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## Horn of Africa Bulletin (May 2008)

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# HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

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## Analyses

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### **Ethiopia: holding elections after post-election trauma**

Ethiopia held local and by-elections on 13 and 20 April 2008. The local elections pertained to the *kebele*- and *woreda* level councils, the rough equivalent of neighborhood- and commune level councils, respectively. The by-elections intended to fill the vacant seats in Parliament and in regional/city councils (valid for two years until the next general elections in 2010). These seats were not taken up by the elected candidates after the May 2005 general election in protest to assumed electoral fraud committed by the incumbent party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The 2008 elections aimed at filling well over 3 million seats – a notable number of contestable seats even for a country of nearly 80 million inhabitants. This massive amount of seats is due to a recent change in local electoral structures that increased each kebele's governing council from approximately 15 elected officials to 100-300 (not uniform over the electoral districts as the number of council seats is decided on a regional level). The ruling party has stated that this swell of local elected officials is a move towards better adherence to the principal of direct democracy. However, critics state that it is a sheer political manoeuvre by the incumbent government as the EPRDF knows that the Ethiopian opposition currently has nowhere near the capacity to present the number of candidates needed to challenge the EPRDF seat-for-seat.

Indeed, while the ruling party put forward an unprecedented number of nearly 4 million candidates for these elections, the 32 opposition parties engaged in the 2008 local and by-elections were together only able to field approximately 100,000 candidates. Consequently, in many electoral districts (be it kebele or woreda level) the EPRDF ran uncontested. Local, private media outlets have subsequently deemed the elections as being “one-sided” and “uncompetitive”.

The elections were flawed by the above mentioned issues and at least two opposition parties have cried foul. One of the largest opposition parties, the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), complained that intimidation and procedural irregularities limited registration to roughly 25 percent of the candidates they attempted to put forward. UEDF ultimately withdrew from the electoral race a few days before the first round of local and by-elections. Similarly, Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) Party Chairman Bulcha Demeksa cited that his party could only field 2 percent of the 6,000 candidates it had intended to present.

After taking part in the first round of elections on 13 April, the OFDM stated that it would boycott the second round because of electoral irregularities and the mistreatment of its election observers in the first round.

The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) has consistently rebutted the above opposition parties' grievances by stating that these types of unjustified complaints have become "a way of a political struggle" in Ethiopia. However, the aggrieved parties' accusations have been supported by a recent Human Rights Watch report. The report has been rejected by the EPRDF administration. The rest of the international community, be it the vast diplomatic corps in Addis Ababa or the plentiful international NGOs present in the country, has been deferentially silent – unlike the 2005 elections when the international bodies played a significant role. Of course, this time around the international community was not allowed to observe the elections as the NEBE posited that it was not customary for internationals to observe local elections. However, many opposition parties have cited the utmost necessity for a neutral, outside arbiter, especially in the current Ethiopian political landscape.

Although the NEBE has yet to announce the official results (they are expected to be released at the end of May), preliminary results made public by the Board show that the EPRDF has won a landslide election. Given the weak competition and the overwhelming EPRDF machinery, the presumed outcome may not be that surprising. However, the Ethiopian electorate's behaviour is noteworthy, especially considering the post-2005 election atmosphere. It should be remembered that the local and by-elections of April 2008 are the first elections following the 2005 general elections, which were the most contested and publicly engaging ones in the country's history. However, the aftermath of those elections became even more unforgettable with the deaths of nearly 200 persons, several thousands arrests (including some of the main opposition leaders) and a public with a lost appetite for the democratic process – to the point where many vowed to never go near the ballot box again.

Three years later official figures show that 26 million voters registered for the April 2008 elections, meaning an increase of half a million compared to the 2005 elections. Even more curious was the increase of registered voters at the epicentre of discontent with the ruling EPRDF, Addis Ababa, which went up from 1.1 million to 1.3 million persons. Not only did the Ethiopian electorate register to vote in greater numbers, according to the NEBE, but the turn-out on the two election days was over 90 percent – again, a figure slightly higher than in 2005. Although there are claims that these released figures are significantly exaggerated, exit polls in the urban centres conducted by fairly independent media sources have confirmed at least a 70 to 80 percent voter turn-out. The preliminary results further show that 137 seats in the 138-seat Addis Ababa city council were won by the EPRDF in 2008. Remarkably, in 2005 the same amount of seats was won by the opposition, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), but it forfeited in protest. The same goes for the 14 vacant parliamentary seats, which were won and forfeited by the CUD in 2005 but in 2008 they were won by the EPRDF. At the kebele- and woreda level, it is similarly expected that EPRDF has won the vast majority of seats.

So what has prompted this sudden change of heart in the Ethiopian electorate? It cannot solely be explained by the lack of choice of candidates, for why did the electorate not show their discontent with the incumbent – presuming that the discontent still exists – either by failing to register or by registering and boycotting the elections, alternatively voting for the opposition where possible? At present, one could consolidate the various hypothesis for the change of heart that are circulating in the country into three main explanations.

Regime-friendly voices described the 2005 election outcome as the result of the EPRDF's constituency casting protest votes against the ruling party. Hence, in 2008 the ruling party has simply won back the trust of its supporters through a three-year push to improve its relations with the constituency by holding community dialogues and by enhanced provision of basic services such as housing and infrastructure.

Thus, the change of heart is interpreted as the reward for the EPRDF's improved governance.

At the other side of the spectrum are the most critical voices who claim that the people, especially the urban poor and the rural populace, registered and voted for the EPRDF because of coercion and fear of losing their government-sponsored "safety-net" benefits (which mostly come in the form of food assistance), or of being disadvantaged in the various government housing schemes. Along the same lines, there is a popular notion that the recent near-thirty percent inflation (as recorded in March 2008) and consequent soaring consumer goods prices witnessed in the last couple of years has purposely been brought on by the regime to avenge its 2005 electoral embarrassment. Thus, the argument suggests that perhaps the inflation will be pacified along with the ruling party if the EPRDF enjoys a clear electoral victory in the local and by-elections.

More moderate analysis suggests that the 2008 electorate behaviour is an expression of the hopelessness and disappointment in the democratic process that has lingered since the 2005 elections. Hopelessness in the sense that people seem to believe that their votes do not really count anyway, that might will always be right in Ethiopia and that political change does not come through the ballot box. Therefore, around the capital it is not uncommon to hear individuals saying things similar to "*in 2005 [they actually say 1997, the year according to the Ethiopian calendar] I voted with my heart, but in 2008, I am voting for my good*". In other words, during the 2005 elections the electorate voted believing that they could affect regime change, but this time around people seem to have voted to gain greater benefit from the current system. There is also a sense of disappointment with part of the opposition that won the hearts of particularly the urban populace three years ago, but that has not been able to overcome its own internal squabbling ever since, let alone come forth with viable policy and governance alternatives. The 2008 electorate seems to be exacting punishment on the opposition for not properly accounting for the votes bestowed upon them en masse in 2005, and for not being able to restore the electorate's confidence that the democratic, peaceful struggle is worthwhile – even after experiencing post-election trauma.

Even if this last explanation is the most judicious, it is also the most disheartening for the future democratization process in Ethiopia. Needless to say, the chapter on the 2005 elections cannot be closed neatly. Some serious and balanced reflection is needed from all vested stakeholders on how to heal and learn from the past post-election trauma, and move the populace beyond it and into an open, reinvigorated democratic dialogue among citizens as well as between citizens and their representatives. Otherwise the risk is that the 2005 elections will be a thorn in the flesh of the Ethiopian democratic process for an unforeseen amount of time.

H.T.

## The Sudan census: another bone of contention

Very few unequivocal statements can be made about the 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census in Sudan, but here are two – it is controversial, and the results will be open to challenges. It is controversial because of its importance. In the run up to elections in 2009 and a referendum on southern secession in 2011, population statistics give power to those who can control and manipulate them. For this very reason the results will be challenged by those who feel their interests are contradicted by the statistics. This would happen even if everything went perfectly. The census has, however, not gone perfectly, and this will give more ammunition to those who wish to challenge its results.

The problems are rooted in the design of the census. It is a snapshot of the country at a given moment in time. This means that everyone located within the borders of

Sudan on a particular night must be counted during the two-week enumeration period that follows, even non-Sudanese people. Every individual is counted in the place where he or she is that night – people are not expected to return home for the census. So far, so good. However, the omission of key questions about ethnicity and religion in a country where the political exploitation of ethnic and religious identity are amongst the root causes of conflict, and where millions of southerners are displaced from their homes, was a serious error. Or rather, it was not an error but a deliberate policy on the part of the National Congress Party (NCP). Putting it simply, the number of southerners is so crucial because southerners want to vote for secession in 2011 while the northern political establishment wants to preserve the territorial integrity of a united Sudan.

The error was, however, perhaps on the part of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in apparently accepting the omission. Documents were printed and everything was ready to kick off on the night of 14-15 April. Only two days before the start, the GOSS suddenly announced that the census would be postponed, as "the objectives of the Census would not be achieved under the prevailing circumstances". As an explanation they cited the problems of border demarcation, security concerns, the ethnicity and religion issue, funding constraints, the Darfur conflict and the fact that over two million southerners were still resident in the north. It was hinted that the census would not take place until the end of the year.

These are all good reasons, but questions were raised as to why the GOSS had not dealt more forcefully with them during the preparation phase and had now suddenly put everything on hold at the last minute. Some argue that there had been hints that this would happen, visible to those who know the south well, but these hints had not been taken seriously. The SPLM may also have been buoyed by the success of its dramatic walk-out from the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2007. The SPLM has learned the lesson that the NCP is a master at manipulating and delaying negotiations, but that the NCP doesn't like it when the public spotlight is turned on it and its quest for international credibility is damaged. Pulling out of the GNU in September 2007 was a right judgement by the SPLM because it was an effective strategy that produced some gains. However, the SPLM's action in connection to the census in April 2008 may have been a miscalculation since the SPLM had to back down from its dramatic action within a week without achieving any concessions from the GNU.

The SPLM did however receive a great deal of public support for its efforts to delay the census. Although some southerners were disappointed at the delay in the census that everyone was so much looking forward to, and some of SPLM's political opponents used the occasion to score points, generally southerners understood and shared their leaders' concerns. Nevertheless, after crisis meetings of the presidency, the GOSS had to back down. The census was conducted only one week late, on the night of 22-23 April.

There are reports of huge differences of opinion within the SPLM and the GOSS about this, reflected in ambiguous statements being issued right up to the census date. South Sudan Information Minister Gabriel Changson Chang said "We are not bound by the outcome of the census", and that he did not know "what credible results will come out of that". Referring to ethnicity, Chang said, "We want to dispute that Sudan is an Arab country... The Africans are the majority in Sudan". He also stated that the process should not serve to determine wealth or power sharing. Even after the census had begun, the SPLM announced its "official position" that the census should not proceed without including the question of ethnicity and religion. The issues of repatriation and the counting of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were also crucial. "Who will they count; the trees?" asked a southern journalist. "They should postpone the date until more people come back."

In Jonglei, the governor publicly supported the decision to postpone the census. In Southern Kordofan, the SPLM announced a boycott and Malik Agar had to rush there to persuade it to participate. Fighting broke out on the border with Unity State. Reports suggest that many SPLM cadres in Kordofan are not happy with the eventual compromise. In areas as diverse as Aweil, Bor and Western Equatoria there were disputes over local boundaries. In Aweil and Eastern Equatoria there were disputes between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and census enumerators. Tensions were inflamed when northern "census monitors" appeared unannounced in all ten southern states. Some were arrested, and eventually up to 170 were sent home. The opposition South Sudanese Liberation Front completely boycotted the census.

The main liberation movements in Darfur supported the decision to postpone the census, and arrested some enumerators. The GNU announced that the census would not take place amongst IDPs in Darfur, mainly due to security issues, but that numbers in the camps and other "unsafe" areas would be estimated based on information provided by humanitarian agencies. However, such estimates are notoriously inaccurate and are also often manipulated by the agendas of local communities, local authorities and the aid industry itself. As one veteran southern analyst put it, "Conducting census in Darfur will be an exercise in futility."

On top of all of the political problems, the enumerators faced huge practical challenges. Security, weather (the rains had begun), terrain, lack of transport and the huge distances to be covered all militated against a comprehensive count. Many areas have never been properly mapped, making it more difficult to track down all the individuals and communities. Some enumerators complained that they were assigned far more households and far larger areas to cover than planned. Enumerators also faced problems with food, money, materials and other logistics support.

In a normal country without military and political conflict, with a relatively homogeneous population, the census might have been judged quite successful. Given a degree of trust between all parties, its shortcomings due to the practical problems would not have affected the overall result significantly. In Sudan, alas, a census that was always going to be controversial merely marks the beginning of a new phase of mutual accusations in the ongoing conflict.

*John Ashworth*

*Freelance analyst and consultant. Former coordinator of Sudan Focal Point Africa, a peace and advocacy ministry of the Sudanese Church.*

## NEWS AND EVENTS

### DJIBOUTI

#### **Stand-off between Djiboutian and Eritrean forces**

Since 16 April, Djibouti has accused Eritrean forces of digging trenches on both sides of the border, infringing several hundred metres on to Djiboutian territory. Asmara has so far denied the accusation. On 5 May the Arab League's Peace and Security Council held an emergency session, at Djibouti's request, and demanded that a fact-finding mission be despatched to the border. In a letter a day later Djibouti also urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take immediate action in order to prevent a conflict between the two countries.

In a statement released on 9 May, Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh said that the Djiboutian army was now in a dangerous border stand-off with the army of

neighbouring Eritrea. "There is a hostile action which poses real problems because it is a blatant violation of our territorial integrity, of our borders," the President said in the statement. The President added that "We are now in a rather tricky situation because both armies are facing each other. However we have noted that there, so far, has not been any intention on the part of our neighbours to wage war against us". Guelleh warned that Djibouti would take firm action should international arbitration fail to settle the issue and allow the Eritrean presence to remain. At the same time the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Mr Meles Zenawi, declared that the new stand-off between Eritrea and Djibouti constitutes a serious threat towards peace and security in the region.

*Sudan Tribune, Jeune Afrique, APA, BBC News, LFW*

## ERITREA

### **Eritrean opposition elects new leaders and unites in struggle against government**

The Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) – a congress of Eritrean opposition groups – held its convention from 5-11 May in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The congress formed a 26-member central leadership, which is the legislative body of the umbrella organisation. After lengthy overnight deliberations between the 8-9 May, the congress elected Mr. Tewelde Gebresselase as Secretary General of the Executive Council and Mr. Abdella Mahmoud as Chairman of the Legislative Council. The opposition now says that it has laid aside earlier internal disagreements in order to form an alliance that could overthrow Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki. In a concluding statement, the EDA congress condemned the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) regime for terrorising Eritrean citizens but also announced its readiness to study means of holding a dialogue with the Eritrean Government. Such willingness was however said to be conditional on a corresponding promptness on behalf of the Eritrean Government to find a peaceful means to resolve Eritrea's political crisis by paving the way for a democratic transformation.

*Gedab News, Reuters, Sudane Tribune*

## ETHIOPIA

### **Ethiopia breaks diplomatic relations with Qatar over TV reports on Ogaden**

Following reports about the situation in Ogaden by al-Jazeera satellite TV, Ethiopia decided to break diplomatic ties with Qatar (21 April). Ethiopia accused the broadcast station of supporting armed opposition groups. Al-Jazeera journalists exposed the miserable humanitarian situation in the Ogaden region, e.g. interviewing women claiming that they had been raped by Ethiopian soldiers and farmers saying that the Ethiopian army had stolen their properties. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) denied allegations that Qatar supported them.

*Sudan Tribune, Reuters*

## ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

### **Security Council expresses readiness to assist, Eritrea calls UNMEE presence illegal**

In a statement that was approved on 30 April, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) expressed its readiness to assist Ethiopia and Eritrea to overcome the current stalemate. The terms of a future UN engagement and the UN border mission (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMEE) would be defined in consultation with both parties. However, the Council stressed that the primary responsibility for achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the border dispute and normal-

ising relations between the countries rested with the parties themselves. UNMEE has already withdrawn 1.700 troops and military observers due to Eritrea's hindrances. Most peacekeepers have been sent home temporarily. Only 164 stayed in Eritrea to guard the UNMEE equipment until it can be evacuated.

Following the declaration, Eritrean permanent UN representative Ambassador Araya Desta, called for the Security Council to wind-up the mission altogether. The letter denounced the UNSC statement for failing to mention the ruling of the Boundary Commission and to call on Ethiopia to withdraw its troops. As recent as April, Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki stated that the continued presence of UNMEE peacekeepers was illegal.

*Reuters, Eritrea – Monthly report by the Lutheran World Federation, www.unmeeonline.org, UN News Service*

## KENYA

### **Resettlement of IDPs: Fear of insecurity as large numbers are resettled**

The resettlement of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) began on 5 May in Kenya's Rift Valley Province under a government campaign dubbed "Operation Rudi Nyumbani" (go back home). The process started in Trans Nzoia and then moved to Molo, Kuresoi and Eldoret. The Government considers the operation to be a success, assuming that it would be completed within a month (as of 8 May).

However, civil society groups and media reports point to the reluctance of IDPs to return home, especially in Eldoret, citing fears of insecurity. The National Internally Displaced Persons Network of Kenya raised concerns in an action alert released on 9 May about IDP camps that were forcibly closed by the Government. According to the network, the Government addressed neither the issue of security nor of compensation adequately. Also, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported on 9 May that due to the sudden and unexpected nature of the operation, serious concerns have been raised about the lack of consultation, participatory planning for returns and clear information about the conditions in places of return. The IDPs ability to make informed decisions about their choice to return may therefore have been compromised.

*IRIN, The Nation (Nairobi), Reuters, The National Internally Displaced Persons Network of Kenya, UN OCHA Kenya Humanitarian Update, Vol. 18 (9 May)*

### **Army and rebel militia responsible for human rights violations in Mt. Elgon**

Kenyan human rights activists have accused the Kenyan army of the torture of more than 4.000 people. According to a report by the Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) and two other local NGOs, the Kenyan military has – in the context of an army offensive against the Sabaat Land Defence Force (SLDF) carried out since March 2008 – committed systematic human rights abuses. US based Human Rights Watch raised awareness of human rights violations in early April, claiming that both the SLDF and the Kenyan military are "responsible for horrific abuses, including killings, torture and rape of civilians". In early May, the controversial military operations in Mt. Elgon were also taken up by Members of Parliament, who were seeking a ministerial statement on the matter. The Government has so far denied any claims of torture.

*Reuters, Human Rights Watch, East African Standard*

## SOMALIA

### **New wave of violence in Somalia**

War-torn Somalia has seen a new wave of violence in recent weeks. Heavy fighting in the capital between Ethiopian troops and insurgents on 18 and 19 April is said to

have claimed about 100 lives and wounded 200 people. The flare-up of violence also sparked a fresh exodus of an estimated 7.000 people. Ethiopian troops were also accused of brutally attacking a mosque in Mogadishu's Huriwa district on 19 April and supposedly killing 21 people, among them religious leaders. An US airstrike carried out on 1 May killed Aden Hashi Ayro, the leader of al Shabaab and according to the US one of the six members or associates of al Qaeda in Somalia. The US operation targeted the central Somali town of Dhusamareb and killed according to local sources 15 to 30 people. Furthermore, violence continued in other parts of central-southern Somalia, such as Baidoa, Beledweyne and the Gedo-region.

UN-backed reconciliation talks between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the opposition – mainly the Eritrean-based Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) – set off on 12 May.

*Garowe online, Shabelle.net, UN News Service, Reuters, IRIN, Amnesty International Press Release*

## SUDAN

### **Salva Kiir urges new Archbishop to unite Sudan's Anglican church**

The first Vice President of Sudan and President of southern Sudan, General Salva Kiir, has called the Anglican church of Sudan to unite. Speaking at the enthronement of the new Archbishop of the Episcopal church of the Sudan, the Most Reverend Daniel Deng Bul, on 21 April, Kiir pointed out that the Anglican church was very divided during the 21 years of conflict. Now, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the Archbishop should engage for a united church that can effectively deliver services and support the development of war-torn southern Sudan. The new Archbishop also addressed the political leaders of the Sudan. Amongst other appeals, he called for an implementation of the Abyei protocol and for government action to bring peace to the Darfur region.

*Sudan Tribune*

### **Donors pledge almost 5 billion USD, CPA in critical stage and Darfur crisis ongoing**

Meeting in Oslo in early May, the so-called Sudan Consortium reviewed the progress on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan and pledged 4.8 billion USD to support further reconstruction and development in Sudan. The Sudan Consortium is a donors group that consists of donor countries and international organisations and is jointly chaired by the Sudan Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan, the Norwegian organisers, the World Bank and the United Nations (UN). In the context of the donor meeting warnings were raised that the implementation of the CPA had fallen dangerously behind schedule. Several key provisions of the agreement have yet to be completed, such as the final re-deployment of armed forces; disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants; border demarcation; the Abyei issue and the distribution of oil revenues.

The Oslo donor conference was overshadowed by new violence in Darfur. After Darfur rebels had already raised the accusation of aerial bombings at the end of April, the UN and the African Union (AU) condemned the bombing of a primary school and a market in Northern Darfur (3-4 May) that killed at least 13 people. On 11 May, one of the Darfur rebel groups – the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – staged a bold attack and fought fiercely with the Sudanese army in the outskirts of Khartoum. It was the first time that the fighting reached the capital. Following the attack, Sudanese forces hunted for suspected Darfur rebels in Khartoum and mass arrests were reported. Moreover, the Sudanese Government cut off diplomatic ties with Chad, accusing it of supporting the JEM. On 13 May the UN Security Council

(UNSC) deplored the attacks by the rebel group, but urged restraint from all sides and warned that no retaliatory action should be taken against civilians. (For more thorough analyses of the JEM attack, see *Resources*).  
*IRIN, Reuters, Sudan Tribune, UN News Service*

## RESOURCES

### GENERAL

#### **“The ‘Ambivalence of the Sacred’ in Africa: The Impact of Religion on Peace and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa” (GIGA Working Paper No. 70)**

By Matthias Basedau and Alexander De Juan, 2008

[www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp70\\_basedau-juan.pdf](http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp70_basedau-juan.pdf)

#### **New study on interfaith relations in Africa**

The new LPI publication “Striving in faith. Christians and Muslims in Africa”, edited by Anne N. Kubai and Tarekegn Adebo, analyses interfaith relations with a special focus on the wider issue of conflict and inter-community relations. Four cases are included: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania. For more information see [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

### ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

#### **Special report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (S/2008/226), 7 April 2008**

[www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm)

### KENYA

#### **“Kenya: Setting the stage for durable peace?”**

Dorina Bekoe, senior research associate at the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace, analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act.

[www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2008/0415\\_kenya.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0415_kenya.html)

#### **“Crisis in Kenya. Land, displacement and the search for ‘durable solutions’” (25 April 2008)**

The Humanitarian Policy Group, one of the world’s leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues, looks into the post-election displacement and places it within long-term unresolved and politically aggravated land grievances. It also formulates recommendations for finding “durable solutions”.

[www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/hpgbrief31.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/hpgbrief31.pdf)

#### **“Truth and reconciliation commissions in Africa. Lessons and implications for Kenya”**

This briefing paper by George Wachirai and Prisca Kamunge, researchers at the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), indicates some lessons and problems from truth and reconciliation commissions (TRC) experiences in Africa and makes recommendations for Kenya. Drawing on experiences from South Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia,

Ghana and DRC, this brief cautions that previous TRCs have not been as successful as is sometimes assumed.

<http://rescuekenya.wordpress.com/2008/05/06/npi-africa-truth-and-reconciliation-commissions-in-africa-lessons-and-implications-for-kenya/>

### **Peacebuilding initiative in Kenya: Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP)**

This initiative is led by renowned mediators, peacebuilders and diplomats. Efforts during the crisis – some of them still ongoing – included supporting high-level political dialogue, raising public awareness by spreading positive messages, peace advocacy through mass media, encouraging dialogue at the local level, and linking civil society dialogue with the national dialogue and reconciliation process.

<http://rescuekenya.wordpress.com/category/peace-initiatives/concerned-citizens-for-peace/>

## **SOMALIA**

### **“15 years after Black Hawk Down: Somalia’s chance?” (24 April 2008)**

A series of strategy papers by ENOUGH will explore the complex situation in the Horn of Africa. This paper by John Prendergast on the conflict in Somalia is the first in the series.

[www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/SomaliaApril2008.pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/SomaliaApril2008.pdf)

### **Amnesty international reports on gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Somalia**

“Routinely targeted. Attacks on civilians in Somalia” (6 May 2008)

[www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/006/2008/en/1162a792-186e-11dd-92b4-6b0c2ef9d02f/afr520062008eng.pdf](http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/006/2008/en/1162a792-186e-11dd-92b4-6b0c2ef9d02f/afr520062008eng.pdf)

### **“Bringing together Somali civil society in the quest for peace”**

In March 2008, 150 Somali civil society leaders – almost half of them members of the Somali Diaspora – gathered in Entebbe, Uganda.

[www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Somali%20civil%20society%20meeting%20Entebbe%2011-13%20March%202008.pdf](http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Somali%20civil%20society%20meeting%20Entebbe%2011-13%20March%202008.pdf)

## **SUDAN**

### **Analyses of JEM’s attack on Khartoum**

Alex de Waal published two articles discussing the JEM attack (“The hour of the hardliners”, 11 May and “Making sense of Khalil’s putsch”, 13 May) on

[www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/](http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/)

Mahmoud A. Suleiman: “Battle of omdurman responsible for battle of omdurman”

[www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27119](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27119)

Mahgoub El-Tigani: “A hundred twenty five millions reward to capture a rebel leader”

[www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27110](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27110)

Human Rights Watch Press Release: “Mass arrests after rebel attack raise concern”

<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/13/sudan18812.htm>

### **The Chad-Sudan proxy war**

ENOUGH project: “Nasty Neighbors. Resolving the Chad-Sudan proxy war” (22 April 2008)

[www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/ChadSudanApril.pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/ChadSudanApril.pdf)

Small Arms Survey: “The Chad-Sudan proxy war and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and reality” (17 April 2008)

[www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan\\_pdf/SWP%2012%20Chad%20Sudan%20Proxy%20War.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP%2012%20Chad%20Sudan%20Proxy%20War.pdf)

### “Sounding the alarm on Abyei”

In his report, Roger Winter gives an update on recent events in the Abyei conflict and recommendations for US policy imperatives.

[www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/SoundingAlarmonAbyei.pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/SoundingAlarmonAbyei.pdf)

### Facts about and analysis of the oil industry in Sudan

European Coalition on Oil in Sudan: “Sudan’s oil industry: Facts and analysis” (April 2008)

[www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf\\_reports/2008/dossier%20final%20groot%20web.pdf](http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf_reports/2008/dossier%20final%20groot%20web.pdf)

### Andrew S. Natsios: Beyond Darfur – Sudan’s slide into civil war, in: *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008.

### Reports of the UN Secretary-General on Sudan

Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/2008/267), 22 April

Report of the UN Secretary-General on the deployment of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (S/2008/196), 9 May

[www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm)

### Johan Brosché: “Darfur. Dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation”

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Paper No. 2 (2008), Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala

[www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP\\_pub/Darfur\\_080317.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/Darfur_080317.pdf)

## UGANDA

### Female youth in northern Uganda

Jeannie Annan, Ph.D., Christopher Blattman, Ph.D., Khristopher Carlson, LL.M., and Dyan Mazurana, Ph.D. (Tufts University, Feinstein International Center) based their findings in “The state of female youth in northern Uganda: Findings from the survey of war affected youth” on a quantitative survey of 1,018 households and 619 young women and girls.

<http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/SWAYIIreporhighres.pdf>

### “Uncertain future for IDPs while peace remains elusive”, 24 April 2008

With the peace process plagued by delays and confusion, and with conditions in return areas often worse than in the IDP camps, the future for IDPs in northern Uganda remains uncertain.

[www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/FCB62B2B34C6E7E6C1257435004C2DFB/\\$file/Uga\\_Overview\\_Apr08.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/FCB62B2B34C6E7E6C1257435004C2DFB/$file/Uga_Overview_Apr08.pdf)

### “A new peace strategy for northern Uganda and the LRA”

In their report, ENOUGH Policy Analyst Julia Spiegel and Co-Chair John Prendergast argue that there is an opportunity to build peace in northern Uganda and the region, despite LRA rebel leader Joseph Kony’s failure to sign a peace deal in April.

[www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/uganda\\_may\\_2008.pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/uganda_may_2008.pdf)

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## Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 20, No.5, May 2008

### Editorial information

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### Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

