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Item Type	Journal volume
Authors	Life & Peace Institute
Publisher	Life & Peace Institute
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Download date	2026-09-14 05:49:18
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/190444

VOLUME 18

New Routes

PUBLISHED BY THE LIFE & PEACE INSTITUTE

2/2013

A journal of
peace research
and action



*Hope amid
hardships*

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Hope amid hardships

DURING THE PRODUCTION of this New Routes issue, spring came to large parts of Sweden after a long and cold winter. After the dark months on these latitudes, people can't get enough of light and warmth, and when it comes at last, it is as if not only nature but also humans wake up and regain hope and energy.

When it comes to the shift in seasons, this part of the world is in many aspects an exception, but regarding the hope that we nurture for something better to come, it seems to be quite universal. And maybe this hope is what keeps us all going? In some situations, it would be more than natural to give up and submit to that which seems impossible to change. But history is full of evidence of the contrary, that people take up the struggle against all odds and do their utmost for a better future, for themselves and coming generations.

A number of articles in this issue provide examples of this attitude. Dr Ibrahim Farah points to signs that, after numberless attempts to reach a solution for Somalia, sustainable peace may in fact be within reach. J.L. Kambale Nzweve shows how, after decades of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, new efforts are made to overcome hostilities between breeders and farmers. Shamsia Ramadhan relates initiatives to prevent a repeat of post-election violence in Kenya by educating media people in peace journalism. The challenges facing Mali after the armed insurgency and coup d'état are analysed by Dr Kwesi Aning and Festus Abyn.

In spite of the predicaments facing refugees, says Ralston Deffenbaugh in his article, new possibilities may emerge that turn resignation into hope. Chris Coulter and Emma Johansson point out the uniqueness of UN Resolution 1325 in its observance of women not only as victims of conflict but as agents of influence. The impact of Mindanao Peace Institute's peace-building programmes on the Asia-Pacific region is explored by Gabrielle Aziza Sagaral.

We believe that this issue will give you food for thought and inspiration. Any comments are, as always, most welcome!

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New Routes

New Routes is a quarterly publication of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI), produced with financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Sida has not been involved in the production and is not responsible for the contents of the journal.

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Cover photo: Georg Lulich

Layout: Georg Lulich Grafisk Form, Uppsala, Sweden

Printer: KPH Trycksaksbolaget AB

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ISSN 2000-8082 (electronic version)

ISSN 1403-3755 (printed version)

For more than two decades Somalia has been plagued by internal conflicts. Numerous political factions have striven to gain power, leaders have entered the stage and left it, and external actors have made repeated attempts to solve the country's problems, more often than not resulting in failure. Since last year, however, there is reason for some hope for Somalia's future, provided that the present government attends to Somali realities.

Somalia: No more missed opportunities

Realities and responses

Ibrahim Farah

For Somalia, and the East and Horn of Africa sub-region, the year 2012 was another year of uncertainty but this time for the better. Indirect elections were held, the first on Somali soil for the past twenty years or so, with new faces coming into Somali politics. In spite of cyclical droughts and famine, always posing a threat of humanitarian crisis, there are more hopes than fears. However, also this major achievement – if not well attended to and built on – can become another missed opportunity.

The country remains in an extremely fragile situation, with the new Federal Government of the Somali Republic facing the challenge of delivering stability, security and basic social services. In the external environment, regional politics and international diplomacy are part of the problem. But with improved security, there is also hope that the recently-formed 'federal' government will become 'the only game in town'.

Since the civil war broke out in early 1991, Somalia has attracted a considerable number of external efforts at peacebuilding and mediation. There have been many attempts to broker peace and create a government. To date, except for the current 'federal' government, none has succeeded.

There have also been many local peace processes held, facilitated and funded by Somalis. However, this article will only discuss the most significant external attempts at resolution. It will do so in terms of their differences in diplomatic approach as well as in terms of their success or failure in contributing to a resolution of the Somali crisis.

The central theme is that the current government seems to be gaining ground and that there is a need to do everything possible to make it work this time.

The UN initiative, 1992-1994

In late 1992, as a result of intense media coverage, the United States decided to join the ongoing international drive for peace in Somalia. They resolved to lead what was termed as 'an international humanitarian intervention', known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), later named UNOSOM. Its mission was the cessation of factional fighting in Somalia and the end of the famine that then raged in the country.¹ However, the conflict soon escalated into one between the UN-led international forces and General Aidede's United Somali Congress (USC) forces.

With the assistance of the Ethiopian government, the UN facilitated two peace and reconciliation efforts in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993, the result of which was the Addis Ababa Accords. These were never implemented, however, in part due to the influence of warlords, who acted as spoilers to block a political process which would have allowed local communities to select their own leadership.²

It is believed that the UN targeted the warlords and ignored other Somali actors and at the same time focused more on the country's post-conflict relations than the structural root causes of the conflict. In other words, it sought institutional and constitutional solutions to the conflict rather than looking at the mechanics of reconciliation.

The EC attempt, 1995-1996

In addition to the UN initiatives for Somalia, the European Commission (EC) in 1995 commissioned the London School of Economics and Political Science to conduct a comparative study to assess the implications of various types of political and administrative decentralisation in Somalia.³

The report, which was titled "A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options", focused on four models: (1) confederation, (2) federation, (3) a decentralised unitary state, and (4) a community-based type of power sharing known as 'consociation'. In 1996 the EC also sponsored two seminars on the study's findings in Naivasha and Nakuru, Kenya. A broad spectrum of Somali traditional and religious leaders, professionals and other representatives of Somali civil society were invited to the seminars,

Somalia has attracted a number of external efforts at peacebuilding and mediation.

all of whom supported the concept of establishing 'a decentralised state with constitutional guarantees for the full autonomy of its constituent units'.

It has been suggested that the limited effectiveness of the EC initiative was due, in part, to the fact that – just like the UN attempt – it focused on consti-

tutional debates rather than on conflict management (with particular reference to taking cognizance of grassroots views, the sentiment of the Somali people and the positions of the various warring factions).

The Arta peace process, 1999-2000

Yet another peace process was initiated in September 1999 by President Gelle of Djibouti, who appealed both to Somali leaders and member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to join him in addressing Somalia's security situation. The president hosted pre-conference consultations in Djibouti, which were attended by sixty scholars. The conference focused on members of civil society.

The actual peace process began in May 2000 in Arta, Djibouti, with delegations from all corners of Somalia. Discussions continued for over four months and concluded with the election of a 245-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA), an interim president and a Transitional National Government (TNG). The first Somali interim government in more than a decade then took office in Mogadishu in September 2000. Overwhelmingly positively received by Mogadishu residents, the government haltingly tried to establish itself in Moga-



PHOTO: KATE HOLY/IRIN

View from a residential area in Mogadishu. After numerous failed attempts, Somalia is in dire need of sustainable peace and stability.

and hope at the time for the initiative was that the process would have gone further and dealt directly with the issues of dialogue and national reconciliation.

The Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process, 2002-2004

Further talks aimed at resolving the Somali conflict were launched in October 2002, this time in Kenya, and under the auspices of IGAD. In late January 2004, a major breakthrough was achieved, when around forty warlords and politicians signed an agreement at State House in Nairobi, Kenya, on a transitional charter to establish a new national assembly. In August 2004 a 275-seat Transitional Federal Parliament was sworn in.

The Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) were at the time charged with overseeing the writing of a new constitution and the staging of elections after five years. Under the terms of the January 2004 accord, Somalia's northeastern region Puntland was to be reunited with the rest of Somalia and, despite the fact that the northwestern region Somaliland was not party to the accord, the TFIs were also mandated to open dialogue with the Somaliland leadership soon after they were done with the peace process throughout the rest of Somalia.

The ICU and Khartoum talks, 2006-2007

In June 2006, there was the worst outbreak of violence since 1991, when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged

as a popular Islamist regime in Mogadishu and expanded to the rest of South Central Somalia.⁴ At the same time, however, it was the longest period of peace in Mogadishu and much of South Central Somalia, since it was the first time this part of the country came under one political entity like that of the ICU. Therefore, in spite of the warfare, there was peace internally.

The Arab League moved in and facilitated talks between the TFG and the ICU in Khartoum, Sudan. But, as more talks were planned, the TFG overran the ICU bases in Mogadishu and throughout South Central Somalia with the Ethiopian military leading the incursion. For over two years, an intense war was fought between the TFG and the Ethiopian military on one side and remnants of the ICU, supported by various Somali clan militias and other nationalist elements in Mogadishu, on the other.⁵

The Djibouti supplement, 2008

Another peace process was initiated after the realisation that the TFIs alone could not deliver basic social services and fulfil its mandate to govern Somalia. Also the opposition was gaining the upper hand on the ground, even with Ethiopian military support and with the presence of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu. Pioneered by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Ould Abdallah, the idea of Somali talks between the 'government'

The first Somali interim government in more than a decade took office in Mogadishu in September 2000.

dishu throughout its three-year term. There were, however, no concrete plans to expand its influence to the rest of the country. Subsequently, a number of faction leaders resisted the TNG and, with Ethiopian support, formed a coalition of opposition groups with a rotating chairmanship, the 'Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council'.

As with the EC attempt, the delegates at the Arta process focused on institutional and constitutional solutions to the conflict, rather than looking at the mechanisms of reconciliation. Moreover, although the establishment of an interim government and certain other state institutions was noteworthy, the belief

and the 'opposition' was received with cautious optimism in all corners.

The TFG and the opposition ARS-Djibouti (Alliance of the Re-liberation of Somalia) agreed on a number of proposals, including the enlargement of the parliament by an extra 275 seats allocated to the ARS. The parties also aimed to reach out to those who were outside the process as well as members of the civil society and the Diaspora. The new inclusive parliament would also elect the new 'Somali' leadership. All agreements resulting from the process were embedded as amendments to the Transitional Federal Charter.

Although the Djibouti process more or less followed the same official diplomatic approaches as all other past processes, it seemed to have gained more currency. Members of the international community voiced their support for the peace process, from the League of

Arab States, to the EU Presidency, to the United States.

The end-of-the-transition process

The Djibouti process that created the TFG II was followed by a series of other agreements: from the Kampala Accord, which gave Sheikh Sharif's⁶ TFG II a one-year extension, to the various Garowe Principles, and the famous UN-led Roadmap, all of which aimed at ending the transition.⁷ The UN Development Programme (UNDP), with support from the TFG and members of the Nairobi-based international aid and diplomatic community, led a constitution-making process resulting in the production of a rushed product: a draft provisional 'federal' constitution for Somalia.

In late 2012, a majority of Somalia's traditional leaders assembled in Mogadishu, selected and formed a new Constituent Assembly, endorsed

the draft 'constitution' and selected a 275-member 'federal' parliament. In what many analysts called a 'civil society *intifada*', the new parliament elected a Speaker and a President, who in their turn appointed a Prime Minister. The new government, the first of its kind for the past two decades or so, is now grappling with issues facing the new Somalia: from the burden left by former transitional 'governments' to issues of security and governance coupled with complex regional politics and challenging international diplomacy.

Missed opportunities or lessons learned?

The above survey of failed peace processes since 1991 is sobering. It serves as a reminder of the intractability of conflict and the difficulty of management in contemporary Somalia. None of these peace processes took root, as they all lacked



PHOTO: MOHAMED AMIN JIBRIL/IRIN

The largest market in Somalia, Bakaara Market in the heart of Mogadishu, was created in late 1972 during the reign of Mohamed Siad Barre. Besides its supply of daily essentials, it is a focus of ongoing arms control efforts for the disarmament and has caught fire a few times in recent years.

the key ingredients for peace and reconciliation: local ownership, a genuine political will by 'Somali leaders', long-term commitment by the international community, and, most important of all, a focus on the psychological and perceptual aspects of the conflict rather than on post-conflict (or post-conference) relations.

In Ambassador Sahnoun's⁸ view, the UN missed three opportunities to save Somalia from state collapse in the late 1980s-early 1990s.⁹ The first presented itself during the 1988 civil war when the former Somali government bombed cities in the northwest. Sahnoun argues that the UN should have mediated between the military regime and the secessionist Somali National Movement.

Peacebuilding and state-formation are inter-related

The second opportunity was in 1990 when Siyad Barre arrested members of the Manifesto Group (a coalition of 114 opinion-makers) who signed a letter calling for the president's resignation and the subsequent holding of free and fair elections in Somalia. Sahnoun argues that the UN should have forced the military regime to release these political prisoners and to restore the pre-1969 democracy.

The third opportunity occurred in 1991 shortly after Siyad Barre fled from Mogadishu. Although there were Egyptian and Italian attempts to continue dialogue with him, the UN did nothing but evacuate its personnel from Somalia. Instead, Sahnoun maintains, the UN should have forced the victorious Hawiye-led USC to share power with its Darod clan partner and prevent further civil war in the south.¹⁰

In line with Ambassador Sahnoun's argument, there were three other missed opportunities in Somalia:

Firstly, the US-led UNOSOM was a major missed opportunity for the so-called international community, under the auspices of the UN, to force 'Somali leaders' to form a government of national unity and help with peacebuilding and state formation.

The famous Djibouti-led Arta peace process was another missed opportunity. It is widely believed that if Ethiopia

and other IGAD member states had given the necessary political and diplomatic recognition, the TNG would have worked, since it was only the warlords who were absent from the process. Once the TNG was fully installed in Mogadishu, an attempt could have been made to bring 'Somaliland' on board and an acceptable form of a political solution worked out, one that would have given the 'Somalilanders' enough room to breathe and develop on their own without too many bureaucratic impositions from Mogadishu.

Finally, the formation of the TFIs and attempts to salvage them, including the internalisation of the Djibouti product, the 'government of national unity', or TFG II was another missed opportunity. In the history of the East and Horn of Africa sub-region there had never previously been this level of inclusivity, which was supported at the time not only on the Somali side but also in the sub-region and in the international community. One major factor behind this missed opportunity was Abdullahi Yusuf's¹¹ reluctance to engage in dialogue and reconciliation; another was Sheikh Sharif's incapacity to govern and engage other Somali actors, including civil society.

Some Somalia observers argue that the Somali people would have had a much higher chance of a successful transition to a post-Barre Somalia if any of the past transitional arrangements had developed into stable governments. The key message here is that the current federal government stands the best chance and it needs the support of each and every Somali, as well as the support of Somalia's friends in the region and the international community.

A narrow window of opportunity

Peacebuilding and state-formation are inter-related. While peacebuilding requires reconciliation, mending of relations and the restoration of trust, state formation, on the other hand, is characterised by competition, anxiety and tension. Within this context, there are lessons to learn from all past peace processes and the various missed opportunities: from the approaches used, to the lack of political will, commitment and local ownership and leadership by the Somali people.

The new 'federal' government in the Somali Republic presents a new window

of opportunity. One should not expect that it is going to be 'the Somali government'. But the chances of making it work are much better and brighter than for any of the past transitional arrangements. The new government therefore needs to expand its policy framework and make it work. Priority areas should include the reformation of the Somali army, the Somalisation of the 'provisional constitution', the genuine facilitation of the formation of regional administrations in much of South Central Somalia, and the setting up of a policy and coordination unit, which should prioritise and advise on the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development needs. The key message is that the 'federal' government of the Somali Republic must attend to Somali realities and there should be no more missed opportunities. 🌿

1 Under UNSC Resolution No. 751, the US-led UNOSOM intervention force was created and was mandated to undertake a peacekeeping mission with the consent of the Somali factions.

2 See Chopra, Jarat et al, 'Fighting for Hope in Somalia', Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations No. 6, 1995.

3 See S. Illing, *Helping Rebuild Somalia: The EC in Somalia 1993-1996* (Nairobi: Majestic Printing Works, 1997).

4 See UNDP and World Bank's report: *Somali Reconstruction and Development Framework: Deepening Peace and Reducing Poverty*, Vol. II; South-Central Somalia, 30 October, 2006.

5 See *Somali capital rocked by fresh clashes*, AFP, Tuesday, 17 April, 2007.

6 President of the TFG, indirectly elected at the end of the Djibouti talks soon after the former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned.

7 See for example J. Mosley, "End of the Roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul Conferences", Programme Paper, Chatham House, June 2012

8 The first Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Somalia in the early 1990s.

9 See Sahnoun, M., *The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994).

10 Sahnoun's arguments aside, Saadia Touval argues that the UN has had great difficulties performing many basic functions required of an effective mediator: it did not serve well as an authoritarian channel of communication, it has had little real political leverage, its promises and threats lacked credibility and it was incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible, and dynamic negotiations guided by an effective strategy. See Saadia Touval's notes in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October Issue, 1994.

11 TFG President indirectly elected soon after the Eldoret/Mbagathi talks were concluded in Kenya.

Cet article portant sur la régulation de la transhumance en Territoire de Fizi rend compte d'une démarche inverse de la construction de la paix, partant de la base pour éclairer les solutions à mettre en œuvre aux différents niveaux de la société. Il a pour objectif de montrer les liens entre peacebuilding et statebuilding tels que dégagés par les résultats de la recherche – action participative menée par les organisations partenaires de Life & Peace Institute.

La régulation de la transhumance – un enjeu de la paix à l'Est de la RDC

J.L. Kambale Nzweve

L'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) connaît, depuis deux décennies, des conflits armés permanents dont la trame se nourrit tant de la faible intégration spatiale, socioculturelle et politique dans un environnement mondialisé que de la faible viabilité intérieure et extérieure de l'État.¹ Sa sécurisation et sa stabilisation font l'objet d'une longue intervention de la communauté internationale. Incapable d'arrêter les violences, cette intervention est jugée inefficace par des observateurs autorisés, à l'instar de Séverine Autesserre, qui trouvent les raisons de cette inefficacité dans la non-prise en compte des enjeux locaux des conflits, notamment la compétition des communautés ethniques pour l'accès et le contrôle de la terre.²

Le Territoire de Fizi se trouve à l'extrême Sud de la Province du Sud-Kivu, à l'Est de la RDC. Deux ensembles géographiques caractérisent son relief : la vallée qui s'étend sur le littoral du Lac Tanganyika dominé par une clairière et une savane herbeuse et les hauts plateaux au climat tempéré par l'altitude où prospère un élevage extensif de bovins. Entre les mois de juin et septembre de chaque année, la saison sèche fane l'herbe dans les montagnes, privant ce bétail de son fourrage naturel. Comme les techniques d'ensilage et de stabulation ne sont pas encore en vigueur dans ce système agro-pastoral traditionnel, la transhumance vers les bas plateaux et la vallée constitue alors la seule alternative pour la survie des vaches.

Plus qu'une simple migration saisonnière du bétail, cette transhumance s'avère être un jeu répété de rencontre et de heurt de diverses identités : socioprofessionnelles, politiques, économiques

etc. D'abord ce sont des éleveurs de la tribu Banyamulenge, et accessoirement Bafulero, qui investissent un fief des Babembe et des Babwari qui sont en général des petits exploitants agricoles. En référence à une mémoire collective relative aux mouvements migratoires de la région, les deux derniers groupes se considèrent comme les autochtones et revendiquent de ce fait un droit naturel de « premier occupant » tandis que les deux premiers sont traités volontiers de non-originaux.³ De toute façon, les éleveurs négocient le droit de passage ou de pacage saisonnier auprès des communautés d'accueil établies sur ces terres, ce qui génère un contrat foncier. Au concret, ce contrat consacre des relations de type féodal entre le chef local et l'usager du pâturage. La destruction fréquente et quasi-inévitable des cultures à l'occasion du déplacement du bétail sous-tend des conflits permanents entre deux classes socioéconomiques dans un rapport de force inégal : des éleveurs de bovins face à des paysans exploitants de petits lopins de terre.

La transhumance bovine en Territoire de Fizi pose ainsi une forme particulière de la question foncière, mettant en branle un ensemble des relations sociopolitiques, économiques, juridiques entre les communautés locales. En l'espace d'un demi-siècle près, elle participe à la reproduction de la guerre permanente que se font des groupes armés d'obédience ethnique.⁴

L'érosion d'une régulation traditionnelle

En principe, ces rapports multiples sont régulés par une tenure spécifique qui, dans la logique du droit coutumier,

établit pour le demandeur de terre, un rapport de type politique d'allégeance au régisseur de terres et un devoir de sociabilité dans la communauté d'accueil, ritualisé par le paiement de la redevance foncière,⁵ l'*itulo*, et du reste assorti de la protection des cultures et



Chaque année, c'est un cheptel d'environ 200.000 bêtes qui descend les flancs de Monts Mitumba pour paître dans la vallée

de l'indemnisation des dégâts, le cas échéant. En Territoire de Fizi, ce contrat consacre un pacte séculaire de la cohabitation pacifique entre les éleveurs Banyamulenge et les chefs et agriculteurs Babembe.

Par la conjugaison de divers facteurs historiques, l'exécution harmonieuse de ce contrat se trouve fort éprouvée. Tout d'abord, l'augmentation continue du cheptel bovin, importé des pays voisins (Tanzanie, Burundi et Rwanda) entraîne son potentiel de plus en plus élevé de destruction des cultures et l'exacerbation subséquente des ressentiments de la paysannerie. En effet, chaque année, c'est un cheptel d'environ 200.000 bêtes qui descend les flancs de Monts Mitumba pour paître dans la vallée.

Par suite, la subordination du droit coutumier au droit positif, dans le cadre

de la création de l'état-nation qui a absorbé les chefferies, royaumes et empires précoloniaux, érode progressivement le pouvoir des chefs coutumiers.⁶ En outre, la guerre qui perdure à l'Est du Congo, réplique locale de la guerre interethnique et du génocide au Rwanda, entretient une psychose de peur au sein des populations locales. La propagande politique aidant, des groupes ethniques redoutent en effet une volonté de domination, voire d'extermination, dans le

geant ainsi les droits des chefs locaux. En revanche, les éleveurs organisent une garde armée du bétail pour parer à toute éventualité, récusent l'autorité des chefs locaux, perçus comme complices des groupes armés ou dorénavant incapables d'assurer une transhumance paisible, conformément au contrat.⁷ Ainsi, les bases de la tenure *itulo* et de sa capacité de régulation des relations entre les éleveurs et les agriculteurs, et sous-entendu celles des identités tribales, se trouvent, au fil du temps, érodées.

Le renouveau de la régulation de la transhumance

C'est au bout d'un long cycle de Recherche – Action – Participative (RAP), facilitée par les Organisations de la Société Civile locales partenaires de Life & Peace Institute (Réseau d'Innovations Organisations, Actions pour le Développement et la Paix Endogène et Arche d'Alliance), que les populations locales ont reconstitué cette trame de la destruction du tissu social et resitué la place centrale de la transhumance dans le développement des escalades. En effet, le premier cycle de cette recherche a couvert la période allant de 2008 à 2010 et culminé par la tenue d'une Table-Ronde au cours de laquelle les différentes délégations des communautés tribales de Fizi ont affronté leurs lectures multiples de leur conflit séculaire avant de s'accorder sur un plan d'actions pour sa transformation.⁸ Ce plan traduit un effort d'élévation de la conscience

collective par delà le conditionnement psychologique dans lequel les communautés sont maintenues par les élites qui exploitent à dessein les identités ethniques et territoriales pour la mobilisation politique.⁹ La mise en œuvre de ce plan, depuis le début de l'année 2011, marque le début d'un deuxième cycle de cette RAP qui continue jusqu'à nos jours.

Le noyau central de ce plan consiste en une régulation de la transhumance par les groupements d'éleveurs et d'agriculteurs, à travers les structures intercommunautaires de transformation de conflit. Les accords relatifs à celle-ci se résument en trois points :

- l'entérinement du contrat foncier traditionnel de pacage saisonnier du cheptel, impliquant les trois parties prenantes : les chefs coutumiers, les éleveurs et les petits agriculteurs ;
- instauration d'un dialogue permanent des parties prenantes, notamment pour la planification concertée de la transhumance à chaque saison et le règlement des litiges éventuels dans la gradation des instances : 1) médiation préalable dans les structures communautaires de transformation de conflits, 2) arbitrage des chefs locaux (coutumiers) si un échec de la médiation est avéré, et dans les cas extrêmes, 3) le recours à la procédure judiciaire (police, cours et tribunaux) ;
- l'implication des pouvoirs publics (administration du territoire, inspection de l'agriculture etc) dans le zonage du territoire ou la démarcation participative des espaces exclusifs ou alternatifs d'élevage et de culture et la protection de l'application des accords.¹⁰

Les premiers résultats et les défis restant à relever

L'application de ces accords fait l'objet du projet de transformation des conflits en cours d'exécution. Tout d'abord ces structures locales de planification d'une campagne de transhumance, de médiation des litiges et de concertation permanente des communautés ethniques sont déjà mises en place et leurs membres formés, conformément aux exigences des tâches qui leur sont confiées. Par la suite, cette version moderne des accords pour une transhumance apaisée est en vulgarisation par la sensibilisation de masse.

Plus qu'une simple migration saisonnière du bétail, cette transhumance s'avère être un jeu répété de rencontre.

chef de l'autre. C'est dans ce contexte que prolifèrent des groupes armés d'autodéfense communautaire, revendiquant ce statut ou perçus comme tels.

En Territoire de Fizi, ces groupes armés interfèrent dans la transhumance et le contrat d'*itulo* qui lui est lié. Sous prétexte de protéger les terres de la communauté, ces gangs limitent le mouvement du bétail, pillent ou carrément rançonnent les éleveurs, prélèvent indûment et de force une *itulo*, s'arro-



Les vaches et les hommes en armes: une combinaison dangereuse à l'est de la RDC.



La transhumance bovine est un lieu de rencontre des identités et des acteurs multiples. Ici marché des vaches à Runingu, dans la Plaine de la Ruzizi, au Sud-Kivu.

A l'actif de ce projet 2011-2012, il y a lieu de noter que la confiance compromise pendant les années de guerre entre communautés ethniques renaît petit à petit puisque des contrats d'*itulo* entre comités d'éleveurs et chefs coutumiers sont conclus dans la vallée de Nganja, conformément aux accords. Des indemnisations consenties par des éleveurs contribuent un tant soit peu à atténuer des escalades qui auraient pu découler de la grogne des agriculteurs dont les champs avaient été dévastés sur le littoral du Lac Tanganyika.

Cependant, les conditions d'une pleine application des accords pour une transhumance apaisée sont loin d'être réunies. Du fait du large rayon d'action couvert par le projet, toutes les couches de la population ne sont pas encore atteintes par la vulgarisation des accords. Certains acteurs dénoncent même les lacunes de ces accords et proposent déjà leur amendement. Par ailleurs, les structures communautaires de transformation de conflits n'ont pas encore réussi une planification concertée d'une campagne de transhumance. Bien plus grave, les groupes armés

séviennent encore dans une contrée qui échappe entièrement au contrôle de l'état et interfèrent dans l'application des accords par des voies de fait : pillages de vaches, meurtres des bouviers. Enfin, l'implication de l'autorité publique reste encore virtuelle, mitigée par endroit, sourde par ailleurs. Le Gouverneur de Province tarde à prendre un édit pour le plan d'aménagement du territoire qui pourrait prendre en compte l'impératif de zonage du Territoire de Fizi et celui de l'entérinement des arrangements contractuels et des structures de transformations des conflits fonciers tel que le prévoit une loi nationale récente.¹¹

Conclusion

La transhumance en Territoire de Fizi n'est qu'un cas de figure des conflits fonciers à l'Est du Congo, qui résulte d'un déficit de la capacité régulatrice de la société congolaise en proie à des conflits de type divers : économique, politique, socioculturelle, etc. Le lecteur/la lectrice notera que lorsque les communautés locales sont appelées à construire la paix, à partir d'en bas, elles réhabilitent d'abord leurs modes traditionnels de règlement

de litiges, à l'occurrence les structures de conciliation et de cohésion sociale, en s'adaptant à l'usage, en créant au besoin de nouveaux espaces d'échange.¹²

L'usage consiste justement à compter avec l'État pour l'entérinement et la protection des arrangements institutionnels au sein de la société civile. Dans le cas du Congo, l'État est encore miné par plusieurs défaillances, notamment l'impossible imposition de son « monopole de la violence légitime » pour reprendre l'expression chère au sociologue et économiste allemand, Max Weber. Par ailleurs, il n'a pas encore intériorisé les politiques de régulation basées sur une co-construction de règles, une expression de la co-gestion des secteurs entre les services publics et les organisations de la société civile¹³, pourtant déjà exprimée dans ses derniers textes législatifs et réglementaires.

En conséquence, la transformation des conflits intercommunautaires en RDC est liée, entre autres, à la construction de l'État. Pour affronter ce défi, la suite du projet de la régulation de la transhumance en Territoire de Fizi pour les années 2013-2014 intègre la

contribution de la société civile à la gouvernance des Entités Territoriales Décentralisées. Puisse l'approche à adopter répondre au besoin d'une implication effective des pouvoirs publics dans l'aboutissement de projets de construction de la paix. 

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- 2 Séverine Autesserre, *The trouble with the Congo. Local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, ed. Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 176
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- 5 Jean-Pierre Chauveau, « La logique des systèmes coutumiers » in Philippe Lavigne Delville (dir), *Quelles politiques foncières pour l'Afrique rurale ? Réconcilier pratiques, légitimité et légalité*, ed. Karthala et Coopération française, Paris, 1998, pp. 66-75
- 6 Vincent Kangulumba Mbambi, *Précis de droit civil des biens. Théorie générale des biens et théorie spéciale des droits réels fonciers et immobiliers congolais*, T.1, coll. Bibliothèque de droit africain, éd. Academia Brulant, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2007, p. 371
- 7 Un ouvrage à paraître probablement au cours de l'année 2013 (Justine Brabant, *La vache et le fusil. Conflits liés à la transhumance en territoires de Fizi et Uvira*, inédit), présente en détail ce jeu à somme nulle entre les groupes armés organisés sous le mobile de la protection des intérêts des éleveurs ou des agriculteurs.

- 8 ADEPAE et al, *op cit*, p. 18
- 9 Alexis Bouvy et Maria Lange et al, *Sortir de l'impasse : Vers une nouvelle vision de la paix à l'Est de la RDC*, International Alert, Londres, Septembre 2012, p. 55
- 10 Cfr Accords sur la transhumance ; signés à Baraka (Territoire de Fizi) le 23/09/2010 et à Uvira (Territoire d'Uvira) le 22/02/2011.
- 11 La loi du 24 décembre 2011, portant principes fondamentaux relatifs à l'agriculture instaure des cadres de concertation permanente des acteurs fonciers et de médiation de conflits portant sur les terres agricoles qui ne sont pas encore structurés.
- 12 Hélène Morvan et J.L. Kambale Nzweve, *Small steps towards peace. Inventory and analysis of local peace practices in North and South Kivu*, International Alert, London, 2010, p. 23
- 13 Menard, C., « Une nouvelle approche de l'agro-alimentaire », in *Economie rurale*, n°255-256, Janvier-Avril 2000, éd. SFER, Paris, pp. 186-196

The regulation of transhumance – an issue of peace in eastern DRC

Summary in English of J.L. Kambale Nzweve's article

This article deals with the regulation of the “transhumance” – the seasonal migration of pastoralists with their livestock from high- to lowlands – in Fizi territory, South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The author describes a participatory peacebuilding process – Participatory Action Research (PAR) – which has been conducted by LPI's partner organisations RIO, ADEPAE and Arche d'Alliance with the technical and financial accompaniment of LPI.

The eastern DRC has, for two decades, been subject to permanent armed conflicts. The international community has engaged for the same time period to promote security and stabilisation, however, without being able to stop the violence. Analysts hold that this ineffectiveness is due to the fact that international efforts do not take into account local causes of conflict, particularly the competition between ethnic communities to access and control land.

The author explains the causes of conflicts related to the transhumance phenomenon, linked to the erosion of traditional regulation mechanisms and other factors. He also talks about the duality of land law, where the subordina-

tion of customary law to positive law has gradually eroded the power of the chiefs. In this context, local armed groups interfere in the transhumance. Under the pretext of protecting the land of the community, they restrict the movement of livestock, looting or extorting herders, who in response organize armed guards and reject the authority of local customary chiefs.

The transhumance problems and their link to inter-community conflict was highlighted through a PAR process, conducted by RIO, ADEPAE and Arche d'Alliance. An inter-community round table defined an action plan for transforming conflict. The core of this action plan is the regulation of the transhumance through inter-community structures for conflict transformation. The agreements concerning that regulation concern three points:

1. endorsement of the traditional land contract about seasonal grazing of livestock, involving the three stakeholders: traditional chiefs, cattle breeders and small farmers;
2. establishing a permanent dialogue between stakeholders in order to plan

each transhumance season and regulate potential disputes through mediation, arbitration and, in extreme cases, resort to judicial proceedings (police, courts);

3. involvement of state authorities (territorial administration, inspection of agriculture etc.) in the zoning of territory or participatory demarcation of exclusive or alternative livestock and crop areas, and the protection of the agreements.

Transhumance within Fizi territory is an example of land conflicts in eastern Congo, resulting from a deficiency of the regulatory capacity of the Congolese society. Beyond the efforts on local level by the stakeholders, the future transformation of communal conflicts within the DRC is linked, among other things, to the construction of the state. To meet this challenge, the engagement of LPI's partners and local stakeholders to regulate the transhumance in Fizi for 2013-2014 integrates the contribution of civil society to the governance of decentralised territorial entities. This strategy is meant to respond to the need of an effective involvement of state authorities in the success of this peacebuilding effort.

Bertrand Ligny

After years of internal strife between the Philippine government and rebel forces, an agreement was signed in autumn 2012 to end hostilities and begin the long road of creating sustainable peace. A key actor in these efforts is the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, which since 2000 has run peacebuilding programmes and trainings, at first implemented within the Filipino context and later extended to the Asia-Pacific region.

Mindanao, Philippines

Conflict transformation training making a difference in Asian communities

Gabrielle Aziza Sagara

Much euphoria and hope enveloped Mindanao and the entire Philippines on October 15, 2012, when representatives from the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), after years of conflict and violence from both sides, formally signed what is now dubbed as the “most important document” that aims to end the adversarial relationship of the two parties: the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)¹. For many peacebuilders and peace advocates in the country and in other parts of the world, this is a long-awaited milestone towards achieving sustainable peace in conflict-torn Mindanao, and an affirmation that, through genuine dialogue and proper consultation of all stakeholders, people can come to an agreement – though it will take time.

FAB is a recognition, as well, of the long, arduous and unceasing efforts by countless peacebuilders in the country working in the affected communities, and not only of those who were involved directly in the peace negotiations. It is important to note that a myriad of peace initiatives were implemented by different actors on the ground to help make people in the communities cognizant of what genuine and lasting peace is and to strengthen their yearning to put an end to the hostilities as soon as possible. But as much as it is a recognition, it is also a reminder – a reminder that the work of building peace and restoring justice does not end in the signing of a peace agreement. Words must be translated

into action and for that to be possible, social transformation must happen in the communities.

Part of the work that needs to be done in order for people to move from conflict-ridden to peaceful and just communities is increasing the skill set and degree of knowledge of peacebuilding of all actors from every sector in society. Here lies the significance of training programmes in the Philippines that are focused on equipping individuals and communities with the necessary tool set and understanding to transform conflict into something positive.

Since 2000, one such programme has been initiated in the Philippines to ad-

Through genuine dialogue and proper consultation of all stakeholders, people can come to an agreement.

dress the need of empowering individuals and communities in order to achieve social transformation and strengthen peacebuilding initiatives in the Philippines and the Asia-Pacific region. Grassroots peacebuilders, civil society leaders, community development workers, local and national government officials, educators, activists, youth leaders, indigenous peoples, spiritual leaders from different

faiths, and even personnel from the security sector coming from the Philippines and outside the country have gathered in the heart of the second largest island in the archipelago for three weeks of intensive training and experience-sharing. From its humble beginnings, the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) has grown to become one of the most sought-after training institutions in the Asia-Pacific region.

Long road to MPI

The history of MPI can be traced back to 1996 when peacebuilding programmes in Mindanao began to appear and mature as a result of the signing of the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front. It was during this time that the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) moved beyond its relief work and pioneered the Peace and Reconciliation Programme within the organisation.

In 1998, as part of its Peace and Reconciliation Programme, CRS sent the first Filipino delegation to the Summer Peacebuilding Institute at Eastern Mennonite University in the USA. Eight Filipinos returned to their home country invigorated by the idea of replicating a model similar to the Summer Peacebuilding Institute.

Working with John Paul Lederach and reaching out to various groups across Mindanao, CRS began to design a training programme that would answer the demand for training and technical support for local grassroots peacebuilding



This is not goodbye, this is just the beginning. Before returning to their respective areas, facilitators, participants and staff at the 2011 training bid each other farewell while signifying that a sense of camaraderie has been created among them all.

The emphasis that the theory assigns to relationships, as well as to peace and reconciliation are important factors because of its compatibility with Asian cultures.³ In addition, it is considered as an adequate framework for addressing the Mindanao conflict because of its notion that conflict, *per se*, is a normal and neutral fact of life. This is particularly relevant for those who work constantly within a conflict-ridden environment, because this framework will help them understand and recognise that conflict can be transformed into something positive.

Education, praxis, reflection

The primary goal of MPI as an institute with an educational mandate is to transform society through the promotion of the values of peace and reconciliation. The process of social transformation entails more than capacity-building through training of skills and deepening of knowledge. For change to be long-term and extensive, it must permeate structures and systems. In light of this, MPI's approach in facilitating such a process is three-fold: education, praxis, and reflection.

Central to the education component is the annual three-week intensive training where MPI takes on an elicitive and participative approach to learning and teaching. This approach emphasises that the trainee's knowledge is the primary source of learning and the facilitator's role is to create an environment where the trainees can explore their own knowledge and values regarding conflict, and make their own conclusions based on their needs and context.⁴ This approach allows the trainees to take ownership of the outcomes of their learning experience. Consequently, the alumni will have a better grasp of what they have gained from the experience, in turn giving them a deeper sense of empowerment as peacebuilders. The facilitators at MPI also recognise that teaching and learning is two-way between them and the participants. In the classroom-based courses, the facilitators employ interactive activities such as role-playing, simulations, small-group reflections, games, case studies and the like in the learning process to generate active participation from the trainees.

The learning process is incomplete without application of the knowledge and skills gained at the training in various

initiatives. However, sister organisations in the Asia-Pacific region encouraged CRS to internationalise the initiative. According to John Paul Lederach, "MPI emerged as an answer to the question of sustainability, that is, how to get closer to the context. [...] it is [also] a resource that is accessible and less costly to people in the region [Asia]."²

CRS, in collaboration with Mennonite Central Committee, organised the first MPI Annual Peacebuilding Training in the city of Davao, Mindanao, Philippines, in 2000. The two-week peacebuilding training was attended by both local and international facilitators and participants. It was a courageous feat considering that during those times security was an issue in Mindanao because of the violence that erupted in many parts of the island after the then President Joseph Estrada declared an "all out war" against the MILF.

From 2001 to 2009, through the collective efforts of international and grassroots organizations, MPI opened its doors to many innovations: adding community exposure courses in 2003, providing a scholarship programme that targets women, youth, indigenous peoples, religious and community leaders in 2004, welcoming more than just conventional "peace activists", such as military professionals in 2005, reaching out to younger generations of leaders through the secretariat and internship programme beginning in 2005, documenting activities and grounding itself in critical assessment, and working to strengthen the networks among its alumni.

In 2009, a decade since its birth, MPI finally realised its dream by becoming an independent, legally incorporated foundation in the Philippines in the hope of better achieving its goals as an international training institute with a strong Mindanawan flavour.

To date, thirteen trainings have taken place in Davao City with the participation of almost 1,665 peacebuilders from more than forty countries across Asia-Pacific and other parts of the world. In the past years, MPI has grown and evolved but remains true to its goal of educating and empowering peacebuilding scholars and practitioners, enhancing and contributing to the body of knowledge in the field of peace and conflict studies, promoting the conception of unique and practical peace initiatives, linking peacebuilding organisations in the country and the region, and striving towards a global environment of just peace.

Conflict transformation as core framework

Since its inception, MPI has been integrating the precepts and practices of the conflict transformation theory in different ways. In the MPI trainings, in particular, the framework is embedded in the content of the courses in terms of the principles, concepts, and the analytical tools introduced and employed in the lectures and the activities. According to Reina Neufeld of CRS, there are several reasons for the preference of this theory over others, such as conflict management or conflict resolution.

settings and through various methodologies. The second component is relevant in determining how the lessons are infused in actual situations. MPI acknowledges that the application of learning – using the theory of change model of conflict transformation – may occur at different levels: personal, relational, structural, and cultural.⁵ The Institute supports its alumni with the praxis component through a follow-up programme for selected scholars and through spin-off activities. These activities mainly consist in assistance to similar peace institutes in other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Sri Lanka and South Korea, through consultation and/or mutual sharing of human and material resources.

In the future, MPI intends to be a relevant resource centre in grassroots peacebuilding, not only to benefit the Philippines but also the Asia-Pacific region. In this way, the learning process does not end with the alumni, the organisations in which they work and the communities where they work, but it transcends this by contributing to a greater network of peacebuilders in the region and the world.

Catalyst of social transformation

First and foremost, the root of MPI's impact is in the individual. In the documentation process done in 2006, in many interviews and group discussions, the alumni agreed that MPI taught them that global change starts with personal transformation, and that MPI and its methodology contributed to improving their personal skills and enhanced their potential as human beings.

Some of those who participated in the trauma healing course shared how their own personal traumas brought about by their experiences in the field were addressed and healed during the course. There also are numerous testimonials of how the trainings at MPI enabled participants to deepen their understanding and commitment to peace and justice. These transformations are ultimately essential to start the process of transforming communities.

The process then moves from the individual to an organisation and/or community. The alumni apply what they have learned in their own organisations, projects, and communities, enriching their activities by integrating new visions, approaches and methodologies learned at MPI. Oftentimes, the alumni echo the

lessons learned in their courses to the communities and/or their organisations by conducting similar but smaller trainings that are modified to fit their own local context. The MPI training creates a pool of trainers, mediators, facilitators, researchers and advocacy leaders. A replication of the transformation then occurs within these communities and organisations.

Specific examples of the impact of MPI: A Filipino civilian peacekeeper working in South Sudan incorporated insights and ideas from the training he received at MPI into security and protection modules he produced. A director of a civil society organisation in India was able to strengthen a network of activists and peacebuilding organisations in Tamil Nadu that promotes peace among the untouchable subgroups. A Cambodian working for an international organisation compiled a manual on peacebuilding, which includes a module on trauma healing intended for victims of the Khmer Rouge brutality. An Afghan peace programme officer was able to develop technical proposals on peace issues and practice mediation in transforming family and community conflicts. A Filipina NGO worker developed a campaign against *rido* (clan feud) and facilitated a series of dialogues in Mindanao to settle the *rido* between two warring clans. Through partnership with other Mindanawan organisations such as the Bishops-Ulama Conference, MPI contributed to the popularisation of interfaith dialogue between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao.⁶

In the Philippines, overall, it can be said that MPI has contributed to the building of local capacity, reinforcing the value of ongoing peacebuilding efforts and transforming and invigorating individuals and organisations engaged in peacebuilding. In the Asia-Pacific region, MPI has been a pioneer in elicitive, empowerment-focused education in conflict transformation, in connecting grassroots leaders with academic, religious and government level actors, and in marrying theoretical and practical education within a conflict setting. Several other organisations in the region have followed in MPI's footsteps, launching local peacebuilding institutes either as a direct result of attending or being involved in MPI, and/or based on their own experiences. The Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute is one

particular organisation that has benefited from a form of mentorship from MPI on the technical and administrative side of organising an international training. The capacity to create linkages between diverse organisations and networks is also one of MPI's evident contributions in the region.

In the end, MPI's vision is the creation of a critical mass of peacebuilders that will, in perfect synergy, transform the world into a place that is just, good and peaceful. 

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4 See John Paul Lederach (1996), *Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures*, First Ed., Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press.

5 See John Paul Lederach (2003), *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, for more on theory of change. It is good to note that the Mindanawan perspective on the model includes the spiritual level because of the important role spirituality plays in the perception of conflict and human interaction based in the Filipino culture.

6 Selected testimonials from MPI alumni from the years 2005, 2010, and 2011.

With 2007 post-election violence in fresh memory, fears were great that history would repeat itself after the elections in 2013. Various precautions, however, managed to contain outbreaks of violence. A move of major importance was the media training in peace journalism, organised by the Uwiano Platform for Peace, Life & Peace Institute and Saferworld.

Peace journalism in post-election Kenya

Shamsia Ramadhan

It is widely acknowledged that the media operating in a conflict context have the capacity to escalate conflict by accentuating differences, highlighting confrontation or providing a platform for dissenting voices. It is through media that a conflict in society is reported and it is the manner of reporting that can increase violence, even when this was not the intention.¹ On the other hand the media are also able to de-escalate conflict by utilising their expansive platform to campaign for peace, by altering their language and avoiding, to some extent, covering issues that can intensify violence, and also by providing a platform for alternative voices. It was with the understanding of the vital role of media in a conflict context that peacebuilding organisations in Kenya, such as the Life & Peace Institute, Saferworld, Peacenet-Kenya and Local Capacities for Peace International, made a decision to target the media with the purpose of developing a partnership in an attempt to encourage them to fulfil their role in a way that promotes peace and prevents violence.

The local media in Kenya have been accused of self-censorship during the general elections held in March 2013. This raises the need for discussion on what role the media have in conflict prevention and on whether self-regulation by the media within a volatile context is appropriate to prevent violence. Although the Kenyan media are facing reproach for not carrying out their mandate, there is little clarity on what they were expected or supposed to report and where they failed. The dominant perception is that the local media should have reported election anomalies and other injustices, such as the few incidences of commotion

between a couple of people and police in some areas. But what would have been the outcome of media reports of such anomalies within a highly divided society and during a hotly contested election in a country that has a history of post-election violence?

This paper seeks to present the media as key actors in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, using the engagement with the Kenyan media as a case. The article supports the general notion that with adequate support and preparation, local media can contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It describes the activities carried out by peace practitioners ahead of the general elections in Kenya. The focus is on journalists, reporters, editors and media owners committed and prepared to ensure that the elections were peaceful. The article will highlight the preparation that media practitioners underwent under the Uwiano Platform for Peace in collaboration with the Life & Peace Institute and Saferworld, an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict.

Media in a conflict context

The citizens of Kenya have the right to information and free access to the media. Press freedom as well as freedom of expression is guaranteed in the Constitution, and the media are thus expected to report without withholding any information. However, in view of the events following the 2007 elections, the citizens of Kenya also have the right to protection from violence. Any institution operating in Kenya with the capacity to prevent violence has a moral obligation to ensure that citizens are protected from a situation that will lead to a repetition of the violence experienced in 2007.

It is a fact that within a conflict context, information is critical to determining the attitude and behaviour of the different parties to the conflict. In an era of technological advancement, the ability to do so will largely depend on the quality of available information that is relayed mainly through the various media channels, both electronic and print. The information to be relayed is not the issue. What matters is how the information is relayed. The manner in which information is shared with the public in a conflict context contributes either to de-escalation or escalation of violence. Therefore, was the so called “self-censorship” of the media necessary to prevent violent conflict? Did the media contribute to the relative peace that was experienced by Kenyans after the elections? How and why did the media adopt the “self-censorship” mode?

Within a conflict context various activities are carried out focusing on conflict prevention, involving civil society organisations and critical actors who have the capacity to prevent violence. Among them is the private sector, which, because of the impact of violence on the economy, is keen to ensure that it does not occur. Additionally, not only is there a major risk of loss of lives but also of destruction of property and disruption of livelihoods and economic activities. This has an impact on the social, political and economic capital. For the private sector, a peaceful environment is a prerequisite to guarantee that the economic engine continues to operate in order to generate profit. Therefore, in the private sector in Kenya, the media which are the main source of information for the Kenyan public were identified as vital stakeholders in conflict prevention.

The media worldwide are known for sensational reporting of events as a strategy to attract readers/audiences. Many media institutions, whether electronic or print, are profit driven and thus, their approach is to ensure that they spread news and information that not only appeal to but also excite readers/audiences. The media are a very competitive industry, whose ability to maintain their clientele partly depends on the type of stories relayed to the public. A common approach in news reporting is sensationalising as a strategy to attract audiences and readers. In a conflict context this kind of reporting has the potential to increase tensions, which may lead to physical violence.

The media's role in conflict prevention

The media project under the Uwiano Platform for Peace was crafted in a manner that allowed the media to carry out their mandate but at the same time promote peace. Taking into consideration the mandate of the media, the project infused conflict sensitivity in media coverage by conducting conflict sensitive journalism/reporting training with journalists and reporters from all over Kenya. The project linked peacebuilding principles and practice with media practice in a pragmatic session that allowed for dialogue between the two sectors. The approach adopted was grounded in conflict sensitivity, based on already existing structures instead of creating new ones. Since the media have their distinct mandate, the purpose of the initiative was – of course – not to prevent the media from sharing information and news. By advocating for peace journalism, the project sought to challenge conventional journalism to work actively for peace through the media.

As was revealed by the various commissions of inquiry, the Kenyan society is deeply divided along ethnic lines, a fact that defines and determines political support and affiliation of the various groups. As such, any information in an environment that is yet to recover from the effects of violence ought to be relayed in a manner that does not aggravate the situation. This was the main purpose of promoting conflict sensitivity among the Kenyan media.

The conflict sensitivity training focussed on issues that were expected to be used by the different political groups during the campaign period. They were identified by the journalists and report-

ers attending the training sessions and included land ownership, devolution, marginalisation and underdevelopment.

A paradigm shift

The editors, journalists, reporters and correspondents who attended the capacity building sessions were encouraged to adopt a 'Do No Harm' framework, that is, media coverage during the election period should not contribute to the weakening of local capacities for peace, but instead all reporting should reinforce Kenyans' inclination towards peace. Peace journalism provided an alternative to the traditional conflict oriented news paradigm, changed the dynamics during a tense period, and contributed to averting violence.

Even with the long delay in announcing the result of the elections after the failing of the electronic tallying system used by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the media assured Kenyans that the alternative approach was equally reliable. They also impressed upon political parties who were not satisfied with the election tallying results the importance of channelling their disagreement through the legal system. They called upon the supporters of the various political groups to remain calm. After the announcement of the election results, one of the presidential candidates, Mr. Raila Odinga, filed a petition in the Supreme Court, challenging the results of the presidential elections. The media covered the court proceedings and continued to appeal for peace, and they also carried out objective analysis of the petition in a manner that provided information to citizens without inflaming emotions of the different political groups.

The main purpose of the training was to enable the media to report in a conflict

context without suppressing information but adopting a language that would not cause anxiety in an already divided society. Thus, the civil liberties guaranteeing freedom of expression and the right to information are upheld. Providing news and information to the public is also an economic issue for the media, since withholding it would be detrimental to their economic sustainability.

The conduct of the media

What was visible during the 2013 election period was the change in language and a more cautious coverage by the various media, irrespective of political affiliation of the media owners or the media personalities. This was different from the media coverage during the 2007 election. Before the elections, various media houses developed internal policies that outlined strategies of coverage and reporting. Several of them developed a code of conduct that was published both in public and as an internal guide for media coverage, including during the election period. For example, the Nation Media Group published an announcement outlining the requirements of any political advertisement several months before the elections. This included vetting of the content to ensure that it was not provocative or adversarial.²

Internally, media institutions agreed that they would broadcast or print any political engagement that in their assessment was not offensive to any of the political groups. They were also aware that if they decided not to cover political campaigns that had provocative content, political parties would use paid space for advertising. Thus, the media houses came up with an advertising code of conduct, which all the political parties or leaders who wished to pay for

In an effort to minimise post-election violence, journalists and reporters from the whole country participated in a series of conflict sensitive media trainings.



PHOTO: SHAMSIA RAMADHAN



Three women on their way to a polling station in Nairobi's Mathare slum, wearing 'women for peace' headbands given out by a local women's organisation.

space in the media, whether electronic or printed, had to comply with. The media also collectively organised and managed two presidential debates that included all the eight presidential candidates. They were able to provide a platform for citizens and aspiring candidates to engage in a constructive manner. This shifted the focus of the coverage from the politicians to matters of national interest to all Kenyans, regardless of political affiliation.

The media complied with the decision that only the IEBC had the mandate to announce election results. They also decided not to broadcast any episode that was confrontational, particularly during the release of election results when political actors disagreed with the results being announced. Publicising confrontation and political disagreement to a population that is not only politically but also ethnically divided has the potential to cause anarchy, as was the case in 2007. Neither did the media sensationalise the failure of the electronic voting system that the Kenyan government had invested in, in order to ensure free and fair elections. In addition to the conduct of the media, other institutions also created an enabling environment for the media through legal reforms. The reformed justice system acted as a confidence building measure, providing political groups and citizens with alternative options to pursue disagreements.

A conflict sensitive approach

The socially responsible approach adopted by the local media led to relative peace

during the post-election period and confirms that the media in a conflict context are one of the channels that can be used either to incite or reassure citizens. Their thoughtfulness in reporting and their constant call to uphold peace had a great impact on the conduct not only of the citizens but also of the political elite. From a peacebuilder's perspective, the media adopted a conflict sensitive approach to reporting. Not only did they use a sensitive language, but they also decided not to broadcast incidences that could have led to anarchy. It was a deliberate choice that was influenced by training in peace journalism.

In December 2010 when the International Criminal Court revealed the names of Kenyan suspects accused of violence during the 2007 post-election riots, the thought of a journalist being named seemed farfetched. Nonetheless, among the six suspects were politicians, government officials and a journalist. Although the indictment was of an individual, he or she is affiliated with a key institution in the society. This indictment, in addition to the conflict sensitive training of media personalities, had an effect on the reporting style adopted by the media, making them less inclined to report election related incidences. Nonetheless, whatever the cause of the change in reporting, the media conduct prevented violence. The absence of violence, however, does not translate to sustainable peace. The challenge is how that change in behaviour can be sustained and how the media

platform can be used in peacebuilding by promoting social unity.

Maintaining peace

In retrospect the media's role in conflict prevention ought to have started long before the elections. They should have found out whether the various institutions were adequately prepared to ensure free, fair and peaceful elections. The critical institutions in this process were the IEBC and the Kenyan police. Being proactive, the media should have provided information related to the process of the election, for example by asking questions about the main register that was to be used and whether there were any alternatives in case this register should fail.

The conduct of the local media in the 2013 elections affirms that they indeed can contribute to conflict prevention. Their changed conduct altered the perception of the traditional role of the media in a conflict context, namely that of highlighting negative incidences. The media made a strategic and deliberate effort to approach the coverage of the election process, not as outsiders, but insiders. They are a part of the group of internal actors who have a role in maintaining peace in a conflict context. The approach they adopted, if well managed, is proactive and sustainable, with the capacity to alter citizens' attitudes and behaviour, utilising existing institutions. This approach enables the media to actively commit to safeguarding their society, a role that the Kenyan media managed judiciously. It is now up to other actors in society to follow suit by engaging with the citizens to ensure sustainable peace. 🌿

LPI's participation in the media project was financed by the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

- 1 Francis Rolt, "The Media: Reaching Hearts and Minds". In *People Building Peace*, edited by Paul Van Tongeren, Malin Brenk and Juliette Verhoeven, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005, pp. 175-177.
- 2 Saturday Nation, 19 May 2012.

Notwithstanding the predicaments of refugees, who are forced to leave their country under harsh conditions, experience from the past and present shows that even seemingly insufferable situations in the end may lead to renewed possibilities. Under propitious circumstances, “small spaces”, often involving education and training in refuge, may open up for initiatives for community development and peacebuilding.

Refugees

From protection to new potential

Ralston Deffenbaugh

Running for your life, fleeing from persecution, forced migration – whether the terms are technical or not – a sad reality of the human condition is that tens of millions of people in our world have had to become refugees or internally displaced. Nobody plans to be a refugee. Everyone who is, hopes that it won't be for long. Especially in sudden mass flows, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), host countries, and partner agencies struggle to provide life-saving protection and sustenance for those who have fled. What is little focused on, however, is that the time of refugee protection can also be one of the “small spaces”, a time when refugees can equip themselves and act for human rights, justice, and peacebuilding.

History is replete with examples of future leaders who had to flee their countries and find refuge elsewhere. There they were able to learn and equip themselves so that, once it was safe to do so, they could return and help rebuild their countries. Here are three:

Vaira Vike-Freiberga fled her native Latvia at age seven in an open boat. After sojourns in a displaced persons camp in Germany and then in Morocco, her family found refuge in Canada. She completed her education and became a university professor. After Latvia regained its independence she was able to return. From 1999 to 2007 she served as Latvia's sixth president.

Willy Brandt fled Nazi Germany at age 20. He found refuge first in Norway. Then, after the Nazi occupation, he had to flee again, to Sweden. He worked as a journalist and lecturer. After the war, he returned to Germany. He served as

Mayor of Berlin from 1957 to 1966 and as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1969 and 1974.

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf fled her native Liberia at age 42, where she had been serving as Finance Minister. She found refuge in the United States, Kenya, and Côte d'Ivoire. She held prominent positions with the World Bank, Citibank, and the UN Development Program. She returned to Liberia first in 1985, was arrested, and had to flee again. She returned a second time in 1997 but yet again had to go into exile. Finally she returned for good in 2003. In 2006 she was inaugurated as Liberia's 24th president, the first female elected head of state in Africa.

Refuge – and then?

Refugee protection is rooted in human rights law, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” (Article 14(1).) The Refugee Convention of 1951 and Protocol of 1967 flesh out this right in more detail, defining who is a “refugee” and how refugees should be protected. Perhaps the most important protection is that of “non-refoulement” – refugees should not be forcibly returned to a situation where they would be in danger.

Once someone has been given refuge – has been accorded protection – what happens then? The UNHCR serves as the UN Refugee Agency. UNHCR speaks about three “durable solutions” for refugees. The first is repatriation – the happy situation in which conditions in the country of origin have changed

so that the refugee can return home in safety and dignity. The second is local integration – the refugee is allowed to permanently settle in the country of first refuge, living and working without discrimination along with the other residents of that country. The third is resettlement – the refugee is allowed to settle and integrate into a third country.

Most of the world's refugees, however, are stuck. They are in what I have called the de-facto fourth solution – protracted stay in a refugee camp without access to the three durable solutions. At the end of 2011, there were some 10.4 million refugees of concern to UNHCR. (These numbers do not include the Palestinian refugees in the Near East, for whom another UN agency, the UN Relief and Works Administration, has the mandate.) Of these, UNHCR reckons some 7.1 million were in “protracted” situations – in exile for five years or longer.

Tens of millions of people in our world have had to become refugees or internally displaced.

So what to do with and for the millions of refugees who are stuck, whose lives are in limbo? First of all, it must be said that indefinite stay in a refugee camp can be tremendously demoralizing and depressing. People who have been active and vital in their home setting find themselves uprooted and

dependent. They may be “protected” in both the legal and physical sense, in that they are not in danger of refoulement and their basic needs for food, water, sanitation, and shelter are provided. But they are usually not able to work, not able to engage in stimulating and productive activity. And to top it off, most refugees are concerned about their loved ones and friends who were left behind, feeling both helpless that they cannot be of support to them and guilty that they have survived and the loved ones may not have. The months and years of refugee lives spent in boredom and waiting are a tremendous waste of human potential.

Happily, as with the three political leaders named above, there can be situations where refugees have the opportunity to study, work, and improve themselves, using the “small space” of their time in exile so that they can prepare themselves to work for positive change in their countries of origin. Here are four examples where there has been significant involvement of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and its related organizations:

Namibia – it worked!

Namibia is a large, sparsely-populated country in southwestern Africa. Half of its population of roughly two million are members of Lutheran churches; most of the rest are Christian as well. Its colonial history was brutal. It was colonized by Imperial Germany in 1884, then conquered by South Africa in 1915 as part of the Allied effort in World War I. Between 1904 and 1907, the German occupation forces carried out the first genocide of the twentieth century, during which an estimated three-quarters of

tions peace plan, Namibia achieved its independence in 1990.

During the latter period of South African rule, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, about one out of twenty Namibians fled the country – some 50,000 people. Since part of the apartheid scheme was to discourage the education of blacks beyond the primary level, there were few well-educated Namibians who would be able to assume leadership positions after independence. Several major efforts were launched to address this need, one through the United Nations and one through the LWF. Another major effort was through the Cuban government, who set up a special school for Namibians on the Isle of Youth.

The UN Institute for Namibia (UNIN) was established in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1976. It took in some of the brightest among the Namibians in exile, equipping them in fields such as public administration, financial management, and social sciences. The head of UNIN went on to become Namibia’s first prime minister. Other graduates assumed roles such as chief of staff for the president, head of the national water supply parastatal, and ambassadors in the diplomatic service. The LWF and its related organizations set up special scholarship programs for Namibians who came both from exile and from inside the country. The largest such effort was for 100 Namibians who studied at Lutheran colleges in the United States. Graduates of these programs went on to assume leadership positions in the church, in the professions, and in government.

South Sudan – underway but not yet there

The Republic of South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011, following bloody civil strife that went on and off for more than half a century and which, tragically, continues to this day. During that time, Sudan won the dubious distinction of producing the world’s largest number of internally displaced persons (some four million) and one of the largest populations of refugees (approximately half a million).

A well-known group among the many Sudanese refugees were the so-called Lost Boys. These were some 20,000 boys (and some girls) who were orphaned or otherwise separated from their parents and taken by liberation fighters on dangerous long treks by

foot first to Ethiopia, then back into Sudan, and eventually to the Kakuma refugee camp in northwestern Kenya. Kakuma is run by UNHCR, with land and security provided by the government of Kenya and camp management by the LWF.

After the Lost Boys arrived at Kakuma in the early 1990s, there were efforts to set up educational and vocational programs for them. It gradually became clear, however, that the possibility of return to Sudan would not happen anytime soon and that young lives were being put on hold for too long. In 2000 and 2001, nearly 4,000 of the Lost Boys were resettled to third countries, primarily to the United States. There they have been able to study and work and improve themselves. Their story helped raise the level of international awareness and concern for human rights in Sudan. Especially since the 2005 Sudan peace accord, many of the Lost Boys have been able to regain contact with their families. Some have begun returning to South Sudan to use their skills for their new country; many more send financial aid.

Burma/Myanmar – beginning to be underway


Even before the military took over power in Burma in 1962, tensions were high between the majority Burman (and predominantly Buddhist) population and the various ethnic groups (some Christian, some Muslim, some of other religions) who live on the periphery of that vast country. Military governments exacerbated the tensions through their suppression of democracy, violations of human rights, and denial of autonomy to the ethnic groups. Over the past half century, Myanmar (as the military rulers unilaterally renamed their country) joined the ranks of one of the world’s largest refugee-producing countries.

The majority of the estimated half million Burmese refugees come from the minority ethnic groups. But there are also many majority Burmans who have had to flee. Notable populations among them are the students whose protests were violently suppressed in 1988 and the supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy whose election victory was taken away in 1990.

Most of the Burmese refugees have been in the neighboring countries of Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and Ma-

Most refugees are concerned about their loved ones and friends who were left behind.

the Herero and half of the Nama people were killed. Under South African rule, the official racially discriminatory system of apartheid was implemented in all its cruelty. Finally, after a liberation struggle, intense international pressure, and the implementation of a United Na-



Classroom in a Bhutanese refugee camp in southeastern Nepal. Father Varkey Perekatt, SJ, talks to the students while their teacher looks on. The Lutheran World Federation manages the camps in partnership with UNHCR. Caritas Nepal organizes the educational efforts.

laysia. None of those countries have been parties to the UN Refugee Convention, so the refugees' legal protection has been precarious. The refugees have been living without legal status, trying to make a living as they can. However, some of the refugees have been resettled to third countries, where they have been able to live, work, and study. There they have been able to participate in efforts to inform the world about the situation in Burma and to lobby for change.

Following the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 2010, Burma/Myanmar has been going through a "fragile but hopeful" (as New Routes put it in the last issue¹) transformation of reform and democratization. Some of the refugees are beginning to be able to return and make a contribution. They have assisted in the re-establishment of political parties, in the negotiations between ethnic groups and the central government, in business and economic development, and in expanding the activities of civil society organizations.

Bhutan – hope for the future?

Bhutan is a Himalayan kingdom tucked between India and Chinese Tibet. It has carefully cultivated an international image as an exotic Shangri-La, where the cultural, economic, and environmental excesses of modernity are rejected through a policy of "Gross National Happiness". What Bhutan has successfully

gotten away with, however, has been ethnic cleansing.

In the early 1990s, through a campaign of intimidation, detention, torture, seizing of land, and revocation of citizenship, Bhutan expelled the one-sixth of its population who were ethnic Nepali. India facilitated the process by shepherding the Bhutanese refugees across its narrow strip of land that separates Bhutan and Nepal. In southeastern Nepal, staffers of the LWF found the Bhutanese refugees camped by a riverside and began to organize assistance. The UNHCR came in, and with support of the Nepali government six large refugee settlements were established, with a total population of more than 100,000.

During the 1990s and the 2000s, there were numerous efforts to try to negotiate with the Bhutanese government to provide for the repatriation of the refugees. Bhutan dragged out the negotiations and to this day refuses to acknowledge that the refugees are Bhutanese, not even allowing an aged refugee woman to go home to die. Conditions in the camps were relatively good, in terms of food, shelter, sanitation, and primary education. But people's lives were still on hold, and a whole generation was growing up without opportunity. In the mid- and late 2000s, when it became clear that repatriation would not happen anytime soon, UNHCR launched an extensive resettlement program.

More than half the Bhutanese refugees have by now been resettled, primarily to the United States, Australia, and Canada. There they are able to work, study, and integrate into society. Their lives are no longer on hold. And, no longer isolated in refugee camps in the southeastern corner of Nepal, they will be better able to organize themselves to tell the world their story and to press for the right to return in safety and dignity to their native Bhutan. That in turn would help change Bhutan from a country that condones ethnic cleansing to a more peaceful society, one that respects the rights of its minorities.

The protection of refugees is a good in itself, grounded in humanitarian principles, human rights law and the international refugee conventions. In addition, the protection of refugees can also have important positive side benefits for peacebuilding. In order for that to happen, however, refugees must be given the opportunity – the "small spaces" – to become self-reliant through work, education, and freedom of expression. This kind of investment in the human capital and human freedom of refugees is an investment in future leaders. Who will be the next Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the next Willy Brandt, the next Ellen Johnson Sirleaf? 

¹ South, A., Peace process in Burma/Myanmar: Fragile but hopeful signs of opening space. *New Routes*, no. 2013:1, pp 18-20

UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which concerns the impact of armed conflict on women as well as their role in the different stages of conflict, is unique in its focus on women in ways that have not previously been observed. As a consequence of the resolution all UN member states are to pass National Action Plans, a crucial but complicated task in many countries, not least in post-conflict contexts, such as Libya.

UN Resolution 1325

Challenging issues with progress and obstacles

Chris Coulter and Emma Johansson

On 31 October, 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325). The resolution was historic as it was the first time the Security Council focused on the unique impact of armed conflict on women specifically. To reach an adoption was no easy task, however, but became a reality only after persistent advocacy from civil society organisations in general, and women's rights organisations in particular. To this date, four additional resolutions following and strengthening 1325 have been adopted.¹ Together, these comprise the Women, Peace and Security thematic agenda of the Security Council, and the international security policy framework in this area.

The resolution can be seen as a landmark, as it was the first time the impact of conflict on women, and women's partaking in both conflict and conflict resolution during all stages of conflict, was addressed by the Security Council. Under the UN Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Security Council decisions. This gives UNSCR 1325 the potential to impact and influence high level policy work and diplomacy, to a degree previously unheard of at the international level.

It is also a landmark resolution in that it focuses on women not only as victims of conflict but on their power as agents of influence in ending conflicts and building peace. 1325 and its following sister resolutions encompass all of

these aspects but are often summed up by the three P's: Prevention, Protection and Participation. Sometimes a fourth P is added: Promotion, as in promotion of a gender perspective. The obligations of the resolutions stretch from the international to the local level, from intergovernmental bodies, such as the United Nations, to national level governments. UNSCR 1325 calls on all



Prior to the revolution, independent women's rights groups did not exist.

member states to pass National Action Plans (NAP) on the resolution, and up until today, 40 states have adopted NAPs. In addition, several regional action plans have been adopted, by the European Union, NATO etc.²

Implementing the resolution

While many countries are working on drafting NAPs, most of the countries which already have their NAPs are instead struggling to implement the resolution, and working on monitoring and evaluation. Although states carry the responsibility of implementation under the UN Charter, NGOs worldwide

work on all levels for the realisation of UNSCR 1325. For example, in Colombia, where the state has not recognised the resolution, NGOs have created a national network for its implementation, and are about to create a draft for a National Action Plan. But, just because there is no NAP in Colombia does not mean nothing is being done on the state level. Several authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, work on issues of gender perspectives in conflicts, although they refer not to the resolution but to national documents with similar focus. In the Democratic Republic of Congo there is a National Action Plan, but not all relevant actors, state and non-state, are aware of the content of the NAP. In South Sudan work is in progress towards drafting a NAP. Here, both government and civil society have been and continue to be involved with the help of the donor community. The challenge for South Sudan is a continued militarisation of society due to the conflict with neighbouring Sudan that affects smaller local ethnic and cattle-related conflicts.

Wherever we shift our gaze in the world, the work on UNSCR 1325 seems to be characterised by a few common denominators. First, common for many NGOs in the field is that they are actually implementing the resolution – without knowing it. They are working towards greater participation of women in decision making processes, they are working towards ending impunity for



PHOTO: MARTYRS SQUARE MEDIA

About 200 activists attended the second One Voice – New Horizons Women's Conference in Tripoli, Libya, to discuss how to uphold and promote women's rights in the new Libyan Constitution. The conference was co-organized by five women's organizations. The participants came from all over Libya and some international guests were also present.

violence against women, and they are working to raise awareness in order to prevent more violence from occurring. What they are often not aware of in these sometimes Herculean efforts is that they have the UN Security Council behind them. They lack knowledge of how the UN and its Security Council function, and they lack knowledge about the resolution itself, as well as how they can claim responsibility from their states. It is often knowledge that is missing – not the work on the ground. On the state level, the relationship seems to be the opposite; state ministries have knowledge about the resolution, but show real limitations in the amount of real work that is done.

Challenges in post-conflict Libya

"I have to admit that it hurts a lot to see that what we are fighting for in my country are simple rights in other countries. You don't know how much a walk in the street and knowing that there are no dangers ahead of you in any way, what it means to us, the freedom we feel. Sometimes what I learn

from a walk in the street [here in Sweden] is more powerful than what I learn in the lectures, because it brings to me the question: why we don't have our simple rights in our country? But also, I get the answer that we should not give up, no matter what obstacles face us, as we know it's a long battle ahead, but yet, it gives me the hope that if others were able to get their rights then me and all Libyans can too."

Hajer, 21 years old

In October 2012, we met a young woman from Libya, Hajer. She had come to Sweden to participate in a Sida funded training programme focusing on UN-SCR 1325, on human rights, women's rights and on how to work for social change. Hajer belongs to a whole new generation of Libyan activists from the youth and women's movements that has emerged since the revolution. Two years have now passed since the Gaddafi regime fell and the country began its arduous journey to democracy. The challenges facing Libya are in many ways no different from other post-conflict

countries: unemployment, human rights violations, high costs of living, an increased tension between different religious/ethnic groups, and an increase in post-conflict (militia) violence. The government lacks the capacity to act, and to build or rebuild state institutions remains a big challenge. Some of the same militia groups that helped overthrow Gaddafi are now also threatening the democratic process that they fought for. This has a lot to do with trust, or in this case, the lack of trust. The militia groups do not trust the present government and are unwilling to disarm and demobilise under present conditions.

In the beginning of 2012, the National Transitional Council handed over power to the democratically elected General National Congress (GNC). Its first and most important mission was to decide on the formation of the entity that would draft the new constitution. This has also been the main focus of most civil society organisations that have developed in Libya since the revolution. Unfortunately, there has been

little progress. The flawed and hurried Egyptian process of passing a new constitution has often been mentioned as a deterrent, but whatever the reason, the new constitution has engaged the whole of Libyan society. For example, the second women's conference in Libya, held in January 2013 and organised by the civil society organisation Voice of Libyan Women focused mainly on the new constitution – the process of writing it as well as its content.

Although work on the constitution has been slow and fraught with conflicts, the very existence of a women's rights NGO is remarkable. Prior to the revolution, independent women's rights groups did not exist. The state had to sanction any activities promoting women or protecting their rights. Today, women are organising, participating in and influencing community life and social development on the local as well as the national level. For the first time in Libyan history women have 17 per cent of the seats in the temporary parliament, the GNC. Some women have been appointed ministers and many

women are either active members or even co-founders of new political parties. The level of education in Libya is quite high, also for women. In 2010, over 51 per cent of Libyan women had a third level education.

“For the first time in Libyan history women have 17 per cent of the seats in the temporary parliament.”

This would leave one to presume that progress is underway and that the status of women in Libya is improving. However, the setbacks are many. First of all, recently Libya's High Court of Justice removed all restrictions imposed by the previous law that limited polygamy. Although this was met with demonstrations from women's organisations, the court carried on. The second issue sail-

ing up on the agenda is Libya's stance on CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women). Libya has previously ratified CEDAW with two reservations³, and now women's groups fear that there are more reservations to come, due to recent discussions regarding the fact that CEDAW is not compatible with Islam or sharia law. Thirdly, rumours have started to circulate regarding women's rights to travel outside of Libya unaccompanied by a man. Women activists in Libya are alarmed by the recent developments, especially considering that the process of drafting the constitution is about to start.

Fragile security situation

Another challenge for all citizens in Libya, but with particular consequences for women, is the security situation. Since the revolution, security is upheld by the police and by the different militia groups. For example, the international airport in Tripoli is guarded by one of the armed groups. Due to failed demilitarisation and demobilisation ini-

PHOTO: KATE THOMAS/IRIN



Women waiting for Friday prayers to begin in Benghazi. Even if the status of women has improved in Libya after the revolution, there is still a lot more to be desired. Meanwhile, women's meeting places and solidarity are of great importance.

tatives there are still many weapons in the hands of civilians, militias and other armed groups. Reports have shown that there is a link between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and violence against women⁴, and this is something that concerns many women's groups for which the collection and destruction of arms and ammunition constitutes an important step towards peace and security.⁵

Demilitarisation, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are often contested and conflictual exercises,

There is a fine line between maintaining security and controlling cities, which makes the situation unstable.

wherever they take place in the world, and Libya is no exception. Here, there is also the added problem of legitimacy. This can be illustrated by a recent trip to Libya, where one of us, Emma Johansson, met a former rebel who admitted he still had weapons in his house. The reason for hanging on to them, he said, was that he and several others distrust both the police and security staff in charge of the demobilisation process.⁶

In addition, in contrast to many other post-conflict countries going through a DDR process, the high level of education and financial well-being of the former fighters in Libya mean that it has been difficult to identify proper incentives for fighters to demobilise. In this context, it is futile to bargain with offers of education or a couple of hundred dollars in exchange for a weapon. As mentioned above, there is a lack of trust in the process, and there is also a real security need. The national police cannot uphold security in this transitional phase, and citizens to some degree depend on militia groups to maintain security in parts of cities. However, there is a fine line between maintaining security and controlling cities, which makes the situation unstable. This is but one instance where general security concerns become specific women's concerns as well.

Then there is also the problem with the GNC itself. In the women's rights community there is a mistrust of the women representatives in the GNC. As in many other countries, women often express a lack of faith in their female representatives in congress or other legislative bodies. Although this is not something new or unique for the country, it poses a major problem in a new democratic state such as Libya. Considering the obstacles to women's equal participation in society that have emerged recently, there is a felt need for women to support each other. The women in the GNC, as all other representatives, also have to choose their battles, and in doing so do not and cannot represent all women. The women in the GNC are nevertheless critiqued by women's groups for only looking out for their own vested interests and not for the greater good of Libyan women. Other voices nevertheless emphasise that in order to push for more women in key positions, women need to support other women, to pose a role model for others.

The ongoing debate about the constitutional review process nevertheless shows that there is a strong commitment among women's organisations to make sure that women's rights are included in the new constitution. But organising in civil society is still a relatively new phenomenon in Libya, and women's rights organisations are sometimes grappling in the dark. This became evident during the conference One Voice when the head of the UN mission stated that, "The UN will provide you with the help you need", and the women's organisations answered, "But we don't know what we need. Can you help us identify what we need?" The UN head of mission, slightly confused, answered, "We cannot give you anything unless you tell us what you need". The inevitable Catch 22.

A long way to go

The power of UNSCR 1325 is that it both anticipates and covers all ongoing processes and discussions on women's rights. Due to its statutes, it can be used as a mechanism and a tool to put pressure on key actors and institutions to push for improved representation and participation of women at all levels of decision making in post-conflict states. However, the resolution has no way of

working on its own; it is not a *deus ex machina*. State after state is drafting and passing National Action Plans, and in country after country women's rights groups are spreading awareness of its content and opportunities.

In Sweden, we are just now in the process of reviewing our own National Action Plan, using the recently adopted indicators by which we will measure progress and failure. One example of such progress, we believe, is the creation of the International Training Programme on UNSCR 1325 funded by the Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency (Sida), targeting post-conflict countries such as Colombia, DRC, South Sudan and Libya. This was where we first met Hajer and many more men and women like her, incessantly fighting to increase the participation of women in decision-making, to prevent violence and abuse and to protect those girls and women who suffer from it. 🌸

1 SCR 1820 (2009) is focused on sexual violence as a weapon of war. SCR 1888 (2009) builds on SCR 1820 and calls for the appointment of the Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict, as well as establishes Women Protection Advisors within peacekeeping missions, in addition to a Team of Experts, meant to rapidly deploy to situations of sexual violence. SCR 1889 (2010) is focused on post-conflict peacebuilding and in particular calls for the development of indicators to measure the implementation of SCR 1325. SCR 1960 (2011) creates institutional tools to combat impunity and outlines specific steps needed for both the prevention of and protection from sexual violence in conflict.

2 See also Akatsa-Bukachi, M., 'Gender and violence: Small arms – a human security issue', *New Routes*, 2012:4, pp. 17-19.

3 There are two reservations. The first, Article 2 of the convention shall be implemented with due regard to the peremptory norms of the Islamic sharia relating to determination of the inheritance portions of the estate of a deceased person, whether female or male; and the second, the implementation of paragraph 16 (c) and (d) of the convention shall be without prejudice to any of the rights guaranteed to women by the Islamic sharia.

4 The International Action Network on Small Arms, Amnesty International, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, etc.

5 See also Akatsa-Bukachi, M., 'Gender and violence: Small arms – a human security issue', *New Routes*, 2012:4, pp. 17-19.

6 <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlight-rm18.html>

With the armed insurgency and coup d'état in Mali last year, the country's fragile democratic development was seriously hampered. Obvious warning signs like deteriorating socio-economic conditions and widespread corruption were sadly neglected. The country itself and ECOWAS are now facing critical challenges in turning things for the better. No stakeholder in the country should be left outside this process.

Challenges in Mali

Historic duty to ensure peace

Kwesi Aning and Festus Aubyn

Recent years have seen significant gains made in consolidating peace and democracy in the West African sub-region. This development, however, had a serious setback in 2012, caused by an armed insurgency in northern Mali and a coup d'état in the capital city, Bamako. In this article, we analyse the responses of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as the proximal sub-regional organisation to this dual crisis. Specifically, we assess the strengths and weaknesses of the ECOWAS responses to the crises in Mali, evaluate what the French intervention means for the leadership of ECOWAS on the Malian crises and identify some possible challenges that the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) may have to confront in order to bring stability to the country.

The article proceeds in three sections. First, a brief background to the crisis in Mali is provided. This is followed by an assessment of ECOWAS responses to the political quagmire in the country, and the article concludes with some pragmatic proposals for how the role of ECOWAS in finding a peaceful negotiated settlement in Mali should evolve.

A nation divided?

Emboldened by the presence of well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of Gaddafi's regime in 2011, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNL) initiated a series of attacks against government forces in northern Mali. These attacks were carried out along with other Islamic armed groups, including Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and

Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Subsequently, a mutiny by disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north resulted in an overthrow of Mali's President Ahmadou Toumani Touré in a military coup d'état led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo.

Although what prompted the coup was a rising tide of discontent over the government's failure to equip the military to effectively deal with the northern "separatist" insurrection by Tuareg rebels, we contend that poor governance and grievances over deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the country inspired the military takeover. That is, prior to the coup, the indicators were evident, and though they pointed to a country that was sitting on a time bomb and waiting to explode, no proactive measures were put in place to address them.¹ These early warning signs included concerns over the poor political and military management of the Tuareg rebellion, issues of widespread corruption in government, nepotism, mismanagement of natural resources, deteriorating socio-economic conditions and proliferation of arms from the Sahel region.²

With all these deep-seated issues, it is not out of place to assert that Mali was a nation in crisis long before the coup. We argue that the military junta, which eventually became known as the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDRE), just tapped into these long-simmering problems and staged a popular coup d'état. But this notwithstanding, the fact remains that the coup was misguided and an affront to Malian democracy. More-

over, it undermined ECOWAS efforts and gains over the last two decades towards entrenching a democratic culture and the rule of law in the sub-region.

Until the French led-intervention in January 2013, Mali was divided into two, with the transitional government controlling the south and the north being dominated by a multitude of radical and extremist groups, comprising MNL together with Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM. For the nine month period that these groups occupied northern Mali, they wreaked havoc and imposed strict sharia law on the local population. Human Rights Watch reports indicated despicable human rights abuses by the Islamist rebels, such as rape, arresting unveiled women, stoning unmarried couples to death, publicly flogging smokers, amputating limbs of suspected thieves, and recruiting child soldiers.³ Following a joint assault on the town of Konna, 700 km from Bamako by AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine, in early January 2013, Mali's interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, requested the French to assist in fighting the rebels and to liberate all the occupied regions. After weeks of several air raids by French air forces, a majority of the occupied territories were recaptured by the French and Mali forces, pushing the rebels further to the desert regions near the Algerian border, with some even fleeing to neighbouring countries.

The coup d'état received a "unanimous" condemnation internationally, especially from ECOWAS and the African Union (AU). Consistent with its principle of zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means, as

enshrined in the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS reacted promptly to the unconstitutional changes of government in the country.

Complex dilemmas facing ECOWAS

In Mali, two complex political and security dilemmas awaited ECOWAS. The first was how to swiftly return the country back to constitutional rule and the second how to restore the territorial integrity by recapturing the northern part of the country. In dealing with the former challenge, ECOWAS first suspended Mali's membership and threatened to impose political, diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions on the CNRDRE and its associates, should they fail to restore constitutional order.⁴ Additionally, the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, was appointed as the ECOWAS mediator for the crises. Following the failure of the CNRDRE to relinquish power, ECOWAS imposed sanctions, including a travel ban on members of the CNRDRE, closing all borders of member

states with Mali, except for humanitarian purposes, and freezing the assets of the leaders of the CNRDRE and its associates, as well as the accounts of Mali held at the Central Bank of West African States.⁵

Frightened by the consequences of the sanctions, the CNRDRE agreed to sign a framework agreement that was brokered by the ECOWAS mediator, and in return ECOWAS lifted the sanctions. Under the framework agreement, President Touré resigned in the beginning of 2012, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, was designated as the interim President for a 40-day period in accordance with the Malian Constitution.⁶ A transitional government was also formed with Cheick Modibo Diarra as interim Prime Minister, whose main task was to organise elections and to resolve the security and humanitarian crises in the northern part of the country.⁷

However, the framework agreement failed to clearly define the role of the CNRDRE in the transition, timelines for the transition and the modalities for

the organisation of the elections.⁸ Furthermore, in defiance of the principles in the AU Constitutive Act, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and other relevant instruments on unconstitutional changes of government, the putschists were granted amnesty and immunity from any prosecution. Taken together, these limitations served to frustrate not only the work of the transitional government but also the ECOWAS mediation efforts, as the CNRDRE interfered in the transition process by undertaking arbitrary and unilateral actions.⁹ Subsequently, ECOWAS had to extend the duration of the transitional period to 12 months, during which it was expected that presidential elections would be organised. However, in spring 2013 the feasibility of this transition period is yet to be determined, with the volatile and highly unpredictable security situation in the country.

Two track approach

With respect to the separatist rebellion in northern Mali, the response by ECOWAS has followed a two-track approach



PHOTO: BRAHIMA OUEDRAOGO/IRIN

Poor governance and a deteriorating socio-economic situation paved the way for the armed insurgency and military coup in Mali in 2012. The Islamist group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa is in control of much of northern Mali and has imposed sharia law.

of negotiating with the groups that are open to dialogue, along with the deployment of a 3,000-strong military force as part of AFISMA.¹⁰ Seeking a negotiated solution, the ECOWAS mediator has, together with other regional leaders, engaged in series of dialogues with the MNLA and Ansar Dine to adopt a common platform to negotiate with the transitional authorities. The groups were also urged to distance themselves from terrorist and organised criminal networks, like AQIM and its affiliate groups.¹¹ In response, the two groups also pledged their commitment to a negotiated solution to the crises, and the Ansar Dine, for example, issued a statement to distance itself from AQIM.¹² While the dialogue process has so far yielded some positive results, the negotiations committee that was envisaged, to complement the ECOWAS mediation efforts by facilitating the direct negotiations between the transitional authorities and groups in the north, is yet to become a reality. Moreover, the ECOWAS mediation efforts have also failed to involve civil society groups and the local communities, thereby undermining the local ownership of the process.

Apart from the mediation efforts, ECOWAS forces have also been deployed to Mali as part of AFISMA to support the Malian authorities to regain the occupied regions in the north, dismantle the terrorist and criminal networks and effectively restore the authority of the state over its entire territory.¹³ But arguably, the deployment of AFISMA occurred rather too late, creating a void that was subsequently exploited by the French. The abject failure of ECOWAS and the AU, especially to promptly come up with a detailed, definitive African plan to resolve the crisis before the unilateral intervention by France, has exposed the limitations of both institutions in bridging the gap between early warning and early response. It has also demonstrated the mismatch between the slow political decision-making and swift deployment capacity. This has indeed raised important questions about the maxim of 'African solutions to African problems', as the intervention exposed the weakness of ECOWAS and the AU in dealing with their own problems and the fact that Africans still require external support in order to effectively mount peace-enforcement operations on the continent.¹⁴

Need for political solutions

Moreover, the indications that AFISMA would soon be transferred to a UN peacekeeping mission further highlight the inability of Africans to sustain longer-term operations on the continent without external support. But though humanitarian reasons and the quest to protect Mali's territorial integrity have been cited as the prime motivation for the French intervention, we argue that there are other important issues that cannot be glossed over. Some of these issues include the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the pursuit of French economic interests in the form of protecting the oil and uranium resources in Mali, Niger and the Sahel region as a whole. Arguably, these issues also formed part of the pivotal consideration for the French intervention. And many Africans see this as yet another sign of the continued domination by former colonial powers of former colonies. Again, while the intervention may have served a purpose of protecting the sovereignty of Mali and the short-term cessation of atrocities, it did little to address the underlying causes of the conflict.

In this regard, political solutions will be necessary in order to usher in relative peace and stability in Mali. This will entail establishing a legitimate government in Bamako, addressing the governance deficits or grievances of the Tuaregs and the provision of humanitarian aid. Evidently, it is these unresolved issues that will confront AFISMA's operations, together with many other challenges, such as liberating areas that are yet not free from AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine control, stabilising and securing the liberated areas and state institutions, undertaking security sector reforms, and dealing with the threat of organised crime. Successfully undertaking these tasks will be the litmus test for ECOWAS and the AU. After failing to intervene swiftly in Mali, both organisations now have the historic duty to ensure that peace and genuine democracy come to Mali whilst curtailing the real threat of Islamic extremism in the sub-region.

Crucial collaboration

Drawing some critical lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq and even Libya shows that it will take a great deal of sustained effort and cooperation by all stakeholders to bring long-term stability to Mali. Hence, ECOWAS needs to effectively

collaborate with the AU, the United Nations, the European Union, France, the United States and other bilateral partners to help establish a legitimate government, undertake security-sector reforms and build strong governance institutions in the country.

Concerning the situation in the north, the transitional government should be supported to restore national cohesion by facilitating direct dialogue with the Tuareg groups for a peaceful settlement. In doing this, all other stakeholders, such as civil society organisations and the local communities in the north, should be included. They must be deeply involved in any initiative to bring peace to the country. Lastly, it is imperative that the dialogue processes are accompanied by the implementation of policies that would facilitate socio-economic development across the country to reduce poverty, unemployment and the horizontal inequalities. 🌿

1 See WANEP, "MALI: Managing the Damage of a Complex", <http://www.wanep.org>, accessed 3 October 2012

2 *ibid*

3 Human Rights Watch, "Mali: Islamist Armed Groups Spread Fear in North", <http://www.hrw.org>, accessed 12 October 2012

4 See ECOWAS Press Release N°: 092/2012 "Emergency Mini-Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on the Situation in Mali", 30 March 2012.

5 *ibid*

6 United Nations Security Council (2012a), Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa, New York: United Nations

7 United Nations Security Council (2012b), Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, New York: United Nations

8 See Kwesi Aning, Frank Okyere & Mustapha Abdallah, "Addressing Emerging Security Threats in Post-Gaddafi Sahel and the ECOWAS Response to the Malian Crisis" KAIPTC Policy Brief 1/May 2012

9 ECOWAS Press Release N°: 128/2012 ECO-WAS Leaders Agree New Measures to Restore Peace to Guinea Bissau, Mali, 4 May 2012

10 PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCCXLI)

11 United Nations Security Council, (2012b), *op. cit.*

12 *ibid*

13 PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCCXLI)

14 See Mehari T. Maru, 'AFISMA: Military ahead of Politics' <http://studies.aljazeera.net>, accessed 3 April 2013

LPI News

Kroc Institute and LPI in collaboration

Cross-fertilisation between theory and practice is one of LPI's strategic priorities. For this purpose, LPI staff members Jenny Svensson, Michele Cesari and Charlotte Booth travelled to Indiana, USA, in March to engage with faculty and students of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame University.

The goal of the visit was to find opportunities for joint learning, both feeding into LPI's and partners' practice in conflict transformation and enriching teaching and academic research. As a result, a number of collaboration options were identified, including the collaboration with a PhD class on the question of land governance reform in the DRC. During the visit, the LPI staff taught in several graduate and undergraduate classes and held a public lecture.

LPI and Kroc will also explore whether LPI's upcoming *Participatory Action Research for Conflict Transformation – a handbook combining inquiry, dialogue and collaboration* can be published to accompany an academic publication on the same topic by John Paul Lederach and Laura Taylor.

LPI – driver of practice and policy

LPI's periodicals, the quarterly *New Routes* and bimonthly *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, are increasingly appreciated and subscribed to globally. The number of direct subscribers has reached 1,500 for *New Routes* and 2,700 for the *HAB*. In addition, both publications are easily accessible through major international databases like EBSCO and Globethics, as well as through LPI's own website www.life-peace.org

A recent review shows that the *New Routes* journal has engaged 145 different authors over the past three years. LPI is aiming at both cross-fertilisation between theory and practice and driving policy change in peacebuilding. The analysis indicates that *New Routes*, between 2010 and 2013, offered an almost equal number of articles in the two categories, with 44 related to practice and 46 policy-oriented. For the regional *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, an overwhelming majority of the 63 articles in the three-year period combined conflict analysis with a policy-focus, often providing recommendations.



PHOTO: LPI

Omar Jama, Deputy Director of Mogadishu-based Zamzam Foundation, recently visited LPI's head office in Uppsala

Provision of water with peace in Somalia

Access to water and the competing interests in relation to control over water points is a common problem in Somalia. In the most recent development of its work in the country, LPI and its local partner, Zamzam Foundation, engage communities in some of the most conflict-prone areas, Hiran, Middle Shabelle and Galgaduud, in the search for peaceful solutions.

– We make sure to include the whole community, including religious leaders and women, says Omar Jama, Deputy Director of Zamzam Foundation. We use LPI's conflict transformation procedure and tools combined with our long experience of providing thousands of boreholes and wells across Somalia.

The collaboration between LPI and its Somali partner was initiated in 2011 and the water-related peace project is the first joint engagement. It is a new development which creates expectations at Zamzam of even more successful and sustainable water projects.

– The partnership with LPI has clearly added value, and peacebuilding is a new dimension to our work, confirms Omar Jama. Zamzam has for two decades been providing substantial humanitarian aid as well as development assistance in terms of water, health care, education and income generation projects across Somalia.

The LPI-Zamzam project is financially supported by the European Union and the German INGO Brot für die Welt.



PHOTO: ZAMZAM FOUNDATION

The Zamzam Foundation promotes sustainable water projects in combination with conflict transformation in Somalia.

LPI advisor in Kenyan government

A member of LPI's International Advisory Council, Ms Amina Mohamed, former Deputy Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Program, has been appointed Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Kenya.

LPI signs agreement with major donor

The Swedish development cooperation agency, Sida, and LPI have signed a major agreement for conflict transformation programmes in Africa 2013-2016. The agreement covers peace-building programmes in DR Congo, Somalia and the regional programme for the Horn of Africa, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

– I am happy for the confidence and the high expectations on our work expressed by Sida, says Peter K Sjögren, Executive Director of LPI. This support will enable us to continue our promising conflict transformation work, including the important aspect of capacity building with local partners.

Among other financial partners and donors to LPI's work are the EC, Brot für die Welt, Church of Sweden, Swedish Mission Council and the governments of Norway and Belgium.

– The already confirmed financial support is great, but especially our programmes in Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia would need additional financial support and we are exploring options in various countries, says Peter K Sjögren.

Staff changes

Jules Nshamamba has been employed new head of finance in LPI's DRC programme, based in Bukavu. His predecessor *Zaurati Nasibu* has been appointed liaison officer for LPI in the capital Kinshasa.

Tobias Petrelius has been employed by LPI DRC as Technical Advisor to be based in Goma. He was previously doing consultancy/volunteer work for LPI in Goma from September 2012 through January 2013.

Reviews and resources

Multiple aspects on the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security, edited by Redie Bereketab. Pluto Press and Nordic Africa Institute, 2013

This anthology contains a quite long introduction and eight articles. The term 'Horn of Africa', which previously referred to Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, now includes also the Republic of the Sudan and the new South Sudan Republic. The merit of the anthology is that it brings together the vast literature on conflicts and security in this region within a single volume, thus doing the general reader a great service.

However, as in most anthologies, the quality of the articles varies greatly. Moreover, the same issues (causes of conflicts) with more or less the same answers are dealt with in the first four chapters. The long introduction attempts to explain the causes of conflicts between states and within states using sociological parameters such as relative deprivation and identity theories. This is followed by chapter 2 (Poverty, inequality and state identity), chapter 3 (Leadership in the Horn of Africa) and chapter 4 (Conflicts in the Horn of Africa), all dealing with the same causes and providing more or less the same explanations. Out of the three, however, chapter 4 by Kassahoun Berhane is by far the most cogent and relevant, while chapter 3 on leadership in the Horn of Africa is very obscure and has little to add to the scope of the anthology. Chapter 6 on political violence in the Horn of Africa, with special focus on Ethiopia, has

virtually nothing to say either on Ethiopia or on political violence. It deals mainly with theories of state building and state disintegration that are not contextualised at all. It is the least relevant contribution and the anthology could have done without it.

Uneven treatment of issues and countries is perhaps inevitable in anthologies. Chapter 5 on the relations between the Republics of Sudan and South Sudan, though based entirely on secondary sources, provides a very good introduction to the area and the issues of conflict. Replete with acronyms, the article could have benefitted from careful editing. The section on the making and unmaking of Somalia (chapter 8) and the role played by internal and external actors (one of which is alleged to be Ethiopia) is also a good chapter that provides contextual frameworks for the reader to make an independent assessment of the arguments used. The history of the Intergovernmental Organisation for Development since its inception in 1996, and its sustainability over time, is treated in chapter 7. Finally, the study on militias and piracy on the Somali coast, essentially presented as responses to external interference since the early 1990s, provides in a way a good conclusion to the anthology.

No matter how the term 'Horn of Africa' is defined, Ethiopia and Eritrea are very prominent regions. It is unfortunate that the anthology pays scant attention either to what is going on in Ethiopia or to Eritrean-Ethiopian relations, which heavily impact the security and stability of Djibouti, Somalia and to some extent Sudan. We know very little of what goes on in this core region beyond the proxy wars in which Eritrea and Ethiopia are allegedly engaged in the wider Horn.

With the exception of the last article on the dynamics of piracy, most of the contributors call for a better methodology of international/external intervention to solve conflicts between states and within states. However, analyses of the pitfalls of external/international intervention in whatever form it comes and the extent to which external intervention impedes or enhances the capacity of leaders and citizens to confront conflict issues are missing elements, although they are integral parts of any study that aspires to deal with the subject.

Tekeste Negash
Professor Emeritus
Dalarna University

Discussing peace, not war

Opting Out of War: Strategies to Prevent Violent Conflict, by Mary B. Anderson and Marshall Wallace. Lynne Rienner Publishers London: Nov 2012

On 24 January this year, the Life & Peace Institute in collaboration with Fredens Hus (Uppsala Peace Museum) was honoured to host the book launch of 'Opting Out of War' in the presence of the two authors. This latest publication by Collaborative Learning Projects is the result of the STEPS Towards Conflict Prevention project. The book discusses thirteen communities around the world who have decided to 'opt out of war'. In a strategic territory or in the midst of conflict, these communities made a conscious choice to not take part in violence, resulting in a number of necessary measures and strategies.

The first part of the book covers the underlying common characteristics or steps they went through in order to avoid becoming war zones. These include assessing that war is coming, analysing which consequences this might have for the community and weighing options, in order to make a clear decision (a clear synopsis can be found on p. 97). In the second part, five case studies are discussed thoroughly.

First of all, this book is of immense value to every person in the field or interested in peace studies. A frequently made comment compares the share of literature discussing peace with the research on war and its implications. It notes that very little research has been done about peace as such and on how peaceful communities overcome their conflicts. Moreover, as we all in some way envision a world where conflicts are managed in a constructive way, it is interesting to study how this can actually work in the reality of war.

For me, one of the most illuminating mutual characteristics of these communities was their high level of organisation. This did not necessarily have to be democratic to be successful. Often traditional, religious or existing forms of governance sufficed, which could question the ways in which a democratically elected government is sometimes hastily pursued and perceived to be key for successful transition. It seems that, despite having a leadership not elected according to Western democratic rules, some communities appear to be organised enough to opt out of war. Furthermore, the non-war zones were not established primarily by peace activists and idealists but were rather characterised by pragmatism and perseverance. The choices these communities made were strategic and practical.

As the book is titled 'Opting out of war, strategies to prevent violent conflict', I think that a delineation of the concept of conflict prevention would deserve some more attention from the authors' side. As they emphasise in the conclusion, these groups chose to not take part in violence, which prevented the conflict from overrunning their social unit. However, this does not affect the underlying grievances or the causes of the conflict surrounding them or the way in which this conflict is managed.

Esmeralda Van den Bosch
Intern, LPI Programme Unit

On the same topic: Local Peacebuilding and National Peace. Interaction between Grassroots and Elite Processes. Mitchell, C.R. and Hancock, L.E. Continuum, London: 2012

The many pieces of the peacebuilding jigsaw

Integrated Peacebuilding. Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict, Craig Zelizer (ed.), Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 2013

It is only appropriate that this book opens with a quote by the Indian diplomat Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, saying, "The more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war", because the business of building peace is still an evolving enterprise that warrants deep contemplative exercises and dedicated field work to put all the scattered pieces together.

Dr Craig Zelizer, Associate Director at Georgetown University's MA in Conflict Resolution Program and founder of the web-based Peace and Collaborative Development Network portal, has made an attempt in this 13-chapter book to see if – and how – peacebuilding can be integrated into other segments of the aid and development industry as well as the media and private corporate sectors.

After laying down a conceptual foundation in an introduction that he has co-authored with fellow researcher Valerie Oliphant, which defines the full range of jargon, actors and tools employed in the field of conflict analysis and cross-sectoral integration, Zelizer presents a comprehensive overview of what he calls "The business of peacebuilding" in Chapter 2, identifying and analysing the institutions in this fast evolving field.

In Chapter 3, Andrea Wisler dwells on the relationship between international development and peacebuilding, describing how the two for many years worked in separate areas and what is bringing them together now (in two-thirds of the conflict-affected countries). Chapter 4 by Mike Jobbins looks at the theoretical and practical aspects of attempts to link up humanitarian assistance with peacebuilding, while in the next chapter Evelyn Thornton and Tobie Whitman review the research and practice in gender-sensitive programming and how its design and implementation affects men, women, boys and girls.

Shawn MacDonald analyses the role of the private sector in generating as well as resolving conflicts and explores how for-profit business corporations can integrate and contribute to building peace.

The role of religion and environmental change is examined in Chapters 7 and 8, while the next chapter focuses on efforts to integrate defence, diplomacy and development

into a peacebuilding framework. Integration of media and the sectors of health and rule of law into peacebuilding programming is discussed in the last three chapters. Zelizer wraps up this wide-ranging and comprehensive exploration of the various facets of this evolving discipline in his concluding essay that summarises future prospects of peacebuilding work and the challenges in the way. He also poses a set of questions to further explore in order to refine the methods and practice in this evolving field.

Usually, books that compile essays by dozens of authors tend to lose coherence and compactness. It is especially so when every writer is an expert in their own geographical or thematic area, as those featured in this book certainly are, and the editor has the unenviable task of putting them all together in a sequence and format that hold readers' interest.

It is a testimony to Dr Craig Zelizer's editorial skills and academic discipline that this book avoids becoming a disjointed mishmash of disparate expert opinions. On the contrary, as Professor Dipak Gupta of San Diego State University observes in his comments on the volume, *Integrated Peacebuilding* is a book that is "logically constructed and conceptually tied together" and "offers a perfect blend of academic thinking and application".

Najum Mushtaq

Policy and Communications Advisor, LPI

Homage to Hammarskjöld

Hammarskjöld. A Life, by Roger Lipsey. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2013

This is a remarkable tribute to Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961). The second Secretary-General of the United Nations, elected in 1953, he died in office together with 15 others in a plane crash caused by still unclarified circumstances. He was on his way to meet Moïse Tshombe, leader of the secessionist Katanga province in the Congo. His last mission remained unfinished.

The Congo conflict showed the limitations of the United Nations if the big powers are purely driven by their egoism. It also showed that the skills of Hammarskjöld were applicable only within boundaries drawn by others. His relentless efforts to find a solution against all odds at the height of the Cold War, plays a prominent role in the final parts of this massive volume. They show that the interests at play were immune to diplomacy and political intuition, both talents which Hammarskjöld successfully applied in several other cases – from the spectacular release of the US Air Force soldiers captured as prisoners of war by China during the Korea war to the Suez crisis to the Lebanon.

Lipsey meticulously documents Hammarskjöld's diplomacy. He also puts the diplomat's approach into the wider context of his personality and mindset. He is able to present Hammarskjöld's finesse and integrity as the synthesis of ethical values, spirituality, love for the fine arts, affinity to nature and an openness to the multitude of cultures – all integral parts of "the color palette of Hammarskjöld's developed humanism" (p. 70). Digging into the posthumously published personal notebook, his many personal letters and his official speeches and notes, Lipsey presents a novel way of finding access to the moral compass and indeed also the

feelings of this "veteran of bitter internal wars" (p. 4), who so often was the lonely unicorn.

This biography, the result of several years of research in the archives in Stockholm, New York and elsewhere, including interviews with those still alive who worked with Hammarskjöld, offers access to Hammarskjöld through Lipsey's personal engagement. This is the portrait of a person who appeals to and resonates very intimately with him. Chapter 5 is particularly noteworthy among the many discoveries, where Lipsey at the end draws an analogy to the authors Henry David Thoreau and Albert Camus (p. 111f.), which few would be able to see.

This expedition through the life of Hammarskjöld in more than 600 pages is demanding, frequently interspersed with lengthy quotes in small print. But for those really interested, this is a rewarding journey. It also shows the author's acquaintance with art, spirituality and philosophy. This homage therefore (at times maybe too uncritically) presents a genuine prism. We benefit from Lipsey's admiration for this exceptional man, who once wrote to his friend Bo Beskow that he took pride in belonging to the family of grasses and remained "quite green in spite of a lot of trampling" (p. 603).

Henning Melber

*Senior Advisor/Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
Extraordinary Professor/University of Pretoria and
University of the Free State*

Local development step by step

Local First: Development for the Twenty-First Century.
Edited by Kate McGuinness. *Peace Direct*, 2012

Local First is a development approach that looks for capacity at hand within the developing countries themselves before bringing in external expertise and resources. It recognises that much of this capacity is found outside the central governments and acknowledges that local people need to lead their own development. Local First can be seen as a response to the fact that large scale operations, which do not observe and utilise available resources locally, will continue to fail and will not improve the situation in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

This book tries to contribute to the evidence base for local action, which can be equally effective on a large scale, by presenting case studies that follow the introduction of the concept Local First. Local First argues that initiatives should be locally led, or at least locally owned, in contrast to locally delivered, which is most common today.

The authors argue that the challenges to implementing Local First can be overcome by approaching the partner identification and choice of methods in a different way than how INGOs act today: Local capacity could be judged by, for example, the ability of an NGO to mobilise volunteers. The INGO should purchase goods and services without distorting the local market via procurement that the local suppliers cannot meet. It should work on an appropriate level of operation and redefine its role to discover and nurture talented organisations to lead already from the beginning of a programme. In this way the local actors are encouraged to contribute their experience and knowledge to the INGO.

Six cases from Africa and Asia, relevant to the work of peacebuilders, give the reader food for thought related to Local First. The authors have also formulated twelve suggestions to donors, INGOs and local NGOs for how to put Local First to use, for example by including motivation and social accountability as indicators in capacity assessments, remunerating staff with local wage rates and committing to long-term evaluations of impact and sustainability from locally led projects. I would assume that many international and local NGOs agree with most of the suggested methods or perceptions of each other's roles and possibilities.

The idea of Local First is similar to many other approaches presented over the years, but at the same time there is still a need for this paradigm shift to take place. The authors are pushing for possible ways to change the way NGOs work in order to gain sustainable results locally. The success might still be in the mist, depending on the preparedness to change and on whether those who control the financial support are prepared to look for long term commitments where steps are taken one at the time and not in giant leaps, as is often required by donors and INGOs today.

Peter K Sjögren
Executive Director, LPI

International responses to conflict-related sexual violence

Conflict-related sexual violence: International law local responses, by Tonia St Germain and Susan Dewey (eds). Kumarian Press 2012

This interdisciplinary volume remedies a dearth in the literature on the initiatives and institutions that address conflict and post-conflict sexual violence from different perspectives. It does this by mapping out strategies to move forward, informed by rich fieldwork and thorough analysis of the obstacles to reach formal justice.

The case studies highlight the message of the volume: the implications of international responses to local conflict-related sexual violence. The contributing authors, with backgrounds in anthropology, mental health care, international human rights, political science and activism, share their research on efforts by international organizations, criminal courts and tribunals to reduce or respond to conflict-related sexual violence. A unanimous finding is the wide gap between policy and practice.

A particularly provoking and interesting chapter is written by Laura Sparling, in which she problematises the notion of protection, underpinned by protectionist policies that erode women's ability of self-protection, which she calls the illusion and perversion of protection. Sparling notes that the current debate is focused more on the effective application of these policies than any general problematising of the unintended and harmful consequences that are imbedded in the implementation of the current discourse.

Another rare gem is the chapter on male intimate partners of female rape victims from Cape Town, South Africa. Evalina van Wijk provides an interesting contribution with a perspective rarely portrayed. The partner of a rape victim/survivor is in psychological terms a secondary victim/survivor, who suffers both physically and mentally. Yet Wijk finds that in practice there are no holistic responses that cater to

the couple's needs, rather than solely to the primary victim/survivor.

The volume provides a critical analysis of current international legal structures, enabling a much needed debate to ensure that these institutions remain relevant in their approaches. They need to be reminded of their purpose: to serve those who live and have lived their lives amidst war and conflict and who have suffered from conflict and post-conflict-related sexual violence.

It is my hope that this provocative, reflective and action-oriented volume will reach far beyond and above the clique of gender experts in the protection field.

Linda Forsberg
Gender expert

Discussions on the future of humanity

Climate, Development and Equity, Development Dialogue No. 61, September 2012, The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden

This edition of Development Dialogue is the third and last volume of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's What Next project series. The project was conceived as a sequel to the foundation's What Now project, which culminated in the 1975 report What Now: Another Development and the monograph Another Development: Approaches and Strategies (1976).

The initiative had brought together a diverse group of concerned people – civil society activists, academics, media representatives, national and international policymakers and civil servants – to engage in “intense debate and dialogue” to “propose bold and innovative alternatives to the predominant development trajectory”.

This volume adds to the pioneering work of the What Next project, which has already had a considerable influence on the climate debate (for example, ‘Carbon Trading – a critical conversation on climate change, privatisation and power’). As the title suggests, the main theme covered in this issue is the understanding of the links between climate change, environment, development, justice and equity.

In addition to a critical review of the nature of current development debates, the publication presents an array of perspectives on key challenges, and outlines possible alternatives and ways forward in the 21st century. As its editor, Henning Melber, states, this volume “relates to other issues of Development Dialogue challenging mainstream discourses”, which include ‘Postneoliberalism – A beginning debate’ (No. 51, January 2009) and ‘No future without justice – Report of the Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives’ (No. 59, June 2012).

Najum Mushtaq
Policy and Communications Advisor, LPI

Free download: These publications as well as other climate-related volumes, including ‘Critical Currents’, ‘Contours of Climate Justice – Ideas for shaping new climate and energy politics’ and ‘Carbon Trading – How it works and why it fails’ are available for download at www.dhf.uu.se
All What Next related publications are also available at www.whatnext.org

EU as a promoter of peace in the Horn of Africa

War takes its toll much beyond the battlefields. In a region plagued with local, regional and international conflicts, the impact of natural disasters is multiplied manifold. Somalia is a tragic example. More than a quarter of million Somalis died in the 2011-12 famine, most of them children under five.

The United Nations (UN) admits it could have done more. But the main reason the UN and humanitarian agencies failed to save lives despite clear early warnings of drought and famine was the unrelenting war in the country that goes on till today. The failure of the international community to respond to the famine warning is the direct result of its bigger failure to end the Somali conflict that has since 1991 taken millions of lives.

Peace in Somalia will remain elusive unless nonviolent, non-military and diplomatic approaches to conflict transformation are taken. Take the example of Kenya. After the December 2007 election more than 1,300 people were killed in a few weeks of violence.

A diplomatic intervention by the African Union, led by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, made a peaceful resolution of the conflict possible. Several other peacebuilding initiatives were put in place. While the country's political, economic and ethnic problems are far from over, it is a testimony to nonviolent approaches to peacebuilding that even the contentious election in March 2013 passed without much trouble. A democratic transfer of power bodes well for the country's future and brightens the prospects of resolving local level conflicts in the country through peaceful means.

The international community, including intergovernmental bodies like the European Union (EU), as well as international nongovernmental peacebuilding organisations, must play their part in transforming the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and creating conditions for peace. It was against this background that the European Peacebuilding Liai-

son Office (EPLO) organised an EU Member State Meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, on 22 May. Hosted by the Life & Peace Institute and Kvinna till Kvinna, the meeting focused on how the EU can contribute to peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa. Diplomats, academics and field practitioners from Europe and Africa gathered to assess the role of the EU in regional affairs and to explore ways to enhance its role in bringing lasting peace in the Horn. It was concluded that a more sustained and stronger EU commitment and engagement in the region will foster an environment conducive for peace in the Horn countries, which is essential not only to save lives but also for long-term human development.

A report of the EPLO meeting's proceedings is available at www.life-peace.org

Najum Mushtaq
Policy and Communications Advisor, LPI

LPI AND ITS PERIODICALS

Life & Peace Institute (LPI) is an international and ecumenical centre based in Uppsala, Sweden.

The Institute's conflict transformation work is based on an understanding that conflict is a natural part of societies that has the potential for both constructive and destructive change. It also builds on the premise that peace can only be achieved through the active involvement of the communities in conflict themselves.

LPI's operational focus is on Africa, and more specifically on the Central Africa and Horn of Africa regions. In addition to the head office in Sweden,

LPI has programme offices in Nairobi (Kenya), Bukavu (DRC), and Khartoum (Sudan) and staff working with the Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia.

LPI publishes two periodicals: the quarterly journal **New Routes** and the bi-monthly electronic newsletter **Horn of Africa Bulletin** covering the African countries of the Horn. Free online subscription to both periodicals.

Prices for hardcopy subscription to **New Routes**:
(2013) 4 issues (one year):
€70 \$100 SEK 600

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