

Globethics Repository

The logo for Globethics, featuring the word "Globethics" in white, sans-serif font centered within a solid blue rectangular background.

Horn of africa bulletin [Vol 21 No.10. October 2009]

This page was generated automatically upon download from the Globethics Repository. More information on Globethics see <https://www.globethics.net>. Data and content policy of Globethics Repository see <https://repository.globethics.net/pages/policy>.

Item Type	Journal
Authors	Kibui, Olivia
Publisher	Life & Pecaie Institute
Rights	With permission of the license/copyright holder
Download date	2026-06-12 05:53:49
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/180550



HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Analyses

- ▶ **The current election crisis in Somaliland:
outcome of a failed 'experiment'?**
- ▶ **Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Challenges in Somalia**

News and events

Resources

The current election crisis in Somaliland: outcome of a failed 'experiment'?

Until recently Somaliland was perceived by many benevolent observers as 'Africa's best kept secret' in the sense of being democratic, peaceful and showing signs of modest economic development, without enjoying international recognition.¹ The country that had seceded from collapsing Somalia in 1991 certainly is a stunning success story regarding bottom-up peace building and the establishment of a hybrid system of governance, incorporating 'traditional' and 'modern' aspects of authority and rule.

The democratisation process that was initiated in 2001 by the adoption of a new constitution unfolded quickly and led to a series of mostly free and fair elections. Shortly before the presidential elections in 2003 the long-term observer Matt Bryden confirmed that Somaliland would pass the test of statehood easily, particularly if compared with its undemocratic, highly militarized and internally divided neighbors in the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, he also cautioned that 'in reality, the foundations of democracy and rule of law in Somaliland are still fragile and the transition has far to go.'² Bryden confirmed that corruption was endemic, and clan-based interest groups would cling to power. He stressed that only the government's relative poverty and its lack of coercive authority rendered it somewhat accountable to the public.

The most recent Human Rights Watch report on Somaliland published in July 2009 can be read as a continuation of Bryden's analysis. It shows the growing tendency of the government in Hargeisa to disrespect the laws of the country, including the constitution, and deny the democratic freedoms of Somaliland's citizens.³ These negative developments climaxed in the election crisis since 2008, which in late September 2009 resulted in the fifth postponement of the elections (without any clear date set) and the third prolongation of the president's term. The government seems to be generally unwilling to compete with its contenders in free and fair elections. The crisis is not entirely 'home made'. It was fuelled by a well-meant but, *ex post*, obviously misguided initiative of the European Commission (EC) and the international NGO Interpeace.

Voters' registration and election crisis

According to the constitution, the elections had to take place in April 2008. Yet, neither the administration nor the opposition had taken the necessary steps for holding the vote. Already the nomination of the seven members of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) through the government, the opposition parties and the *Guurti* (House of Elders) took longer than expected. After its establishment, the NEC was continuously criticised inside Somaliland, but also (certainly more diplomatically) by international donors, for ineffectiveness and even inability to organise the elections. The elections had to be postponed repeatedly, and the president's term was prolonged accordingly. The process was complicated by the agreement between the government of Somaliland, the European Commission and Interpeace to organise a country-wide voters' registration that should result in the issuing of voters' and ID cards.⁴ The Somaliland parties and NEC opted for a sophisticated biometric registration system based on fingerprint identification, against the explicit advice of the donors and Interpeace. The ID cards were supposed to contain photographs. Fingerprints should be taken, in order to be able to sort out double registration.

In preparation, hundreds of laptops and the accordant software had to be brought to the country, and local staff had to be trained to handle the equipment. Transport throughout the country and security had to be provided. This made the registration a highly ambitious endeavour in the absence of basic infrastructure such as tharmac roads and electricity in much of the country (apart from a handful of urban centres). The registration carried also considerable symbolic value. It was the first time that all willing citizens of Somaliland were able to receive a document identifying them as 'Somalilander'. The whole process started in October 2008. It came to a sudden halt when Somaliland was shaken by three concerted suicide bomb attacks on 29 October 2008, which most probably had been planned and executed by Islamic extremists related to *Al Shabaab* southern Somalia.⁵ The voters' registration in Somaliland continued after a break of six weeks. Initial registration concluded by end of 2008; until February 2009, 'late comers' had a chance to make use of supplementary registration.

The registration, however, had produced some problems. Just after the first region (Saxiil) had been registered in October 2008 it had already become obvious to close observers that many people had registered several times and circumvented registration rules. Nonetheless, the politically responsible actors in Somaliland and the donors let the process continue. The full scale of the misconduct only became public in January 2009, when it was announced that about 1.4 million people had registered, over 50% without fingerprints.⁶

My *ex post* analysis suggests two main reasons why it should have been clear to all involved parties (particularly those in Somaliland) from the beginning that the voter's registration was not feasible for securing (democratic) elections in Somaliland. First, Somaliland society is still characterised by pastoral-nomadic traditions, involving extreme mobility. This is true even though the majority of the country's population resided meanwhile in towns. Also the borders between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Puntland are not strongly administered, and movement within Somaliland as well as across borders is possible almost unrestricted. Already in the past, various clans had mobilised their relatives across the border (particularly in Ethiopia and Djibouti) to vote in Somaliland and thereby influence the outcome of the elections in the clan's interest (that was frequently, but certainly not exclusively, related to one of the three national parties).⁷ Second, registration and census are classic state-technologies of control. Somalis all over the Horn have a long history of avoiding permanent state control in general, and taxation and other interferences in their daily lives in particular.⁸ It is also well known that Somali pastoralists categorically exaggerate the numerical strength of their own group in order to boast and/or to scare off potential adversaries.⁹ During the voters registration 2008/2009, people in Somaliland reacted accordingly. As certain locations in Somaliland could easily be

identified as strongholds of United Democratic People's Party (UDUB), Kulmiye or Justice and Welfare Party (UCID), respectively, it was clear that the multiple registrations particularly in Boorama, Hargeisa and Burco and surroundings had had the aim to enhance the voting powers of the different constituencies.

Tensions between the political actors and the donors in early 2009 showed that sorting out the extra registrations was not only a technical issue. EC and Interpeace delegations repeatedly visited Hargeisa to contribute to the solution of the crisis that they helped to create. However, neither the opposition party leaders nor the government were ready to compromise. Representatives of the three parties lamented the 'misbehaviour' of the respective opponents' supporters, but sought to play down the fraud of their own followers. It became again impossible to hold elections at 29 March 2009, the date that had previously been set.

In early March 2009, the so far unelected House of Elders prolonged the president's term for the second time to October. It referred to provisions of the constitution concerning the 'security situation' (article 83[5]) that arguably did not apply to the situation.¹⁰ This unconstitutional delay, in the eyes of many, caused raising tensions in Somaliland. Calls of the opposition parties for demonstrations were regularly met with threats from the administration that declared any demonstrations illegal, accused opposition leaders to undermine the "peace and stability" of Somaliland, and deployed armed police and military in the major cities to keep the situation under control. Nonetheless, protest marches took place in the capital and the regions in August and September, and at least one person died when the police opened fire during a demonstration in Hargeisa on 12 September. On 25 September, the *Guurti* extended the term of the President and Vice-President 'until one month after holding the presidential elections', without presenting a date for these elections. This decision means that a vacuum of power in the country and possibly further escalations of violence were prevented, yet, the election crisis continues.

Conclusion

Clearly, between 2008 and 2009, the political process in Somaliland got stuck without the necessary change of government. The problem is not exclusively 'home made'. It involved otherwise highly credible external actors such as Interpeace and the EC. It is unclear why these actors were willing to provide funds and equipment for registration process that at least some experts in these organisations had recognized as highly problematic from the beginning. In my view, the registration was a kind of 'real life experiment', and Somaliland was – with the consent of its ruling elite – used as a laboratory.

The ordinary people partly resisted in their own way, but also have to pay the price, which is basically the extreme delay of holding elections and political tensions that occasionally escalated in violence.¹¹ If the voters' registration in Somaliland was an experiment, then all involved actors have to be held accountable for the outcome. This also points to the paradoxical position of the donors who are on the one hand extremely powerful in poor and underdeveloped Somaliland, but on the other hardly can sanction their national partners for non-compliance, since the latter officially do not exist (as recognized government of a recognized state). Also, even if there are many aid-projects in Somaliland, the daily survival of its citizens is provided by the diaspora, not by the donors.

Furthermore, the crisis illustrates the risks of political transition that could be observed in many other African countries since the late 1980s. It also shows that state institutions *per se* do not guarantee peace.¹² They are frequently involved in oppression and escalating violence. The question, that has been asked by Bryden already some years ago, is: what kind of state institutions can support Somaliland's continued and peaceful existence?¹³ It seems that the incumbent government does not have a vision for a democratic future of Somaliland. This certainly undermines the stability of the country, more so since Islamic extremists operating in southern Somalia do

not loose hope that people in Somaliland, once they are fed up with being fooled by their own leaders, join their ranks and fight for a united Islamic Somalia.¹⁴

Markus V. Hoehne

is a PhD candidate at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale, Germany. His research focuses on identity and conflict in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland). Currently, he participates in a research project funded by the European Union on 'Diasporas for Peace'.

Notes

1. Jhazbhay, Iqbal 2003: Somaliland: Africa's best kept secret, a challenge to the international community? *African Security Review* 12 (4): 77-82; Shinn, David H. 2002: Somaliland: the little country that could. *CSIS Africa Notes* 9.
2. Bryden, Matt 2003: The banana test: is Somaliland ready for recognition?, *Annales d'Ethiopie* XIX: 341-364, p. 363.
3. Human Rights Watch 2009: 'Hostages to peace'. Threats to human rights and democracy in Somaliland. Online: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somaliland0709web.pdf>.
4. It is a very interesting question (to which the author has no answer) why the EC and others are keen on organizing elections in a country that is not even internationally recognized. The just mentioned 'others' are: DfID/UK, USAID, SIDA Sweden, Norway, and DANIDA/Denmark. These organisations provide most of the resources; together they form the Democratization Program Steering Committee.
5. Hoehne, Markus V. 2008: Somalia: Update on the current situation (2006-2008). Swiss Refugee Council, Bern, pp. 13-15.
6. In the parliamentary elections (2005), during which ink was used to prevent multiple voting, only about 674,000 voters were counted.
7. For an example of the complex relationship between clan-belonging and party politics in Somaliland, see Ciabbari, Luca 2008: No representation without redistribution: Somaliland plural authorities, the search for a state and the 2005 parliamentary elections, in A. Bellagamba and G. Klute (eds.) *Beside the state: emergent powers in contemporary Africa*, Koeln: Ruediger Koeppe, 2008, pp. 55-73.
8. See for instance the brilliant articles by Turton, David 1972: Somali resistance to colonial rule and the development of the Somali political activity in Kenya. *Journal of African History* 13(4): 119-143; and Gesheker, Charles L. 1985: Anti-colonialism and class formation: the eastern Horn of Africa before 1950. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 18(1): 1-32.
9. Observations of the author during field research in northern Somalia, 2002 to 2004; these observations were shared with and confirmed by various Somali and non-Somali colleagues.
10. Article 83(5) reads: 'If on the expiry of the term of office of the President and the Vice-President, it is not possible, because of *security considerations*, to hold the election of the President and the Vice-President, the House of Elders shall extend their term of office whilst taking into consideration the period in which the problems can be overcome and the election can be held' (italics added).
11. For a highly insightful perspective on humanitarian and political interventions as means of external control and as experiments see Pandolfi, Mariella 2008: Laboratory of intervention: The humanitarian governance of the postcommunist Balkan territories, in DelVecchio Good M.-J., S. T. Hyde, B. Good and S. Pinto (eds.), *Post-colonial Disorders*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 157-186.
12. Call, Charles 2008: Building states to build peace? A critical analysis, *Journal of peacebuilding and democracy* 4(2): 60-74.
13. Bryden, Banana test, pp. 362-364.
14. Al Shabaab Terrorist Leader Ahmed Abdi Godane Lambastes Somaliland, Online: <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/397/3.shtml> (accessed 20.09.2009).

Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Challenges in Somalia

It is 18 years since the eruption of the Somali conflict following the collapse of the government of Siaad Barre. During this period the conflict has fluctuated in terms of its intensity, the nature of actors involved as well as the conflict dynamics. Currently, the conflict is raging on between militarily weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and their supporters on one hand and Al Shaabab and other opposition groups on the other hand. The TFG which was expanded in early 2009 following the peace agreement between the TFG and the moderate opposition group 'Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia' (ARS-Djibouti), which was led by the current President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, is facing difficulties in implementing the Djibouti peace agreement.

Regardless of the signing of the peace agreement, peace in Somalia appears and remains to be elusive. The TFG with the support of Africa Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM) which is a peace keeping force drawn from Burundi and Uganda controls only a small part of the capital city Mogadishu. The rest is in the hands of Al Shaabab who are alleged of receiving support from some countries in the Horn of Africa and Middle East.¹ Various efforts have been made at resolving this highly protracted conflict. So far, there have been 15 internationally led peace processes and none has been fruitful yet. Since 2008, the UN has initiated a new peace process in an attempt to return peace and normalcy in Somalia.

Indeed, one of the achievements of the UN-led peace processes has been the signing of an agreement between the TFG and the ARS-Djibouti, which culminated to the appointment of a new President, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Although this aroused hope for peace in Somalia, the rejection of the peace process and the new government by armed opposition groups, and the increased intensity of fighting raises concerns as to whether the peace agreement will hold. While in the past, clan politics and rivalry between various warlords fuelled the conflict, in the recent times the conflict has increasingly taken the shape of a conflict between those perceived to advance different forms of Islamic beliefs fragmenting the Somali people into different religious factions but all championing Islam.²

The divergent colonial traditions inherited from the British and Italians in which preference was given to certain clans to entrench divide and rule ideology, accentuated inter-clan mistrust and hostility.³ This has serious implications on both peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts. For peacekeepers it raises the question of the nature of the government structure best suited to address these challenges. It poses the challenge in setting priorities for peace building processes and establishing legitimate institutional hierarchies at the level of the state.⁴

On the other hand, the peacebuilders are posed with the challenge of how to they can effectively undertake peacekeeping and peace-building activities without being perceived by the members of the warring factions as being supportive of the enemy group. It appears that the opposition groups perceive AMISOM to be sympathizers of the TFG government and this has continued to fuel the Somali crisis. The interest of most of the factions is to have political and economic power to dominate and control state machinery. In the recent times for example, Al Shabaab has been targeting AU peacekeepers who they believe are supporting the TFG.⁵

The collapse of the state and the retreat of individuals to their clans and sub-clans for security contributed to the formation of other forms of civil society that are shaped by multi dynamics of the country. The absence of border control aggravated the situation as weapons freely moved into the country; hence, weapon proliferation became inevitable. As the UN's interventions in 1990s shows, these conditions pose formidable challenges both in terms of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Since all factions are armed with sophisticated weapons, it is imperative for the negotiators to drum support from of all actors in the conflict for the process to be inclusive by inviting all opposition groups to the discussions.

Similarly, any deployment for peacekeepers needs to be implemented without any significant opposition from the Somalia belligerents and at best with their full support. Once deployed and depending on their mandate, peacekeepers will also face the challenge of being drawn into the conflict as they seek to uphold peace agreements and protect their mandate. The major challenge that AMISOM is currently facing is that they are targeted by insurgents and this has complicated the situation.

The breakdown of respect for the rule of law poses a big challenge for any transformative peacekeeping process. The prolonged absence of any institutional culture of respect for the rule of law and human rights in Somalia and to inculcate this in the society, there has to be a long-term programme of establishing the rule of law and security institutions.

Therefore, peacekeeping initiatives should have huge package for awareness creation, to instil a human right's culture and for building the confidence of Somalis

in the rule of law as the foundation of their individual, collective security and development.

The foregoing exposition of the nature of the Somalia conflict clearly shows that the conflict in Somalia is fluid, dynamic and complicated. The ever changing nature of the belligerent forces, the regionalization (within the country) and internationalization of the conflict and the involvement of competing external actors further compounds the complex conflict. Hence, it is necessary for all these features of the conflict to be taken into account in designing peace processes and peacekeeping as a response of international community to resolve the conflict and restore peace and security.

The nature of the conflict is such that peace processes involving political settlement among factional leaders are highly inadequate. There is need for transformative approaches like nation-building, control of movement of arms, grass root reconciliation and destruction of divisive clan relations and discourses, economic transformation and configuration of the war economies.⁶ Thus, the complexity of the conflict calls for well manned, well resourced and well equipped peace operations with robust and multidimensional peace-building mandate of which the current AU mission in Somalia seems to be lacking.

The Djibouti peace process was seen as an overture to bring peace in Somalia, but this hope has remained elusive. The opposition groups have continued their military attacks on foreign forces. After the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the groups continuously attack the AMISOM peacekeepers. This sends a message to the AU and the international community in general, that their initiatives for expanding AMISOM is not welcomed. If the militia groups would not be convinced to allow AMISOM to execute its mandate and participate in the Djibouti process, AMISOM will not be spared from the guerrilla attacks it is currently facing.

Conclusion

The attacks frustrated the Ethiopian forces which culminated to its eventual full withdrawal by January 2009. It seems the military option is proving unworkable, the AU and members of international community should support AMISOM by boosting its capacity and mandate and look for ways to adequately address the continued hostility it faces from the opposition groups.

However, the ongoing peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts is a gallant step to build peace. The root causes of the conflict need to be addressed for any meaningful achievement to be realized. It is important that the mission establishes a good relationship with the local population, especially religious leaders, clan elders and other society actors. This should do without compromising its mandate.

Conclusively, it is clear that if the Djibouti process is to move forward and address comprehensively all aspects of the conflict in Somalia, there is need for a continued and a more robust and positive international engagement in Somalia from all actors, including the AU, United Nations, European Union and the Arab League. It encourages and impresses upon all Somalis the need for supporting and participating in the effort for establishing lasting peace in their country and region. While emphasis should be put on achieving ceasefire and bring the opposition groups to the peace process, it is imperative efforts to be directed to alleviate the suffering of millions of Somalis.

Denilson Mairura Onseno,

is an MA, Armed Conflict and Peace Studies Student at the Nairobi University.

Notes

1 CGI, Somalia: To move beyond the failed state, Africa Report no.147, 23 December 2008, 25-26.

2. See world Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, 2005, pp. 10-16.

3. I.M Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society,

(Lawrenceville, NJ; Red Sea Press), 1994.

4. Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State building* (Oxford University Press, 2007).

5. See ICG Report 147.

6. Affyare Abdi Elmi and Abdulahi Barise, *The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles and peace-building strategies*, *African Security Review*, 15 (1) (2006) 34-35.

NEWS AND EVENTS

GENERAL HORN OF AFRICA

Africa wants Kyoto pact to stay in place

Africa does not want the Kyoto Protocol replaced or merged with another climate change agreement during the global talks in Copenhagen, Denmark. African negotiators said in a statement issued on October 27 that they preferred amendment to sections of the current pact and a separate legal instrument developed based on the outcome of negotiations of the Bali Action Plan under the Climate Change Convention. The continent wants the outcome of the Copenhagen convention to provide new, additional, sustainable, accessible and predictable finances. The updated and consolidated position will be submitted to the African ministers and heads of state on the eve of the Copenhagen forum.

The Daily Nation

AU summit on refugees and IDP's

The African Union on 19 – 23 October organised a Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons. This is the first summit of its kind and was held in Kampala, Uganda. Africa hosts a total of 11.6 million refugees out of an estimated population on 26 million worldwide. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Ugandan President Mr. Yoweri Museveni urged for a more thorough analysis, understanding and resolution of the root causes of forced displacement. He told the summit that many mediators misdiagnose the causes of conflict and therefore prescribe the wrong solutions.

The summit was expected to deal with prevention and root causes, burden sharing and protracted situations, reconciliation and post conflict reconstruction, refugees in mixed migratory movements and natural disasters, climate change and food security. AU Heads of State and Government will sign and adopt the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDP's in Africa and the Kampala Solemn Declaration which should considerably change displaced persons lives by refraining from, prohibiting and preventing arbitrary displacement of populations. In addition, this first ever legal framework generates obligations to states parties. The summit was attended by 46 member states.

African Union

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia seizes rebel arms base

The Ethiopian government has reported seizing more than 4 tonnes of explosives and other arms from the Eastern Ethiopia rebel group, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).

The defector was described as a commander who had fought against the government for the last ten years. Ethiopia army reportedly seized the ammunition store located in Korahe, the border region with Somalia. They were acting on tips offered by the defector. The ONLF is fighting for independence of the ethnic Somalis, who

have lived in the Ogaden region since 1970s. Ethiopia accuses the rebel group of terrorist activities with links to the Al Shabaab, and backed by Eritrea. These accusations are denied by the group.

allAfrica.com, Daily Nation on the Web

KENYA

Disarming not the answer

Disarming communities living along international borders will not address conflicts that pit pastoralists living along the Kenya/Ethiopia and Kenya/Uganda borders. Adakar Peace and Development Initiative (APEDI) project coordinator Mr. Alexander Losikiria said the government should permanently station both the military and provincial administration at its border. Kenya has stepped up security near its border with Sudan after reports of clashes between police and Toposa pastoralists at Nadapal area in Turkana. Mr. Losikiria said that stationing the officers strategically at the border points will improve security of the residents living along the border and emerging business opportunities will reduce the insecurity menace amongst the pastoralist community by half. The disarmament of the communities on one side will only improve their internal security but leave them vulnerable to outside attacks.

Daily Nation on the Web

SOMALILAND

Rising numbers of illegal immigrants

Immigration officials in the Somaliland on 23 October expressed concern over the increase in the number of illegal Ethiopian migrants entering the region, with claims that up to 90 people are arriving daily, against 50 in 2008. The exact number of Ethiopian refugees in the country is still unclear as the region's authorities and the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, have different figures. Mohamed Ismail, the director of social affairs in the Ministry of Interior - charged with overseeing refugee affairs and asylum-seekers - said: "We consider 4,000 individuals as Ethiopian refugees but all the other people who live in Somaliland are not refugees; [they have] come to Somaliland for a better life."

An immigration official said that those arriving in the country are asylum-seekers from the Oromiya region of Ethiopia. Others transit through Somaliland en route to the Arabic Peninsula. According to UNHCR Somalia, Somaliland has 1,600 Ethiopian refugees and more than 14,000 asylum-seekers. An Ethiopian official, who requested anonymity, told IRIN it seemed the UNHCR office in Hargeisa was encouraging asylum-seekers to enter Somaliland.

IRIN News

UGANDA

Joint military training in the North

A Joint Field Training exercise was held from 16 October in Pajema, Kitgum District of Northern Uganda. The training; *Natural Fire 10*, brought together armies of the five member states of the East Africa Community (EAC) together with members of the US Africa Command. 1,150 soldiers took part in the exercise. The training included Humanitarian Civil Assistance, helicopter familiarization, weapon handling, riot control, hand-to-hand combat and entry control point.

allAfrica.com

Government deploys more troops at Uganda-Congo border

The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) has increased deployment along the Uganda-Congo border in Kasese. Since 19 October lorries ferried troops to the sub-counties of Kisinga, Karambi, Ihandiro, Kitholhu and Mpondwe-Lhubiriha Town Council. Moses Musubaho, a resident of Karambi Sub-county, says in addition to the troop's build-up, civilian movements between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are restricted. He said anyone intending to leave or enter the country is required to produce valid travel documents.

The UPDF 2nd Division spokesperson, Capt. Robert Kamara, said there is nothing unusual about the deployment and there is no need for alarm. He says the deployment is necessary to counter any threat from the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) rebels who are attempting to re-enter Uganda. The Kasese Resident District Commissioner, Mr James Mwesigye, said there is enough intelligence information to corroborate reports of active Ugandan rebels in the Congo. He however, says there is no need for panic. Since last year the Amnesty Commission has been engaged in peace talks with the ADF.

Monitor Online

SUDAN

Terms of the Sudan Referendum denounced

On 16 October, South Sudan said it had achieved a breakthrough in talks with the north over terms for a referendum on full independence for the south. South Sudan's Vice-President Riek Machar said the vote in 2011 will require a simple majority as long as two-thirds of voters take part. In the past, central government in the north has insisted that 75 % of voters must agree to independence. The issue was one of a number that have caused tension between north and south. Mr Machar announced the deal in the South Sudan capital Juba following talks in Khartoum with national Vice-President Ali Osman Taha. He also stated that all southerners will be allowed to vote, including those in the northern capital Khartoum and those outside Sudan. However, on 21 October, the South Sudan government backtracked on the statement and rejected the deal based on the fact that a two thirds turnout of all registered voters and a 50 % plus one vote would be necessary for the South to become a separate state. John Andruga Duku, the head of mission at the Government of Southern Sudan Liaison Officer in Nairobi said this was not acceptable to the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of South Sudan. The South instead wants 66 % cap placed in the number that turns out to vote and not the voter list.

BBC Daily Nation on the Web

RESOURCES

GENERAL

"A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding" (October 2009)

Experience shows that conflating the two concepts or treating them as entirely distinct and unrelated, results in poorly conceived programming and reduces effectiveness. This article by Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas examines the damage done by the conceptual confusion between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, and proposes some ways to distinguish them, it suggests that the evidence, may lead to more effective peacebuilding and conflict sensitive practice.

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-7X7R9U?OpenDocument>

“Conflict parties interest in mediation” (September 2009)

Experience has shown that mediation contributes positively to solving violent conflict. In order to improve mediation practice and support activities this policy brief by Berghof Research Centre takes a specific perspective on mediation through the lenses of conflicting parties.

http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/bcr_bps_policy_brief_01.pdf

“Implementing the UN Programme of Action: A Checklist for Matching Needs and Resources” (May 2009)

States recognize that international assistance is essential for the effective implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects. Presented here by Kerry Maze is a checklist designed to help states consider the types of activities they may need to undertake to address small arms and light weapons in their territory, whether through national resources or through international assistance. This checklist is an integral part of the Matching Needs and Resources mechanism developed by UNIDIR and hosted by the Programme of Action Implementation Support System, administered by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.

<http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-009-C-en.pdf>

“Protection of civilians in armed conflict” (October 2009)

This 2009 Cross-Cutting Report builds on this historical background and analysis and looks specifically at developments since the end of 2007, both at the thematic level and in country-specific situations. As this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Council’s first thematic decision on protection of civilians as well as the 60th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, there has clearly been greater focus on the Council’s role in relation to protection issues. Several ongoing and recent crises have also highlighted the wider implications of attacks against civilians for international peace and security. In addition to analysing recent Council action related to the protection of civilians’ agenda, including through case studies of the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gaza and Sri Lanka, and identifying key challenges, the present report suggests some possible future options for the Council. This and future annual cross-cutting reports on protection of civilians should enable stakeholders to begin to systematically track progress in the Council’s handling of this issue.

<http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=28019>

UGANDA

“Harnessing Oil for Peace and Development in Uganda” (September 2009)

A report by International Alert written by Jessica Banfield examines the potential of Uganda’s newly discovered oil reserves and recommends increased transparency and principled leadership to promote broad economic opportunities of oil discovery for peace and development in Uganda. This discovery of oil, taking place within a context of a variety of tensions that exist on both sides of the DRC-Uganda border, represents a potential risk of conflict and presents a peacebuilding challenge for local communities, the government, private sector investors, donors and civil society. With a proactive approach that takes into account conflict risks, the dual dividend of peace and development can be realised through the equitable and transparent exploitation of this resource.

<http://www.international-alert.org>

“The consequences of forced displacement in Northern Uganda”

(October 2009)

This analysis from households and communities in northern Uganda offers the opportunity to exploit a possible exogenous variation in movement and a discontinuity design in order to control for endogenous factors and thus obtain potentially unbiased estimates of the cost of movement on the people. Being forced to move is associated with an increase in the value of assets for households that originally had little or no assets and a decrease in the value of assets of all other households between 17 % and 26 %. Estimation on principal component analysis is likewise significant and suggests an even greater association. I also find that, for all income groups, displacement is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a household consuming meat, an indicator of consumption quality and general health, of up to 71 %. These two indicators suggest a possible serious long-run decrease in the economic growth potential of households as the people move home.

<http://www.nathanfiala.com/research.html>

“Women and Girls at War: ‘Wives’, Mothers and Fighters in the Lord’s Resistance Army” (October 2009)

Data from Uganda challenge conventional notions about the role of females during and after war. Women and girls recruited by the LRA play active roles and are not passive victims. J. Annan, C. Blattman, D. Mazurana and K. Carlson show how LRA treatment of females - especially strict rules against civilian rape and the use of forced marriage - serves an instrumental purpose, enhancing control of the forces and protection from HIV. Finally, in contrast to conventional beliefs, we find that only a minority of females exhibit serious psychosocial reintegration difficulties, whether psychological distress or persistent community and family rejection.

Abduction also has little adverse impact on their education and economic activity, although this is largely because of the tragic dearth of opportunities for all females. Evidence from a growing set of cases suggests that these patterns may be of general relevance, and imply need for a shift in post-conflict policy towards females in war.

<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp63.pdf>

SOMALIA

“The Political Development of Somaliland and its conflict with Puntland” (September 2009)

In 1991, Somaliland emerged as an autonomous entity in this turbulent region after unilaterally declaring its independence from the rest of Somalia. Over the past eighteen years Somaliland has managed to display an enviable measure of peace and stability. Through successive clan conferences, Somaliland established relatively viable institutions which paved the path for reconstruction of an entity mainly employing local resources. The accomplishments of Somaliland, however, have been overshadowed by the lack of international recognition of its statehood and also its territorial dispute with neighbouring Puntland. The overall objective of this paper written by Mesfin, Berouk is to provide a detailed account and analysis of the political development of Somaliland and its conflict with Puntland.

<http://www.iss.co.za>

“The Somalia Conflict: Implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts” (August 2009)

The paper by Solomon A. Dersso draws heavily on secondary sources, including books, journals and reports of various institutions. Nevertheless, primary sources such as decisions of international, continental and sub-regional organizations, press releases and news clips are also employed. Methodologically, the implications of the

root causes, nature and dynamics of the conflict for peacemaking and peacekeeping are drawn out and discussed as part of the analysis in the various sections.

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?q51=Mali&ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=105908>

SUDAN

“Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post – CPA Arms Flows” (September 2009)

On the basis of interviews, customs and trade data, original documentation, published reports, and evidence from photographs and satellite imagery, and by focusing on specific case studies, this working paper provides a snapshot of what is known about arms transfers to Sudan’s state forces since the signing of the CPA, as well as the distribution and circulation of weapons to non-state armed groups.

<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>

“The Human Security Baseline Assessment” (September 2009)

A workshop report generated by the Small Arms survey workshop entitled ‘Southern Sudan and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): Adopting an integrated approach to stabilization.’ The primary objectives of the workshop were to discuss the feasibility of DDR in Southern Sudan as it is being currently planned and implemented, and to explore linkages between DDR and other post-conflict stabilization measures. A workshop outcome statement containing policy considerations for the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the international community was released after the event.

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7WQA84?OpenDocument>

Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 21, No. 10, October 2009

Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is Life & Peace Institute (LPI) and the editor is Olivia Kibui, olivia.kibui@life-peace.org. For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org. For a link to HAB and more information see www.life-peace.org

Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

