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Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Tanzania

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Part of UNRISD Project on Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector.

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"Our country is one of those in Africa that is highly praised for its unity. We have no tribalism, no religions quarrelling, no colour discrimination, and we oppose discrimination and oppression on grounds of tribe, religion, or colour, wherever it exists."[1]

"In a continent where the post-independence process of nation-building has produced many serious, and in some cases, disastrous conflicts, Tanzania stands as a model state. Possibly because there have been so many few serious conflicts over national integration in Tanzania, this remarkable achievement—arguably Nyerere's greatest personal contribution—has received little attention."[2]

[1] Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development/Uhuru na Maendeleo (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973) p. 74

[2] Colin Legum, " They Nyerere Years" in Michael Hodd ed. Tanzania After Nyerere, (London: Printer Publishers, 1988) p. 10

I. **Ethnic Structure and Governance of the Public Sector in Tanzania**

Introduction

The standard narrative on ethnicity in Tanzania as reflected in the two above quotes is that Tanzania represents the success story on ethnic accommodation. Unlike many other countries on the African continent and elsewhere, Tanzania has managed to develop a political system that has successfully managed to neutralize the potential for ethnic conflict by developing an ethos of national ideology. The national ideology, so goes the argument, is largely a reflection and a result of the nationalist ideology, which was put in place by the late President Julius Nyerere. The creation of a Tanzanian national identity was seen as a culmination of the nationalist project.

The argument for a nationalist project is a familiar one: Tanzania like all other countries in Africa were artificial creations of the colonial project which was formalized at the Berlin Conference of 1884/85. Colonial rule conveniently subjugated and subsumed under its authority, the different ethnic groups that constituted the colonial subjects. Colonial administration worked well because it hardly presented itself as democratic. As Mahmood Mamdani has noted, in order to affect political control of its subjects, colonial rule emphasized the difference between Africans and their European colonizers. This had both a political rationale and a practical effect in the nature of colonial administration:

> [t]he emphasis on differentiation meant the forging of specifically "native" institutions through which to rule subjects, but the institutions so defined and enforced were not racial as much as ethnic, not "native" as much as "tribal." Racial dualism was thereby anchored in a politically enforced ethnic pluralism.[3]

Ethnic pluralism was also used by the colonial state to justify the presence of an overarching authoritarian state. In a curious way, ethnic "differences" or "tribalism" was viewed by the colonial state as posing dangers to national integration and cohesion. The fact that "tribalism" was seen to be a problem reflected the anxiety of the colonial state in its project of physical and political control. Tribal differences as they were could not be allowed to disrupt economic production and the smooth functioning of colonial administration. The underlying conceptualization of African societies by Europeans was that these societies had not politically matured to accommodate modern institutions of governance. Colonially established institutions were therefore viewed as the bridge between primitivism and modernity. This ideology to a great extent

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[3] Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 7

informed the studies of modernization in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, which equated development with Westernization. The ethnic or tribal question was thus one of accommodation to modern political structures.

Arguably, nationalist leaders in Africa were also influenced by this thinking. However, the difference in thinking between nationalist leaders and western modernizers on the question of ethnicity was that for the nationalists, ethnicity did not necessarily represent backwardness, but rather a point of identity. For nationalists the issue was one of negotiating between the positive aspects of ethnicity—including mobilization against colonialism—and the need to create a new national identity, which at times conflicted with ethnic ideology. Tanzania was by no means immune to such a contradiction. Though generally committed to a broad pan-Tanganyika political agenda against colonialism, Julius Nyerere frequently used "tribal associations" to mobilize for independence. Thus tribal associations such as Haya, Chagga, Gogo, Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Hehe, and Luguru associations were all enlisted in the fight against colonial rule. Perhaps the most famous of the tribally based cases of political mobilization, was the Meru land case in Arusha region (north-eastern Tanzania).[4]

According to Iliffe, Meru ethnic politics and mobilization were important because of two primary reasons. First, they attracted international attention to the realities of colonial domination, and secondly they contributed to the Arusha region's accumulated political experience to the emerging nationalist movement. The Meru land case (and protest) originated from a British colonial judge's proposal to remove the Meru from two large tracts of land in order to create a homogeneous bloc of European ranching between Meru and Kilimanjaro. Meru tribal leadership was forced to capitulate, but the people being moved refused and sought to organize themselves against eviction. Their protest gained world wide attention when their case ended up at the United Nations as an example of bad colonial rule. The leader of the protest, Kirilo Japhet subsequently became one of the anti-colonial organizers at the national level, traveling the country in the company of other ethnic leaders who clearly had pan-territorial aspirations. Thus in the case of Tanzania, organizational politics from its inception had a pan-territorial tradition which was later adopted by nationalist leaders, particularly Julius Nyerere, the first president.

Tanzania as a country came into being on April 26, 1964 as a result of the union between two sovereign states: Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Tanganyika, a former German colony and Trusteeship/Mandate territory of the League of Nations and the United Nations under British rule, became independent on December 9, 1961 under the leadership of Julius K. Nyerere. Zanzibar, a British protectorate, became independent in December 1963 as a Sultanate under the rulership of

[4] The following summary is derived from John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) Ch. 15.

Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdulla.[5] A month later, on January 12, 1964, the Sultan of Zanzibar was overthrown by the Afro-Shiraz Party. Julius K. Nyerere and Abeid Amani Karume, Presidents of Tanganyika and Zanzibar respectively, soon engaged in discussion that led to the Union between the two countries. Julius Nyerere became President of the Union, while Abeid Karume became the First Vice President. Mr. Karume occupied the post of First Vice President until his assassination in early 1972. Since the merger of the two countries, there has been an ongoing controversy regarding the nature of the Union. To date, circumstances of the Union form part of the national debate on equality between the two former independent and sovereign states.[6]

Prior to the Union between the two countries, the ruling party in Tanganyika was the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Julius K. Nyerere, the first President of Tanganyika had led TANU from its inception on July 7, 1954. The ruling party in Zanzibar was the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) which had come into being in 1957 following the merger of the African Association representing the urban and rural working class, most of whom had their ancestral origins in Tanganyika (and therefore "indigenously African"), and the Shiraz Association representing primarily those of mixed Arab and African blood. The Shiraz have always claimed that they are the true indigenous Zanzibaris, although this claim has been subject to dispute over time.

After the merger of the two countries, TANU and ASP continued to be the ruling parties in their respective territories; the two parties however strove to pursue identical national policies. The two parties also shared an ideology: socialism, although the interpretation of socialism continued to be a point of contention between and within the two political parties. TANU and ASP eventually merged in February 1977 to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), under the Chairmanship of Julius Nyerere.[7] Nyerere who had been President of Tanzania from 1964 stepped down in 1985. He was succeeded by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a Zanzibari politician and former Vice President of the Union government. CCM ruled as a single party until 1992 when Tanzania adopted a multi-party system. Since the adoption of the multi-party system, Tanzania has had two general elections, in 1995 and 2000. The next elections are slated for late 2005. CCM won both elections under the multi-party era with overwhelming majorities at the national level. Benjamin Mkapa, the CCM candidate was elected President of the country in both instances. Mkapa had chosen as his running mate, Dr. Omar Ali Juma, a Zanzibari politician and prominent member of CCM on the islands. In the case of Zanzibar however, CCM has barely been able to hold onto power as opposition

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[5] Zanzibar is situated off the coast of mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika). It consists of two large islands, namely Zanzibar and Pemba, each with its own archipelago. The main island has an area of 1657.6 square kilometers (640 square miles). Pemba has an area of 984.2 square kilometers (380 square miles).

[6] On the question of the Union see: Issa G. Shivji, The Legal Foundations of the Union (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1990); Haroub Othman ed. Babu: I saw the Future and It Works (Dar es Salaam: E & D Limited, 2001)

[7] Chama Cha Mapinduzi is Kiswahili for the Party of the Revolution

parties, particularly the Civic United Front (CUF), have presented a formidable challenge to the ruling party.[8] For example, in the 1995 elections for the local Zanzibar parliament, CCM received 49.62 percent of the popular votes versus 50.38 percent for CUF. Nonetheless, through constituency manipulation, CCM secured 26 seats versus 24 seats for CUF. As a consequence, CUF contested the results, albeit unsuccessfully. Zanzibari politics are currently reflecting tensions that sometimes at least on the surface, take ethnic tones: Arab/Shiraz i.e. CUF versus black/African, i.e. CCM.

But Mohammed Ali Bakari, a noted political scientist from Zanzibar argues that the political tensions on the islands are not racially or ethnically based, but rather stem from a "retarded" transition to democracy. According to Bakari, CCM, the ruling party won the elections by fraudulent means, thus eliciting a strong negative reaction by the opposition, particularly those belonging to the Civic United Front (CUF). Even though on the surface it may seem that CUF represents the "Arab" or "Shiraz" elements on the islands, in reality the situation is much more complex. I discuss this point further below.

On a broader scale, the ethnic tensions that on the surface seem to be apparent in Zanzibar are not as pronounced on the mainland (Tanganyika). This fact may be one of the important puzzles of politics in Tanzania, which this study will seek to highlight. Since the introduction of multi-party politics, several opposition parties have participated in national elections, although clearly these parties had more presence on the mainland than in Zanzibar. As noted earlier, CUF is the principal opposition in Zanzibar. The most prominent opposition parties on the mainland include: National Convention for Constructive Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi); Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA). The main campaign issues on the mainland have been a charge by the opposition of poor government performance; and what the opposition parties describe as the "authoritarianism" of the ruling party. In short, argues the opposition, there is a need for a more open and democratic political system that allows for the expression of multiple and alternative voices to those of CCM, the ruling party. Ethnic politics are to a large extent suppressed and therefore essentially absent from the political discourse on the mainland, although one may suspect that in the allocation of important cabinet posts, the CCM leadership attempts to maintain a geographical balance in their distribution, which in turn has implicit ethnic implications. The practice however has no official sanction of any kind.

[8] For a critical analysis of Zanzibari politics since 1992 see: Mohamed Ali Bakari, The Democratisation Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, 2001)

Tanzania's Ethnic Profile

Based on the ethnic typology developed for this research project by UNRISID, Tanzania is a multi-polar fragmented society. Under this typology, a country consists of many small ethnic groups, thus making ethnic-based political behavior less likely to be prevalent. The logic for this behavior is determined by the fact that under normal conditions of electoral competition, political parties have to appeal to a large cross-section of ethnic groups in order to be successful. In the alternative, single political parties would most likely hold sway, since ethnic coalition for purposes of political organization would be limited to a single choice. Up to the 1995 general elections, Tanzania fit the single party model, but one cannot say with any level of confidence that political organization, especially within the context of CCM, was organized as an overt expression of a cross-ethnic appeal. Rather, the discourse within the party was that of "development."[9] The ideology driving the discourse was "nationalism" with an element of "socialism" although the latter element faded with time, especially in the post 1985 period. Tanzania is a country of 34.5 million people. The last census was conducted in 2002. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba have a population of 900,000. Dar es Salaam, the largest city in the country, has an estimated population of 2.8 million. The country has 120 separate ethnic groups, the majority of whom are Bantu speakers. The largest ethnic group is the Wasukuma who number roughly 4 million and represent 13% of the total population. Other large ethnic groups include: the Nyamwezi, Chagga, Haya, Hehe, Nyakyusa, and Makonde. In spite of their relative numerical superiority vis-à-vis other groups in Tanzania, each of the remaining large groups represent fewer than 5% of the population. (For a more comprehensive list, please see Appendix) The number of people in each ethnic group is imprecise because the government of Tanzania usually does not keep such statistics. Much more importantly however, is the fact that ethnic identification in Tanzania—particularly on the mainland—has been frowned upon since independence. Indeed, ethnicity as a category no longer appears on the Census form.

In a recent study, Bruce Heilman notes that,

> "The 1967 census, the last to take into account ethnic groups, noted that the process of classifying people into ethnic groups was complicated and imprecise, but it nonetheless listed 130 African ethnic groups…later Foster, Hitchcock, and Lyimo observed that 120 is most often cited as the number of different ethnic groups. The largest ethnic groups according to the 1967 census were the Sukuma (12.4%), Makonde (3.9%), Chagga (3.6%), Haya

[9] Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) Chapter VI.

> (3.3%), and Nyamwezi (3.3%)…In the years since the 1967 census it is unclear how demographic, social, economic, and political trends have influenced the relative size and conceptualizations of Tanzania's various ethnic groups'[10]

Historians have noted that one of the essential features of the population that occupy modern day Tanzania—both on the mainland and on the islands—but particularly on the mainland, is that some of the tribal or ethnic groups were actually "invented" by Europeans, or by Africans themselves who saw benefit in being identified as such with one group or another. Europeans had made the wrong assumption that "different tribes were related genealogically, so that Africa's history was a vast family tree of tribes. Small tribes were offshoots of big ones and might therefore be reunited."[11] For Europeans in Tanzania, tribal grouping was an easy way to arrange political administration and control of the "natives," since each native had to belong to a "tribe." The British Governor, Sir Donald Cameron's introduction of "indirect rule" in Tanganyika was partly based on the notion that each tribe would be internally coherent and homogeneous. Colonial rule therefore could be effected cheaply, using pre-existing tribal structures. But the reality of course was far much complex:

> This stereotype [by Europeans]bore little relation to Tanganyika's kaleidoscopic history, but it was the shifting sand on which Cameron and his disciples erected indirect rule by 'taking the tribal unit.' They had the power and they created a new political geography. This would have been transient, had it not coincided with similar trends among Africans. They too had to live amidst bewildering social complexity, which they ordered in kinship terms and buttressed with invented history. Moreover, Africans wanted effective units of action just as [European] officials wanted effective units of government. Many Africans had strong personal motives for creating new units, which they could lead. Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans built tribes to belong to.[12]

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[10] Bruce E. Heilman "Identity and Politics in Tanzania" unpublished paper, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 2002. p. 8

[11] John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) pp. 323-4.

[12] John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 324.

The process of tribal identity was further complicated by the fact that quite often migration among Tanganyika's population was widespread both before and after the establishment of colonial rule. Before colonial rule, much of the migration resulted from inter-tribal conflict as was the case with Ngoni invaders from Southern Africa who completely altered the political views in Southern Tanganyika. The Ngoni had themselves been victims of the Zulu mfecane in South Africa at the beginning of the 19th century. After the establishment of colonial rule, most of the migration was occasioned by the colonial need for labor. Almost no group in the country was spared from the demands of the colonial economy which included: portage, railway construction, road construction and plantations. The consequences for tribal identity under such circumstances were that there was less of it, and the tribe became less of an organizing unit, in spite of the insistence of such a unit by the dictates of indirect rule. An example of the massive integration and fusion of peoples, as early as 1894—ten years after the establishment of German colonial rule in Tanganyika—a survey of Dar es Salaam, the capital, showed that of every 100 unskilled workers, 47 were Zaramo (locals); 23 "Swahili;" 10 were "Sagara;" 7 Nyamwezi (from Central Tanganyika); 5 Shambaa from Tanga Region, 3 Masaai, 2 Gogo, 2 Mahenge, and 1 Manyema (from Congo).[13] Over the years, the Zaramo proportion went down, thus making Dar es Salaam a truly pan-territorial city. Furthermore, from early on, internal migration and assimilation among different groups of people was common practice in many parts of the country. Such movements and circumstances naturally breed a culture of tolerance and accommodation which the nationalist leaders readily used in the fight against colonial rule.

Thus, in Tanzania, the large number of small ethnic groups with fluid boundaries may have made the task of creating a national identity a little bit easier than in other countries in Africa where ethnic group identities may have been much sharper—certainly this was the case in Sudan, Nigeria, and Rwanda. In the case of Sudan, both ethnic and racial differences have led to the longest civil war in Africa. Southern Sudan has sought to secede from the rest of Sudan, complaining of ethnic/racial, economic and religious oppression. The death toll from the conflict, which began in the early years of independence, is so far estimated to be 5 million. In the case of Nigeria, ethnic differences were a major contributing factor to the 1967-70 civil war which claimed the lives of 1.5 million people, primarily in Eastern Nigeria, the geographic location of the breakaway state of Biafra. In the most serious recent catastrophe in Africa, the so-called ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda led to the massacre of almost 1 million people. Irrespective of the underlying causes of conflicts in the cases cited, "ethnicity" whether real or imagined, played a significant role in fueling the conflicts.

The official non-identification on the basis of ethnicity in the national census in Tanzania is in line with the grand nationalist project of Julius Nyerere, the

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[13] John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 161

founding president of the country, who insisted on creating a nation of citizens who would only be identified as Tanzanians. To a great extent, Nyerere's grand nationalist project has succeeded, as indicated by among other things, the lack explicitly ethnic data in official records; and the evolution of a political culture in Tanzania where it is incredibly "politically incorrect" to ask new or old acquaintances what ethnic group they belong to. To paraphrase Nyerere in a speech at the 1995 CCM candidate nominating conference in Dodoma (the country's administrative capital): ethnicity in Tanzania is only good for ritualistic purposes, beyond that, is a moribund concept with no place in modern Tanzania.[14]

At the time of independence in 1961, President Julius Nyerere noted that his government's principal objective was to quicken the pace of economic development. Thus, Tanzania's initial Ujamaa policy (1962-1967) was aimed at collectivizing villagers who live in economically disadvantaged regions such as Mtwara and Lindi in the South, Dodoma and Singida in Central Tanzania, and Kigoma in the West. The idea behind collectivization was that the government could deliver essential social services such as health, education and communications infrastructure at a lower cost through economies of scale by reaching a larger number of peasants living in close proximity. Although the idea may have had considerable intellectual appeal, the intended beneficiaries were slow to embrace it. The main reason for the slow acceptance of villagization was the excessive bureaucratic nature of its implementation. There was little consultation between government officials and villages, who were supposed to be moved. In 1967, the government adopted a more radical approach to economic development by enunciating a policy for "Socialism and Self-Reliance" through the Arusha Declaration.

Significantly, the Arusha Declaration as national policy did not mention ethnicity as a consideration in national planning. Over the years, the government has been to a great extent neutral on this question, although periodically the CCM leadership has decried "tribalism" as did President Nyerere in the opening quote of this paper. Significantly, some of the least developed parts of the country such as Shinyanga and parts of Mwanza region (areas near Lake Victoria) are also populated by the Wasukuma, the most numerous ethnic group. In classic theorization on ethnic policy, one would assume that in such circumstances, the government would either make an explicit policy of favoring the region because of the population's numerical numbers for purposes of political support; or rally other parts of the country to political forestall backlash if the numerically superior ethnic groups were to rise up against the government. This did not happen in Tanzania.

One other consideration on ethnicity in Tanzania is the fact that since colonial times, areas with minority ethnic groups seem to have had considerable advantage in terms of education and economic development. Thus, the areas around Mount

[14] Recorded in audiotapes that play regularly on public transport in Tanzania, particularly upcountry buses.

Kilimanjaro (Arusha-Moshi), West Lake (Kagera), and the Southern Highlands, respectively occupied by the Chagga, Haya and Nyakyusa, were significantly more economically developed than the rest of the country. These ethnic groups also had the largest number of educated people who became members of the new elite at the time of independence. These areas also produced the most cash crops such as coffee and tea; which in turn accounted for their economic advantage. And yet, in terms of distribution of political posts in the government, there has been throughout the independence period, a cross-section of representation from all parts of the country—signifying that economic and education advantages of a region did no guarantee or translate into political advantage at the national level in Tanzania. Tables I, II, and III demonstrate this point quite effectively. The data covers the period 1990-2000.

Tables I, II, and III can be summarized as indicating the lack of dominance of one or a few ethnic groups in Tanzania's political elite. With the current President coming from a small ethnic gorup in the South, the rest of the cabinet is chosen from across two dozen ethnic groups. The same applies for the other top positions of permanent secretaries and regional commissioners. The majority of Regional Commissioners who are the administrative representatives of the President in the regions are from different regions of the country. The significance of such cross-ethnic appointments cannot be overemphasized.

Table I: Tanzania Cabinet Ministers by Ethnicity/Region 1990-2000

Position	Ethnicity (1990)	Ethnicity (1995)	Ethnicity (2000)
Prime Minister	Gogo/Dodoma	Fyome/Arusha	Fyome/Arusha
President's Office (Civil Service)		Bena/Iringa	Barbaig/Arusha
Industry/Trade	Pare/Kilimanjaro	Swahili	N/A
Communication/Information	Machinga/Lindi	Sukuma/Mwanza	Nyakyusa/Mbeya
Planning	Zaramo/Coast	Yao/Ruvuma	Zigua/Tanga
Community Development	Kinga/Iringa	Barbaig/Arusha	N/A
Labor/Youth Development	Haya/Kagera	Fipa/Rukwa	Nyamwezi/Tabora
Finance	Ndali/Mbeya	Pare/Kilimanjaro	Chagga/Kilimanjaro

Agriculture/Food	Hehe/Iringa	Gogo/Dodoma	Chagga/Kilimanjaro
Foreign Affairs	Swahili/Zanzibar	Kwere/Coast	Kwere/Coast
Civil Works	Nyiramba/Singida	Yao/Ruvuma	Sukuma/Mwanza
Lands/Housing Development/ Human Settlement	Sukuma/Mwanza	Ndali/Mbeya	Ndali/Mbeya
Minerals/Energy/Water	Kwere/Coast	Digo/Tanga	Mwere/Ruvuma
Education/Culture	Dukuma/Mwanza	Nyamwezi/Tabora	Hehe/Iringa
Health	Luo/Mara	Pogoro/Morogoro	Yao/Ruvuma
Science/Technology/ Higher Education	Sukuma/Mwanza	Sukuma/Mwanza	Sukuma/Mwanza
State/VP's Office	Maasai/Arusha	Maasai/Arusha	Pare/Kilimanjaro
Home Affairs	Chagga/Kilimanjaro	Swahili/Zanzibar	Swahili/Zanzibar
Tourism/Natural Resources	Mwera/Mtwara	Swahili/Zanzibar	Swahili/Zanzibar
PM's Office	N/A	Barbaig/Arusha	Hehe/Iringa
Justice/Constitutional Affairs	N/A	Digo/Tanga	Digo/Tanga
Water/Livestock Development	N/A	N/A	Maasai/Arusha
State/President's Office	N/A	N/A	Haya/Kagera
Defense	Somali/Arusha	Mwera/Ruvuma	Luo/Mara
Cooperatives/Markets		Gogo/Dodoma	Haya/Kagera
Youth Development/Women/ Children	N/A	N/A	Pare/Kilimanjaro
Local Government	N/A	Matumbi/Kilwa	Nyakyusa//Mbeya
Water	N/A	Nyiramba/Singida	

Source: Department of Information, Government of Tanzania, Disposition of Regional Commissioners (1990,1995, 2000)
Note: Designation of government ministries change from time to time through consolidation or elimination of some ministries. An N/A signifies such a change

Table II:Tanzania: Permanent Secretaries by Ethnicity and Region 2000

Chief Secretary, State House

Pogoro/Morogoro

State House

Pogoro/Morogoro

Civil Service

Angaza/Kagera

Planning and Privatization

Nyakyusa/Mbeya

Vice President's Office	
Maasai/Arusha	
Bondei/Tanga	
Office of Prime Minister	Digo/Tanga
Home Affairs	N/A /
Arusha	
Finance	
Chagga/Kilimanjaro	
Pare/Kilimanjaro	
Industry and Trade	
Haya/Kagera	
Communication and Transport	
Swahili/Zanzibar	
Agriculture and Food Security	
Haya/Kagera	
Health	
Yao/Ruvuma	
Foreign Affairs	
Bena/Mbeya	
Water and Livestock	
Haya/Kagera	
Natural Resources and Tourism	Luo/Mara
Science, Technology and Higher Education	Karia/Mara
Works	
Maasai/Arusha	
Land, Housing and Human Settlement	N/A /
Tanga	
Labor, Youth Development and Sports	N/A /
Ruvuma	
Community Development, Gender and Children Affairs	
Nyiramba/Singida	
Defense and National Service	
Pare/Kilimanjaro	
Cooperatives and Markets	
Ngoni/Ruvuma	

Source: Department of Information, Government of Tanzania, Disposition of Permanent Secretaries, (2000)

Note: N/A indicates that information is not available wither through self-reporting or conjecture by author.

Table III: Tanzania: Regional Commissioners by Ethnicity and Region 2000

Arusha	Haya/Kagera
Dar es Salaam	Sambaa/Tanga
Dodoma	Nyiramba/Singida
Iringa	Hehe/Iringa
Kagera	
Chagga/Kilimanjaro	
Kigoma	N/A
Kilimanjaro	Nyakyusa/Mbeya
Lindi	Pare/Kilimanjaro
Manyara	
Chagga/Kilimanjaro	
Mara	Jita/Mara
Mbeya	Barbaig/Arusha
Morogoro	Sukuma/Mwanza
Mtwara	
Chagga/Kilimanjaro	
Mwanza	Maasai/Arusha
Pwani/Coast	Zaramo/Coast
Rukwa	Ndengereko/Coast
Ruvuma	N/A
Shinyanga	N/A / Mtwara
Singida	
Chagga/Kilimanjaro	
Tabora	Gogo/Dodoma

Tanga Luguru/Morogoro

Source: Department of Information, Government of Tanzania, Disposition of Regional Commissioners (2000)

Note: N/A indicates that information is not available wither through self-reporting or conjecture by author.

In Zanzibar however, the racial and ethnic situation has been quite different from that on the mainland. In particular, the January 12, 1964 revolution that overthrew the Sultan was explicitly racially and ethnically charged. The Sultan, who was Arab in origin, had been seen as a symbol and instrument of racial oppression by black Africans who form the vast majority of Zanzibaris. Indeed reports indicate that several hundred Arabs were massacred during the uprising, which lasted several days.[15] Thus the issue of race and ethnicity would seem to be important to Zanzibari politics both in the pre and post-independence periods. Predictably, after the 1964 revolution, most Arabs in Zanzibar complained of discrimination and harassment. The assassination of Union Vice President Abeid Amani Karume was partly blamed on "Arab" and "Shiraz" conspirators. But from the perspective of some black Africans on the Islands, positive discrimination in their favor was seen as long overdue affirmative action. Yet as noted by Mohamed Ali Bakari, it would be a gross mistake to view Zanzabari politics in primarily ethnic or racial terms. For one, the blood mixture and racial/ethnic identification in Zanzibar is so diffuse as to render any categorical statement on the matter patently false. Much of the self-identification on the island would be more for social convenience rather than a category for political mobilization.

Research Issues

It is now a truism in political analysis that ethnic diversity is not in itself a neither problem, nor does it shape political behavior deterministically; and that ethnicity is constantly adapting. In this study, I will take that position as a given. For this study, therefore, one of the key questions I will seek to examine is whether ethnicity has been politicized in Tanzania leading to the overriding of other loyalties and obligations. This question is interesting for the analysis of politics in Tanzania in light of the country falling under the category of "fragmented multipolarity." Under this category, no ethnic group is large enough to dominate

[15] Michael F. Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Don Petterson, Revolution in Zanzibar: An American's Cold War Tale (Boulder, Co: Westview, 2002)

the political system and public sector. On the surface, this appears to be the case in Tanzania, particularly on the mainland.

In Zanzibar however, the situation would seem to be more complicated. While the population of Zanzibar is less than 1 million, a small number relative to the whole population of Tanzania, which stands at 34.5 million (2002), nonetheless if one goes by the old and traditional notions of ethnic identification in Zanzibar, the ethnic/racial breakdown would be closer to a "unipolar" structure in which one ethnic group accounts for an overwhelming majority of the population. In the case of Zanzibar, this would be Africans. According to S.G. Ayany:

> Africans fell into three classes: first, the Shirazis; second, the descendants of the ex-slaves; and third, those who had only recently emigrated from the mainland. The Shirazis were a composite group made up of the Wahadima, Wapemba and Watumbatu. These descended from the ancient Shirazis and were regarded as the "indigenous" people of the coral islands.[16]

Arabs are the minority in Zanzibar. Since racial/ethnic categories are not part of official statistics in Tanzania, an intelligent guess would put the Arab population in Zanzibar on the basis of Ayany's racial categories, at about 15 percent. Yet historically, the Arab minority held all political and economic power, a primary reason and justification for the revolution of January 12, 1964. Indeed the inequality—socio, political, and economic—between the minority Arabs and majority Africans had been ingrained in Zanzibar's political economy since the early days of the Omani dynasty before the 19th century. The increase in slave trade and clove production on the islands at the beginning of the 19th century led to the transfer by Sultan Seyyid Said in 1832, of the Al-Busaid Omani dynasty's capital from Mascut to Zanzibar, cementing the predominant role of Arab power. Some scholars of Zanzibar have argued that it is incorrect to consider the survival of the Al-Busaid dynasty until 1964 as the survival of Arab rule. Quoting Abul Sheriff, perhaps the leading Zanzibari historian, Mohamed Ali Bakari agrees with the notion that the seeming Arab predominance needs to be understood in the overall context of British system of indirect rule where the pre-colonial political system was preserved within a colonial framework. In essence, this meant that the Arab administered Zanzibar on behalf of the British—essentially colonial control on the cheap. Bakari concludes that

> In Zanzibar, the adoption of indirect rule was so effective that during the struggle for independence in the 1950s and early 1960s the bulk of the citizenry under the Afro-Shirazi Party directed their

[16] S.G. Ayany, A History of Zanzibar: A Study in Constitutional Development 1934-1964 (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1978)

> nationalist struggles to overthrow 'the Arab rule' and not the British."[17]

But that is essentially the point. In the eyes of the "bulk of the citizenry," who were racially "black" or "African," minority Arab rule had serious negative political and economic implications. For the Africans, Arab rule in any guise meant a confirmation of their oppressed status, and therefore of the need to change power relations. The fact that the Arabs were an obvious minority, and yet possessed disproportionately high levels of political and economic clout, meant that African (and Shiraz) nationalist mobilization would use ethnicity/racial "differences" to make their case for political change. The intense ethnic/racial debate in Zanzibar still revolves around the question of access to power—both political and economic, which has its history in the formation of Zanzibar as a modern state.[18] For purposes of this study, the seeming unipolar ethnic profile of Zanzibar will concern me less because of the overwhelming fragmented multipolar structure for the rest of the country, and the fact that scholars are now authoritatively indicating that the current political discourse in Zanzibar is more about access to political power and less, about ethnic and racial differences. The latter categories seem to have been diffused by the overarching Swahili/Zanzibari culture.

A related research question concerns political change in the past decade. With the abandoning of the one-party system and the adoption of a pluralist/multi-party system in 1992, Tanzania embarked on a political journey that reflected political trends across the African continent. In many African countries, the multi-party era has witnessed political mobilization on the basis of ethnicity—certainly this was the case in Kenya in the first multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997. The question for Tanzania is: has ethnicity become a rallying point by the opposition to express political grievances? This does not seem to be the case. Indeed one precondition the government placed on the establishment and registration of political parties was that the parties may not be ethnic based; and must demonstrate that they have support in all regions of the country. In other words, all political parties must have a "national character."

So, without explicitly stating so, Tanzania seems to have a national policy on ethnicity—which is that ethnicity may not be the basis for political organization. Yet it is clear that the leading opposition leaders such as Augustine Mrema of Tanzania Labour Party (TPL) and John Cheyo of the United Democratic Party (UDP) received most of their electoral support in their home regions of Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria region. But still, this is not evidence of an ethnically based political mobilization.

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[17] Mohamed Ali Bakari, The Democratisation Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, 2001)

[18] See: Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson eds. Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule (London: James Currey, 1991)

One interesting fact in the fragmented multi-polar ethnic structure of Tanzania is that since independence, all Presidents of the country have come from some of the smallest ethnic groups: Julius Nyerere from the Zanaki ethnic group who perhaps number at only 500,000; Ali Hassan Mwinyi from Zanzibar, where the combined population of the two Islands is about 900,000; and Benjamin Mkapa who comes from a small ethnic group in Southern Tanzania.

Another research question is: what has been the effect of economic policy of the structural adjustment era in Tanzania, particularly on the issue of social inequality? Tanzania Government's current broad vision for development is "The Tanzania Development Vision 2025." The Vision 2025 was prompted by the fact that Tanzania's economy has performed poorly for the past three decades. As the Vision 2025 states in the introduction:

> The three principal objectives of the Vision 2025 are: achieving quality and good life for all; good governance and the rule of law; and building a strong resilient economy that can effectively withstand global competition…[19]

This vision relates directly to one of the principal questions of this project: performance of the public sector. Vision 2025 itself acknowledges that even though at the time of independence Tanzania vowed to eradicate poverty, disease, and ignorance, there is reason to believe that there was slippage in the attainment of these goals in the 1980s and 1990s. This slippage may have resulted in the accentuation of socio-economic inequalities, and may have perhaps prompted more explicit ethnic identification as people sought refuge in the comfortable ideological world of ethnic identity, although this is less clear, with little evidence of it.

What is significant though is the fact that the entire text of Vision 2025 (17 pages) does not mention ethnicity. It concludes that:

> (t)he Tanzania development Vision 2025 seeks to realize patriotism, nationalism and strengthen national cohesion of all the people in society…the Nation (sic) cohesion will be realized only when the implementation of the Development Vision entails equal opportunities extended to all people for the enjoyment of the fruits of its achievement.

In a general sense therefore, the research will examine policies adopted by the government since 1992, policies that would seem to respond to two basic imperatives: economic decline and political pluralism.

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[19] http://www.tanzania.go.tz/vision.htm

Tanzania's Constitutional and Administrative Structure

Tanzania is a constitutional republic with the President as Head of State, the Head of Government and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.[20] Naturally, such a position carries considerable power and authority as the President also appoints Cabinet Ministers and their deputies who must by law, be members of Parliament. Further, the President also appoints Permanent Secretaries, who are the top civil servants in the government.

Administratively, Tanzania is divided into twenty-nine regions—23 on the mainland and 5 on the islands. Each region is headed by a Regional Commissioner (RC), who is also appointed by the President. In essence, the Regional Commissioner is the official representative of the President at the regional level and therefore the most important political figure at that level. Each region is composed of several districts. The numbers of districts vary, depending on the size of the region. There are regions with as many as five districts, while some have as few as 2 districts. The numbers of regions and districts have changed over time.

Each district is headed by a District Commissioner (DC), who is also appointed by the President. The DC's role in the district is similar to that of the RC at the regional level. Each district has a Council of directly elected officials from the smallest political unit in the country know as "kata" or division. In theory, the District Councils are responsible for "development" projects at the local level, and do reflect the people's voice. The effectiveness of the councils however, is minimized by the fact that districts and regions have little or no taxing authority. Thus almost all available resources for development purposes must come from the central government. This clearly demonstrates the fact that the state in Tanzania is highly centralized, and therefore arguably, less representative of local voices.

The national representative institution in the Tanzanian political system is the Parliament. There are 230 constituencies encompassing both the mainland and the islands. Each constituency elects its member of parliament (MP) through a direct vote. Ministers are appointed by the President from the ranks of elected MPs. As a minister, the individual serves both as an MP and a minister, an arrangement that raises serious questions of representation and accountability. When an MP is a minister, where do his or her first allegiances lie? To his or her constituents or to the government? These are some of the questions that are bound to arise as Tanzania begins to think about constitutional reform to reflect the rapidly changing political situation in the country. For example, a proposal to deocuple ministerial appointments from parliamentary membership would help in clearing the issue of accountability if the constitutional role of the minister would be confined to the executive branch.

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[20] United Republic of Tanzania, The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 (As Amended, 1998).

Even though Zanzibar is part of the Union Republic of Tanzania, the islands have their own government provided for under the Constitution of the United Republic. "The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar" as it is officially known, has authority in Zanzibar over matters which are not "Union." Union matters generally include: Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and the general administration of Tanzania Mainland. The Head of the "Revolutionary Government" has the title of President of Zanzibar. Zanzibar also has a local parliament.

Both the President of the country and MPs are directly elected using first past the post system. There are some basic qualifications for the positions including age and citizenship. For someone to qualify to run for President, he or she must be 40 years of age. The President also appoints members of the High Court.

Significantly, under the constitution, the only provision specified for the appointment of individuals is that they be qualified for the position. Ethnic, religious, or any other affiliation does not feature in the decision-making process for positions of authority in Tanzania. The following Tables show by ethnic identification the list of Cabinet Ministers 1990-2000, Permanent Secretaries 2000 and Regional Commissioners 2000.

The Tanzania Civil Service

Similar to other colonial entities, the civil service in Tanzania was dominated by colonial officials from Great Britain. The colonial Governor had been assisted in his responsibilities by Provincial (now Regional) Commissioners, who in turn were assisted by District Commissioners. Government departments were also run by British officials in all facets of administration, including functional areas such as agriculture, forestry, mining, water management and health. By the time Tanzania (Tanganyika) gained its independence, very few Africans occupied positions of authority in the government. Naturally, one of the key issues addressed by the newly independent government was *Africanization*.

In the context of Tanzania, Africanization specifically meant the rapid transfer of power from Europeans who still occupied important positions in government, even after independence to indigenous Africans. There is evidence that this was a contentious issue within the ruling party, particularly between those who advocated a slow and deliberate system of Africanization (the Nyerere camp); and those who advocated rapid Africanization (the Kawawa camp affiliated with the Tanganyika Federation of Labour).[21] Naturally, the first camp made the argument that there were not enough Africans to fill all the posts that would be vacated by Europeans. The latter camp made the argument that on the job training was possible, and indeed a more desirable path to pursue. The latter camp was so

[21] Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton, 1970)

adamant about this position that they forced the dismissal of a European Finance Minister who had been invited by Julius Nyerere to take up the post at independence.

Both camps however, were agreed that the long-term solution to the lack of qualified personnel was to institute a vigorous scheme of training Tanzanians for various jobs in the civil service. Thus the Ministry of Education became one of the most important ministries of the new government. The Ministry was the central focus for education from primary school all the way to University. Consistently, annual budgets for the ministry average 20 percent of the entire government budget until the mid 1980s.

For purposes of this project, it is important to note that recruitment to top civil service positions from independence in 1961 was strictly on the basis of academic qualification, not ethnic, religious, or regional basis. But as I indicated earlier, the tree regions which supplied the bulk of the first civil servants after independence were Kilimanjaro, West Lake (Kagera), and Mbeya—regions which had been settled by European Missionaries, and therefore had better access to educational opportunities than the rest of the country. As a result of these perceived and real advantages, the government deliberately set out to build secondary schools and other institutions of higher learning in areas that seemed disadvantaged.

The Tanzania civil service is now fully Africanized. It expanded rapidly in the years 1967-1985 as the government pursued a policy of centralized control of national development through the creation of national parastatal bodies—economic enterprises run by the government. In the post 1985 period, and more so in the late 1990s and early 2000, both public and private sector reforms introduced by the government has led to a significant shrinking of the civil service. Since the late 1990s, more than 80,000 civil servants have been trimmed from the government payroll. This follows conditionalities agreed to by Tanzania on the insistence of the IMF and World Bank as part of the overall economic restructuring process.

II. **Inequality and Economic Transformation in Tanzania**

A. The Early Years of Independence 1961-1967

Tanzania's economy, like most Third World economies, had historically relied on the export of primary commodities for its earnings of foreign currency. In the early years of independence, these commodities included: sisal, coffee, tea, cotton, cashew nuts and pyrethrum for the mainland; and cloves for Zanzibar. The heavy reliance on these commodities meant that the economy was always hostage to the fluctuations of world prices, which Tanzania had no control over. The first such fluctuation was in the price of sisal which fell precipitously in the

early years of independence, resulting in a financial crunch for the newly independent country.

The decline in the price of sisal was soon followed by a number of international incidents that led to the loss of external funding for the Tanzanian government. The first such incident was the Union that actually created the United Republic of Tanzania. Under the Hallstein doctrine, West Germany protested the maintaining of diplomatic relations with East Germany, which had established diplomatic relations with the new revolutionary government of Zanzibar in 1964. President Nyerere's refusal to break off those relations led to the suspension of West German aid.[22] The second such incident was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the White settler regime in Rhodesia. Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith declared independence from Britain in November 1965. Julius Nyerere and a few other leaders on the continent saw Ian Smith's action as an affront to African aspirations for independence in the region. They held Britain responsible for its colony, and requested British intervention to quell the rebellion. When Britain refused to intervene, Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations, leading to a cut off of foreign aid from Britain.

Thus a combination of international economic realities (the fall of commodity prices); and a string of diplomatic incidents, led to a severe strain on the Tanzania economy only a few years after independence. Further, the reality of Tanzania's economic underdevelopment combined to put tremendous pressure on the Nyerere regime. Clearly, the overwhelming majority of Tanzanians at that time, 95 percent of whom lived in the rural areas, could be described as poor. For a regime which came to power with an explicit promise of improving peoples' material condition, the post-independence economic uncertainty could not have come at a worse time. Table IV is a summary of the economic conditions in Tanzania in the years up to 1967.

	1961	1962	1963	1965	1965	1966	1967
Per Capita income growth %	-7.1	4.3	1.2	3.6	-0.2	9.9	1.8
Population growth %	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0
Urbanisation %	4.8	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.9
Terms of trade (1987=100)	130	124	137	142	137	137	126
% of labour force in agriculture	92.4	92.1	91.9	91.7	91.4	91.2	90.9
Monetary growth %		21.7	25.6	-15.2	31.8	476.7	13.1
Inflation %	7.8	0.6	4.9	2.8	-2.4	9.3	11.5
Gross investment % of GDP	13.7	11.6	10.7	12.0	13.9	15.1	18.9

Table IV Economic Data for Tanzania 1961-1967

[22] Timothy C. Niblock "Tanzania Foreign Policy: An Analysis: in s.s. Mushi and K. Mathews eds Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1981: A Reader (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1961)

Source: Arne Bigsten and Aders Danielson, Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? p 15
Adapted from World Bank World Development Report, various years.

In retrospect, even though Tanzania's foreign relations seemed to be fairly radical—if we consider the West German and British incidents and Julius Nyerere's active participation in the non-aligned movement—it is reasonable to conclude that the country's economic policies were quite cautions. In considering this period, Arne Bigsten and Anders Danielson have noted that the government concentrated on the Africanization of the public sector and conventional measures to stimulate the economy. Indeed, there were no dramatic changes in the economic policies pursued by the colonial power, and not very different from what most other colonies did:

> "Peasant agriculture was encouraged by conventional measures. Industrial development was promoted with a relatively mild import substitution policy and relied on private investors. The economy remained fairly open and was highly dependent on revenue from commodity exports. During the…period 1961-1967 per capita incomes grew by 2 percent per year, the highest rate of any period in independent Tanzania."[23]

Yet it is also true that while growth in per capita incomes were a respectable 2.2 percent per year, the growth was not high enough to put a serious dent in the glaring poverty in the country. Worse still, the government observed rapidly increasing inequalities. These facts led the government to take a radical step which was to change both the political and economic profile of the country for a long time to come.

B. The Arusha Declaration and Beyond

In response to growing economic pressures, the government adopted a policy of "Socialism and Self-Reliance" in February 1967. The policy document guiding the policy was called the Arusha Declaration, named after the small city on the

[23] Arne Bigsten and Anders Danielson, Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001) pp 14-15

slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro where the ruling political party met to consider these policy proposals.[24] The principal tenets of the policy were stated to be in line with the TANU constitution whose policy was to build a socialist state. According to the document,

> "[a] truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers and in which neither capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does not have two classes of people, a lower class composed of people who work for a living, and an upper class of people who live on the work of others"[25]

The policy instruments to achieve the socialist objective were first and foremost, "self-reliance" where the effort of the citizens would be the key to achieving development whether it was the building of clinics, roads, or schools. Secondly, all the major means of production would be nationalized. This entailed the nationalization (taking over) of foreign enterprises including banks, insurance companies, trading houses and factories. The Arusha Declaration stated:

> "To build and maintain socialism it is essential that the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their Government and their cooperatives. Further, it is essential that the ruling Party should be a Party of peasants and workers"[26]

The reaction to such policies by the West was predictable. Western countries began to see Tanzania as slowly falling into the socialist camp, and therefore, hostile to international capitalism. A number of economic aid projects were suspended or abandoned completely, including a proposal to build a railway from Dar es Salaam to Zambia. The railway had been envisaged to serve two basic purposes: to give Zambia an outlet to the sea in light of regional sanctions against Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia, and to open up Southern Tanzania for economic development. In the latter case, the railway was seen as providing several economic benefits; particularly the reduction in transportation costs for goods in the Southern half of the country and the opening of coal mining in the region. The non-availability of Western funding for this project led to the seeking of assistance from China by the governments of Tanzania and Zambia. TAZARA railway, as it was called, was completed with Chinese aid in 1973.

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[24] See: Julius K. Nyerere

[25] Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 15

[26] ibid: p. 16

Perhaps the most important pillar of the Arusha declaration was its rural development component. The government's strategy was contained in the paper "Socialism and Rural Development" which laid out the principles of rural collectivization as the best way to achieve rapid economic development. The logic of rural collectivization under the name Vijiji Vya Ujamaa (Ujamaa villages) was simple and compelling: Tanzania was a poor country which lacked basic infrastructure in all essential services: education, health, transport, etc. Since the government lacked resources, the optimal way of utilizing limited national resources was to collectivize rural dwellers and deliver these services to more people at once, collectively, rather than try to reach each rural peasant individually. In turn, rural villagers would pool their resources, particularly labor, in supplementing what the government would do. Thus, in the case of education for example, villagers would build a primary school through their labor, while the government would supply building materials and teachers. This model was to be replicated in other sectors of the economy. The anticipated result was a comprehensive system of participatory development. The policy document concluded by saying:

> "What is being proposed is that we in Tanzania should move from a nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and the ethics of the capitalist system. Instead we should gradually become a nation of Ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these small groups co-operate together for joint enterprises."[27]

In the initial years of the Arusha Declaration, the collectivization process was voluntary. The government calculated that the logic of collectivization would be so obvious that peasants in rural areas would immediately see the benefits of living together in planned villages with an expectation of government support. However, most peasants did not see it that way. Peasants were slow to embrace the idea of collectivization, perhaps affirming the old adage of the peasant as rugged individualist, and primarily conservative in this economic thinking, which is risk averse. Collectivization would undermine those two essential elements of the peasant. Collectivization presented a loss of social control for the peasant and much more importantly, in terms of production, collectivization presented an economic risk by shifting the responsibility to the community, away from the individual. Consequently, by the end of 1972, only a small minority of peasants had moved to Ujamaa villages voluntarily. In response to this slow collectivization, in early 1973, the government instituted Operation Ujamaa whereby peasants were forcibly removed from their traditional areas of living and moved to villages that were planned by the government. Operation Ujamaa may have one of the largest acts of movement of citizens within a country in Africa in the 20th century. As Dean McHenry noted a few years later:

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[27] ibid p. 143

> "When the ujamaa policy was initiated in 1967, less than 5 percent of the rural population lived in villages. Of the remaining 95 percent, a few peasants lived in relatively close proximity to each other, but most lived at widely scattered points throughout the countryside…By the end of 1976, virtually the entire rural population had been moved into villages"[28]

The effects of villagization were negatively devastating to the Tanzania economy. While the government expended its resources facilitating the movement of people in the rural areas to Ujamaa villages, peasant production fell precipitously. There were four primary reasons for the fall in peasant production. First, a good number of resettling villagers in new places was done in the rainy season when peasants were supposed to be working in the fields, planting and weeding. Second, the resettlement process was done with too much haste, and therefore no adequate planning took place. For example, bureaucrats less familiar with local situations moved families from fertile areas to less fertile areas. In some cases this was done simply to have a village near the main road, not considering that local residents through many decades of experience had settled in particular areas for good reason. Third, strangers were being assembled together and were expected to warm up to each other and participate in communal production right away. The process of social integration proved to be extremely difficult, resulting in poor and less than ideal conditions for production. Fourth, the 1973-1975 period when most of the collectivization took place coincided with an extended period of drought in the country. The combination of all these factors led to a fairly difficult economic situation for the majority of the population in the rural areas.

In the formal economic sector, the government undertook a radical policy of nationalizing banking activity, large portions of the industrial sector, and the bulk of international trade. Retail trade was conducted by regional state agencies. Buildings worth more than T.Shs 100,000 were nationalized in 1970. Market prices were largely replaced by administrative prices set by the National Price Commission. All these measures were accomplished by the mid 1970s. The basic industrial strategy remained import substitution although the government through its 1974 Basic Industries Strategy (BIS) attempted a much more vigorous approach. BIS was subsequently curtailed as the 1973 oil shock began to reverberate in the economy.

In February 1977, the ruling party on the mainland—the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)—and the ruling party on the Islands—the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP)—merged to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The occasion of the formation of the new party coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Arusha

[28] Dean E. McHenry, Jr. Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1979) p. 116

Declaration. President Nyerere used the occasion to assess the "socialist" status of Tanzania and progress towards economic self-reliance. President Nyerere was candid in his admission that he had underestimated the obstacles, time, effort, and commitment required to achieve both objectives. He stated thus:

> Ten years after the Arusha Declaration Tanzania is certainly neither socialist, nor self-reliant. The nature of exploitation has changed, but it has not been altogether eliminated. There are still great inequalities between citizens. Our democracy is imperfect. A life of poverty is still the experience of our citizens.[29]

Nyerere proceeded to note that it was obvious that Tanzania had not reached its goal in all the stated objectives, but that fact alone was neither surprising, nor alarming. He observed that as of 1977, no country in the world was yet fully socialist, although many had committed themselves to this philosophy decades before Tanzania even became independent. Yet, by 1979, Tanzania was facing the worst economic crisis of its independence period. The immediate trigger was again, an external factor—the 1978/79 war with Uganda; and the breakup of the East African community in 1977. Bigsten and Danielson summarize the situation as follows:

> "The 'Crisis' period began in 1979 with a major increase in the fiscal deficit associated with the war in Uganda. During this period, the control regime was tightened even more as the government sought to finance the increased spending and to maintain the import—intensive BIS in the face of declining export proceeds. External arrears developed rapidly, and after the end of the Uganda war foreign inflows fell dramatically as the government clashed with the donors over macroeconomic policy."[30]

President Nyerere's disagreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over macroeconomic policy in Tanzania is legendary for its acrimonious nature. As is well known, the IMF's standard prescription for all economies caught in a crisis consists of three essential elements: fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization. These were the pillars of "Washington Consensus" advice throughout the 1980s and 1990s.[31] In the specific case of Tanzania, the IMF insisted on a "standard" SAP package consisting of seven main points:

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[29] Julius Nyerere "The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After" in Andrew Coulson ed. African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979) p. 43.
[30] Arne Bigsten and Anders Danielson, Tanzania…p 17
[31] Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002) p. 53

1. 66-75 percent devaluation;
2. 35-40 percent nominal interest rates;
3. a freeze in nominal wages or salaries;
4. dismantling of price controls;
5. reductions in real government recurrent and capital expenditures;
6. domestic credit limits resulting in reductions in productive sector inventories already at levels inconsistent with significant output expansion; and
7. 50-70 percent increase in export crop prices and 25 percent increase in prices paid to staple food growers.[32]

Nyerere saw these conditionalities as an affront to the principles of equity, self-reliance and independent policy-making by sovereign states. The first serious dialogue between Tanzania and the IMF in 1978-79 resulted in a tentative agreement which included the key elements of IMF conditionalities including a 15 percent devaluation, the liberalization of agricultural marketing, liberalization of the commercial banking system, and the streamlining of the government bureaucracy. President Nyerere vetoed the agreement, noting that the adoption of such policies were tantamount to surrendering Tanzania's sovereignty, and going counter to the principles of the Arusha Declaration on equality.

The response by the Tanzanian government was instead to institute a milder form of economic reform, which would not send serious shock waves in an already fragile economy. This "home grown" initiative was known as the "National Economic Survival Programme" and it was introduced in fiscal year 1981-82. These measures did not meet the approval of the IMF because the IMF considered them to be hopelessly inadequate in dealing with the serious economic distortions that had been engendered by government policy over a period of two decades. A second initiative the following year, known as the "Structural Adjustment Programme," was more robust, but still did not satisfy IMF criteria. The IMF was still concerned about what it saw as large government deficits, exchange rate overvaluation, state dominance in agricultural marketing, and other areas of government spending including in the health and education sectors.[33] As the disagreement with the IMF continued, foreign donors, including the previously generous Scandinavians began to express serious misgivings on Tanzania's economic policy. The international economic noose was tightening on Tanzania. When it became obvious that the country's options had virtually disappeared, and the only remaining one was the IMF way, the political landscape was shaken by the retirement of Julius Nyerere in November, 1985. Nyerere was succeeded by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who had served as his Vice-President since 1982.

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[32] Reginald H. Green, "Political-Economic Adjustment in IMF Conditionality: Tanzania 1971-81" in John Williamson, ed. IMF Conditionality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983)
[33] Horace Campbell and Howard Stein, eds. The IMF and Tanzania (Harare: SAPES, 1991)

C. Economic Reforms Since 1986

The ascendancy of Ali Hassan Mwinyi to the presidency was marked by a quick response to IMF proposals which had been tabled a few years earlier. Indeed within a few months, the government essentially accepted the earlier IMF package which had caused so much friction with the previous President. As Bigsten and Danielson note:

> "The 'Reform' period began in 1986 with a maxi-devaluation and the initiation of a standby agreement with the IMF and a structural adjustment programme with the World Bank. The "Economic Recovery Programme" 1986-89 (ERP) presented that year included a broad range of policies aimed at liberalizing internal and external trade, unifying the exchange rate, reviving exports, stimulating domestic savings, and restoring fiscal sustainability."[34]

Unleashing market forces in the economy has had its detractors, both within the government and in civil society circles. As can be expected, those in the ruling party who had been part of the Arusha Declaration saw the adoption of these reforms as a fundamental betrayal of the "socialism and self reliance" principles enunciated in 1967. The arguments put forth by this group to a large extent mirrored the position taken by Julius Nyerere when the initial IMF proposals were presented to him. Indeed, the whole question of IMF conditionalities was reduced to a political question as reflected in Nyerere's speech at the Royal Commonwealth Society in London in March, 1985.

> "There is one International Agency…which is now increasingly being used to back up anti-internationalist actions. The IMF was established to bring stability to world trade, and to encourage its expansion. Its decisionmaking is virtually controlled by five major industrialized countries; for some purposes the USA alone can at least veto a decision by all other members. The IMF has virtually ceased to concern itself with the economic problems of the Rich Countries for which it was originally conceived. *It has become largely an instrument for economic and ideological control of poor countries by the rich ones"* (emphasis added).[35]

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[34] Bigsten and Danielson, Tanzania…p. 19

[35] Julius K. Nyerere. "Speech at the Royal Commonwealth Society" London, March 20, 1985. (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Tanzania, 1985)

Fundamentally, the reasons for the adoption of the Arusha Declaration had not changed. The majority of Tanzanians were still extremely poor; social and economic inequalities were still rampant; the government still needed to build schools and fund the education of its students from primary to University; the government also needed to build more clinics in response to the health needs of the population. Given the high poverty levels in the country, "cost recovery" an IMF euphemism for "paying for services rendered" meant that poor parents could no longer send their children to school, resulting in increased levels of illiteracy; it also meant that when poor people fell sick, they would not seek medical attention because they could not afford doctors' fees and money for medication, resulting in a growing phenomenon of a less healthy nation, and so on. The outbreak of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the mid 1980s did not help matters, as the government scrambled to address the issue, again with very limited resources. Nonetheless, the detractors lost the battle as the government proceeded full speed in implementing the IMF conditionalities.

The record of economic performance in Tanzania in the reform period is a mixed bag. While the move to bring the economy into financial stability has shown some success, overall, commentators see the economic performance as "modest" at best.[36] Table V is a summary of economic data during this period.

Table V: Economic Data 1986-1999

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Per Capita income growth %	3.4	2.7	1.3	-0.6	3.1	-0.3	-1.3	-4.1	-0.1	0.6	1.4	0.5	(2.1)	(2.5)
Population growth %	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1.	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.4
Urbanization %	18.2	18.9	19.5	20.2	20.8	22.0	23.2	24.5	25.7	26.9	28.1	29.3	30.5	31.7
Current account % of GDP			-7.0	-7.6	-13.8	-14.9	-15.5	-21.0	-14.1	-11.2	-6.4	-6.2	-9.2	-6.8
Inflation %	32.4	28.9	31.2	25.8	35.8	28.7	21.8	25.3	33.1	28.4	21.0	16.1	12.8	7.9
External Debt, million $	4902	5508	6009	5850	6451	6558	6678	6791	7235	7406	7362	2129	7633	7968

Source: Arne Bigsten and Anders Danielson, Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? P. 21 ?? World Bank, World Development Report

Overall, it can be noted that if one discounts the first three years of reform when the economy was recovering from the serious declines of the pre-reform period, the reform period reflects so far growth of less than 1% in per capita income. Real growth has only been registered in the post 1995 period when the increase in per capita income in percentage was 1.4, 0.5, 2.1 and 2.5 for 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively; the latter two figures being provisional. In sum, there is evidence of improvement at the macro level of the economy; but very moderate

[36] Bigsten and Danielson, p. 20

improvements. The reforms have set the country on a path that adheres to the standard conditionalities of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

D. Economic Reforms and Inequalities in Tanzania

The reform period in Tanzania has led to an overall confidence by donors of the seriousness by Tanzania to implement economic policies that will maintain stability. Commitment by the government to reform has sent signals to international investors that Tanzania is an attractive destination for their capital. As noted earlier, opposition to these reforms, particularly within the ruling party, was based on serious questioning of the consequences and effects of reform on the principles of equality contained in the Arusha Declaration. Indeed critics have suggested that since large segments of the government were not committed to reform, the level of domestic ownership of the program was initially low and the implementation was poor. Coupled with the adjustment requirements of the World Bank however, the government has slowly but surely embraced reform. Commenting on the issue of privatization, an important plank in the reform program, President Benjamin Mkapa noted in August 2003:

> "There are some people [in Tanzania] who are still debating on privatization, not realising that such a debate belonged to the past, since most of the formerly state-run firms had already been privatised, and the focus should now be on how to run the privatised firms efficiently for the benefits of all Tanzanians"[37]

Finally, the state's commitment to economic reform and privatization is demonstrated by the fact that there is a special ministry established to oversee the privatization process. The ministry is aided by a statutory body known as the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC).

The role of the PSRC is to ensure that the bidding process and tenders for privatization meet all the legal requirements set by the terms of its establishment. By 1998, the state had divested 40 percent of its public enterprises. The figures are much higher for the period ending June 2003, confirming and prompting the statement by President Mkapa on the subject.

As can be expected in a condition where state run institutions provided considerably large segment of formal employment, any kind of reform dealing with the reduction of the size of government would have serious consequences for individuals employed by government. Downsizing of

[37] Daily News, Dar es Salaam August 12, 2003 p. 3

the public sector and the selling of loss-making public enterprises led to the loss of jobs and privileges in the government and the parastatals. The fear of losing jobs had contributed to the lack of commitment to reform by a large number of government officials.

If the deliberate action of government officials is discounted, we can nonetheless examine the apparent effect of the reforms on the overall welfare of the population in various sectors of the economy. Studies by a team of researchers at the Dar es Salaam based Economic and Social Research Foundation[38] began to indicate as early as 1998 that income distribution (inequality) has worsened in the reform years. The big question here is whether there is a direct correlation between reform implementation and inequality. Bigsten and Danielson in the earlier quoted study are tentative about this conclusion, but they nonetheless, suggest that income disparities have increased markedly in the reform era. They state:

> "There are some indications that income distribution has worsened during the last few years, although comparisons of changes over time are very uncertain. However, combining that with the low levels of per capita income growth, it is possible that the extent of poverty has increased in spite of positive per capita income growth. It is estimated that about 50 percent of the population live in poverty, most of them in the rural areas"[39]

Chaligha and his colleagues report that the privatization process has actually resulted in 80,000 workers being added to the roster of the jobless since 1992.[40] These figures confirm the fears that many anti-reformers had with regard to job security.

I would however point to the authoritative 2000/2001 Household Budget Survey as evidence of increasing economic problems in the country and thereby resulting in increasing inequality.[41] The survey which measured change from 1991/92-2001/02 had the following findings:

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[38] D. Mutalemwa, et. al. "Managing the Transition from Aid Dependence: The Case of Tanzania" Paper presented at the AERC/ODC Aid Dependence Workshop, Nairobi, December 1998.
[39] Bigsten and Danielson, p. 22
[40] Amon Chaligha, et. al., Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' Views of Political and Economic Reform Afrobarometer Paper No. 18 (Cape Town: IDASA 2002)
[41] National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania, Household Budget Survey 2000/2001 (Dar es Salaam: NBS, 2002)

(i) Household Demographic Composition:

- There has been a large rise in the proportion of households headed by a woman—from 18 percent in 1991/92 to 23 percent in 2000/01. Urban areas other than Dar es Salaam have the highest proportion of such households
- There has been a fall in household size—from an average 5.7 to 4.9 people—and a small rise in the proportion headed by the over 65s.

Household facilities and consumer goods

- Overall, 10 percent of Tanzania households are connected to the electricity grid. Coverage is much greater in urban areas—59 percent of households in Dar es Salaam and 30 percent in other urban areas. In rural areas, only two (2) percent of households are connected. Over the 1990s, coverage of the grid increased in urban areas but showed little change in rural areas.
- Average distance to a number of important services fell over the 1990s. Such services include markets, shops, and public transport, although distance to primary court and primary cooperative society increased. In rural areas, there are long average distances to some important facilities. Rural households are on average 37 kilometers from a bank and 18 kilometers from a police post.

(ii) Productive activities and productive assets

- Although most Tanzanians still depend on agriculture, households have diversified their economic activities. Some 70 percent are now headed by an individual who works in agriculture or fishing, compared with 75 percent in 1991/92. Sixty three percent gave either as their main activity in 2000/01 compared with 73 percent in 1991/92.
- There has been a big drop in government and parastatal employment—from 5.2 to 2.5 percent of adults. The fall is biggest in Dar es Salaam, where such employment is down from 21 to seven percent of adults. There is a rise in private sector employment and in self-employment, which are now the main activities of 40 percent of adults in Dar es Salaam, and 31 percent in other urban areas.

(iii) Income poverty and inequality

- The rise in real expenditure was combined with a small increase in inequality, with the Gini coefficient up from 0.34 to 0.35. The richest 20 percent of households now account for 44 percent of household spending, compared with 43 percent in 1991/92. The biggest rise in inequality was in urban areas, particularly Dar es Salaam.
- Poverty lines were developed as part of the analysis. The price of a minimum food basket necessary to provide 2,200 calories per day was calculated, based on the consumption pattern of the poorest 50 percent of the population. A higher, 'basic needs' poverty line was also set to allow for non-food consumption. This was done for both 2000/01 and 1991/92, so that trends in income poverty could be assessed.
- There was a small fall in income poverty of about three percentage over the decade. Some 36 percent of Tanzanians now fall below the basic needs poverty line and 19 percent below the food poverty line, compared with 39 and 22 per

cent in 1991/92. However, this decline is not large enough to be statistically significant.

- Rural areas have the highest poverty levels, with 39 percent of the population below the basic needs poverty line compared with 18 percent in Dar es Salaam and 26 percent in other urban areas. Over the decade, poverty declined most in Dar es Salaam. Poverty remains overwhelmingly rural, with 87 percent of the poor living in rural areas.
- Absolute numbers in poverty increased over the 1990s because of population growth. Using national population projections, there are now 11.4 million Tanzanians below the basic needs poverty line compared with 9.5 million in 1991/92.
- Regional comparison of income poverty levels should be undertaken with caution. However, looking at both income poverty and share of food, four regions are consistently identified as poorer than average: Lindi, Mara, Singida and Shinyanga. Dar es Salaam and Mbeya have lower levels of poverty than average.

Understandably, figures that indicate increasing levels of poverty and inequality are bound to create controversy. On the one hand, the government has sought to indicate that while economic problems persist, there has been a general improvement in the overall health of the economy. On the other hand, critics still point to what they see as little improvement in the poverty levels. Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba is such one critic. Lipumba's criticism may have been ignored were he not an important personality in Tanzanian politics. Besides his academic credentials as a former Professor of Economics at the University of Dar es Salaam, he is also leader of the opposition party Civic United Front/Chama Cha Wananchi in Tanzania. In a recent interview he stated:

> "[Recently, I have been] reviewing and rethinking development policy in Tanzania. I started by reviewing the levels of poverty…The Household Budget Survey 2000/2001 has reported that the people living below the poverty line decreased from 39 percent in 1991 to 36 percent in 2000. These estimates have been derived by using an extremely austere poverty line. An adult spending Shs 330 (33 US cents) per day in Dar es Salaam is considered to be non-poor. I have re-estimated the incidence of poverty using an internationally accepted poverty line of spending one purchasing power parity dollar. My estimates indicate that poverty has increased from 48.5 percent in 1991 to 75 percent in 2000. The main cause for the increase in poverty is that growth has been modest, an average of 4.2 percent

> per year during 1995-2000, and income distribution has worsened"[42]

Table VI below summarizes the trend in poverty levels in Tanzania which reflect the findings of the Household Budget Survey and are captured by an official report of the government of Tanzania:

Table VI: The Incidence and Depth of Poverty, 1991/92 and 2000

	Dar es Salaam		Other Urban Areas		Rural Areas		Mainland Tanzania	
	1991/92	**2000**	**1991/2**	**2000**	**1991/92**	**2000**	**1991/2**	**2000**
Households living in Poverty	**(In percent)**							
Below Food Poverty Line	14	8	15	13	23	20	22	19
Below Basic Needs Poverty Line	28	18	29	26	41	39	39	36
Percent of the Poor								
Food Poverty	3.4	2.3	8.7	9.7	87.8	87.7	100.0	100.0
Basic Needs	3.9	2.9	9.4	10.0	86.7	87.2	100.0	100.0
Addendum								
Gini Coefficients	**0.30**	**0.36**	**0.35**	**0.36**	**0.33**	**0.33**	**0.34**	**0.35**
Expenditure of Poorest Qunitile (%)	7.8	6.7	7.1	6.7	7.2	7.1	7.0	6.9
Expenditure of Richest Quintile (%)	43.3	48.4	45.3	44.5	41.6	42.2	43.0	44.2

Source: VPO, 2002. Poverty and Human Development Report—2002; pg. 68, table 16.

Reviewing this data, Professor Fidelis Mtatifikolo of the university of Dar es Salaam concludes:

> "A brief comparison of data of the early 1990s and the early 2000s shows only a slight decline in income poverty of the period, and significant variations between rural and urban, and within urban areas. An overriding verdict relevant here is that the poverty burden continues to weigh heavily on those in the rural areas. Further evidence points to increased inequality over the period, and more significantly so in the areas where income poverty declined significantly."[43]

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[42] Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba "Politics is too important to be left to professional politics" Interview in News from the Nordic Africa Institute 2/2003 p.12

[43] Fidelis P. Mtatifikolo, "Governance in Tanzania: The Case of Economic Management" Paper presented at the 5th Annual Workshop, OSSREA Tanzania Chapter, August 14, 2003 p 6.

Further Evidence of Inequality: Education and Health in Tanzania

The unfortunate story of declining access by the population to both education and health services in Tanzania was sadly, but eloquently captured in a recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD) report. The report begins by noting that one of the pillars of Tanzanian government policy at the time of the Arusha Declaration was to bring about rapid end to poverty by providing universal education and health services, particularly in the rural areas where the overwhelming majority of the population lived. In the initial years of Arusha (1970s and 1980s), considerable progress was made: indeed the government achieved virtually universal primary school enrolment in a few years. But the project was doomed by the economic crisis of later years (where per capita income fell by at least one-quarter). The government had few means to run schools or health care centers. For good measure, Tanzania is now classified among the last in Africa in terms of per capita health and education spending.[44]

The consequences of reduced spending in these sectors, coupled with the emergence of HIV/AIDS as a serious concern, have been quite negative on Tanzania's education and health profile. The changes in the health sector have to also confront the fact that at least 1 million children have been orphaned by AIDS. Life expectancy in Tanzania has declined from 52 years (1981) to 47.9 (1997). The adult literacy rate has also dropped from a high of 79 percent in 1980 to 71.6 percent in 1997. Table VII summarizes other important data in this regard.

HDI Rank in 1999 (156)	Years	
Life Expectancy at birth (years)	1970 1981 1997	45.3 52.0 47.9
Infant Mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	1970 1980 1997	129 101 92
Population without access to safe water (%)	1995-80 1990-97	39 34
Underweight Children under age 5 (%)	1975 1990-97	25 27
Adult Literacy rate (%)	1970 1980 1997	37.1 79.0 71.6
Gross enrolment ratio for all levels (% age 6-23)	1980 1997	44 33

Table VII: Tanzania: Human Development Indicators

Adapted and adjusted from: Christian Morrisson, ed. Education and Health Expenditure and Poverty Reduction in East Africa: Madagascar and Tanzania (Paris: OECD) p. 118

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[44] Christian Morrison, ed. Education and Health Expenditure and Poverty Reduction in East Africa: Madagascar and Tanzania (Paris: OECD 2002) p. 9

The implications of the emerging data for the overall development of the country are quite negative, particularly as the further implications of globalization become essential aspects of national planning. First, the decline in literacy levels suggests that the big gap in education between the developed countries and Tanzania is increasing. Information technology, the recent engine for globalization requires a highly technically competent workforce. For Tanzania to be part of the globalization equation, the country must change the skill profile of its work force. At this juncture, this seems a Herculean task given the objective realities. Tables VIII and IX summarize the figures on literacy in the labor force. They are not encouraging.

Table VIII: Literacy Rate of the Labor Force 1990/91 and 2000/2001

Sex and Literacy		1990/91			2000/2001		
		Total	Total Urban	Total Rural	Total	Total Urban	Total Rural
Males	Literate	38.5	47.7	35.9	36.6	43.3	35.0
	Illiterate	11.3	4.4	12.6	12.4	5.0	14.2
	Total	49.8	52.1	48.5	49.0	48.3	49.2
Females	Literate	28.9	27.4	28.0	32.5	43.2	30.0
	Illiterate	21.3	10.1	23.4	18.5	8.5	20.8
	Total	50.2	37.5	51.4	51.0	51.7	50.8
Total	Literate	67.4	84.5	63.9	69.2	86.6	65.0
	Illiterate	32.6	15.5	36.1	30.8	13.4	35.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Labour Force Survey 2000/01 (Dar es Salaam: NBS, 2002)

Table IX: Percentage Distribution of Economically Active Population by Sex, Education Level, Employment and Area (National Definition) 2000/01

Area	Education Level	Sex					
		Male			Female		
		Employed	Unemployed	Total	Employed	Unemployed	Total
Urban Total	Never attended	6.2	6.7	6.3	14.0	12.9	13.6
	Primary not complete	19.1	15.5	18.2	20.5	12.8	17.5
	Primary complete	53.9	61.9	55.9	51.4	64.0	56.2
	Secondary +	20.8	15.9	19.6	14.0	10.4	12.6
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Rural	Never attended	23.7	25.0	23.8	36.2	36.5	36.2
	Primary not complete	31.7	33.3	31.8	23.1	24.8	23.3
	Primary complete	41.3	39.5	41.1	39.0	36.0	38.8
	Secondary +	3.4	2.3	3.3	1.6	2.6	1.7
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Never attended	20.8	17.6	20.5	33.1	24.0	31.8

	Primary not complete	29.6	26.1	29.2	22.8	18.5	22.1
	Primary complete	43.3	48.5	43.9	40.8	50.8	42.2
	Secondary +	6.2	7.8	6.4	3.4	6.7	3.9
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: NBOS (2002b). National Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Labour Force Survey 2000/01 (Dar es Salaam: NBS, 2002)

III. **The Politics of Ethnicity and Inequality in the Post Nyerere Era**

Introduction

By most accounts, Nyerere's grand nationalist project of creating a nation of Tanzanians who viewed themselves as Tanzanians first and other identities second has been a resounding success, hence Colin Legum's statement that in a continent where the post-independence process of nation-building has produced many serious, and in some cases, disastrous conflicts, Tanzania stands as a model state.[45] As I noted earlier, Tanzania has a large number of ethnic groups (at least 120). Most of these groups have fluid boundaries. This fact may have made the task of creating a national identity a little bit easier than in other countries on the continent where ethnic group identities were sharper. Certainly, this was the case in Sudan and Nigeria. As I also noted before, the official non-identification on the basis of ethnicity on the national census has been in line with the grand nationalist project of Nyerere, the founding president of the country, who insisted on creating a nation of citizens who would only be identified as Tanzanians.

Thus, it would seem that to a great extent, Nyerere's grand nationalist project has succeeded, as evidenced among other things, the lack of explicitly ethnic data in official records; and the evolution of a political culture in Tanzania where it is incredibly "politically incorrect" to ask new or old acquaintances what ethnic group they belong to.

The nationalist project has further been aided by two factors: ethnic intermarriage and the development of Kiswahili as a national language. More than any other country on the continent, ethnic intermarriage is the norm in Tanzania, particularly in urban areas, and among the elite. If we consider that the elite do

[45] Colin Legum "The Nyerere Years" in Michael Hodd, ed. Tanzania After Nyerere (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988) p. 3-11

influence important perceptions about identities, the fact that one's psychology is not preoccupied with an ethnic identity essentially pushes that aspect of one's life to a remote background that is less consequential to one's identity. Children born of interethnic marriages have tended to speak only one local language: Kiswahili; with English as the other working language particularly in schools and in international communication. Thus, there is at least a whole generation of urban dwellers whose ethnic identity is only nominal, and can barely understand or speak the language of either parent. This also applies even to parents who are from the same ethnic group, if their children were born in urban areas. This transformation of Tanzania society seems to have been profound and enduring.

Data from recent surveys of Tanzanians bears this position in very clear terms. A survey by the reputable AFROBAROMETER concluded that despite its ethnic and religious diversity, the vast majority of Tanzanians see themselves in occupational rather than ethnic or religious terms. Afrobarometer specifically measured social identity by asking:

> Besides being Tanzanian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?" …Three quarters (76 percent) defined their social identity in terms of the work they do on a daily basis, that is, their occupation. Only 3 percent identified themselves in terms of some ethnic group (for example, by language or by tribe) and another 5 percent gave a religious answer. One in ten (9 percent) think of themselves primarily in gender terms and most of these people are women.[46]

The specificity of the Tanzania case therefore requires a re-examination of the ethnically fragmented category for a comparative study of ethnic structure, such as the present one. Nonetheless its usefulness as a case study would be to demonstrate anomalies that are sometimes embodied in generalizations about ethnicity and its impact on public life in a variety of cases globally, and in Africa specifically. This would be the case, for example, in comparing Tanzania to Kenya, its neighbor to the north. Indeed in noting the specificity of the Tanzanian case, Afrobarometer concludes that:

> In contrast to several other African societies, Tanzanians seem to lack ethnic consciousness. Or like party identification, ethnic identity is a secondary association. Or, perhaps people will not readily reveal primordial inclinations to a survey interviewer in a country where so much government effort has been devoted to discouraging sub-

[46] Amon Chaligha, et. al. Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' Views of Political and Economic Reform, Afrobarometer Paper No. 18 (Cape Town: IDASA, 2002) p. 10

> nationalism. By contrast, anywhere from one-half to one-thirds of the people in Nigeria (48 percent), Namibia (46 percent), Mali (40 percent) and Zimbabwe (36 percent) think of themselves first and foremost, in ethnic (i.e. tribal or linguistic) terms.[47]

This is an important point that requires serious consideration in any analysis of comparative ethnicity. It is a reflection of some successes on the African continent of aspects of the nationalist project. One of the conclusions that can be made from the lack of ethnic consciousness in Tanzania is that political stability in the country since independence can largely be attributed to this, even though Tanzania remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In some countries, poverty and inequality have been used as ethnic mobilizing factors leading to sharp political conflict.

Multipartyism and the politics of transition

The study by Chaligha and his colleagues thus confirms the standard narrative on the question of nationalism and ethnicity in Tanzania. The analytical question however, is whether the reality of economic problems since the early 1990s has had an effect on how Tanzanian's perceive themselves on the question of ethnicity. On the surface, based on the credible and authoritative report in the AFROBAROMETER, it would seem that if anything, there is a stronger feeling of nationalism now, than before. One plausible interpretation for the continued sense of nationalism even under economic decline is that the economic downturn has affected all Tanzanians equally. There is no evidence to suggest that the government, based on ethnic considerations, has favored one region over others. Here is a case of "equal opportunity poverty."

Arguably, the one-party state, a hallmark of the Nyerere era, was a conducive instrument for sustaining the nationalist project. However, I have noted elsewhere that some of the positive aspects of the nationalist project were used by the party leadership to foster authoritarian tendencies in the political structure of governance in Tanzania. The forced villagization in some parts of the country in the mid 1970s, the "corporatization" of party organs such as the Youth League, the Womens league, etc; and the seeming intolerance for political dissent were some examples of the authoritarian tendencies of the Nyerere era.[48] But it would be a mistake to view the "soft" authoritarianism of Tanzania as equivalent to the "hard" authoritarianism found in other parts of the continent during the same

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[47] Chaligha, et.al. Uncritical Citizens…p.10

[48] Julius E. Nyang'oro "Sate Corporatism in Tanzania" in Julius E. Nyang'oro and Timothy M. Shaw eds. Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1989)

period. The 1992 introduction of multi-partyism in Tanzania ushered in a new era, which changed the practice of politics in the country in a substantive way.

The interesting aspect of the transition to multipartyism in Tanzania was that unlike in most African countries, the decision to go multi-party was a CCM orchestrated move led by none other than Julius Nyerere who still occupied the influential position of CCM Chairman after his retirement as president of the country. In August 1990 in his farewell speech to the CCM National Executive Committee (NEC), which had just elected President Ali Hassan Mwinyi as its chairman to succeed the retiring ex-president, Nyerere argued that it was time to seriously think about transition to, and adopting a multi-party political system. He pointed to rapid and sometimes-violent political changes taking place across the continent, and cautioned that the best way to introduce a new system would be through a gradual process. Gradualism, he argued, would allow the country to pay careful attention to the details of the transition, thus allowing for minimal disruption and political conflict. He noted that further delay in consideration of the new proposal would engender chaos, as had already happened in other countries, including neighboring Kenya and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).[49]

CCM heeded Nyerere's advice. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi appointed a commission in March 1991 headed by Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to assess the desirability and mechanics of change from one-partyism to multipartyism. The commission's members traveled across Tanzania and several foreign countries—including Zimbabwe, Zaire, Britain, and the United States—interviewing Tanzanians and foreigners alike on relevant issues connected with political transformation. It is interesting to note that although the overwhelming majority of Tanzanians interviewed favored the continuation of a single-party system, the Nyalali Commission actually recommended the adoption of the multi-party system. Table X is a summary of views as compiled by the Nyalali Commission.

Table X Responses to the Question: Should There Be a Continuation of the One-Party System?

[49] Daily News, Dar es Salaam August 15, 1990 p. 1

	Yes	No	No Response	No Opinion	Total
Tanzania Total	28,918.0	7,817.0	244.0	220.0	36, 299
% of Total	77.2	21.5	0.6	0.6	100
Tanzania Mainland Total	25, 725.0	6,118.0	238.0	200.0	32, 275
% of Total	79.7	19.0	0.7	0.6	100
Tanzania Zanzibar Total	2,074.0	1,582.0	5.0	18.0	3,679
% of Total	56.4	43.0	0.1	0.5	100
Embassies Abroad Total	221.0	117.0	1.0	2.0	341
% of Total	64.8	34.3	0.3	0.6	100

Source: **Nyalali Commission Report, vol. I (1992), 60.**

On the basis of the Nyalali Commission Report, which was presented to the president on 17 February 1992, two days later, an extraordinary CCM National Conference unanimously passed a resolution formally opening the door to multiple political parties and repealed a clause in the country's Constitution that had given CCM monopoly over political activity in the country.[50] The CCM Conference, however gave the following guidelines for the introduction of new parties:

1. New parties must be panterritorial with members on both sides of the union and should not be based on religion, regionalism, "tribe," race or creed.

2. They should be "genuine" parties formed by Tanzanians themselves and committed to protecting national gains.

3. Parties should respect and defend the principles of equality, justice, and human rights for all people.

4. Parties should accept and respect the principle of inviolability of the national borders of the United Republic of Tanzania and the territorial integrity of Zanzibar and all its islands.

[50] Daily News, Dar es Salaam, February 20, 1992

5. Parties must advance their causes through the force of argument rather than argument of force.[51]

Again, we see in these guidelines, a concerted effort by the government to further the nationalist project of Julius Nyerere. The first two guidelines are clearly directed at the racial and ethnic question, and emphasize the Tanzania national spirit. The guidelines have subsequently been codified into law. Thus by law, no ethnic or religious parties may be registered. Beyond these legal requirements, or prohibitions, the Handbook of Tanzanian Electoral Laws and Regulations in its section of code of ethics specifically stipulates that during election campaigns:

> "Political parties, candidates or their followers are not allowed to conduct campaigns on the basis of tribalism, religion, race or gender. Likewise, they are not allowed to conduct such campaigns in tribal languages. The language to be used is either Kiswahili or English."[52]

Further,

> "Political parties, candidates and followers should refrain from all acts that can incite animosity and cause disharmony among people on the basis of political ideology, tribalism, religion, race or gender"[53]

In general, Tanzanians seem to have taken to multi-partyism without much fanfare. By the end of 1992, twelve parties besides CCM had been granted temporary registration, with even more parties seeking to be registered. By the middle of October 1992, the number of temporarily registered parties was over 20.[54] On October 29, 1995, the first genuinely multi-party elections since independence were held in Tanzania, ending 34 years of one-party rule. The overwhelming winner of the elections was CCM, which gained 78.1 percent of the total seats in parliament. Other parties gaining seats were Civic United Front (CUF), 10.2 percent; NCCR-Mageuzi, 6.9 percent; United Democratic Party, 1.5 percent; CHADEMA, 1.1 percent; and others, 2.2 percent. The seats won by the combined opposition were only 21.9 percent, indicating the overwhelming dominance of CCM in Tanzania's electoral politics.[55] Table XI is an updated list of fully registered parties as of the 2000 general elections.

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[51] Tanzania Embassy Newsletter, (Washington DC) March 1992 p. 1
[52] National Electoral Commission, A Handbook of Tanzania Electoral Laws and Regulations 2000 (Dar es Salaam: NEC, 2000) p.108
[53] National Electoral Commission, A Handbook of Tanzania Electoral Laws and Regulations 2000 (Dar es Salaam: NEC, 2000) p.109
[54] Daily News, Dar es Salaam, various issues October 1992.
[55] Pamela R. Reeves and Keith Klein, Republic in Transition: 1995 Elections in Tanzania and Zanzibar: Report of the International Foundation for Election Systems [IFES] International

Table XI. List of Fully Registered Parties as of 2000 General Elections (with Date of Registration)

1. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	1 July 1992
2. Civic United Front (CUF)	21 January 1993
3. Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)	21 January 1993
4. The Union of Multi party Democracy in Tanzania	21 January 1993
5. National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi)	21 January 1993
6. National League for Democracy (NLD)	21 January 1993
7. Tanzania People's Party (TPP)	4 February 1993
8. United People's Democratic Party (UPDP)	4 February 1993
9. National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)	8 February 1993
10. Popular National Party (PONA)	5 April 1993
11. Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA)	5 April 1993
12. Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	24 November 1993
13. The United Democratic Party (UDP)	24 March 1994

Source: National Electoral Commission, A Handbook of Tanzanian Electoral Laws and Regulations 2000 (Dar es Salaam: NEC) pp 141-142.

Of the 13 parties, only a handful, led by CCM, had any significant chances of competing nationally. In 2000, only four parties fielded presidential candidates:

Observer Delegation (Washington DC: IFES, 1995); see also Lisa Richey and Stefano Ponte, "The 1995 Tanzania Union Elections" Review of African Political Economy 23 March, 1996 p. 67

CCM, NCCR-M, UDP and CUF. This trend was also reflected in the (in)ability of most parties to field parliamentary candidates across the country as demonstrated in Table XII.

Table XII: Number of Parliamentary Candidates by Political Party (1995/2000)

	1995		2000	
	Number	%	Number	%
CCM	232	100	231	100
CVF	171	73.7	138	59.7
TLP	55	23.7	112	48.5
NCCR-M	191	82.3	93	40.3
CHADEMA	153	65.9	66	28.6
UDP	119	51.3	66	28.6
TADEA	144	62.1	42	18.2
PONA	34	14.7	37	16.0
UPDP	34	14.7	32	13.9
UMD	47	20.3	24	10.4
TPP	36	15.5	13	5.6
NCD	44	18.9	6	2.6
NRA	78	33.3	2	0.9
TOTAL	1338	100.0	862	100

Source: Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi: 2001

Note: The number of constituencies was reduced by 1 from 1995-2000.

We can surmise from the above statistics that CCM would have tremendous advantage over the competition, and therefore enhance its chance of being a winner in the elections. This fact is reflected in the current (post 2000) composition of parliament:

Table XIII: Number of Seats in Union Parliament (1995-2000)

Party	1995	2000
CCM	186	202
CUF	24	17
CHADEMA	3	4
TLP	--	4
UDP	3	3
NCCR-M	16	1

***Source*: Tume ya Taifa Uchaguzi (2001)**
Taarifa ya Tume ya Uchaguzi, Jedwali No 7 UK. 74

Table XIII clearly demonstrates the overwhelming electoral strength of CCM, the party that has in effect ruled the country since independence. There is a clear indication that between the two most recent elections of the multi-party era, CCM actually gained more seats thus consolidating its already preeminent position.

Politics of Inequality in the multi-party era

While the standard narrative of ethnic harmony and racial tolerance still holds in much of the political discourse in Tanzania, the liberalism ushered in through multi-partyism has also engendered a strand of intolerance. Specifically, Chris Maina Peter argues that one of the leading opposition figures, the Reverend Christopher Mtikila has attempted to exploit economic inequality in Tanzania by blaming Tanzanians of Asian origin (Indian and Arab) as the principal exploiters of indigenous (black) Tanzanians. Peter argues that these sentiments are coming up because of the ongoing political changes in the country relating to the essential abandoning of the Nyerere era policies of socialism and self-reliance:

> For years there has been serious sentiments in the country about the pivotal position occupied by the

> Tanzanians of the Asian origin in the economy. However, the then policy of socialism and self-reliance seemed to promise a journey to total equality and that helped to hold the explosion. This is because this policy provided a dream of a better future. Following the Zanzibar Resolution of 1991 which effectively buried the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the blue print of Ujamaa, there was nothing remaining to ideologically hold the people of Tanzania together. Therefore, any attack on the Tanzanians of Asian origin, however incorrect it may be, has always found support with the poor majority of the people.[56]

It may be tempting to dismiss Rev. Mtikila's accusations as coming from an erratic politician who has not had much impact on the Tanzania political scene, and who does not stand much of a chance to become president of the country. Nonetheless his views need to be understood in the context of another perception and reality of corruption in Tanzania in the post 1985 era. The defining incident of corruption in Tanzania during the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995) was the Loliondo scandal, commonly known as Loliondogate in Tanzania.

Loliondo is part of a game reserve on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, in Northern Tanzania. In circumstances that have never been fully explained by the government, foreign hunters and collectors of game were given a free hand to do whatever they desired in a wide track of land in Loliondo. According to reports, transport planes from the Arab world would land in the middle of the night at Kilimanjaro International Airport, bringing hunters, and also spiriting away valuable game which is a Tanzania national resource. People in Tanzania were genuinely upset about this, and the Reverend Mtikila exploited the situation to make provocative comments on matters of race. Chris Maina Peter quotes Mtikila in an interview the Reverend gave to a German television journalist:

> "You see God created Tanganyika to be the mother of the children called Tanganyikans. And she was given to us to take care of us…But the country is on sale: They are selling the land. What about Loliondo, the game parks, everything? They are selling everything and they say I am an instigator and what have you. They are sick. They are selling everything, all the diamonds are going. The elephants, we had 300,000 at independence. No one should point a finger at the British, because they left us with everything intact. Now we have

[56] Chris Maina Peter, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Insolences in Tanzania AAPS Occasional Paper 6, 2 (Pretoria: AAPS, 2002) p. 8

> got about 8,000 left from 300,000 elephants. Everything is finished and we know who is finishing it. It is these people who are coming for elephants not coming to our country because we are friends. No …"[57]

Mtikila reference to "Tanganyika" related to one of his pet projects of responding to some elements in Zanzibar, but particularly in Pemba, who have had an agenda of seceding from the Union. As far as Reverend Mtikila is concerned, those in Zanzibar who want to secede, are welcome to do so. In any event Zanzibar, according to him, has been getting a free ride on the Union, a view which to some extent, is shared by some mainlanders (Tanganyikans) including government officials and members of parliament.[58]

The essential point however, is that Reverend Mtikila's discourse is still nationalist, and fundamentally non-ethnic. It is still political taboo in Tanzania (let alone illegal) to mobilize or speak in ethnic terms in the broader realm of public policy. Tanzania is one of the few countries in Africa where a politician's luck of ethnic identity is actually an asset, especially if the politician aspires to be a national leader. Indeed, a sure way for a politician to make himself or herself unwelcome in the political arena is to pursue the ethnic route. Although the Reverend Mtikila has come fairly close in crossing that line, in terms of his reference to Asians, his rhetoric has always been in defense of "Walalahoi"—those who sleep tired and hungry. And no ethnic group in Tanzania has a monopoly of such people. In more recent times, the debate on development in the context of economic liberalization has taken the tone of "indigenization." The government of Tanzania is particularly sensitive to this debate because of the fact that most of the formerly state owned parastatals have been sold off to non-Tanzanians; and Tanzanians seem to be getting the short end of the stick when it comes to employment in new foreign owned companies which are operating in the country.

During 2002-2003, the debate on indigenization was led by a prominent CCM member, Iddi Simba. What is interesting about Iddi Simba and the difficulties he is causing CCM is that he is CCM royalty. He is a member of parliament for Ilala constituency in Dar es Salaam, and former minister for Commerce and Industries (1995-2000). Iddi Simba, one of the wealthier Tanzanians has defined the concept of indigenization as follows:

> "Indigenization is a process of involving actively African Tanzanians individually or as corporate bodies in all modern commercial enterprises. It is a

[57] Chris Maina Peter, Racism…p. 9

[58] See: Julius E. Nyang'oro "Civil Society, Democratization , and State Building in Kenya and Tanzania: in Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril Daddieh eds State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999) p. 188

> process which aims at the total mobilisation of African entrepreneurial, managerial and technical skills so that the ownership and control of the agricultural, manufacturing, trade and service enterprises will progressively reflect the people of this country."[59]

The indigenization debate—"uzawa" in Kiswahili—has acquired an urgent tone in recent years as the government has strived to "sell off" or privatize all parastatals. The issue of uzawa became so sensitive in 2003 that CCM brass apparently ordered the rank and file not to use the word in public discourses.[60]

The critical question is why has such debate become so important to the government, and to CCM, the ruling party? This may stem from the fact that associated with privatization, is the issue of corruption. Rightly or wrongly, there is a growing public perception that many government and CCM leaders are highly corrupt. While on occasion one would encounter corruption under the regime of Julius Nyerere, the level of corruption then was miniscule, and subject to public shame. In contrast, since 1985, corruption as a phenomenon has become widespread, and the government's lax attitude to corruption has fostered an "ethic" of corruption. Concerns about corruption in Tanzania in the mid 1990s prompted the government to appoint a commission to study the extent of corruption in the country. In December 1996, the Commission Report on the state of corruption in Tanzania was released. The Report is commonly known as the Warioba report, named after the Chairman of the Commission, Judge Joseph Warioba, a former Prime Minister and one of the most respected jurists in the country.[61] The Report was categorical on the state of corruption in Tanzania. Here are two statements from the report:

> "It has become evident that the greatest source of corruption in the country is not the poor economy and low salaries; although these two have played some part. The greatest source is the laxity of leadership in implementation of established norms. The absence of clear guidelines on accountability of leaders in their respective positions—be it in political leadership or senior administrative or management positions is part of that weakness"[62]

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[59] J.V. Mwapachu "Portrait of a Leading African Tanzanian Entrepreneur: Iddi Simba" Change, Dar es Salaam, January 1993, p. 9

[60] See: The Guardian, Dar es Salaam (various issues August 1-15, 2003)

[61] Joseph S. Warioba, et. al. Tanzania: Report on the State of Corruption in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Government of Tanzania, 1996)

[62] Joseph S. Warioba, Tanzania: Report on the State of Corruption Vol. 1, Ch. 3 para. 43

> "There is no doubt that corruption is rampant in all sectors of the economy, public services and politics in the country. There is evidence that even some officers of Government Organs vested with the responsibility of administration of justice namely the Department of National Security, the Police, the Judiciary and the Anti-Corruption Bureau are themselves immersed in corruption: instead of these organs being in the forefront of combating corruption, they have become part of the problem."[63]

For purposes of this project, the conclusion which I draw from the Warioba Report is that the combination of inequality emanating from the consequences of economic reform and privatization; and the increasing level of corruption, is making the governance of the public sector in Tanzania to be highly unsatisfactory. Corruption has further sullied the reputation of the country which previously stood as an example of a government in Africa which was totally committed to the welfare of its citizens as opposed to exploiting them through corruption. In a 2001 report, the African Development Bank listed 22 countries on the continent with the perception of their level of corruption; and also in comparison to other regions of the world. Tanzania ranked a poor 16 out of 22 countries.
Table XIV summarizes the perception on corruption in Africa relative to other regions.

Table XIV: Corruption Perception in Africa Compared to Other Regions (2000)

[63] op. cit. Vol 1, Ch. 2 para. 12

Country Rank	Country	2000 CPI Score	Surveys Used	Standard Deviation	High-Low Range
1	Botswana	6	4	1.6	4.3-8.2
2	Namibia	5.4	4	0.8	4.3-6.1
3	Tunisia	5.2	4	1.5	3.8-7.1
4	South Africa	5	10	0.9	3.8-6.6
5	Mauritius	4.7	5	0.8	3.9-5.6
6	Morocco	4.7	4	0.7	4.2-5.6
7	Malawi	4.1	4	0.4	3.8-4.8
8	Ghana	3.5	4	0.9	2.5-4.7
9	Senegal	3.5	3	0.8	2.8-4.3
10	Zambia	3.4	4	1.4	2.1-5.1
11	Ethiopia	3.2	3	0.8	2.5-3.9
12	Egypt	3.1	7	0.7	2.3-4.1
13	Burkina Faso	3	3	1	2.5-4.4
14	Zimbabwe	3	7	1.5	0.6-4.9
15	Cote-d'ivoire	2.7	4	0.8	2.1-3.6
16	Tanzania	2.5	4	0.6	2.1-3.5
17	Uganda	2.3	4	0.6	2.1-3.5
18	Mozambique	2.2	3	0.2	2.4-2.7
19	Kenya	2.1	4	0.3	2.1-2.7
20	Cameroon	2	4	0.6	1.6-3.0
21	Angola	1.7	3	0.4	1.6-2.5
22	Nigeria	1.2	4	0.6	0.6-2.1
	Average	**3.4**	**4.4**	**0.8**	**2.6-3.5**
Other Regions	Number of Countries		Average	**Standard Deviation**	**High-Low Range**
Eastern Europe	21	3.4	4.1	0.7	2.5-4.7
Latin America	11	3.9	3.8	0.5	3.0-5.3
Asia	12	4.5	3.8	0.5	2.8-5.8
Western Europe	18	7.8	4.2	0.7	6.3-8.9
North America	2	8.5	4.0	0.6	7.2-9.6

Source: Compiled by the Research Division from Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2000; Reproduced in African Development Report, 2001 Summary, Pg 18.

Notes: 2000 CPI Score: Relates to perception of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analytic and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). **Standard Deviation: Indicates** differences in the values of the sources: the greater the Standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a countries among the sources. **High-Low Range**: Provides the highest and lowest value of the sources.

The evidence then suggests that the government of Tanzania has done a poor job in governing the public sector, resulting in increased inequality among its citizens. But even more so, in managing Tanzania's competitiveness in the global economy. True to the general problems associated with public corruption, as outlined by the Africa development Bank, the basic problem with public corruption is primarily three fold:

(1) the massive economic losses for the government in terms of reduced income from taxes, revenues, and other fiscal charges; loss of income from natural resources; and losses through misappropriation of public assets; and
(2) substandard quality and quantity of physical and social services delivered by the public sector as a result of diversion or abuse of public resources through corrupt practices.

(3) Consequently increased costs of living for the citizenry as a result of misallocation of productive resources and market failure occasioned inefficient production delivery processes.[64]

The results of this poor governance have been devastating to the whole population of Tanzania. The dominance of CCM in parliament and the close relationship between the government, ruling party, and parliament have all conspired to make this a reality. There is a high level of complicity and protection of those considered "our own" in CCM government and parliament.

IV. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis suggests that the principal cleavages that have developed in Tanzania over the last two decades or so, have primarily been of a socio-economic nature, as opposed to either ethnic or religious. It is fair to conclude that this outcome is a direct result of policies pursued by the government since independence where the issues of ethnic and religious differences were strongly discouraged. But there is also a historical reason for the success of the government in this regard. Tanzania as a country was from the beginning, a country where the fluidity of ethnic relations allowed for a fairly benign sense of ethnic identity. In essence, ethnic identity over time became a matter of "convenient identity" and birthplace as opposed to a deeply entrenched identity which guided one's behavior in relation to fellow Tanzanians or attitude towards government. Even in Zanzibar where the potentially problematic ethno-political situation exists, Mohamed Ali Bakari concludes:

> Lack of common culture has never been a critical problem in Zanzibar, even during the colonial era. None of the main ethnic identities for at least half a century has claimed to possess a distinct culture. This applies to the three main ethnic groups, namely Shirazis, mainland Africans and Arabs. Zanzibar is one of the few multicultural nations in the underdeveloped regions that have been successful in crystallizing various diverse cultural communities into a single all encompassing culture—[Swahili].[65]

In the 1970s, academic scholarship and social analyses in Tanzania was dominated by class analysis.[66] Important studies of the time were partly driven by

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[64] Africa Development Bank, Africa Development Report 2001 (Abidjan: ADB, 2001)

[65] Mohamed Ali Bakari, The Democratisation Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2001) p. 86.

[66] See for example the work of scholars based at the University of Dar es Salaam in the period 1970-1980. Even though some of the work did not specifically deal with Tanzania, it nonetheless got inspiration from the Tanzania political context. This was particularly true of scholars from Uganda. These works included: Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975); Issa G. Shivji, ed. The State and the Working People in

the commitment to socialism by the political leadership of the country, led by President Julius Nyerere. In Tanzania, as noted in previous sections of this essay, ethnicity as an analytic variable in both political and academic discourse was shunned and dismissed. Instead, class categories were employed as the key explanatory variables in political analysis. Issa Shivji perhaps the best known Tanzanian scholar at the time, described the political situation in Tanzania as primarily where an emerging ruling class—which he identified as a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'—was busy attempting to occupy and control the state machinery as a response both to imperialism and acting on behalf of the oppressed classes in the country primarily workers and peasants. In describing this class he:

> "proposed to identify the ruling 'group' as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. Before the Arusha Declaration, this would consist mainly of those at the top levels of the state apparatus—ministers, high civil servants, high military and police officers, and such like. In so far as the state has not yet gone into the economy in a major way this group still, strictly speaking, constitutes a bureaucratic stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. It has not yet acquired an economic base, hence the major turning point in its development was the nationalizations of Arusha Declaration."[67]

Significantly, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of Tanzania, according to Shivji, had all the good intentions of shielding the country from "imperialist" exploitation, and was highly nationalist. He noted that this class saw its anti-imperialist role at two basic levels: fist at the level of anti-colonialism in the classic sense; and secondly, anti-colonialization as opposition to a particular imperialist country, in this case, Britain. Again, the thrust of the ideology of this class was the farthest one could get to an ethnic ideology. I would argue that this unique nationalist outlook has been the hallmark of Tanzanian politics since independence. The current debate on wazawa (indigenous people) still reflects this nationalist bent and promises to be the rallying ideology for those who decry the excessive control of the Tanzanian economy by foreigners. In a fundamental way, the current

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Tanzania (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1985); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972); Yash Tandon ed. Debate on Class, State and Imperialism (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1982); Henry Mapolu, ed. Workers and Management (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976); Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation: The Economies of the Transition to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); D. Wadada Nabudere, The Political Economy of Imperialism (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977); D. Wadada Nabudere, Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1980); Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Mahmood Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1983); Lionel Cliffe and Josh S. Saul eds Socialism in Tanzania 2 volumes (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House, 1973)

[67] Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania p. 64

debate reflects the concerns that Julius Nyerere had when he put forth the Arusha Declaration in 1967. In concluding the discussion on broad national policy, the document noted:

> "The Arusha Declaration talks of men (sic) and their beliefs. It talks of socialism and capitalism, of socialists and capitalists. It does not talk about racial groups or nationalities. On the contrary, it says that all those who stand for the interests of the workers and peasants, anywhere in the world, are our friends. This means that we must judge the character and ability of each individual, not put each person into a pre-arranged category of race or national origin and judge them accordingly."[68]

Arguably, one of the reasons many people in Tanzania feel that there is growing inequality in the country, is the simple fact that inequality is indeed increasing. The data from the 2000/02 Household Budget Survey confirm this. But the perception of foreign control makes matters worse, coupled with the increased levels of corruption as expressed in the Warioba report. Thus the defining political question on inequality is back to issues of class.

In the contemporary period, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' continue to be that group of people who occupy the reins of government and have access to the resources that the state controls. Under the economic regime of liberalization, the state resources which are important as an asset are in the hands of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, including the power to decide which tenders are to be accepted on bids for privatization. Further, the authority to grant licenses to operators of foreign businesses has given enormous power to members of the state bureaucracy who are in such positions, again leading to the growing perception of corruption, especially when most new businesses seem to be foreign owned. The bulk of the tourist industry—hotels, airlines, tour operators, etc—and most of the productive industries: breweries, cigarette making and mining; all seem to have a heavy dose of foreign ownership.

I would argue that Nyerere's nationalist project has held partly because poor Tanzanians still see themselves first as Tanzanians and therefore see their problem as a collective struggle against a corrupt state which is in collusion with foreign interests. In an ironic twist, some of Nyerere's policies which at some point had become very unpopular because of their restriction on individual entrepreneurship, are nostalgically viewed by those who see current state economic policies as callous and uncaring of the less advantaged. Cassettes of Nyerere's speeches have become hot selling items in Tanzania since his death in October 1999. As socio-economic inequality increases, regular citizens do not

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[68] Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 42

see any other institutions emerging to challenge the monopoly of political power by the CCM establishment. Parliament is one of the weakest institutions in the Tanzanian political system. In its present configuration, parliament can hardly challenge the authority of the government to undertake policy measures that may be harmful to the economic integrity of the country. Instead parliament is pretty much a rubber-stamping institution for government policy.

Indeed, I would argue that one of the fundamental reforms that need to take place in Tanzania is a constitutional reorganization that gives substantive power to parliament as a representative of community interests, and cuts off the symbiotic link between the executive branch and parliament. At the moment, the presidential parliamentary system in Tanzania provides that ministers in government must come from the ranks parliamentarians. Under such arrangement it is not clear constitutionally who is answerable to whom. Because of government continuity, it is clear that it has the historic advantage over parliament in terms of resources. For the common man or woman in the street, no clear distinction is made between serikali (government) and bunge (parliament). This confirms to many in the country that governance of the public sector in Tanzania leaves a lot to be desired.

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Appendix
Regions of Tanzania

Mainland	Zanzibar
Arusha	Unguja North
Coast/Pwani	Unguja South
Dar es Salaam	Urban West
Dodoma	Pemba North
Iringa	Pemba South
Kagera	
Kigoma	
Kilimanjaro	
Lindi	
Manyara	
Mara	
Mbeya	
Morogoro	
Mtwara	
Mwanza	
Mbeya	
Morogoro	
Mtwara	
Mwanza	
Rukwa	
Ruvuma	
Shinyanga	
Singida	
Tabora	
Tanga	

Appendix
Tanzania: Ethnic Groups

Mawia
Nyamwezi
_____
Zigua
Hadizapi
Kuria
Mbulu
Nyasa
Sonjo
Zinza
_____
Nata
Sizaki
Mbulu
Barbaig
Nata
Kara
Kiroba
Kwaya
Nyambwe
Maasai
Nyaturu

Arusha
Bahima
Haya
Kutu
Mbugwe
Nyidna
Suba
Hehe
Kwavi
Mabunga
Nyika
Subi
Baragugu
Holoholo
Kwaya
Mepa
Pangwa
Sukuma
_____
Ikizu
Kwere
Mpepo
Pare
Sambwa
Bena
Ikoma
Lambia

Meru
Pimbwe
Tatog
Bende
Iramba
Luguru
Mwera
Pogoro
Tangwe
Bondei
Iraqwi
Luo
Ndali
Rangi
Brungi
Isanzu
Machinga
Ndamba
Rufiji
Turu
Chagga
Jiji

Ndendeuli
Rundi
Vidunda
Digo
Jita
Makua
Ndengereko
Rungu
Vinza
Doe
Kaguru
Malila
Ngindo
Rungwa
Dorobo
Kahe
Mambwe
Ngoni
Safwa
Wanji
Fipa
Kerewe

Ngureme
Sagara
Wungu
Gogo
Kara
Matambe
Ngulu
Sangu
Yao
Gorowa
Kimbu
Matengo
Nyakyusa
Segeju
Ha
Kindiga
Matumbi
Nyamwanga
Shambala
Zaramo
Hadimu
Konongo
Nyiramba

Source: George Thomas Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World, Volume III, Facts on File (New York, 1992)