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New Routes

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Horn of Africa:
The way forward

Peace the only solution to displaced people's needs

Somalia:
The political process needs the middle ground

The politics of naming:
Genocide, civil war, insurgency

Horn of Africa Bulletin – old success meets new needs

Christian-Muslim leaders' initiative for peace in Somalia

Civil society and state in peacebuilding:
"One cannot have one without the other"

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CONCERN ABOUT THE HORN

WRITING THIS FROM THE SOUTHERN TIP OF AFRICA, Cape Town in South Africa, gives a different perspective on the content in this issue. The horror in Mogadishu and Darfur is given daily attention by media. In addition to a general interest, I am sure it could also be seen as warnings and reminders about the bloody past in South Africa. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission dealt with the horror time in South Africa and named it "crime against humanity". Victims met with perpetrators in public hearings. Media covered it all, and by taking the lid off, truth and forgiveness became a window of opportunity to reconciliation. The process started, and instead of the expected bloodshed South Africa is experiencing a peaceful transition.

In the late 1990's New Routes presented perspectives on conflict transformation in the Horn of Africa region. In 2007, there is a peace agreement in Southern Sudan and a good number of returnees. There is a transitional government in Somalia, although under fire, and there is a "cold peace" between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is easy to forget the progress. There are, however, all the reasons for concern. Elisabeth Ferris reports about the millions of refugees and displaced people as a human consequence of the conflicts and political repression in the region. Mahmoud Mamdani looks at Darfur from a very challenging perspective and says that "peace cannot be built on humanitarian intervention, which is the language of big powers". Shane Quinn analyzes the role of civil society and the private sector in a Somalia on the edge of anarchy.

And, don't miss to read the interview with outgoing Claudette Werleigh, leaving LPI for Pax Christi after eight years as conflict transformation director.

TORE SAMUELSSON
tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org

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Life & Peace Institute
Sysslomansgatan 7, SE-753 11 Uppsala, Sweden
Tel: (+46) 18-16 97 86, Fax: (+46) 18-69 30 59
E-mail: info@life-peace.org,
Web site: www.life-peace.org

Editors: Tore Samuelsson and Kristina Lundqvist
Assistant editor in this issue: Kristina Lundborg
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About the authors

ELIZABETH FERRIS is Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington, DC. 1991-1993 she served as Research Director of the Life & Peace Institute. 1999-2006 she worked in the World Council of Churches in the areas of international relations, humanitarian assistance and development.

SHANE QUINN is Programme Officer for the Horn of Africa at the Life & Peace Institute Uppsala.

MAHMOOD MAMDANI Ph.D., from Kampala, Uganda, is Herbert Lehman Professor of Government in the Departments of Anthropology, Political Science and International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, USA, where he was director of the Institute of African Studies from 1999 to 2004. He has taught at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Makerere University and University of Cape Town.

TORE SAMUELSSON is Director of Communications at the Life & Peace Institute Uppsala.

HANNAH TSADIK is a Master's student at the Department for Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and holds a BA in Political Science. In spring 2007 she was an intern at the Life & Peace Institute.

KRISTINA LUNDQVIST is Communications Officer at the Life & Peace Institute Uppsala.

SUSANNE JUNGERSTAM-MULDERS, Ph.D., is research director at the Svenska yrkeshögskolan University of Applied Sciences, Vasa, Finland. Previously she was a researcher at the Centre for European Studies at the University of Helsinki. She is also board member and member of the research council of the Åland Island Peace Institute.

TONY KLUG Ph.D., is senior policy consultant at the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum and vice-chair of the Arab-Jewish Forum, both based in the UK. For many years, he worked at the international secretariat of Amnesty International.

War, drought and political unrest have forced millions of people in the Horn of Africa to leave their homes and live as refugees or internally displaced persons. Their situations are, however, disparate, and there is no simple single remedy for the hardships of these people – except peace and stability in the region.

Peace the only solution to displaced people's needs

Elizabeth Ferris

The human costs of conflict, instability and natural disasters in the Horn of Africa have been almost unbearably high. The lives of millions of women, children and men have been shattered by violence, while political and military leaders have sought power and control of resources. In some places, peace agreements remain fragile. Elsewhere peace negotiations have yet to produce results, which means that many of those displaced by the violence continue to live in limbo – or terror.

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Horn of Africa are a disparate group. Some have been displaced for many years while others are hoping to soon return to their communities, and still others were forced to flee their homes last week. The situation of displacement in the region is a dynamic and complicated one. While there is considerable awareness of the situation of those displaced by the violence in Darfur, few people outside the region are aware that there are still Ethiopians displaced from the 1998 Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict – even after the peace agreement was signed almost seven years ago – or that over 150,000 Somali refugees have been living in Kenya for more than five years.

Refugees and IDPs are not just an issue of humanitarian concern. Displacement of populations has become a strategy of war by governments and militia groups throughout the region. Their fate is tied to both domestic and regional political dynamics, and at the same time their very presence influences political and strategic discussions. This article presents a brief overview of displacement in the Horn of Africa as a contribution to the debate on the larger issues of peace and security in the region.

Statistics of numbers of displaced people – both refugees and internally displaced people – reveal two trends: first, there are a large number of IDPs and refugees in protracted situations, which are defined as populations of more than 25,000 who have been displaced for more than five years.[1] These represent the legacy of unresolved conflicts. At the same time, there are often dramatic new flows of displaced people as illustrated by the increasing displacement from both Somalia and Darfur. It should be noted that these recent displacements are generally not captured in statistics but rather in news reports. The table below gives an overview of displacement in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan by country of origin.

IDPs and Refugees in the Horn of Africa

Country of origin	Number of IDPs	Number of IDPs in protracted situations	Number of refugees, 31 December 2005	Number of refugees in protracted situations, 1 January 2005
Eritrea	40,000 – 45,000	40,000 – 45,000[2]	143,594 10,700/Ethiopia 116,746/Sudan	111,000/Sudan
Ethiopia	100,000 – 280,000	62,000[3]	65,293 14,862/Kenya 14,633/Sudan	
Somalia	400,000[4]	300,000 – 400,000	394,760 9,828/Djibouti 15,901/Ethiopia 150,459/Kenya[5] 64,000/Yemen	154,000/Kenya 64,000/Yemen 25,000/Djibouti
Sudan	5,355,000	3,000,000	693,267	45,000/DRC 90,000/Ethiopia 68,000/Kenya 215,000/Uganda

Protracted refugee situations are defined as those lasting at least five years with a population of over 25,000. Source: UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. IDP figures are taken from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *www.internal-displacement.org* for the most recent period available. Protracted IDP situations are defined as those lasting at least five years with a population of over 25,000. Refugee statistics are from end of 2005 as reported in *2005 Global Refugee Trends,* UNHCR, June 2006, *www.unhcr.org/statistics*

Displacement in four countries

Somalia

In a short article like this, it is difficult to do justice to the complexities of the many situations that have displaced people in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, for example, has had large numbers of displaced people for many years.[6] A devastating drought in 2006 forced people to leave their communities, the current conflict has claimed up to half a million lives, and over two million people – out of Somalia's 8.22 million population – are considered vulnerable. Prior to the latest outbreak of violence, there were some 250,000 IDPs living in Mogadishu.

The ongoing struggles for power and resources have led warlords to deliberately displace people from other clans, adding to the widespread movement of hundreds of thousands of people in recent months. While Somaliland has managed to reintegrate a part of the almost one million returned refugees who fled the land in the late 1980s, many live in makeshift camps in urban areas together with IDPs and new arrivals from the conflict in the south.

The displacement of Somalis reflects the political realities in that country, but also complicates relations between governments in the region. For example, when the number of Somalis fleeing into Kenya increased dramatically in late 2006, the Kenyan government closed the border, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had to appeal to the Kenyan government not to send them back to Somalia.[7] Human smuggling of Somalis to Yemen has not only claimed a large toll in human life, but is also evidence of the regional dimensions to Somalia's internal crisis.

Conditions for IDPs in Somalia – as indeed throughout the region – are precarious. They face high morbidity rates, lack access to safe water and sanitation, live in crowded conditions in slum settlements, and have difficulty accessing education. International humanitarian access to displaced and other vulnerable groups is extremely difficult and many assistance programs for Somalia are managed from Nairobi.

The establishment of peace and security in Somalia is a prerequisite for solutions for both IDPs and refugees. And yet even if a political settlement is reached, there are many long-term obstacles to IDP and refugee return. For example, unresolved property issues are one of the core obstacles to IDP returns, and resolution of those claims not only require an effective judicial system, but also records of land ownership.

Ethiopia

Displacement of people in Ethiopia also stems from several sources: ethnic conflicts, drought, the government's regionalization policy, and the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea. Ethnic conflicts in Gambella between the Anuak and the Nuer displaced thousands of people, and incursions by rebel groups from these ethnic groups from Sudan have caused further displacement in the border regions. Tensions along the regional border between Somali and Oromiya have displaced some 80,000 people, while drought and flooding have caused even more to leave their home.

In February of this year, ethnic violence led almost 800 Ethiopian pastoralists to seek safety in Kenya where they were repatriated back to Ethiopia. Traditionally a centralized state, the Ethiopian government's regionalization policy is exacerbating tensions between the country's 80 ethnic groups[8], and the government's intention to resettle people to more fertile parts of the country is raising questions about state support for forced displacement of large numbers of people.



The Ethiopian government's regionalization policy is exacerbating tensions between the country's 80 ethnic groups.

About 100,000 people were killed in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict and over 360,000 were internally displaced. At that time, Ethiopia deported tens of thousands of persons identified as Eritreans, while Eritrea did the same with Ethiopians living on its territory. While most Ethiopian IDPs returned home after the ceasefire of June 2000 and the December 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement, an estimated 62,000 people remain displaced in the Tigray region.

In Ethiopia, as in other countries, the issue of who is an IDP and when that condition ends, is a hot political issue. Presently the government does not consider people who have been displaced for more than five years to be IDPs, and international agencies find it difficult to monitor returns, making reliable statistics hard to come by.

Eritrea


The Ethiopian-Eritrean war displaced more than one million of Eritrea's[9] 3.8 million people, most of whom returned to their communities after the 2000 ceasefire. By 2005, the number of IDPs was estimated to have dropped to around 45,000, and a year later, the Eritrean government decided to return the large majority of IDPs to their villages or areas of origin near the Temporary Security Zone. But return to border regions is difficult given the deadlock over demarcation of the border and the presence of landmines.

The IDPs in Eritrea depend almost completely on relief assistance, living in makeshift settlements in camps and with host communities. But in 2005 the government imposed restrictions on international agencies and blocked distribution of food in favor of its own cash-for-work projects, leading the government's largest food aid donor, USAID, to withdraw, as did some 24 of the 37 NGOs active in Eritrea. The IDPs in Eritrea are only part of a larger movement of Eritreans, including one million former IDPs, expellees from Ethiopia, and refugees who have returned to their home villages – all of whom depend on food assistance. As in Ethiopia, limitations on NGO activity make accurate statistics difficult.

Sudan

Displacement – both internal and external – in Sudan is Africa's largest uprooted population and, as in the other countries of the Horn, includes several groups of people. Those displaced by the civil war between the central government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army number some 3.2 million, of whom 2 million are southerners living in and around Khartoum – also the world's largest urban displaced population. In response to the 2005 peace agreement, some 1.2 million Sudanese have returned to their homes in the southern part of the country. But returns are slow, in part because of the lack of infrastructure and public services for the returnees. Almost all of the IDPs who have returned have done so spontaneously without waiting for UN assistance.

PHOTO: STR/SCANPIX



Somali children looking through a bullet ridden window.

The government of Southern Sudan encourages IDPs to return – apparently in preparation for the November 2007 census.[10] However, return is problematic and there are cases where IDPs living in Khartoum have gone home, only to return to Khartoum as conditions are better there than in their home communities. As if the situation weren't complicated enough, incursions by rebel armed groups from both Chad and Uganda have further threatened security in the south.

The conflict in Darfur flared up in early 2003 and since then has claimed some 450,000 lives and displaced almost 2 million people. The violence has spilled over into Chad. Not only are there 220,000 Darfurian refugees in Chad, but there are Chadian refugees in Sudan and growing numbers of internally displaced persons within Chad. In spite of a peace agreement in May 2006 (signed by only one of the rebel factions) and the presence of an African Peacekeeping Force, the violence has continued, and the Sudanese government has resisted UN efforts to establish a hybrid UN-African Union force to stabilize the region. Meanwhile, the world's largest international humanitarian operation is taking place in Darfur with some 14,000 humanitarian workers, but conditions are still abysmal for much of the population. Security concerns and violence continue.

Peace the only real solution

The displacement of people in the Horn of Africa is the human consequence of the conflicts and political repression taking place in the region. It can only be resolved by negotiating and implementing peace agreements. In the meantime, governments in the region have a responsibility to protect those who are displaced, whether they are internally displaced or have fled across borders in search of protection. Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (but not Eritrea) are all parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol.

In 1998, the Organisation of African Unity Ministerial Meeting on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa adopted the "Khartoum Declaration", which calls on member states to seek durable solutions to the problem of forced population displacement in their countries and to adopt national legislation that protects their well-being. A second ministerial conference on Internally Displaced Persons in the Sub-Region of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development adopted another "Khartoum Declaration" in 2003, which reaffirms the primary responsibility of national governments to protect and assist IDPs and calls on governments in the region to incorporate the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into national legislation.

Ultimately, of course, the solution for displaced people in the Horn of Africa depends on the establishment of peace, justice, and security. But this is a long-term process and until those conditions are achieved, there is an urgent need to ensure that the basic human rights of the millions of uprooted people in the region are addressed. This is a fundamental responsibility of governments, whether the task is protecting the human rights of one's own displaced citizens or upholding the basic right of all human beings to seek asylum in another country.

[1] UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 2006. Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 106-107. Also Elizabeth G. Ferris "Protracted IDP Situations", forthcoming, 2007.

[2] 8,900 IDP households in Gash Barka & Debub.

[3] IDP figures from OCHA-Ethiopia as cited by IDMC. Protracted IDPs include an estimated 62,000 displaced in Tigray as a result of the 1998 Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute, even after December 2000 Peace Agreement.

[4] IDP figure of 400,000 from September 2006, but 100,000 more fled Mogadishu in February-March 2007. "UN appeals for end to suffering as thousands flee deadly fighting in Somalia's capital", UN News Centre, 2 April 2007. The number of protracted IDPs includes drought IDPs.

[5] By September 2006, this figure had climbed to 240,000. http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2253

[6] This description is based, unless otherwise noted, on "Somalia: Fear of renewed displacement as rise of Islamists heightens tensions", Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2 October 2006. www.internal-displacement.org

[7] See for example, http://allafrica.com/stories/200701010001.html; http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2253

[8] See "Ethiopia: government recognition of conflict IDPs crucial to addressing their plight", Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 16 April 2006. www.internal-displacment.org

[9] See especially, "Eritrea: Uncertain future for thousands of returning IDPs", 13 June 2006.

[10] See for example, "Sudan: Slow IDP return to south while Darfur crisis continues unabated", 17 August 2006, www.internal-displacement.org

For any society to reach a reasonable level of stability and development, the middle ground or civic movement plays a decisive role. However, clannism and external influence in Somalia leave little room for civil society to become a viable actor. Also, the weakness of the state entails a lack of the kind of counterpart that middle ground actors need in order to affect the political situation.

SOMALIA:

The political process needs the middle ground

Shane Quinn

The development of the middle ground throughout the years in Somalia since the fall of the dictator Siad Barre in 1991 has been one of twists and turns, and for the most part it has been a story of paroxysm in making its voice heard on the political scene. For the purposes of this article, the middle ground can be loosely defined as a grouping of NGOs, moderate Islamists, media, the business community, academics and human rights activists. Although traditional elders are often seen to be representative of their own clan constituencies, they are nonetheless placed closer to the constantly shifting political power in Somalia in terms of influence. In that respect, and although it is open to argument in the complex analysis of the Somali troubles, traditional elders are excluded from the term "civic agents" of change.

For most analysts and long time observers of the complexities of Somali politics, there has been an effervescent hope that civil society will manage to exercise some form of influence on political developments in the country, if not on a political agenda, then using its clan networks to lobby their respective clan elders and leaders. However, it is the latter that is one of the greatest obstacles to civic unity, and the setbacks have been manifold.

Somalia has experienced many shades of what is commonly referred to as "uncivil" society, where issues of power, clannism in the clientelist sense and external influences have encroached on political and daily life to such a degree that there is little space or will for civil society to gain a foothold. Although the activities of advocacy networks, influential individuals and peace activists across the conflict spectrum have been omnipresent over a longer period of time, seldom do they achieve any kind of momentum and are often sidelined in the multivariate peace processes. Matters are not helped by the recurrent actions of spoilers, who often find more than enough backing to jeopardise any fragile peace arrangement.

It is no secret that Somali civil society is itself relatively fragmented and suffers from its own ad hoc "centralisation", in that the capital Mogadishu is extremely symbolic in terms of the ongoing political struggle as well as being a regular feature in the national and international media spotlight. The result is a deeply weakened civic movement out in the provinces, and in other important urban centres such as Kismayo and Baidoa.

> ***The inter-clan rivalries remain a thorny issue even in the current political stalemate.***

However, for civil society to develop and to be able to affect the political landscape, there needs to be a viable state structure in place, even if it does not measure up to a Western model. One of the major reasons why Somalia stagnated politically is the very absence of this working state structure, which leaves civil society with nothing to mirror itself with and also leaves it open to misappropriation by clan influences. Even in the current impasse, donors and international negotiators involved in the political process in Somalia allocate little or no space to the middle ground, preferring instead to lobby the increasingly isolated Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Clans on the move

Running steadily through this predicament is the common thread of the clan issue, which again threatens to derail yet another effort to end the violence in Somalia. The newcomers to the cycle of violence, the fundamentalist movement *muqarima*[1], are supposedly made of elements of the vanquished Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). However, it is not surprising that the recently brokered ceasefire between the Hawiye elders and the Ethiopian commanders even resulted in what are commonly referred to as the "Islamic insurgents", following suit.

The UIC itself was largely dominated by Hawiye sub-clans such as Ayr and Habr Gedir, and despite its use of pan-nationalist rhetoric and promulgation of Islam in bringing about a semblance of governance after the ousting of the warlords, it was subsumed by its inter-clan rivalry with the largely Darood administered TFG.

In analysing Somali politics, identifying the clan issue as an abrogating factor of conflict is sometimes perceived to be counter-productive and sensitive in bringing about any peace

PHOTO: KIRSI SAARISTO/LPI



LPI works primarily with civil society representatives in Somalia. The picture is from a conference arranged in Baidoa.

settlement. However, it is illuminating – to say the least – that since the fall of Siad Barre, clans in Somalia have been on the move as a migratory force and have been involved in countless micro-conflicts resulting in forceful seizure of grazing and arable lands, particularly in the south. In some areas, discrimination and violent methods of forced labour are commonplace amongst bigger more powerful clans toward their less influential brethren in smaller clans.

The Bantus in southern Somalia are a case in point, where they have lost their access to the river Jubba and rely on the whims of their larger sub-clan neighbours including the Marehan and Habr Gedir. The inter-clan rivalries that pervade the top echelons of the political struggle tend to be omnipresent at the grass-roots level in Somali society, and remain a thorny issue even in the current political stalemate and for any reconciliation process.

Conservative Islamic trend

Religion also plays a distinct role in Somalia, but it is even more pronounced with the recent rise of the UIC. It has always been a religiously liberal country by tradition, with the majority of the Sunni population adhering to the Sufi strain of Islam. More recently, and with the rise of a more Wahabbist element of Islam through the UIC, the mood has swung in a slightly more conservative direction. This reflects not only developments in Somalia, but in the Horn of Africa in general and gives credence to the expansive influence of political Islam from the Middle East. In certain cases, civil society in Islamic countries tends to be part of a complex web of religious and political involvement and often struggles to make an impression on the political landscape.

However, with the advance of the UIC, there was a visible meeting space between the moderate Islamist majority within the latter and a civic opinion where the issues of security and law and order dominated the agenda. It was brief, but it was nonetheless a crucial period in the history of the conflict. It is small wonder that the extremist elements of the UIC were allowed to steer the agenda once Ethiopia – with the tacit backing of the US – fulfilled its threat of invasion. In the grim aftermath, there has been no concrete initiative to encourage moderate Islamists to take part in the imminent reconciliation conference, and this vital window of opportunity to promote the position of the middle ground from a socio-religious perspective, could be detrimental to the success of any future reconciliation process.

The actions of Ethiopia in Somalia reflect an adversity to any stabilisation of the Somali problem. The phenomenon of civil society or the middle ground is often looked on with suspicion by the overly centralised governments throughout the Horn of Africa. There is a certain amount of fear of the ungoverned periphery in countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, and this even applies to Somalia with the recent formation of a new government. The cross-clan progress made by the grass roots and civil society actors during the Djibouti-sponsored Arta process in 2000 resulting in the formation of the Transitional National Government – where the warlords were effectively marginalised – was undermined by Somalia's neighbour and rival, Ethiopia, which perceived it as a dangerous precedent not only for its own influence on Somali affairs but also on its own domestic front.

On the edge of anarchy

The almost constant absence of a regulatory state and its tenets of rule of law and accountability over the years has allowed freelance and clan militias to operate unabated and to maintain a conflict footing. So much so, that daily life in Somalia – and in Mogadishu in particular – is riddled with insecurity. In a sense, Somalia has teetered on the edge of anarchy for so long that its statelessness is almost a fait accompli. It is easy to brush away any tendency on the part of the West to remain pragmatic, and to allow any thoughts of a diplomatic solution in the face of the ongoing po-

litical imbroglio. Within this generally unpredictable scenario, the disjointed but surprisingly durable civil society networks manage to maintain some pressure on the political actors, but are often ignored by the TFG.

Through this durability and somewhat stubborn approach, representatives of civil society can often create a form of protection, within which it is possible to attain a measure of what can be termed civic space. In other words, those actors operating on this level can benefit from "civil" behaviour on behalf of the belligerents in a conflict zone. This protection often allows for civic actors to drift across clan lines. However, this ad hoc and somewhat effective approach was shattered when a prominent peace activist was brutally murdered in his house, and managed to highlight the constantly shifting power dynamics on the local level and the socio-religious divide.

One of the main dividers as well as connectors in the case of Somalia – and one which continues to play a role in the conflict – has always been the burgeoning private sector. On the one hand, it has played the role of divider in the sense that it used warlord militias to protect its businesses, thereby contributing to the long cycle of violence. More recently it was partly responsible for allowing the UIC to develop from its rudimentary beginnings as an informal security force put together by concerned businessmen in the capital, into a socio-political movement challenging for political power. On the other, it has played the connector through enabling trade and an ad hoc economy to prevail over the years in the absence of a regulatory state structure and ensuring that Somalia maintains some semblance of normality through its import and export trade.

Nonetheless, it is an important starting point for any nation in a post-conflict setting, and this has not been seized upon by concerned actors in the political process. Even during the peace process negotiations in Mbagathi in 2003-04, the private sector – together with the representatives of civil society – were significantly marginalised by those warlords who feared a re-run of Arta in 2000. Prior to a final vote on distribution of seats, the Somali business community met in Djibouti to discuss its possible role in the peace process.

Over the course of the Somali troubles, there has been a succinct absence of real engagement by international actors and those involved in the peace process to elevate the position of civil society in the political dialogue. Inclusiveness is a commonly used term for the case of Somalia, but it often refers to including the potential spoilers at any cost, while negating the role that the middle ground can play. Unfortunately, instability will continue as long as these potential spoilers and wayward politicians are indulged, and as long as no pressure is brought to bear in achieving greater inclusiveness in the imminent reconciliation process in Somalia.

[1] This particular grouping of insurgents evolved in the aftermath of the defeat of the UIC, and little is known of its make-up, though it is thought that some UIC members could be involved. It has also been suggested by some commentators that it is a mix of UIC and Hawiye sub-clan militias intent on ending the Ethiopian presence in Mogadishu.

Grassroots actors in Somali peacebuilding

The main objective of the Life & Peace Institute's (LPI) work in Somalia is to contribute toward national reconciliation through strengthening local and sub-national conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts. LPI aims to involve grassroots actors as partners in peace and conflict resolution or conflict transformation initiatives at all levels. Below are some examples of LPI's present activities in Somalia.

On the eve of the anticipated national reconciliation process in Somalia, where the National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) is expected to play a central role, a capacity building workshop for the NRC and Parliamentary Committee for Reconciliation (PCR) was conducted by LPI in Baidoa, in April 2007. The workshop was planned on the lessons learned from a previous NRC and PRC training session in August 2006. Members of both committees fully attended the training with dynamic participation and useful contributions, and showed strong interest in learning from the training.

The training session was officially opened by the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), the Honorable Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur. He said that he was one of beneficiaries of LPI capacity building trainings for district councils in 1999 and 2000, so he could understand and evaluate the usefulness of such trainings by LPI. He asked LPI to double its efforts towards peacebuilding and reconciliation in Somalia. The speaker also exhorted the participants to learn as much as they could from such training in the interest of their national responsibility.

On the final day of the training, deputy Prime Minister Ambassador Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail closed the workshop with encouraging words for both LPI and the members of the two committees. He said that the government is very much aware of the efforts of LPI to contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation in Somalia. He added that a good number of Somali Members of Parliament (MPs), district and regional commissioners had benefited from the LPI training in the 1990s.

A Women's Conference is planned to take place in Baidoa in June-July 2007 under the auspices of the ministry for Women Development and Family Affairs (WDAF) in collaboration with LPI. The conference will be a follow-up of a larger women's conference held last summer, where a recommendation was made to establish an Inter-regional Women Peace Committee. This committee is aiming to augment the role of women in peacebuilding, not only in their respective communities or regions but also at a national level. The women MPs in the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) are expected to play a leading role in the development and the articulation of women's issues in the conference.

A number of meetings with the traditional and religious leaders in the Bay region were held during the Somali Programme officer's stay in Baidoa. These leaders have greatly contributed to the resolution of many conflicts and peacebuilding efforts in all districts of the region.

In the meeting, the possibility was discussed of organizing a gathering for traditional and religious leaders, women and youth to enable them to share ideas and discuss issues relevant for the enhancement of peacebuilding and reconciliation in their respective districts and the region in general.

Traditionally these leaders are responsible for the management and resolution of conflicts within communities of their clans or other neighbouring communities. Therefore, it is crucial to strengthen their capacities and participation not only in the resolution of local conflicts but at a national level.

Kirsi Saaristo/Kristina Lundqvist

To compare suffering with suffering, violence with violence and conflict with conflict is a delicate, not to say impossible, task. Yet, in different conflict situations, where international intervention is called for, the understanding and identification of each context is important, in order to make a correct analysis and draw the proper conclusions.

The politics of naming: Genocide, civil war, insurgency

Mahmood Mamdani

The similarities between Iraq and Darfur are remarkable. The estimate of the number of civilians killed over the past three years is roughly similar. The killers are mostly paramilitaries, closely linked to the official military, which is said to be their main source of arms. The victims too are by and large identified as members of groups, rather than targeted as individuals. But the violence in the two places is named differently. In Iraq it is said to be a cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency, in Darfur it is called genocide. Why the difference? Who does the naming? Who is being named? What difference does it make?

The most powerful mobilisation in New York City is in relation to Darfur, not Iraq. One would expect the reverse, for no other reason than that most New Yorkers are American citizens and so should feel directly responsible for the violence in occupied Iraq. But Iraq is a messy place in the American imagination, a place with messy politics. Americans worry about what their government should do in Iraq. Should it withdraw? What would happen if it did? In contrast, there is nothing messy about Darfur. It is a place without history and without politics, simply a site where perpetrators clearly identifiable as 'Arabs' confront victims clearly identifiable as 'Africans'.

A full-page advertisement has appeared several times a week in the *New York Times* calling for intervention in Darfur now. It wants the intervening forces to be placed under 'a chain of command allowing necessary and timely military action without approval from distant political or civilian personnel'. That intervention in Darfur should not be subject to 'political or civilian' considerations and that the intervening forces should have the right to shoot – to kill – without permission from distant places, these are said to be 'humanitarian' demands. In the same vein, a *New Republic* editorial on Darfur has called for 'force as a first-resort response'. What makes the situation even more puzzling is that some of those who are calling for an end to intervention in Iraq are demanding an intervention in Darfur, as the slogan goes, 'Out of Iraq and into Darfur'.

> ***They speak the same language and embrace the same religion.***

What would happen if we thought of Darfur as we do of Iraq, as a place with a history and politics – a messy politics of insurgency and counter-insurgency? Why should an intervention in Darfur not turn out to be a trigger that escalates rather than reduces the level of violence as intervention in Iraq has done? Why might it not create the actual possibility of genocide, not just rhetorically but in reality? Morally, there is no doubt about the horrific nature of the violence against civilians in Darfur. The ambiguity lies in the politics of the violence, whose sources include both a state-connected counter-insurgency and an organised insurgency, very much like the violence in Iraq.

From co-operation to armed struggle

The insurgency and counter-insurgency in Darfur flared up in 2003. Both were driven by an intermeshing of domestic tensions in the context of a peace-averse international environment defined by the War on Terror. On the one hand, there was a struggle for power within the political class in Sudan, with more marginal interests in the west (following those in the south and in the east) calling for reform at the centre. On the other, there was a community-level split inside Darfur, between nomads and settled farmers, who had earlier forged a way of sharing the use of semi-arid land in the dry season. With the drought that set in towards the late 1970s, co-operation turned into an intense struggle over diminishing resources.

As the insurgency took root among the prospering peasant tribes of Darfur, the government trained and armed the poorer nomads and formed a militia – the Janjawiid – that became the vanguard of the unfolding counter-insurgency. The worst violence came from the Janjawiid, but the insurgent movements were also accused of gross violations. Anyone wanting to end the spiralling violence would have to bring about power-sharing at the state level and resource-sharing at the community level, land being the key resource.

Since its onset, two official verdicts have been delivered on the violence, the first from the US, the second from the UN. The American verdict was unambiguous: Darfur was the site of an ongoing genocide. The chain of events

leading to Washington's proclamation began with 'a genocide alert' from the Management Committee of the Washington Holocaust Memorial Museum. According to the *Jerusalem Post*, the alert was 'the first ever of its kind, issued by the US Holocaust Museum'. The House of Representatives followed unanimously on 24 June 2004. The last to join the chorus was the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell.

> ***Co-operation turned into an intense struggle over diminishing resources.***

The UN Commission on Darfur was created in the aftermath of the American verdict and in response to American pressure. It was more ambiguous. In September 2004, the Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, then the chair of the African Union (AU), visited UN headquarters in New York. Darfur had been the focal point of discussion in the AU. All concerned were alert to the extreme political sensitivity of the issue. At a press conference at the UN on 23 September Obasanjo was asked to pronounce on the violence in Darfur: was it genocide or not? His response was very clear:

Before you can say that this is genocide or ethnic cleansing, we will have to have a definite decision and plan and programme of a government to wipe out a particular group of people. Then we will be talking about genocide, ethnic cleansing. What we know is not that. What we know is that there was an uprising, rebellion, and the government armed another group of people to stop that rebellion. That's what we know. That does not amount to genocide from our own reckoning. It amounts to of course conflict. It amounts to violence.

The defining of genocide

By October, the Security Council had established a five-person commission of inquiry on Darfur and asked it to determine 'whether or not acts of genocide have occurred'. In its report, submitted on 25 January 2005, the commission concluded that 'the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide . . . directly or through the militias under its control'. But the commission did find that the government's violence was 'deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians'.

These acts, the commission concluded, 'were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to *crimes against humanity*' (my emphasis). Yet, the commission insisted, they did not amount to acts of genocide: 'The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing . . . it would seem that those who planned and organised attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.'

At the same time, the commission assigned secondary responsibility to rebel forces – namely, members of the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement – which it held 'responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to *war crimes*' (my emphasis). If the government stood accused of 'crimes against humanity', rebel movements were accused of 'war crimes'. Finally, the commission identified individual perpetrators and presented the UN Secretary General with a sealed list that included 'officials of the government of Sudan, members of militia forces, members of rebel groups and certain foreign army officers acting in their personal capacity'. The list named 51 individuals.

The commission's findings highlighted three violations of international law:



PHOTO: MOHAMMED AMEEN/ SCANPIX

An Iraqi soldier plays with a soccer ball at a checkpoint...




PHOTO: PAUL JEFFREY/ACT INTERNATIONAL

... just as a boy in Darfur. But it is not the same game in Iraq and Sudan, different "rules" are applied, concludes Mahmood Mamdani in this article.

disproportionate response, conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, targeting entire groups (as opposed to identifiable individuals) but without the intention to eliminate them as groups. It is for this last reason that the commission ruled out the finding of genocide. Its less grave findings of 'crimes against humanity' and 'war crimes' are not unique to Darfur, but fit several other situations of extreme violence, in particular the US occupation of Iraq, the Hema-Lendu violence in eastern Congo and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Sedentary and nomadic groups

The conflict in Darfur is highly politicised, and so is the international campaign. One of the campaign's constant refrains has been that the ongoing genocide is racial: 'Arabs' are trying to eliminate 'Africans'. But both 'Arab' and 'African' have several meanings in Sudan. There have been at least three meanings of 'Arab'. Locally, 'Arab' was a pejorative reference to the lifestyle of the nomad as uncouth. Regionally, it referred to someone whose primary language was Arabic. In this sense, a group could become 'Arab' over time. This process, known as Arabisation, was not an anomaly in the region: there was Amharisation in Ethiopia and Swahilisation on the East African coast. The third meaning of 'Arab' was 'privileged and exclusive'. It was the claim of the riverine political aristocracy who had ruled Sudan since independence and who equated Arabisation with the spread of civilisation and being Arab with descent.

> ***Peace cannot be built on humanitarian intervention.***

The Save Darfur campaign's characterisation of the violence as 'Arab' against 'African' obscured both the fact that the violence was not one-sided and the contest over the meaning of 'Arab' and 'African', a contest that was critical precisely because it was ultimately about who belonged and who did not in the political community called Sudan. The depoliticisation, naturalisation and, ultimately, demonisation of the notion 'Arab', as against 'African', has been the deadliest effect, whether intended or not, of the Save Darfur campaign.

Contrast this with the UN commission's painstaking effort to make sense of the identities 'Arab' and 'African'. The commission's report concentrated on three related points. First, the claim that the Darfur conflict pitted 'Arab' against 'African' was facile. 'In fact, the commission found that many Arabs in Darfur are opposed to the Janjawiid, and some Arabs are fighting with the rebels. At the same time, many non-Arabs are supporting the government and serving in its army.'

Second, it has never been easy to sort different tribes into the categories 'Arab' and 'African': 'The various tribes that have been the object of attacks and killings (chiefly the Fur, Massalit and Zeghawa tribes) do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic groups to which persons or militias that attack them belong. They speak the same language (Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Muslim). In addition, also due to the high measure of intermarriage, they can hardly be distinguished in their outward physical appearance from the members of tribes that allegedly attacked them. *Apparently, the sedentary and nomadic character of the groups constitutes one of the main distinctions between them*' (emphasis mine).

Finally, the commission put forward the view that political developments are driving the rapidly growing distinction between 'Arab' and 'African'. On the one hand, 'Arab' and 'African' seem to

have become political identities: 'Those tribes in Darfur who support rebels have increasingly come to be identified as 'African' and those supporting the government as the 'Arabs'. On the other hand, this development was promoted from the outside: 'The Arab-African divide has also been fanned by the growing insistence on such divide in some circles and in the media.'

> ***'The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing.'***

Why Darfur and not Iraq?

How, then, can it be that many of those calling for an end to the American and British intervention in Iraq are demanding an intervention in Darfur? It's tempting to think that the advantage of Darfur lies in its being a small, faraway place where those who drive the War on Terror do not have a vested interest. That this is hardly the case is evident if one compares the American response to Darfur to its non-response to Congo, even though the dimensions of the conflict in Congo seem to give it a mega-Darfur quality: the numbers killed are estimated in the millions rather than the hundreds of thousands. The bulk of the killing, particularly in Kivu, is done by paramilitaries trained, organised and armed by neighbouring governments. The victims on both sides – Hema and Lendu – are framed in collective rather than individual terms, to the point that one influential version defines both as racial identities and the conflict between the two as a replay of the Rwandan genocide. Given all this, how does one explain the fact that the focus of the most widespread and ambitious humanitarian movement in the US is on Darfur and not on Kivu?

The dynamic of civil war in Sudan has fed on multiple sources. First, the post-independence monopoly of power enjoyed by a tiny 'Arabised' elite from the riverine north of Khartoum, a monopoly that has bred growing resistance among the majority, marginalised populations in the south, east and west of the country. Second, the rebel movements which have in their turn bred ambitious leaders unwilling to enter into power-sharing arrangements as a prelude to peace. Finally, external forces that continue to encourage those who are interested in retaining or obtaining a monopoly of power.

The dynamic of peace, by contrast, has fed on a series of power-sharing arrangements, first in the south and then in the east. This process has been intermittent in Darfur. AU-organised negotiations have been successful in forging a power-sharing arrangement, but only for that arrangement to fall apart time and again. A large part of the explanation, as I suggested earlier, lies in the international context of the War on Terror, which favours parties who are averse to taking risks for peace. To reinforce the peace process must be the first commitment of all those interested in Darfur.

The camp of peace needs to come to a second realisation: that peace cannot be built on humanitarian intervention, which is the language of big powers. The history of colonialism should teach us that every major intervention has been justified as humanitarian, a 'civilising mission'. Now, as then, imperial interventions claim to have a dual purpose: on the one hand, to rescue minority victims of ongoing barbarities and, on the other, to quarantine majority perpetrators with the stated aim of civilising them. Iraq should act as a warning on this score. The worst thing in Darfur would be an Iraq-style intervention. That would almost certainly spread the civil war to other parts of Sudan, unravelling the peace process in the east and south and dragging the whole country into the global War on Terror.

This is an abbreviated version of an article with the same title first published in London Review of Books, LRB, Vol. 29, No. 5, 8 March 2007.



PHOTO: PAUL JEFFREY/ACT INTERNATIONAL

The physical structures are still there, but the houses are burnt and the villagers are displaced.

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB), initiated in the late 1980s, has provided thousands of readers in over 100 countries with news and information from the Horn of Africa region for more than 18 years. We knew that it was important, but the impact became evident with the numerous testimonies from readers in response to our letter about important changes to the HAB as of March 2007.

Horn of Africa Bulletin – old success meets new needs

Tore Samuelsson

Sture Normark, former Horn of Africa Programme Director at LPI, recalls the start of the media review in 1989.

– We initiated the news service to meet a need expressed by a network of mainly European ecumenical aid agencies engaged primarily in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. LPI was encouraged to summarize what was reported in the media and provide an editorial. The interest for this kind of service and knowledgebase was great, and I remember that we soon had subscribers in 40 countries.

The readership gradually grew with individuals and institutions. Target groups included decision makers as well as practitioners, and not least the Diaspora all over the world. One of the those engaged in the beginning, Mr George Wachira, later Director of the Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa, speaks about the ambition to build a communication link between the Horn of Africa region and other parts of the world, particularly Europe and the USA.

Importance source of information

Due to restructuring in the LPI office in Nairobi, the production of the HAB stopped last autumn, but since March this year production has been taken up again in a new format and with primarily digital distribution. The many e-mails and letters from readers received in response to the re-launch speak clearly about the communication linkages over the years.

There is the subscriber who explains that she had over the years made sure that the local library in her town in New Zealand got the HAB to put on the shelf. There is the respected university of School of Oriental and African Studies in London that informs us about the need to share the HAB with all relevant students, and that the digital version or the link to the website would fit them very well.

There are the voices from the Diaspora and refugees expressing deep gratitude for keeping them abreast over the years. There are the activists, field workers, church leaders, journalists, libraries and academics ... all telling us how much the HAB has meant to them in terms of an information source.

And there is our current intern at LPI, Hannah Tsadik, who found out that she is now working in the very place where the HAB has been produced. She grew up in an Ethiopian Diaspora family where the Bulletin played an important role for her parents as a source of information.


APRIL 2007

HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Analyses

- Condemned to repeat mistakes in Somalia
- Strong efforts needed to avoid a third Eritrean-Ethiopian war
- Sharpened risk for war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
- Internally displaced persons – a multifaceted dilemma

News and events

Resources and links

Condemned to repeat mistakes in Somalia

Is anyone learning anything from recent history in Somalia? Or are both Somalis and foreign interveners condemned to repeat past mistakes, over and over again?

That question was on the minds of many in late March, when grisly scenes from Mogadishu – corpses of foreign soldiers being dragged through the streets by angry mobs, and a helicopter crashing after being hit by ground fire – appeared on the evening news. The scenes were eerily reminiscent of images from the October 1993 Black Hawk Down disaster in Mogadishu. They raised the troubling question of whether Ethiopian decision-makers had learned anything at all from the disastrous UNOSOM experience of 1993-94. The last time foreign "peacekeepers" were deployed in Mogadishu against the wishes of a well-armed portion of the capital's population, they got bogged down in an unwinnable, asymmetrical, urban insurgency. Was there any reason to believe it would be different this time?

Ethiopia's slide into the Mogadishu quagmire – and Uganda's rush to join them with its own outgunned peacekeeping force – is hardly the only instance of a misstep in Somalia which, had lessons from the past been properly consulted, could have been avoided. Contemporary Somali politics is littered with horrific mistakes by Somalis and foreigners alike, all of whom seem to share a wilful disregard for lessons of history.

Among the more distressing failures to learn from history:

The elusive quest for a victor's peace. Somali state-building and reconciliation processes repeatedly produce the same disastrous outcome – a transitional government which on paper looks like a government of national unity, but which in reality concentrates power in the hands of a narrow political coalition at the expense of its rivals. The current administration, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), is no exception. These faux governments of national unity appear to believe they can dupe foreigners into providing them military and economic aid to allow them to impose a victor's peace on rivals.

History in Somalia instructs us that fragile transitional governments are too easy for spoilers to undermine, and that clans and groups left out of a government have no shortage of tools to sabotage, block, and unravel states they do not accept. Forging

HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

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The new HAB is a monthly electronic newsletter.

I was surprised that so many took their time to write e-mails and letters. Even the few regretting that they were too old to read or had other priorities were grateful for what HAB had offered in the past.

Is the Horn of Africa a region?

In discussions with some engaged readers we have reflected on the name "Horn of Africa". Is it a region and, if so, how does one define its borders? Sometimes there is the expression the "Greater Horn" in order to include additional countries. With a renewed effort to collaborate among the East African countries, with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development wrestling with political obstacles, for example related to the Somalia crisis, and with the war in Darfur spilling over into Chad and possibly the Central African Republic, it might become increasingly difficult to define the Horn of Africa as a region. We have, however, chosen to use the original name in the re-launching of the bulletin.

On another level, there is the concern that the Horn of Africa is a label with mainly negative connotations. A reader suggests that it is normally portrayed as a region of famine and war, and a region targeted for humanitarian assistance more than anything else. True as this might be if you would ask the man

or woman in the street in Europe, the USA or Asia, we do hope that the Horn of Africa Bulletin will bring also other perspectives. It is meant to be complementary to the general media flow and bring voices of justice and hope to the subscribers.

Sture Normark expresses his satisfaction with the re-launching of the HAB. He feels the new format, monthly issues with analyses, news and a resource list is most appropriate.

– Time has changed and while the problem in the 1980s was to get hold of relevant material, it is today a matter of selecting and analyzing in order to get a good overview for the engaged individuals and organizations. There is no lack of information, but you need someone that can direct you and present the most relevant material in terms of peace and reconciliation work. HAB offers insights, analyses and material that do not normally appear in the regular media.

HAB is free of charge

The editing and distribution of HAB is done by LPI in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils & Churches in the Great Lakes & the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). For feedback and more information, contact Director of Programmes Arthur N.E. Shoo, AACC, Director Fred Nyabera, FECCLAHA, or Communications Director Tore Samuelsson at LPI. For digital subscription, which is free of charge, just contact Ms Selin Amirthalingam by e-mail: HAB.subscriptions@life-peace.org or selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org, or call +46 18 16 97 71

Footnote

Editors over the years have been Susanne Lundén Thurfjell, Mats Lundström and Basil BS Nyama.

The re-started HAB as of March 2007 is edited by Tore Samuelsson and Kristina Lundqvist at LPI, in close collaboration with colleagues at AACC and FECCLAHA.

Christian-Muslim leaders' initiative for peace in Somalia

A contact and working group established during the Christian-Muslim leaders peace initiative on Somalia and the Horn of Africa conference in Dar-es-Salaam, held in early 2007, meets regularly to review the progress and seek synergy effects. An important mission to Somalia for meetings with the main actors is among the planned actions.

The peace initiative has underscored the need for close engagement and accompaniment of the multilateral diplomatic processes in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. These include the processes facilitated at the level of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the International Contact Group on Somalia.

One of the initiators, Fred Nyabera, Director of the Nairobi-based Fellowship of Christian Councils & Churches in the Great Lakes & the Horn of Africa, explains:

- It is envisaged that through track-two diplomacy, the initiative will be able to influence the decisions and approaches that are adopted in dealing with the Somalia and other conflicts in the region towards sustainable peace with justice in the region. The initiative's intervention will also advocate for a common and coordinated approach to the Somalia conflict and other conflicts in the region and seek to check unilateral actions by state and other non-state actors that jeopardize multilaterally agreed processes.

Indiscriminate attacks and aerial bombardments in populated areas in recent hostilities in Mogadishu have led to a high number of civilian deaths and injuries. The first quarter of 2007 has also witnessed an upsurge of revenge killings and inter-clan fighting in South-Central Somalia. The religious leaders see an urgent need to restore the broken relationships among sub-clans, clans, communities and individuals. It is also imperative to attend to the psychosocial needs of the individuals that are suffering trauma from the war.

The Christian-Muslim Leaders Peace Initiative on Somalia and the Horn of Africa conference has emphasized the need for an all-inclusive reconciliation and healing process to check the vicious cycle of conflict in Somalia and pave the way for the renaissance of the country. The conference has called for an exploration of the possible synergy between religious and traditional leaders in steering local and national level reconciliation and healing processes to complement the government-led national reconciliation process.

In seeking to foster reconciliation and the healing of clans, sub-clans, communities and individuals, the initiative will focus on local level reconciliation together with Somali traditional leaders. The process will also seek the participation of the Somali Diaspora community. Efforts will be made to ensure that local level reconciliation and healing feeds into the government-led reconciliation efforts at the national level.

- The contact group has been given an urgent mandate to immediately reach out to the religious leaders in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti who were not present in the conference, says Pastor Nyabera.

The conference proposed that Ethiopian and Eritrean religious leaders be invited to a meeting in a third country where they will be informed about the initiative, and through confidence and trust building explore their role in helping resolve the protracted border dispute between the two countries. The religious leaders will also nominate members to the contact group of the initiative.

A contact establishing mission will visit Somalia and hold meetings with the Transitional Federal Government, the religious, clan leaders and traditional leaders, and other actors in the Somali conflict. The aim of the mission is to brief the target groups about the initiative and its planned work with Somali religious and traditional leaders and the community. The mission will entail two visits: the first will have Muslim religious leaders from the region, and the second will consist of Christian and Muslim religious leaders and will build on the first visit and seek to implement the initiative's programmes.

Solidarity and fact finding missions will be undertaken by the initiative to Somalia and the Horn of Africa region on an ad hoc basis depending on the urgency of the situation and the importance of a regional interfaith intervention. It is envisaged that these missions will meet the advocacy objectives of the initiative, and will highlight gross violations of human rights and make the necessary appeals for humanitarian assistance.

Tore Samuelsson

A new research agenda of civil society in relation to conflict and conflict resolution has been set up. The question is no longer whether civil society has a role to play, but how it can fulfill its potential. The importance of strengthening the role of the state so that it may provide a nurturing context for civil society has been confirmed. On the other hand, peace will not evolve automatically only by the strengthening of civil society. The challenge is to position civil society within the larger peacebuilding endeavor.

Civil society and the state in peacebuilding:

"One cannot have one without the other"

Hannah Tsadik

A group of 140 Cambodians, Buddhist monks and lay people walking through the countryside together for twenty-one days after the signing of the 1991 peace agreement, encouraging remote villagers to have faith in the fragile peace.

Mobile phones in the hands of a network of volunteer citizens becoming tools in an alert system for potential spoiler violence during the political transition in Northern Ireland.

The scrap of destroyed weapons being transformed into ploughshares under the auspices of the Christian Council of Mozambique.

These are snapshots of the plentiful examples around the world[1] where citizens and various civil society groups have decided to be more than victims or helpless by-standers in areas that the onlooking world may call conflict-ridden, but the citizens call their home.

Civil society's potential to contribute to building peace has become widely accepted. A sure indication of this normative entrenchment is the UN Secretary General's statement in September 2005, which emphasized that more has to be done to tap into civil society's comparative advantages, namely a strong local presence and experience when it comes to peacebuilding.[2] Hence, both in theory and practice, the burning question is no longer whether civil society has a role to play, but rather how it can best realize its potential. This is particularly imperative, as recent research findings indicate that the mere existence and support of civil society does not automatically lead to successful peacebuilding.[3] Therefore, the focal inquiries are the roles and functions of civil society actors as well as the conditions for their effectiveness and success.

At the end of February, 2007, the author of this article and Dr Tarekegn Adebo, Research Coordinator, from the Life & Peace Institute attended the International Studies Association Conference in Chicago, where a group of researchers with expertise in civil society and peace studies were tasked to jointly refine a new framework to better understand civil society's role in peacebuilding. A new and much needed research agenda of systematic and comparative analysis of civil society's potential, limitations and other critical factors as it relates to armed conflict and its resolution has thus been set in motion.

Before proceeding it is important to have some conceptual clarity on the terms 'civil society' and 'peacebuilding', as their meaning is fairly elusive and contested. Broadly speaking, civil society is "the arena of voluntary, un-coerced collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values"[4] – contention typically arises when the concept is positioned vis-à-vis other arenas, such as the state, market and family. Certain schools of thought stress that civil society is a sector of its own[5], while others understand it as the space between, or the overlap of, societal sectors[6]. The latter understanding is helpful because it 'un-Westernizes' the concept to some degree by uncovering actors that have been neglected in the more conventional understanding of civil society, e.g., traditional associations in Africa that cover several spheres, refusing to be neatly boxed in a single one.

Peacebuilding can be defined in various ways[7], depending on the understanding of the scope and timeframe of the endeavor. This article subscribes to a compromise definition, which states that "peacebuilding aims at preventing and managing armed conflict and sustaining peace after organized violence has ended – [it] covers all activities that are directly linked to this objective within a timeframe of 5-10 years"[8]. If all constructive initiatives of any sort for an indefinite period of time in post-conflict settings are deemed peacebuilding, the definition becomes too large and therefore unhelpful as illuminator of the concept. Conceptual clarity is needed to help narrow down the concrete type of peacebuilding work towards which society can successfully contribute.

Though the notion that civil society actors can positively engage in peacebuilding is not new under the sun, theory has not always captured that reality. For a long time peace research as an academic discipline has supposed an elite-level, state-oriented lens, often with an undue emphasis on the role of external actors. John Paul Lederach's groundbreaking framework[9] identified three tracks of peacebuilding and moved the thinking along on how to build peace, sustained from within and from below.[10] Inspired by Lederach's approach, a "mushrooming of peacebuilding initiatives" could be witnessed in the mid-1990s performed by all sorts of non-state actors, most of them from the civil society sphere.[11]

With the increased activity of primarily peace NGOs and subsequent donor funds being channeled through them, new questions have arisen – primarily regarding the impact and effectiveness of these initiatives and the appropriate means to bolster the above two.[12] In order to respond to the issues at hand through research, it has been deemed important to map the 'lay of the land' first, to intellectually tame the diversity

of civil society actors and initiatives. Roughly, two ways of categorizing civil society engagement in peacebuilding have emerged.

The typology that has gotten most attention in the past, both in theory and practice, has been the actor-oriented one.[13] The emphasis on understanding 'who is doing something' over 'what they are doing' (functional approach) has received some recent criticism. Mapping out the identity of actors involved in peacebuilding has not yielded enough fruit, in terms of enabling systematic analysis of their contribution to peacebuilding – primarily because such an approach does not sufficiently emphasize the purpose and objectives of civil society engagement in peacebuilding.[14] It is then this second typology, the functional approach, which has now stepped into the limelight as a potential way to further research on the nexus of peacebuilding and civil society – yet the findings of this new research are also likely to improve peacebuilding practice.

Seven functions of civil society

The foundation of this perspective has largely been laid by the work of German political scientists Merkel and Lauth, who presented five civil society functions in their research on system transformation in Eastern Europe[15], and development cooperation practice has stood as a second source of relevant functions[16]. These discourses have been revived and adapted for peacebuilding purposes by researchers Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk in the 2006 World Bank Paper "Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding", and in their innovative framework seven civil society functions in peacebuilding have been developed. Some of these functions have already surfaced in Paffenholz' earlier work on LPI's work in Somalia, but have been refined further in the 2006 framework.[17]

The seven functions entail the following[18]:

1. *Protection*: Protecting citizens' life, freedom and property against attacks from state and non-state actors. During and in the aftermath of conflict, protection in essence becomes a precondition for fulfilling other roles and functions, as civil society actors are hindered in carrying out their work when threatened by armed groups. This function is often linked to external NGOs that support local civil society as watchdogs or through accompaniment.
2. *Monitoring/Accountability*: Observing and monitoring the activities of all pertinent actors (e.g. government, conflict parties) or relevant issues. This function is closely related to the advocacy function – international and local groups monitor the conflict situation and disseminate the information to advocacy groups or give recommendations directly to pertinent decision-makers.
3. *Advocacy/Public Communication*: Articulating specific interests, bringing relevant social and political issues to the public agenda and inciting public debate.
4. *Socialization/Culture of Peace*: Working for attitudinal change in the direction of tolerance, reconciliation and mutual trust within adversarial groups and thus imparting a 'culture of peace', especially in divided societies. Out of the seven functions, this function is most employed by civil society actors engaged in peacebuilding.
5. *Conflict Sensitive Social Cohesion*: Restoring/building social capital and bridging societal cleavages. The objective of this function is to help adversarial groups to learn to live together in peaceful coexistence. Variants of dialogue programs are the most used strategies to achieve this end.
6. *Intermediation/Facilitation*: Acting as a facilitator between citizens/interest groups and the state, but also between conflict parties as well as within and between societal groups.
7. *Service Delivery*: Providing basic needs to citizens as an entry point to other peacebuilding functions.

Moreover, it is understood that simply tracing functions will not suffice for a true understanding of the optimal involvement of civil society in peacebuilding. Therefore, the functional approach is complimented with a contextual analysis in order to understand the enabling environment for civil society to carry out these functions in particular settings, as well as relevance and effectiveness assessments of each function in the different conflict phases. At the first stage of testing the framework empirically, some tentative research findings have been presented. Below, a few of them are highlighted.

The functionalist approach

Regarding the functions themselves, two have stood out for opposite reasons. The function of advocacy has been found to be one of the most important civil society functions, especially as it is relevant in all conflict phases – though the nature of the issues may differ for each phase.[19] The constructive role of service delivery for peacebuilding, on the other hand, has been contested. Some empirical evidence shows that the engagement of civil society organizations in service delivery (as a means to build peace) distorts their "priorities, incentives and accountability"[20] and undermines the role of the state. The counter arguments relate to the nexus between development and security – e.g., delivering services to excluded communities may address some of the root causes of the conflict.



PHOTO: KIRSI SAARISTO/LPI

Civil society's potential to contribute to building peace has become widely recognized. Here represented by a major conference for Somali women arranged in Baidoa by LPI.

Regarding the nature of civil society, two clear insights have been distilled from the first round of analyzing empirical data.[21] First, civil society's engagement in armed conflict is not always constructive. There is such a phenomenon called 'uncivil society', in which segments of civil society preach hatred against perceived outgroups and even may instigate violence.

Second, empirical evidence shows that most donor support goes to urban-based NGOs who know the 'donor speak' at the expense of 'genuine' civil society, groups who may be more difficult to identify and gain access to. The hope is that assuming a functional approach will lead donors to partner with those who are already performing these functions, whoever and wherever they may be. Of course, another set of debatable issues come up when the work of the civil society organizations is stressed over their identity – e.g., should fundamentalist/chauvinist segments of civil society be supported if they are best positioned to carry out a certain function?

Regarding the enabling environment in which civil society operates, it is confirmed that strengthening the role of the state, so that it in its turn may provide a nurturing context for civil society to flourish, is equally important. One cannot have one without the other. It is important to remember that supporting civil society is no panacea. Some of the logic of channeling support through civil society seems to have been birthed out of a donor weariness of going through ineffective and corrupt state structures to do development and peace work.

No miracle solution

While strengthening and building the capacity of civil society certainly is a worthy objective, it would be foolhardy to believe that peace will descend with the fulfillment of that objective alone and thus bypass the state. *This* is the real research gap, as I understand it. The challenge is not so much this neat categorization and clustering of civil society as it is to position the same, with its composite actors and functions, within the larger peacebuilding endeavor. Formulated as a question: How can the plentiful civil society initiatives, now organized into functions, accumulatively be linked to and have an effect on the larger macro-level conflict and peace dynamics or on the official peace or state-building processes?[22]

One obvious answer seems to be that those segments of civil society that wish to have an impact on the macro-level dynamics must themselves be prepared to operate and cooperate with actors from that level[23], without being 'co-opted by power'. The presented functions themselves witness that there is reluctance towards such a proposition. In those functions where the state is mentioned the relationship between state and civil society is consistently adversarial. This is perhaps an effect of a liberal bias in peacebuilding research. There is a fear of resuscitating a predatory state and a presumption that follows, namely that the best state is a limited state and thereof the desire to create a strong, liberal society that can restrain the state.[24]

Yet, prominent researchers have found that liberalization prior to institutionalization can unleash societal demands before the state has developed the institutional capacity to channel and respond to those demands, thus triggering instability and conflict.[25] In other words, peacebuilding cannot be divorced from state building. So what does that mean for civil society? Should it fold its collective arms and shut down business until the state is reconstructed, a task that may take decades? Certainly not, the Buddhist monks should keep walking and the Mozambican weapons continue to be transformed into ploughshares, but this does not preclude segments of civil society from contributing to the 'building of their state to build peace'. A small example would be for a pertinent civil society organization to facilitate a capacity-building program for parliamentarians interested in acquiring conflict analysis tools.

Taking on a state building lens on civil society peacebuilding functions does not have to be synonymous with being handmaidens of the state or undermining the role of the same. Civil society has undoubtedly a vested interest in a sound state and good governance. If such lofty aims are ever to be reached, that will most likely happen by means of collaborating and deliberation across spheres (e.g., state, market and civil society) as opposed to antagonizing each other and inadvertently fuelling the conflict dynamics – in the name of peacebuilding.

[1] All examples are taken from People Building Peace II – Successful stories of Civil Society, eds. Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema and Juliette Verhooven. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers (2005).

[2] Secretary-General Statement, New York. 20 September 2005. http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1692

[3] Paffenholz, Thania and Spurk, Christoph, "Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding", Social Development Paper, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, No. 36, Washington DC: World Bank (October 2006), 1.

[4] Merkel, W and Lauth, H. (1998), cited in the above note on page 7.

[5] Exemplified here by the position of the Centre for Civil Society, London.
< http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/>

[6] See note 4.

[7] For the latest conceptual debates of peacebuilding, see Michael Barnett, David Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, "Peacebuilding: What's in a Name?" Global Governance, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2007).

[8] Paffenholz and Spurk (2006).

[9] Lederach, Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

[10] In this framework, Lederach divided society into three levels, and at each level or track he identified actors to be approached with different peacebuilding strategies. Lederach focuses on empowering the middle level in each society to build peace, as he assumes that such a focus would influence peacebuilding at the macro as well as grassroots levels.

[11] Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), 18.

[12] Examples of recent peacebuilding evaluation literature: Anderson, M.B et al. "Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practioners". Cambridge, MA: The Collaborative for Development Action (2003); Church, C. and Shoudice, J. "The evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Part I and II. INCORE, Londonderry (2003); Paffenholz, T. Aid for Peace. Baden Baden: Nomos (2007).

[13] A list of actor-oriented approaches may be found in Paffenholz, Thania and Spurk, Christoph. "The different roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: New Insights from a functionalist perspective", Paper presented at the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association 28 February-3 March 2007, Chicago, p. 4.

[14] See note 4.

[15] See note 4.

[16] Paffenholz and Spurk (2007).

[17] Some thirteen functions, or strategies, were identified in LPI's peacebuilding approach in Somalia. See Paffenholz, Thania. Community-based Bottom-up Peacebuilding. Uppsala, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute (2003), 49.

[18] The functions are taken from Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), 27-32.

[19] Forster, Reiner and Mattner, Mark. "Civil Society and Peacebuilding", Social Development Department Report, No. 36445-GLB, Washington DC: World Bank (December 2006), 14-15.

[20] Ibid.

[21] The following findings can be found in Paffenholz and Spurk (2007), 20-21.

[22] What Anderson et al (2003) call 'Peace writ Large'.

[23] Synonymous with Track 1 in Lederach's conceptualization. See note 10.

[24] Barnett, Micahel. "Building a Republican Peace", International Security, Vol. 30, No.4 (Spring 2006), 89.

[25] For example, Paris, Roland. At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. New York: Cambridge Press.

After eight years as the Director of the Conflict Transformation Programme at the Life & Peace Institute, Claudette Werleigh moves on to the position as Secretary General of Pax Christi International. She describes herself as "a black woman with origin and cultural legacy from America and Africa". With her experiences and knowledge she leaves a deep impact on LPI and will continue to be a bridge-builder in her new context.

The world always needs peace and reconciliation

Kristina Lundqvist

Claudette Werleigh, trained as a lawyer, *former* Executive Director of the Washington Office on Haiti, *former* Foreign Minister and *former* Prime Minister of Haiti, and up to March of this year Director of the Conflict Transformation Programme at the Life & Peace Institute (LPI), is the *future* Secretary General of Pax Christi International (PCI). In November 2007 she will succeed Etienne de Jonghe, who has had the post for nearly 30 years.

> ***People motivated by their faith have a strong pillar to lean upon, an inner force they can grab and hold on to.***

Claudette Werleigh has been with LPI for eight years, a period that has added to her wealth of experiences and given her valuable insights to share with people around her. She is a person who never boasts about herself but has a deep and rich source of wisdom and humility. In the shift between her years at LPI and her future at PCI she reflects on what she has learnt and done, and what she wants to bring with her into the next phase of her life.

PCI is already very well known to Claudette Werleigh. From 1992 to 2001 she served as its Vice President and Member of its Executive Committee. So, with her experiences from LPI and PCI she has a broad picture of what it means to work with peacebuilding and conflict resolution within a faith-based context, and is also familiar with the work of non-faith-based institutions.

– When it comes to the methods and techniques for carrying out conflict transformation programmes or implementing peace building activities, I don't see much difference between faith-based and non-faith-based institutions, says Claudette Werleigh. After all, most peace building practitioners have been trained in the same schools of thought and been exposed to the same concepts. They have read and learnt from the same great scholars: Mary B. Anderson, Adam Curle, Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederach, Thania Paffenholz, Peter Wallensteen, to name a few.

The motivation of faith

In her broad contacts Claudette Werleigh has seen that both faith-based and non-faith-based organisations are doing an excellent job. They also have much of the same target audience. Both the Catholic PCI and the ecumenical LPI have a broad and inclusive approach when it comes to the people they work with and for.

The main difference, according to Claudette Werleigh, lies in the motivation of the faith-based actors, the inner strength that inhabits them, the in-depth conviction that they are carrying some sort of a sacred mission, that they form part of something greater than themselves.

– Such deep conviction is what feeds and sustains the faith-based actors and helps them carry their activities during the most adverse circumstances and enduring moments. People motivated by their faith have a strong pillar to lean upon, an inner force they can grab and hold on to, where they draw their inspiration from and also find the strength they need.

Another possible difference that Claudette Werleigh has noticed is in the workplace environment. As people working in faith-based organisations tend to believe that they are all animated by the same faith or share the same values, such assumption or knowledge serves as some sort of cement that binds them together. And it is such togetherness and collective effort which actually can make a difference.

– I, personally, have been brought up and profess the Christian Catholic faith, continues Claudette Werleigh. My understanding is that Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and other faiths also profess such virtues as brotherhood, tolerance, understanding, compassion and love.

In spite of that, religion is sometimes perceived and presented as a cause of conflicts. Claudette Werleigh believes that this is due to the fact that religion, as well as politics, is a very "flammable" or emotional topic.

– With faith and conviction comes, in my view, responsibility. This is why I believe that those of us who profess our faith also carry the responsibility to put our faith into practice, or action, and live up to the values that we proclaim.

Security on the geopolitical agenda

During Claudette Werleigh's eight years with LPI drastic events have occurred in the world, some giving rise to the evolvement of major changing trends. One of the most striking examples is, of

course, September 11, 2001. She thinks that since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers in New York and on the Pentagon, security has become the most important topic on the geopolitical agenda of world leaders. These attacks have furnished occasion and, at times, pretext for operating deep cuts in the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and placing restrictions on already agreed-upon individual citizens' rights.

As for 11 September, although less costly in human lives, the riots in Paris in autumn 2005 sent a strong message that something is definitively wrong in the actual world order. Claudette Werleigh is upset with what she has seen:

– When I saw the riots in Paris on TV, I could not help but think of a special TV programme that I had seen, precisely in Paris, about a year before. It was a documentary prepared or commissioned by Abbé Pierre and his organisation Emmaus as a way to commemorate the World Habitat Day.

– I have visited Paris a number of times for discovery and leisure as a tourist, or to attend meetings, participate in conferences and seminars. Still, I had no idea that in such a magnificent metropolis so many people, mostly immigrants, lived in such appalling conditions: overcrowded quarters – that should be either demolished or refurbished – lacking running water, electricity and/or heat.

The riots in Paris have raised a warning flag that discrimination, marginalisation and unemployment are hotbeds for violence. In spite of the fact that several analysts have established the correlation between the conditions prevailing in some suburbs and the recent upheavals, the response of the establishment has been heavily put on security measures.

– While the latter are by all means necessary, unless strong measures are also taken to build up better integrated communities within a better balanced and equitable society, there is no guarantee that such violent incidents will not occur again, reflects Claudette Werleigh.

I had no idea that in such a magnificent metropolis so many people, mostly immigrants, lived in such appalling conditions.

Information around the globe

Information technology plays an ever-increasing role in the world of today, and some people call the 21st century the Technology Era. At a speed never experienced before, new technologies are invented, and it becomes day by day easier, quicker and less expensive to communicate with other people and to know what is happening around the world. This is shaping and changing human lives all over the world.

Claudette Werleigh remembers the weeks after Christmas 2004:

– Images of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean circulated around the globe. Also manifestations of climate changes, unusual or long periods of drought, mudslides, and floods, with their heavy death tolls, keep taking place and are becoming more and more frequent. Thus, a new awareness and concern for the environment is gradually increasing, partly thanks to the power of the information technology that I have mentioned above.

Because of this new power to share news, consult and organise at a speed and on a scale that was not possible before, big demonstrations have been able to take place in different cities to protest against the actual – unjust – world order and the institutions that sustain it, mainly the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Huge protests against the war in Iraq have also taken place almost simultaneously.

– Unfortunately, remarks Claudette Werleigh, on such important matters as war and economy, some powerful world leaders who have been elected by

PHOTO: TORE SAMUELSSON/LPI



Claudette Werleigh discussing with Bernard Makiza, Media Ombudsman in Congo Brazzaville, and her colleague Jérôme Gouzou.

PHOTO: LPI



Claudette Werleigh is moving on to head International Pax Christi in Brussels after having served LPI for eight years.

the people of their respective countries, supposedly to implement the will of the people, have chosen to be blind and deaf, and not side with the people. What a lesson of democracy this must be for ordinary people!

Giving and sharing

Asked what she will bring to PCI, Claudette Werleigh answers with a French expression: "On ne donne que ce qu'on a", which means that one can only give and share what one possesses.

– I am not going to change or to "revolutionise" Pax Christi International. And I don't think anybody expects me to do so. In any case, this would be an error. Pax Christi International Secretary, Etienne De Jonghe, has done a fantastic job. What I will do is to bring a personal touch, which inevitably will be different, and to a certain extent complement what is already there.

Claudette Werleigh reflects on the difference in backgrounds of herself and her predecessor:

– The actual Secretary General is a white European male who lives in a rich country. At the opposite, I am a black woman whose origin and cultural legacy comes both from America and Africa. I was born and grew up in Haiti, one of the most impoverished places on earth. It is a country one almost never hears about unless there is some coup d'etat or some bloody upheavals, always imputable to the Haitians themselves, whether the violence comes from the established forces: military, "tontons macoutes", or, as more recently, from gangs as the "chimeres".

What many people do not know is that Haiti is the first country where former slaves already in the 18th century[1] successfully fought for independence and put an end to slavery.

What most people certainly ignore is that, as an independent country, Haiti welcomed (actually gave both freedom and land to) all the people who came to take refuge in its premises.

– What some people do know but choose to forget is that my Haitian forefathers helped countries like the USA and several others in South America gain their independence. Somehow, I carry with me these ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity, although I recognize that my country is far from what our ancestors wanted it to be, says Claudette Werleigh.

Having grown up at a time of dictatorship, Claudette Werleigh has experienced fear, prejudice and violence against her loved ones.

– These are not merely theoretical concepts to me. I have experienced in my soul and body what they mean and why it is so important that I work for a world free of violence, a world at peace, in peace.

Wealth of experiences

Claudette Werleigh comes to PCI with an accrued knowledge and experience of countries in Africa, in particular the two Congos, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. She has also had the opportunity to get to know better some of the other Christian Churches: the Evangelical, Lutheran, Methodist, Orthodox and Pentecostal. Also, although briefly, she has had the opportunity to exchange views and collaborate with Buddhists and Hindus. She has experienced working both in governmental and non-governmental settings. Most important of all, perhaps, she has worked closely with people from different backgrounds and socio-economic strata.

– This has exposed me to different points of view. The resulting – or acquired – capacity to listen to and to understand different angles of a situation has made me realise that opposed positions are not always, neither necessarily, irreconcilable. As a result, I have at times, worked as a bridge, which is important in any organisation aiming at promoting peace.

> ***"It becomes day by day easier, quicker and less expensive to know what is happening around the world.***

"On ne donne que ce qu'on a" – you can only give and share what you possess. It is very obvious that Claudette Werleigh has a wealth of experiences, knowledge and empathy to give and share in her future position as Secretary General of PCI.

– As long as there are violent conflicts, as long as people die from the deliberate actions of others, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace building remain relevant, she concludes.

Since 2004 the European Union (EU) has included eight post-communist states. Relating to the Western European party system literature, this article explores and examines ideological cleavages, dimensions and salient issues in the politics of these new member states. Therein, the aim is to capture some of the similarities – but also the variance – between the new, post-communist EU member countries.

Ideological differences between old and new EU members

Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders

In many respects, the enlargement of the European Union (EU) has been a peace project. Hence, the aim and goal of the enlargement in 2004 was not only to extend the internal market of the EU. It was also believed that bringing a vast number of post-communist countries into the EU would guarantee the stability of the region and minimise the risk of conflict. This belief was initially supported by the fact that merely the prospect of becoming a member of the EU, by itself, brought some stability into the political systems of candidate member states, along with an increased economic stability and growth as well as the firm establishment of the principle of government by law.[1]

For this reason, and considering that the foundation of the enlargement is the postulate that all member states share some basic characteristics, including representative democracy based on comparatively stable party systems, the enlargement of the EU provides a logical starting point for comparative efforts into former communist Europe. Here, the particular focus is the comparison of ideological dimensions in party politics in the new, post-communist EU member states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.

In traditional party and party system literature, political parties are often categorised into party families according to their ideological positioning. Therein, the notion of party families is often derived from Seymoure Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's concept of social cleavages that are reflected in party systems and in party ideologies (see below). However, even though each country has its own constellation of parties, with roots in its specific cleavage structure, and its own set of principal ideologies and prevailing issues that dominate the political debate, in Western Europe it is not uncommon to identify party families primarily along a left-right socioeconomic dimension.

Cleavages and ideological dimensions

According to Rokkan and Lipset, there are essentially four historical cleavages that have developed from the national and industrial revolution, and which later have converted into party ideologies and translated into party alignments. The first conflict was the one between dominant and subjective cultures, or, in other words, between regional interests, between the centre and the periphery of a nation or state. This dimension is today more commonly referred to as a cleavage between the socio-political centre and its periphery. The second conflict line was between the authority of the church and state, including conflicts with respect to the secularization of the state and a supranational church. The third conflict occurred between the interests of the primary and the secondary economy, typically between the countryside and the town. Finally, the fourth cleavage occurred between workers and employers or owners, i.e., the class cleavage.[2]

In the 1970s and 1980s, in most democratic party systems, Arend Lijphart identified a total of seven ideological dimensions. These were, amongst others, the socioeconomic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural and post-materialist dimension.[3] Today, still, most of these dimensions can be identified in various European countries, though it is rather commonly agreed upon that the socioeconomic dimension has come to dominate the others.

Therein, our understanding of a party's position in a party system commonly derives from our understanding of the ideological position of the party on a continuum from the left to the right with respect to the role of the state in the market economy, taxation, welfare policies and related issues. And whenever 'new' issues develop, such as environmental values or integration, voters seem to incorporate these in their understanding of a prevailing pattern of party ideologies in a one-dimensional left-right continuum that is congruent with the left-right socioeconomic continuum.

> ***Party systems in the new EU member countries are formed along similar dividing lines as Western European party systems.***

Diverse party systems

In former communist EU countries, some scholars would argue that today there are only two dimensions affecting voting behaviour: the socioeconomic and the cultural dimension. Here, the socioeconomic dimension refers more precisely to the cleavage between those who favour free market economy versus those who prefer welfare orientated state interventionism. The cultural dimension, on the other hand, expresses a division between particularism and universalism, sometimes expressed in

PHOTO: EUROPEAN COMMISSION



1 May 2004 was the "E-Day", the day of enlargement of the EU to 25 countries.

a conflict between the traditional and the modern, the confessional and the secular, and between nationalism and a pan-European orientation.[4]

All of these dimensions were initially also identified as separate ideological dimensions in Western Europe by Lijphart. Hence, regardless of its further analytical implications, this suggests that party systems in the new EU member countries are formed along similar dividing lines as Western European party systems. Yet, taking a closer look at the party systems of the eight post-communist EU member states that entered the EU in 2004, we find that different patterns and developmental trends occur in the different countries.

In relation to ideological divides, scholars of parties and party systems in the eight post-communist EU member states offer evidence that the first dimension of conflict in these countries was the communist-anti-communist cleavage. This cleavage dominated politics in the early years of the democratic regime. However, since the first years, different dimensions of conflict have risen, and the communist-anti-communist cleavage line has began to fade away.

But contrary to expectations in the 'old' EU member states, it appears that the socioeconomic cleavage line has not become as dominant as one might have thought, based on the Western European experience. Instead, in most post-communist countries the (socio)economic dimension has become secondary or subordinated. In fact, only the Czech party system seems to be a more or less one-dimensional clustering around a socioeconomic dimension. Only a few parties make an effort to generate votes based on other issues and/or dimensions. Alongside the socioeconomic agenda, these occasionally emphasise a nationalist rhetoric and moral-conservative issues, in particular.

Moreover, in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia the socioeconomic dimension appears to be emerging as a potential dominant dimension in the future, but in Hungary it is clearly secondary. Instead, the nationalist and moral-cultural cleavages emerge as the dominant cleavage lines. In Poland too, the socioeconomic dimension has been clearly subordinated to the moral-cultural and historical interests (see below).

Morality, culture and history

Instead of the socioeconomic dimension, it appears that ideological dimensions in post-communist EU countries today commonly include something we might call a *moral-cultural* and/or a *cultural-historical dimension*.[5] The former includes religiosity, being particularly salient in Poland and Lithuania, but also moral attitudes with regard to family-life, lifestyles and sex, drugs, euthanasia, abortions etc. These constitute a common dividing line between parties in almost all post-communist EU countries, regardless of the role of religiosity in and by itself.

In some instances this dimension is related to as a church-state divide in its classical sense, but in a broader sense it focuses more on moral issues in modern societies than on the role of the church versus the secularization of the state. Therein, this dimension is of relevance also in countries where the role of religiosity and the church is downplayed, for example in Slovakia. Moreover, expanding the notion of 'culture' from moral-cultural issues to include historical identity, there is a so-called *cultural-historical cleavage* dealing with the past in Slovenia, for instance.

In Hungary, in contrast, there is a nationalist cleavage that is essential to the ideological divides of the country, dealing with issues concerning national identity and minorities. However, this nationalist dimension may also be included in a broader cultural dimension, including the communist past, national identity and the Hungarian interest in protecting minority rights in neighbouring countries. In addition, in Poland, nationalism has also been a salient issue in politics, but here it has primarily been part of a so-called nationalist-cosmopolitan divide. In Poland, this divide is based on attitudes towards EU integration and the role of foreign capital, which in part places the nationalist divide in Poland on the socioeconomic dimension.

Moreover, there is also a cluster of countries with a clear-cut and dominant *centre-periphery dimension* that resembles the Hungarian case in regard to identity issues, but rather refers to the conflict between the dominant culture of the political centre and the (sub)cultures of the periphery. This dimension is most commonly related to the ethnic issues in Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia. However, where ethnic issues have been downplayed in politics in

Estonia in recent years, in part because Russian minority interests have been incorporated into a variety of Estonian parties, this conflict is still very much present in Latvia.

In Slovakia, on the other hand, the centre-periphery dimension is two-dimensional: first, it includes a conflict in respect to ethnic divisions and, second, it includes regime orientation. This conflict was first derived from the position of Slovakia in relation to the Czech centre of influence in the early years of post-communist rule, and later rooted in the development of a centralized and authoritarian rule of the Slovak Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in the 1990s. However, the regime aspect of the centre-periphery cleavage has been fading away in Slovakia since the HZDS became an opposition party.[6]

Finally, there was also a salient urban-rural dimension found, particularly in Estonia and Slovenia, referring to conflicts in respect to landed and urban interests. In some respects this dimension, too, overlaps with the cultural divide. For instance in Slovenia the urban-rural dimension mainly polarises on issues related to traditionality versus modernity.[7]

In Hungary there is a nationalist cleavage that is essential to the ideological divides of the country.

New ideological dimensions

Returning to the initial aim of this article, to capture varieties as well as similarities between new EU member states and relating these to the experience of the old EU member states, it appears that Jasiewicz' earlier identification of only two dominant ideological dimensions in the party systems of new EU member states is still quite accurate. The communist-anti-communist divide is fading away, being replaced by an emerging socio-economic dimension in some of the new EU member states.

However, contrary to expectations, this dimension seems to be secondary – or sometimes absent – in all countries but the Czech Republic. Instead, the cultural dimension is dominant, though it occurs in somewhat different shapes in different countries. In one country the cultural dimension is a dimension of national identity, in others it is a moral-religious dimension, or a dimension closer to what one might call a centre-periphery dimension.

Focusing on the future development of parties and party systems in the EU, the problem is then to foresee in what direction the EU is headed: is it feasible to believe that parties and party systems in post-communist EU member states will, in time, consolidate into party systems along established ideological dimensions as we know them in Western Europe? Or is it reasonable to believe that those differences in ideological orientation that we find today between old and new member states will prevail? Or is it rather to be expected that the new EU member states are, in fact, moving 'ahead' of the development of Western Europe? From where we are standing now, it seems possible that this may be the case.

Based on the experience of post-communist EU member states, the new cleavages in a majority of EU member states may very well, in the near future, primarily concern culture and national identity, including cultural-historical, moral and religious issues. This is supported by the fact that moral-cultural issues and nationalist sentiments have become increasingly more dominant in the old EU countries as well as in the new. Here, I refer to the electoral successes of far right and populist right-wing parties in Belgium, Austria and Denmark, for instance, which have also generated an opposition and polarisation along this dimension in those countries.

In addition, in countries lacking a clear-cut far right party taking a stand on nationalist and moral-conservative issues, there seems to be a tendency among established parties to incorporate some of the 'new' issues and themes in their rhetoric.[8] This, in addition to an increased individualisation of party politics and a decrease in party alignment and party loyalty in Western Europe, suggests that it is quite feasible that 'old' cleavage structures erode in European party politics.[9] However, due to long-lasting ties and traditions in political behaviour, the process towards change may proceed in a somewhat slower pace in the 'old' EU member states than in post-communist, new member states.

This article is largely based on the book edited by the author, 'Post-communist EU Member States. Parties and Party Systems', Ashgate 2006. In part it is a summary of a lecture held at the Åland Peace Institute in January 2007

[1] Raunio and Tiilikainen 2002, p. 9
[2] Rokkan 1990. Also, see Gallagher, Lave and Mair 2001 (chapter 9) for a comprehensive overview of cleavage structures and electoral development.
[3] Lijphart 1990
[4] Jasiewicz 2003
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7] ibid
[8] See for instance Kitschelt (1997), Lubbers (2001) and Jungerstam-Mulders (2003) on the electoral success on far right parties in Western Europe. In respect of the change of (some) issue positions and shifts of parties in Western Europe, see for instance Kitschelt (1997) and Lubbers (2001).
[9] See Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001) for a discussion on the erosion of party ties and change in cleavage structures and electoral behaviour in Western Europe.

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For nearly four decades, Tony Klug has written about the imperative of an equitable Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, the futility of military solutions and the flawed character of most past peace plans. Now he explains how peace finally broke out in the Middle East. Well, not exactly the whole Middle East, nor quite a definitive peace ...

ISRAEL-PALESTINE:

Peace in principle or on the ground?

Tony Klug

The comment that sparked it all off followed an on-the-record lecture at the prestigious Chatham House in London during which the "security fence", the targeted assassinations, the detention of thousands of Palestinians and the deadlock generally in the peace process were all blamed on "Palestinian terrorism" and the constant threat to Israeli security. In response to a question from the floor Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert casually affirmed that in the hypothetical event that a full and genuine peace with the Palestinians and the Arab states were obtainable, Israel would "of course" be willing to withdraw fully from the West Bank, subject to agreed minor land exchanges. This formula would allow Israel to hold on to the large settlement blocs in close proximity to the old green line while relinquishing the more far-flung settlements. "This has always been Israel's position", he went on, "didn't we withdraw from Gaza - and Lebanon too? But we have constantly been forced to defend ourselves in the face of the other side's murderous attacks and their intention to destroy us."

A slightly baffled chair of the meeting tentatively asked if Israel's preparedness to withdraw in exchange for full peace applied to all territories captured in 1967, "including on the Syrian front?" "Why not?" came the instant reply. "Of course we would insist on the demilitarization of the evacuated area, monitored by an international force, similar to the arrangement in Sinai which has stood the test of time. But if the Syrians and the other Arabs are serious at last about full peace and they stop attacking us, threatening us and bad-mouthing us, then we too are ready in principle for full peace." It was just a statement. But at that moment the Middle East changed forever.

Settlers invited to stay

And then came the second bombshell. "We invite the settlers to stay", proclaimed a newly confident President Abbas on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in an interview on Israeli TV. "We want them to stay. Not as agents of an occupying power of course, but they are welcome as civilian inhabitants of the Palestinian state and to help us build it. All that we ask is that they are ready to live in peace with us. We offer them Palestinian citizenship, but, if they prefer, they can retain their Israeli nationality or even have dual nationality." When asked what he would say to those who challenged the sincerity of his intention, he pointed to the million-plus Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and remarked that it is of equal importance to have a substantial number of Israeli Jews living in Palestine.

> ***It was just a statement. But at that moment the Middle East changed forever.***

With one brief statement, Mahmoud Abbas had pulled the rug from under the settlers' feet. No one was forcing them to leave either their homes or the land that was holy to the religious among them. They could choose from a menu of options – but what was not on the table was the sovereignty of the territory. Furthermore in an interview with the Washington Post, Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian Prime Minister and a leading Hamas member, announced his support for President Abbas' stance on the settlers. Asked how he could reconcile this sentiment with the virulently anti-Semitic statements in the Hamas Covenant, he declared that the covenant is in an advanced stage of review and he expects that some parts of it will be revised or even excised.

In response to the perennial questions about whether the Hamas government would recognize the state of Israel, abide by past agreements and cease all violence, he repeated the offer of a long-term mutual hudna (truce), reiterated the aim to establish "a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital within the 1967 borders", observed that it was up to the PLO to conduct the negotiations, and affirmed that Hamas' decisions would be determined by what was "in the interest of the Palestinian people". "Could this include recognizing Israel?" the interviewer persisted. "If it is in the interest of the Palestinian people", came the cryptic but telling reply.

Caught on the hop, the settler movement – representing some four per cent of the Israeli population – and the

broader Israeli right set about discrediting not just the "so-called offer" but also Abbas himself. They warned that a Palestinian state would be a dagger in the heart of Israel, the whole purpose of which was to enable the wider Arab and Islamic worlds to finish off the Jewish state once and for all. The influential evangelical Christian right in the US warned of "Armageddon" and accused President Bush and Secretary Rice of "acting contrary to God's wishes".

The early indications were that the counter-offensive, clearly designed to play on people's fears, was having the intended effect. While a slim majority of Israelis, concerned this might be their last chance for a genuine peace, remained generally supportive, a growing number looked upon the initiative as a dangerous step towards the destruction of their state. Right on cue, a suicide bombing in the oft-targeted coastal resort of Netanya took 16 lives and left many more seriously wounded. Islamic Jihad proudly claimed the credit, prompting Defence Minister Amir Peretz to vow to teach the militant group "a lesson they would never forget". Smelling victory, the Likud leader Netanyahu appeared on television to demand an early election "to save the nation and the country".

Reactions within the region

No sooner had he uttered these words than they were overshadowed, along with Peretz's retaliatory plans, by an Al Jazeera broadcast of a brief announcement by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia that he was looking forward to an invitation from Israel to visit the holy city of Jerusalem to pray at the Mosque and talk peace with the Israeli people and their government. "It is time to end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Arabs, and bring peace to the region we share", he concluded his statement.

The first senior Israeli figure to react publicly was the Housing and Acting Justice Minister, Meir Sheetrit, who strongly welcomed the proposed visit and reminded reporters that he had told Israel Radio back on 4 October 2006 that Israel should accept the Arab Peace Plan. Even if Prime Minister Olmert was not aware in advance of the Saudi King's proposal, there was no possibility of him doing anything other than laying out the red carpet to such an important figure, a colossus in the region and a close ally of US President George W Bush. The Saudi Arabian delegation prayed at the Al Aqsa Mosque, spoke at the Knesset in Jerusalem, delivered a very similar speech at the Palestinian Parliament in nearby Ramallah, held talks with political leaders on both sides and addressed the people direct on both Israeli and Palestinian television. Then they left. And the Middle East will never be the same again.

Within 48 hours after the delegation's departure, Bashar Assad, the Syrian President, gave the first-ever live interview to Israeli television telling Israeli viewers that Syria was ready to hold peace talks with Israel, preferably in the presence of an impartial arbiter. Events moved rapidly in the wider region too. For a period, it seemed like the whole population of Israel had one ear permanently glued to the radio, riveted by the declarations of intent by one Arab state after another to upgrade their future relations with the Israeli state. First off the mark was Morocco, then Tunisia, followed by Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. In the wake of the Oslo Accords, the first five of these states had established ties with Israel, only to downgrade them following the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000.

What seriously convinced most Israelis that the Arab world as a whole was earnest about making peace were the subsequent declarations to similar effect by Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen and Libya. Only the Islamist government of Sudan, the embattled government of Iraq and the Lebanese government – which had vowed that Lebanon would be the last Arab state to make peace with Israel following the July 2006 war – remained silent.

The Riyadh summit

While the US government seemed to take it for granted that 'Camp David III' would host the peace talks, competing offers came in from Spain, France, the UK, Germany, Russia and China. All bids were off, though, when Saudi King Abdullah called for a special Arab League summit in Riyadh to which the Prime Minister of Israel would be invited.

The Abdullah proposal may be summarized as comprising three main elements. First was the proposed Riyadh summit itself, where, in a beefed-up echo of Oslo, 'Irrevocable Declarations of Principle' would be signed by all participating parties. Secondly, permanent-status negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians – within the parameters of UN Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 – would be organized, outside of the public spotlight, with the Saudi King offering to complement the US-led Quartet in the role of honest broker. And thirdly – once the bilateral agreements on all the details had been achieved – an international conference would be held



PHOTO: SUNE S FROM DENMARK/EAPPI

Woman and child waiting for clearance at Huwara checkpoint, Nablus.

PHOTO: BRITTA FROM SWEDEN/EAPPI



Palestinians and Israelis in a joint protest against the wall on the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall.

to endorse the bilateral agreements, ratify the 'irrevocable principles' and authorize their immediate implementation, and determine the processes necessary to resolve other outstanding issues of a regional dimension.

A buzz of activity marked the days leading up to the Riyadh summit, contributing importantly to a build-up of mutual confidence among the parties. The first significant move in this round came from the Palestinians, in the form of a joint Hamas-Islamic Jihad declaration of a unilateral ceasefire for a period of one month, with a prospect of extending this indefinitely depending on Israel's response and broader developments.

In response, the Israeli government declared that for as long as it was not being attacked, it would suspend its "security operations" in the Palestinian areas "from immediate effect". To coax the Palestinians into extending and consolidating the ceasefire, the defence ministry announced that, as long as it held, construction of the "security barrier" in the West Bank would likewise be put on hold. The barrier gates would be open for longer and the number of internal checkpoints and roadblocks steadily reduced. The operating principle would be "security for security".

Whatever motives underlay the initiatives of each party, it is doubtful if the Riyadh summit would have met with the acclaim it received without the advances in goodwill that each of the moves helped to generate. The summit itself was a low-key affair that lasted less than 48 hours. All Arab countries were represented, most of them by heads of state or government. Also present were Israel, the Quartet parties (the US, UN, EU and Russia), the Arab League and, indicatively, China.

As the ground had been carefully prepared and the mood was congenial (rather than warm), agreeing the 'Irrevocable Declarations of Principle' was relatively straightforward. The principles were largely drawn from the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the Clinton/Taba parameters, but in broad terms, they had been common to many other peace proposals over the years. In sum, there was unanimous agreement at the summit that a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would embrace the following seven irrevocable principles:

- Full Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories captured in June 1967 subject to agreed, minor, equitable land exchanges around the Israeli-Palestinian border.
- A full peace agreement and the establishment of normal relations between all Arab countries and Israel.
- A sovereign independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel.
- Jerusalem to be an open city with free access by all religions to their holy sites.
- East Jerusalem to be the capital of the future Palestinian state and West Jerusalem to be recognized as the capital of Israel, with Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighbourhoods and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighbourhoods.
- A just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
- The mutual termination of all boycotts and sanctions and of all forms of vilification.

The summit called for the urgent creation of a Palestinian government of national unity and urged the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to conclude a permanent-status agreement "in as little time as realistically possible", at which point the Arab countries would officially "declare the Arab-Israeli conflict ended" at an international conference which would formally approve and ratify all the agreements.

Positive steps forward

The essential first move forward – as urged at Riyadh – was the successful formation of a Palestinian government of national unity, led by the academic Mohammed Eid Shubair. The new Prime Minister confirmed that President Abbas would conduct any future negotiations with Israel, while his Hamas-approved government of mainly technocrats would concentrate on internal affairs, a formula that allowed him to sidestep the crucial issue of whether the new administration would openly recognise the Israeli state. The Olmert government bowed to the inevitable and participated in the consensus.

> ***It is time to end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Arabs, and bring peace to the region we share.***

Repayment commenced of the hundreds of millions of dollars of tax monies legally owed to the PA by Israel – about half of the total PA budget – but withheld since February 2006 following the election of Hamas. Although Israel did no more than restore the status quo ante, it received plaudits from around the world for this move. The elevation in its international standing was reflect-

ed in a surge of inward investment, a burgeoning stock exchange and a tourism boom that spilled over into the territory of the PA, facilitated by an easing of movement across the borders.

However, the inevitable price was tragically paid for the general relaxation of security measures when a busload of German Christian pilgrims was blown up on the road from Bethlehem to Hebron, resulting in 11 mortalities, including the Israeli driver and two Israeli guides, and serious injuries to 23 others. What differentiated this atrocity from the many previous ones was the nature and mood of the reactions. Not only was it instantly condemned by the Fatah and Hamas leaderships – the new PA government called it "a crime against the Palestinian people and against humanity" – but many Palestinians spontaneously marched through their own towns and villages to denounce the act and its perpetrators, scenes that had not been witnessed since the bombs on the buses during the Oslo period of the 1990s. The purveyors of violence were losing the street

Israel's reaction to the atrocity did not follow the usual pattern either. Instead, the Israeli government and the PA, with the support of most other regional powers, joined forces to assert that violence will only make them more determined to achieve the longed-for peace, and they vowed to step up the pace. This, they pledged, would be their resolute response to any further such outrages.

Peace process among grassroots

When the Oslo Accords were first made public, they sparked considerable interest among ordinary Palestinians and Israelis and some excitement about what they foretold. But in practice, there was relatively little involvement in the process at non-official levels. This was widely regarded as one of Oslo's flaws and probably contributed to its ultimate failure.

Determined not to repeat this mistake, the EU-funded Israeli-Palestinian NGOs Forum – comprising more than 100 Israeli and Palestinian organizations dedicated to peace and human rights – devised a strategy to engage both civil societies in the push for peace and reconciliation among the two peoples, with a strong emphasis on the grassroots level. Plans were laid for an Israeli-Palestinian civil society peace summit, with broad-based participation, to launch and coordinate a far-reaching programme of activities.

Finally, the majority of Palestinian political prisoners held prior to the launch of the Olmert initiative were released. The number let out was far in excess of that demanded or expected by the Hamas or Fatah leaderships. Excluded from the amnesty were common criminals. In the other direction, Corporal Shalit was surrendered to the Israeli authorities amidst huge publicity

How those talks will work out is of course yet to be seen. But the omens could hardly be better. The whole world is watching, and failure is not an acceptable option. Most importantly, the principal parties themselves are determined to achieve the peace that has consistently evaded their predecessors, and they know what is needed to get there.

There are of course other outstanding issues to be resolved, but no one expects any of these matters to threaten the whole process. On the contrary, once they reach the table it would be a sign that the big issues have been resolved and the age-old conflict brought to an end.

This is an abbreviated version of the article At last, peace in the Middle East first posted at IPCRI News & Views

Six days of war – 40 years of occupation

In June this year 40 years have passed since the Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours took place. In June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt's airforce fearing an imminent invasion by Egypt. Jordan then attacked the Israeli cities of Jerusalem and Netanya. At the war's end, Israel had gained control of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

The consequences of the war still affect the geopolitics of the Middle East and large parts of the world. Below are some glimpses from individuals with own experiences and memories of the war.

The soldier

"The skies of the Middle East grew ominously dark in May 1967. War was palpably in the air. I was 29 and the editor of the weekly journal Zo Haderech (This Is the Way). On Friday evening, May 19 I followed the news, which left no doubt: the region was deteriorating with sure steps toward another war.

At 1 A.M., pounding on the door woke me from restless sleep. Two reservists were there to deliver an emergency order: I was to report to my reserve unit in the morning. The countdown to war had begun. Miriam, my companion at the time, who was in her seventh month of pregnancy, stood behind me as though petrified, without saying a word. I felt a surge of anger shoot through me, but kept myself from shouting so as not to wake our son, Gadi, who was then five and a half.

...

From Jaffa we were taken to a base near Ramle to organize and receive our equipment. As a company medic, I was burdened with two first-aid knapsacks and a folding stretcher in addition to the standard gear.

...

The question that preoccupied me most at night was how I would act if I were sent into battle. I had always known that I was incapable of shooting another person, of wounding or killing someone else.

...

Before dawn on Monday, June 5, we received the order to prepare for war. For hours we sat on our equipment, waiting for the signal. Together with other forces, we were to capture Umm Katef, which was described as a site fortified according to Soviet military doctrine.

At midday we boarded a bus that took us west. We crossed the border into Egypt. On the way I reached a decision: I will not wound or kill anyone, even at the risk of my life. I would advance with the rest of the forces, but I would not turn my weapon, an Uzi submachine gun, on anyone, even if I were attacked and in danger. I decided that I would do my best to

treat the wounded, Israelis and Egyptians alike. As soon as I had decided this, I went through everything a medic had to do in my head. That calmed me. Henceforth I felt that I had made the right decision."

From The Sixth Commandment by Joseph Algazy

The Golan inhabitants

"Najwa Hamsa Amasha, a widow with four grown-up children, cries briefly as she remembers her last visit to the family home in Damascus 21 years ago. "When my mum saw us off, she said, 'Maybe it's the last time I will see you'." Her late mother's premonition was right. She has never been able to return since, not even for her mother's funeral. The Syrian capital is just 20 miles to the north-west of this Druze village called Majd el Shams. But the geopolitics of the Middle East means it might as well be on another planet.

...

Fringed by lethal minefields, Majd el Shams is the northernmost village of the Golan Heights, the fertile and famously beautiful 1,100sq km plateau which was seized from Syria by Israel in the Six Day War, and which, almost 40 years later, stands in the way of peace between Damascus and Jerusalem.

Mrs Amasha's children speak perfect Hebrew as well as Arabic. But she has never doubted she is still in Syria. Like more than 90 per cent of her fellow Druze in the Golan, she refused to become an Israeli citizen after Menachem Begin's government passed a law annexing the Golan in 1981.

...

Nowhere is opposition to a deal [with Syria] more pronounced than among the post-1967 Jewish settlers in the Golan itself. Ramona Bar Lev lives in the biggest settlement, Katzrin. "We believe the Golan should stay Israel's for ever", she said. "Because we have been here for 40 years and what we have accomplished here in that time, I would humbly say, is amazing."

...

Materially most Druze, with farms or jobs, are relatively comfortable here. They also live in a freer society than they would face in Syria under the present regime. Moreover the refusal to take Israeli citizenship is in part a recognition that if they did they would have little chance of staying on their land if they accepted it.

Nevertheless in the village of Bukata, Suleiman Awasha, 59, a religious Druze, can remember every day of the Six Day War – the bus journey from a blacked-out Damascus and the 7.5-mile walk from Kuneitra. And he is still proud of his little act of resistance at the war's end. Finding an abandoned Syrian army jeep, he camouflaged it with leaves and branches, fondly assuming the troops would soon be back to recover it.

His 19-year-old granddaughter Waed, bilingual, of course, in Hebrew and Arabic, and working in the family bakery, admits to watching Israeli TV as well as Al Jazeera. But she too feels Syrian – and wants to go to university in Damascus. "Life here", she says, "is regular, but something is missing. Like a nationality."

From After 40 years, could the ice be melting on the Golan Heights? The Independent UK, 7 Jan. 2007

The IPCRI June 5th Initiative

The Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information has launched the June 5th Initiative, which is coordinating events in Israel, Palestine and around the world to call for the end of the conflict and for peace and justice:

On June 5 the "march for Israeli-Palestinian peace and justice" will take place in cities and towns throughout the world in solidarity with the people of Israel and Palestine who will march, demonstrate and organize for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Several main events will be held in key cities such as Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ramallah, Nablus, Gaza, Washington, New York, Chicago, Athens, Paris, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, London, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, Moscow, Rome, Amman, Cairo, Tokyo, and others.

The call for Israeli-Palestinian peace, based on the formula "For Peace and Justice: Two States for Two Peoples – One Peace" and for ending the conflict, will be the uniting force that will bring out millions of people across the globe.

The following advert (in Hebrew) was placed in the Haaretz newspaper: "40 years since '67. On the 5th June we will say: Enough! Two states for Two people. End the occupation, End the confict. In Israel, Palestine and the rest of the world we will gather together under one voice saying we are ready for peace. Join us."

A joint exhibition of Israeli and Palestinian artists, who oppose the occupation and call for its immediate and peaceful end, will open on June 5 at the Jerusalem Artists' House. Two weeks after the opening in Jerusalem, the exhibition will move to Ha'Kibbutz Art Gallery, Tel Aviv.

The exhibition is comprised of hundreds of images sent via e-mail by artists from Israel, Palestine and around the world. The images represent a generation of Israeli and Palestinian artists doomed to waste their best years in the desert of the occupation. Freedom of expression is indivisible, and as long as Palestinians are deprived their right of self-expression, Israelis too cannot be free.

Sources: www.ipcri.org and www.june5thinitiative.org

WCC initiative for peace

The World Council of Churches (WCC) is launching an international, inter-church advocacy initiative for peace in Israel and Palestine, the Palestine Israel Ecumenical Forum, at a conference in June 17-21, 2007, in Jordan.

The initiative is a major step toward WCC's goal of mobilizing churches around the world for peace with justice in the Middle East. Its launch takes place during this year's observances of 40 years under occupation for Palestinians.

WCC member churches and related organizations from different regions of the world and especially churches from the Middle East take part in the inaugural conference. The forum they launch will coordinate existing church advocacy work and promote new joint efforts for peace.

Source: media@wcc-coe.org

Compiled by Kristina Lundqvist

LPI News

Major grant from Sida

The Swedish Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has granted LPI an amount of 20 million SEK (about 3 million USD) for its activities in 2007. The grant will cover a variety of programmes and projects in the Horn of Africa, Congo Kinshasa, Congo Brazzaville as well as out of the head office in Uppsala, Sweden. Among other main donors to LPI's peacebuilding programmes are the Ministries for Foreign Affairs in Belgium and Finland, respectively, the British development agency DFID, churches and related organizations such as the Church of Sweden, Swedish Mission Council, Bread for the World (Germany), the Church of Finland and FinnChurchAid.

Board of Directors meet in Nairobi

The 15-member LPI Board of Directors, representing Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, will assemble in June in Nairobi, Kenya, for its annual meeting. In addition to regular matters, the board members will attend seminars on "Christian-Muslim Dynamics" and "The Luarca Declaration on the Human Right to Peace". Exposure visits will also be made to LPI partner organizations in Nairobi as well as to the LPI peacebuilding programmes in Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasa.
A special Round Table with invited participants will be arranged to review peacebuilding work in Africa by LPI and other ecumenical organizations.

Staff changes

Mr ***Runo Bergström***, LPI's Resident Representative in Brazzaville, retired in May 2007 after six years with LPI, following an earlier career with United Nations peace-keeping for almost twenty years. The new Resident Representative is Mr ***Séraphin Ngouma***, who has been working in the Congolese peacebuilding programme since its initiation in 2001. Mr ***Jérôme Gouzou***, working as a Programme Officer with LPI since 2001, has been appointed Programme Coordinator for research and conflict transformation.

Peace education topic in Alexandria

The Swedish Institute in Alexandria, Egypt, and LPI co-hosted a regional seminar in Alexandria 22-25 April as part of the Publications for Peace Education project. Earlier seminars were arranged in Nairobi, Cape Town and Brazzaville. The seminar focused on the Middle East and the importance of peace research and accessibility to information regarding peace education in this region. Among the speakers were Ambassador Ali Maher (Former Foreign Minister of Egypt), Dr Hasan Nafaa (Amman), Dr Samir Karam (Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut), Dr Iman al-Kaffass (American University, Cairo), Director Abel Mun'im Sa'eed, (Al-Ahram Centre, Cairo), Director Marie Loller (Mar Elias Peace Centre, Ibillin), Dr Daniel Nord (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm), and Dr Anne Kubai (Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala).

A Mother's Cry for a Healthy Africa

The women's programme within the initiative Inter-faith Action for Peace in Africa (IFAPA) arranged a visit for 15 African women leaders to the Nordic countries in April. The programme in Sweden included a seminar arranged jointly by the Collegium for Development Studies, Uppsala University, Church of Sweden, IFAPA and LPI. Speakers on the topic "Experiences of African Women in the context of conflict and peacebuilding" were Hon Ms Lorettta Akouavi Massan, Minister for Reconciliation in Togo, and Professor Ms Fatima Zohra El Kebir, from the University of Oran in Algeria. Participants on the panel were Ms Joyce Kamoto from Zamiba, Ms Pravina Varajidas from Mozambique and Ms Linda Habimana from Rwanda. Dr Anne Kubai from LPI was the moderator

Religion on the Borders

Dr Anne Kubai from LPI was one of the speakers at the major international conference Religion on the Borders, with some 400 participants, arranged by the University of Södertörn, Stockholm, in April 2007. Kubai spoke on the topic "Religion and Re-Embedding of Ideas: the Case of Rwanda". Other topics in the sub-section on changing national identities in Africa were Islam in Ethiopia and human rights, and governance and peacebuilding in Nigeria.



PHOTO: TEEMAR KIDANE/LPI

Anne Kubai and Marie Loller at the seminar in Alexandria.

Civil society in peacebuilding

Swiss-based peace researcher Dr Thania Paffenholz paid a week-long visit to Sweden in March for seminars and lectures in Stockholm and Uppsala. Paffenholz highlighted the role of civil society in peacebuilding. In a seminar together with Professor Lars Rudebeck, the Collegium for Development Studies, Uppsala University, and Dr Tarekegn Adebo, LPI, she also shared her views on the recent developments in Somalia in relation to her book "Community-based Bottom-up Peacebuilding".

Darfur seminars

A report from a series of Darfur seminars arranged in Stockholm in February-March 2007 is available from the organizers Nordic Africa Institute and LPI. The speakers were: Professor Adam Elzain Mohamed, Professor Leif Manger, Ambassador Marika Fahlén, H.E. Mr Jan Eliasson, Professor Ove Bring, and Ms Björg Mide (see article in New Routes 1/2007).

Reviews

Comprehensive picture of a complex country

Peace in the Balance: The Crisis in Sudan, eds. Raftopoulos, Brian and Alexander, Karin. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2006

Today, few can deny the complex features that characterise the current state of affairs in Sudan. With three peace agreements signed, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005, Southern Sudan), the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA, 2006) and the East Sudan Peace Agreement (2006), the country still faces enormous difficulties to maintain peace and security.

In the light of this, the Cape Town-based Institute for Justice and Reconciliation last year published Peace in the Balance: The Crisis in Sudan, which in a straightforward and easily attainable way captures the many perspectives that are connected to the crucial issues in Sudan.

Starting with an outlook on the historical and economic origins of the current challenges, Sara Basha notes that there is no one single root cause of the Sudanese conflicts. A combination of factors such as the legacy of colonial rule, the emergence of the northern political elite, a failure to address the relationship between state and religion, and the connection to the South are all reasons that contribute to the volatile situation. In addition, the exclusion of marginalized groups and areas, and a chaotic political scene have generated the existing circumstances. In the next chapter the same author continues to provide a synopsis of the CPA and the implications of its implementation, especially for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

In chapter three, Yasmine Sherif and Noah Ibrahim analyze the Sudanese internal post-conflict dynamics. Sarah Crawford-Browne continues in chapter four with a look at the situation in the South, especially since the unfortunate death of the SPLM leader, John Garang.

Subsequent chapters are devoted to Darfur, whose future may very well be essential for the achievement of stability in the rest of Sudan. Here the reader is guided by Ayesha Kajee through the regional and international dynamics of the crisis. Furthermore, Fanie du Toit exploits in her analysis the failings of the DPA and asserts that negotiations and forces along with large quantities of political will are vital in order to rebuild the shattered Darfur. The origins of the Darfur conflict is more complicated than what is described in the media, and chapter eight therefore makes an attempt to clarify the root causes of the tragedy.

In the last chapter, Sara Basha, Sarah Crawford-Browne and Karin Alexander identify current obstacles to transitional justice in Sudan and conclude that sustainable peace above all depends on, for example, the resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict, as well as addressing impunity, ongoing human rights abuses and provisions for a national reconciliation process.

All in all, this is a necessary publication that comprehensively summarizes the complex picture, including a few overlooked points. All of them are significant in order get a full understanding of what has shaped contemporary Sudan and the challenges that lie ahead.

Catrin Rosquist

Conflict mediation behind the scene

Kings of peace, Pawns of War – the untold story of peacemaking by Harriet Martin (foreword by Kofi Annan). London: Continuum, 2006

Ever wanted to be a fly on the wall in those peace negotiation rooms, or pick the brains of those brilliant mediators who convince previously warring parties to put their guns down and pick up pens to sign peace accords? Well, former war correspondent Harriet Martin has offered us that opportunity with her book, Kings of Peace, Pawns of War – the untold story of peacemaking, in which she renders fascinating first-hand accounts of conflict mediations in action. Six of the world's most leading mediators, from different continents and professional backgrounds, step out from 'behind the scenes' and take centre stage, for the first time speaking out in detail about their efforts to incite peace in some of the most intractable conflicts: Iraq, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Iraq and Aceh.

Needless to say, the book is captivating – not only for the obvious reasons, such as learning about various mediation tactics or going deeper than the shallow coverage of these conflicts in the evening news, but for reasons hidden in the title of the book. In her research and interviews with the mediators, the author stumbles upon a common thread: the mediator's paradoxical relationship to power. Martin writes in the preface that "he [the author states that 99 percent of time, the mediator is a man] is both the perpetrator of the mediation process, and also, very often, the victim of it". Every mediator sets out to be the 'king of peace', but in reality more frequently becomes a 'pawn of war'– used and manipulated by the conflict parties to retain the upper hand in the game of war and peace.

The way that the mediator, in response, plays each side against the other while moving them towards each other and an end where both parties save face is not easily contained in a written format. Martin's book does, however, give us a glimpse: the tactics are often improvised, manipulative, intimately connected and contingent on the personalities involved and above all subtle – sometimes, a glance in the wrong direction at a critical juncture can become a deal breaker. The portrayed reality is far from the textbook examples of conflict resolution and mediation. After all, maybe one should become that proverbial fly on the wall...

Hannah Tsadik

Toolkits for peacebuilding

Aid for Peace: a Guide to Planning and Evaluation for Conflict Zones by Thania Paffenholz and Luc Reychler. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007

Aid for Peace is a result of research presenting "a common methodological framework for planning and evaluating peacebuilding and development or humanitarian policy and program interventions". The guide has two broad applications: firstly as a tool for planning and evaluating peacebuilding interventions, and secondly providing a "peace/conflict lens" for development and humanitarian assistance in conflict in order to avoid unintended harm and to facilitate proactive

practices. This is done through applying the framework in "separate peace and conflict assessment, integrating the framework in standard aid planning and evaluation".

Peace research and peacebuilding have become established fields of work. Concern for the 'professionalisation' of the field has been raised from the mid-1990s, and so has the quest for a standard evaluation tool. Aid for Peace is divided into four parts and twelve chapters, and addresses well this need. Particularly, for those who are engaged in peacebuilding, the presentations in Part II, chapters 5 and 6, go a long way in providing a useful framework for planning, monitoring and evaluating interventions.

Another contribution toward the 'professionalisation' of peace interventions has recently been published:

Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit, by John Paul Lederach et al. The John B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2007

This book of 13 chapters, following Lederach's seminal theoretical path of conflict transformation, gives a valuable toolkit for planning, tracing and gauging changes in peace interventions. Here conflict transformation as a guide "focuses on change, addressing two questions: 'What do we need to stop?' and 'What do we hope to build?'" Conflict transformation practice seeks solutions by working with change "in both the immediate and longer term, and at content and relational levels".

The model offers four dimensions of conflict (personal, relational, structural and cultural), where transformation problems are identified, objectives and indicators are specified, and monitoring and evaluation tasks are pursued with clear criteria.

While reading the whole book affords 'trekking' on the footsteps of a leading peace theorist and practitioner, chapters 5, 7, 11 and 12 in particular offer a good guide for those who want to develop quick planning, monitoring and evaluation skills and approaches.

Tarekegn Adebo

Important tool for scholars and practitioners

Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen Olser and Aall, Pamela. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., USA, 2007

When the predecessor to this volume, Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflicts, was published in 2001, it quickly became an indispensable resource for scholars of contemporary international conflict. The volume identified the state of the art in international conflict management and presented an optimism that inter-communal conflicts were declining. We also began to understand the growing potential for third-party actors to play a part in conflict management.

In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, the editors have once again gathered over forty of our most influential analysts of international affairs, who present multiple perspectives on how to prevent, regulate and solve international conflicts. Acknowledging the new security environment in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the new volume primarily stresses the pivotal question of whether powerful states and international organizations can simultaneously conduct a war on terror and at the same time conduct conflict managing policies in conflict zones. In addition to the predicaments in the 1990s attached to humanitarian intervention and peace making, researchers and policy makers are now troubled with how to pursue nation building and democratic processes in fragile and conflict-ridden states.

In order to accurately tackle issues of conflict management, Part 2 of the book starts off by tracing the sources of conflict and the challenges to global security. In Part 3 and 4 it discusses the use and limits of force in conflict management and the use and limits of statecraft, diplomacy and soft power. Part 5 explores the capacities and weaknesses of institutions in conflict management, and Part 6 looks to possible lessons learned regarding successful democratic state building.

On the one hand, Leashing the Dogs of War presents a somewhat bleaker picture than its predecessor, but on the other hand it reflects a positive belief that many measures can be taken to moderate, reduce or even resolve today's conflicts. The editors continue to impress by comprehensively capturing the many perspectives in the contemporary debate on conflict management, making yet again an important tool for both scholars and practitioners of international relations.

Catrin Rosquist

Peace and security in the 21st century

SIPRI Yearbook 2006. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press, 2006

In July 1966, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) initiated its work, and three years later the first edition of the SIPRI Yearbook was published. The 2006 Yearbook, thus, marks the 40-year anniversary of SIPRI. It presents a review of what has changed and what has not over the past four decades of global security development.

In her comprehensive introduction, Alyson J.K. Bayles makes an overview of four main themes: From East-West confrontation to what?; From armed blocs to multifunctional, 'human' and active security; From arms control treaties to security building – with or without a rule book; and The changing evaluation of, and approaches to, arms control and disarmament.

The actual edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses developments in 2005 in Security and conflicts, Military spending and armaments, and Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Among the special studies can be mentioned: Regional security cooperation in the early 21st century, Peace-building, the new international focus on Africa, and Developments in the Russian arms industry.

The volume is amply provided with maps, tables and diagrams, which adds to its usefulness and gives a multitude of hard facts to support the theories and analyses.

As a matter of interest it can be mentioned that the translation of the Yearbook into Arabic was presented and discussed at the seminar within the Life & Peace Institute Publications for Peace Education project, which was recently held in Alexandria, Egypt (see further p 29).

Kristina Lundqvist

Prayer for Darfur, Sudan

Almighty God, you have promised to hear your people when they pray in faith. We pray that your church mission in Darfur continue to be successful. You have seen the suffering of our people in Darfur. We pray for your divine intervention and touch of the stone hearts of people. We pray that the government of Sudan and the United Nations find better understanding in regards to the UN Peace Keeping Force.

We pray, Lord God, that the different factions will unite themselves for peace dialogue so that the inhuman war atrocity stops soon, and that the discrimination between the tribal groups may cease.

This we pray through the Risen Lord, Jesus Christ.

Amen

