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# HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

## ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

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Towards “Human Security” in Ethiopia

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#### **A Critique of the National Security Policy:**

##### **Towards “Human Security” in Ethiopia**

A good place to start a constructive critique is to look at the logical foundation of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and subject it to the tests of consistency, coherence, and soundness.

The FANSPS is premised on the proposition that “security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival. The alpha and omega of security is the ensuring of national survival. Other national security issues may be raised only if national existence is ensured. Foreign affairs and security policy must be formulated first and foremost to ensure national security. Issues of prosperity, sustainable peace, and stability and other related concerns then follow.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the FANSPS’s primary focus is on potential and actual threats to its territorial integrity. It aimed primarily at protecting its sovereign frontiers against external aggression. Such being the logical foundation of the FANSPS, it becomes clear that non-military aspects of security are relegated to a secondary place. This is not surprising given that securing its independence and territorial integrity has been the preoccupation of Ethiopian foreign and national security policy for millennia.

In view of the foregoing, it is no wonder that The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) numbers about 200,000 personnel, which makes it one of the largest militaries in Africa. During the 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, the ENDF mobilized strength reached about 350,000<sup>2</sup> and its military expenditure peaked 10.7% of its GDP.<sup>3</sup> The ENDF has its roots in the peasant-based EPRDF guerrilla army and is still in the process of being transformed into an all-volunteer professional military organization with the aid of the United States. The ENDF received training in peace-keeping operations, professional military education, military training management, counter-terrorism operations, military medicine, and unspecified military training funds from the United States.<sup>4</sup> The ENDF is one of the largest military forces in Africa along with Egypt and Morocco, 29th largest in the world of 132 in terms of armed forces growth, and 11th out of 166 countries in terms of personnel. Military expenditure for the year 2005 amounts to \$800,000,000.00 and this places her on 56th position of 170.<sup>5</sup>

Despite that, one of the most striking features of the FANSPS, at least on the face of it, is its emphasis on democratization and development. It also tells us about the threat to national security posed by human rights abuses: “In the absence of a democratic order, national and religious divisions will invariably intensify, the abuse of human rights would result in strife, and poverty would spread further - a recipe for disintegration and destruction.”

Nevertheless, the Government’s bad track record in human rights attests to the contrary. The thrust of my argument is that the central purpose of Ethiopia’s foreign and security policy has remained the same, in spite of the shift in orientation. A change in discourse has not brought about a change in practice. Human security should constitute the basis of the FANSPS. Moreover, the Government should work aggressively to get a critical mass of women into leadership positions in the foreign affairs and security sector.

In the received discourse of international affairs, the term “security” connotes the protection of territorial integrity and dignity of the state. This is not surprising given the fact that hitherto, international relations have been more “state-centric” than “people-centric.”

Nevertheless, with the cessation of the Cold War and the advent of globalization in the international arena, the concept of security is expanding to focus more on people than on the state. Security, in its classical sense, refers to the security of the state from external aggression. It is about how states use force to counter threats to their territorial integrity, their autonomy, and their domestic political system, primarily from other states.<sup>6</sup> The classical formulation restricts the scope of security to military threats from other states. Nevertheless, in its modern conception, security is equated with the “security of individuals, not just security of their nations” or, put differently, “security of people, not just security of territory.”<sup>7</sup>

The modern formulation gives primacy to the safety and well-being of “all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment”,<sup>8</sup> whilst the classical conception of security emphasizes territorial integrity and national independence as the primary values that need to be protected. The latter has been related more to nation-states than to people.<sup>9</sup> What this conception overlooked was “the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.”<sup>10</sup>

Human security also encompasses a sense of personal choice and surety about the future and of personal efficacy and opportunity. Thus, in drawing attention to the difference between human security and its cognate, human development, the FANSPS argues that the latter is a “broader concept” and refers to “a process of widening the range of people’s choices,” while the former implies that “people can exercise these choices safely and freely – and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow”.<sup>11</sup> Along with a sense of choice and surety about the future, people should be efficacious and empowered enough to be “able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living.”<sup>12</sup> The report lists seven aspects of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

Furthermore, the concept of human security helps us understand that basic human rights, as stated in the international human rights instruments, are indivisible and inter-related. Sometimes, human rights are overridden or ignored for the sake of state security. Human security puts people first, emphasizing that human rights are central to state security. Human security complements human rights law by drawing attention to international humanitarian law in the context of armed conflict.

However, the hitherto emphasis on sovereignty has neglected other no less important aspects of security, such as ecological security, energy security, economic security, food security, and health security. There has been a host of complex threats

to the security of the Ethiopian polity for so long including, but not limited to, poverty, widespread malnutrition, population explosion, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, degradation of the environment, loss of faith in institutions, uncontrolled urbanization/ rural-urban migration, insecurity of employment, brain drain, alienation of the youth, inflation and other economic disruptions.

Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia is a clear indication of its strategy of conducting foreign policy through war, albeit war had to be kept to the minimal. Ethiopia should embrace what Owen Harries calls the "prudential ethic" as a signpost to international relations. According to Harries, the just war theory, given that it accepts that it is futile to assume that war can be abolished, provides one such important ethic.

The aim of the theory is two-fold: on the one hand, it prohibits an unjust war, by laying down rules for the determination of the legitimacy of use of force (*jus ad bellum*), and makes war less savage, by establishing rules of conduct (*jus in bello*), on the other. Hence, a resort to force must have a just cause, in that it is resorted to in response to injustice, is authorized by a competent authority, and is motivated by right intention. It must meet four prudential tests in that it must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil, have a reasonable chance of success, be a last resort and be expected to result in a state of peace. The requirements of *jus in bello* are that when force is resorted to, it must be discriminate and proportional.<sup>13</sup>

Leaving the issue of legitimacy aside, (not least because it was invited by the TFG) Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia hardly passes the four prudential tests. At least, we have every reason to doubt that the military intervention was a last resort and was expected to result in a state of peace. With the benefit of hindsight, it has become crystal-clear that Ethiopia's resort to force failed to bring about a state of peace in Somalia. Besides, reports that Ethiopia violated the requirements of *jus in bello* abound. For instance, in March and April 2007 Ethiopian soldiers violated international humanitarian law by using heavy artillery and rockets to fight an insurgency in Mogadishu, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing up to 400,000 people.<sup>14</sup> Though Ethiopian troops have since withdrawn from Somalia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated in June 2009 that the country has not ruled out a future redeployment.<sup>15</sup>

To illustrate how others' perception of Ethiopia's vulnerability, or miscalculation, led to aggression, the FANSP invokes Somalia and Eritrea under the leaderships of Siad Barre and Isaias Afewerki respectively. In the words of the FANSPS, "some time ago the Siad Barre regime in Somalia launched an attack on Ethiopia on the presumption that Ethiopia was unable to offer a united resistance and that it would break up under military pressure. The regime in Eritrea (the Shabia) similarly launched an aggression against Ethiopia thinking along the same lines. Both regimes were soundly defeated because of their misguided and misconceived perceptions."

In this regard, it is interesting to note the continuity in foreign and security policy, despite the change in regimes. Somalia has never been removed from Ethiopia's security agenda. In conclusion, Ethiopia's FANSPS has to give recognition and full effect to the paradigm shift in the approach to security from state-centricism to people-centricism.

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#### Notes

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2. US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm>

3. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>
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9. UNDP, "Redefining Security," p. 229.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid, p. 230.
12. Ibid.
13. Owen Harries, "Power and Morals", in Prospect, Issue 109, April 17, 2005, [http://prospectmagazine.co.uk/article\\_details.php?id=6807](http://prospectmagazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=6807)
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### **The New US Sudan Policy: moving from Rhetoric to Reality?**

It took the President Barack Obama's administration nine months to come up with a comprehensive Sudan strategy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton introduced the five page document<sup>1</sup> on 19 October 2009 to the media standing next to Scott Gration, US Special Envoy to Sudan who had been her main rival in formulating a new Sudan policy. Obama's nomination of Scott Gration as Special Envoy was a step towards a policy of finding conclusive political solutions to move Sudan forward. The new strategy does not constitute a fundamental change but an important clarification of the US policy toward Sudan that was at best contradictory. In fact, this is the most coherent US policy since the National Islamic Front's coup in 1989. The realist approach of engagement with Khartoum represented by Scott Gration, now replaces the precious previous strategy of political isolation and an ineffective policy that was overly dominated by the Darfur conflict. In fact, this approach fits with President Obama's dominant policy of engagement with what the US considers "rogue" governments like Myanmar, North Korea and Syria as well as the overall desire to initiate a dialogue with the Muslim world.

#### **Critical timing**

This new US strategy comes at a crucial time for Sudan, which will face two momentous events in the next 15 months. First is the general election, the first multi-party nationwide election in Sudan's history. The multi-party elections in the 1960s and 1980s did not include war-affected areas in the south, thereby dooming the resulting governments. Second is the referendum on self-determination in Southern Sudan, which, based on the current mood in the region, will lead to a decisive vote for secession. For now, international partners are focused first and foremost on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and a path toward a 2011 referendum. However, far too little attention has been given to what will happen afterwards.

The new and clarified US Sudan policy removes one of the major obstacles in US-Sudan relations, namely the perpetual second-guessing about Washington's effective position toward Sudan. It also clarifies who is the prime counterpart the prime counterpart is talking to Khartoum is – Scott Gration.

It includes the conflict in Darfur but also acknowledges that the conflict in the Sudan's Eastern Province is improving and that there was an overly focus on the crisis in Darfur, stating that "in the past, the United States' approach to Sudan has been [...] narrowly focused on emerging crises." It also acknowledges that the

decade-old North-South conflict (and connected conflicts like Abyei and Blue Nile) is heating up dangerously. At the same time, US security interests, circumscribed as “ensur[ing] that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists”, are openly put on the table.

While engagement is the overall theme, Clinton the Secretary of State referred to a classified annex that includes both carrots and sticks, while the latter seem to include some sort of military intervention. The document reads that the US “will use all elements of influence to achieve our strategic objectives.” But the carrots are classified as well. It is unclear, if they might include a removal of Sudan from the terror list, the lifting of sanctions or normalization of relations? In other words, the root of US credibility in moving forward remains obscure.

### **Overcoming the focus on Darfur**

In order to understand the new US policy toward Sudan it is particularly interesting to take a closer look at domestic US politics and the influence of organized constituencies.

When George W Bush took office in early 2001, evangelical lobby groups successfully managed to put Sudan high up on the agenda. According to their understanding, the main conflict in Sudan was religious, between a Muslim north and a Christian and animist south. In the end, their concern yielded positive results. Bush nominated John Danforth, a former senator and Episcopal priest, as special envoy for peace in Sudan and invested some political capital that led to the signing of the CPA in 2005.

The promises made on the normalization of US-Sudan relations thereafter were largely not undertaken due to the flaming up of the Darfur conflict. From that moment on, Darfur became the prime focus of official US-Sudan politics and domestic discourse, effectively neglecting the North-South conflict and the CPA. Yet, the whole debate was a semantic one. At its center stood the question of whether the slaughter killings in Darfur should be labelled “genocide.” In late 2004, former secretary Secretary of state State Collin Powell did call the atrocities “genocide,” however; no UN Charter Chapter 7 measures followed this statement. With ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration could not afford to militarily engage in another conflict where they would be perceived to fight against Muslims.

Nevertheless, the US sought Sudan’s collaboration in intelligence and security matters in the context of the war on terror while upholding sanctions and maintaining Sudan’s position on the state-sponsorship of terrorism list. The new strategy actually addresses this usually unmentionable intelligence cooperation, saying: “It must be clear to all parties that Sudanese support for counter-terrorism objectives is valued, but cannot be used as a bargaining chip to evade responsibilities in Darfur or in implementing the CPA.”<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, one cannot deny that labeling Khartoum’s regime as genocidaire remained without serious consequences. Mahmood Mamdani, director of Columbia University’s Institute of African Studies put it the following way: “if you brand a regime as genocidaire, it is very difficult to negotiate with that same regime.”<sup>3</sup> In fact, such a regime should per definition be toppled and their protagonists brought to justice. Therefore, the language of “genocide” (which was never used in the North-South conflict) became an obstacle to the development of a US Darfur policy.

Some might see it as an irony that grass-root organizations lobbying for US engagement “to stop genocide in Darfur”, epitomized in the Safe Darfur Coalition and backed by the Congress’s Sudan Caucus, were at their height of political influence with the run-up to the US presidential elections in 2008, although the slaughter killing in Darfur happened in 2003-2004. In fact all presidential candidates pledged to be very tough on Sudan and “end genocide in Darfur”. This can be seen as a natural political reaction, as there was a major constituency that had mobilized

in the US, in particular young college voters. In order to win the election there was the need to take account of that.

After the Obama administration had taken office, a policy shift towards Sudan became obvious as the situation had been assessed more objectively: while the conflict in other parts of Sudan were conflicts in other parts of Sudan were heating up, the situation in Darfur was actually improving, at least by numbers – and they are indeed important. From 2005 onwards the average level of monthly mortality amongst civilians killed through violence has been less than 200 a month. Last month (October 2009) UNAMID reported 67 deaths directly attributable to violence in Darfur.<sup>4</sup> The declining mortality figures let the UN itself call Darfur “a low intensity conflict” in April this year,<sup>5</sup> although a recent UN report does acknowledge that war is far from over in the western province of Sudan.<sup>6</sup>

The US is apparently not able to change its rhetoric and still uses the term genocide when referring to Darfur. There is, however, an interesting wording in the new strategy calling for “a definitive end” to genocide. This actually shifts the focus of a policy to stop atrocities to a policy of finding conclusive political solutions that can move Sudan forward. It is exactly what Special Envoy Scott Gration was trying to do since he is in office. But after telling US reporters on a trip to Sudan in late September that “we’ve got to think about giving out cookies. Kids, countries - they react to gold stars, smiley faces, handshakes, agreements, talk, and engagement” he was much criticized as naïve for his outreach to Khartoum.<sup>7</sup>

In particular the “Darfur campaign”-constituency advocates that “President Omar al-Bashir and his top advisers respond only to pressure” as Johns Prendergast put it, a former director of African Affairs at the National Security Council under president Clinton during the time the US attacked the al-Shifa medicine factory in Khartoum in 1998, and now co-chairman of the Enough Project, one of the Washington, DC, based lobby groups advocating for tougher US action in Darfur.

Yet, Mahmood Mamdani also sees splits in the pressure groups opposing engagement with Sudan. He points out, that “the membership base of Save Darfur has significantly demobilized over this year. The leadership is divided between those with a predominantly Darfur focus and those concerned mainly with the South. It is the former that is alienated.” One example are is the Evangelical pressure groups which still have some influence on the US Sudan policy, especially on the Hill. They have been worried that the Administration’s Sudan policy has been too Darfur-driven. But also more researched driven advocacy groups like the Enough Project now start to advocate for a Sudan policy that also takes into account the North-South conflict. Of course such a split within the influential lobby groups leaves the US administration with more leverage in formulating and implementing their new policy.

### **US Leverage on Sudan**

With the introduction of the new US-Sudan policy, another crucial question haunts US policy makers: How much leverage can the US actually have on Sudan and what could they achieve?

According to Douglas Johnson, an independent scholar and author of *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, the US indeed have some leverage whether the Sudan goes back to war of Southern Sudanese independence. He points out<sup>8</sup> that the US particularly have influence over the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), being able to make clear that a unilateral declaration of independence will not receive widespread international recognition.

On the other hand, achieving the same goal through an international monitored referendum will bring this viable recognition for a new Southern Sudan state. Johnson also suggests, suggests that providing an independent GOSS with defensive military hardware could neutralize Khartoum’s current superiority in airpower and

mechanized armour and thereby function as a deterrent for all-out warfare between North and South. But the true question might be, if the US policy-change it not too late and too low profile, to actually influence current dynamics in Sudan which are heating up in the course of the national elections and in the referendum in the South in particular. Still, the main challenge might be what happens after the referendum.

Results are expected to be contested and an independent Sudan runs the risk to decent into chaos. A closer look should be given Sudan's People Liberation Army's (SPLA) capacity to deal with internal dissent. Up to now, the SPLA is much harsher with its critics than the National Congress Party (NCP) is with its opponents, which is not a good omen for a post-independent Southern Sudan.

### Conclusion

The time it took the Obama administration to come up with a comprehensive Sudan strategy already speaks for itself and the current administration's priorities. The new strategy appears to be dictated by changing Sudanese realities in Darfur and the North-South conflict, and in particular the two decisive events for the near future of Sudan: the general elections in April 2010 and the Southern Sudan referendum in 2011. These realities brought an end to an internal deadlock between hard-liners – most notably US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice – and realists – US Special Envoy to Sudan General Scott Gration.

The realist approach of engagement with Khartoum represented by Scott Gration, now replaces the precious strategy of political isolation and an ineffective policy that was overly dominated by the Darfur conflict. However, there remain more questions than answers. It is yet unclear how strong the mandate of Gration will be, as no new resources have been attached to the effort to date. The heart of a credible US Sudan policy – its carrots and sticks – remain classified at a time, when it is unclear how much leverage the US can actually have on the upcoming events shaping the future of Sudan.

While a split in the Darfur lobby groups leaves the US administration generally with more leverage in its Sudan policy, a crucial question will be, how much political capital Obama will be willing to invest in Sudan at a time where he finds himself bogged down in domestic politics and most of his foreign policy agenda is consumed by the war in Afghanistan?

### Georg-Sebastian Holzer

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#### Notes

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3. Correspondence, 23 October 2009.
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## NEWS AND EVENTS

### DJIBOUTI

#### **UNHCR protests forced repatriation of Somalis from Djibouti**

On 11 November 2009, the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR, protested the forced repatriation of 40 Somali asylum seekers by the government of Djibouti. UNHCR said the move by the Djibouti government was in contravention of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees.

According to UNHCR Djibouti Representative Ann Encontre, the 40 asylum seekers were part of a group of Somalis migrants rescued at sea by a Dutch naval ship in October. The group was allowed to disembark in Djibouti on 4 November and transferred to a hosting facility jointly run by the UNHCR and the Djibouti National Refugee Agency where they underwent medical treatment, were registered and assessed in terms of their needs for protection. UNHCR said the group of 40 who included six women and seven children were removed from the screening facility and put on a plane, and flown back to Mogadishu.

*UN Radio Geneva*

### ETHIOPIA

#### **Ex-Ethiopia President Negasso Gidada joins opposition**

Ethiopia's former President Negasso Gidada on 26 November joined an opposition party, as the country builds up to an election scheduled for May 2010. Mr Negasso, in power between 1995 and 2001, said he had joined the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ) to try to unite Ethiopia. Analysts say his defection and that of ex-Defence Minister Seye Abraha are likely to boost the UDJ's popularity. It is however unlikely to overhaul the governing party in the next year's election. Its leader Ms. Birtukan Medeksa is in jail after election dispute protests following the last election in 2005. Mr Gidada told Reuters news agency: "Our joining the UDJ sends a signal that we have to work hard for the unity of the country and the Ethiopian people."

*BBC Africa, Reuters*

#### **Heavy fighting in Somali region**

Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia has launched an offensive in the south-eastern Somali region and claim to have recaptured seven towns from government forces. In a statement released early on Saturday, 14 November the ONLF said its attacks were launched across a broad front and had begun on November 10. "The operation involved thousands of ONLF troops and resulted in two days of heavy fighting. A significant number of Ethiopian troops have been killed and their military hardware captured or destroyed," it said. The Ethiopian government on 16 November denied the claims. "They haven't taken any towns at all," Mr Bereket Simon, Ethiopian government head of information, told Reuters. "Their attacks last week were simply the desperate act of a dying force and about 245 of their fighters were killed".

*AFP, Reuters*

### KENYA

#### **The All Africa Dance Conference and Festival"**

This is a cultural extravaganza on the theme of peace to be held annually in Nairobi,

Kenya and organized by Purple Images Productions. The event will take place on 9–13 December 2009. The theme for this year’s festival is: “Celebrating the Role of Cultural Dance in Peace Building and Human Understanding”.

The main aim of The All Africa Dance Conference and Festival is to bring people together to celebrate the wealth and diversity of African dance. This year’s event will showcase a rich and vibrant mix of dance and musical performances by more than 100 dance groups and 500 established artists from all over the world.

### **Kenya’s draft law launched**

The quest for a new constitution in Kenya edged closer to reality after the harmonised draft constitution was published on 17 November. Kenyans will now have one month to debate the draft and make their views known to the Committee of Experts, who drew up the document. Committee chairman Nzamba Kitonga said it was “a working draft to facilitate dialogue among Kenyans.” He added that his team had strived to come up with a draft largely acceptable to Kenyans and said while there were “voices of disquiet” particularly with regard to the Kadhi Courts, he noted that Kenyans had not categorised it as a contentious issue as long as it remains “in the current constitutional form.”

The team had identified ten cardinal principles to guide the process that will culminate in a document that will among other things: unite and strengthen Kenya, constrain executive power, decentralise power, avoid acrimonious elections of winner-take-all, ensure a stable government and ensure a peaceful government.

*Daily Nation on the web*

## SOMALIA

### **Somali Refugees hired to join Yemeni insurgents**

Al-Houthi rebels on Yemen’s northern border are hiring Somalis from refugee camps to fight against the Yemeni government. Ibrahim A-Shuweimi, the Arab League’s envoy to Mogadishu, reported on 24 November that the conflict in Somalia was forcing many Somalis to flee for Yemen and offer their services to the Al-Houthi rebels for financial incentives. The report stressed that the Somalis’ motivations were financial rather than ideological. A Somali government official said fighters were more likely to be from the large Somali Diaspora in Yemen rather than from among the refugees. Yemeni authorities recently arrested at least 26 Somalis in northern Yemen for links with the Al-Houthi rebels, according to Yemeni news reports.

The Al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen has been ongoing since 2004 but intensified last August. The Al-Houthis belong to the Zaidi minority, an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam, who make up a minority in Yemen but a majority in the country’s north. They wish to restore the Zaidi Imamate to Yemen after it was overthrown in a 1962 coup, and have accused the Yemenite government of being too closely allied with the United States. Analysts are concerned the conflict might be stirring wider confrontations between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the Middle East, exacerbating existing tensions between the two streams of Islam.

*The Media Line*

### **Treatment by Puntland angers leaders Bay and Bakool regions**

Somali legislators from the Digil and Mirifle of Bay and Bakool region came together in the Somali capital Mogadishu to denounce the authority of the semi autonomous region of Puntland.

The leaders were angered by the alleged mistreatment of people from their communities in the region. The leaders said that they are more cordial in their treatment of people from Puntland than the leaders of the region. Mohammed Sheikh Ali, a Member of the Somali Parliament speaking on 26 November said he

did not recognise the semi-autonomy of Puntland because it was the occupants of the region are from one ethnic community.

*Somaliweyn Media Centre (SMC)*

### **Al-Shabaab rebels seize town close to Kenyan border**

Somalia's Al-Shabaab on 29 November captured a key town close to the Kenyan border. They are said to have driven out Hizbu-Islam, to take control of Dhobley, the border town which neighbours the Kenyan town of Liboi. There were no confrontations. Sheikh Hassan Yakoub Ali, a resident, said that the Hizbu-Islam group had crossed the border into Kenya, adding that they had rebels held talks with Kenyan officials. With this victory, Al-Shabaab appears to have consolidated its presence in the strategic Juba region. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab leader Sheikh Mukhtar Abdurahman Abu Zubayr has rejected any reconciliation offers by the government. He said that unless foreign forces leave the country and an Islamic state is established, his movement would intensify attacks. Over 5,000 African Union peacekeepers, are in the country.

*Daily Nation on the Web*

## UGANDA

### **Buganda kingdom rejects new Uganda land law**

The Buganda kingdom has rejected a new land law passed after heated debate in Uganda's parliament. Buganda Prime Minister John Baptist Walusimbi on 27 November said the kingdom would continue to campaign against the law, saying it would remain "idle".

The kingdom feels the new law encroaches on the king's territory. The land law was passed by a majority of 112 to 55. The three ruling party MPs - all from Buganda - voted against the bill that would give tenants more rights to resist eviction by landlords. Landlords need a court order to evict tenants and must notify them before selling their land. Buganda is the largest of Uganda's four ancient kingdoms, the king currently has absolute jurisdiction over land..

*BBC Africa, New Vision*

## SUDAN

### **Pollution of South Sudan water**

A German aid agency on 16 November accused an oil consortium in southern Sudan of contaminating water supplies, affecting at least 300,000 people in Unity State. The group, Sign of Hope, said tests found life-threatening metals in wells near two major oil fields. "The chemical composition of water samples we have taken from oil well drilling pits is nearly the same as we found in the contaminated water boreholes the people are using for drinking water supply," the spokes person Klaus Stieglitz said.

The tests were done by Mala and Thar Jath oil fields after the community complained the water tasted salty and had been making them sick. It said it had passed the findings to the government and the consortium. The White Nile Petroleum Operating Company says protecting water quality is a priority and it has built a water treatment plant for the community. But it could not be reached to comment directly on the allegations.

*BBC Africa*

### **UN-backed demobilization process begins in North Darfur**

Over 150 ex-combatants who once fought for armed militia in Sudan's war-torn Darfur region participated on 23 November in a United Nations-backed in a three

day demobilization and reintegration programme which aimed to ease the return of former soldiers to their communities. The scheme, supported by the joint UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur (UNAMID) and the Sudanese Government, was expected to register more than 400 ex-combatants in the North Darfur capital of El Fasher before moving onto West and South Darfur.

The process involved briefings on what to expect during reintegration, verification of administrative documents, medical and disability screening, fingerprinting, and the provision of identification cards. Participants were also given a cash payment in local currency of \$150 and after two months they receive food vouchers in addition to other basic amenities. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme is part of the final security arrangement of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, which paved the way for the deployment of UNAMID at the start of last year.

*UN News Service*

## RESOURCES

### GENERAL

#### **“Internal Displacement in Armed Conflict: Facing Up to the Challenges”** (November 2009)

This special report examines key issues of protection and assistance affecting displaced people, from prevention of displacement in the first place through the phases that follow when it cannot be averted. It finds that those who stay or host the displaced can be as vulnerable as those who flee, or even more so, as can be those who return. Some who flee may not run directly from fighting or attacks, but from the economic consequences and disrupted access to essential goods and services.

<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p1014>

#### **“Uncharted Territory: Land, Conflict and Humanitarian Action”**

(November 2009)

This Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Policy Brief seeks to inform and build upon these various initiatives. Humanitarian action is understood here in its broader form, extending beyond mere relief to include advocacy, protection and attention to livelihoods and early recovery.

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/ASAZ-7Y4SB2?OpenDocument>

#### **“Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa”** (November 2009)

Armed conflict within nations has had disastrous humanitarian consequences throughout much of the world. This is the first comprehensive examination of the potential impact of global climate change on armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. The findings show strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with warmer years leading to significant increases in the likelihood of war.

<http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2009/11/20/0907998106.abstract>

### SUDAN

#### **“Report of the African Union high-level panel on Darfur (AUPD)”**

(November, 2009)

The AU high-level panel on Darfur (AUPD) was constituted by the AU Peace and Security Council to examine the issues of peace, justice, accountability, impunity and reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan. It began its work in March 2009 and completed its assignment in September 2009. This Report is the outcome of four missions to

Sudan undertaken by the Panel, amounting to forty days spent in the country, during which time it met with more than 2,700 representative individuals in Darfur and about 400 in Khartoum and visited Juba. The Panel also visited the countries of the region and had discussions with representatives of the international community as a whole.

<http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/AUPD-Report-Final-October-2009.pdf>

## KENYA

### **“Climate change and conflict: lessons from community conservancies in northern Kenya”** (November 2009)

The study focuses on the linkages between climate change and resource based conflict in northern Kenya. Its aim is to deepen understanding of the complex relationship between these factors in order to develop more informed and meaningful policy responses. At the heart of the climate change/conflict relationship is the issue of natural resource scarcity and competition. The research was conducted in two conservancies located in Laikipia and Samburu districts. The report is written by Conservation Development Centre, International Institute for Sustainable Development and Saferworld.

<http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1202>

## UGANDA

### **“Report of the Secretary – General on children and armed conflict in Uganda”** (September 2009)

The report highlights that the cooperation with the Government of Uganda has been very effective and has allowed the United Nations and its partners to successfully verify that no more children are present in the ranks of UPDF or its auxiliary forces and that no cases of recruitment or use of children have been reported since August 2007. The report also shows that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains very active in the region.

<http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=21066>

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### Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is Life & Peace Institute (LPI) and the editor is Olivia Kibui, [olivia.kibui@life-peace.org](mailto:olivia.kibui@life-peace.org). For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, [selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org](mailto:selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org). For a link to HAB and more information see [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

### Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

