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HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

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News and Resources

What went right?

The fabric of peace in Tanzania and Kenya

The call by the African Union for 2011 to be a year for peace and security in Africa highlighted a deep concern with the continent's violent reaction to the nation-state. Analysis of challenges to international and intra-national peace and security naturally focus on the stories of Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Somalia as pertinent case studies. Though the bad news is always necessary to examine, good news can be equally informative.

This article takes a look at one long-term cause of peace and stability – that of a shared language – and explores this with regard to the specific case studies of Kenya and Tanzania. With over 120 main ethnic groups, mixed with Congolese and Rwandan migrants, how has Tanzania achieved domestic peace? Why is it that Kenya, a country very similar to Tanzania in many respects, has seen the descent to violence during elections whilst Tanzanian elections have remained peaceful? An example of how to get things right can be just as important as describing where things have gone wrong.

The two countries are fertile terrain for comparison. Firstly, they are similar in population, with estimates of 2005 putting the population of Kenya at 35.6 million and that of Tanzania at 38.5million.[1] Further similarities in urban population growth can be observed, with a slightly higher trend in Tanzania the result of a higher rate of total population growth. The two countries border each other in east Africa, both forming coasts on the Indian Ocean and bays on Lake Victoria. They perform similarly in levels of perceived corruption,[2] and 'share a common and related history dating back to the pre-colonial era, a common culture and ethnic makeup, and a common set of geographical and natural conditions that bear on the day-to-day lives of their people.'[3]

Kenya and Tanzania are also believed to be good comparative cases due to similarities in historical trajectories up until President Nyerere of Tanzania's Arusha Declaration of January 1967, through which the country embraced socialism and self-reliance. Because of the historical juncture caused by the Arusha Declaration,

Kenya and Tanzania 'pose the classic choice between concentration on the expansion of the national pie versus concentration on the distribution of the pie', setting at odds programmes of patron-client capitalism and one-party socialism.[4]

Peace and stability in Tanzania and Kenya

Within the literature on international development, mainland Tanzania[5] has suffered a glorious rise to fame followed by an embarrassingly sharp descent. Considered 'famous for its failed experiment in socialism based on rather inventive notions of African family hood (*ujamaa*)',[6] the economic stagnation and poor display of multi-party democracy all but silenced its claim for an alternative, Africa-born development initiative. However, the paradoxical way in which Tanzania has remained 'remarkably peaceful'[7] has fostered the interest of some academics, diligently sifting for 'what went right'.[8]

The importance of this endeavour has suddenly been thrown into sharp relief by the 2007/8 election violence in Kenya, which highlighted a deeper trend within that country of political violence. In contrast to Tanzania, extra-judicial killings by the police forces in Kenya have been normalised and given support by the government.[9] Violence has stained multi-party elections in Kenya since their restoration in 1991,[10] culminating in 2007/8, which saw more than 1,500 deaths.[11] The Waki Report, written in response to this most recent and horrific display of violence, points out that 'the post-election violence was spontaneous in some geographical areas and a result of planning and organization in other areas, often with the involvement of politicians and business leaders.'[12]

The post-election violence of 2008 was not spontaneous. Kenya is a country of layers, and three layers together caused the chaos. The first was the violent network connected to the main opposition, the Orange Democratic Movement, led by Raila Odinga. Political parties in Kenya have been led at the centre by vocal and determined populists. They enjoy a reach to their localities through patrimonial ties mixed with genuine popular support. Specifically, MPs fund groups of youths who support them locally. The groups are sometimes linked with local militia who operate outside the state, a phenomenon particularly prominent in the west of the country.

Militia groups linked to political parties were ordered and paid to take to the streets in violence in response to the perceived rigging of elections. Then came the second layer: those in support of the election results within the incumbent government gave the green light to the most ferocious police reprisals. Evidence of deaths collected by *Human Rights Watch* shows numerous examples of persons shot from behind, killed as they ran. The third layer of violence then came from the opportunists who took advantage of the chaos to steal.

How have politicians and the police been able to adopt the position of overseers of violence? The answer lies in poor interpersonal relations at the community level. In the absence of community cohesion, legitimacy is easily bestowed on those groups willing to ensure public order.

Language and community cohesion

Kenya and Tanzania have developed different capacities for inter-group communication. Compared with Tanzania's stress on Kiswahili as a force for unity, Kenya has witnessed the consolidation of tribal languages alongside a national stress both on Kiswahili and English.

Writing in 1977, ten years after the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere could proudly claim that the figure of Tanzanian pupils in primary school had jumped from 825,000 to 1,532,000.[13] The Tanzanian government's socialist convictions favoured a policy of education available for all, only reneging on free education when forced to do so by the Structural Adjustment Policies of donors. In addition to a stress on educating the young, numerous literacy campaigns for adults have been conducted,

involving by the mid-1970s more than three million adults not previously exposed to formal schooling.[14]

The importance of education's proliferation for communal identity-building comes alongside the language policy of Tanzania with regard to Kiswahili, representing an ongoing historical trend since Kiswahili's early formation as a practical medium of communication in east Africa. The colonial period saw Kenya under British control and Tanzania (then Tanganyika) administered first by Germany until defeat in World War I led to British administration. Both Kenya and Tanganyika exhibit diverse languages, many of Bantu origin and some with strong Arabic influences (especially in the coastal cities of Mombasa, Tanga and Dar es Salaam). The numerous tribal languages and dialects provided no common language for colonial administrations to interact with. However, rather than enforcing the use of English – as was done in Kenya, at least nominally – the German administration employed and formalised the *lingua franca* of Kiswahili. Tracing the rise of Kiswahili as a national language in Tanzania, Whiteley explains that '[t]o the early administrators, bewildered by east Africa's diversity and multiplicity of languages – more than two hundred of them – Swahili appeared as a godsend.'[15]

German administrators aimed not at unifying the country under a common tongue but, rather, to cut costs in administration by achieving a system whereby communication into the mainland through locally employed junior administrators could be relied upon. A common tongue also had the added advantage of standardising levels of language proficiency amongst German officers. Progress with Kiswahili was slow but fruitful, and proved of great value to the successors, the British.[16]

After Germanys defeat in World War I, Britain took control of Tanzania. The period of British colonial administration led to some confusion with regards the national language, as English was brought in with sudden urgency. The dilemma can be seen in the amusing lyrics of the popular Tanzanian band of the late 1940s, *Frank (Humplinck) and sisters*:

> I greet my friend, 'How do you do?'
> She's startled and swings round
> She asks why I'm calling her an *mdudu* [insect][17]

But the roots of Kiswahili had been widely and deeply sown at the levels of both state and society, and rose undaunted as TANU shook off the shackles of British rule. Kiswahili replaced English as the country's official language in the mid-1960s, growing from strength to strength as a force for unity. As such, Barkan claims that the potential for conflict in Tanzania has 'been muted by the near universal use of Kiswahili'.[18]

Kenya has retained both Kiswahili and English as official languages, though popular use of Kiswahili along the coastline has not travelled up-country.[19] Tanzanians complain at the poor Kiswahili they hear from Kenyans and many Kenyan politicians employ local tribal languages when campaigning in constituencies. In terms of educational influences, stress on *harambee* (*self-help*, literally *all pull together*) led to the foundation of many schools whose language teaching consisted of maintaining the local tribal language in addition to English, reinforcing the lesser relevance of Kiswahili. Linguistic developments in Kenya – especially Nairobi – have recently seen the rise of *Sheng*, a 'witty, cheeky, freewheeling *Clockwork Orange*-style brew of Kiswahili, English and indigenous Kenyan languages, with added dollops of reggae jargon, American slang, French and Spanish'.[20]

Central to understanding the development of community cohesion in Tanzania is the country's promotion of a common language. Why is language important? Involved in language is more than mere communication. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre points out how shared language also allows the natural development of rules and norms between persons. Through deliberation over things in common,

persons come to identify with others in their desired behavioural responses. Language facilitates the expression of truths; the habit of recounting events and experiences develops between persons and so trust is forged. MacIntyre even goes so far as to maintain that 'the recognition of a norm of truth telling and of a virtue of honesty seems written into the concept of a society.'[21]

Conclusion

The fabric of peace lies in each person identifying with the other. No competition of interests develops and no single faction understands itself as separate. Conflict starts with a lack of communication – a phrase that should extend beyond the confines of international diplomacy. As the case of Tanzania's social cohesion reveals, the ability to communicate lies at the heart of good stories of peace and security.

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The centrality of environmental conflict

– grim scenarios and possible mitigation

As the world mourns the passing of Professor Wangari Maathai, whose valiant efforts to protect the environment and human rights earned her a Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, the significance of her hybrid approach to peace and justice is profound. Celebrated for her substantial contribution to environmental conservation, Professor Maathai did not segregate her life's work of protecting the environment from her fight for multiparty democracy, challenging political impunity and corruption, protecting human rights notably the rights of women and political prisoners. Her quest for peace and justice mainstreamed environmental concerns, epitomizing the centrality of the environment as a concern that transcends traditional separations of class, identity, gender, political affiliation and geography.

Indeed, the environment affects us all. For instance, deforestation leads to environmental degradation, which exacerbates the impact of climate change resulting in further environmental degradation. A direct consequence of this is that land becomes unsuitable for farming or livestock rearing thereby forcing populations to move in search of greener pastures. This forced displacement of populations for environmental reasons will potentially increase competition for progressively scarce quality environmental resources, hence environmental conflict. If left unchecked, this domino effect of unregulated human activities on the environment, compromising quality and quantity of available resources with negative population displacement, will be felt even more severely in the near future and greater incidence of environmental conflict will come to bear.

The centrality of environmental conflict is premised on the fact that human beings need the environment to survive and its condition positively or negatively impacts their wellbeing. This necessity for environmental resources to survive, against the backdrop of a growing scarcity of quality environmental resources, introduces an element of competition and/or conflict. Whether it is land to live off, water to drink, air to breath, minerals to make electronics, oil for machinery, or timber to build, these resources are fast diminishing either in quality, quantity or both.

These environmental resources fall in either of two categories, renewable (forests, water, air) or non-renewable (oil and mineral ores). Shwartz and Singh argue that environmental conflict caused by scarcity of both of these resources is either directly over access or control of the resources or indirect when the variable of scarcity interacts with other variables like socio-economic factors[1]. To further clarify this definition, Libiszewski contends that conflict over renewable resources can only be qualified as environmental if it is due to environmental degradation[2]. Environmental degradation refers to deterioration in the quality of environmental resources from either human activity such as industry pollution and dumping or natural calamities such as floods.

Fertile grounds for conflict

Classifying conflict as environmental is often obscured by the fact that the conflict over environmental resources is seldom in isolation of other causative variables. A conflict over land may be due to a scarcity of arable land or pasture but it may also be as a result of incompatible economic or cultural goals, with the former being classified environmental and the latter, socio-economic. Environmental conflict is therefore distinguishable when the root cause of the conflict is attributed to environmental degradation that creates scarcity providing fertile grounds for conflict.

In the Kenya for example, causes of environmental degradation include illegal dumping of toxic waste on land or water, air pollution from traffic and industries, deforestation and harmful agricultural practices. The toll of unplanned industrialisation and unsustainable livelihood options has greatly accelerated environmental degradation, negatively impacting the quality of available environmental resources.

Environmental conflicts revolve around the access, control or use of environmental resources with conflicts over privatisation of public environmental resources or ownership/controlling access to these resources. As the march towards greater industrialization progresses, increasing the demand for environmental resources, there is likely to be an even higher occurrence of environmental conflict.

The centrality of environmental conflict will be experienced even more acutely as it begins to manifest regionally. This potential for the regionalisation of environmental conflict is enhanced by the trend towards regional bloc formation and the existing disparities in industrialisation and socio-economic development of neighbouring countries. Where there is scarcity of quality environmental resources in one country, there might be abundance in another, thereby increasing the likelihood of population movement to compete for these resources.

An illustration of this is the recent forced displacement of thousands because of drought in parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Described as the most severe drought in the past 60 years, it has resulted in thousands of environmental refugees crossing over to Kenya and Ethiopia. Within the context of chronic drought, in the event that displaced persons do not return to their countries of origin[3], there is the potential for future conflict with host communities as the new inhabitants intensify the demand for increasing scarce quality environmental resources.

Apart from natural calamities, differences in levels of industry and socio-economic demand for environmental resources may also be a factor in the regionalisation of environmental conflict. Taking the case of the East African Community (EAC), the disparate land ownership systems served as a stumbling block towards the right of establishment as contained in the draft protocol for the EAC Common Market. Fears were expressed that citizens from neighbouring countries with increasingly scarce arable land would seize the opportunity to 'grab' land across borders. To assuage these concerns, the EAC reached the decision that regardless of the level of integration, member states would remain the custodians of their own land[5].

Grim scenarios and mitigation

Future scenarios for environmental conflict are grim in the light of a continued disproportionate and uninformed dependence on the environment for survival. The sustained impact of harmful agricultural practices, overgrazing, overfishing, charcoal burning, unregulated industry pollution and illegal timber logging will intensify environmental degradation and magnify scarcity of quality environmental resources.

Already, governments in the Horn of Africa are facing food security challenges and the consequent forced displacement for environmental reasons as evidenced by the recent severe drought in parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. To complicate these national situations, environmental conflict that was previously confined to national borders may now spread to the region in an augmented scramble for quality environmental resources that may be more readily available across the border.

This need not be the case. A multipronged approach of civic education in environmental conservation, alternative sustainable livelihoods and aggressive programs to reverse environmental degradation would mitigate future trends of environmental conflict. First, civic education through school curriculums and adult learning, would seek to encourage responsible and sustainable usage of environmental resources and create a culture of caring for the environment for future benefits. Second, in consultation with affected communities, alternatives need to be sought for existing livelihoods that have occasioned over use and are primarily dependent on environmental resources. Third, programs reversing environmental degradation must be urgently put in place as an investment for the future wellbeing of populations. In their planning, regional governments need to factor in programs for civic education, alternative sustainable livelihoods and reversal of environmental degradation.

A coherent regional approach is essential to ensure that countries are in step in ensuring sustainable environmental resource management. The move to expand the areas

of regional cooperation of the then Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) transforming it into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should have enhanced regional capacity to not only address drought but more comprehensively tackle matters of environmental conservation management and socio-economic development. Based on the severity of the current drought and its far-reaching consequences, IGAD needs to evaluate its accomplishments vis-à-vis the current situation, and strategies on how to move the region forward.

The work of Wangari Maathai was inspirational both in the way that she mainstreamed environmental concerns as part of the fight for peace and justice and also in her individual commitment to this cause that soon earned her a global following. Following a ten-step program including civic education and a community approach towards reforestation, the Green Belt Movement has planted over 45 million trees since its inception in 1977. If this movement could galvanise such widespread community participation in reversing environmental degradation, then it is possible for this effect to be further multiplied with the goodwill of regional governments to comprehensively address this.

The Horn of Africa region should find inspiration in the late Professor Maathai's work, which is well captured in her observation on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, "It is evident that many wars are fought over resources which are now becoming increasingly scarce. If we conserved our resources better, fighting over them would not then occur … so, protecting the global environment is directly related to securing peace … those of us who understand the complex concept of the environment have the burden to act. We must not tire, we must not give up, we must persist."[5].

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A new start for South Sudan

Lessons from two decades of statehood in Eritrea

As expected, the January 2011 referendum in Sudan has heralded the emergence of a new state in the Horn of Africa South Sudan is the second state in the region that seceded and successfully joined the international community. The first to become independent was Eritrea which separated from Ethiopia two decades ago, and its existence for two decades carries a lot of lessons for South Sudan.

Notwithstanding differences, the independence struggles in these two states with two of the longest running civil wars in Africa share a great deal of similarities. The wars were fought against "mother" states in which they have been part. In addition, the independence struggles of the two countries were seen as "just, right, and deserved."[1]

However, while Eritrea has had two decades of statehood experience, the republic of South Sudan is just beginning its independent statehood. Hence, based on the two decades statehood experience of its predecessor, South Sudan may draw relevant lessons.

Experience from Eritrea tells that South Sudan should at least carefully deal with the two major issues of post independence relations with North Sudan and the nation-state building process within.

1. North- South relations

Border relations

When Eritrea became independent in 1991, the border issue was relegated as secondary. Despite the absence of a clearly agreed boundary, the two countries went on cooperating on several sectors including defence. The two countries had to pay for their negligence when a war broke out in 1997 allegedly caused by border disagreements. The border dispute as a major cause of the conflict is arguable but it was presented by the parties as the principal cause of the conflict.

In South Sudan, despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) providing for the demarcation of the border to be finalized within six months of the signing of the CPA, the issue of the border has not yet been settled. It is neither fully delimited nor demarcated. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report (2010), five years after the signing of the CPA, the task of the border demarcation remains incomplete. Saeed (2010) on his part indicates that the parties to the CPA have failed to put in place an internationally accepted border through most of the six years interim period.

Un-demarcation of the border is quite worrying, given the heavy dependence of both North and South Sudan on oil revenues that also largely come from border lands. According to the ICG report (2010), both the government in Khartoum and Juba depend heavily on oil revenues and much of the country's known oil deposits are located along the border between North and the South.

Violent clashes are already witnessed in hotly contested territory of Abyie. In June 20, 2011, the two countries agreed for the demilitarization of the Abyie area. They concurred to withdraw their respective forces from Abyie and let the Ethiopian peace keeping force to be deployed. As of September 30th, 1,842 peace keeping troops are on the ground in Abyie;[2] the withdrawal of the armies of the two countries, however, remains to be completed. Despite their promises, the two parties have failed to fully withdraw their forces from Abyie area.[3]

Furthermore, the ICG indicates that any agreed border line between the two countries needs to be a "soft" one that allows the movement of seasonal pastoralists, traders and people along the border. Such a clearly defined but flexible boundary will benefit communities along the border by allowing cross border interaction and movement. A fully closed boundary that strictly separates people who rather lived interpedently will be costly. The closure of the Ethiopian and Eritrean border following the outbreak of the conflict caused a lot of suffering to the people along the border.[4] It destroyed families; separating members in Eritrea and Ethiopia.

In Sudan, as the ICG notes, firmly closed border where traffic is restricted "threatens pastoralist livelihoods in North and South alike and create hardships for Southerners who rely on goods and services from the North." Cognizant of this fact, the parties had agreed to open up 10 crossing roads along their common border in September 17, 2011.[5]However, implementation was poor and both countries have recently vowed to shut their borders against the other.[6]

Citizenship

Since the independence of Eritrea, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have subscribed to different polices with regard to the citizens of the other state. Thousands of Ethiopians in Eritrea were expelled while Eritreans in Ethiopia continued to enjoy benefits of double citizenship. According to Abbink (1998:560) since its de facto independence

in 1991, Eritrea massively expelled at least 50,000 Ethiopians who were working as traders, workers in the Assab port, industries, Ethiopian army and government administration. These Ethiopians were expelled arbitrarily without their possession (Ibid). Until the outbreak of open hostilities 1997, Eritreans in Ethiopia on the other hand lived in good conditions enjoying positions in government, business and privileges such as cross border trade, credit provisions, and the right to bear arms (Ibid). Later in the years of the war, both Ethiopia and Eritrea expelled thousands of citizens of the "enemy" country. In many instances, this process was carried out with incidents of intimidation, robbery, plunder and other forms of human rights violation (Abbink, 1998:554).

In the new Sudan, the status of the Southerners in the North and Northerners in the South has not yet been formally agreed by the National Congress Party and the SPLM.[7]Already during the days to the referendum, thousands of Southerners (University students, workers, government officials etc) from the North returned to the South claiming that they were seen as "foreigners" in the North. In July 2011, in a law passed by the parliament, Sudan striped the citizenship right of Southerners in the North. Khartoum also terminated their employment contract. On the other hand, President Saliva Kiir, who criticized the decision of Sudan, reiterated his government's readiness to grant citizenship and priority in investment and job market to northerners in the south.[8]The implementation of this position of the president remains to be seen. If implemented, however, signifies a non reciprocal approach and could serve as a recipe of conflict between the natives and northerners in the South.

Currency

The flawed currency transition was one principal reason that caused the Ethiopian and Eritrean war in 1998. Eritrea's introduction of its own currency, the Nakfa, in 1997 was done with little consultation with Ethiopia. According to Negash and Tronvoll (2000:35), "it appears that there were no formal negotiations between the two countries on the issue of the new Eritrean currency throughout the 1997." Consequently, the two countries disagreed on the parity of Birr vis-a-vis Nakfa and cross border trades. With the introduction Eritrea's new currency, Ethiopia also replaced its old Birr notes with new one's annulling millions of the old birr notes that were circulating in Eritrea.

Both Sudan and South Sudan have introduced their own new currencies. This, however, seems to be done with little consensus. South Sudan has accused Khartoum of currency war.[9]A minimum of $700 million old notes of Sudan's pound that has been circulating in the South has turned to be invalid due to the introduction of new currency notes by Khartoum.[10] Sudan maintained that the old pound notes are worthless. Hence, South Sudan needs to put efforts to successfully bring an end to the currency transition and prevent the current currency war rhetoric from turning in to a deep source of grievance and violent conflict.

Resource utilization

Although Eritrea is not endowed with a lot of resources, it has had the opportunity to earn revenue by providing port services to land locked Ethiopia. Ports services was one component of the economic agreements the two countries signed under the Asmara pact in 1991. However, Ethiopia only used the Eritrean port of Assab for few years and in the mid of growing economic rows in 1997 channelled its port services to Djibouti.

Unlike Eritrea, South Sudan is fortuned with an oil reserve in its territory. However, though most of the oil wells are mainly located in the South and adjacent border areas, the oil infrastructure lies in the north. The pipeline runs north, the refinery is located in Khartoum and the oil is transported via the Port of Sudan. The building of a new pipeline through Kenya is perhaps possible in the long run. However, in the short run, South Sudan must strike an acceptable deal to the service of the oil infrastructure and refinery owned by the north to supply its oil resource to the world

market. Such a deal will mutually benefit the two countries. Sudan will be able to get a share from the oil revenue in the form of service fees for its oil infrastructure and South Sudan will securely supply its oil to the international market. An impasse, on the other hand, would endanger the revenue from the oil industry and creates a huge economic pressure to both countries.

2. Within the South Sudan

The domestic political process

Eritrea's independence in 1991 was greeted with huge expectations both from inside and outside. The Eritrean people who endured the thirty years of war hoped for better days to come. They expected the liberation fighters to deliver on their promises of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. Similarly, the anticipation of the international community from the new leadership of Eritrea was high. In his trip to Africa in March and April 1998, President Clinton praised President Issayas of Eritrea and his counterpart Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia as "new generation leaders" and "leaders of the new African renaissance" (Glikes and Plaut, 1999:37).

However, the euphoria of independence and expectations in Eritrea were soon shattered. Genuine motivations lacking, early democratization effort did not last long. Two decades after its celebrated independence, the country has sadly transformed in to a one man dictatorial dominion. According to the recent UN report (2011), Eritrea today possess the "most highly centralized, militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent."[11]

In view of this, SPLM in South Sudan should ensure the party and the political spectrum of the country remains open and democratic. An amicable political space in which all political actors and the civil society play a meaningful role in the democratization process of the country should be developed. As the ICG cautions in its latest report (2011), failure to do this could endanger the emergence of an "overly centralized, authoritarian and ultimately unstable" state of South Sudan.

Militarization

As noted in the UN report, Eritrea currently has the most militarized government in Africa. Eritrea has had violent clashes with three of its neighbours, Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The government uses force to crush opposition against the regime. Huge spending is made on defence. The majority of the youth are employed in the army. The national military service is often extended frequently, causing shortage of labor force particularly in the rural parts of the country (Hedru, 2003:438).

Similar trend of militarization is also discernable in South Sudan. South Sudan is said to have one of Africa's highest population to army ratio. The SPLA is said to have about 140,000 members in a country with an estimated population of about 8 million (Mutiga, 2011). Quoting the World Bank, Mutiga further points out that during the transitional period "the South spent 42 per cent of its revenue on national security needs, a figure four times higher than what it spent on education and five times higher than what it spent on healthcare." This huge investment on the military is understandable given the security concerns that existed before the referendum. However, now as the referendum has been undertaken and independence achieved, the country should embark on the task of practical demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration.

Segmentation at elite level

Experience from the post revolutionary Eritrea demonstrates the institutionalization of cleavages between ex-combatants of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and other professionals of the country. According to Woldu and Bromall (2011), ex-liberation fighters are glorified and rewarded richly and those professionals who had no badge of liberation fighters were undermined and denied the ability to freely share their talents and skills. Political and administrative positions of the

state at various levels were assigned to former liberation fighters who entirely lack administrative and managerial skills. The consequence of this was huge incompetence in the civil service of the post liberation Eritrean government.

In South Sudan's political processes, the SPLM seems to be reluctant to share power with the opposition. The ICG (2011) notes that the SPLM: "appears reluctant to agree to power-sharing formulas of any kind, and most of its senior officials – harbouring a "winner-takes-all" mentality – indicate no intention of giving up high-profile ministries." Such an exclusive approach by SPLM undermines the political process and risks a weak civil service and instability from within. Therefore, the political process currently underway needs to be broad based and all South Sudanese should equally be given with the opportunity to contribute their own share in the building of the state.

Conclusion and recommendations

At last, South Sudan has become a sovereign state of its own. However, behind the ecstasy of independence celebrations lie huge tasks of nation building. This article has been about the lessons South Sudan learns from its predecessor in the region. The two decades experience of Eritrea urge the government of South Sudan to carefully deal with post independence issues of border, citizenship, debt and resource sharing. These issues must carefully be addressed before they turn into recipes for renewed conflict between the north and south.

There are efforts under way to deal with these issues and treaties have been signed. However, experience from Eritrea once again reminds us that the implementation of the agreements in good faith is crucial and it is not just the simple signing of agreements. The Ethiopian and Eritrean war in 1998 unfolded in the shadow of the ill implemented Asmara pact.

South Sudan also faces a second formidable task of building a stable and democratic nation state from within. It should be able to build a common and shared South Sudanese national identity across the tribal/ ethnic divisions that define the people of South Sudan.

The democratization process should be broad-based, involving all relevant political actors and the civil society, and the prominence of SPLA members shall be minimized, just to mention few.

As witnessed in Eritrea, failure to realize these two tasks from inside and outside risks the resumption of a renewed conflict and conception of an authoritarian, centralized and unstable South Sudanese state.

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1 Woldu, Dawit O. and Bromall, & Irvin H(2011) "South Sudan and building a new nation: Lessons from the Eritrean experience" Sudan Tribune http://www.sudantribune.com/Eritrean-Experience-Lessons-to,40114 Monday 12 September 2011

2 UNIFSA, official website http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/facts.shtml

3 Sudan vows to withdraw from Abyei as juba urges action against Khartoum" Sudan Tribune, http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-vows-to-withdraw-from-Abyei,40355 Friday 7 October 2011

4 In a field work conducted in the summer of 2008, the local people in the two of the disputed border towns of Bademe and Zalambesa have told the author the huge strain the continued stalemate has put on their daily lives

5 "North, South Sudan agree to open border crossings" AFP Sep18, 2011 http://news.yahoo.com/north-south-sudan-agree-open-border-crossings-175007956.html

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7 "South Sudan leader prepared to grant citizenship for Northerners" Sudan Tribune, 11 July 2011 http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-leader-says-prepared,39496

8 Supra Note v

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11 The UN Monitoring Group in Somalia and Eritrea (2011) Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) 18 July 2011 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433

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Back to war in Sudan

– bad governance or incomprehensiveness of the CPA?

No doubt, the CPA has brought an end to the civil war (1983-2005) in the Sudan. Yet, its outcome and implementation have been below the expectations of the bulk of the local communities in the war-torn regions of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile and Abyei, widely referred to as contested, marginalized, transitional areas or border territories[1]. In recent political rhetoric, these same areas have been described as "the New South", in geographical and socio-political, after the separation of the South Sudan.

Following the signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, there was a commonly held, but ultimately wrong conviction that the underlying root causes of the large-scale and protracted civil wars in the formerly undivided Sudan had been accurately diagnosed, comprehensively negotiated, and finally transformed into a text that provides a final settlement for its social, economic, and political problems. On the contrary, the recent drift back to violent conflicts in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile and the overall prevailing political disarray in Sudan after the separation of South Sudan implies that the CPA is neither a 'comprehensive' nor an effective framework for conflict resolution to the Sudan's protracted wars and political instability. Moreover, these recurring wars manifest a persistent practice of bad governance in the Sudan.

Towards the end of the transitional period, it was obvious that substantial parts of the CPA that are directly related to the three areas of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile and Abyei, either remained unimplemented or delayed beyond their timeframe. Most of the delays were not simply technical problems or adjustments, but part of political manoeuvres that jeopardized the implementation of these crucial parts of the CPA which were supposed to take place *before the referendum*.

This article reveals that the delay in implementing the CPA in the three areas is ascribed not only to lack of political will by the involved parties but also to the way the CPA was originally engineered. In the negotiation process, the three areas were isolated in two shaky protocols because it seems they were, in fact, nothing more than objects of bargaining between the negotiating parties and the mediators. Thus, the on-going violent conflicts in the two areas is, to large degree, (i) an inevitable result of the way the CPA failed to effectively address the root causes of the wars in these two regions; and (ii) a manifestation of the Sudanese dysfunctional state and its failing nation-building process.

Vague and incomprehensive solutions

It is worth noting, from the outset, that most of the key terms used in the CPA's Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile States (in short the Protocol) are vague, therefore, inviting more troubles than providing solutions. Take, for example, the term *Popular Consultation*: it was loosely defined in the CPA as a mechanism to ascertain, by way of asking 'the people' as to whether the CPA had met their political, economic, social, and administrative aspirations in the implementation process during the interim period (2005-2011). Definitions of what in fact 'popular consultation' exactly meant and how it should be carried out were ambiguous though the problems of the two areas were clear.

During peace negotiations, the Government of Sudan (GOS) continued to insist on excluding the three contested areas from the peace talks while the SPLM/A demanded their inclusion, especially its leaders in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, Malik Agar and Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu respectively. For example, since 1998, Yusuf Kuwa Mekki insisted that in the event the people of southern Sudan opted for separation in the course of exercising their right to self-determination, the Nuba should have the following options:

1. to choose to be part of the southern Sudan state;
2. to choose to be part of the northern Sudan state; or
3. to choose to have an independent state.[2]

Due to persistent pressure from the international, regional, and locally involved actors, a breakthrough was made when the question of the three contested areas was included in the last stage of peace negotiations and as a consequence in the CPA. The Protocol on the two areas sets certain modalities and principles as the basis for political, administrative, economic, and social solutions to the conflict in the two contested regions including, among others:

1. The structures of the state government, legislature, and the judiciary;
2. South Kordofan State shares 2% in the oil produced in its land,
3. Both states share half of the 75% of the total fund designated to the war-affected areas;
4. Power-sharing in the two states during the interim period was allocated 55% and 45% to the NCP and the SPLM respectively;
5. The right for 'popular consultation', is to be exercised by the people of both regions to assess the effectiveness of the Protocol in redressing their multiple grievances; and
6. Part of the SPLA forces are to participate in security arrangements in the two areas through the Integrated Joint Units (JIUs).

After the end of the transitional period, a sizable number of the people in the two areas hold the view that the fundamental question of their *identity, territory,* and *political destiny* have not been satisfactorily dealt with in the CPA. Despite its embedded incomprehensiveness, vagueness, and loopholes, the CPA was perceived as a positive turning-point in the recent history of political movements of the people of the two regions, because it seriously attempted to redress their long standing grievances. Moreover, the articulation of a right to Popular Consultation of the people of the region, the maintenance of the SPLA forces, and the participation of the SPLM with 45% in power-sharing in the two regions during the interim period were all seen as extremely important, albeit insufficient, political developments.[3] The following, however, are obvious shortcomings and loopholes in the CPA:

1. *Political* aspects: The CPA denied the people of the two regions the right to self-determination. Instead, their political demands were reduced to an inferior and ambiguous political exercise of 'Popular Consultation'.
2. *Economic* aspects: The CPA suppressed the right to compensation of local communities affected by expanding mechanized farming and oil extraction on their traditional livelihood bases.
3. *Socio-cultural* aspects: The CPA ignored the demand to address basic issues of socio-cultural emancipation and self-determined identity, which were systematically subdued under successive central governments.
4. *Human rights* aspects: The CPA is silent with regard to the atrocities and gross human rights violations committed by the GOS during the war.

Implementation of the CPA in the two areas and the aftermath

The Protocol provides two sets of socio-cultural, economic, and politico-administrative arrangements for normalizing the situation during the transitional period and beyond. The first set includes, among others, (i) socio-political accommodation through power- and wealth-sharing, (ii) integration of civil service, police, and judiciary, (iii) creation of an integrated military force formed out of SPLA and SAF, (iv) social reconciliation among different ethnic groups in the two regions, (v) setting up an institutional framework for settling land rights disputes, and (vi) assisting IDPs in returning to their homelands.

These arrangements were formulated as preconditions for socio-political stability that must prevail before conducting elections and the popular consultation. The reality, however, is that all these fundamental arrangements were hardly met, resulting in an apprehensive situation between the state and local communities, as well as between different communities, especially in South Kordofan. The new violent eruption of the old conflict and its possible solution in the two regions must be seen in this wider context.

The second set of arrangements includes a number of specific political steps in a logical sequence and bound to a specified timing, all aiming at final solutions to the conflicts. This is by way of allowing the people of the region to express their view, through democratic processes, as to whether the CPA is acceptable or not as a final settlement for their political, economic, and socio-cultural questions. This set of steps starts with the *population census* as a prerequisite for *elections*, while the election is a prerequisite for the exercise of *popular consultation*, the final step in all the arrangements. The crux of the matter is that all these processes were intentionally arranged in a way that their implementation would finish *prior* to conducting the referendum in South Sudan and that this very sequence was a crucial part of the CPA. Had these logical procedures been observed, the SPLM, partner in the CPA, could have participated effectively in implementing the arrangements of the Protocol before the south determined its destiny through the referendum.

The clue here is that the popular consultation as a mechanism to determine the views of the people already contains a self-defeating mechanism. The Protocol stipulates that any shortcomings in the CPA identified by the popular consultation shall be rectified

within the framework of the CPA through a negotiated deal between the two states and the central government. First, it is clear that the right of the people to rectify the CPA, to effectively redress political grievances in each region, is restricted to the CPA's *framework*. But it is this very problematic framework, which needs to be challenged, if any rectification is to be effective. Second, the Government of National Unity (GON) was and is dominated by the NCP which resisted the inclusion of the two areas in the CPA in the first place, and thus, lacked political will to implement the Protocol.

As a result, to the present day, the key provisions of the Protocol remain without implementation or any alternative to the, namely questions of the customary communal land rights, cultural rights like the promotion of local languages and self-chosen religion, milestones in the Protocol for their prime role in triggering war. Another delay concerned the integration of qualified SPLM members into the civil administration, judiciary, police, and security forces. Instead, the politics of exclusion continued: exclusion from decision-making processes, exclusion from economic benefits, and exclusion from public services. The above-mentioned pre-referendum issues were delayed by the NCP with the intention of pursuing them alone and on its own political terms at a later stage. This is evident in its recent move of defining the SPLM-N as a 'foreign force' after the separation of South Sudan followed by banning its activities as a political party coupled with the arrest and harassment of its members and the closure of its offices nationwide.

The whole exercise is essentially due to a lack of *political will* and *determination* rather than technical or practical constraints. In fact, the postcolonial Sudan's political history informs this lack of political will is, in turn, a manifestation of *bad governance*. Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has undergone a troubled socio-political process that culminated in the longest civil war in contemporary Africa. This political situation is still prevailing. It is the inevitable demonstration of a dysfunctional state and a failing nation-building process. Instead of promoting national integration and unity with respect for socio-cultural diversity, the governing elites time and again resorted to forcing national unity through coerced uniformity. In consequence, the Sudan remains a highly contested state, caught in the following cycles of civil war and fragile peace agreements:

- the first civil war in southern Sudan (1955-1972), ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement;
- the second civil war (1983-2005), which started initially in southern Sudan, extended gradually to northern Sudan via the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, and led to the separation of South Sudan on 9th of July 2011;
- the full-blown crises in Darfur (2003 until today) and Eastern Sudan (2006); and finally
- the resumption of war in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile state (mid 2011). These political, social and humanitarian crises are clear indicators of the political disarray in the Sudan and show an uncertain political future at the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Conclusion

To sum, pushing fundamental questions about the future of the two areas beyond the formal timeframe of the CPA without agreeing on new arrangements that safeguard acceptable solutions has cumulatively contributed to an inevitable emergence of on-going violent conflicts. The overall analysis informs that on-going wars in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the increasing trend of political disarray in the Sudan not only plead for an urgent negotiated peace deal to de-escalate the situation, but also imposes a need for a critical rethinking of the way the CPA was conceived by various involved national and international actors, and, subsequently, of the manner in which the conflicts in these contested areas were and still are (mis)conceived and (mis)handled. The importance of a *critical rethinking* at this decisive moment of the

emerging two Sudans stems from the fact that the potential international mediators are likely to repeat the same mistakes, while trying to intervene and provide solutions to the unfolding violent conflicts in the two regions.

Finally, The long path of the struggle and eventual separation of the South Sudan informs that the on-going violent conflicts not only undermines the intended national integration and the overall nation-building process but endangers the very survival of the Republic of Sudan as a viable political unit.

This paper is a simplified version of a detailed report by R. Rottenburg, G. K. Komey and E. Ille: *The genesis of recurring wars in Sudan: rethinking the violent conflicts in the Nuba Mountains / South Kordofan*. Halle, Germany September 2011

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1 See Komey, Guma K. 2010. *Land, Governance, Conflict and the Nuba of the Sudan*. Woodbridge: James Currey.

2 Ibid

3 For more details, see Komey, Guma Kunda. 2010. 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Questions of Identity, Territory, and Political Destiny of the Indigenous Nuba of the Sudan'. *International Journal of African Renaissance* 5 (1): 48-64.

NEWS

Kenya might alter election next year's general elections

The Interim Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has maintained that next year's general election can only be held in December. IEBC chairman Isaack Hassan says that holding the elections in August as provided in the constitution is not practical. According the chairman of the IIEB commission August elections have been hindered by the timelines available for various programmes by the electoral body to enable a free, fair and credible election. It is almost impractical to hold the polls in August as preparations for the elections will take a whole year. New voter registration, extensive civic and voter education, and registration of Diaspora voters, boundary delimitation and recruitment and training of new election officials are exercises that hinder the possibility of the August elections.
Source: allAfrica.com

Sudan and South Sudan presidents to resolve Abyei issue

The two presidents of Sudan and South Sudan will decide on the future of Abyei. The two presidents agreed that the decision will be made at the presidential level in a planned meeting. Related issues to be discussed include demarcation of the border. In the meantime, both sides have agreed to the implementation of the interim arrangement on Abyei as was signed in Addis Ababa in preparation for the final agreement. The two sides also agreed to enhance collaboration and also to foster peaceful resolution of differences and also an end to aggressive posturing and behaviour towards each other. Other issues discussed and agreed upon include transitional economic and financial arrangements on oil, cooperation on higher education and humanitarian work including training and capacity building programmes.
Source: Daily Nation, Wednesday October 12, 2011

Crimes against women in Somalia not a priority

Women and girls in Somalia face the risk of rape in the midst of the fighting and humanitarian catastrophe. Women and girls in search of humanitarian assistance intermittently experience incidences of rape committed by armed men. Girls as young as 11 years have been victims of rape when their single mothers go out in search of food provided by humanitarian organizations. Dire situation increases the vulnerability of girls. The mothers further experience physical abuse while trying to rescue the girls from rape by the armed men. Many of the rape cases are not reported because of social stigmatization in the Somali society. Those that are reported are not appropriately attended even with the rise in cases of rape and sexual violations. The priority of agency organizations is not dealing with the crime but providing humanitarian assistance in the form of food and water to the scores of displaced persons. Mitigating the escalating sexual violence has a low priority.
Full article can be accessed at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/11/rape-somalia-women-famine

Kenya pursue Al Shaabab in Somalia

Kenya security is in pursuit of Al Shaabab militia after an increase in cases of kidnappings alleged to be perpetrated by the group. It is also alleged that the group has been recruiting its militia from Kenya particularly in regions populated be Somali ethnic communities and persons professing Islamic faith in Nairobi, Mombasa and Isiolo. The recruits from Kenya are encouraged to joint "holy war" in Somalia with promises of huge rewards. In a move to deal with the group, the Kenyan government is engaging militarily as well as enticing combatants recruited from Kenya with amnesty and rehabilitation as Kenya officials tout the possibility of prosecution of leaders of the group by International Criminal Court. It is believed hundreds of youth from Kenya have been recruited to join the group since 2005. The pursuit for al Shaabab in Somalia led to a security alert in Kenya after the group threatened to attack Kenya.

The Kenyan government military approach to eliminating has received substantial backing although dissenting voices also call for dialogue citing that the group will not be "pacified by military means only".
Sources: Sunday Nation, 30th October 2011, Daily Nation, 31 – 1, 2011.

Call to increase peacekeeping force in Somalia

The UN Security Council has urged the African Union (AU) to urgently boost the size of the African peace keeping force (AMISOM) in Somalia to its mandated level of 12,000 so it could effectively carry out its mission in the war-torn nation. "The African Union must urgently increase its force strength to its mandated level of 12,000 uniformed personnel, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate." the UN Security Council said. Currently AU has some 9,000 troops on the ground contributed from Uganda and Burundi helping the Transitional Federal Government. Other countries that pledged to send troops include Djibouti, Republic of Guinea and Sierra Leone as well as additional from Uganda and Burundi.

AMISOM, which has been supporting Somalia to establish long term security since 2007, has a mandate up to 31 October 2012. Backed by the United Nations, AMISOM has been protecting government structures, training the security forces, escorting and protecting humanitarian groups from attacks.

The UN Security Council has now called on Member States and regional and international organizations to provide additional equipment, technical aid and finance to the AU peace keeping force. The UN Council has also called for a more permanent and increased UN presence in the country, particularly in Mogadishu.
Source: Sudan Tribune

South Sudan seeks membership in regional initiative

The newly independent Republic of South Sudan has sought full membership of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) two months after it became independent on 9 July. The country has already been enjoying an observer status in the organisation as a semi-autonomous region before independence, under the umbrella of the then national government in Khartoum.

Since its establishment in 1999, the inter-governmental organisation is dedicated to equitable and sustainable management and development of the shared water resources of the Nile Basin. Its objectives include developing the Nile Basin's water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples. Its member states include Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda with Eritrea also as an observer.

NBI also thrives to ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources as well as ensure cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking mutual benefits. The regional body also targets poverty eradication and promotes economic integration and to ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action.

The leadership of the new nation is also in the process of applying to join various regional bodies such as the East Africa community. The United Nations made South Sudan its 193rd member on July 14th. The African Union followed shortly, which brought the total of African countries to 54.

RESOURCES

Lord's Resistance Army Crisis Tracker

A Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Crisis Tracker project has been launched. This a joint initiative of Resolve and Invisible Children that seeks to expand the breadth and credibility of publicly available information about LRA attacks in central Africa. Information about reported LRA incidents will be available through a digital map, a breaking newsfeed, regular data-analysis reports, and other tools. Below is a list of tools included in the LRA Crisis Tracker project.

- Map of reported LRA incidents, updated every hour, which shows incidents across South Sudan, Central African Republic, and DR Congo from December 2009-present. Users can manipulate the map to focus on incidents in a specific date range or geographic area.
- Quarterly Security Briefs that analyze data from a three-month period, including statistics and trends on the frequency, nature and location of reported LRA incidents.
- Monthly Security Briefs that list all reported LRA incidents for that month and provides minimal analysis on reported LRA incident trends.
- Public access to the full LRA Crisis Tracker database, excluding sensitive sourcing information, will be available for public download. Users can also generate unique datasets focusing on incidents in a specific date range or geographic area.

These tools, as well as others, are available at *www.LRACrisisTracker.theResolve.org.*

World Apart

– What can we learn from the Bosnian war?

Worlds Apart tells of a well-meaning foreign policy establishment often deaf to the voices of everyday people. Its focus is the Bosnian war, but its implications extend to any situation that prompts the consideration of military intervention on humani-

tarian grounds. Ambassador Swanee Hunt served in Vienna during the Bosnian War and was intimately involved in American policy toward the Balkans.

During her tenure as ambassador and after, she made scores of trips throughout Bosnia, and the rest of the former Yugoslavia, attempting to understand the costly delays in foreign military intervention. To that end, she had hundreds of conversations with a wide range of politicians, refugees, journalists, farmers, clergy, aid workers, diplomats, soldiers, and others.

In Worlds Apart, Hunt's eighty vignettes alternate between those living out the war and "the internationals" deciding whether or how to intervene. From these stories, most of which she herself witnessed, she draws lessons applicable to conflicts throughout the world. These lessons cannot be learned from afar, Hunt says, with insiders and outsiders working apart. Only by bridging those worlds can we build a stronger paradigm of inclusive international security.
More information on *http://www.swaneehunt.com/worldsapart.htm*

New research

The lives of women of South Sudan

The South African Institute for Justice and Reconciliation has released Hope, pain and patience: The lives of women of South Sudan. It is an edited collection of new research and analysis by a selection of South Sudanese and non-South Sudanese authors outlining the experiences and contributions of women to South Sudan's path to freedom. It is the first of its kind. By telling the stories of many brave women, the book highlights some of the tremendous challenges related to gender issues in South Sudan today. These are, amongst others: a lack of access to education for women, the prevalence of highly patriarchal traditions and customs many of which are enshrined in a patriarchal customary law framework and poor health care services resulting in the highest maternal mortality rate in the world. It is hoped that this book and the stories in entails will contribute meaningfully to the creation of a policy framework that is in line with the vision of a democratic and peaceful South Sudan.
Find the book at *http://www.ijr.org.za*

Understanding obstacles to peace

– actors, interests, and strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region

This book describes and analyzes protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In doing so, it emphasizes obstacles to peace rather than root causes of conflict. Case studies are presented from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Northern Kenya, Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, and Zanzibar. Amongst other conclusions, the book shows that, to settle or transform protracted conflicts, distinction must be made between strategic and nonstrategic actors: the former must be able to prevail upon the latter in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements.

The theme and collection of the research presented in this book are unique in the literature. The case studies all employ methods of "thick description" process tracing (following particular actors and their interests), and in-depth personal interviews. The book will be of interest to academics, researchers, undergraduate and post-graduate students, and professionals in conflict theory, analysis and resolution, African and development studies, political science and international affairs, as well as to mediators, negotiators, and facilitators in conflict resolution.
The book is downloadable from IDRC website; *http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/Publications/Pages/IDRCBookDetails.aspx?PublicationID=881*

Make Room for Peace

– a guide to women's participation in peace processes

The manual Make Room for Peace focuses on the participation of women organisations acting for peace in conflict affected regions. It gives practical guidance to third

parties, such as donors, diplomatic delegations, mediators and other intermediaries aiming at supporting sustainable peace processes. The recommendations apply to both national and international stakeholders in peace processes. The manual may also be used as a tool for women's organisations advocating women's participation in peace processes.
For the full manual follow the link;
http://www.kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/make-room-for-peace

Research report

Structures of Peace

Structures of Peace is a research report produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace identifying key economic, political and cultural determinants that foster peaceful societies. Structures of Peace provide a new conceptual framework for understanding and describing the factors that create a peaceful society. Derived from an empirical and statistical analysis of the Global Peace Index, over 300 country data sets were used to define the key economic, political and cultural determinants that foster the creation of a more peaceful society.

The framework consist of the following elements: Well-functioning government, Sound business environment, Equitable distribution of resources, Acceptance of the rights of others, Good relations with neighbours, Free flow of information, High levels of education and Low levels of corruption. These factors were found to be associated with peaceful environments and can be seen as both interdependent and positively reinforcing of each other. This means the relative strength of any one 'structure' has the potential to either positively or negatively influence peace.
The full report can be accessed from:
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Structures-of-Peace.pdf

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Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 was done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA).
The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Shamsia Ramadhan, *shamsia.ramadhan@life-peace.org*.
For subscription matters contact: Tore Samuelsson, *tore.samuelsson@life-peace.org*
For a link to HAB and more information see *www.life-peace.org*
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Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.