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Rwanda' s tremendous tragedy : how a very different UN Secretary General could have changed the whole picture

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Rwanda's tremendous tragedy

How a very different UN Secretary General could have
changed the whole picture

Diana Miserez
Autumn 2024

Thirty years from the turbulent period in which Independence was secured

... and another thirty since...

What happened thirty years ago to that small country in the heart of Africa is basically well known to the readers of this paper; yet a summary will provide a focus on the many integral parts of what then was still a looming tragedy. Let us however first give prominence to the moving speech delivered on 27 May 2021 in Kigali by Mr. Emmanuel Macron, President of France, confirmed three years later on the occasion of the 30th commemoration of the genocide.

Only those who went through the night can recount it. Recount that night.

These words summon up a profound silence. The silence of more than a million men, women and children who are no longer here to tell of that interminable eclipse of humanity, those hours when everything fell silent.

They are words that would tell us of the headlong flight of the victims into the forests and the marshes. A race with no finishing line and no hope, an implacable hunting down renewed every morning, every afternoon, in a terrible, banal repetition of evil.

They invoke the voices of those who, after falling, faced death or torture at the hands of their executioners, without a cry, sometimes to allow a loved one, a parent, a child, or a friend, to escape, someone they protected in their dying breath. Those voices that fell silent just as at break of day, the terrible euphoria of the rallying calls of those who killed "together" and those who left, in their twisted vocabulary, for "work".

This place restores to them what was taken from them: a face, a story, memories. Desires, dreams. And above all, an identity and a name: all the names, engraved tirelessly, one by one, on the eternal stone of this memorial.

Ibuka, remember.

Those words also invoke the voice of those who bear the wound of that night, those who bear the open wound of being there and still being here. Those whose suffering was not heard, not before, not during, and not after, and that is perhaps the worst.

*This sensitively framed recognition of the unimaginable suffering of a people is here just the first half. This version in English is a translation found on internet.

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Introduction

In April this year as we all thought about Rwanda, a valued acquaintance in Nyon, Switzerland who I look upon as “an old Rwanda hand” and who presumably knows of my lifelong attachment to Rwanda and its people, wrote requesting me to write out a theory I have, and together we would make it available to people of consequence: namely ***had Sadruddin Aga Khan been appointed Secretary General of the United Nations – a real likelihood at more than one period - he could (and doubtless would) have managed to prevent the development of the tsunami of violence and unbridled hatred that in 1994 convulsed Rwanda. He had been universally recognized as a highly competent UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the top candidate more than once for the post of UN Secretary General, an effective UN “troubleshooter” and the instigator of worldwide “think-tanks” on vital questions that included humanitarian issues, the nuclear danger, globalization and environmental destruction. Alas for Rwanda, the Soviet Union vetoed his nomination.***

First, let us focus on what actually happened. There is much to record, as briefly and as succinctly as possible, and to reflect upon, in these 16 parts. The elements seen to be of particular significance are rendered in bold. Literary source material referred to throughout this paper was found in the following:

Barnet, Michael N. *The International Humanitarian Order*, Routledge, 2010

Michael Barnet went from an academic background to serve as the US representative on the Security Council in the vital years of 1993/94, later continuing to reflect on what had happened and on the respective role(s) of the UN administration and the Security Council.

Dallaire, Maj.Gen. Roméo, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York, 2003

Maj.Gen. Dallaire portrays in his harrowing book the reality of everything that happened from the time he was first sought for the peacekeeping mission to Rwanda.

Guillebaud, Meg, *Rwanda - The Land God Forgot*, Monarch Books, London and Michigan, 2002

Meg Guillebaud (of a missionary family I got to know in both Switzerland and Africa in the early 1960s) spent most of her life in Rwanda, living through the genocide that was to eliminate many of the people she knew.

Kinzer, Stephen, *A Thousand Hills, Rwanda's Birth and The Man Who Dreamed It*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. USA 2008

Stephen Kinzer, an experienced American author, who before writing his book consulted a bibliography that covers over 8 pages, and had periodic access to Paul Kagame following after 1994.

Miserez, Diana, *Price Sadruddin Aga Khan - Humanitarian and Visionary*, The Book Guild, 2017 – ex-UNHCR, extended missions In the Great Lakes area, 1964/5 and 1976/77 and lifelong friendships with Rwandans

Then I should explain how - just after this year's commemoration of the 30th anniversary of Rwanda's unimaginable suffering - I was asked to write down my theory: namely that a different Secretary General of the United Nations – a certain Sadruddin Aga Khan, had he been appointed to the post – could have prevented there ever being the terrible genocide in Rwanda.

Sadruddin was universally recognized as an outstanding United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and had been familiar with Rwanda's problems from the time he had been appointed Deputy High Commissioner in 1962. Twice he had been the top candidate for the post of Secretary General of the United Nations, he was a significant UN "trouble-shooter" and the instigator of worldwide "think-tanks" on vital questions such as humanitarian problems, the nuclear danger, globalization and destruction of the environment.

Alas for Rwanda, the USSR twice vetoed his appointment.

1. Mr. Juvénal Habyarimana and the Hutu government

Background

Juvénal Habyarimana was born in 1937 to a well-to-do Hutu family in Kisenyi, a town at the northern tip of Lake Kivu in the north-west of the country – an area described as having traditionally consisted of autonomous Hutu princedoms resistant to Tutsi central rule. As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, open revolt by Hutu princedoms in and around Ruhengeri that had led to brutal repression by the Tutsi seconded by the German colonial power left a deep sense of grievance, to which we learn was added the fact that the Hutu of the whole area despised the Hutu from the south for accepting Tutsi rule.ⁱ

The young Habyarimana had the benefit of both academic and military training, initially under the Belgians. After Rwanda's grant of independence (1962) he served under Grégoire Kayibanda in the first (exclusively Hutu) Rwandan government, as head of the Garde Nationale Rwandaise, then as minister of the national guard and police. Overthrowing President Kayibanda in a military coup in 1973ⁱⁱ and taking over the same anti-Tutsi policies, Habyarimana with his MRNDⁱⁱⁱ took Rwanda on as a totalitarian one-party Hutu state. By then, both before and after the grant of Independence, armed cross-border incursions by Rwandan refugees living dissatisfied in camps in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Congo had led to repercussions – both violent acts perpetrated against Tutsi living in Rwanda resulting from heightened fear on the part of the Hutu population, and new refuge flows.

In 1978, Habyarimana brought in a new constitution and in 1983 and 1988 elections were organized in which he reportedly won 99% of the votes. Though Belgium still had a role in Rwanda, its main ally and financial backer was France, keeping up its support year by year along with the IMF and the World Bank. President Mitterand and his son and advisor, Jean-Christophe were close friends of the Habyarimana family, and had been fully backing the Hutu régime for years. In terms of the president's popularity within the country, his principal followers were the people of the north-west - relatives and childhood comrades – a fact that was going to sow Rwanda's doom. A secretive group called *akazu* ("little house") consisting of extreme radicals formed around Mme Habyarimana, her three brothers and others from the Ruhengeri region would eventually be seen to be calling many or most of the shots.

Evolution of the MRND

With time, and the introduction of quotas that further disadvantaged Tutsis, the numbers of Habyarimana's supporters, including moderates, began to wane, while there was a concurrent increase in the strength of a clandestine rebel movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), created by Rwandan refugees within the Ugandan armed forces. By the mid-eighties, Kigali was becoming increasingly concerned at the numbers of Rwandans working under Yoweri Museveni, the former freedom fighter who was now president of Uganda - two of them, Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, by then actually promoted to a very senior level.

When in January 1991 the RPF came to make its first successful cross-border raid, choosing Ruhengeri that they encircled during the night and attacked at dawn, Habyarimana and his government were stunned and humiliated. They could no longer persist in believing that the

rebels had been crushed or had lost their will to fight following their short incursion made three months earlier (on 1 October 1990), forcibly repelled with the help of French forces. On the contrary, the RPF had now shown that they had a mastery of guerrilla tactics. What was recognized as the start of a civil war between the Rwanda regime's army and the RPF resulted in Habyarimana both tripling the size of his army and, in time, giving in to France's urging to bring in other political parties. Formed and recognized – but as late as 1992-3 – were the Republican Democratic Movement, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party.

Arusha and stark warning signs

In early August 1993 Habyarimana signed, albeit under some duress, the Arusha Peace Agreement that the extremists violently condemned because it gave them no place in the future government. **By then the president had come more and more under the influence of his radical wife and her *akazu*, the group determined to keep its hold on power. And although the innumerable widespread incidences of atrocious human rights abuses were being documented in a UN special report that was meant to come to the notice of world powers by the second half of that year (1993), time would prove that few (probably very few) got to be familiar with the terrible facts described on every page.**

As Maj.Gen. Roméo Dallaire, the appointed Head of the UN peacekeeping force UNAMIR, would relate (though years later),

In September two of the major moderate parties, the MDR and the PL, had fractured into moderate and extremist "Hutu Power" wings. Each wing had then laid claim to the ministerial positions and representative seats that had been allocated by party in the Arusha Peace Agreement. The RPF, of course, preferred the moderate candidates in each of these parties; the president's party and an increasingly visible Hutu extremist party, the CDR, preferred the Power candidates. These intrigues were only now coming to the surface and needed astute political handling. I knew I wasn't up to the task and could now hand it over to Booh-Booh and concentrate on the military and security sides.^{iv}

Dallaire further recalled in relation to the transitional government foreseen at Arusha, the BBTG,

In the Arusha negotiations, Lando's PL had been allocated the powerful justice portfolio, and the RPF had been given the interior ministry, which in theory would enable them to investigate, charge and try individuals for corruption, murder and other crimes. This ability undoubtedly worried any of the current power-holders in Rwanda, who had money in their pockets and blood on their hands. According to Faustin, designated Prime Minister in the expected transitional government, the biggest fear of the former ruling party was that once the transitional government was installed, the PL and the RPF would see to it that the president and many of his entourage were clapped into jail for crimes committed during the regime. That night, Faustin also told me that President Habyarimana was trying to manoeuvre around the installation of the BBTG

and that his direct interference was one of the major factors behind the political impasse.^v

Faustin revealed other elements pointing to damaging intrigues. “Lando was also having trouble with his party president, Justin Mugenzi. Both (N.) and Mugenzi were known to be extremists who had joined the shadowy group that called itself Le Power, or Hutu Power. There were rumours that Mugenzi was being paid off by Habyarimana’s henchmen to stir up trouble within the PL.”

Other parts of this paper continue to reveal elements that could have served as dire warnings of what could come. **And thus the salient single element that led to the devastation of the country and its people – the savagery planned and directed by extremists – would remain largely unnoticed by the outside world.**

Eight months on from the August 1993 signing of the Arusha Agreement, Habyarimana was killed when the Falcon aircraft (a gift from France) in which he was travelling back on 6 April 1994 from meetings with other African heads of state was shot down on its approach to Kigali airport. Other victims of the fatal crash were the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira and the French crew.

It seemed that there had been no end of warning signs – but the shooting down of the Falcon became the signal for the immediate start of a carefully planned genocide.

* * * * *

2. Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front

I understood, at 10 years old, that the strongest pain for a political refugee
is lack of dignity Stafan de Mistura

We recall here, in relation to the background of RPF, how in 1959 (three years before Belgium granted Rwanda and Burundi their independence), an aristocratic Rwandan and her children, including Paul, a two-year-old, narrowly escaped being murdered in front of their house by a violent gang; they had been saved thanks to the queen’s awareness that the new violence could spell extreme danger to her relatives, sending her chauffeur to rescue them. Like countless Rwandans who had fled for their lives into the neighbouring countries, the young Paul Kagame had grown up as a stateless refugee in a camp, increasingly aware of the family’s homelessness, poverty and the lack of any real rights.

Paul Kagame, like his fellow-refugees, came to be humiliated by the frequent rejection by Ugandans and by potential employers because of his statelessness. Twice managing to get into Rwanda clandestinely to assuage some of his longings, and listening – seated incognito in the dark corners of a café - to what normal Rwandans and some officials were talking about, his longing to return grew day by day. When his young pal and soulmate Fred Rwigyema returned suddenly from a long and mysterious absence to explain that he had been on military activities in Uganda as a co-opted member of a rebel movement (the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni), Kagame did not hesitate to join it. Over several years, receiving more

and more experience as a soldier and intelligence officer, he and Fred were two of increasing numbers of Rwandan refugees who lived on very little food, travelled great distances on foot and helped Museveni overthrow the illiterate dictator Idi Amin. It was now 1979 and Kagame was 22. Subsequently, when Milton Obote, now restored to power, chose to impose increasing restrictions on the country and in particular on Rwandan refugees, Museveni decided to overthrow him too (1985/86).

Meanwhile, as Stephen Kinzer would write^{vi}, the regime in Kigali presumed that Tutsi who departed during the years around independence or after other pogroms would fade into a scattered *diaspora* and slowly forget their homeland. But in fact, the opposite happened: “Rwandan exiles and their children never adjusted to their status as refugees and never forgot the country they had been forced to leave.”

Kinzer goes on to affirm that whereas many Tutsi who remained in Rwanda managed to get used to the reality of an authoritarian Hutu government, living as unobtrusively as possible, the six hundred thousand or so who had fled their homeland after 1959 were not only eager to return but were outraged at the way Rwandan leaders repressed their fellows at home. However, earlier efforts to go back had failed miserably – namely the *inyenzi* raids of 1961-66, born of rootlessness and loss, when bands of armed exiles based in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo crossed the borders, mainly targeting police stations and government offices. But their damaging raids were too sporadic and too uncoordinated to pose a serious threat, though they were used by the government to justify waves of anti-Tutsi repression. Yet they did arouse some sympathy in the wider world thanks to some serious reporting, some of which in the more sensational press had headlines such as “*Giant seven-foot Tutsis try to take over their homeland*”. As for Tutsi refugees who were not confined to the camps in the four asylum countries, despite some discrimination they demonstrated resilience, intelligence and a willingness to work hard.

Meanwhile over a period leading up to 1990, Fred and Paul were forming the nucleus of a guerrilla force one day capable of beating Habyarimana’s army. By that year, they had meticulously planned an invasion even though Kagame – as Museveni’s response to Kigali’s expressions of fearful concern - was being sent to the U.S. Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for further high-level military training. Aware of increasing pressure to put their secret plans into effect with no delay, the two leaders chose 1 October 1990 - a date that would find most heads of state in New York attending the World Summit for Children.

Fred Rwigyema was the overall RPF commander. As Kinzer relates, when Fred and fellow commanders arranged for large numbers of troops to move within Uganda, no one raised any questions and two thousand soldiers of Rwandan origin, dressed in battle gear and fully armed, were assembled and ordered to proceed southward.

Beginning on September 30, trucks packed with soldiers began rolling into Ankole district in southwest Uganda. At outposts near the Rwandan border, they unloaded crates of recoilless rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers, and even several Soviet-made light automatic cannons, all of which they had taken from armories in Uganda. They packed these onto their trucks and jeeps – also appropriated from the

Ugandan army - and then...ripped the Ugandan insignias off their uniforms. They were no longer soldiers in a national army, but revolutionary guerrillas fighting h power in a country all of them loved passionately, but few of them knew. Kagame was in the process of leaving the USA to join the campaign, his military hosts managing reluctantly to understand his position.

As the invading army advanced across the border, it was joined by volunteers from all over Rwanda. But when Kagame got the news after having failed to reach Fred Rwigyama by telephone for several days, it was devastating: Fred had been killed by a sniper on the second day of the invasion and his troops were severely damaged and in disarray after being unexpectedly met with strong artillery fire and firing from French helicopter gunships. Kagame and Rwigyama had made their plans without reckoning on having to face such elements of a European army.

So Kagame, forced to leave the USA precipitously, had to use all his skills to avoid arrest *en route*, an international arrest warrant having been issued. On reaching his troops, he was shocked to see what state they were in. Then his long years of experience as part of Museveni's^{vii} rebel army came into play and led him to imagine that the depleted force could be rebuilt only by being removed to a secret location and retrained. The young force of dedicated men ("*inkotanyi*" - *those who fight bravely*) now spent months where no one could have imagined it happening- high up in the Virunga range. They lacked warm clothing and shelter – but absorbed the high-level training Kagame supplied, doubtless using elements from the US training manuals that he had been allowed to take with him. And during that time, supporters around the world worked to raise money and buy clothing and other supplies, sending them by porter to fighters at their mountain base.

Such was the eve of a civil war that would last for three years and end with Rwanda in total chaos. **At dusk on 22 January 1991**, an RPF force of 700 *inkotanyi* crept down the mountainside to positions on every side of Ruhengeri. At daybreak they made an all-out attack described by Kinzer,^{viii}

The first targets to fall were grain warehouses, which were full of maize flour and other products the hungry RPF was eager to seize. Guerrillas also easily captured a government-owned farm, and made off with several hundred head of cattle; Kagame wanted milk and meat for his many malnourished comrades. Around police stations and army outposts, though, there was unexpectedly strong resistance, and attackers took heavy casualties. Only later, when fifteen French paratroopers were recommended for medals to recognize their valor at Ruhengeri, did it become clear that this resistance came from French-led units.

Kinzer's next paragraphs show up disturbing shadows of what the future might hold for Rwanda:

A terrible massacre was narrowly averted at the prison that was one of the raid's main targets. Hundreds of inmates were confined there, most of them political prisoners. When fighting broke out, the panicked warden called Kigali to report what was happening. He reached Colonel Elie Sagatwa, a cousin of Madame Habyarimana who

was the president's private secretary and a key member of the *akazu*. Colonel Sagatwa gave him a chilling order: kill every inmate. He refused. Several minutes later, Sagatwa called back, repeating the order and adding that it came from the president himself. The warden still could not bring himself to obey. (However) the army responded ... by ordering soldiers and militia squads in Ruhengeri to hunt down local Tutsi and "cut them to pieces". Hundreds were slaughtered...

The shock and horror of Habyarimana and his entourage, and some of the other consequences of those Ruhengeri events, are outlined above. For the following three years, a disciplined force without the advantages of either a means of transportation or adequate ammunition – but led by an inspired, determined officer - faced the national army, achieving some remarkable results, such that discussions had to be entered into that would lead to the design of a peace agreement.

If the scene can be said to have been set for what could have been a judicious intervention by intelligent United Nations representatives or bodies, nothing meaningful or significant happened before 1993 – which, as of course it turned out, was too late to arrest the momentum of an announced genocide.

* * * * *

3. Fatal seeds sown in Rwanda's centuries-long social structure

With a brief glimpse back into the relatively distant past of Rwanda, we recall that was called "Ruanda-Urundi" - the future Rwanda and the future Burundi - became a German colony after very large areas of Africa had been "opened up" by explorers made famous by their exploits and their accounts, and subsequently "parcelled out" to European nations at the Berlin Conference of 1888. To Germany were attributed Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. The Germans were so curious about Rwanda's peoples and so teutonic in their thinking (taken dangerously far) that they introduced what would become a fatal measure: the ethnic identification of each resident. Belgium, when it came to be handed Ruandi-Urundi to administer as a United Nations Trust Territory, emulated the Germans' method of pinning down each person on the territory.

Belgium, like the former colonial Germany, allowed the Tutsi and their king (mwami) to run the country - initially. But the fact that the individual identity cards led to the realization that those registered as Hutu heavily outnumbered the Tutsi, roughly in the ratio 85:15, with the Batwa (pygmies) representing 1%, was startling news, soon communicated to the hitherto unwitting population. But that was alas not all: the Hutu had begun to be fed with the Belgians' belief that the Tutsi were not true Africans at all, but had come from elsewhere, such as Ethiopia. Suddenly the danger of ethnic conflict came to be written on the wall, because whereas for most of Rwanda's precolonial history people had lived side by side without rancour, new Belgian conceptions began to tip the balance.

Then with the cry "Uhuru" – *Independence!* - echoing across much of Africa, between January 1960 and the end of 1964 no fewer than twenty-six African countries obtained their independence from Belgium, Britain and France. In many cases the lack of any serious prior

preparation meant that the new young countries remained dependent to a degree (sometimes to a marked degree) on their former “masters”, this did not altogether displease the latter.

In the case of Rwanda, the Catholic church continued, through its “Pères Blancs” (White Fathers), to have a pervasive influence. It would play a crucial role at every stage of recent Rwandan history. Even before Rwanda attained its independence, members of the small core of educated Hutu close to the Catholic church elected to stand as candidates for posts of local and regional councils, which in most places they won. We read the following in Kinzer’s book:

In 1957 nine of them, several associated with a powerful Swiss-born bishop, André Perraudin, published a fiery appeal that would resonate through the next phase of Rwandan history. Known as the Hutu Manifesto it called on Hutu to rise up against “the political monopoly that is held by one race, the Tutsi” which it said condemned them “to remain forever underlings”. The signers and their supporters, by one account, “derived a burning sense of grievance from the monopoly exercised by the Tutsi caste over all sectors of the administration and the economy; to break the hold of this monopoly became a central objective of Hutu intellectuals on the eve of the revolution.”

The document with its central idea of Rwanda being a Hutu country was printed by a Catholic press and copies were distributed in churches across the country. By late 1959, Bishop Perraudin’s secretary, Gregoire Kayibanda, was announcing his plan of forming a new political party, the Movement for Hutu Liberation, known as PARMEHUTU. **It called for a completely new system under which Hutu would rule and Tutsi would have to submit.** If the new Belgian policy in support of the Hutu came up against resolute opposition in the person of King Mutara III Rudahigwa, who said that he could not support any independence formula that did not guarantee the safety of all Rwandans, he perhaps signed his own death warrant. For invited to meet prominent Belgian officials at a lunch in Bujumbura on 25 July 1959, he died just after starting to eat, pronounced dead hours later by a Belgian doctor. Reactions to their mwami’s death can be imagined: civil strife erupted on a huge scale. People I was with in Rwanda in 2015 told me that as far as they were concerned, *the genocide had begun in 1959.*

What had seemed so basic to the Belgians, many of them impregnated with deeply-held racism^x such as was foreign to the population of Rwanda back in the 1960s, can be seen in this anecdote, given me recently by a Rwandan lady who came to Gruyères (our part of Switzerland) for the wedding of a godson and stayed at our “B&B”. One day a little boy she knew told his parents when he went home that he had been slapped by his teacher, a priest. Next morning, the boy’s father went to the school with him to find out why this had happened. The explanation was puerile, an example of Belgian bigotry : “He refused to say which ethnic group he belongs to.” The boy had simply no idea of his ethnic background. His parents, ostensibly like many others, did not consider it of any importance. The sense of citizenship of the Rwandan public had not yet been distorted back then, and no doubt they had successors in those who convinced the 1993 Special Rapporteur that Rwanda’s residents could live peacefully together.^x

However, from time to time Tutsi inhabitants certainly suffered the serious repercussions of the spasmodic cross-border raids of refugees (*"inyenzi"*). By the end of 1963 the Kayibanda government, not seeing the raids as likely to stop, decided to kill all the country's remaining Tutsi leaders. Drawing up a list of 20, reportedly all of them moderates who had agreed to participate in a political system designed by and for Hutu, he *nevertheless* had them all killed in the prison at Ruhengeri.

Back then (late 1963/early 1964)

There were certainly tensions across the Great Lakes region, though in reality a great deal of understandable resentment on the part of populations of the whole area was probably as attributable to the presence of Europeans as to inter-ethnic strife. At that period, there was evident rivalry between Chinese and Americans, both countries having an exaggerated number of staff in their embassies. In Congo, totally unprepared for the Independence Belgium had suddenly thrust on it in 1960, a rebel movement inspired by Pierre Mulele (who had briefly been the minister of education in the newly formed government), accounted for the deaths of many Europeans (including our team member François Preziosi and the ILO colleague who had travelled up country with him that fatal day). Large numbers of Europeans, most of whom had been living in the Congo for years or even decades, streamed across the border to Bujumbura with only what they could carry. When the limited hotel accommodation in the town was all taken, they were grateful to be offered even floor space in our homes!^{xi}

In Rwanda, the massacre of Tutsi in December 1963, like that of 1959, was on a huge scale^{xii}. And not for the first time, and alas not for the last, Ugandans living on the shores of Lake Victoria saw bodies brought down to the lake by the Kagera river, one of the Nile's tributaries.

As for Burundi, in Bujumbura itself the newly-appointed Hutu prime minister, Pierre Ngengandumwe, was shot on the steps of the hospital where he had gone on the evening of 7 January 1965 to see his wife and newborn baby. We heard the shots from the office, and were subsequently warned that we were on a hit list because we were working for Tutsi refugees, it being believed that a Tutsi had fired the shots that evening.

We have basically seen what transpired years after all that. So although in all probability most unlettered Hutu – and *certainly* the remaining Tutsi inhabitants - wished for nothing other than peace and quiet, periodic outbursts of tensions occurred, never more than after the Tutsi regime in neighbouring Burundi carried out in 1972 the savage murder of large numbers of Hutus, many or perhaps most of them schoolchildren. Survivors in their hundreds of thousands poured into Congo's Kivu Province and into Tanzania (all of them naturally of concern to UNHCR, headed by then for years by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan).

In Rwanda, the reactions of Hutus to the outrage can be imagined.

* * * * *

1. The role of France (1)

Rwanda's government under Mr. Habyarimana knew that it could rely on more or less unconditional support from its colonial patrons, France and Belgium, both of whom seemed

to consider Rwanda a colonial success story, little imagining that “they had set in motion forces that would propel it beyond the edges of imaginable horror”.^{xiii}

In Kinzer’s account, frequently referred to in this paper, we read on pages 36 and 37 how Habyarimana achieved popularity with the people of Rwanda and with France and Belgium. He followed the same two central precepts that had guided Grégoire Kayibanda – namely that Rwanda was a Hutu country and the Tutsi must never be allowed to return; and it must be faithful to its European patrons. We read that President Habyarimana was frequently a guest of the Belgian royal family, and that the France/Rwanda relationships grew ever closer under Charles de Gaulle, Michel Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterrand.

Rwanda was looked upon as a pillar of “Francophonie”^{xiv}, the group of the world’s French-speaking nations that apparently considered Habyarimana a faithful ally. Reportedly he had been educated by a French-speaking religious order, and when visiting Paris, he charmed his hosts by reciting passages of French poetry. They promised to defend him from any threat, and carried out that promise in numerous circumstances - but actually did much more than that. Over several years, they carried out professional training of the army and supplied huge quantities of arms, ammunition and vehicles (including the Falcon aircraft that was to crash fatally on 6th April 1994). And French paratroopers and other soldiery played a role every time Habyarimana indicated to Paris that danger was afoot, whether it really was or not.

When on 1 October 1989, the *Inkotanyi* had made the incursion under Fred Rwigyama across Rwanda’s northern border with Uganda, Habyarimana immediately appealed to France for urgent help, reportedly going as far as to allege that there had been heavy fighting in the capital Kigali. There seems even to have been evidence that he had ordered his own army to stage a night attack on Kigali that he could blame on the RPF. “President Mitterrand was more than ready to bale his friend out. We know from various sources that in the early 1990s, France sold the Rwandan regime more than \$20 million worth of weaponry and helped it buy five times that amount from arms dealers in Egypt and South Africa, a French bank standing as guarantee.” The Duclert report of 2021 (https://www.vie-publique.fr/files/rapport/pdf/279186_1.pdf) tells us that the French prime minister, Michael Rocard, announced “Opération Noiret – Operation North Wind – under which 600 elite paratroopers were to be rushed to Rwanda. They would deploy close behind government battle lines, taking over management of the campaign, directing artillery attacks, advising Rwandan commanders on field tactics and supplying essentials.

François Mitterrand was ready to go to great lengths to keep hold on Rwanda for France’s “Francophonie” and prevent it from falling into the hands of the dreaded “Anglo-Saxons”. Belgium, to bolster the French force as well as to symbolize a continuing interest in their former ‘colony’, sent 400 soldiers of its own.

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5. The UN Secretary General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative

Background

Article 99 of the United Nations Charter says that the Secretary General “may bring the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. This provision allows the SG to choose between playing an activist role, in the tradition of Dag Hammarskjöld (in the 1950s until his 1961 death in the Congo), or more of a bureaucratic role, like that of Kurt Waldheim (in the 1970s).

The SG is required to uphold the values of the United Nations, even at the risk of challenging Member States.

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, born in Cairo in 1922, was a man of considerable distinction whose career was outlined in a Lowy institute paper^{xv}: a background in law and political science after taking a Ph.D. in Paris, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs in May 1991 and a long association with international affairs as a diplomat, jurist, scholar and author. Member of the Institute of International Law, the International Institute of Human Rights, of the African Society of Political Studies and the Académie des Sciences morales et politique of the Académie française, Paris, he participated over several decades in meetings dealing *inter alia* with international law, human rights, economic and social development, decolonization, the Middle East, **and the rights of ethnic and other minorities**, attending in 1978 the Camp David summit with a role in the Camp David accords signed in 1979 between Egypt and Israel.

Egypt is a member of “Francophonie”, the grouping referred to above of nations using French, and eventually Dr. Boutros-Ghali became its president. Amongst his other attributes, Boutros-Ghali is recognized as having formally created the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992, that within its first year had to oversee the situation in Somalia in which warlords maintained an upper hand and wrought havoc and death.

Appointment of a “Secretary General’s Special Representative” (SGSR)

When it came to Rwanda, Boutros-Ghali appointed as his Special Representative from November 1993 Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, a Cameroonian politician and diplomat born in 1938, who had been his country’s Minister of External Relations from 1988 to 1992. **As a political nominee of the SG**, he was considered to be the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR. On arriving in November 1993 (just five months before the genocide), he had left the work he preferred of running a banana plantation, claiming that only a direct appeal from his friend Boutros Boutros-Ghali had brought him out of retirement to take up the post of SRSG.

Major General Dallaire, the senior Canadian army officer chosen to head the force of several thousand UN peacekeepers, thought after welcoming Mr. Booh-Booh to Kigali that the two men could work well together. He hoped that the political appointee would manage to put an end to the party infighting that was obstructing any movement towards installing the transitional government foreseen at Arusha, the BBTG. Dallaire wrote,

(We) briefed him to the best of our ability. In September, two of the major moderate parties, the MDR and the PL, had fractured into moderate and extremist “Hutu Power” wings. Each wing had then been allocated by party in the Arusha Peace agreement. The RPF, of course, preferred moderate candidates in each of these parties; the president’s party and an increasingly visible Hutu extremist party, the CDR, preferred the Power candidates. These intrigues were only now coming to the surface and needed astute political handling. I knew I wasn’t up to the task and could now hand it over to Booh-Booh and concentrate on the military and security side.^{xvi}

In the event, Dallaire wrote,

To our surprise and chagrin, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh turned out to be a proper gentleman who kept diplomatic working hours. He was not involved in helping me deal with the fall-out of the massacres and the propaganda wars they were provoking. He was rarely in his office before ten, took a full two-hour lunch and left the office before five. He made it clear that he was not to be tracked down and disturbed on the weekends unless there was a dire emergency. He seemed to bring nothing new to the table in the way of expertise on Rwanda, knowledge of the conflict, familiarity with the Arusha Accords, or skill at identifying and dealing with the political intrigues of the nation. He was not inclined to take the lead on the international political effort, even though the enormous power invested in him and his mandate by the UN Security Council made him the logical person to do so.

Even more serious, it seems that acts that could almost be qualified as subversive were practised by Boutros-Ghali and Annan

As Kinzer revealed on pages 118-119 and 133 of his book:

French and American diplomats working to limit the Rwanda peacekeeping mission had a reliable friend in Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. He was Paris-educated, believed passionately in France’s *mission civilatrice* in Africa, and, by one account, “could see nothing unless it was through a Francophone prism.” Among the favors he had done for France while serving as Egypt’s deputy foreign minister in the early 1990s was brokering a deal that brought the Rwandan government \$6 million in weaponry, including seventy mortars, two thousand land mines, and three million rounds of ammunition. He was especially close to President Mitterrand, whose decisive support had made possible his rise to secretary-general.

... Half a world away, the Security Council met on April 5 to authorize an extension of the UNAMIR mandate. It was a bad week for peacekeepers. The mission in Somalia was collapsing, and in Bosnia, Serbian troops were storming across UN lines to attack the “safe haven” of Gorazde. No one wanted more bad news, and in his report on Rwanda, Boutros-Ghali did not give any. Instead he wove a reassuring fantasy. **He attributed much of the violence in Rwanda to banditry and said the country’s leaders were “committed to the peace process.” For weeks Dallaire had been sending urgent cables warning that the situation had become explosive – he used the phrase “deteriorating significantly” in no less than seven – but Boutros-Ghali mentioned none of them.**

Later Boutros-Ghali claimed that if he misled the Council, it was only because he had been away from New York for weeks and was not well briefed on what was happening in Rwanda.

There are other disturbing elements, actually the most disturbing of all in relation to the Secretary General and the head of the UN's peacekeeping division, to be seen in relation also to the parts of this paper numbers 7, 8 and 12. Michael N. Barnett sets out those elements on page 13 of his book *The International Humanitarian Order* (Routledge, 2010) while presenting a discourse on ethics:

I began to wonder after considerable soul-searching in response to one of the twentieth century's darkest chapters: the genocide in Rwanda. At the time of the genocide I was working at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and assigned to cover Rwanda (in addition to other sub-Saharan peacekeeping operations). Like many others at that moment, I had grave doubts regarding whether a humanitarian intervention might stop the genocide, and worried that the UN was, once again and just like in Somalia and Bosnia, about to be a sacrificial lamb. Fearing the Security Council would send an undermanned and token peacekeeping force to certain defeat at the same moment that the United States had just finished its withdrawal from Somalia and ten Belgian peacekeepers had been killed at the beginning of the genocide, I and others spent considerable energy debating how to justify non-intervention.

About a year after the genocide I began to question why I was so intent on arguing that not intervening was ethical even in the face of genocide, and a few months after that I learned that high-ranking UN officials, including Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan, had been receiving detailed recommendations from Force Commander General Romeo Dallaire, including a fairly well-conceived plan for intervention. **This was news. During the first weeks of the genocide the Secretary-General's office consistently and repeatedly told the Security Council that it had not received any concrete suggestions from Dallaire, intimating that he was too overwhelmed by events to develop any contingency plan. Why the Secretary-General's office would withhold information that would provide fuel for an intervention became something of an obsession of mine for the next several years.**

NOTE: Dallaire had of course supplied New York with continuous news. That provided by the nocturnal visit of the man called "Jean-Pierre" revealing practically all the plans of the extremists and of course being immediately sent on to Annan, was dated 11th January, i.e. many weeks before the genocide began in earnest on 7th April.

There was unfortunately worse to come. "Events in Rwanda during mid-April presented the Security Council with a stark choice"... (but) **"Boutros-Ghali was travelling in Europe, and nothing symbolized his lack of interest more vividly than his refusal to return to New York as this crisis exploded."** - a statement of Kinzer, on his page 156, parallel to that of Barnett, *op cit* pages 118-119:

Boutros-Ghali also emanated indecision to the point of paralysis, if not complacency. He happened to be in Europe in early April and opted to stay there rather than return to New York. This decision, in my view at the time, reflected a disturbingly distant stance from the unfolding tragedy and demonstrated a troubling abdication of responsibility and leadership. A more distressing episode concerned a reported conversation between him and Belgium's former Foreign Minister Willy Claes. With ten peacekeepers already dead and its remaining soldiers at risk, the Belgian government was debating whether to withdraw its troops. Claes called Boutros-Ghali to ascertain the Secretariat's thinking and how Belgium's decision might affect the future of UNAMIR. According to an authoritative source, despite the urgency of the situation, Boutros-Ghali responded by saying that he would "get back to him in four or five days."

Years later, Boutros-Ghali said on being questioned, "I was not realizing that there was a real genocide, it takes time for us to understand." (Kinzer, *op.cit* page 272) But given the UNSG's academic background and his apparent involvement across the board in human rights issues in particular, one certainly has difficulty in finding such an excuse valid.

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6. Warnings of the UN Special Rapporteurs of 1991 and 1993, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam

At the beginning of the 1990s, warnings of trouble brewing were given by two United Nations Special Rapporteurs (1991 and 1993). The first of the two reports was doubtless submitted by René Degori-Ségui, but I have found no documentation on it or on its author. However, there was substantive reporting by the 1993 UN Special Reporter, to be drawn on below. In addition, the following was available thanks to **Human Rights Watch, then Africa Watch, that began reporting on massacres of Tutsi and other human rights abuses in Rwanda in 1991. The following is posted on their website:**

As part of an international commission of inquiry, Human Rights Watch documented abuses and violations of international human law from October 1990 through 1992.

*Human Rights Watch has been documenting and exposing human rights violations in Rwanda since the early 1990s. Its senior adviser in the Africa division, Alison Des Forges, one of the foremost experts on Rwanda, dedicated her career to the struggle for human rights in the Great Lakes region of Africa and to Rwanda in particular. **In the period leading up to the 1994 genocide she worked tirelessly to alert world powers to the impending crisis in Rwanda. Few would listen.***

Human Rights Watch was aware that Habyarimana's supporters perfected some of the tactics they would use during the genocide: how to choose the best sites to launch attacks, how to develop the violence – both in intensity and extent – from small beginnings, how to mobilize people through fear . . . and how to build cooperation between civilian, military and militia leaders to produce the most effective attacks. Youth gangs developed into militia squads, being told that killing Tutsi was merely a form of communal work, called "clearing the bush".

Oxfam was another principal NGO present year by year in Rwanda. Staff had expressed similar concerns to visitors, including the UN Special Rapporteur Mr. Ndiaye.

Then there was invaluable detailed information presented by the UN Special Rapporteur Mr. B.W. Ndiaye that encourages us not only to refer to but also to quote, in part or in full. Mr. Ndiaye had carried out a mission to Rwanda in April 1993, reporting back to the Commission on Human Rights which took his report at its fiftieth session in August 1993^{xvii}.

In Mr. Ndiaye's succinct prose, we read that, during 1992, he had "received reports and allegations relating to extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of unarmed civilians by the Rwandese security forces in connection with the armed conflict between government security forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR) since October 1990". He had also received information concerning "killings of members of the Tutsi minority...allegedly perpetrated with direct or indirect involvement of the security forces" (para.2). He wrote that his work had been greatly facilitated by the considerable amount of information brought to his attention by various human rights organizations, both Rwandan and international which he said was on the whole sufficiently convincing and precise to be taken into account. **Making special mention of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry, which he was able to use as his main working document because of its methodical and specific nature and the diversity and consistency of the testimony it contained, he had concluded after cross-checking that the substance of the allegations of human rights violations and in particular of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions could be regarded as established.**

The Special Rapporteur related how, after Habyarimana's 1973 *coup d'état*, regional rivalries were added to the existing ethnic antagonism, with the north-west, the home region of the president, enjoying privileges in relation to the rest of the country. While the majority of the population reportedly considered that it is possible for the two main ethnic groups to live together peacefully, **there is a certain élite which, in order to cling to power, is continuing to fuel ethnic hatred, for instance by spreading rumours prejudicial to the Tutsi" (para 20). He reported that the situation had become particularly explosive with the distribution of weapons to civilians by the authorities (paras 21-22).** The report referred to the number of displaced persons, between 900,000 and one million, adding "an indeterminate number of persons who, as a result of local acts of violence whose presumed perpetrators are still at large, live in a permanent state of terror and dare not move back into their homes, cultivating their fields in the daytime and spending the night in the open or with members of their families" (para 23).

In the section of the report labelled "A. Types of violations" the Special Rapporteur wrote that killings had been taking place not only in the combat zones during or after clashes but also in areas situated some distance from the hostilities. **"In the latter case, it has been shown time and time again that government officials were involved, either directly by encouraging, planning, directing or participating in the violence, or indirectly through incompetence, negligence or deliberate inaction."** And he went on to write that the number of victims had sometimes reached tragic proportions, as for example in Kibilira, where at least 348 persons were said to have been killed in forty-eight hours shortly after the outbreak of war in October 1990 (para 28). In the following paragraph, Mr. Ndiaye reported that death threats

and “political” assassinations had been used to intimidate or eliminate the regime’s opponents, witnesses of human rights violations, or human rights activists. Such violations of the right to life had sometimes been committed by government officials.

In the section of his report labelled “B. Persons responsible for violations”, he reported inter alia in relation to the hurried recruitment campaign after the start of the armed conflict, increasing numbers from 5,000 to 40,000 men within a few months. The undue haste with which recruits had been selected and instructed had, he said, had negative repercussions on the discipline of the combatants and on their training in the rules of war. These inadequacies combined with the low wages received by the soldiers, **facilitated the crimes committed, such as the endemic practice of raping Tutsi women (cases o twelve-year-old rape victims have been reported), looting, armed attacks, revenge killings and murders of civilians (para 33).** “Soldiers of Bigogwe camp (Mutura Commune) are said to have organized fake attacks by rebels during the night of 4 February 1991), so that they could then unleash indiscriminate and bloody reprisals against those alleged to be responsible. **The Forces Armées Ruandaises are also accused of incitement to murder and of giving logistic support to the killers... setting up roadblocks” (para 35).**

The report went on along similar lines for another twenty paragraphs, each tending to be quite as alarming as the others (under headings “**Violations attributable to local government officials**”, “**Violations attributable to political party militias**”, “**Violations attributable to clandestine organizations**”, “**Violations attributable to private individuals, to the Rwandese Patriotic Front**”, “**Absence of the rule of law**”, “**Tradition of impunity**”, “**Judicial system (lamentable)**”, “**Absence of any system for the protection of ethnic minorities**” and “**Injurious propaganda**”). Then came the Special Rapporteur’s conclusions and recommendations.

The word “genocide” was brought into use by the Special Rapporteur before the much larger-scale violence began, and unfortunately there was no time to implement the recommendations before April the following year, when all hell would be let loose – **even had the UN had the will to try**; for they would have required years rather than months, and, furthermore, they would of course also have required the goodwill of the authorities which patently was not available. The Special Rapporteur must have realized that there was little hope of action being taken on his recommendations before things got out of hand, although his paragraph 60 and the first line of his paragraph 61 remain significant in the circumstances:

These recommendations take as their starting point the principle that although their country is poor and overpopulated and they are exposed to all the evils of underdevelopment, Rwandese citizens, whatever their ethnic group, political affiliations or social origin, have the same fundamental rights as all other citizens throughout the world. There is no reason why their lives should not be as precious and well protected as the lives of citizens of the Netherlands, for example.

The international community cannot remain indifferent to their situation and must therefore provide its assistance wherever that of the Rwandese State is inadequate or non-existent.

One could weep (again). **And wonder who read the report of this brilliant man**, who showed every sign of realism, lucidity and compassion:

1. **The top staff of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan *et alia*?**
2. **The head of the UN Peace-keeping mission about to go on from New York to Rwanda in October 1993, Major-General Dallaire? – apparently not told of it.**
3. **The UN Secretary General, who one supposes needed to keep abreast of what was happening in Rwanda**, despite what may have been heavy involvement (throughout most of the 1990s in the critical situations in Somalia and the Balkans (Bosnia & Herzegovina in particular).
4. **The Special Representative of the Secretary General, a political appointment; Mr. Booh-Booh who arrived in Kigali from his native Cameroon in November 1993. We do not learn whether he was shown it.**
5. **States Members of the UN Security Council?**

Did that vital UN report serve any useful purpose in what was *a most critical time*?

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7. The UN Peacekeeping Division, New York - Mr. Kofi Annan and colleagues

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), a year into its formal existence in March 1993 saw Kofi Annan become its head with the high grade of Under Secretary General (USG). The UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) states “The DPKO is dedicated to assisting Member States and the United Nations Secretary General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security.”^{xviii}

In that capacity, one assumes that there would have been a close ongoing relationship between the senior DPKO staff and the head of any UN peacekeeping mission – in the case of Rwanda, between Maj.Gen. Roméo Dallaire and a triumvirate of senior staff leading the DPKO - USG Kofi Annan, his deputy Iqbal Riza, and General Maurice Baril, a Canadian. Dallaire reports that Baril had set himself an enormous task, namely to build the office “into an effective military-strategic as well as operational headquarters”. But

Critics charged that the DPKO was staffed by a bunch of incompetent boobs who kept bankers’ hours and disappeared when situations in the field came to a head. Canada’s Major General Lewis MacKenzie, who had led the UN peacekeeping contingent in Sarajevo, had heaped scorn on the DPKO for its generally negative attitude toward those in the field, its lack of response to immediate needs, and the way its staff and leadership seemed to be consistently unavailable when urgent decisions had to be made^{xix}.

Be that as it may, Dallaire was to work with them, first carrying out the necessary technical mission in Rwanda and clearing the ground in Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa with the pertinent top people, then returning to New York to present his recommendations on the

strength of the future “UNAMIR” peacekeeping force. This was to be Dallaire’s first step towards receiving the necessary authorizations to go ahead, including confirmation of his future role as head of the UNAMIR mission. Though he had been warned beforehand by Gen. Maurice Baril, the chief military officer in the peacekeeping office, that “This thing has to be small and inexpensive”, he estimated that he would need 8,000 men to carry out his mission. The DPKO team was horrified, and Dallaire reduced the request to 4,500, the number that he insisted was the bare minimum to do the job.

That was still far more than the UN was willing to provide. The Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali finally agreed to ask the Security Council to send 2,548 peacekeepers. Two powerful countries, both permanent members of the Security Council, worked resolutely to narrow both the size and scope of the mission. One was France, which had for years been the dominant power in Rwanda and did not want to share that role with anyone else. The other was the United States. President Bill Clinton was under intense congressional pressure to reduce American contributions to peacekeeping operations, and he responded by taking a tough line on the Rwanda mission. US Ambassador Madelein Albright suggested that the number be cut to 50! At every point as the Rwanda crisis intensified, she worked diligently to keep the UN peacekeeping force small and weak. ... Before approving Boutros-Ghali’s proposal, diplomats from France, Britain, and the United States greatly limited the force’s mandate. **The Arusha accords stipulated that the “neutral international force” in Rwanda should be authorized to seize weapons and suppress “armed gangs”. The Security Council, however, gave UNAMIR a far more limited assignment. Dallaire and his force were to do nothing more than “monitor observance of the ceasefire agreement, monitor the security situation and report on incidents.”^{xx}**

The UNAMIR force consisted of 450 Belgians, 1,100 Bangladeshi, 800 Ghanaians (plus a number of unarmed military observers. Dallaire’s support group and logistics group were civilians).

By the end of 1993 and into January 1994, at a time that it was becoming more and more obvious that shadowy forces were at play in Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire was sending increasingly preoccupying cables (all in code) to his boss, Kofi Annan. Then one night in the New Year he sent in alarm and anguish one that revealed the stages to which the extremists had progressed, **recommending immediate vital action on the part of UNAMIR that one imagines could very possibly have transformed the whole picture – and saved Rwanda’s future.** Dallaire was reporting to DPKO on 10th January 1994 that late that afternoon, Faustin Twagiramungu (the designated prime minister of the transitional government foreseen by the Arusha Agreement as a vital element of the future peace) had come to his office and insisted on a private meeting. He had been shaking with excitement and fear.

I took him out onto the balcony where we could talk without being overheard. Almost breathlessly, he told me that he was in contact with someone inside the Interahamwe who had information he wanted to pass on to UNAMIR. I had a moment of wild exhilaration as I realized we might finally have a window on the mysterious third force,

the shadowy collection of extremists that had been growing in strength ever since I had arrived in Rwanda.

Dallaire then had chosen a senior Belgian officer, Col. Luc Marchal, for the encounter with the informant, whom they code-named Jean-Pierre. Marchal made copious notes of what he heard, the whole tenor of which was subsequently communicated to Kofi Annan in a coded cable assiduously drafted by Dallaire during the remaining night hours.

Jean-Pierre had told Luc that he had been an officer in the commandos and the Presidential Guard, He said that he had left the army to become the chief trainer for the Interahamwe, and in 1993 he had begun drilling cells of young men in the communes (villages) of Rwanda, initially under the guise of preparing a civil-guard-style militia to fight the RPF if it resumed the offensive. Jean-Pierre said that his direct superior was Matthieu Ndirumpatse, the president of the MRND party. He reported to and received his orders from Ndirumpatse, along with a salary of 150,000 Rwandan francs a month (about \$1,500 U.S.) He told Luc that in the past few months, the real plan behind the training of the Interahamwe had begun to be articulated.

He and others like him were ordered to have the cells under their command make lists of the Tutsis in their various communes. Jean-Pierre suspected that these lists were being made so that, when the time came, the Tutsis, or the *Inyenzi* as Rwandan hate radio called them - the word means "cockroaches" in Kinyarwanda - could easily be rounded up and exterminated. ...He was horrified that he had been drawn into a plan to create a series of highly efficient death squads that, when turned loose on the population, could kill a thousand Tutsis in Kigali within 20 minutes of receiving the order. He described in detail how the Interahamwe were being trained at army bases and by army instructors in several locations around the country, and that on a weekly basis a number of young men would be collected and transported for a three-week weapons and paramilitary training course that placed special emphasis on killing techniques. Then the young men were returned to their communes and ordered to make lists of Tutsis and await the call to arms.

And there was very much more. In his much later account of it all, Dallaire went on "I was silent, hit by the depth and reality of this information. It was as if the informant, Jean-Pierre, had opened the floodgates on the hidden world of the extremist third force, which until this point had been a presence we could sense but couldn't grasp."

Kinzer takes up the story.

The informer offered a straightforward deal. He would reveal all he knew, ranging from the location of arms depots to details about the regime's connection to death squads, in exchange for free transit out of Rwanda and foreign residence permits for himself and his family. It was a small price for such explosive information.

That night Dallaire composed a two-page cable to New York outlining his plan to raid the arms depots, whose existence violated a provision in the peace accords that

banned the storage of weapons in Kigali. One can imagine how thrilled and relieved he felt.^{xxi}

But the opportunity was lost to avert the genocide, for a few hours later, Dallaire was stunned by a return cable from New York. It ordered him to suspend his planned raid on the grounds that “it clearly goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR.” Even more astonishingly, he was directed to prove his “neutrality” by passing all the informant’s claims to President Habyarimana.

We hear that understandably, his mood crashed from ebullience to outrage on receiving a response that to his shock and horror, translated a totally negative attitude. Far worse than anything that could have been anticipated, Annan’s instructions putting an end to Dallaire’s commonsense proposal proved to be fatal for an undetermined number of Rwandans, both Tutsi and Hutu, who perished months later in savage genocidal acts that no one could now stop.

The coded cable that Dallaire had sent that night was later called “the genocide cable”. The Danish member of the Security Council stated subsequently that had it been shared with the Security Council, an immediate intervention would have been rapidly organized.

Ten years after the genocide, Annan (chosen as the new UN Secretary General) said “I could and should have done more to sound the alarm and rally support.

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8. The Canadian head of the UN peace-keeping force, UNAMIR - Major-General Roméo Dallaire

The man chosen in June 1993 to consider heading the UN mission to Rwanda was 46-year-old Major-General Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian military commander with a distinguished record of service in a wide variety of posts, including some NATO posts in Europe. Soldiers he had trained had served as UN peacekeepers in Kuwait, Cambodia and Bosnia, so Dallaire must have felt that he had a good idea of what could be expected of him if he accepted the mission to Rwanda. Two months later, he was told that the leaders of the two warring parties had signed peace accords in Arusha, Tanzania, that called for “a neutral international force” inside their country.

Early beginnings

A UN diplomat reportedly described him “as cultured but straight-shooting, hardworking, energetic and determined” – a reflective ethnical thinker shaped by the humanitarianism that was part of Canada’s ethos. If we see that Dallaire appeared to seem the perfect man for a challenging job, nothing can convince us that he was adequately briefed: “No one briefed him or gave him even a single page of written analysis of what was happening in Rwanda. All he was able to glean about the country came from a photocopied encyclopedia entry and a Michelin map. He never even saw public reports like one issued that summer by Oxfam, which warned that Rwanda “stands at the brink of an uncharted abyss of anarchy and violence and there are all too many historical, ethnic, economic and political pressures that are likely to

push it over the edge."^{xxii} Yet UNAMIR would be charged with overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords, the blueprint to end the civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, and to install a new, more representative government.

It seems absolutely beyond understanding that Dallaire was not properly briefed for a mission that he would one day describe (in the 560 page book that it took him seven years to decide he could manage to write) as “a story of betrayal, failure, naivety, indifference, hatred, genocide, war, inhumanity and evil”^{xxiii}.

Although he had been warned by friends that working for the UN could be a nightmare, he was nevertheless “tremendously impressed by Annan...gentle, soft-spoken and decent to the core. I found him to be genuinely, even religiously, dedicated to the founding principles of the UN and tireless in his efforts to save the organization from itself in these exceptionally troubled times, where conflict and humanitarian catastrophes, often linked, were breaking out around the world.”^{xxiv}

One could perhaps say that the one-year-old Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that Kofi Annan headed and that was accommodated, it seemed to Dallaire, “in the drabest and most cramped offices” in the huge UN headquarters building, was unfortunately only at a “teething stage”. Its dramatic 1992/93 experiences in Somalia could not be said to have been successful, for in dire circumstances far beyond their control the reverse was nearer the truth. Yet as Kinzer tells us, the DPKO staff

“allowed themselves to presume the mission would be relatively easy with high prospects for a success that would reestablish (*sic*) the reputation of UN peacekeeping... Dallaire was told repeatedly that the United Nations wanted a “quick success”. “This thing has to be small and inexpensive,” Dallaire was warned - which gave him the first inkling that he might not be given the tools needed to succeed. “But he was not yet even close to grasping the intensity of the maelstrom into which he was stepping.”^{xxv}

Dallaire was told while he was still in New York that an Arusha Peace Agreement, refereed by Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwingi, had been signed on 3 August 1993 at the end of long negotiations between the RPF and MRND. It allowed for a transitional government (BBTG) to be set up within 22 months, with priorities that included the resettlement of refugees, elections, demobilization of both armies along with the creation of a national force and the drafting of a new constitution. The international peace-keeping force was to be in place by 10 September.

However,

“What Dallaire did not realize was that neither party to the Arusha accords believed they would actually take hold. Both were going through the motions of peacemaking while preparing to renew war. **Even more ominously, a diabolical third force - large, well organized, fully armed, and sponsored by some of Rwanda’s most powerful figures – had shown itself determined to block any political compromise even if that meant drowning the country in blood.**^{xxvi}

This basically was the aspect that Dallaire hoped the Special Representative of the Secretary General, to arrive in Rwanda in November 1993, would tackle.

The future force commander had meanwhile engaged in activities that included carrying through the 12-day technical mission in Rwanda required of him, meeting with the representatives of UN Member States, getting alongside the principal government people (waiting for some time, however, to meet Mr. Habyarimana) and going up to Malindi, the former tea plantation that Paul Kagame had made his headquarters, to go over the ground with him and two of his top people; and then travelling to Dar-es-Salaam to meet the president of Tanzania, facilitator of the Arusha Peace Agreement and to Addis Ababa to meet the Secretary-general of the OAU Salim Ahmed Salim, before going on to New York to present his findings.

He wrote that at that stage, he felt “real peace and contentment” but “truly did not realize that the devil was already afoot. I did not understand that I had just met men in Rwanda who would become “genocidaires”. While I thought I was the one who had been doing the assessing, I was the one who had been carefully measured. ... They had judged that the West was too obsessed with the former Yugoslavia...to get overly involved in central Africa. ...Were the hard-liners playing us, and me, for fools? I think so. I believe they had already concluded that the West did not have the will, as it had already demonstrated in Bosnia, Croatia and Somalia, to police the world. ...They had calculated that the West would deploy a token force and when threatened would duck or run. They knew us better than we knew ourselves.”^{xxvii}

Even subsequent events may have utterly disheartened the man destined to lead a mission in Rwanda – being told that the process of mission approval and troop deployment could take a minimum of three months, and left to find his own paper, pencils and laptop in a borrowed conference room to prepare the document which “would form the basis of a formal report to the Secretary General, which in turn would form the basis for his report and recommendation to the Security Council, which in its turn would form the basis for a Security Council resolution mandating our mission.”^{xxviii}

Dallaire’s recommendation for a force of 8,000 did not get through DPKO and he was persuaded to reduce the figure to 4,500. That was still more than the UN was willing to provide, and the Secretary General finally agreed to ask the Security Council to send 2,548 peacekeepers, two permanent members of the Council, France and the USA, having worked to narrow both the size and scope of the mission. The Arusha accords stipulated that the future UN force should be authorized to seize weapons and suppress “armed gangs”; but – particularly after what had just happened in Somalia, ***UNAMIR was to do nothing more than “monitor observance of the ceasefire agreement”, “monitor the security situation” and “report on incidents”***. An American diplomat wrote later “This was a gift from member states who hoped for a quick victory and were willing to take shortcuts to get there.”

Dallaire was evidently not properly informed of this, writing later of his time back in New York,

Nothing materialized. I was never invited to speak with Boutros Boutros-Ghali or any members of the Security Council. I didn’t sit back, either; I actively lobbied for the mission. The doors to the people who held the most influence on the Security Council,

the Americans and the British, remained firmly closed. In fact, the Americans never took Rwanda or me seriously.

It must have felt – then as later – as though he was trying to roll a huge round boulder uphill...

Back to Rwanda “for the duration”

By December 1993, as Dallaire wrote, the Rwandan politicians were trying in interminable meetings to decide on the final lists for the representation in the transitional government foreseen by the Arusha Agreement: the BBTG was to be a coalition of Rwanda’s five signatory parties. “The extremist CDR party, whose ideology was blatantly fascist and racist, had refused to sign on with Arusha and as a result, was shut out of the transitional government. That did not prevent its members from infiltrating the official parties and whipping up public paranoia and hysteria in their propaganda rag, *Kangura*, and over RTLM”. The titular head of the BBTG, Faustin Twagiramungu, explained to Dallaire on a late night visit to him that manoeuvring was going on that could further delay the installation of the BBTG and risk the loss of support of moderates inside the army, the Gendarmerie and the communal police who supported Arusha. “According to Faustin, the biggest fear of the former ruling party was that once the transitional government was installed, the PL and the RPF would see to it that the president and many of his entourage were clapped in jail for crimes committed during the regime. That night, Faustin also told me that President Habyarimana was trying to manoeuvre around the installation of the BBTG and that his direct interference was one of the major factors behind the political impasse.” Another troubling aspect of the whole situation was that people who were co-operating with UNAMIR felt they were under some kind of threat.

“The political players – the president, the two prime ministers and the RPF - with the concurrence of the SRSG, decided to try again to swear in the representatives for the BBTG on Saturday, January 8. We moved into high gear to ensure that the ceremony happened under the tightest possible security. But on that Saturday morning we were surrounded by a series of violent demonstrations throughout Kigali. Many of the demonstrators were armed with machetes...angry crowds prevented the politicians from getting through to the CND where the ceremony was to be held. The mobs materialized rapidly, and again, a number of Presidential Guards in civilian clothes, men we recognized, were inciting them.”^{xxix}

It had become increasingly evident that a very dangerous force was at work below the surface of Rwandan life. Then suddenly, an opportunity to know more – much more - presented itself, as related in the previous section – someone offering to reveal the secret plans of the extremists, “Jean-Pierre” who offered to deliver to UNAMIR practically the totality of the deadly preparations for a planned genocide.

We know now just what were the consequences of the decisions taken in New York. Dallaire and all the men entrusted to him, faithful to reality, went on heroically to do their very best but they were subjected to near-helplessness in the face of nationwide barbarism that soon shocked the world (to the limited extent that the world was watching and listening). Though in taking deadly risks they did succeed in saving the lives of a number of the intended victims of the “génocidaires”, many of their own lives were damaged beyond all imagining.

Very long afterwards, having had to struggle to recover any of the well-being he had started out with, Major-General Roméo Dallaire conscientiously described in some detail in his book - the title of which says all ("*Shake Hands with the Devil*") - every stage of the experience he had been through. He was only too glad in writing to describe those unparalleled sequences to have the support of others as the need arose. When all had been drafted, he wrote, on his page 5,

It took me seven years to finally have the desire, the will power and the stamina to begin to describe in detail the events of that year in Rwanda. To recount, from my insider's point of view, how a country moved from the promise of a certain peace to intrigue, the fomenting of racial hatred, assassinations, civil war and genocide. And how the international community, through an inept UN mandate and what can only be described as indifference, self-interest and racism, aided and abetted these crimes against humanity - how we all helped create the mess that has murdered and displaced millions and destabilized the whole central African region.

* * * * *

9. The Arusha Peace Agreement – a common sense OAU initiative

The Secretary-General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim (referred to by Dallaire in his book as "a key to the Arusha Accords") was the instigator of the process of consultation that led to the Arusha Peace Agreement. On 4 August 1993, representatives of the Rwandan political parties (MRND, the Republican Democratic Movement, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party – only not the CDR, the camp of the hardline faction once part of the MRND), met with representatives of the RPF in Arusha to sign the Agreement that under the aegis of the President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, had been under discussion for almost two years. Also involved in the design of the Arusha Agreement were several dignitaries of countries of the Great Lakes region, including Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, and Col. Mobutu Sese Seko, President of what was then "Zaire"

The Arusha Accords, officially the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, consisted of 5 accords (or protocols). Primarily organized by the Organization of African Unity and the heads of state in the African Great Lakes region, the talks, taking place in different venues of the region, began on 12 July 1992 and ended when the accords were duly signed. The Agreement envisioned the establishment of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG), to act until elections could be held. The Agreement went to 163 Articles in 101 pages, two of which can be quoted here:

Article 16 The BBTG shall delete from all official documents to be issued any reference to ethnic origin. Documents in use or not yet used shall be replaced.

Article 17 Public Freedoms and Fundamental Rights. Principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1947 shall take precedence over corresponding Principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda.

The Kigali Weapons Secure Area agreement stated that weapons caches were a violation of the Arusha accords and the UNAMIR mandate, while Dallaire stated (page 144 of his book) “My rules of engagement allowed the use of unilateral force in self-defence, in the defence of the force overall and the prevention of crimes against humanity.”

The Broad-Based Transitional Government would have included the RPF and the five political parties that had composed a temporary government since April 1992, in anticipation of general elections. The Accords included other points considered necessary for lasting peace, the rule of law, repatriation of refugees both from fighting and from power-sharing agreements and the merging of government and rebel armies. Of 21 cabinet posts in the BBTG, MRND was given 5, including the Defence portfolio. The RPF got 5 too, including the Interior and the role of Vice-Prime Minister. The major opposition party, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) was given four, including the office of Prime Minister, assigned to Faustin Twagiramungu. The Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party were each given 3 portfolios, the Christian Democratic Party one.

The settlement was highly favourable to the RPF but decreed an end to sectarian rule – and thus to the ruling group’s hold on power. President Habyarimana signed the accords (one journalist quoted by Kinzer wrote, “with a heavy heart and no doubt a wife incandescent with rage.” And “The reality was that the French military presence had alone kept Habyarimana from defeat and exile, and that Arusha was now the best hope of keeping him and his Hutu hardliners in power – even if it meant some compromises.”

As one diplomat wrote afterwards, “Between the roots of the conflict and the possibility of its resolution lay political elites willing to destroy a society rather than concede their own power.”

As soon as the Arusha accords were signed, the CDR issued a defiant manifesto declaring that anyone who supported compromise with the Tutsi rebels was guilty of “high treason” and calling on the army and other “democratic forces” to protest. Militants poured onto the streets of Kigali for what became six days of rioting. Chanting slogans denouncing the “sell-out”, they slaughtered three hundred Tutsi. At the height of this rampage, the CDR issued another manifesto with a striking new twist. It blamed the country’s crisis not only on the RPF, the Tutsi, and Hutu “traitors”, but also on their own leader. “Mr. Juvénal Habyarimana, President of the Republic, has approved the contents of an agreement obviously detrimental to the interests of the Rwandan people”, the CDR declared. “This shows clearly that (he) does not care any more about the interests of the Nation and is now defending other interests.”^{xxx}

UNAMIR had been charged with overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords, and with installing a new, more representative government. But for some months, the Rwandan government had been dragging its heels and thwarting the installation of the transitional government, leaving many on the Security Council increasingly irritated. And of course the BBTG never materialized. The Arusha Accords stood no real chance in the face of the extremists’ determination to destroy the Tutsi and, as it turned out, the moderate Hutu, along with the Rwanda everyone had known.

* * * * *

10. The United Nations Security Council

The UN Security Council consists principally of five Permanent members: France, the United Kingdom, the USA, China and Russia, **and five Non-Permanent members**, drawn from these five groups: 1. The African Group, 2. The Asia-Pacific Group, 3. The Latin American and Caribbean, 4. The Western European and others group, 5. The Eastern European Group. In 1994 they were representatives of Rwanda, Oman, Argentina, New Zealand, Spain and the Czech Republic. The delegate from Rwanda was one of the extremist group, the CDR.

In relation to settling the question of the size of the UN peacekeeping force UNAMIR, diplomats from three permanent members of the Security Council, France, Britain and the United States, before approving Boutros-Ghali's proposal on the size of the UNAMIR force, greatly limited not only the size but also the mandate. **The Arusha accords that the UN force was supposed to uphold stipulated that the "neutral international force" in Rwanda should be authorized to seize weapons and suppress "armed gangs". The Security Council, however, gave UNAMIR a far more limited assignment. Dallaire and his force were to do nothing more than "monitor observance of the ceasefire agreement, monitor the security situation and report on incidents." This was virtually a mandate without any teeth, cutting across the wisdom of the African presidents who had drafted the accords.**

Maj.Gen. Dallaire in a series of cables to New York pleaded for permission to conduct "weapons search and seizure operations". But Kofi Annan reportedly turned down these requests, insisting that the UN force "cannot take an active role" and must limit itself to "a monitoring function". Dallaire was warning that a catastrophe was imminent, but his superiors did not want to listen. We now know that Kofi Annan made sure that no ambassadors ever saw the "genocide fax", as the report on Jean-Pierre's revelations came to be known. **As one American diplomat later wrote, that cable was "a starkly written warning sign, a scarlet message of danger to civilians, to the peace process, and to peacekeepers...a graphic cataloguing of detailed plans for violence and sedition". It is mind-numbing that, to the few UN officials who saw it, it was inconvenient and it proposed an operation that would make the Rwanda mission more complex and therefore more controversial. So to the eternal shame of the United Nations, it was buried.** We know that other informants came forward in the weeks that followed the revelations of "Jean-Pierre", all of them warning that powerful Rwandans were methodically preparing to exterminate both the country's Tutsi population and the moderate Hutus.

It would seem that between the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan and the Security Council there was a belief that they knew best, "hubris", one could almost say: overturning the provision in the Arusha Agreement re arms, and furthermore, more or less forbidding members to pronounce the word "genocide" because of the obligation it brings with it to act, in line with The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1948.^{xxxii} But as Kilzer wrote on pages 154 and 155 of his book, Dallaire never managed to persuade his superiors that the violence in Rwanda was state-sponsored terror. They insisted on the entirely mistaken view that it was the result of clashes between two armies. By that logic, the RPF was the guilty party, but Kagame refused to call off his offensive. The Tutsi were facing genocide, and his fighters

were the only force capable of preventing their total extermination. When Prudence Bushnell called from Washington to urge him to stop fighting he replied simply, “Madame, they’re killing my people”, then he sent a cable to the Security Council that was the first document to give the murder campaign its true name:

“A crime of genocide has been committed against the Rwandan people in the presence of a UN international force, and the international community has stood by and only watched,” it said. “Efforts have been mobilized to rescue foreign nationals from the horrifying events in Rwanda, but there has been no concrete action on the part of the international community to protect innocent Rwandan children, women, and men who have been crying for help.”

Michael N Barnett, the US representative on the UN Security Council’s months of deliberations on Rwanda, testified in his book *The International Humanitarian Order Security and Governance* how the death of President Habyarimana altered the situation in the Security Council. Having explained in detail his role as the political officer at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations covering Rwanda, and having lived through the “daily monotonous routine” of the practically endless debates on UNAMIR’s mandate, he wrote that it was immediately recognized that the force Maj.Gen.Dallaire headed was confronted by two increasingly untenable tasks – protecting the lives of civilians and defending themselves. The tension between these two goals became immediately apparent when ten Belgian peacekeepers were brutally murdered while protecting moderate Hutu politicians during the first days of the violence. But he goes on in terms some of which we now find simply shocking:

“Back in New York, the Security Council had to decide quickly about both the future of UNAMIR and the UN’s responses to the growing violence. The Security Council was in almost constant sessions, meeting sometimes twice daily and long into the night. As I watched and participated in the debate over the Security Council’s response during this critical period, I (and others around me) came to believe that the only responsible decision was to reduce UNAMIR’s presence and mandate. Three factors, in my view, were most important for producing this consensus.

“First, the Secretariat, namely Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s office and DPKO, gave an impression of distance and aloofness from the emerging tragedy, which only reinforced the disinclination among any member states in the Security Council to propose a greater role for UNAMIR. During these first days of the crisis, one of my responsibilities was to meet with officials as DPKO to try and ascertain their thoughts on UNAMIR’s future and on how the UN ought to respond. In doing so, I became increasingly alarmed by their “business as usual” approach. Few who I encountered displayed much urgency. Two other incidents also contributed to my view of a Secretariat that was not up to the task. During a meeting between DPKO and representatives of the member states contributing troops to UNAMIR, the latter bitterly complained that they were unable to receive any information on the whereabouts or safety of their troops – or even to get DPKO to return their phone calls. As they walked out of the meeting, many of those representatives grumbled that they could not afford to place the lives of their people in the hands of a cavalier UN. (...)

“Boutros-Ghali also emanated indecision to the point of paralysis, if not complacency. He happened to be in Europe in early April and opted to stay there rather than return to New York. This decision, in my view at the time, reflected a disturbingly distant stance from the unfolding tragedy and demonstrated a troubling abdication of responsibility and leadership.”

The telephone conversation between the Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes and the Secretary General reported by Michael Barnett has been included in Part 5 above. The quotations from Barnett goes on:

“Most consequential, however, was the failure of the Secretariat to offer any options to the Security Council regarding the future of UNAMIR. The Secretariat, through its recommendations and reports, shapes the Security Council’s deliberations and potentially, its decisions. The Secretariat’s agenda-setting influence was potentially enhanced in this instance because few, if any, member states had independent sources of information, and they therefore relied heavily on the Secretariat for intelligence and policy recommendations regarding UNAMIR’s future. Yet the Secretariat’s reports were evasive and noncommittal. My overall impression, shared by others on the Security Council, was that the Secretariat was “not up to the task” of crisis management, being either overwhelmed or insensitive to the dead peacekeepers and the escalating violence. (...)

“A second reason for the consensus to reduce UNAMIR’s role was that no country was willing to contribute its troops for an expanded operation or mandate. (...)

“Third, with UNAMIR’s mandate to oversee the Arusha Accords effectively over, with no country willing to send its troops into an increasingly chaotic environment, and with access to the airport increasingly precarious, the Security Council had to protect its peacekeepers and the UN’s reputation. This was a line most forcefully argued by the United States; it and others consistently argued that the Security Council had a duty and obligation to protect the lives of the peacekeepers and that the failure to do so would make it harder to obtain troops for future operations and, perhaps, further the decline in the UN’s reputation.”

There is more, for “No sooner had the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR’s presence than it and Boutros-Ghali revisited whether and how the UN might respond to confront the increasingly evident genocide. Boutros-Ghali now began to take a visible lead, using his bully pulpit to formulate options and to urge the Security Council and the member states to respond vigorously to the continuing massacres. The Security Council, highly embarrassed that its only answer to the bloodshed was a reduction of UNAMIR, began to debate the possibility of an intervention force. But there were no volunteers for such a force. It seemed that the daily reports of carnage and brutality only contributed to the belief that it was highly improbable that a modest-sized outside force could halt the terror, and no member state was enthusiastic about sending its troops into such chaos.

“When the Secretariat finally unveiled its long-awaited plan in late April, it was greeted with considerable enthusiasm by the Security Council, although more because it created an image of a UN that was poised for action than because the plan was likely to contribute to ending the genocide. Simply put, this proposal was merely symbolic and highly impractical: it proposed to dispatch 5,000 troops to Kigali, acknowledged that these troops might not be located for

months (if ever) and confessed that it had no real idea what they could do once they arrived. The United States rightly criticized the plan as little more than smoke and demanded that the Secretariat and others on the Security Council design a realistic proposal rather than constructing a Potemkin village.”

Michael Barnett, after referring to France’s proposal featured in Part 14, wrote “the UN had more to lose by taking action and being associated with another failure than it did by not taking action and allowing the genocide in Rwanda. The moral equation was: genocide was acceptable if the alternative was to harm the future of the UN.”

No wonder that some time later, the top officers of the Rwandan government were disinclined to welcome Kofi Annan to Kigali...

* * * * *

11. The rise in hatred, the spread of *Akazu’s* poison in the extremist radio and newspaper

Prior to the events related in parts 8 and 9 above, while Habyarimana had started to come under pressure from France and other outside entities to proclaim democratic reforms, the extremist faction that Stephen Kinzer refers to on page 92 of his book as “The president’s *akazu*” was pushing him in the opposite direction. As the RPF grew stronger during the early 1990s, extremists in a series of inflammatory speeches warned that an RPF victory

“would mean death or enslavement for every Hutu”. Rwanda’s foreign minister - an extremist - told the diplomatic corps in Kigali that the RPF...leaders were bent on returning the Hutu to “forced labor and feudal servitude”. Behind these public rants lay a private fear. Members of the *akazu* realized that under a new regime, they would be held to account for crimes that according to one Hutu politician included “drug rackets, prostitution, extortion, bribery and murder.” Their only choice, they concluded, was to kill or be killed. ...

They launched a new propaganda campaign aimed at intensifying sectarian hatred. Its themes were simple: Hutu have nothing in common with Tutsi, the two groups are in fact natural enemies, and the conflict between them can only end with one exterminating the other. The country was flooded with broadsides demonizing the Tutsi as “assassins”, a “race of vipers”, “drinkers of untrue blood” who had “used their power, daughters, and corruption” to oppress the Hutu. “We will never allow them to fulfill their dreams”, one of these broadsides promised.

Kinzer went on to tell us more in his Chapter 6:

No public document embodied this message more vividly than the “Hutu Ten Commandments”, then broadcast repeatedly on hate-mongering radio programs. Perhaps coincidentally, the edition of *Kangura* in which it appeared also carried a full-page photo of President Mitterrand with the caption “A True Friend of Rwanda: It Is in Hard Times That You know Your Real Friends.”

The “ten commandments” could not have been more vitriolic or more effective in inciting people to engage in mass murder when the time came. They were soon to be repeated *ad nauseam* over the *akazu* radio, RTL, that broadcast

“a steady stream of racist venom and chilling threats. Radio is ubiquitous in Rwanda, and as soon as RTL made its *début* in the summer of 1993, it became a central part of national life. It offered a snappy mix of upbeat music, colorful patter and bloodcurdling threats against the Tutsi, along with helpful tips on efficient ways to kill with homemade weapons.”

A Canadian aid worker quoted by Kinzer said “It was the endless and mindless expression of ethnic cleansing on a scale hitherto unknown in Africa and rarely in the world. After a while, the endless repetition of lies to an illiterate and poverty-stricken population looking for someone on whom to blame all their woes and with no alternative way of assessing reality becomes truth of a sort, capable of inciting an uncontrollable bloodlust.”

Concurrently with the directing of those broadcasts, members of the *akazu* were importing hundreds of thousands of *pangas* and other “agricultural implements” hoes, axes, scythes, and knives. The *pangas* alone were enough to arm every third adult male in the country. We know of course that there were hidden caches of weapons that were ready to be seized and used when the time came.

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12. The outbreak of genocide

On 5 April – two days before the start of the genocide - the Security Council met to authorize an extension of the UNAMIR mandate. But it seemed impossible at that late stage to do much about it. It was a week in which the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia was collapsing, and in Bosnia Serbian troops were storming across UN lines to attack the “safe haven” of Gorazde. No one wanted more bad news and in his report on Rwanda, it appears that the Secretary-General Mr. Boutros-Ghali did not give any. Reportedly, despite the Force Commander’s explicit reports, and of course the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur Mr. Ndiaye, he attributed much of the violence in Rwanda to banditry, claiming that the country’s leaders were committed to the peace process.

On 6th April the aircraft bringing back from Arusha the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi was shot down. No investigation was authorized so it has never been clear who fired the fatal shots, though the charge was immediately laid on the RPR. Others have believed that it was the *akazu* that so wanted the country’s president out of the way that they decided to kill him, to have a free hand to carry out their plans. Hugh McCullum, a Canadian author working in 1994 for the All Africa Council of Churches, wrote later, “What happened in Rwanda was premeditated murder, a genocide with clear motives, means and opportunity to carry it out. The plane crash was merely the signal.”

Now the fat was in the fire on a monumental scale.

All those whose names featured on the lists that had been made up in the previous few weeks – principally Tutsi but all the moderate Hutu too – were to perish violently virtually before day dawned on 7 April. Indeed, in the first twenty-four hours after the plane crash, the Presidential guard, the army and *interhamwe* units killed 6,000 Rwandans, among them almost every opposition figure in the country. The “hate radio” went ahead uninterruptedly to urge every Hutu to destroy the Tutsi, be they men, women, children or babies, while the two armies resumed the war. By early June, the RPF force, swollen to 20,000, was fighting around the capital and reportedly, French leaders were horrified. A confidential memorandum Stephen Kinzer quotes said: “Considerable political and geo-strategic interests are hidden behind the Rwandan heap of corpses The region cannot be left in the hands of an English-speaking strongman completely aligned to American views and interests”. And **President Mitterand, determined to prevent this outcome, sent a steady stream of supplies to the Rwandan army, in mid-June dispatching two planeloads of weaponry, “including thousands of the fragmentation grenades that *Interahamwe* killers liked to throw into huddled crowds of refugees”.**

There was soon nothing but chaos except for the relatively unrestricted departure of diplomats, aid workers and virtually all other non-Rwandans... except for the brave members of Maj.Gen. Dallaire’s peacekeeping force who we should always keep in mind as people of immense courage and humanity, working on in the teeth of horror. There was now nothing that the bureaucrats in New York could do, other than let the Security Council agree to the proposal of the French that was simply going to make matters even worse.

Rwanda and its neighbouring Kivu Province of Congo would suffer unspeakable atrocities as a result of what one may see as the international mishandling of the realities of the years leading up to 7 April 1994. In the case of Kivu, a province I had happened to work in less than twenty years earlier, it is not just that it found itself sheltering up to two million Hutu who had escaped from Rwanda in July 1994, or that it became the scene of both subsequent wars and the merciless exploitation of its mineral deposits, but that it suffers ongoing mayhem from killers who emerge from the forests to prey on its populations, damaging beyond imagining women, girls and even babies – and additionally killing the brave rangers appointed to protect the mountain gorillas in the Virunga National Park (160 rangers killed to date).

Five months before the start of the genocide, people like the archbishop of Rwanda, a Tutsi, could see the writing on the wall and crossed into Uganda. How tragic that the rest of the world remained blind, week after week, to what was happening in that little overpopulated country. It is surely no wonder that the new Rwanda government, facing utter chaos and hardly knowing where to begin to rebuild the country, had no confidence whatsoever in the international community. It had to take over the abject ruins of a severely traumatized, dysfunctional country that was now short of not only the million or so killed in the previous hundred days, but also of about two million who had fled in terror into neighbouring countries, most of them into Zaïre - along with the “genocidaires” who had been allowed by the French military on the border to take their arms and equipment with them.

It should not have been like that at all. A judicious selection of UN Secretary-General in December 1991 could have transformed the future of Rwanda - were it not for the USSR.

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13. Inescapable aspects of the tragic blight brought on Rwanda

There is no wish to include in this paper the traumatizing scenes of violence that Rwanda experienced for a hundred days from 7th April 1994. But as Paul Kagame said, “It’s a seriously wounded society that we’re managing.” Practically all the children who survived were lost and traumatized after witnessing unspeakable violence, and for a child, witnessing violence and the murder of a parents or sibling is a form of torture. 95,000 children had been orphaned, 99.9% had witnessed violence, 90% believed they would die, 87% saw dead bodies, 80% lost at least one relative, 58% saw people being hacked with pangas, and 31% witnessed rapes or other sexual assaults. Rwanda became the home to one of the world’s largest proportions of child-headed households, with an estimated 101,000 children living in some 42,000 households. These children were on their own because their parents were killed in the genocide, died from AIDS or had been imprisoned for genocide-related crimes. And ten years later, the children of Rwanda were still suffering the consequences of a conflict caused of course entirely by adults.^{xxxii}

Of course, help for many of the stricken children did start coming, from the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE and the Save the Children agency, and from the remarkable Rosamond Haley Carr, formerly the owner of a flower arm who at the age of eighty-two managed to get back to Rwanda against the stiffest of odds (and apparently against the strongest advice of her friends and family). Within about four months, with her faithful Sembagare and a team of staff, she renovated and converted the old drying space of her former flower farm to create the central part of an orphanage that over many years was to accommodate several thousand children of every age, and help them back to being children, both loved and cared for. Rosamond Carr describes what had greeted her when she had landed back in Rwanda on 11 August 1994:

I found Rwanda a war zone. Kigali’s beautiful airport – once the pride of Rwanda - had been ravaged by mortar shells and riddled with bullet holes. The windows had been blown out and broken glass littered the floors. ... Kigali was unrecognizable. The city was in shambles, with rubble everywhere. Every house, hotel, and business had been damaged and looted. Every building bore the scars of shelling, and some were simply heaps of stones. Street-lamps had been wrenched from the ground and were lying helter-skelter on the sidewalks. There was no running water and no electricity. Nothing remained of the beautiful city I remembered. Apart from the soldiers, the streets were deserted.^{xxxiii}

And she went on to share with us that on reaching her lifelong home, Mugongo, a few days later, stunned and shaken by what she and a companion had seen at a former university campus not far from her house, she found complete devastation, with everything she had possessed gone or irrevocably damaged. “A lifetime of hard work and memories was all gone. ...I wept with shame for the people who had done this, and I wept with anger at the utter violation of my life and the senseless destruction of the country I loved.” But suddenly, her two half-starved dogs had found her! Though they had not been fed for weeks they had survived, as had her cat. “That was perhaps the defining moment, when my thoughts turned from leaving in defeat to believing that I had a reason to stay. Amid the throes of our joyful reunion,

I looked up and saw the dear face of Birimo, my old cook. He was thin and dressed in ragged clothes, and his face bore the haunted look of a man who had returned from the bowels of hell. With what little strength I had left, I threw my arms around him and wept with sorrow and untold anguish.”^{xxxiv}

Yes, Rwanda was in ruin. The rebel army was to inherit a devastated country, blighted physically and psychologically. And not only that, it again was under attack from killers who crossed from Kivu to continue their murderous activities – a thorn in the side of the struggling new government that continued to wonder why the outside world had still failed to understand the reality. Today’s fine UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, who in the 1990s was a senior UNHCR official working for months in the chaos brought about in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire) by the dramatic influx from Rwanda, wrote on page 6 of the 31 pages of the Winter 1997 issue of “Refugees” entitled *Crisis in the Great Lakes – Anatomy of a tragedy* “We climbed a mountain of dilemmas every day. And we were all scarred permanently.” The whole issue, its reports illustrated with maps and photographs, makes for difficult reading even now.

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14. The USA and the UK: CLINTON, Somalia and the Balkans

In August 2024, the BBC in a series of documentaries entitled “*Corridors of Power: Should America Police the world?*” was to show in one hour-long part what had been going on in Washington in relation to the Rwanda genocide and all its horrors.

The film first has some initial sequences in which the US government is claiming that thanks to America, the world is assured of peace and security, in line with President H.W. Bush’s assertion in relation to America being “a force for good”.

Next we see a young Bill Clinton, full of confidence, taking his Oath of Office (January 1993). The new president could never have imagined that by that October, US forces supported by UN peacekeepers (UNOSOMII), pitted against forces of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) in the Battle of Mogadishu, would lose 18 of their men and suffer 73 wounded. In subsequent atrocities that surely must have traumatized many American citizens who saw those film sequences, American bodies, the feet tied to long ropes, are seen being dragged through the streets of the capital, jeered at by the crowds.

All too soon after those events, very disturbing reports come in to Washington from the US Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, describing violence on an unimaginable scale:

Patricia Bushnell, Deputy Secretary of State for Africa, is seen explaining that “Information that gets to the top is what the top wants to hear and other information tends to fall to the bottom.” She believes that Dallaire’s urgent cable warning of massive violence had had no response from his New York superiors. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, known for preferring negotiation to confrontation, is informed of the situation and is understood to be saying “We must get out of there.”

We TV viewers are given to watch the withdrawal of the US staff on a long convoy of road vehicles – officers like a young Laura Lane seeming amazed that despite the generalized violence that accounts for countless bodies being strewn along the roadways, white people are being allowed through the checkpoints. “We were apparently being *encouraged* to leave, but on no account were we allowed to take anyone with us, not even a small black child.”

There seems to be no realization in Washington of what’s happening, of Hutu at roadblocks murdering Tutsis on the spot, of Hutu going from neighborhood to neighborhood to massacre all the Tutsis, whose names have been listed in advance - all of it orchestrated by extremist Hutus. The radio’s commanding voice goes on and on, inciting everyone to leave their houses to kill - “The job’s not finished yet”. We see Prime Minister Agnès Uwilingijimana walking alone, pregnant and in great danger. Ten Belgian peacekeepers have been kidnapped, taken to the airport to be killed there.

Mention is made of the presence of UN peacekeepers in line with the provisions of the Arusha Agreement, but of course they are unable to stop the massacres. French and Belgian soldiers arrive in force - to get their nationals out, and hundreds of Tutsis are trying to hide, while pleading to be taken out with them - evidently hoping and praying the Americans will save them, knowing they’ll be massacred if they are left behind.

At intervals as the film progresses, we see Bill Clinton reclining in an armchair in his office, in the company of an all-male collection of high-level advisers. John Shattock, Assistant Secretary of State and one of the many who clearly have no idea what to do, what to advise the young president, tells us that the extremists had seen that it was unlikely that the US would engage after what had happened in Mogadishu.

The US convoy passes through, taking out people from other embassies too (no problem as long as they are white), then the Hutus close in on the Tutsis. “It was all part of the plan”, young embassy officer Laura Hall concludes, “to get us to leave. We get back and Clinton thanks us all for getting everyone out. This was the last interest in Rwanda shown by him.”

The National Security Adviser believes he should have got more information. The Deputy Secretary of State observes “If you have several crises ... the well-planned genocide in Rwanda “was just a local thing”... Hutu civilians either joined in or were victims themselves. Someone called Schwarz, Assistant to the President for humanitarian measures, asks “Shouldn’t it have been *important information*? (infering perhaps that to begin with it hadn’t reached him.) What can I say?” A Special Assistant to the President for global affairs, like others, concludes, as do others, “When our interests are at stake... All the senior people knew.” We hear that the Security Council is considering whether to withdraw its troops – or to keep an effective force in Rwanda. The Security Council ends up ordering the peacekeepers out, Dallaire refuses. Meanwhile Patricia Bushnell explains that it’s much too costly to block the extremists’ radio that goes on spewing hate.

Above all, there is an unwritten US decree resulting in it being forbidden to call what's happening in Rwanda *genocide* – that word's introduction would immediately bring with it legal implications - i.e. an obligation to take measures (as mentioned earlier).

John Shattock travels over the Rwanda-Uganda border in a light aircraft. "I saw in the river what looked like logs, many many logs...but they were bodies, bodies being washed down into Lake Victoria. The memory of so many dead... I will carry those images with me for ever."

Laura Lane says she can't sleep at night, can't talk to anybody. "Who would understand? If you're a junior officer, there are many more senior people above you...We didn't know what the next step was – a low point reflecting the terrible fact that the US government stood by." She had to go back and reopen the embassy. I had to go back, I'd made a promise - to people we'd abandoned. I couldn't look in the faces of those we'd betrayed.

And the film concludes: Seven tenths of the Tutsi were dead, and the only hope was the RPF – the rebels fighting their way towards Kigali. The church in which 5000 sought shelter, a house of God, became a killing zone: ordinary citizens transformed into cruel killers. One week later, Tutsi rebels entered Kigali.

The few peacekeepers were the only ones doing anything, pleading for additional men – but it all got worse. Several years later Clinton went to Kigali and tried to voice an apology - a hollow moment. The nagging question remains open: with Africa being different from Europe, and there being very little strategic interest in Rwanda....

As for Europe, there was very great concern in relation to extreme tensions in the Balkans, in particular the situation in Bosnia, as events would show... The United Kingdom seems, once again, to have followed the US line. Prime Minister John Major had taken over from Mrs Thatcher, who years earlier had had a close relationship with Ronald Reagan. The UK Ambassador to the UN was Lord Hannay (David Hannay, Baron Hannay of Chiswick). I actually tried to contact him, but failed to reach him. The Foreign Secretary in 1994 was Douglas Hurd. It seems there was no one of sufficient good sense to contribute to what could have been some wise decisions.

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15. The role of France (2) The Duclert commission report

Michael N. Barnett's chapter on Rwanda continued from the paragraphs quoted in Part 10:

"No international action would be taken until late June, when a UN-authorized French operation went to southern Rwanda to protect the refugees. The Security Council was unenthusiastic about France's proposed intervention. France had long-standing ties to the very Hutu military that was now accused of genocide, and the Security Council feared that France would use the pretext of a humanitarian intervention to intervene on behalf of the Hutu allies. But the Security Council set aside these concerns and reluctantly approved what was its only real option, by a vote of ten in favor and five abstentions. Soon thereafter, the United States

and other countries contributed humanitarian assistance (although outside the UN umbrella) to try and alleviate the suffering of an estimated 2 million refugees. And in the fall of 1994, UNAMIR returned to Kigali in greater numbers, long after the RPF had captured the country, between 500,000 and 800,000 people had perished and 2 million had become refugees.”

By mid-June 1994, the RPF seemed to be so much on the verge of taking over the whole country that the interim government fled to Gisenyi (Kisenyi) at the tip of Lake Kivu. Enormous masses of Hutu, estimated at two million, were fleeing along the roads in advance of the RPF, believing them to want to kill them – since that is what they had repeatedly been told. President Mitterand, apparently still determined to prevent an RPF victory, decided to order the French army to Rwanda as a last-ditch effort to save its besieged client regime. General Dallaire was told by Bernard Kouchner, well known from other humanitarian theatres, that it was sending a force into Rwanda to stop the genocide and deliver humanitarian aid, setting up a safe haven in the west of the country where Tutsis fleeing could find refuge. Dallaire was shocked in the extreme:

He asked me for my support. Without a pause, I said “Non – and I began to swear at the great humanitarian using every French Canadian oath in my vocabulary. He tried to calm me with reasons that probably sounded high-minded to him but, considering the track record of the French in Rwanda, struck me as deeply hypocritical. Surely the French knew that it was their allies who were the architects of the slaughter... I could not believe the effrontery of the French. The *génocidaires* believed the French were coming to save them, and they now had carte blanche to finish their gruesome work.”^{xxxv}

The day after the Security Council approved the sixty-day mission, French troops began arriving at airstrips in eastern Zaire: nearly three thousand soldiers, most of them from the elite marine, paratroops, special operations and Foreign Legion units, along with 500 support staff. With them they brought a fleet of helicopters, fighter-bombers, armoured vehicles (100) and a battery of 120 mm machine guns to their self-proclaimed “Turquoise Zone” in Rwanda. One and a half million people flooded into the “Turquoise Zone”. Most were of course Hutus who had actively or passively participated in the genocide. Kinzer wrote, “Announcers from the Mille Collines hate-radio even turned up with their transmitter, so the station was able to continue broadcasting as if nothing had happened. Dallaire was outraged. ...”France’s claim that the Turquoise Zone was created to save innocent lives, though, was only for public consumption. It was above all a safe haven for the defeated regime and its army.”^{xxxvi} The killing of Tutsis in the zone went on unchecked until the end of August despite the presence of French soldiers.

Dallaire realized the nature of the catastrophe that seemed to loom ahead. He was quite right: these disastrous measures initiated by President Mitterand were the beginning of a process that would result in huge numbers of terror-stricken Hutus being ushered by the French into Zaire ahead of the *génocidaires* or *Interahamwe*, where they would be trapped for some two years, loosely controlled by the latter. The heavily armed extremists would be free to enjoy the indefinite use of the weaponry they had taken with them, even managing to import ammunition, and as General Dallaire explained to a senior US State Department official whom he went to Nairobi to meet, they would regroup and prepare to fight again.

As usual, Dallaire was right. Thus began the chaos and the never-ending violence in Kivu. And furthermore, some of the Hutu Power people got to France (Dallaire was told that French officers who were back in Rwanda in relation to the French initiative had taken a UNAMIR vehicle to drive them to the airport. Year later, Madame Habyarimana, safe in France, was the subject of an extradition request that was refused.

Emmanuel Macrons' instructions

Mr. Emmanuel Macron after in 2017 becoming President of France worked over several years to try to repair the badly damaged relationship between France and Rwanda. On more than one occasion, we saw him beside the Rwandan president and knew that he was commissioning an extensive enquiry into the activities of the Mitterand government vis-à-vis the Hutu dictatorship and the terrible genocide. On 5 April 2019, Monsieur Macron gave clear instructions to M. Vincent Duclert who was to head the enquiry, indicating also that he wished there to be a change in the way the Rwanda genocide would be taught in schools in future.

Eight thousand documents were declassified so that they could at last be examined by the newly-constituted panel of experts, and a report came into being consisting of 1,200 pages. On 26 March 2021, the "Rapport Duclert" was presented to the President, and published on 7 April 2021. It came in three main sections, first *S'engager au Rwanda* (« Engaging in Rwanda ») chapters 1, 2 & 3, pages 36-309, then *La France face au génocide* ("France in relation to the genocide") chapters 4, 5 and 6, pages 310-661, then *Gouverner l'Etat dans la Crise rwandaise* ("Governing the State in the Rwandan Crisis") Chapter 7 starting on page 662.

Various reactions were published in the press : one by a former prime minister, Bernard Cazeneuve claiming "Le rapport Duclert est une contribution à la vérité au Rwanda, il n'est pas la vérité » (17 May 2021) (The Duclert report is a contribution to the truth in Rwanda, it is not the truth.) « Il comprend des angles morts et qu'il revient aux historiens de les combler pour établir la vérité. » (It has some blind spots and it will be up to the historians to fill in what's missing to establish the real picture.)

The *Nouvel Observateur* on 30 April 2021 reported that the « Commission scientifique, à l'issue de ses travaux, se félicite que la recherche qui nous a été demandée, en toute indépendance, par le président de la République, sur le rôle et l'engagement de la France au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994, aboutisse au constat que rien dans les archives consultées ne permet de démontrer que la France a eu la volonté de s'associer à l'entreprise génocidaire dirigée contre la minorité tutsie.

« Pour autant, cette commission scientifique à l'issue de ses travaux, a conclu unanimement sur des « responsabilités lourdes, accablantes » de la France dans le processus ayant conduit au génocide des Tutsis.

« Les conclusions du rapport sont fondées sur la méthode de la recherche historique impliquant l'établissement des faits par des sources authentifiées et contextualisées. Elles résultent de l'exploitation systématique, par notre commission de chercheurs, historiens et juristes, des fonds d'archives publiques français ».

(The scientific commission, at the completion of its work, is glad that the whole independent work of research required of us by the President of the Republic, on the role and the engagement of France in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, reaches the conclusion that nothing in the papers we consulted enables there to be any proof indicating that France had any wish to associate itself with the genocidal undertaking carried out against the Tutsi minority.

Nevertheless, the scientific commission, at the completion of its work, concluded unanimously that France had had heavy and even overwhelming responsibilities in the process that led to the genocide of the Tutsi.

The conclusions of the report are based on the method of historical research involving the establishment of the facts through authentic, contextualized source material. They are the result of our commission of researchers, historians and jurists being enabled to have the systematic utilization of the range of French public archives.)

16, Who was Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan? How would he have been likely to act as UNSG?

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was born in Paris in January 1933 and seven years later when the Nazis invaded France, he and his parents rapid left France and lived virtually as refugees in Gstaad, Switzerland. He was born “prince” by dint of his father, Aga Khan III, receiving decades earlier from Queen Victoria a hereditary knighthood.^{xxxvii} Sadruddin went on to secondary school in Lausanne, then to Harvard University, where he studied for seven years and was elected into the category *Phi Beta Kappa*, the oldest American college fraternity to which distinguished undergraduate and graduate students are admitted.

From the time he returned from Harvard, he would take on many vital UN roles. In 1958, UNESCO appointed him Consultant for Afro-Asian projects. Then in 1959 and 1960, he was Head of Mission and Adviser to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Auguste Lindt, travelling the world in relation to World Refugee Year projects.^{xxxviii}

UNESCO retrieved the prince in 1961, appointing him this time Special Consultant to the Director-General and Executive Secretary of the International Action Committee for the Preservation of Nubian Monuments. In that capacity, he was responsible for the coordination of the campaign to save the Nubian monuments from what would be the rising waters of a new Aswan dam – work that came to involve more than sixty national archaeological teams. He had extensive discussions with governments at the highest levels, *inter alia* meeting President Kennedy and his administration in Washington, and addressing many university and other groups to explain the campaign and whip up the initial financial support needed (ten million dollars) for what was to be a multi-year project to save the Abu Simbel temples, described by Egypt’s State Information Service as among the most magnificent monuments in the world. They needed to be raised several meters to prevent their being immersed in the waters of the future dam.

From 1962 to 1966, he was the Deputy UN High Commissioner for Refugees, then the General Assembly appointed him UN High Commissioner, a post he held for the twelve ensuing years,

to the end of 1977. Subsequently, he was Consultant and Chargé de Mission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar (1978), Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission (1981), Convenor and Co-Chairman, Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (1983-86), Convenor and Co-Chairman of the Independent Working Group on the UN Financial Emergency (1985), Coordinator of the UN Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan (1988-90), Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Humanitarian Assistance relating to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis (1990-91), Executive Delegate of the UNSG for a United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme dealing with problems of Iraq's border areas (1993) and Convenor and Co-Chairman of high-level colloquia on nuclear issues and globalization (in particular in 1985, 1995 and 1998). Clearly, he was inexhaustible!

In 1965 and soon to be appointed UN High Commissioner by acclamation at the General Assembly, Sadruddin at 32 was demonstrating great leadership qualities, a very deep concern for suffering people and a dynamism that would enable him to move mountains. He was described at that 1965 General Assembly by the chief delegate of Tanzania, Mr. Mwaluko, as *"the diplomat, the leader of men, the accomplished artist and the humanitarian, combines all these qualities with the same humility that characterizes his community"*. His name was in people's minds and he was frequently mentioned in the media throughout no fewer than four periods, notably in the autumn weeks of 1971, 1981, 1986 and 1991 when there were people who saw him as the ideal United Nations Secretary-General!

How he was thought to be ideal by many for the post of UN Secretary-General

In 1971, governments were seeking a successor to U Thant, who had fulfilled two mandates. In fact, one newspaper as early as 1970, under the heading "WANTED...a man for **ALL** nations" sketched what it imagined would be the requirements for that high post: "A man of almost incredible ability, of high independence, acceptable to all nations and people of all colours. Must be both bold and discreet...", reporting that "a number of diplomats with U.N. associations are wondering if the most likely candidate of all might well be Prince Sadruddin Khan (sic) who, though only 36 years of age, is regarded as having an exceptionally wide international outlook and a great devotion to the United Nations, having been deeply involved first in UNESCO and then in U.N. affairs for nearly 12 years."

The UNA Monthly of April 1970, asked, below a large photograph of the prince, THE NEXT UN SECRETARY-GENERAL? going on to say "Youth and glamour may be brought to the post of UN Secretary-General next year when U Thant's term of office comes to an end. ... By all accounts, his eight years with the UN as Deputy High Commissioner then High Commissioner for Refugees have been an outstanding success. ...His work for refugees has won wide acclaim inside and outside the UN. His statesmanship, professional competence and drive have understandably led to the current speculation that he is a front runner..."

The Washington Post on 13 September 1971 in an article by Stephen M. Schwebel said of Sadruddin "He has established...an excellent reputation as a serious and capable international civil servant. He is 38 years of age, and there is a tendency to discount him at present on the basis that his time will come later."

Sadrudin was not a candidate for the post anyway! - even if some people close to him said that he wanted it very much. To a Guardian reporter the prince said that he wouldn't have wanted the job for itself, but only if he could have made a contribution towards peace. *"Simply for the post, no. I don't believe in just being simply the captain of a ship: you have to be sure that the ship is seaworthy."* And was the UN a seaworthy ship? – *"Bureaucracy"*, said Sadrudin. *"Parkinson's Law."* He was an outsider, and anyone not a professional bureaucrat was going to be struck by Parkinson's Law at the UN. You could see this more clearly from outside than if you had risen through the ranks.

Sadrudin had said in an interview in the mid-1960s, when asked what he thought he would have been doing had he not been appointed UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *"I think I would probably have chosen the UN, not necessarily the field I am in now. I have a very deep faith in the UN and in the UN system as a whole. It is important to align governments, building peace..."* And later, he said, *"Once you've been involved in the UN, and been able to test your ability, you begin to know what areas you can function in, what you're best at."*

Move to 1981 and beyond

In 1981 he was proposed for the post by the government of Jordan, and was the person that the Security Council wished the General Assembly to appoint. Indeed, Sadrudin had acquired extraordinary international experience at every level, his personality was deemed ideal for the job, and he was widely considered to be a candidate. To be elected, each candidate needed a minimum of nine votes. Sadrudin obtained even more. But after weeks of waiting in New York when Kurt Waldheim was attempting to obtain a third mandate, Sadrudin returned to Geneva to tell us that although he had obtained almost all the Security Council's "straw votes", the USSR had used its veto to prevent his nomination. No explanation was given by Moscow. Leonid Breznev was the leader of the Soviet Union at the time, it was still the Cold War, and we can only speculate on motives for disallowing Sadrudin nomination. It must have been a crushing disappointment not only for Sadrudin, who had a strong belief in the world organization and would devote many more years to its work^{xxxix}; but for the world. The Herald, Glasgow, wrote "The UN Secretary-General the World Never had". The Observer called Sadrudin "A man for all nations."

Just one veto! whereas in 1971, Kurt Waldheim was appointed despite having been the subject of 14 vetoes, two other candidates each having been met with 12 vetoes!

And a decade later, for the misfortune of Rwanda, as the Glasgow Herald wrote (in its obituary of 13th May 2003):

In 1981, this capable and clever man (Prince Sadrudin) was branded by the Soviet Union as a stooge of the West. Delegates turned him down in favour of the little known, now long forgotten, Peruvian lawyer Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. A decade later, without reference or understanding of his vast achievement as the youngest and most dynamic head of the United Nations Commission for Refugees in the 1960s and 1970s,(and) instead of the vastly experienced and well educated Prince Sadrudin Aga Khan becoming the most powerful voice at the UN, we got the likeable but ineffectual Boutros Boutros Ghali whose nationality (Egyptian) and ethnic background (Arab/African) seemed to count so much more than

discernment and an ability to spread out historical roadmaps on the Middle East and Africa ... At certain points of history men capable of building bridges between ethnic groups, great religions and conflicting and powerful interest are simply not wanted..."

In 1986, when Mr Pérez de Cuéllar's mandate was about to run out, *The Observer*, in an article of 28 September wrote "Most people assume that the Security Council will decide to put him forward to the General Assembly for another five-year term; it is becoming almost the custom that Secretary-Generals serve twice. But there is a chance – and it is no more than a small glittering chance – that they might nominate someone else." The Observer affirmed that the five years that Mr. Perez de Cuellar had been the world's senior civil servant had not been very impressive. "It is not just that he has failed to reform the UN's own structure as he promised back in 1982. It is that, lacking the energy and passion of some of his predecessors, he has mostly failed to interpose the United Nations between human beings engaged in killing one another. Gravest of all, he has done little beyond mild fact-finding visits to check the worst horrors of his time in office: the fighting in Lebanon and the ghastly, Orwellian war between Iran and Iraq."^{xi}

That year, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar had looked like standing down, having always maintained that he was too old to hold the post for two terms, especially having undergone at the age of sixty-six a serious heart bypass operation, when he again hinted that he would retire in December. But it seemed that the five permanent members of the Security Council...changed his mind. They wanted continuity and this, The Observer maintained, was a mistake. "For there is a man close to the UN who might – in my view – turn out to be the best Secretary-General the United Nations has ever had. He is not only capable of cleaning out and invigorating the whole bloated structure, but is qualified as a very special way to deal with the international conflicts which lie ahead or are already burning. This man is Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. Almost everything about him is right for the job of Secretary-General. He is independent, almost stateless. He is only fifty-three, his energy and idealism intact. He is enormously experienced, not as a retired diplomat like Waldheim or Pérez de Cuéllar but as a transnational trouble-shooter."

The article attributed Sadruddin's "strongest card" to being "a leader of the Ismaili community, a Muslim moderate. The rebirth of Islam is by far the most important event of the late twentieth century; the struggle to accommodate it – and contain the blind fury of its fundamentalist wing from the Middle East to Iran – is the supreme task of all statesmen in the world. (...) And here Sadruddin Aga Khan – as Secretary-General of the United Nations – would have a unique chance of taming a creature which has already consumed the blood of millions." The article ended by saying that it was "a pity for the world, whose hunger and homelessness and vandalism, Sadruddin's issues, are flooding across all frontiers. (...) I think we need him now."^{xli}

1991

In an interview in February 1991, asked if he hoped to become Secretary-General of the United Nations, Prince Sadruddin is quoted as having said "*Those who imagine that I am obsessed by*

this possibility and that I resigned from the Salam operation^{1xlii} are wrong. A number of experts, including former UN people, are trying to work out a more solid, more rational selection process. I don't know whether governments will make use of it at the end of this year. I rather doubt it, I am realistic. We may once again find we face a struggle for influence: groups form and take decisions on criteria that are different from those you or I would imagine; in particular, geographical rotation will have an important role. Africa has valid reasons to be in the forefront at the end of this year."

Neil Ascherson of *The Independent on Sunday*, who called Sadruddin "The most accomplished of super-diplomats" asked him again 1 May 1991: "The prince allows himself a weary smile. "That is a post", he says, "that one neither fights to get nor fights to refuse if it is offered." Ascherson writes, "He seems the man for the hour: immensely experienced in UN work at sharp and blunt ends and – as leader of the Ismaili community – a representative of Islam in its most moderate and sophisticated form. The trouble is that the prince, still energetic and with his ideals intact, means change – and the five permanent members of the Security Council, who dominate the choice, are traditionally suspicious of change. As one UN veteran said a few years ago "It displays a dazzling lack of understanding...to think they want a new broom. They prefer old brooms every time."^{xliii}

Mr Perez de Cuellar had stayed on in 1986; and the prince's candidacy fared no better in 1991, despite articles unreservedly favourable to him, such as one from *The International Herald Tribune*: "UN's Hottest Topic: Who's to Succeed Pérez de Cuéllar? The permanent members of the Security Council, who control the final selection of candidates for secretary-general, are said to be looking for a more charismatic leader to take the helm of an invigorated United Nations. The summit meeting of the seven industrial powers in London last month called for a tougher, activist United Nations, ready to intervene in world trouble spots. But whether they got it under the leadership of Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali seems very much in doubt."

We may never know why the USSR again imposed their veto. After all, the Cold War years were over and new individuals were in the Kremlin. At all events, twenty years later an *Economist* article about the prince would say "He seemed the favourite to become the UN's secretary-general in 1981, but the Soviet Union vetoed his candidature, claiming he was too pro-western, and vetoed him again in 1991. Around that time stories circulated that the prince was a secret agent for the British, using his job as a cover for intelligence gathering. It was almost certainly nonsense, but the Russians may have believed it. Sadruddin insisted that he had equal sympathies with eastern and western peoples. His description of himself as "a citizen of the world" was a fair one."

As *The Economist* wrote in their obituary (22nd May 2003), "He bore this second big disappointment in his life stoically. An even greater disappointment was the realization of how little had been done for the world's poor. In a speech not long ago, he said that in 80 countries

people's incomes were lower than they were ten years earlier. The number of people in poverty, earning less than \$1 a day, was stuck at 1.2 billion."

Given the reputation of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who was ready to take initiatives and to use diplomacy in tricky situations, it is grievous that he was passed over for the "top job". Never would he have allowed that genocide to happen, not only because of his considerable experience in the 1960s and 1970s of Rwanda and its refugee flows, but because on taking office he would have brought into being the "action groups"^{xliv} that would have heeded all the warning signs, keeping abreast of each piece of pertinent information that came through and recommending appropriate action. He with the Peacekeeping colleagues (whoever they might have been) and Maj.Gen. Dallaire would have made such an effective team. What an immense difference he could have made if he had been appointed instead of Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali!

Sadruddin's work methods

When in 1962 Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan joined UNHCR as Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, he was young (29) but had for several years already carried through high-level work for both UNESCO and UNHCR. This included work to do with Algeria's emergence from its colonial war, and responsibility for the crisis created by the substantial refugee flows from Rwanda.

While not using his title in any official correspondence or on any UN documents, Sadruddin throughout his time in office met with Heads of State on the basis of equality, and of course with Secretary Generals of the United Nations. Incidentally, the position of UN High Commissioner for Refugees is the one UN post, other than that of SG, that requires the approbation of the General Assembly.

In some instances, he was able to exercise diplomacy and circumscribe the flow of a number of new groups of refugees. He was a proponent of greater co-operation between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies. He established and maintained close contacts with the Organization of African Unity OAU, attending and addressing several of the Summit Meetings of Heads of States and Governments (Accra, Algiers, Addis Ababa, Rabat and Libreville), and one year invited the OAU Secretary-General to attend UNHCR's Executive Committee.

He denounced "Parkinson's law", the adage that work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion, and as a result he created regional offices in Africa and South-East Asia with a mere handful of staff, confident that despite all the demands that were bound to be made upon them, the work would get done.

Both in Geneva headquarters and in the field, he entrusted subordinates with his full confidence and would take into account opinions of his staff, representatives of authorities and refugees before taking decisions. He reacted immediately to emergencies. "Back in 1964, barely a day or two after we received confirmation of the dread news that a member of our small team, François Preziosi, accompanied by an ILO colleague Jean Plique, had probably been murdered in the mountains of Congo, Sadruddin was with us in Bujumbura to express the UN's condolences to the two widows, and no doubt to see how the rest of us were faring. He

immediately got alongside each of us, and we would become familiar with him as an inspiring leader who demonstrated a genuine interest in each of us.”^{xlv}

Sadruddin’s efforts were action-oriented throughout, with emphasis on actual field work. Throughout the four years that he was Deputy and the eleven that he was the UN High Commissioner, he travelled all over the world – sometimes, as there were so many demands made on him from various parts of the globe, practically without a break.

A few things more of those said about him, as recorded in the biography

“Sadri cares for people and their condition and aspirations, and I know he helped to save the future for literally millions of families around the world.” Sen. Edward Kennedy

“He really was a pioneer – very few important people had the concern that he had so early on.” Dr Philippe Roch, Swiss Federal Office for the Environment

“Largely thanks to the good offices of UNHCR and to Sadruddin’s patience, tact and sheer diplomatic skill, nearly three-quarters of a million Sudanese refugees were repatriated... An even bigger test came with the violent birth of Bangladesh. The High Commissioner was accused both of not acting quickly enough and of acting too quickly... An old UN hand compared him to the great Dag Hammarskjöld. Even more than Hammarskjöld, Prince Sadruddin is that rare specimen, the truly international man. Born in Paris, a resident of Geneva, he looks a typical product of the affluent world. Yet when appropriate, he’ll say “We people of the Third World”. John Sillverlight of *The Observer*

“He has preserved his independence. The curious status of “world citizenship” has helped him to become the most accomplished of super-diplomats.” Neil Ascherson, *The Independent on Sunday*, 5th May 1991

NO ONE CAN POSSIBLY IMAGINE BEING IN THE SHOES OF SUCH A BRILLIANT MAN. WE CAN HOWEVER FOCUS FOR A FEW MINUTES ON THE MASTERLY WAYS THAT PRINCE SADRUDDIN MIGHT HAVE HANDLED THE TASKS OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL RELATED TO RWANDA

Whether he had replaced Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar in 1986 and worked two terms until 1996, or had been elected in 1991, his mastery of events thanks to his relative youth (he was still in his fifties), his exceptional ability and the wealth of his experience would have made all the difference in the dangerous situations facing the world, above all that of Rwanda.

Parts 1-4: Juvénal Habyarimana and the Hutu Government; Paul Kagame and the Rwanda Patriotic Front; Fatal seeds sown in Rwanda’s centuries-long social structure; The role of France (1st part)

Before being appointed to the post of SG, Sadruddin would already have become familiar with the evolution outlined in this paper, being well aware of the dangers of dictatorships and their dependence on outside help. Recognizing the irreparable damage already brought about by colonial policies in Rwanda over the years prior to 1962 when the country was first

in German hands, then in those of Belgium, concerned by what France's neo-colonialism was doing in underpinning an unelected and unrepresentative government, he could have resolved to intervene with the government of Françoise Mitterand in relation to all the military assistance France was supplying.

As he once had once explained to an interviewer, *"it is very difficult at times to take initiatives...In many areas, politically, economically, initiatives can be taken, as long as you have very carefully beforehand determined in what particular direction you can obtain results. You have to be able to find out whether initiatives will succeed, and I really believe that occasionally they can succeed. There is a lot of secret diplomacy that can be carried out, there's a lot of convincing that can take place if you have the right contacts at the right level"*. We can imagine him remonstrating with President Mitterand, and perhaps with top ministers such as Alain Juppé, Hubert Védrine, Michal Rocard pointing out the dangers of what France was doing, and in addition tackling the question of the extremist faction's increasing influence that was becoming increasingly detrimental to the overall picture.

On another occasion (it was 1991), the prince said that he thought that in the new world order (a term he was reported as using ironically), the concept of sovereignty had to give way. *"When you have a situation which threatens international peace and security, when a refugee problem becomes a massive exodus, it's no longer a problem for the country itself and provides a focus standi for international action. I am interested in this French idea of a "droit d'ingérence", a right of intervention going beyond the Geneva Conventions and providing the international community with some legitimacy."* He went on to say that the UN had to change. *"It has to be based on a larger constituency than the Security Council. Germany and Japan are outside it, though they are the strongest economic powers in the world now That is an anachronism; the basic underpinnings of the UN belongs to 1945."^{xlvi}*

Sadrudin, aware of the ideals and efforts of rebel groups (for years he had for example quietly given support to South Africa's ANC and to Greenpeace), and having been closely involved for 30 years with the situation of Rwandan refugees, expressing concern as early as the 1960s about their morale and possible or probable trauma, he would have understood their position in mounting armed opposition to the Kigali regime. He would certainly not have ruled out an early contact with Paul Kagame, and he would have followed closely the RPF's side of events in the devolving situations of those three years of the early 1990s.

Part 5 The UN Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali and his Special Representative

As Secretary-General, Sadrudin would have had at all times a strong focus on everything affecting Rwanda. He would have worked closely with the subordinates he would have chosen to take charge of peacekeeping, and with the Security Council. Throughout, he would have openly shared all the knowledge at his disposal, and his sincerity would have been clear to all concerned. He would have chosen an experienced, trustworthy individual as Special Representative, someone who would work closely and constructively with the head of the

peacekeeping force and be far from expecting the special treatment that Mr. Booh Booh evidently required.

Part 6 Warnings of the UN Special Rapporteurs of 1991 and 1993; and of Human Rights Watch and Oxfam

Sadrudin would have placed appropriate emphasis on the mission of the UN Special Rapporteur Mr. Ndiaye and on the extremely shocking report that he came to write. We can imagine that he would have wished to have Mr. Ndiaye visit him, thereby ensuring that he was fully acquainted with all the facts, and aware of the dangerously unhealthy atmosphere across Rwanda. There seems no doubt that he would have ensured that every member of the Security Council received a copy of it to read immediately, and then discuss at subsequent meetings, outlining some necessary actions.

Part 7 The UN Peacekeeping Division, New York - Mr. Kofi Annan and colleagues

We shall of course never know whether Sadrudin would have appointed Kofi Annan to head the UN peacekeeping service. Mr Annan was one of the Africans he had appointed in the 1960/1970 period (and whom I met briefly in connection with my assignment in the Kivu). In any case, the S-G and the head of peacekeeping need to coordinate their thinking, so the prince would have worked closely with the Peacekeeping Division – at the critical time even on a daily basis – giving the fullest information received daily from the field to members of the Security Council who naturally depended on regular briefings.

Part 8 The Canadian head of the UN peace-keeping force

Maj.Gen.Roméo Dallaire was an excellent choice to head the peacekeeping force. Could Sadrudin have managed to grant him the numbers of people he estimated he would need? I suspect he could! At least he would have got to know him, and would have seen to it that he was properly briefed on a mission that it was obvious could be difficult. Little had it been imagined that it would be far worse than anyone could have thought at the outset, but the dynamic Secretary-General would have been behind him. Whether or not Sadrudin went as far as to visit Kigali, he would have seen to it that New York gave Dallaire the fullest comprehension and support.

After it all, the Force Commander wrote “Could we have prevented the resumption of the civil war and the genocide? The short answer is yes. If UNAMIR had received the modest increase of troops and capabilities we requested in the first week, could we have stopped the killings? Yes, absolutely... If UNAMIR 2 had been deployed on time and as requested, would we have reduced the prolonged period of killing? Yes, we would have stopped it much sooner.”^{xlvii}

Part 9 The Arusha Peace agreement

The Arusha Agreement, product of several mature minds, surely should not have been tampered with. Sadrudin would have ensured that all its provisions were included in the mandate of the head of peacekeeping, who thereby would have had a workable basis for his difficult, highly complicated and potentially dangerous task.

Part 10 The UN Security Council

Surely, using his diplomatic skills, Sadruddin would have reasoned successfully with the presidents of the members of the UN Security Council that were loath to allow a valid Peacekeeping force to be set up: France, the USA and the UK. Although President Clinton was smarting from the costly Somalia experience, France had difficulty in seeing the weakness and danger of the Hutu government that it had so massively supported and the UK followed the USA line, surely they along with the rest of the Security Council would have felt bound to agree to realistic measures being put in place.

Part 11 The rise in hatred, the spread of *Akazu's* poison in the extremist radio and newspaper

With Sadruddin in New York, measures would surely have been taken to prevent the highly dangerous rise in extremism. The *akazu* would never have succeeded in appealing to the masses as it did, channelling them into the fatal activities outlined in this summary. One is tempted to imagine the members of *azaku* prevented from harming the country by being put behind bars for as long as the situation required.

Conclusion

It is obvious that had the UN's dynamic "trouble-shooter", Sadruddin Aga Khan, been elected UN Secretary-General instead of the elderly retired diplomats who occupied that vital post from 1981 to 1996, there would have been no appalling violence, with the loss of so many lives, the massive trauma of survivors and the ruin of the well-loved country and of its innocent neighbour, the Kivu Province of Zaire-DRC.

Thirty years on, one's heart still goes out to that little nation, Rwanda, that had suffered so much, but that with time was restored somewhat miraculously by its liberator Paul Kagame and all those, whether killed in combat or sharing in the final victory, who had faced every danger in fighting for it so passionately until success was achieved.

Diana Miserez

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References

- ⁱ Guillebaud, Meg., *Rwanda The Land God Forgot*, Monarch Books London and Michigan, 2002
- ⁱⁱ The coup was given out as bloodless, and indeed the Kayibanda couple was not killed, reportedly because Habyerimana feared, if blood was spilled, being visited by spirits, so they were left to starve to death.
- ⁱⁱⁱ « Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement » the unique party, each newly-born child automatically being enrolled.
- ^{iv} *Shake Hands with the Devil The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, Roméo Dallaire, p.115. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, a Cameroonian, had just arrived as the Secretary-General's Special Representative
- ^v Dallaire, op cit p.137. Faustin Twagiramungo, prime minister designate of the transitional government, had become a frequent visitor to Dallaire's office.
- ^{vi} *A Thousand Hills – Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed it*, by Stephen Kinzer
- ^{vii} Museveni on his return from New York was in shock on finding what had happened in his absence. He has now been president of Uganda for 38 years
- ^{viii} Kinzer, op cit.
- ^{ix} A Belgian living in a small house near our modest office in the Rue du Progrès, Bujumbura, expressed two of us the most objectionable view, in saying "if all we Belgians left Africa, the Africans would soon be back in the trees".
- ^x That little lad went on to study abroad and at length became a bishop in Rwanda's Anglican church. Leaving the country again when the atmosphere became highly dangerous for the Tutsi, he returned to help in the long and arduous process of reconciliation
- ^{xi} Many years later, I was very warmly greeted by a stranger who told me that I had given her hospitality back then.
- ^{xii} At a gathering of missionaries on my first day (a Sunday) in Bujumbura in January 1964, I heard of the terror, the widespread deaths in Rwanda. A Pastor Yona had been arrested and killed on a river bridge while praying for his captors. That violence seeming absolutely to defy all the missionaries' imagination.
- ^{xiii} Kinzer, op cit.
- ^{xiv} OIF, the international Francophonie organisation, according to Wikipedia consists of 88 members, 54 of which are full members, 7 are associates and 27 are observers.
- ^{xv} *Vale Boutros Boutros-Ghali; Former UN Chief and key thinker on peacekeeping*, LesLey Pruitt, Lowy Institute, 18.2.2016
- ^{xvi} Dallaire, op cit.
- ^{xvii} Economic and Social Council : Document E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 of 11 August 1993; Commission on Human Rights, fiftieth session, item 12 of the provisional agenda. The Commission on Human Rights was later succeeded by the UN Human Rights Council, decision of the General Assembly, March 2006
- ^{xviii} Whereas DPKO was created in 1992, its roots can be traced back to 1948, when the UN's first of many peacekeeping operations was created.
- ^{xix} Dallaire, op cit pages 48-49
- ^{xx} Kinzer, op.cit pages 118-119
- ^{xxi} Dallaire, op cit
- ^{xxii} Kinzer, op.cit pages 114-115
- ^{xxiii} Dallaire, op cit page 115

^{xxiv} Dallaire, op cit.

^{xxv} Kinzer, op cit.

^{xxvi} Kinzer, op cit.

^{xxvii} Dallaire op cit, page 79

^{xxviii} Idem page 81

^{xxix} Idem page

^{xxx} Kinzer, op.cit page 109

^{xxxi} It seeks to prevent “the commission of certain acts with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” and commits States to bring alleged perpetrators to justice.

^{xxxii} Unicef statistics issued in April 2004

^{xxxiii} Rosamond Halsey Carr, Land of a Thousand Hills, a Plume Book, 2000

^{xxxiv} Halsey Carr, op cit.

^{xxxv} Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, page 422.

^{xxxvi} Kinzer, op cit page 176

^{xxxvii} This was in recognition of his statesmanship throughout the period in which there had to be a series of consultations between political parties & princes in India and the British colonial government.

World Refugee Year, initiated in Britain as a result of the concern of four young members of Parliament for thousands of European refugees left in insalubrious post-war camps in Austria, Germany, Italy and Greece, was the UN’s first “Year”. It was launched in July 1959 and ran for 12 months, in which the immigration criteria of many countries were made more flexible, and large sums were raised to finance resettlement projects.


^{xxxix} His father, the late Aga Khan III, had in 1937 presided over the League of Nations assemblies, and had taken his 3-year-old son to see the Palais des Nations Geneva, built for the League of Nations, under construction.

^{xl} Sadruddin was referring to the three years relating to assistance to and for Afghanistan

^{xli} Sadruddin was expert at finding, and appointing, people of unusual ability and great dedication to take up work of a demanding character alongside him. He evolved ideas on creating an “Action Group”, an “elite think-tank” of young, alert people who would ensure that they were well informed about situations in the world that could possibly develop disturbing characteristics. The creation later of the International Crisis Group, with Sadruddin involved in its creation, was along those lines.



Constantin A. Stavropoulos, UN Legal Counsel, addressing a Committee at the United Nations in New York on 06 December 1966 on the Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees. At the table with him are Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (centre) and Mrs. Halima Enbarek Warzazi (Morocco), Chairman of the Committee. Photo



Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (1933 - 2003). Photo: UNESCO Courier.

