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Item Type	Preprint
Authors	Hassim, Shireen
Publisher	UNRISD
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Download date	2026-09-24 18:42:53
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/179066



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Gender, Welfare and the Developmental State in South Africa

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Revised draft
May 2005

Prepared for the UNRISD Project on Gender and Social Policy

DRAFT WORKING DOCUMENT

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Introduction

Mainstream welfare state literature identifies four welfare state regimes: liberal, social democratic, corporatist and state socialist. More recently, a fifth category has emerged: the developmental welfare state. As with research on Esping-Andersen's categorization of 'three worlds of welfare capitalism', early research on developmental social policy is revealing enormous variants within this category as well (Mkandawire, 2004). Feminist studies of developmental welfare are poorly developed, and thus far we have very few analyses of how gender is conceptualized. Yet, like other welfare state regimes, developmental states are regulatory in nature: they ascribe meaning to the social category of gender and create a normative framework within which needs are adjudicated and considered to be worthy of attention. While welfare states in the north traditionally re-defined the relationship between work and family, developmental states operating in the context of informalisation of labour markets re-draw the boundaries between responsibilities of state, community, families and individuals. Analyses of developmental states have focused on the types of need that ought to be prioritized, and the extent to which these needs could be satisfied within a range of fiscal and global constraints. However, there has been less attention to the ways in which developmental states *interpret* needs and particularly to the gendered nature of needs interpretation.

South Africa has explicitly adopted the approach of developmental welfare – indeed it is regularly described as 'probably the developing world's largest and most generous welfare state'.² Unusually, South African policy frameworks are underpinned by very strong formal commitments to gender equality. It thus provides a useful case study for the examination of the gendered nature of developmental welfare. In this chapter, I consider the impact of processes of democratization on the structure and ideology of welfare institutions in the post-apartheid. I analyse the extent to which these processes have expanded women's citizenship entitlements. Has democratization shifted the nature of state regulation and conceptions of need and entitlement? How are interpretations of need concretely manifested in policies and programmes? I argue that while women have made enormous strides in gaining recognition for their particular political disadvantages, there has been slower translation of political rights into social rights. The welfare system remains constrained by narrow conceptions of the state

and by distrust of rights-based demands on state resources. These have impacted on the extent to which social inequalities of gender are eroded by the democratic state.

Social rights and gender equality have both been conceived as integral to citizenship in democratic South Africa. The Constitution imposes particular responsibilities on government to address socio-economic inequalities as part of a progressive realization of human rights and in ways that erode inequalities of gender in addition to inequalities of race.³ The constitutional obligations are enacted by the creation of an institutional framework (the national machinery for women⁴) to ensure the inclusion of gender equality concerns in policy formulation. For women, the emphasis on citizenship in the transition to democracy was significant in creating a framework for women to articulate claims on the state on the basis of their individual entitlements rather than on the basis of their status as mothers or tribal subjects. Since 1994, South Africa has consistently been among the highest performers in the world in terms of the numbers of women elected to political office.

This new framework created the expectation that the expansion of citizenship rights to include social rights and the increased participation of women in political decision-making would result in greater attention to gender inequalities. However, South Africa has performed significantly better in improving women's political position than it has in improving women's economic position in the ten years since the inception of democracy. On the Gender and Development Index of the United Nations, South Africa ranks 90th out of 144 countries. Clearly, political presence does not necessarily that poor women's interests will be adequately addressed in economic and social policy.

Poor women are in many respects the most vulnerable citizens in South Africa. Statistics South Africa's labour force study in 2003 showed that women on the whole had lower incomes, higher employment rates and less access to assets than men.⁵ African women make up 42% of the workforce but only 30% of the employed population. Young African women are even worse off, with African women under the age of 30 facing an unemployment rate of 75%. Those women who are employed find themselves in the worst paid sectors of the labour market, notably in domestic and retail work. In 2003, 96% of domestic workers were black (i.e. African, Indian and Coloured) women and 93% of these workers earned under R1000

(approximately USD180) per month.⁶ African rural women are the poorest category of citizens: in 1997 65% of African female-headed households in rural areas were poor compared to 54% of male-headed households.⁷ At 29.4%, the mortality rate among African women was more than twice that of white women in 1994 (11.5%).⁸ It has been estimated that 53% of South Africans, including 60% of the country's children, live in households with the lowest per capita consumption.⁹ On the United Nations' Gender and Development Index, even though women and men had comparable school enrollment and adult literacy ratios, men earned more than twice women's earnings.¹⁰

These gender vulnerabilities are compounded by the HIV/AIDs pandemic. African women are most vulnerable to HIV infection, more women than men are HIV positive and women are likely to become more infected at a younger age than men (Albertyn, 2003). The pandemic imposes additional burdens on women in their roles as primary carers of family members who are HIV positive. These caring tasks, moreover, have to be performed in the context of poor basic services such as the availability of clean water, electricity and modern sanitation.¹¹ Women have borne the brunt of the labour associated with the tasks of fetching water and maintaining hygiene.¹² A Kaiser Family Foundation study of households affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic found that 68% of the caregivers in the households surveyed were female, 7% younger than 18 years and 23% older than 60 years.¹³ The epidemic is also likely to have long-term impacts on areas where South Africa performs relatively well currently such as school enrolment of young girls. The Kaiser Family Foundation study found that almost 10% of girls were out of school, compared to 5% of boys in similar situations.¹⁴ Although this is not solely attributable to the pressures of caring for sick family members (other reasons included lack of money for uniforms, books and school fees and pregnancy), the expectation that girls and women should be the primary carers is likely to affect the Gender and Development Index measures for South Africa even more negatively over time.

Democratizing social welfare

The democratic government inherited a state that from a social policy perspective was unique in Africa. Social assistance was already inscribed as state responsibility, albeit in a racially

discriminatory form, prior to the creation of apartheid. Indeed, most South Africans achieved a level of social citizenship *before* being formally recognized as citizens, *contra* Marshall. State pensions, the major area of government spending on welfare, have always been a non-contributory form of social assistance and although means-tested were awarded regardless of work status and with no reciprocal obligations on recipients. Pensions were supplemented by a range of other non-contributory, means-tested social assistance mechanisms. In general, as Lund has characterized it, the South African system is a 'strange combination of mainly British welfare tradition and apartheid policy'¹⁵ where the distinction between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' poor is marked by race.¹⁶ Race was regarded as shaping lifestyle patterns as well as entitlements. Under apartheid, African exclusion from welfare was justified on the grounds that 'people accustomed to modern lifestyles and consumption patterns had greater need of social protection than those in rural subsistence agriculture, who were not proletarianised and were thus presumed to be better placed to meet traditional subsistence needs.'¹⁷

The provision of pensions and other grants (primarily child maintenance and disability) expanded in the period between the two world wars response to unionized white working class struggles and as a mechanism for reducing the 'poor white' problem. Inclusion of poor whites (mainly Afrikaners) was a cornerstone of the Afrikaner nationalist movement and the creation of safety nets targeted at this group legitimated ideological processes of building a racially exclusive state system. Africans – even those who were workers in the urban formal economy – were excluded from welfare provisions on the grounds that the burdens of social reproduction would be carried by extended families. Indians were regarded as temporary residents in South Africa; a repatriation policy was still adhered to formally.¹⁸ On the basis of recommendations of the Carnegie Commission of Enquiry, which sat in 1929, a state welfare department was established for the first time in 1937.

African urbanization and the rise of urban slums created enormous anxieties for the state during this period, although the response was not the comprehensive welfare system that developed to support poor whites. Over time some benefits, such as pensions and grants for the blind and disabled, were extended to African and Indian people (men and women) although benefits were pegged at different levels on the basis of racist assumptions about the

basic needs of different groups.¹⁹ For example, African pensions were set at one-tenth the amount for whites and the means-test employed for Africans was far more stringent.²⁰ Nevertheless, the acceptance of the idea that all groups were entitled to some benefits is startling given the denial of political and civil rights to all but whites. During the apartheid period, the racial spread of welfare benefits was retained but the gap in the levels of benefits between whites and Africans widened considerably. Apartheid also began to be inscribed not just in the ideological premises of policy but also into the ways in which services were delivered to citizens. Administratively, there was a shift in the 1950s from a single Welfare Department in government for the whole population to separate departments for different race groups, although all departments were governed by the same welfare legislation.²¹ Lund points out that the apartheid government also forced private voluntary agencies to stop offering services on a racially inclusive basis, nor could voluntary welfare bodies have racially mixed committees. State subsidies to private welfare agencies stipulated racially discriminatory salaries for social workers.²²

The 1950s were also a period of heightened political mobilization against the unfolding of the apartheid state, with women being among the most vociferous critics of attempts to control the movement of African people and to limit African women's access to the labour market through the imposition of pass controls. An independent, non-racial national women's movement, the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) emerged that aligned itself with the ANC and linked women's struggles for emancipation with those of the national liberation movement. The FSAW played a central role in redefining women's political roles away from being 'the tea ladies of the struggle' to articulating concrete political demands, within a radical motherist frame.²³ The ideology of motherhood and the political language of 'motherism' became firmly anchored in both the women's movement and the national liberation movement, a defining trope in nationalist discourses on gender. The strength of this approach increased in the face of apartheid's denial of rights to family for Africans, and the state's programmes to reduce African women's fertility, introducing Depo Provera and IUDs through the state health system during the 1960s.

Motherism had a powerful impact on the language of social policy in South Africa that persists into present policy discourses. In the anti-apartheid movement, motherism was

articulated as a radical and empowering discourse and as a means through which women could gain recognition for their gendered responsibilities. The Women's Charter of Demands, adopted by the Federation of South African Women in 1954, echoed policy reforms being promoted by proponents of the welfare state in Britain. The Charter demanded that the state provide four months maternity leave on full pay for working mothers, maternity homes, antenatal clinics, child welfare centres, crèches, nursery schools and birth control clinics. Its list of radical demands included subsidized housing and food and provision of a range of basic services, a minimum wage and the banning of nuclear and atomic bombs. These very concrete demands went beyond a general political demand for the extension of political citizenship²⁴ and reflected the importance placed by women on the creation of an inclusive welfare state. By contrast, the trade union movement - which grew rapidly in the 1970s - focused its demands on wages and political rights with little attention to social insurance or social assistance.

Under apartheid, the main grant for child and family care was the state-maintenance grant (made up of a parent allowance and a child support grant), which was awarded on a means-tested basis to certain categories of women. The grant was awarded on a racially differentiated basis with whites receiving the highest amount followed by Indian and coloured people at the same level, followed by African people at the lowest end of the scale. It was also unevenly administered under the racial and homeland-segregated welfare delivery system: some administrations did not award the grant and some awarded only the child support component of the grant. Although African families constituted the majority of poor households, most African families did not benefit from the grant (only 2 per 1000 African children received the grant); they were largely excluded through a range of administrative measures. For example, the homelands and 'independent' states such as the Transkei did not administer the grant rendering vast swathes of the African population without access to social welfare. The application of a means test resulted in many white people being filtered out of the system due to their higher overall income. By contrast, grants to Indians and coloureds increased dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s as the state embarked on a reform programme that would offer limited citizenship rights to these groups. The majority of the beneficiaries were coloured and Indian families - 48 per 1000 children and 40 per 1000 children respectively.

In the mid 1980s, welfare policy was revised to erode the ‘welfare statism’ that was seen to have permeated policy. The Department of Constitutional Planning’s Directorate of Social Planning (an interesting location for welfare policy that reflected the increasing links between meeting social welfare needs and the political and military objectives of the government²⁵) issued a report recommending further racial segregation of welfare, the privatization of welfare provision (‘the state would act as a safety net only where individuals, communities and the private sector were unable to take on new roles and responsibilities’²⁶) and the devolution of welfare provision to provincial and local authorities. Lund’s study of welfare financing shows that by 1990 the government was ‘attempting to arrest if not scale down the extent of its commitment to social welfare’²⁷ even though reforms aimed at deracialisation increased expenditure on African people dramatically. Leila Patel offers a useful table of state expenditure on welfare for the different population groups that captures these inequalities.

Table 1: Welfare expenditure for the different population groups

<i>Population group</i>	1950	1976	1990
Whites	61%	56%	23%
Africans	25%	28%	52%
Coloureds/Indians	14%	16%	24%

Source: Adapted from Patel, 1992, p. 44.

The provision of welfare was not only inflected with assumptions about race but also with very fixed, Eurocentric views about gender roles. Throughout the apartheid era the welfare system retained the view that ‘people would live in two-generational nuclear families with a male head of household; that there would be full employment in the formal waged economy and that women would be at home.’²⁸ In reality a wide variety of household forms co-existed both between and within population groups, and access to the labour market was racially differentiated. Influx controls and migrancy resulted in urban workers (both female and male), having attachments and responsibilities to more than one household. While unemployment was virtually non-existent for whites due to preferential access to the labour market, it was highly prevalent among Africans. The result was that whites could access a

range of supplementary economic benefits in the private sphere (for example, medical and unemployment insurance, workers' compensation and retirement provisions) that were unavailable to Africans. In part because of high levels of unemployment, pensions came to assume significant importance in poor households as a source of household security.²⁹ Although pensions are allocated to individuals, they are consumed as a household asset thus having redistributive implications. Case and Deaton found that pensions reached almost three times as many women as men.³⁰ Their study found that 23.7% of African households received an old age pension and that 66.4% of pensions go to households in rural areas, the location of the poorest households.³¹ Women draw a pension at age 60, men at age 65; this has added to the evidence that pensions are a gender-sensitive mechanism of redistribution.³² However, as I will argue below, there are systemic barriers to women's ability to access social assistance that may limit the gender sensitivity of all grants.

In the late 1980s, the government adopted the principle of welfare privatization. The National Party government argued that welfare had to be understood as a partnership between the state, the private business sector and voluntary religious and community associations. It therefore encouraged 'community and individual responsibility for meeting needs through market mechanisms, emphasizing volunteerism, mutual aid, reciprocity between providers and consumers, fees for service and private practice in welfare provision.'³³ In the process, no doubt the government hoped to deflect political opposition to the racialised allocation of public resources. However, among the highly mobilized communities in African townships, as well as Indian and Coloured women who were the major recipients of welfare, the idea of privatization of welfare was anathema. Similarly, cash-strapped and overburdened providers of social services were assuming that the advent of democracy would result in an expansion rather than contraction of state responsibilities. Leila Patel's survey among non-state, grassroots providers of social services in the early 1990s found that 75% opposed privatisation of social welfare and the expansion of state responsibility in financing social services.³⁴

Despite considerable discussion in anti-apartheid organizations during the late 1980s about policy alternatives that would be democratic and redistributive, and despite the social development initiatives of grassroots organizations such as the civics movement that dealt

with problems of crime, alcoholism and social conflict in street committees and ‘people’s courts’,³⁵ there seems to have been little discussion about what role welfare specifically would play in meeting basic needs and redistributing resources. Discussions of the relationship between gender equality and social policy were even more rare, as feminists were generally marginal to political and policy debates. Discussions of economic policy occurred in isolation from debates about social policy,³⁶ even though as late as 1990 Francie Lund was raising the question of the affordability of the general British model of the welfare state in South Africa and calling for a holistic discussion of social policy. It is therefore not surprising that the period since 1994 has not been characterized by a clear policy redistributive vision for social welfare. Lund et al, for example, use the phrase ‘stealthy erosion of welfare provision’ to describe the post-1994 period. Rather than locating social policy strongly and unambiguously within a redistributive framework, in the democratic period the bulk of government efforts have been to link welfare to a policy of developmentalism. In the next section I examine the gendered assumptions behind this approach, examining the implications of the developmental approach for the ability of women to access their citizenship entitlements.

Although a highly advanced social security system was in place by 1994, there were gaps in this system: pensions covered by far the bulk of the welfare budget, while other grants (disability, parents’ allowances and child support) were relatively small. The rapid inclusion of women into government also resulted in the women’s movement being able to put through a range of new legislation, such as the Domestic Violence Act and the Maintenance Act, both of which required substantial increases in budgetary allocation if they were to be effectively implemented.³⁷

The notion of developmental social welfare

The concept of developmental social welfare was first outlined in the Reconstruction and Development Programme in 1994 and is embedded in the White Paper on Social Welfare, gazetted in February 1996 and adopted in 1997. The approach is defined in the White Paper as being to create a welfare system ‘which facilitates the development of human capacity and self-reliance within a caring and enabling socio-economic environment.’³⁸ Recognising that

economic growth in itself will not enhance the social and economic well-being of citizens, the White Paper argues for ‘the equitable allocation and distribution of resources...Social development and economic development are therefore interdependent and mutually reinforcing’. The link between social and economic development is not mere rhetoric. A key plank in the developmental social welfare platform is the creation of employment; this is a responsibility of macroeconomic policy in general *but also* specifically of the Department of Social Development (previously Welfare and Population) through the Community Based Public Works Programme, funded out of the social security and welfare budget. Public works programmes are seen to have the twin benefits of addressing the infrastructural needs of the country as well as reducing poverty and long term dependence on state assistance. They are therefore seen as developmental in their impact, and considerable resources have been directed into these programmes.

The White Paper identifies a wide and impressive set of guiding principles, seventeen in all, including democracy, human rights, justice, transparency and accountability. An examination of the list of principles suggests the policy is based on wide-ranging and expansive conceptions of citizenship. In the particular formulations of the guiding principles, it is compatible with the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen which focuses less on the elaboration of the entitlements of citizenship and much more on whether all members of society are capable of achieving an enhanced quality of life. For example, non-discrimination is specified in addition to equity; where equity refers to the distribution of material resources, non-discrimination focuses on ‘tolerance, mutual respect, diversity, and the inclusion of all groups in society.’ The policy is based on the principle that the quality of life of all people should be raised through a redistribution of resources and services. In yoking the cultural concept of ‘ubuntu’ (humanity) the White Paper signals the importance of cultural norms and values, particularly the principle of caring and mutual interdependence, to the project of development. Elsewhere, in the “Agenda for Action”, the policy emphasizes the need for government programs to ensure the realization of citizens; ‘dignity, safety and creativity.’

This expansive notion of development initially found resonance and widespread support in civil society. The White Paper was developed under the new ‘rules of the game’ with regard to public decision-making introduced by the ANC government, in which policies would be

developed through extensive consultations between government and civil society, and where public policies in a range of areas – the economy, health and welfare, trade and so on – were assumed to be synergistic. The White Paper was developed in a context of general optimism about the ability of the state to lead a process of transformation and a faith in the democratic process.

As a policy document produced out of compromise between different interests, the White paper inevitably embodies numerous tensions that are left to particular programmes to deal with. From a feminist perspective, the most noteworthy tension is between the capabilities approach and neo-liberal caveats. Social assistance programmes were to be based on a principle of affordability and sustainability – that is, they were to be ‘financially viable, cost efficient and effective’. These neutral terms obscure the extent to which welfare budgets are vulnerable to the imperatives of ‘fiscal responsibility’. The plan of action for the White Paper recognized the fiscal, economic and infrastructural constraints on government’s ability to implement the principles of developmental social welfare. Social security provisions were thus to be ‘phased in’ on the principle of the progressive realization of benefits (this wording conforms to the constitutional provisions on social rights) as well as sustainability. The issue of how rapidly this would be done and what the targets for inclusion would be are not specified in the White Paper and, like the question of affordability, would be intensely contested in the welfare debates that have ensued. Despite the emphasis on participation, poor women were relatively poorly organised and had very little voice in national level policy debates, making it unlikely from the outset that they would have much power over budgetary choices.

Although developmental welfare seeks to provide a third way between inequality-enhancing residualist systems and expensive social democratic systems, commitments to social justice are relatively weak. There is an inbuilt normative choice in the emphasis on public works programmes as opposed to expansion of the scale of welfare benefits that sets up a two-tier system of benefits with people on work-related programmes treated as ‘deserving’ poor and those on welfare (and particularly mothers drawing the child support grant (as either passive and dependent subjects or cunning exploiters of the system)). Reflecting on the notion of developmental social welfare in 2003 in the context of a debate on the Basic Income Grant,

Ravi Naidoo of the trade union research agency NALEDI argues that the ‘trendy concept of developmental social welfare has failed miserably’ and that it has embedded notions of ‘an undeserving poor’ and ‘promoted ways for the ‘able-bodied’ to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps’.³⁹

The White Paper names the importance of the informal welfare sector (religious organizations and NGOs) as well informal special support systems including community care in meeting social service needs. Again, this is posed in the White Paper in the spirit of ‘national collective responsibility’, but it leaves open the question of the precise balance between the different sectors of welfare provisioning. In this respect the emphasis on the cultural value of caring might perhaps be seen as loading the dice against women, who bear the practical burdens of care-work within families and communities. As Lund et al note, ‘a double equation is at work which assumes that community care is equal to care by families which is equal to unpaid care by mostly women.’⁴⁰ Women’s caring burdens have dramatically increased as the HIV/AIDS infection rates have assumed pandemic proportions. Indeed early evidence from the pandemic is showing that it is not only women who are carrying an even greater burden of caring but that children are increasingly having to take on these roles. The shift away from the language of rights and entitlements in the White Paper would seem to dilute the particular (and greater) responsibility of the state in meeting social security needs through the redistribution of public resources.

A final area of tension in the White Paper relates to the ways in which ‘the family’ is invoked in the document. Under the sub-heading ‘The family’, the White Paper simply states: ‘The family is the basic unit of society. Family life will be strengthened and promoted through family-oriented policies and programmes’. It is not difficult to understand why ‘strengthening family life’ is a desirable goal for many in South Africa, given the ways in which the migrant labour policies of the apartheid state and the dominance of residentially-based domestic work denied basic human comfort and intimacy to so many Africans. The White Paper leaves open, perhaps intentionally, the definition of what constitutes family (while stipulating the social security provisions should include homosexuals). These specificities are left to particular policies to articulate and while in some instances (such as the Lund Committee on the implementation of a child support grant) opportunities were taken to shift away from nuclear,

male-headed family forms as the norm, this approach is not guaranteed in the overarching policy framework, leaving perhaps too much to the political will and ideological perspectives of particular policymakers.

The increasing centralisation of macroeconomic decision-making from 1996 undermined the assumptions of consultative, participatory decision-making assumed by the White Paper. For women's organisations, the ability to leverage the symbolic power and legislative representation of women into policy outcomes was severely undermined. Government's assertion of fiscal restraint introduced a new discourse into policy-making: the debate was increasingly less concerned with what was desirable and increasingly more concerned with what was possible. Affordability was often assessed in narrow fiscal terms and by prioritising gross inequalities rather than a concern with the long term costs of failing to address pervasive systemic inequalities. The formal provisions of the Constitution proved inappropriate in dealing with the ways in which government prioritises spending. Although the right to social security is entrenched in the socio-economic rights clause in constitution (section 27) the implementation of this right is by no means automatic, nor does it guarantee that the extent of social security provided will be adequate to ensure a decent standard of living. The important proviso to the right to social security is a qualifying clause in section 27 of the Bill of Rights, which defines the state's obligations as limited to 'available resources'.⁴¹

The immediate consequences of the emphasis on affordability were seen in the process of overhauling the system of child and family benefits, which the Department of Welfare instituted in 1996 and which coincided with the public debate on the White Paper on Social Welfare. The changes to the welfare provisions for children began in a transitional context of translating broad policy formulations into concrete programmes and the deliberations of the Lund Committee, which spearheaded the changes, reveal the tensions between pursuing equity (by ensuring that poor African families would benefit from social assistance) and affordability.

By July 1996, poor mothers were paid a total monthly grant of R565 (made up of a parent allowance of R430 and a child support grant of R135) for a maximum of two children up to the age of eighteen (that is, to a maximum of R700). For those families receiving it, the grant

played a major poverty alleviation role in raising overall household income above the household subsistence level. However, as noted above, the grant reached very few African households, with Indian and Coloured families being the primary beneficiaries. Attempts to entrench the racial equity of the grant produced the perverse consequence that while more poor families received the grant the monetary value of the grant was drastically reduced. The Committee had to work within the government's decision not to increase overall spending. At the time, government had already cut defence spending significantly (virtually halved between 1990/91 and 1996/97 fiscal years) and increased social security spending by 120% over the same period. There was a strong perception in the Committee that no further increases were likely and that the demands on the existing budget were likely to increase under the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The Committee's recommendations were therefore based on a fiscally constrained scenario in which the already inadequate welfare budget faced further cuts from the central government.

The changes in the state maintenance grant went along with the proposed privatization of maintenance, shifting greater responsibility onto parents (but aimed mainly fathers who did not support their children). While this was couched in terms of parental responsibility, it was criticized by feminist policy analysts for shifting a greater burden onto women, given women's actual primary responsibility for childcare.⁴² In particular, Naidoo and Bozalek argue that 'economic policy is formed around assumptions that women's work will subsidize cuts in social spending.'⁴³ Beth Goldblatt questions the effectiveness of the private maintenance system, pointing to the massive failure of fathers to pay the maintenance grants awarded by courts, in part because of high levels of unemployment.⁴⁴ Even where maintenance is paid by fathers, Grace Khunou argues that these payments are a source of conflict in many households, and reinforces the power of those who do have money.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Goldblatt (2004) argues that the removal of the parental allowance (almost exclusively accessed by mothers) that was part of the state maintenance grant denies women access to money that they were in the past able to claim as their own entitlement.

A number of problems remain with regard to the effective implementation of the grant. Firstly, women's organisations have criticised the two-tier means test to establish eligibility for the grant. The means test requires that the primary care-giver prove that he or she is a

member of a household with a combined income below R9 600 per annum for urban households and R13 200 per annum for rural dwellings or those in informal areas. Other elements of the means-test include a requirement that the primary care-giver show that she/he is actively seeking employment. The Lund Committee was itself not convinced of the benefits of means-testing, favouring instead a universal grant. The Committee noted that the means test imposed administrative costs on the system as it required extensive assessment and monitoring and imposed costs on parents which could act as a negative incentive, particularly for foster parents. The Committee also warned that means-testing could be a biased process. 'Communities, especially in poorer areas, are so greatly under the domain of traditional leaders with extensive powers of patronage that caution should be exercised in this approach. The track record of civic associations in impartial decision-making is likewise uneven.'⁴⁶ However, Department of Welfare officials insisted on the retention of this mechanism, concerned that there might otherwise be overwhelming numbers of people applying for the grant and that many of them might be 'unworthy', at least in economic terms. The Committee stressed that should a means test be adopted, it should be a simple economic test and should not 'in any way depend on a definition of a family.'⁴⁷ However, the old means test appears to still be in place. Recent research shows that many welfare officials informally add on new 'tests' of eligibility, such as proof of tax being paid, and letters certified by police officers.⁴⁸ Anecdotal evidence suggests that mothers who are overtly lesbian are turned away by welfare officials.⁴⁹ The South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) has called for the existing means test to be replaced with one that is based on the income of the primary care-giver, arguing that this will be easier to administer. As Liebenberg points out, 'this is particularly important in view of the fact that the child support grant requires a doubling of the capacity of the welfare system to process grants. The present system is already over-burdened with huge backlogs in poverty-stricken areas.'⁵⁰

These problems are exacerbated by poor management and delivery systems, and in some cases corrupt practices at the provincial levels, which initially led to *under*-spending of welfare budgets for three consecutive years, with the child support grant showing the slowest take up rate (only 20% of potential beneficiaries taking up the grant as opposed to 80% of potential old age pension beneficiaries in 2001⁵¹). In an assessment of the effectiveness of the grant commissioned by the Department of Welfare and conducted in 2000, the Community

Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) found that the capacity and competence of the Department of Welfare to administer the grant was limited by a range of problems: insufficient information, outdated application forms, lack of co-ordination between the Departments of Welfare, Health and Home Affairs, poor departmental co-operation with NGOs and community organisations and by ‘indifferent and even hostile attitudes on the part of Welfare staff’.⁵² The government has sought to deal with some of the administrative problems related to delivering grants by privatising grant payments and creating a common agency for grants payments that would take back control over grants payments from the provincial to the national level of government. This has by no means made the grants more accessible; indeed many pensioners have complained that queues remain as long as ever and that the private companies are using the payment process as an opportunity to sell insurance policies and even short term loans to pensioners. The provinces with the best resources (Gauteng and Western Cape) have been most successful in reaching delivery targets while those with the greatest need (Eastern Province and Limpopo) also have the least functional delivery systems and have been the least successful in reaching their targets.⁵³

Most street children and children in child-headed households cannot access the grant because they do not have the necessary identity documents to apply, or they do not know the procedures for application. The Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security (ACCESS) estimates that 75.8% of South African children live below a poverty line of R400 per month. many NGOs, has recommended increases in the level of the grant, but noted that ‘this would require a political decision involving a trade-off with other grants and budgetary items’.⁵⁴ The government has been responsive to these recommendations, improving information about the grants and increasing the amount and age limit of the grant. By 2003, close to three million poor children were receiving the grant⁵⁵ and by December 2004 this number had increased to 5.4million, despite the administrative difficulties described above.⁵⁶

A major discursive shift introduced by the Lund Committee was the move away from the ‘familist’, male worker model of social policy. The Committee chose to adopt a ‘follow the child’ policy, with emphasis on the child rather than the carer – in other words, the grant would be paid to the primary care-giver on behalf of the child. Means-testing would therefore no longer comprise any component of moral assessment of the worthiness of carer (at least in

theory); nor would carers who were not mothers be excluded from the grant. The Committee adopted the policy in recognition of the fluidity and diversity of household forms. This was a significant shift away from the normative assumption that nuclear family was the desirable model, which was inscribed in apartheid-era social welfare and, importantly, it addressed the rights of children born into polygamous families. At least in formal terms, the effect was to de-link child care from normative assumptions about family forms or gender responsibilities and particularly to de-link carework from mothering. As the Committee noted, 'it resolves the problem of how to define the family in such a complex and multi-cultured society. It says that children, however many in a household, of whatever status, are important and need to be protected.'⁵⁷

Of course, these shifts in the core assumptions of the child support grant do not as yet translate into shifts in the views of welfare officials and the media. In reality, moral discourses continue to infect social security provision, crowding out rights based arguments for social security. In debates about the child support grant, there was a strong view among many in government that welfare grants reinforced apartheid privileges, had no developmental potential and should be phased out in favour of greater attention to programmes such as community-based public works.⁵⁸ Even some ANC women MPs took a conservative view of welfare as reinforcing a 'culture of entitlement,' with welfare grants seen as handouts that reinforced dependency on the state. As one MP argued, 'women should look at developing themselves'.⁵⁹ Fraser-Moleketi herself accused poor people of not doing enough: 'communities had to change the thinking of those who held out their hands for help but kept their sleeves down, a sign that they were not willing to work.'⁶⁰ The child support grant continues to be blamed for increasing teenage pregnancy (that is, that young girls are getting pregnant in order to access cash), that women are spending the money on 'clothing and lipstick' and even an allegation by the Minister of Social Development that mothers have 'rented' out their children to others so that they can claim social assistance. Newspaper reports castigate 'runaway mothers' who 'claim the child support grant meant to feed their offspring'.⁶¹ One researcher found that the grant was termed the 'thigh grant' in one community, ostensibly referring to the belief that women 'spread their thighs' for cash.⁶² Even the Chairperson of the Commission on Gender Equality had to be gently reminded by

feminist activists not to fall into the trap of stereotyping women receiving the child support grants as undeserving.

The Basic Income Grant

The Lund Committee's brief was a narrow one, and the debates which accompanied the release of its recommendations and subsequent problems with the implementation of the child support grant as well as major inefficiencies in the delivery of all social grants have re-opened larger questions about the overall system of social assistance. A central concern among many welfare activists was the narrow reach of social security. However redistributive in effect, by their nature pensions only reach a limited number of people. Although by 2004 uptake of the child support grant outstripped government expectations, a significant proportion of poor children below fourteen years of age do not receive the grant; at the moment, all poor children over seven do not receive support. Up to 60% of the poor – mainly those between the ages of fourteen and sixty – are not getting any social security at all. Lund estimates that 11.8 million of the poorest 23.8 million South Africans live in households that receive no social assistance.⁶³ The trickle down effects of the GEAR policy are not materialising; levels of growth remained well below the rate required to address underlying social needs. Unemployment has continued to rise and employment creation through the public works programme was disappointing. It has been estimated that the Community Based Public Works Programme created between 13 000 and 33 000 jobs per annum between 1996 and 2001.⁶⁴ By the end of the 1990s, COSATU as well as a range of civil society organisations were arguing strongly for a more inclusive system of social security that would have poverty-reducing effects.

The chief proposal put forward by COSATU, at a Presidential Job Summit to address unemployment, was for a Basic Income Grant (BIG) as a universal poverty-reduction mechanism. COSATU envisaged that a relatively small universal grant (R100 per month) would be introduced for all individuals (including children). Although neither business nor government were enthusiastic about a Basic Income Grant,⁶⁵ COSATU kept up pressure for the grant both within the tripartite alliance as well as in the media. In July 2001 the BIG Coalition involving twelve organisations was formed. By this time, government had

appointed a Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa (Taylor Committee) in March 2000, chaired by feminist activist and leading member of DAWN, Vivienne Taylor.

The Committee's brief was to review existing grants, including social assistance and social insurance mechanisms and, after a process of consultation, make specific recommendations for implementation. Apart from practical administrative and fiscal considerations, their recommendations were also to take account of the 'adequacy of adherence to principles of social solidarity.'⁶⁶ The Committee released a report in March 2002 entitled *Transforming the present- Protecting the future*, in which it made a range of recommendations, including mechanisms to improve the institutional arrangements for grant payments, streamlining existing grants and laying out a financial framework for comprehensive social protection. Political attention, however, focused most intensely on the Committee's recommendation with regard to the Basic Income Grant. The Committee recommended the 'gradual development of a comprehensive and integrated income support.' It noted that the 'conditions for an immediate implementation of a Basic Income Grant do not exist. In particular there is a need to first put in place appropriate capacity and institutional arrangements to ensure effective implementation.'⁶⁷ The Taylor Committee argued that existing social assistance schemes reduced poverty by 23% while the BIG would reduce the gap by as much as 74% with over six million people raised above the poverty line. The Committee recommended that a Basic Income Grant be phased in by 2006. Although this was a somewhat guarded recommendation, it was taken as endorsement of the views of COSATU and the BIG Coalition, who then used it as the basis for further activism, now arguing for implementation of the Taylor Committee recommendations.

Although the Taylor Committee report was received with acclaim by civil society and even supported in principle by the Minister of Social Development, the ANC voted against it at the party's National Congress in December 2002. Senior ANC member and government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe, reporting on Cabinet debate on the Taylor report, commented that Cabinet had a different philosophy to that adopted by the Taylor Committee. Their view was that 'only the disabled or sick should receive hand-outs, while able-bodied adults should enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work'.⁶⁸

The government has countered criticism of the existing welfare system by pointing to steady increases in budgetary allocations to welfare since 2000. Servaas van der Berg has shown that ‘the first years after the political transition saw a large and significant shift of social spending away from the more affluent to the formerly disadvantaged members of the population, and that most social spending is relatively well targeted to reach those most in need of it.’⁶⁹ As Stephen Gelb shows in the following analysis of social sector spending, there have been striking increases in budgetary allocations to welfare, even compared with other social sector spending.

Table 2: Government budget: size and distribution

	1990/1	1995/6	1998/9	2001/2	2002/3	2003/4	2004/5	2005/6 ³
Education	18	21	22	20	20	20	20	19
Health	9	10	11	11	11	11	11	11
Social security, welfare	6	10	12	12	14	15	16	16
Housing, other soc services	13	5	3	4	4	5	5	5
Social services (total)	46	46	48	48	49	50	51	51
Protection services	20	17	16	17	17	17	16	16
Economic services	14	11	9	11	12	13	13	13
Interest	12	19	20	17	15	13	13	13
Other	8	7	8	7	6	7	6	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Stephen Gelb, *Inequality in South Africa: Nature, Causes, Responses*, Johannesburg: The Edge Institute.

The most recent research on the economic and social impact of social grants, conducted on behalf of the Department of Social Development by Economic Policy Research Institute (which has been associated with the BIG Coalition), shows that rising expenditure has begun to impact positively on poverty, labour market participation and productivity. Minister of Social Development Zola Skweyiya argues that ‘income support is more than a safety net for the poorest and most vulnerable people in our society. It is also a trampoline that enables many people in these households to jump over the barriers of economic and social exclusion’.⁷⁰ The study showed a 66.6% reduction in poverty, when the destitution poverty line (a measure of relative destitution based on the household expenditures of households in the lowest twenty percent of the income distribution) is used as a benchmark. The study

found that the progressive extension of the child support grant up to the age of 14 would reduce the poverty gap by 57%. Receipt of the child support grant correlates to increasing enrolment of children in primary school, with Lund reporting a remarkable eight percent increase in enrolment in grant-receiving households.⁷¹ The EPRI study also found that the major social grants are significantly and positively associated with greater household expenditure on food and consequently better nutritional outcomes. The impact of existing social grants also seems to be addressing other areas that are of concern to the proponents of a Basic Income Grant. The study found that ‘social grants provide potential labour market participants with the resources and security necessary to invest in high risk/ high reward job search, [and that] living in a household receiving social grants is correlated with a higher success rate in finding employment’.⁷²

The likely impacts of a Basic Income Grant on poor women

Nor surprisingly, the most prominent debates about Basic Income Grant have related to affordability and administrative capacity. The impact of the BIG on women has not been directly addressed by the major participants in the BIG Coalition but the proposal raises a number of issues for feminist analysts. A range of women’s organisations has argued that the BIG should be supported by women on the grounds that women carry the major burden of poverty, and that ‘women are often more responsible than men in using income collectively and developmentally.’⁷³ Furthermore, the universal nature of the grant will certainly remove the stigma attached to other social assistance grants, and the absence of a means-test will reduce the degree of moral regulation of women. However, there are a number of assumptions embedded in arguments for the Basic Income Grant that bear closer attention. These relate to assumptions about intra-household behaviour, the impact of a direct cash grant on women’s autonomy and the consequences of a universal grant for enhancing women’s citizenship entitlements and shifting from notions of female dependency. I will deal with these very briefly.

There has been little attention among Basic Income Grant proponents to the internal power dynamics within households. It is assumed that members of a household will pool their grants and that these would then be used for the benefit of the household as a whole. This assumes

also that the interests of the household are unitary and that there will be consensus as to the spending priorities. There is inadequate research into internal household dynamics and much of the discussion is thus highly speculative. However, existing research suggests that households are not monolithic entities in which incomes will be pooled.⁷⁴ Some of these concerns have been raised in relation to the BIG. As Beth Goldblatt (2003) asks, ‘is it possible or likely that lack of trust will prevent women and men from pooling the BIG or deciding together how it should be spent?’ Francie Lund has pointed out that there is a further assumption that people live in just one household, alluding to the fact that household forms in South Africa are fluid and diverse. Eva Harman has shown how the distribution of social grants is ‘mediated by social relations, historical dynamics and material conditions’.⁷⁵ While her research shows that grants are pooled within some poor households, this does not mean that distribution within the households is fair and may indeed increase dependency of non-grant recipients on recipients. Merely receiving a grant, such as a pension, does not mean that the recipient will have the power to decide how the grant will be used.⁷⁶ The elderly for example, may receive pensions and thereby secure their place and some degree of care from their families but may give up the grant to younger (possibly male) and more powerful members of the household. From this point of view, a direct grant to each member of the household may reduce such dependencies but lack of power in the private sphere may lead to grants being appropriated. Work on the spread of HIV shows the extent to which women lack power over decision-making within households – even where the risk of not asserting voice is extreme illness and even death.⁷⁷ Some have argued that a Basic Income Grant will reduce the extent of domestic violence as women will have access to cash and therefore independence. This seems a far-fetched expectation.

An area in which there is more likely to be a gendered impact lies in the potential shift that would result in rural households away from remittances to reliance on a basic income grant – the ‘crowding out’ effect that some see as a likely consequence.⁷⁸ Although migrant remittances are crucial to the survival of rural households, they are also part of a cycle of power. Dorrit Posel’s research on the varied patterns of distribution of migrant remittances within rural households suggests that we cannot assume that migrants remit to rural households out of altruism.⁷⁹ Posel found that remittances are being directed not at households but at particular individuals in households, and that migrants may be more

responsive to the needs of some household members than to others. Some claimants within households – such as old people and children - are seen as valid claimants whilst others (notably young women) are seen as invalid.

A universal grant may therefore have the effect of uncoupling support for rural households from the vagaries of the remittance system and might offer rural women greater autonomy and enable them to overcome other barriers to economic security. Although women have yet to gain equal rights to ownership and access to communal land, they are able to purchase other forms of land through accessing a state subsidy.⁸⁰ The major barrier to this thus far has been lack of cash (purchasers are required to make a cash deposit before the state will issue a subsidy). An income grant might make it possible for women in households where there is more than one woman to pool their income and purchase the land they are currently working. A basic monthly income might make it easier for women to access low levels of credit to increase their productivity. Evidence suggests that there is a definite gender pattern in household spending. Lund's work on pensions shows that the grant is most generally put to common household use and that, moreover, pension money that goes to women is spent better (that is, on food, health and education) than that which goes to men.⁸¹ Directing cash grants to women is therefore likely to enhance the quality of life of poor women and children. However, these assumptions have not yet been tested by empirical research and cannot be said to decisively provide support for the idea that a small cash grant will be empowering for women.

The paucity of gendered analysis in social assistance debates is partly attributable to the decline in feminist activism since the advent of democracy. Gender politics in the last ten years has centred on increasing women's representation in various institutions while the original link between representation and equality outcomes appears to have been broken. In the apartheid era, a clear line was drawn between struggles for formal equality and those for substantive equality. Formal equality – the achievement of equal rights and opportunities was regarded as an inadequate conceptualization of liberation. The achievement of formal political and civil rights, while an important gain in itself, was understood as a weak form of equality that would have little impact on the lives of poor women. What was needed was substantive equality, understood as the transformation of the economic conditions that

produce gender equality.⁸² The Women's Charter for Effective Equality, adopted by the Women's National Coalition in 1994, articulates a notion of equality that is closer to the vision of substantive equality, with a very clear emphasis on the structural and systemic underpinnings of women's subordinate status.

Definitions of equality of course need to be grounded in the particular context in which claims are being made. I would argue that a strong notion of equality, one that would provide some guidance about appropriate policy choices in South Africa, would rest on the extent to which formal discrimination in law and policy is reduced,⁸³ the extent to which overall poverty is reduced, the degree to which women have autonomy and are able to make choices free of the constraints of care work within families and communities, as well as free of the pressure to remain in oppressive and violent relationships,⁸⁴ and the extent to which women feel safe in society. This notion of equality has specific implications for social policy, as it would require that resources be directed in such a way that they serve not only to address the needs of the poorest women, but are also become part of an incremental process of enhancing women's autonomy and full participation in political and economic processes.

In South Africa and in other developing country contexts the conceptualization of equality primarily in terms of labour market participation and autonomy from family responsibilities is flawed. Firstly, the issue of access to labour markets is different in the context of high and chronic joblessness. Secondly, the caring needs of middle class women have not resulted in demands for publicly funded systems of family support. The availability of cheap childcare and domestic work for the middle class meant that there was virtually no demand for high quality state-provided childcare. The economic and political processes that accompanied demands for greater public responsibility in providing care in northern welfare states⁸⁵ do not exist in South Africa. In South Africa supply (of private childcare) has outstripped demand and consequently the bulk of carework is likely to remain within the private sphere.

Conclusions

This paper has shown that although the transition to democracy has led to the elaboration of wide-ranging set of civil, political and social rights, the gendered patterns of poverty and inequality have not been significantly reduced. The deracialisation of social assistance has led included some poor women into the social security safety nets but the gap in coverage excluded the majority of poor women between the ages of fourteen and sixty. The extent to which poor women have been able to access their citizenship rights has been limited by faltering political will to address poverty in a comprehensive manner, by an overarching macroeconomic framework that prioritises fiscal restraint over redistribution and by an administrative system and infrastructure that is unable to fulfill basic tasks of service delivery.

Despite some progress in using social grants as part of a developmental strategy and despite the increasing monetary expenditure on the social sector, the type of welfare system being built in South Africa retains many of the features of a residual system, reacting only to the worst effects of market or family failures and providing assistance to social groups seen as 'deserving'. Women access support only through their children until they reach the age of sixty. Provision of benefits is not generous, benefits are not universal but income tested and access to benefits is difficult. Unless the basis of entitlements changes in ways that recognize women's entitlements as citizenship rights, poor women will continue to be excluded from the system of social entitlements. Equally importantly, unless the increased representation includes debate and activism about the meanings of gender equality in the South African context, the likelihood is the parity in representation will increase the access of women elites rather than have the outcome of increased gender equality

ENDNOTES

¹ I should like to thank Beth Goldblatt for many hours of debate about gender and welfare in South Africa, and for her critical reading of earlier versions of this paper.

² Ann Bernstein, "Let the market rule in welfare" *Business Day* 4 May 2005.

³ Sandra Liebenberg, "Social security and human rights: Current issues," in *Economic and Social Rights in South Africa Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1998).

⁴ This term is part of United Nations jargon. Despite its clumsiness and its technocratic connotations, I retain it here because it is the common phrase used in South Africa.

⁵ Neva Seidman Makgetla, Women and the economy in south Africa, www.genderstats.org.za/economy.shtml, p. 2.

⁶ Makgetla, p.7.

⁷ Ibid., 40.

⁸ Ibid., 41.

⁹ Michael Samson, 2002, p.71.

¹⁰ Debbie Budlender, Women and poverty, www.genderstats.org.za/poverty.shtml, p. 10.

¹¹ African National Congress, *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*, Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1995, 17-18.

¹² Baden, Hassim and Meintjes, 45.

¹³ Kaiser Family Foundation, 2002, "Hitting home: how households cope with the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic", October, p.4.

¹⁴ Kaiser Family Foundation, p.2.

¹⁵ Francie Lund, with Sally Ardington and Mary Harber, "Welfare" in Debbie Budlender (ed.) *The Women's Budget*, Cape Town: IDASA, 1996, p. 97.

¹⁶ Servaas van der Berg, "South African social security under apartheid and beyond," *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 1997).

¹⁷ Van der Berg, 1997, p. 486.

¹⁸ Francie Lund, "State restructuring of welfare", *Transformation*, No. 6, 1988.

¹⁹ Notably, however, family allowances for large low-income families, instituted in 1947, did not include Africans.

²⁰ Van der Berg, 1997, p. 487.

²¹ Lund, 1998, p. 24.

²² Lund (1988) points out that welfare agencies accepted these changes because they were highly dependent on state subsidies. However, some did make private arrangements to equalize salaries of their social workers

²³ Julia C. Wells, 1992, *We Now Demand!*, Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand Press.

²⁴ Cherryl Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa*, London: Onyx, 1981.

²⁵ Leila Patel, *Restructuring Social Welfare: Options for South Africa*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992, p. 41.

²⁶ Lund, 1988, p.25

²⁷ Lund, 1990, p.70.

²⁸ Lund et al, 1996, p. 97.

²⁹ FJ Lund, "State social benefits in South Africa", *International Social Security Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3:5-25; A. Case and A. Deaton, 1996, *Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa*, Research program in Development Studies. Princeton: Princeton University.

³⁰ Case and Deaton, 1996, p. 23.

³¹ Cited in Lund et al, 1996, p. 101.

³² Lund et al, p. 102.

³³ Patel, 1992, p. 45.

³⁴ Patel, 1992: 109

³⁵ See Patel, 1992, chapter three for a useful discussion of these initiatives.

³⁶ Stephen Gelb, personal communication.

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- ³⁷ Lisa Vetten, 2003, “‘The budget appears to be less than required’: four government departments’ expenditure on activities addressing violence against women”, Unpublished draft report (Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation).
- ³⁸ Government of South Africa, White Paper on Social Welfare, ch 2
- ³⁹ Ravi Naidoo, “The Basic Income Grant: Poverty, politics and policy-making” Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture, University of Natal.
- ⁴⁰ Lund et al, 1996, p. 115.
- ⁴¹ Constitution of South Africa, 1996.
- ⁴² Marie Naidoo and Vivienne Bozalek, “Maintenance grant parity: women pay the price,” in *Agenda*, No. 33, 1997: 30.
- ⁴³ Ibid: 31.
- ⁴⁴ Beth Goldblatt, 2004.
- ⁴⁵ Grace Khunou, 2004, “Is human fatherhood a social invention? Attitudes and views of men on maintenance”, in Debbie Budlender and Bhikinkosi Moyo (eds.) *What About the Children: The Silent Voices in Maintenance*, Johannesburg: Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre, p.80.
- ⁴⁶ Lund Committee, p. 29.
- ⁴⁷ Lund Committee, p. 92.
- ⁴⁸ Comments by Beth Goldblatt, CALS Workshop on Gender and Social Security, December 2004
- ⁴⁹ Comments at CALS workshop on Gender and Social Security, December 2004.
- ⁵⁰ Liebenberg, 1998: 11.
- ⁵¹ EPRI, “Social security Reform and the Basic Income Grant for South Africa” EPRI Policy report No. 31, 2002.
- ⁵² Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), “A social impact study on the phasing-in of the child support grant,” Johannesburg: CASE, 2000: 120.
- ⁵³ Teresa Guthrie, 2002, “Family and social security benefits in South Africa”, *Social Dynamics*, Vol. 28, No. 2: 122-245.
- ⁵⁴ CASE, 2000: 120.
- ⁵⁵ Woolard, 2003.
- ⁵⁶ Vivienne Taylor, Paper presented to CALS workshop on Gender and Social Security, December 2004.
- ⁵⁷ Lund Committee, p. 91.
- ⁵⁸ Interview with Francie Lund.
- ⁵⁹ Minutes of Portfolio Committee on Welfare, 13 Oct 2000
- ⁶⁰ Andre Koopman, ‘Poor urged to roll up their sleeves’, Cape Times, May 25, 1999
- ⁶¹ Victor Rhipiso, “Dumped with daddy”, *Sunday Times Metro*, February 23, 2003.
- ⁶² Comment by Sibongile Ndatshie, CALS workshop, December 2004.
- ⁶³ Francie Lund, 2004, “Gender and social security: What we know, what we think we know and what we really don’t know”, Paper presented at CALS Workshop on Gender and Social Security, December.
- ⁶⁴ Anna McCord, 2002.
- ⁶⁵ Paradoxically, the Democratic Party which in many respects can be seen as the party of business, has supported the introduction of BIG.
- ⁶⁶ Taylor Committee, 2002, p. 10.
- ⁶⁷ Taylor Committee, 2002, 63.
- ⁶⁸ Netshitenzhe, press release.
- ⁶⁹ Servaas van der Berg, 2001, “Redistribution through the Budget: Public Expenditure Increase in South Africa, 1993-1997”, *Social Dynamics*, 21 (1), p. 157
- ⁷⁰ Ministry of Social Development, ‘Opening Remarks by Dr Zola Skweyiya, Minister for Social Development, at the launch of the report on the economic and social impact of social grants, Pretoria, 10 December 2004’.
- ⁷¹ Lund, 2004.
- ⁷² Ministry of Social Development, 2004.
- ⁷³ Beth Goldblatt, 2003.
- ⁷⁴ Dorrit Posel, 2001, “How do households work? Migration, the household and remittance behaviour in South Africa”, *Social Dynamics* 21(1).
- ⁷⁵ Eva Harman, “Social grants and their social circulations”, paper presented at the II Annual USBIG Conference of the Eastern Economic Association, February 21-23, 2003.
- ⁷⁶ Naila Kabeer, 1991, *Reversed Realities*, London: Verso Press.
- ⁷⁷ Albertyn, 2003.

⁷⁸ Lund, 2002.

⁷⁹ Posel, 2001, p. 170.

⁸⁰ Cherryl Walker, "Piety in the sky", 2002.

⁸¹ Lund, 2004.

⁸² Elsewhere Catherine Albertyn and I have argued that even this conceptualization of freedom is limited, as it fails to address the social and cultural dimensions of inequality. See Albertyn and Hassim, 2003, "The boundaries of democracy"

⁸³ Of course, certain forms of gender discrimination are both inevitable and desirable, such as in relation to maternity and reproductive health benefits.

⁸⁴ Ann Shola Orloff, "Gender and the social rights of citizenship: The comparative analysis of gender relations and welfare states", *American Sociological Review*, 58(3), p. 319. Orloff takes this argument much further in suggesting that social policies should aim at decommodification of gender relations by enabling women to form and maintain autonomous households. I am hesitant to apply this notion to women in the South African context, given the particular cultural attachments and support systems that women value within family and communities. It could also be argued that the high number of women-headed households in South Africa suggests that women are indeed free to form autonomous households, but this has patently not empowered women to become full and equal citizens.

⁸⁵ Bergqvist and Nyberg, p. 288.