, in effect, was the depolitization of students and campuses.

the party had collected a small number of votes, many of them were highly educated, and the party represented an influential segment of the society.<sup>2</sup>

PK was reconstituted as the PKS in April 2002 because the former failed to meet the two per cent requirement of the electoral threshold in the 1999 elections to contest the 2004 elections. The ‘new’ party had very much benefitted from its dynamic militant cadres. During the 2004 legislative elections, PKS collected 7.34% of the Indonesian vote, and 45 out of the 550 seats in the DPR. It participated in the government through three ministerial positions, and its leader, Hidayat Nur Wahid, became chairperson of the People Consultative Assembly (MPR). At the local level (Pilkada), the party won 88 out of 149 election rounds. These huge gains transferred the party into the sixth largest party in the parliament.

In the 2009 legislative elections, the party became stronger in Indonesian politics, and was positioned as the fourth largest party. It won 7.88% of the total votes, and gained 12 extra legislative seats in parliament. Though the PKS failed to capture the vice presidential position in the presidential election, it secured four ministerial posts in the government coalition.<sup>3</sup>

## **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The significant gains of PKS symbolized the rise of a ‘new’ Islamic revival in Indonesia that has facing many challenges. The Islamic revivalist political party, PKS had been discredited by the so-called liberal Muslims. Abdurrahman Wahid, the former Indonesian president, and the elite of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU, the Awakening

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<sup>2</sup> The party is supported by young Islamist university students, mostly from the middle class of Indonesia’s best universities, who are active in LDK. The LDK is based in the Masjid (mosque) of every campus, and it is linked to every *muşallā* (small prayer room) in most of the faculties and departments.

<sup>3</sup> All election data are cited from the Indonesian General Election Commission (KPU) website. <<http://www.kpu.go.id>> (accessed 27 March, 2010).

of Preacher), supported by the former chairman of Muhammadiyah (the Follower of Prophet Muhammad), Syafi'i Ma'arif, organized what was called a national awareness against "transplanted transnational Islamic movements in current Indonesia."<sup>4</sup> At least three reasons underlined Wahid's campaigns. *Firstly*, he claimed that the PKS was nothing but a wing of the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood that literally implanted the Middle Eastern character of Islam, and had evolved into a political party.<sup>5</sup> He also dismissed the party as an 'enemy from within' (*musuh dalam selimut*),<sup>6</sup> with a radical revivalist spirit to implement Islam from the top down to the grassroots, which threatened Indonesian nationalism. Moreover, Wahid maintained that the PKS manifesto, which adopted the Islamic revivalist spirit and political struggle, was totally different from the apolitical characteristics of mainstream Islamic groups, Muhammadiyah and NU.<sup>7</sup> *Secondly*, he argued, the PKS did not have roots in Indonesian Islam because it shifted Islam from a faith into a political ideology, and thus confined it into a narrow political platform.<sup>8</sup> *Thirdly*, Wahid asserted, the PKS harmed the cause of the emerging Islamic revivalist movement in Indonesia, as it created friction and conflict within the mainstream Islamic movements, NU and Muhammadiyah.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> He published a best seller book about transnational Islam in current Indonesia. See Abdurrahman Wahid et al., *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*, edited by Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Cited from a footnote, Abdurrahman Wahid, "Musuh dalam Selimut" in *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*, edited by Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009), 24.

<sup>6</sup> He titled his introduction as 'Musuh Dalam Selimut' (enemy from within). He claims that the character of PKS is alien in Indonesian Islam. Ibid. 11.

<sup>7</sup> He compares PKS with Muhammadiyah and NU, the mainstems of Indonesian Islam that uniquely comprise of nationalism, culture, and Islam as a foundation of national unity (NKRI). It seems that there is no place for 'Middle Eastern' Islam except to threaten Indonesian unity.

<sup>8</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid, "Musuh Dalam Selimut," 19-20.

<sup>9</sup> Muhammadiyah and NU protest over some infiltration cases by the PKS cadres in their mosques and *amal usaha* (institutions and charities). See Munir Mulkan, "Sendang Ayu: Pergulatan Muhammadiyah di Kaki Bukit Barisan," *Suara Muhammadiyah*, 2 January 2009; Farid Setiawan, "Ahmad Dahlan Menangis," *Suara Muhammadiyah*, 20 February 2006. Wahid also claimed that the infiltrations have spread among NU's mosques in Pati, Central Java. These issues created friction

In light of the above information, this research is conducted to examine Wahid's onslaught on the PKS by answering the following questions: What is the origin of the PKS? What are the PKS ideology, structure and political platform? How and why has the party's strategy (ideology, structure and platform) changed in post-Suharto Indonesia?

## JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

This study may be justifiable because of the following reasons. *First*, Islam and politics in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, is an interesting area of study that attracts many scholars and academicians.<sup>10</sup> Islam in Indonesia occupies a unique political position, and it has coloured the Indonesian political dimension since the Dutch and Japanese colonial rules,<sup>11</sup> comprising Indonesian

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between PKS and the major Islamic institutions in Indonesia, both Muhammadiyah and NU. PKS is banned from any networks and programmes of these institutions. A top leader of Muhammadiyah wrote a book, Haedar Nashir, *Manifestasi Gerakan Tarbiyah: Bagaimana Sikap Muhammadiyah?* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 5<sup>th</sup> edn., 2007). Less than three months after the release of, the first edition of this book, the Muhammadiyah officially rejected any infiltrations that harm the institution. See Act SKPP Muhammadiyah 149/Kep/I.0/B/2006.

<sup>10</sup> For this reason, many scholars are attracted to this area because of Indonesia being a major Muslim country in the world that has a unique Islamic and political development; for example Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion, Popular Radicalism in Java 1912-1926* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); Taufik Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987); Bernhard Dahm, *Sejarah Indonesia Abad Kedua Puluh* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1988); Clifford Geertz, "Near East in the Far East on Islam in Indonesia," (Occasional Papers No. 12, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, Princeton, USA, 2001); Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003); Hiroyoshi Kano, "Sejarah Ekonomi Masyarakat Pedesaan Jawa: Suatu Penafsiran Kembali", in *Indonesia dalam Kajian Sarjana Jepang, Perubahan Sosial Ekonomi Abad XIX & XX dan Berbagai Aspek Nasionalisme Indonesia*, edited by Akira Nagazumi, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, trans. 1986); Graham K. Brown, "The Formation and Management of Political Identities: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared," (CRISE Working Paper 10, University of Oxford, 2005).

<sup>11</sup> It shows in the works of Harry J. Benda, "The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation of Java, 1942-1945," (Ph.D. dissertation: Cornell University, 1955); M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2001); Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslims of The Dutch East Indies and The Caliphate Question", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (1995): 115-140; A.P.E. Korver, *Sarekat Islam: Gerakan Ratu Adil?* (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1985); Alfian, "Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: the Muhammadiyah Movement during the Dutch Colonial Period 1912-1942," (Ph.D dissertation: University of Wisconsin, 1969); Ridwan Saidi, *Cendekiawan Islam Zaman Belanda* (Jakarta: Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1990).

nationalism<sup>12</sup> and early Indonesian political transformation,<sup>13</sup> the new order of Suharto,<sup>14</sup> and the democratic reformation of 1997<sup>15</sup> up to the current Indonesian political situation.<sup>16</sup>

*Second*, the study of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia is still a minor area of research that needs more encouragement compared to its counterparts in Egypt, Sudan, Malaysia, and the Arab World. Most of the studies are generalized under the title Islam in Indonesia.<sup>17</sup> Islamic revival movements and institutions in Indonesia are usually stereotyped into separatist and fundamentalist groups that threaten the unity of Indonesia.<sup>18</sup> In the current Indonesian political constellation, Islamic revival plays a significant role in the political institutions and environment.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Erni Haryanti Kahfi, *Islam and Nationalism: Agus Salim and Nationalist Movement in Indonesia during the Early Twentieth Century* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001); Kay Hock Khoo, *The Development of Indonesian Nationalism* (Kuala Lumpur: Longman, 1977); Badri Yatim, *Soekarno, Islam dan Nasionalisme* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, *Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), which is based on the author's Ph.D thesis, *Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia*; Marshall Green, *Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation 1965-1968* (Washington D.C.: The Compass Press, 1990).

<sup>14</sup> M. Sirajuddin Syamsudin, "Religion and Politics in Islam: The case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order," (Ph.D dissertation, University of California, 1991); Mahrus Irsyam, *Ulama dan Partai Politik: Upaya Mengatasi Krisis* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984); Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Perubahan Perilaku Politik dan Polarisasi Ummat Islam 1965-1987* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1989); Tapol, *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial* (London: Tapol, 1987); Malcolm Cone, "Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto's Indonesia," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2002): 52-67; M. Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to the "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982); Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

<sup>15</sup> Sohirin M. Solihin, *Islam and Politics: Emergence of Reformative Movement in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Research Centre, 2006); Kevin O'Rourke, *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002); Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009); Bilveer Singh, *Succession Politics in Indonesia* (London: MacMillan, 2000).

<sup>16</sup> James J. Fox, "Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia," Paper presented at Harvard Asia Vision 21 (29 April – 1 May, 2004); Deliar Noer, *Islam dan Politik* (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2003).

<sup>17</sup> Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, Issue 5 (2004): 669-690; Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Politics, Islam and Public Opinion," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, issue 1 (January 2004): 109-123.

<sup>18</sup> Ahmad Suhelmi supports the idea of Al Chaidar that the emergence of the Darul Islam (DI, Islamic State) movement has been biasedly described by the orientalist (the writings of van Dijk, Horikoshi, Dengel, Jackson) and the Indonesian military as both separatist and Islamo-phobic. He argues that the vision of an Islamic State of DI is a natural process of early Indonesian political transformations. See Ahmad Suhelmi, *Dari Kanan Islam Hingga Kiri Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 2001), 31-34; Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior*

*Third*, post-Suharto Indonesia is an important phase of Indonesian politics. The 1998 Indonesian ‘*Reformasi*’ created a new dimension of political, social, and religious life. The country developed a new relationship between the state and the citizens that impacted the Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular. The country also regulated the transformation of the political system, shifting from military to civil supremacy, and liberating socio-political life. This development triggered dynamism within the Islamic revival movement in the country.

## **OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The major objectives of this study are:

1. To investigate the origin of the PKS and its political development in post-Suharto Indonesia.
2. To examine the PKS ideology and political platform that triggered Wahid’s campaign against revivalist and transnational Islamic movements in post-Suharto Indonesia.
3. To analyze the changing revivalist political ideology and platform of PKS in post-Suharto Indonesia.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The relevant and related literature on the PKS can be outlined into two major parts: literature on political parties in Indonesia in general and that on the PKS in particular.

The data show the pattern of the relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia.

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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1958).

<sup>19</sup> M. H. Hafez, “Explaining the Origins of Islamic Resurgence: Islamic Revivalism in Egypt and Indonesia,” *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, vol. 22, issue 3 (Fall 2007): 295; Donald J. Peter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

The *politik aliran* (political streams) among political parties and its changing throughout Indonesian political history has been sufficiently analyzed by scholars to indentify the current characteristics and standpoints of political Islam in Indonesia. The second group of literature specifically accumulates updated studies on the PKS, which fall into three major areas: historical studies, works on Islamic radicalism, and the party's compatibility with the rules of democracy..

### **Political Parties in Indonesia**

In a country of 220 million people living in 36 provinces and more than 483 districts and municipalities, and with a variety of ethnic, racial and cultural groups that are significantly overwhelmed by Muslims, Islam, the major religion, has become the most important factor for the Indonesian political party system. These realities stimulated scholars to examine the pattern of Islam in the country's political parties.

Notwithstanding its dominance and importance in Indonesia, Islam, has, unfortunately, problematic relations with the state. The work of Bahtiar Effendy outlines this phenomenon i.e. what he refers to as "political antagonism".<sup>20</sup> His analysis of the early Indonesian nationalism shows that the sole political embodiment of Islam was Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union),<sup>21</sup> which reflected Islam as a binding factor. This characteristic distinguished SI from other nationalist-secular institutions such as Budi Oetomo (BO, Ultimate Virtue), Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI, Indonesian Association) or Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (PNI), which were also populated by Muslims. Islam had also been a factor behind the split of one of SI's

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<sup>20</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).

<sup>21</sup> Later Sarekat Islam recovered into Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (PSII) to balance the movement of Sukarno's PNI (secular-nationalist party). See Deliar Noer, "The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942)," (Ph.D Thesis, Cornell University, 1963), 221.

organs into the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, *Partij de Kommunisten in Indie*),<sup>22</sup> which was also supported by the majority of the members of SI in Central Java.

The works of Clifford Geertz and M.C. Ricklefs detect the polarization among the three dominant ideological groups—Islamist, secular-nationalist and communist—which had become major *politik aliran* (political streams) among Indonesian Muslims since the late 19 century (Dutch colonialism) until the formative year of independent Indonesia.<sup>23</sup> Geertz argues that these political streams ideologically clash with each other, and they uniquely characterize the political party system in Indonesia. The polarization of *politik aliran* is embodied into various political parties. The *santri* have their voices represented in the Masyumi (The *Shūrā*/Deliberation Council of Indonesian Muslims) party, while *priyayi* and *abangan* voices are divided between the nationalist party (PNI), and the leftist parties (PKI and the Indonesian Socialist Party/PSI). It was seen in the 1947 and 1951 composition of the KNIP (Indonesian National Committee/the Lower House) that was dominated by Masyumi as the largest party, PNI which represented the secular-nationalist faction, and later came the leftist PSI and PKI.

According to Bernard Dahm, these *politik aliran* transformed into another new pattern during the first Indonesian general election in 1955. The emergence of PNI as the largest party reflected the unity of *priyayi* and *abangan* to oppose the dominance

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<sup>22</sup> Communism in the Archipelago was seeded by Hendrik Sneevliet, a former activist of the Social Democratic Labour Party in the Netherlands, who came to the Archipelago in 1913 and started the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV, *Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging*). ISDV infiltrated the biggest Islamic institution, SI, by approaching Semaoen, the Central Java's SI leader, to be a native leftist. Later Semaoen declared his SI branch as SI *merah* (the red SI) and splitted from the original SI. In 1920, the red SI was transformed into a fully-fledged communist party, PKI. See Ahmad Suhelmi, *Islam dan Kiri: Respons Elit Politik Islam terhadap Isu Kebangkitan Komunis Pasca-Suharto* (Jakarta: Yayasan SAD Satria Bhakti, 2007), 16-17, 22.

<sup>23</sup> The discourse about *politik aliran* drives from the work of Clifford Geertz. Based on social culture and political affiliations, he structuralizes Java's Muslims into three variants: *abangan* (*syncretic* Muslims or ordinary people from the lower class of society who know Islam only in name not in practice), *santri* (Islamic Students/Islamist people) and *priyayi* (the higher level of society). See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*; M.C. Ricklefs, "Religious Reform and Polarization in Java," *ISIM Review*, vol. 21, (Spring 2008).