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|---|---|
| Item Type | Conference proceedings |
| Authors | UNRISD |
| Publisher | UNRISD |
| Rights | With permission of the license/copyright holder |
| Download date | 2026-11-09 22:35:29 |
| Link to Item | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/179331 |




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# Globalization and Citizenship

Report of the UNRISD International Conference, Geneva, 9-11 December 1996


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## Preface

From 9 to 11 December 1996, UNRISD sponsored an international conference on Globalization and Citizenship. The event was co-sponsored by a consortium of Australian universities, led by the Swinburne University of Technology, and held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Its purpose was to consider a question posed in the conclusion of **States of Disarray**, the Institute report for the World Summit for Social Development: can the polarizing effects of globalization be offset by new approaches that reaffirm the basic civil, political and socio-economic rights of all people?

The first two days of the conference were organized around a small seminar, in which 40 participants considered such issues as the conceptual underpinnings of "globalization" and "citizenship", the changing political economy of the international system, the impact of globalization on people's rights and on the enforcement of international standards, and ways of strengthening democratic institutions. The third day consisted of a public meeting which was attended by 200 representatives of United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the diplomatic and academic communities in and around Geneva. Speakers addressed questions related to the reform of the international economic system, multilateral co-operation, and precedents for expanding the boundaries of citizenship through regional structures. The conference programme and a list of participants in the seminar will be found at the end of this report.

Discussions at the conference highlighted both the threats and opportunities that globalization poses for citizenship. Economic liberalization and restructuring have eroded the economic and social rights of people in many countries, but falling barriers to communication have also expanded international awareness of rights and facilitated the creation of civil society networks on a global scale.

Within the context of extremely complex and contradictory processes of change, people are struggling to create or protect a sense of community and to bolster the institutions that provide them with social protection. In long-established welfare states, this implies defending the entitlements that form part of social citizenship. In a number of Third World settings, it implies organizing for democratic reform. "The rights of the citizen" have become a rallying cry in many situations: the modern concept of citizenship implies the existence of a civic and political community, a set of rights and obligations, and an ethic of participation and solidarity that is clearly needed in times of uncertainty and rapid polarization.

Much of the debate on citizenship occurs within national boundaries and asserts the basic civil, political and socio-economic rights of individuals. But people are also weaving transnational alliances and defining entirely new rights within supranational arenas. For example, women have been able to forge strong international alliances to insist upon recognition of reproductive rights. Environmental movements have championed the ideal of "sustainable development", which implies that generations yet unborn have an entitlement to live in an undiminished natural environment. These rights are increasingly articulated at an international level, although they may affect even the most local and personal spheres of daily life.

Rights go hand in hand with obligations, and the enforcement of both requires effective institutions, operating within a framework of legitimate governance. Therefore one of the most important questions discussed at the conference was the extent to which institution building — or reform — at national and supranational levels can create a workable structure for the negotiation and enforcement of rights and obligations.

In many developing countries, beset by economic crisis and at times by civil war, the situation is not encouraging. Some of the most powerful actors in these societies — including transnational corporations, the military and international financial institutions — largely escape democratic control. States are often weak and institutions ineffective. Although political and administrative structures are far stronger in developed industrial countries, groups with transnational economic agendas, shaped by the rules of a ruthlessly competitive global market-place, are also gaining power — and escaping accountability — in ways that affect citizenship negatively.

Reinforcing democratic governance within states is obviously of fundamental importance. But globalization also strengthens the need to develop what might be called an "enabling international environment" for citizenship, composed of standards and institutions that uphold universal rights and permit a wide-ranging consideration of issues that affect every human being as an inhabitant of the planet. To gain insights in this area, participants in the Geneva conference considered various layers of supranational institution building, including both the historical experience of the European Union with the creation of regional citizenship (supplementing, but not replacing, national citizenship), and a series of proposals for strengthening the governance structure of the United Nations system.

It seems obvious that while it may have been possible in the past to understand the phenomenon of citizenship by concentrating almost exclusively on the relations of the individual and the state, such a vantage point is no longer sufficient. Elements of citizenship are being created at many levels of society, from the most local through the most global; and it is increasingly necessary to consider how these different layers of identity and experience are related.

At UNRISD, a number of people were involved in planning the Conference on Globalization and Citizenship. A committee composed of Dharam Ghai, Peter Utting, Yusuf Bangura and Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara developed the programme. Shunichi Komabayashi provided invaluable research assistance. Rosemary Max and Jenifer Freedman handled publicity and dissemination; and Wendy Salvo, Josephine Grin-Yates, Rhonda Gibbes and Christine Vuilleumier were responsible for conference organization. The report on the meeting, contained in the following pages, was written by Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara.

The Conference on Globalization and Citizenship was generously supported by the Swedish government, and by the Agnelli, Rockefeller Brothers and Toyota Foundations. It was dedicated to the memory of Claude Ake, who died tragically in an air accident in Nigeria on 7 November 1996, shortly before he was to travel to Geneva for the meeting. Ake was a scholar of great distinction and originality who worked tirelessly for democracy and the rights of the oppressed in Africa. His presence will be sorely missed for many years to come.

September 1997

Dharam Ghai
Director

## Introduction

The end of the twentieth century is marked by conflicting trends of integration and disintegration. The expansion of world markets draws more people than ever before into a closely integrated world economy; but this same process increases the gap between rich and poor, and strengthens a dangerous tendency toward polarization and exclusion. Advances in telecommunications technology offer unprecedented possibilities to increase dialogue and pursue common goals, but they also play a role in exacerbating cultural conflict. The collapse of the Soviet bloc provides new opportunities for international co-operation, while creating a complex field of political and social reorganization with menacing undercurrents of deprivation and xenophobia.

There is a need for a new world order, just as there was in the aftermath of the First World War, at the founding of the League of Nations, and following the Second World War, when the United Nations was created. These institutions (and the specialized agencies surrounding them) have been the cornerstones of efforts to expand the boundaries of international community — to create standards of humane conduct, to facilitate the reasoned resolution of conflict, and to protect the elemental rights of people around the world.

Progress has been made toward the creation of an international community: a combination of ethical commitment, practical political necessity and the remarkable effects of technological change has forged a clear consciousness of some "global" problems and facilitated an unprecedented range of international initiatives to resolve them. National governments routinely meet in a range of fora whose importance should not be underestimated. And there is an international civil society in the making that far surpasses any earlier counterpart in its extensiveness and capacity to mobilize around certain issues. Particularly in the field of the environment, concern for "our global future" creates worldwide networks of co-operation.

Yet as some areas of community are broadening at the end of the twentieth century, others are narrowing sharply. In the current context of global economic restructuring, fierce competition for markets and jobs is reducing the scope for organized defense of common interests and weakening the capacity of public authorities to meet their responsibilities to constituents. Commitments to provide for the least fortunate and to protect the environment, as well as other common projects to improve the quality of life in particular communities, fall victim to the requirements of tax reduction, "downsizing" and ensuring the availability of lower-cost labour.

At the same time, the uncertainties and dislocations associated with economic and political reform affect existing structures of identity, creating or reviving relatively narrow definitions of solidarity, often based on ethnic or religious grounds. Intolerance is on the rise, as some existing nations or confederations break into ever-more-exclusive segments.

Not surprisingly, current debates on international security, national social policy, and human development are marked by a common concern with devising new ways to ensure that trends toward fragmentation and retrenchment are offset by opportunities to strengthen a broader sense of community.

## Globalization and citizenship: Issues for a conference

"Globalization" and "citizenship" are two concepts that form an integral part of these debates: the first term often serving as a synonym for contemporary forms of rapid structural change and the second as a metaphor for social protection and the reconstruction of solidarity. Until recently, they were not systematically juxtaposed in social analysis. "Citizenship studies" have traditionally been more likely to focus on debates over civil and political rights,

immigration law or forms of political participation in particular countries than on global economic and social trends. And analysis of "globalization" has been the terrain of macro-economists and sociologists not usually well versed in the intricacies of individual rights.

But as the pace of change quickens, the relevance of the two concepts for each other becomes clearer. Global market forces now pose a fundamental challenge to social citizenship in advanced welfare states. At the same time, the new ease of international migration continually forces reconsideration of "who belongs" in national societies, and what their rights should be. The revolution in telecommunications encourages debates on the proper balance between the private and public realms. And the definition of rights and obligations of various groups, like women, whose identity and sense of solidarity may transcend national borders, is being subject to persistent re-evaluation.

In consequence, it becomes increasingly important for national citizenship debates to incorporate international elements, and for students of globalization to understand the changing parameters of citizenship. This is a complex undertaking. Neither "globalization" nor "citizenship" is a simple concept. In fact, despite the growing tendency to use them as code words that everyone pretends to understand, these terms can be interpreted in a number of ways — some of which are contradictory.

For three days in December 1996, the various meanings of "globalization" and "citizenship" were explored by a group of eminent scholars, activists and international officials, meeting in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. As various suppositions underlying different usages of the terms were drawn out, some of the possible inter-relations between the two phenomena became clearer. And the importance of analysing the structure of international institutions, practices and conventions that constitutes the macro-framework for both globalization and citizenship was underlined. Discussion on these and other related subjects will be summarized in the following pages.

## Interpretations of globalization

Anthony Giddens began his keynote address by reminding the group that "there are few terms as frequently used and as poorly conceptualized as globalization". It seems to have appeared everywhere from nowhere, he added. For some people, it reflects an unprecedented internationalization of economic and political life — a collapse of borders that heralds fundamental changes in human society and culture. This kind of thinking complements the widespread concern with "endings" ("the end of history", "the end of work", "the end of the family") that seems to be a hallmark of the countdown to the new millennium. For others, such fascination with the novelty of globalization is excessive.

Within the international business community, the term has become synonymous with the unfettered expansion of the global market-place. More than a description, this is an ideology which orients the future actions and expectations of groups within the corporate world. The most extreme proponents of global liberalism — whom Giddens (following David Held) called "hyper-globalizers" — have gone so far as to predict the complete victory of markets over states, and thus the likely reconfiguration of the political map of the world, based not on countries but on city states and their associated economic regions.

For some observers of international trade, finance and politics, such a revolutionary position is not congruent with the facts. "Globalization skeptics" like Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson marshal statistics to show that in many respects the world economy was more integrated at the turn of the century than it is today. In their view, there is nothing fundamentally new about globalization, and it does not necessarily imply any profound restructuring of the international system.

Giddens rejects both the triumphalism of "hyper-globalizers", who pretend to extrapolate a certain future from the laws of the market, and the relative complacency of "globalization skeptics", who see no reason why all cannot go on more or less as before. At the outset of the conference, he suggested considering a far more uncertain future. "I would say that globalization is the most fundamental set of changes going on in the world today....We are at the beginning of a fundamental shake-out of world society...and we really do not know where it is going to lead us."

> *The current phase of globalization is not just an extension of earlier phases of Western expansion.... I would take it to begin only about thirty years ago, when the first global satellite system was established, so that you could have instantaneous electronic communication across the face of the earth.*
> **Anthony Giddens**

Globalization, for Giddens, can be characterized most simply as "action at distance" — the increasing interpenetration between individual lives and global futures. This trend is associated not only with economic liberalization, but also with various processes of technological change, and with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. Developments in global communications, in particular, affect who we are and how we live, producing new solidarities in some places and destroying them in others.

In sum, Giddens put forward a contingent and tentative view of globalization, as a process of social change that does not lead in a single direction. It remains a "wholly contradictory" phenomenon in which we can expect "new forms of unity [to] go along with new forms of fragmentation". Its consequences are likely to vary markedly in different societies, and (unlike earlier phases of Western expansion) to be based upon processes that nobody — including the leading industrial nations — controls.

In his remarks on Giddens' talk, Saad Eddin Ibrahim suggested that by utilizing the term "globalization" with such frequency, we admit the irrelevance of the sociological and economic paradigms currently at our disposal. The popularity of the concept of "globalization" reflects the need to construct new theories, to deal with new realities.

> *Under the guise of globalization, a lot of old-style imperialism is lurking.*
> **Johan Galtung**

Alain Touraine was less convinced that new paradigms were necessary. Speaking at the end of the first day, he argued that we are currently "reliving the experience of the late nineteenth century, more than inventing anything fundamentally new". In other words, we are moving backward rather than forward, going through a period of "de-modernization" in which finance capital is once again progressively freed from regulation and becomes delinked from productive economic activity.

If this is the case, then globalization can be seen as "an extreme form of capitalism", based upon "de-socialized economic processes" of the kind analysed by Karl Polanyi in his studies of the capitalist transition of the last century. People are less and less able to exert control over capital through politics or social pressure. The economy floats free of society. And the kinds of identities that can be adopted by individuals, as they attempt to assert some control over their destinies, become increasingly "folkish".

For Touraine, we now enter not into a new global society, but into a new global space which threatens to be chaotic and unstable. Association on the basis of common economic interests (producing strong labour unions and other class-based forms of representation) increasingly gives way to identity politics, and exploitation becomes less important than exclusion. In such a situation, our greatest challenge is to create the kinds of institutions that can re-link economy and society, and thus "recombine the two halves of a broken world".

## Globalization as a political process

What are the concrete developments through which global capital is becoming disassociated both from productive investment and from the social and political constraints imposed within national borders? It is important to explore this question, because otherwise it is all too easy to assume that humanity finds itself at the mercy of impersonal forces of history. And in that case, there are no alternatives to the present situation. As Swedish State Secretary Mats Karlsson noted at the outset of his address, "It is as if globalization meant only one choice, and thus no choice. Old TINA: 'There Is No Alternative'. And that is simply not true".

> *Basically, globalization indicates a qualitative deepening of the internationalization process, strengthening the functional and weakening the territorial dimension of development.*
> **Björn Hettne**

Ajit Singh argued forcefully that liberalization on a global scale — with its dismal record of weak growth and mass unemployment over much of the developed and developing world — is the result of political decisions, rather than inevitable forces, and that it can (and should) be reversed through political mobilization. Most speakers were in substantial agreement with his assessment of the economic record, and with his emphasis on the importance of politics in determining the current state of affairs.

> *Liberalization is not the only strategy for the world to follow. There are feasible alternatives which are far superior in terms of employment creation, poverty reduction and the promotion of full citizenship, both in the North and in the South.*
> **Ajit Singh**

Alternatives are, however, shaped by contemporary patterns of alliance and confrontation, involving social actors operating within national boundaries and across them. Richard Falk suggested exploring this subject through considering the parallel development of "globalization from above" and "globalization from below". In the first case, "the mentality of the ruling classes is deterritorialized to the extent that even 'security' is defined more by reference to the global economy than in relation to the defense of territorial integrity". This has ideological elements, as well as purely self-seeking ones. But (Anthony Giddens noted), "fat cat" explanations of globalization from above should be supplemented with attention to structural considerations. Elements within the contemporary world economy create a "winner-take-all" dynamic, and this encourages governments to rely more and more heavily on those individuals and groups in each country with the greatest capacity to compete.

## "Captured" markets, politics and the state

Such competition is far from efficient. On the contrary, it involves enormous expenditures to ensure market dominance or capture market shares, and it is based on strategies of resource use that are often unsustainable in both human and environmental terms. Hazel Henderson reminded the group that a reform of national accounting procedures to include "full-cost pricing" would expose the irrationality of current practices in world finance and trade. "Much of today's world trade", she noted, "involves transportation of similar, below-full-cost goods, subsidized by tax-supported transportation and energy infrastructure", to the detriment of the environment and local economies.

As oligopolistic forces are strengthened by a rash of mergers and acquisitions among corporations around the world, transnational business interests favouring the radical liberalization of finance and trade work within state structures, not for the purpose of creating free markets but in order to capture spaces that can be defended through political processes. Thus the politics of trade have come to assume a particularly important place in international affairs, and the foreign policy of major powers is increasingly centred around promoting the competitive position of nationally domiciled corporations.

Under these circumstances, it would be simplistic to say that global economic liberalization necessarily "weakens the state". What is often described as "weakness" may in many cases be a strengthening of internationally oriented business interests in the governing coalition. In other words, as Björn Hettne noted, "the state becomes the spokesman of global economic forces, rather than protecting its population against these forces". This calls into question the explicit pacts between labour and capital on which social democratic régimes are based, and lessens the confidence of many citizens in existing political institutions.

In the international arena, the polarizing tendencies inherent in globalization seem generally to reinforce the position of already powerful states and weaken the less powerful ones. But, as Yash Ghai commented (with particular reference to East Asia), it is necessary to "examine how far [a particular] state [may become] a surrogate for economically powerful global interests", since "then its capacity would reflect not its own apparent strength but that of global forces aligned behind it". Some states would seem to be strengthened by globalization, not weakened by it.

To an increasing extent, unsavoury interests are represented among the groups attempting to use control over the institutions of the state as a means to carve out lucrative niches in global markets. Mats Karlsson noted that "a free market can be captured through too little regulation or too much: by élites, old or new, political or economic, legal or illegal, through corruption or just through well-connected relations taking care of each other". There is a particular danger in countries in transition from communism, where a kind of feudal capitalism may develop; but drug lords and mafias hold power in many regions of the world and collaborate within global illegal economies of unprecedented size.

The questions to be asked when considering the relation between global economic liberalization and "state capacity" must therefore be quite specific. In each case, it is important to analyse the nature of the state; the political coalitions supporting various attempts to increase participation in global markets; the extent to which certain elements of national economic policy have become the preserve of transnational actors; and how much room is left for political debate and relatively democratic control over economic decision-making. This would provide concrete elements for judging the degree to which the economy is indeed breaking loose from social and political control (as Touraine suggested). It would also throw light on the extent to which national and international markets are being "captured" by special interests, whether legal or illegal, and the likelihood that social

democratic control over those markets can be maintained or created (as Karlsson also stressed).

Karl Eric Knutsson underlined the need to look critically not only at the politics of globalization at the national level, but also at international networks of social relations sustaining various global initiatives. He reminded the group that we do not live in one single world, but in a series of worlds or "social fields" ultimately grounded in specific individuals and interests. "Such fields, with their gravity centers in dominant interests — financial, political and cultural — cover the globe in various layers and combinations...." They expand and contract, become accessible or inaccessible, and have different implications for those who come in contact with them, depending upon one's social position and ability to marshal resources of relevance to each field.

In this regard, several speakers reminded the group that the role of the business sector in the politics of economic liberalization should not be stereotyped. Globalization produces a complex combination of interests, even within large corporations. "Free markets" in international capital markets, for example, create a degree of instability that is often harmful for transnational enterprises. And while a maximum use of cheap labour may fit well into the strategies of some companies working abroad, this handicaps others who need protection in order to continue operations in higher-wage home countries. Despite the undoubted "deterritorialization" of some aspects of production, transnationals produce specific goods and services in specific places; and their policies deserve careful analysis.

## Responses to economic globalization: Globalization from below?

If global economic liberalization is in part a political process, determined over a considerable period of time by the cumulative decisions of national governments, firms and international institutions, then the macro- and micro-economic policies on which it is based are subject to modification. Where is support for changes in the economic substructure of "globalization" likely to come from, and what form might new initiatives take?

> *Is the problem globalization*
> *or incomplete globalization?*
> *We witness the globalization of aspirations, of certain standards of consumption and life styles, but not globalization of economic opportunity. We witness globalization of the laws of competition, but not globalization of those institutions and rights that have made life more humane for those who are powerless.*
> **Roberto Toscano**

**Organized labour**. Much of the political economy literature of the past few years assumes that organized labour has lost a good deal of its former capacity to influence national economic policy and to bargain collectively with employers. The "discipline of global capital" — with its heavy emphasis on labour market flexibility — is said to have marginalized unions, which no longer constitute central actors in the politics of globalization. Hans Engleberts strongly challenged such an interpretation. In Western Europe, unions are still full members of the governing coalition, and they have recently demonstrated their capacity to organize and sustain important strikes when provoked.

In a number of newly industrializing countries, organized workers are also playing an increasingly visible role in opposition to free-market policies and have won concessions both from employers and from governments. Nevertheless the union movement in general

confronts a number of serious challenges, both from new forms of regulation of international markets and from developments within the international working class.

Engleberts briefly outlined the struggle now under way to ensure that organized labour has a say in deliberations within the World Trade Organization. Unlike the International Labour Organization, where labour, management and governments are equally represented, this new institution is a relatively closed negotiating body; and decisions reached among governments create binding agreements, backed by sanctions for non-compliance. Since the purpose of such negotiations — to expand the scope for free trade — has far-reaching implications for both macro- and micro-economic management, the international labour movement must work out a strategy to exert influence there, or experience a further decline in the bargaining capacity of the organized working class.

Labour movements in developed and developing countries have important differences of opinion concerning the extent to which standards of minimum wages and working conditions should be enforced throughout the global economy. Eddy Lee explored these differences as they have been manifested in recent debates on the so-called "social clause", which would allow states to ban importation of goods produced under conditions that do not comply with fair labour standards (as defined in "core" conventions of the International Labour Organization).

His presentation gave rise to a lively and sometimes vehement exchange of views among participants, which laid bare the difficulties inherent in any attempt to present a unified challenge to transnational economic forces. Hans Engleberts and Karl Eric Knutsson insisted that certain minimum social standards must be enforced everywhere, no matter what the level of development of the country; while Rehman Sobhan argued that international standards constitute a form of conditionality which — if applied in a country like Bangladesh — would only deprive the population of much-needed employment (and the nation of much-needed earnings) in the export sector. They would do nothing to deal with the worst forms of labour abuses, which are to be found in production for the internal market. He noted that the children, women and other low-wage workers employed in the export industry of Third World countries often have no other alternative but unemployment or crime.

Knutsson replied that the widespread use of child labour increased unemployment among adults, and that every government should ensure that children were in school, not at work. Eddy Lee also reminded the group that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are the core rights in international labour codes; and they affect all economic sectors, whether producing traded or non-traded goods.

Sobhan returned to the fact that in the present world context, the comparative advantage of Third World people is their cheap labour. If they are to make a living without that advantage, then the terms of trade for goods, the cost of capital, and other elements in world markets must become more favourable to low-income countries than they currently are. In a similar vein, Gita Sen suggested that the governments of developed countries determined to protect Third World workers might consider increasing their foreign aid, or loosening their immigration restrictions, to an extent that would permit the creation of more opportunities for education or work.

Clearly there are profound disagreements within the international labour movement on a number of issues, and North-South divisions are exacerbated by global economic liberalization. Meanwhile, general trends in labour markets over the past several decades are altering the social environment within which workers attempt to organize. To an ever-increasing degree, work is being sub-contracted and informalized. People take on a number of different jobs to survive or make ends meet. And, as Charles Reilly noted, if the traditional

union movement does not learn to adapt its strategies to this changing reality — and to create alliances with new groups — it is destined to become increasingly irrelevant.

**Organized consumers and associative forms of production.** In his presentation to the group, Johan Galtung sketched a scenario in which technological change relentlessly reduces the importance of labour, to a point at which countries compete less through low wages than through low taxes. Profits flow toward very low tax areas, causing recession in many other parts of the world. In such a situation, organized consumers, rather than organized labour, might be the ones to engage in strikes. If capital were in consequence to flee production altogether and take refuge in the finance economy, consumers would be forced to organize their own companies. "Not socialism but commune-ism, [supported] not by the working class but by consumers".

Marcos Arruda foresees somewhat similar developments. In his paper, Arruda urged trade unions to establish "bridges of co-operation" with other groups attempting to "design alternative forms of work and trade within the dominant market system". This could lead to the creation of a new form of "co-operative globalization", from the bottom up, that would be based on associative forms of production. Hazel Henderson summed up the views of many progressive futurologists when she said that "if machines are going to eliminate our jobs, we must be sure we own the machines".

> *Competitiveness is not the only game in town.*
> **Hazel Henderson**

**Shareholders, investors and alternative trade.** Henderson is a leading proponent of the view that control over global markets, increasingly "captured" by transnational corporations and financial interests, can be recovered by intelligent citizens. She spoke to the conference about ethical investment initiatives, stakeholder movements and other efforts to promote corporate responsibility. The many millions of people who participate in pension plans and invest in mutual funds have a great deal of potential power in the global marketplace, as do shareholders in corporations. This power can be used in socially responsible ways.

"By far the most creative response to global corporate and financial power," she noted, "is the recognition...that pure information-based transactions can now break the global money monopoly". High-tech computerized barter can overcome the necessity for developing countries to earn foreign exchange, just as it allows people at the grassroots to barter among themselves and to create local currencies. "The very information technologies that today consolidate corporate consumerism can also be used as alternatives to money, as worried bankers know". In fact, between 10 and 25 per cent of all world trade may now be carried out through barter.

**International issues networks and "global civil society".** New information technologies also greatly facilitate many transnational efforts to change the course of global economic liberalization through research, dissemination of information and lobbying. Like-minded people become involved in what Elizabeth Jelin (quoting Kathryn Sikkink) called "international issues networks", engaged in denouncing various aspects of contemporary economic globalization and proposing alternative approaches. The environmental movement is particularly important in this regard.

International NGOs form the backbone of these networks, which are often described as an embryonic "global civil society". In her paper, Riva Krut described how, during the 1990s, global conferences on environmental and human rights issues, population, women's rights, human settlements and social development have provided a major arena for NGO activities.

These meetings have increased contact among many groups acting formerly in isolation, and have highlighted close links between apparently discrete areas of concern. As Kevin Lyonette noted, when commenting on developments in the field of environmentalism, it is now obvious that environmental protection cannot be separated from socio-economic development, nor can an environmentalist group afford to be ignorant about the broader social implications of macro-economic reform.

> *In Africa, power is concentrated in the cities. Most political parties are not national; they are city-state parties. And if you talk about civil society: the NGOs that are currently emerging are heavily concentrated in the cities, not in the countryside or even in provincial centres.*
> **Yusuf Bangura**

Despite a tendency for co-operation to increase among members of international issues networks, such efforts confront very serious challenges. These are often rooted in the problematic relation between transnational activists and their own governments. T. Rajamoorthy, of the Third World Network, described the difficulties that arise for members of NGOs in the South when they feel it necessary to defend their own governments' position against that of Northern counterparts. This occurs, for example, when developing countries oppose blanket liberalization of trade or investment. The "revolt against globalization" may require supporting governments with bad records in the field of human rights, in order to protect certain economic and social rights that seem immediately threatened.

Thus the apparent "indivisibility" or "synergy" of action in the field of international development can quite easily unravel, as profound disagreements on tactics appear among Southern NGOs primarily concerned with human rights, on the one hand, and economic policy on the other. The former seek allies in the North, and are loathe to challenge the industrial democracies on any point. The latter also need allies in the North, but their strategies are more complicated. Rajamoorthy's talk brought home the point that "global civil society" is not simply a group of like-minded individuals who — like "disembedded" capital markets — float free of their societies. They are immersed in a complex network of relations, most of which are grounded in specific national realities.

**Exclusivist forms of resistance.** The labour and consumers movements, stakeholders and ethical investors — as well as thousands of other groupings of like-minded people engaged in some effort to further new models of global economic organization — are elements in the kind of "globalization from below" to which Richard Falk referred at the outset of the conference. Through insisting on the need to reassert social control over economic processes, they contribute to reintegrating Touraine's "two halves of a divided world".

But there are other responses to the polarizing dynamics of global economic liberalization that are less "modern" and "rational" in their orientation. To signal rejection of the prevailing order they rely primarily on the assertion of narrow identities — whether ascribed or acquired. This is the stuff of chauvinism and xenophobia, religious intolerance and ethnic hatred. It constitutes a strong undercurrent in "globalization" as we know it; and it seems to be on the rise.

## Globalization and the mind

As Daniele Archibugi noted, globalization exists at its most fundamental level in the imagination. At the end of the twentieth century, advances in information and

communications technologies create new worlds in people's minds: new hopes, new fears, new knowledge of how others live. "In this sense", Anthony Giddens stressed, "globalization is as much an 'in here' phenomenon as an 'out there' phenomenon. It is as much about the self — the changes in our personal lives — as it is about global systems".

The way global flows of information affect patterns of identity and solidarity in different cultures will obviously depend upon the content of those flows. And the latter will in turn be affected by structures of ownership and access within the international media and telecommunications industries. Rules and agreements determining the future use of the air waves, and of outer space, for the transmission of commercial and non-commercial (public service) messages are the subject of increasing concern within international civil society and should be closely monitored.

In any event, the world confronts a technological revolution in the field of information and communications that must certainly challenge the traditions and values of hundreds of millions of people. Physical distance between cultures can be virtually extinguished, and people in the most remote villages shown ways of life they had never before imagined. Or, on the contrary, people in those same villages can keep in constant touch with family members living thousands of miles away, thus making it easier for the latter to remain a part of their original culture and resist assimilation into a new one. "Interaction at distance" can become as important — or more so — than interaction with those nearby, and "communities" can be formed through mechanisms like the Internet with no necessary face-to-face communication at all.

> *Globalization presents many challenges of change; but the most basic challenge is that of changing ourselves, changing our view of the world and of our place in it.*
> **Sir Shridath Ramphal**

It is impossible to predict what such profound changes in human relations will imply for the nature of society and culture in the twenty-first century. Economic liberalization may come and go; it is even possible to imagine a scenario of market collapse followed by a return to some form of protectionism not too different from that of the 1930s. But the patterns of social change associated with the information revolution are unlikely to be reversible. They will create new identities and new ways of living together. They can also create new hatreds and nurture the seeds of conflict.

## Interpretations of citizenship

It is not surprising that, in the midst of such fundamental and contradictory processes of change, questions of citizenship assume increasing importance. As Alastair Davidson noted, with reference to the works of Norberto Bobbio, "the starting point of citizenship is the attempt by ordinary people to impose order on chaos".

The end point is not in sight; and to the extent that the construction of citizenship is an ongoing process, it may be illusory to think that there will ever be one. In the view of a number of conference participants, citizenship will always be what we make of it. It is in constant evolution, and to "freeze" its attributes in time does not necessarily contribute to understanding contemporary reality.

Nevertheless, the concept has a past which shapes the way most people in the advanced industrial world understand it. The modern "citizen" is in fact the product of centuries of nation building, involving protracted struggles over the nature of political allegiance and over the rules governing the exercise of political power within specific geographical territories.

*Citizenship is a contract about power.*
**Mats Karlsson**

For this reason, as Richard Falk noted, citizenship is usually defined above all in relation to nationality. Citizens are recognized members of one (or more) national communities, to which they owe loyalty and from which they expect protection. This is the identity they assume in the international arena, where they interact with citizens of other countries on a basis only modestly regulated by international law and convention.

The sense of solidarity associated with citizenship has thus been won — in relatively new nations as well as older ones — by drawing clear lines between "us" and "them". Such an undertaking has negative implications that participants felt should be highlighted. Anthony Giddens drew attention to the endless abuses of the patriotism of citizens that have been perpetrated by régimes pursuing nationalist agendas. Citizens have obligations to states that may go as far as the sacrifice of life itself; and one need only remember the carnage of recent wars to understand the pathological underside of strong commitment to a single national community.

Leaving aside extreme cases of loyalty unto death, one can clearly see other ways in which modern citizenship can promote exclusion in some spheres, while encouraging solidarity in others. E.V.K. FitzGerald noted, for example, that within a context of growing disparity between most and least developed countries today, individuals who can obtain citizenship in relatively more powerful and prosperous national entities gain benefits that others — remaining outside such systems — are not likely to have. Membership in certain national societies, bringing entitlement to the protection of their governments and access to the social services provided by their states, has become a scarce commodity, for which foreigners are often ready to pay a high price.

The "insider/outsider" dimension of any form of citizenship below the global level became a recurring theme throughout the conference. Nevertheless it was the inclusionary, liberating and democratic potential of citizenship that received most pronounced attention from participants — first as it developed historically within Western society and then as the idea spread to other geographical areas and interacted with other cultures.

"Citizenship," Elizabeth Jelin reminded the group, "is about rights". Traditionally these have been the rights of individuals. Over a long period of struggle, absolutist régimes in Western Europe were forced to recognize such civil rights as freedom of religion, thought and speech, freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, and freedom to organize. They did so only haltingly, and favoured some parts of the population over others. But as a process of democratization (including expanded suffrage) advanced, so did the protection of a series of political rights. These allowed people the opportunity to have a say in determining the rules under which they would interact with public authorities and with other citizens, as well as in electing the officials who would form the government.

The classical Western "citizen state" can thus be described as a political community, established within a well-defined territory, based upon a system of rights and obligations sanctioned by law, and subject to review by all members through established procedures and in relative equality of conditions. The strong strain of secularism inherent in Western nationalism has ensured that for political purposes "citizens" have been (in Richard Falk's words) "ideally purged of any secondary identities (race, religion, gender) and pledged to reconcile private concerns with the promotion of the public good". This has played a fundamental role in encouraging the institutionalization of tolerance.

In fact, it is precisely the equality of political condition inherent in the concept of citizenship that permits "civil society" to flourish. Members of society can pursue their own interests, within different subcultures and organizations, up to the point at which their actions curtail the basic civil and political rights of others. As Björn Hettne noted, this balance between freedom and order is associated with a quality of "civilness" that can expand or retreat, making the intervention of the state more or less necessary at various times and places.

Relative equality of economic opportunity is a fundamental element in the maintenance of a tolerant, participatory political community. And one of the basic points of contention in the long struggle over rights has been whether individual freedom can be guaranteed without previously, or simultaneously, ensuring a certain level of economic security and social justice. European welfare states have gone furthest in developing the latter as an entitlement of the "social citizenship" that is a hallmark of European democracy.

In contrast, authoritarian political systems, ranging from Bismarkian Germany to twentieth-century communist states like the Soviet Union and China — as well as some others of a strongly statist developmental persuasion in Third World countries — have given priority to economic and social rights, without much attention to civil and political liberty.

## The cultural dimensions of citizenship

There is an obvious cultural dimension to these diverse experiences — an element to which participants in the conference dedicated considerable attention in the course of their discussions. As Yash Ghai noted, cultural idiosyncrasies can be overestimated in order to shield authoritarian régimes from international pressure to protect human rights. But it is also true that different human societies are structured around particular systems of values and behaviour that give "citizenship" a somewhat different content from one country to another — even within the advanced industrial democracies — and, in the view of some observers, may make the concept either entirely inapplicable or only of marginal relevance in other cultural settings around the world.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim took up this question in his discussion of democracy and Islam. The intrinsic worth of all human beings, associated with the "citizen" in Western culture, is associated in Islam with fellowship in religious community. The secular underpinning of a "civil society" thus comes into conflict with religious precepts. Nevertheless, Ibrahim reminded the group that the Islamic world contains régimes based upon relatively more secular, as well as relatively more religious, founding principles; and that the space for individual rights is gradually widening. "In 1980, it was impossible to find an Arab country that would host a conference on human rights. Now it can be held".

In East Asia, Confucian insistence on obedience and obligation can also run counter to Western insistence on individual freedoms and rights. Those who argue for the idiosyncrasy of "Asian values" suggest that it is family and kinship ties, rather than laws and judiciaries, that protect the dignity of each person in Asian societies — thus obviating the kind of human rights discourse that constitutes such a central element in Western conceptions of citizenship. In his presentation, however, Yash Ghai warned against giving too much credence to insistence upon the cultural specificity of rights. "There is no particular coherence in the doctrine of Asian values. Its intellectual roots are weak, and it shifts its ground as expediency demands".

*In my view, objective material conditions are more important than 'culture' in determining the history of, and controversies about, rights in the Asian context. Certainly poverty is one of these conditions.*
**Yash Ghai**

Ghai was especially concerned about the tendency, in so much of the debate on rights, to stereotype and generalize. Cultures are treated as monolithic and static, when in fact they are highly differentiated and undergo a constant process of change. Particularly in today's world, societies are marked by sharp distinctions and discontinuities; and this makes it important to ask "who is speaking for 'the culture'"? There is likely to be no uniform view of rights within China, India, Japan, or anywhere else. Different groups will perceive rights differently; and to an increasing degree, they search out allies across national boundaries. In the process, dividing lines between East and West are blurred. In fact, he added tellingly, even the "diplomats across the world who earnestly and bitterly quarrel over the universality and relativism of rights belong to the same [sub]culture".

## Creating rights

It was the consensus of the meeting that there are universal human rights, cutting across all cultures and reaffirming the intrinsic worth of every human being. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the definition of rights is also a dynamic process, responding to changing material conditions and perceptions. Specific rights for which people choose to fight have varied with time and place, and so have the institutional arenas required for enforcement. At present, we witness a significant expansion in the number and range of rights that various groups consider fundamentally important.

For example, so-called "first generation rights", of a civil and political nature, have traditionally been won from the state (and in opposition to it), but they can also be defended through state action, to limit the abuses of the powerful. Protecting "second generation rights" associated with defining standards of economic and social justice, and defending minority rights, also require active state support, rather than a simple curbing of state power, and may apply not only to individuals but also to collective actors. In recent years, "third" and "fourth generation" rights surpass national boundaries altogether and involve issues like environmental protection, peace and development. They require institution building at an international level.

*We are fighting to affirm the notion of 'personhood'. In many parts of the world, just as children are viewed as the property of parents, women are viewed as the property of husbands or families. Their labour, sexuality and reproductive capacity can in fact be disposed of as their owners think appropriate.*
**Gita Sen**

**Reproductive rights.** Gita Sen provided an overview of the process of struggle and negotiation leading to the recent international acceptance of women's reproductive and sexual rights. These are summarized in the Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women as "their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence". As Jane Cottingham noted, the creation of a global political consensus on such a controversial subject constituted a remarkable success story in the history of cross-cultural negotiation on rights.

The early history of this struggle was marked by deep differences between feminists in Europe and the United States (concerned above all with asserting a position on the subject of abortion), and colleagues in the Third World, who were much more concerned with ensuring that they would not be sterilized against their will. On the agenda of the latter group, guaranteed access to health services was also far more important than it was for feminists in the North. Yet in the course of the 1990s, against a backdrop of economic crisis and crumbling health services, women were able to find a common ground and to defend it forcefully at international conferences. In the process, a new field of human rights has been established.

**Children's rights.** Karl Eric Knutsson analysed a similar phenomenon, involving the international definition of the rights of the child. This process began as early as 1923 and culminated in 1989 with adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, sponsored by UNICEF. The coalition supporting this struggle is committed (in Knutsson's words) to establishing the "full and worthy membership of the child in society", extending rights not as "a generous gift of adult society to its minors", but in order to show "respect for children in their own right and for childhood as a crucial component of society's reproduction and sustainability".

> *Poverty, widening socio-economic imbalances, expanding contacts with the outside world and the erosion of values are working hand in hand...to create a situation which transforms young girls into commodities of exchange in a regional and global market based on gender exploitation and sexual violence.*
> **Karl Eric Knutsson**

In particular, some violations of children's rights should be urgently addressed. Knutsson reminded the group that between 50 and 100 million children may currently be bonded labourers; more than a million are probably being held in the equivalent of sexual slavery; and millions more are currently exposed to the devastating effects of war. Roberto Toscano added that children are doubly powerless: first in relation to their present condition, and second vis-à-vis the future world that others are making for them — and in which they will have to live. It is scandalous that the world they inherit will so frequently be characterized by polluted air and water, unpayable debt, and economic systems so structured that there is no space for the productive participation of young people.

**Environmental rights.** Can there be such a thing as "environmental rights and duties" or "environmental citizenship"? In the paper she presented to the conference, Elizabeth Jelin traced the evolution of a "world environmental consciousness", beginning with the Stockholm Conference of l972 and evolving by the mid-l980s into a global movement in which Third World groups were increasingly represented. Over the course of those decades, growing numbers of people in different societies and cultures came to define the environment as a "public good".

> *Globalization may be 'late expansionism'; but maybe it is also the beginning of 'early conservationism'.*
> **Per Råberg**

With the emergence of the concept of "sustainable development" (coined in the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development), there was a convergence of environmentalism and human rights. Development was defined as "sustainable" if it met "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". Thus nature became an entitlement of humanity, including human beings still unborn.

Jelin emphasized the incremental, contested nature of the process through which concern for the environment is being redefined in terms of rights and obligations. "Nobody can claim that a global consensus exists regarding how to conceptualize the environment. On the contrary, it is an international arena [characterized by] an intense conflict of interests and world views". What is beyond doubt, however, is that the environmental debate has created a new international agenda, in which both multilateral agreements and national laws create sanctions against the infringement of rights to such basic "public goods" as clean air and water.

"Environmental citizenship" does not yet exist. As Jelin noted, "It is not easy to translate principled ideas and values into politics", and then into laws and institutions capable of enforcing the obligations that accompany rights. But this does not mean that the field of concern will not some day form part of new conceptions of citizenship, operating at multiple levels of enforcement, from the local to the global.

## Citizenship as a process: "The right to have rights"

As the meeting progressed, there were clear divisions within the group between those who emphasized primarily the open-ended nature of citizenship — as they looked toward the future, and toward the international arena — and those who focused more consistently on the current situation of Western "citizen states".

> *The fundamental purpose of rights is to preserve the dignity of the human person.*
> **Yash Ghai**

Both Elizabeth Jelin and Gita Sen felt strongly that citizenship is a "work under construction" — a continuing process of political negotiation about (in Jelin's words) "who can say what in the process of defining common problems and [deciding] how they are to be faced". Therefore discussion should never be limited to analysis of the particular historical models developed over the past few centuries in Western industrial democracies — important though these may be.

In a famous ruling of the mid-1950s, the United States Supreme Court defined citizenship, at its most basic level, as "the right to have rights". Jelin pointed out that thinking in these terms has important consequences: the content of demands, the political priorities and the public spaces within which people struggle for their rights can change, if the right to public debate on the content of both norms and laws is upheld. "Furthermore, although ideas about citizenship and rights have been grounded in the notion of the modern nation-state, there is no intrinsic necessity that this be the case. The public sphere might be smaller or larger than the state, or even different" in nature.

Thus while it is true that nation states are the primary locus for the enforcement of rights — even when such rights are defined internationally — we witness a gradual "expansion of the area of citizenship". It is important to focus on this phenomenon as a process. As Gita Sen noted, "how citizenship is constructed will very much determine what gets constructed and how likely it is to be implemented".

## The impact of globalization on citizenship

Such emphasis on citizenship as an open opportunity for the creation and defense of rights reflects one way in which current patterns of global change affect people's expectations and possibilities for action at the end of the twentieth century. The new ease of communication, the wide interaction of ideas across geographical boundaries, create conditions for individuals to define and protect their "personhood" at many levels of society. As Gita Sen reminded the group, "globalization can be seen as a project of people, not just of transnationals".

> *The connection between globalization and citizenship is not one-way, or entirely negative.*
> **Anthony Giddens**

We are, she noted, caught up in a worldwide struggle to define and protect the basic elements of human dignity. And within this context, the broad ideals of citizenship are among the central mobilizing forces of our times. It is true that in most countries around the world, the legal structures — and the political and judicial institutions — required to support and protect newly proposed rights are not in place, nor is there any broad agreement on compliance with the obligations that must come with rights. Precisely because this is the case, the need to expand the dialogue on citizenship beyond the national level has become so urgent: people must find support outside their own national borders in order to reinforce their capacity to operate within them.

Yet it is possible to question, as a number of participants did, whether citizenship is the most appropriate concept for "building an ethos of solidarity beyond the nation state". Richard Falk reflected the opinions of others when he remarked that the essential quality of citizenship is the capacity to create territorially based structures of solidarity, to implement "a geographically grounded ideal of political community". Citizenship may well be an international ideal, but it is protected and implemented locally. And current trends seem in some respects to be undermining the conditions for citizenship even in established Western democracies.

In a paper on "the decline of citizenship in an era of globalization", Falk argued that the new importance of transnational relations is weakening established citizen states. Over a long period of time, it was possible to reconcile the "logic of market opportunity" with the "logic of territorial loyalty"; but this is no longer the case. Elites are increasingly likely to create bonds of solidarity across borders, rather than within them. And citizens intent upon resisting the abusive elements of globalization quite frequently follow suit. Organizing locally and transnationally, but often not nationally and not politically, their activity does little to offset the growing sense of political alienation within each country or to strengthen existing national institutions.

In Falk's view, reinforcing "disparate identities associated with gender, race...or diverse types of ecological consciousness, [as well as] a wide range of efforts to recover spiritual traditions" like those of native peoples, can be of only marginal relevance to the task of strengthening the core values of national citizenship. At the same time, the rise of civilizational, religious and ethnic identities erodes a sense of common membership in a civil community.

If transnational activism is oriented toward reinforcing narrow cross-border identities, it can damage the foundations of solidarity in advanced industrial democracies. And, as Björn Hettne noted, this would weaken the capacity of "decent democracies" to lend support to others engaged in the struggle to realize the ideals of citizenship. Falk stressed the importance of strengthening "civic" values and reinforcing democratic politics within countries of the

North, while also constructing more adequate forms of governance at regional and global levels.

## Globalization, levels of living and the construction of democracy in developing countries

To a far greater extent than in the developed industrial world, Third World countries have been severely affected by trends of global change over the past few decades. How have these developments affected the capacity of people to establish and defend democratic institutions? On the second day of the conference, one session was dedicated to this question.

> *There is no way you can build democracy on a sustainable scale on foundations of poverty.*
> **Yusuf Bangura**

In his discussion of the current situation in Africa, Yusuf Bangura focused particularly on four themes in the study of representative government: plural politics, parties independent of government, some alternation of governments and an effective guarantee of basic human rights. He also called the attention of the group to the contradictions inherent in the international effort to promote democracy while also insisting upon economic reforms with profoundly negative implications for the level of living of the majority.

Bangura painted a picture of considerable progress toward democratic politics in Africa. There has been a noteworthy shift in the political culture, away from support for one-party government and toward pluralism. In many countries, people are fighting resolutely for their political rights. Nevertheless, the groups that ultimately gain power tend to appropriate the state for themselves, and state structures are often weak and under-institutionalized.

The struggle for democracy has been immensely complicated by long economic crisis, which reinforces the precariousness of national administrative and judicial capacity in many countries. The middle class has virtually collapsed in some situations; and growing inequality lends new life to clientelism. Most people in politics struggle to control resources concentrated in the capital, while the remainder of the national territory languishes. At the same time, the extremely heterogeneous ethnic composition of many countries exacerbates problems of representation and dialogue. In Bangura's opinion, the basic institutional structure of African states must be strengthened and economic crisis overcome if the future of many areas of the continent is not to be marked by anarchy or imperialism.

> *Islamic societies now find themselves in the opening rounds of what the West went through in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in redefining the relationship between God and Man, among human beings, and between themselves and the state. I believe that Muslim societies will emerge from this process as more rational and more democratic. The process could be much shorter and less costly, however, if the West lends an honest hand on the side of democratic forces.*
> **Saad Eddin Ibrahim**

In their analyses of the situation in South Asia and the Arab world, Rehman Sobhan and Saad Eddin Ibrahim both emphasized the fact that democracy is a long-term project. It needs time. And as Sobhan put it succinctly, "sustainability is the problem". It is to be expected that two steps forward may be followed by one step back. But to avoid a situation in which progress is followed by collapse, a large number of people must feel that they have a stake in the continuation of democratic régimes. Thus "the essence of sustainability is the capacity to improve people's livelihood".

Beyond that basic point, there are considerable differences in the nature and extent of the democratic projects under way in various countries. Sobhan outlined some of the principal problems to be considered in each Asian case, including the difficulty of building consensus in often highly confrontational settings; the weakness of civil society; the phenomenon of democratic parties led by autocratic leaders; the political strength of plutocracies; and the role of religious fundamentalism.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim placed régimes in the Muslim world along a continuum "from Taliban to Erbakan": from extremist fundamentalism to democratic Islam. He explained that political Islam has grown and spread in the last two decades as an idiom of protest against repression and social injustice. Young, educated members of the lower middle class have been particularly hurt by economic crisis and unresponsive political régimes; and they form an important part of fundamentalist movements. But "Islamic militants are tameable, through accommodative politics of inclusion. Running for office, or once in it, they recognize the complexities of the real world and the need for gradualism and toleration". Iran provides an object lesson in this regard.

> *There is no strong civil society without*
> *a revitalized state.*
> *Without the rule of law,*
> *how can citizens count on anything?*
> **Charles Reilly**

Latin America is a part of the world in which there has been a broad shift from authoritarian to democratic régimes during the past two decades. Nevertheless, Charles Reilly noted that there is a long road to travel before democratic practices permeate many levels of Latin American society. Focusing particularly on "the art of association" at the municipal level, he described innovative efforts to create the conditions for democratic participation and accountability within the cities and towns of the region. At the same time, he warned of widespread and growing political apathy in some countries, as continuing economic hardship among large numbers of people fuels disenchantment with democratic reform.

The return of the military is a real possibility in several Latin American countries, and the military constitutes one of the most important elements of capricious or non-accountable political power in Africa, South Asia and the Arab world as well. There are, however, other forces that exert considerable power behind the scenes, without any necessary subjection to public scrutiny. Rehman Sobhan noted that international financial institutions and foreign investors have special agendas that can be promoted outside the democratic process; and in fact, economic conditionality and democratic process can frequently be at odds with each other. Over the past few decades, economic and social policy reforms have been promulgated in many indebted Third World countries with only minimal attention to democratic procedure. If they had been subject to public debate, a certain number of them would never have been accepted.

In the last analysis, democratic "sustainability" must rest on a firm institutional foundation, including efficient and legitimate courts, impartial electoral commissions, well-run legislative bodies, and free and responsible media. Much can, and has, been learned by encouraging an exchange of information among countries on specific questions of institutional reform. In his intervention, Bengt Säve-Söderbergh pointed out some of the areas in which international dialogue can play a role in strengthening the infrastructure of democracy.

He concentrated particularly on improvements in electoral procedures. In the past, "the old conception of sovereignty" made it difficult to exchange useful technical information on how to carry out free and fair elections in an efficient manner. But now it is possible to create an international association of electoral commissions, and to have a professional discussion on issues of common concern. This may lead to the elaboration of an internationally accepted code of conduct, as well as a project to reduce the high costs of elections.

It should be noted that the new ease of communication among people around the world is also giving rise to co-operative exchanges among parliamentarians in both North and South, who are interested in finding ways to improve the efficiency of legislative procedures. The Inter-Parliamentary Union plays a particularly important role in such efforts.

## Citizenship and the world order

If, in centuries past, democracy could be created and sustained largely as a national project, in which the surrounding international context played a relatively minor role, this is certainly no longer the case. With increasing interdependence among economies and societies around the world, the nurturing of democracy depends upon the existence of a favourable — or at least not systematically unfavourable — international environment.

> *Either we accept that democratic systems are largely incomplete due to the lack of a congenial world order or we attempt to extend democracy to international life as well. This means...developing methods of civilized co-existence that allow communities to democratically address problems that also involve others.*
> **Daniele Archibugi**

The end of the Cold War eliminates one long-standing element of international support for undemocratic régimes. But the promotion of a broader atmosphere of world peace and economic prosperity depends upon defining new arrangements for effective international co-operation. Sir Shridath Ramphal drove home the point when he said that "the essential management of interdependencies and global risks cannot be rooted in yesterday's concepts.... There must be effective multilateralism, more shared responsibilities, less paranoia about sovereignty, more genuine acceptance of the idea of global society".

Conference participants discussed a number of proposals for meeting this challenge. No one felt that it would be either advisable or possible to work toward the creation of a single world government. Yet they all noted that some form of "global identity" is emerging — not (as in the history of national citizenship) as a concomitant of a unitary political project, but as a growing consciousness that all human beings have some general problems in common. What institutional innovations can facilitate constructive attention to these shared problems, providing supranational spaces for discussion and action without ignoring either the reality of national sovereignty or the importance of local-level democracy?

*Embryonic global civil society is not global citizenship.*
**Richard Falk**

There was general agreement that processes of gradual regional integration, of the kind underlying the European Union, offer the best immediate hope for dealing with common economic and social problems beyond national boundaries. Björn Hettne described the "New Regionalism" now taking shape in response to global challenges. Unlike the older version, it is not fundamentally influenced by the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War. It provides an opportunity to reinforce cultural pluralism and to create a degree of protection from world market forces. In a sense, by "scaling down" from globalization, regionalism provides some hope for "humanizing" the wider process. At the same time, by "scaling up" from purely national confines, it creates new scope for dealing with economic crisis, human rights violations and problems of regional security.

Johan Galtung outlined a proposal for what he called "soft global citizenship", which was also based upon the encouragement of regional confederations, "like the European Community before it embarked on 'ever closer union' after Maastricht". Both Galtung and Daniele Archibugi then went on to consider possible reforms in the United Nations system that might provide improved opportunities for avoiding conflict and exercising civic responsibility in areas where global action is increasingly required.

Galtung suggested recognizing the growing importance of civil society — what Ramphal described as "people acting together worldwide, people as distinct from governments" — by creating a United Nations People's Assembly to supplement the United Nations General Assembly. The new body would be composed of representatives of non-governmental organizations, chosen through national elections — perhaps on the basis of one representative per one million inhabitants. Their organizations would be previously screened on the basis of criteria like international representativity, accountable leadership, and concern with basic human problems.

In addition, there might be a third assembly made up of transnational corporations, admitted after reviewing their commitment to democratic practices and social responsibility. The United Nations Corporate Assembly would be a consultative and advisory body, developing procedures that could facilitate contributions by transnational business interests to sustainable development.

The kind of reform of the international system envisioned by Daniele Archibugi goes still further in recognizing the role of non-state actors in a new world order. Archibugi is engaged (with David Held) in constructing a theoretical and institutional framework for "cosmopolitan democracy", which would (in the words of Mary Kaldor) create "a layer of governance that constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty of states and yet does not itself constitute a state. In other words, a cosmopolitan institution would co-exist with a system of states but would override states in certain clearly defined spheres of activity".

The model for this intermediate situation is the European Union, which Archibugi, like Galtung, uses as the starting point for considering the way a reformed world system might look. The General Assembly of the United Nations is an intergovernmental body that corresponds to some extent to the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Archibugi would retain its inter-state nature, but make it more democratic by requiring that each country delegation include representatives of both the government and the opposition. He proposes adding a UN People's Assembly (corresponding to the European Parliament), composed not of NGO representatives (as Galtung suggested), but of individual citizens, chosen in national elections.

The involvement of civil society in the world organization would also be expanded by giving its representatives a consultative role in the Security Council and limiting (and eventually eliminating) the power of veto. Furthermore, Archibugi suggests that the composition of the Council might be diversified by providing representation to supranational groupings like the European Union. He proposes strengthening the power of the International Court of Justice by making compulsory jurisdiction a condition of membership in the United Nations. Finally, the International Court of Justice (in which the responsible parties are states) should be flanked by an International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. "The fact that jurisdiction [in this second case] is individual means that the responsibilities of a people may be separated from those of its rulers, and it is therefore possible to punish the wrongdoers" without devastating a national population.

> *As a journey, the democratic process is not only unfinished but also endless.*
> **Daniele Archibugi**

Proponents of "cosmopolitan democracy" see proposals like those outlined above as merely the first steps in "the progressive evolution of political systems to meet individuals' demands for participation". The continuing challenge is "to identify the areas in which [people] should have rights and duties as inhabitants of the world", rather than simply as inhabitants of countries, and to create the institutions that respond to specific spheres of competence.

## Expanding the boundaries of citizenship: The practical experience of the European Union

This is an explicit proposal for the construction of "world citizenship" — not as an effort to replace national citizenship, but as a way of complementing it. Such a project is no longer entirely visionary. Precedent for a gradual expansion of citizenship beyond national boundaries can be found in the recent experience of Western Europeans, who — in addition to their political membership in their own national communities — have also become citizens of the supranational space of Europe. Alastair Davidson reviewed this experience during the final session of the conference, tracing the evolution of European citizenship from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

He reminded the group at the outset that Europeans have crafted something going far beyond the usual conception of dual [national] citizenship. They have created "an expanded citizenship which covers areas not within the jurisdiction of any single Member State; and the rights and duties it confers are different and perhaps greater than those of national citizenship".

The gradual construction of European citizenship responded primarily to practical needs, and not to idealistic motives. Once the decision was taken to base the post-war reconstruction of the continent on the free movement of capital, goods and labour, the definition of a supranational rule of law was necessary in order to facilitate the process of exchange. "The European experience teaches us", Davidson stressed, "that willy nilly, sooner or later, a common economic space brings with it a rule of law and political institutions".

One of the early challenges faced within the region was the specification of certain basic rights for citizens of one member country who resided or worked in another. When these rights were infringed, it was necessary for aggrieved parties to have recourse to supranational courts. Furthermore, to bolster the legitimacy of such essential European institutions, it was important for citizens of member nations to feel that they had some representation in the process of policy-making. The European Parliament was created.

Little by little, the elements of community began to fall into place. Davidson stressed the procedural, minimalist nature of the undertaking, rather than any systematic attempt to exploit a common cultural heritage. “Communities are not historical givens. They are constructed politically. In the case of Europe, they are constructed by many different ethnic, religious and cultural groups, who have no shared [sense of solidarity]. Indeed, their memories are of antagonisms” which have yet to be entirely forgotten.

European institutions were developed during decades of rapid economic growth and expanding prosperity. But recession and rising unemployment are now changing the economic and social context of this experiment in regional integration. Since states still form the basis of the Union, there is a growing temptation to withdraw within them — to recreate distinctions between “us” and “them”. The economic policy requirements of monetary union exacerbate this trend.

At the same time, the European Union faces the continuing challenge of finding a way to facilitate democratic participation across vast distances and among some 370 million citizens. As conference participants remarked, these are practical problems that would, of course, be magnified if one were to think in terms of a United Nations People’s Assembly or other forms of citizen’s representation at a global level.

Certainly it seems necessary — whether the context is regional or global — to adopt the principle of “subsidiarity”, implying a commitment to deal with problems at the lowest possible level of effective organization. But this may not necessarily imply restricting co-operation to limited geographical areas within states. Collaboration on common issues can be efficient and well-focused even when it involves people living at great distance from each other. For example, Davidson referred briefly to experiments in direct democracy using electronic technology to link citizens of the European Union in specific issue networks, for the purpose of making suggestions and forwarding proposals to the relevant authorities of the Union.

New opportunities for democratic consultation along “functional”, rather than spatial, lines would seem to be one of the most significant hallmarks of the new global age.

## Global economic governance and social citizenship

The problems of slow growth and rising unemployment that afflict such a large part of the world pose fundamental threats to democracy and citizenship in both North and South. The final roundtable of the conference began with a call by Ajit Singh for the kind of macro-economic co-ordination among industrial countries that could stimulate faster expansion of real aggregate demand and production, without leading to inflation. This, in turn, would lead to higher levels of employment and output in the developing world. The success of such an effort would, however, depend fundamentally upon renewing processes of consultation and co-ordination among business, labour and government within each OECD country, so that wage and price movements could be monitored. This is not an unrealistic suggestion; it has worked well in the past and could do so in the future. The recent economic gains of The Netherlands are based in part upon such measures.

At the same time, instruments of global economic governance require reform. Both Sir Shridath Ramphal and Mats Karlsson called for the creation of an Economic Security Council within the United Nations system, to permit a broader and more institutionalized co-ordination of international economic policy than that currently conducted under the aegis of the Group of 7 industrialized countries. A number of participants also suggested strengthening the International Monetary Fund, so that it can in future fulfil its original mandate to

discipline surplus as well as deficit countries, rather than compelling adjustment from the South alone.

Karlsson drew attention as well to the need to rethink development assistance, which is currently declining markedly and — with the added burden of continuing humanitarian crises — is clearly "stretched to the limit". Despite the fact that in some respects such assistance is becoming part of a "global public system", there is no adequate institutional framework for its administration.

At present, E.V.K. FitzGerald explained, the debate on development assistance is oriented by two quite different models. The first rests on a perceived mandate to correct the "market imperfections" that prevent people everywhere from gaining equal access to the global economy. This appears to be the logic of the approach espoused by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose efforts are focused upon supporting the full integration of developing countries into the global economy. Nevertheless, even if equitable treatment in the marketplace were assured — a virtually impossible task in practice — this could not correct the fundamental inequalities that already exist among people with very different assets and capacities.

The second model, espoused particularly by United Nations agencies, assumes that the central purpose of development assistance is to ensure the attainment of minimum levels of health, education and nutrition everywhere in the world. Although in its humanitarian guise this may be an argument for compassion, the "human entitlements" approach also reflects an incipient commitment to "global social citizenship". There is an affirmation of certain basic rights; and this carries with it an obligation to transfer funds, raised in the first instance within developed countries, but perhaps also from taxes on such global transactions as international air travel or short-term capital flows.

At present, the first model is predominant. But it is still important to think about the implications of the second. What would happen if the international community took seriously an obligation to guarantee full-fledged "global social citizenship"? A number of issues come immediately to mind, including the question of cost. FitzGerald estimates that even to bring the 1.3 billion people in the world, who currently fall below the World Bank's absolute poverty line, up to a minimum level of subsistence income would involve multiplying current development assistance expenditures by four. There seems little justification for optimism about the likelihood that this will be accomplished in the immediate future.

A second issue is institutional. Where would administration of transfers be lodged, and what kinds of procedures could ensure efficient use of the funds? It is possible that a United Nations body might oversee the programme, or the "eventual successors of the Bretton Woods Institutions". But regional organizations might be far better placed to fulfil this function. In any case, the degree of conditionality involved in transferring resources would probably be far greater than it is within present development assistance programmes. It would also be of a different quality: the recognition of universal rights and obligations should radically change the meaning of conditionality and make it more acceptable to all concerned.

## Citizenship and the global migration of labour

In the contemporary world, migration by at least one member of a family living below the poverty line is perhaps the single most effective way of ensuring that its basic needs will be met. Yet the current global regime does not allow for the free movement of labour; and the rights of migrant workers are often sharply curtailed, even within states to which they are legally admitted. This creates a situation in which (as Rehman Sobhan noted) "work and residence [may in the case of migrant workers be] delinked from the wider notion of citizenship". In his view, this is an unsustainable situation.

*The proposition that you can globalize all other factors of production, but somehow keep the most important factor of production — labour — under control, is in my view unsustainable. The new comparative advantage is with the emigrant labour of the South. How will the practice of citizenship in the North adjust to these new realities?*
**Rehman Sobhan**

E.V.K. FitzGerald pointed out that existing limitations on the free movement of labour create a situation in which citizenship becomes an exclusive form of property and thus an economic asset. Certain people are able to gain access to the rights of "citizens" that others cannot have. As a scarce commodity, citizenship in some parts of the world must logically have a price. And in fact, recent libertarian proposals (in the tradition of von Hayek) to admit immigrants who can contribute a certain amount of capital to the receiving country, would in effect formalize the "purchase" of citizenship.

Many would assert, with Alain Touraine, that "if citizenship is a commodity, it is no longer citizenship". But the point driven home by FitzGerald and Sobhan remains important: in a world of falling borders, where capital, goods and aspirations for a better life "float free" of geographical constraints, the current régime of nationality and citizenship puts "labour" (embodied, after all, in human beings) at great disadvantage. The structures of solidarity on which national citizenship rests are often neither congruent with impermanent residence nor easily adapted to great cultural difference.

The Convention on Migrant Workers' Rights of 1992 attempts to improve the situation, but (Yash Ghai noted) it is unlikely to be ratified by most states, whether eastern or western. In Ghai's view, the solution must be more sweeping: "the time has come to accept the notion of a global citizen, with certain rights and duties as portable as a suitcase".

*Rights have always been a matter of balancing. In the past these involved, for the most part, balancing the interests of the state against those of the individual. Today the recognition of new rights and the multiculturalism of our societies additionally requires balancing political and civil rights against social, economic and cultural rights — as well as balancing the rights and dignity of different communities.*
**Yash Ghai**

In a broader perspective, globalization exacerbates a number of problems characteristic of multicultural societies. The question of how to reconcile a régime of standard individual rights and obligations with the protection of cultural difference is not easily resolved. Should certain group rights be created, or exceptions to norms and laws be tolerated in an effort to accommodate the customs of minorities? Countries around the world have provided a variety of answers to this question.

The challenge of multiculturalism is so central to any consideration of globalization and citizenship that a number of participants felt it required separate, sustained attention. Therefore the interrelation of global migration, multiculturalism and citizenship became the

principal focus for a second conference, sponsored by UNRISD and the Australian university consortium, and held in Melbourne during May 1997.[1]

## Mapping new areas of research and dialogue

Participants in the Geneva conference on Globalization and Citizenship were left with a number of questions, arising during their discussions over the course of three days. Some of these have to do with the economic and social transformations that underlie the growing interrelatedness of people around the world. Others are associated with the function and meaning of citizenship at a time when the "logic of market opportunity" no longer coincides as closely as before with the "logic of territorial loyalty". Still others imply analysis of the changing nature of international or supranational governance in a world that has an increasingly global economy, without a global state.

A few of these questions, which seem most amenable to further research and discussion, are listed below.

**The forces driving global economic liberalization.** There is clearly room for greater factual clarity and public awareness concerning the reasons why "global markets" are being structured as they are. What, for instance, is the recent social and political history of the liberalization of financial markets? Since this development sharply limits the capacity of governments to promote employment — and thus to improve the life chances of a great many people — its social and political roots should be carefully explored. Are there differences of opinion — different "alternative scenarios" for the future — within the financial community itself? What do various sectors of the transnational business community think about financial liberalization? In the area of trade liberalization, what measures do various groups support and how?

Questions of this kind lead to research (like that suggested by Karl Eric Knutsson) on the "social fields" that surround (and shape) global economic liberalization. "The market" is made up of people with values and interests which should be made specific when analysing the nature of globalization.

Empirical work on the forces driving economic liberalization can also draw attention to the fact that globalization is a political process, and thus amenable to political change.

**The forces and issues driving "globalization from below".** It could be extremely useful to document and analyse the dynamics of cross-border collaboration on the part of groups like the labour movement, consumers' movements or environmentalists as they confront specific common problems. The debate on the "social clause" could provide revealing insights on the complex interests at stake in the process of "globalization from below".

> *Globalization presents new epistemological challenges.*
> *We must not enclose our thoughts in 'systems'*
> *or taxonomical boxes. It is necessary to look*
> *at 'flows' within a porous reality.*
> **Karl Eric Knutsson**

**The regional framework of globalization and citizenship.** Specific processes of economic liberalization and organized social response can be especially well studied within the context

[1] Information on the conference can be obtained by writing to the Centre for Urban and Social Research of the Swinburne University of Technology, John Street, Hawthorne, Victoria 3122, Australia. Fax: (61 3) 9 819 5349; E-mail: CUSR@swin.edu.au

of regional economic integration. There is obviously a useful place for comparative research on the inter-linked economic, social and political dynamics of transnational contacts within regions. Is regional integration providing new possibilities for "humanizing" globalization? And if so, how? What elements of "regional citizenship" seem to be emerging?

A growing number of people are doing innovative work in this field.

**International issues networks and the creation of new rights.** Following the advice of several speakers to look at the creation of rights as an open-ended political process, it could be very useful to analyse the process of cross-national organization and debate leading to the definition of new rights. Problems of defining and enforcing the corresponding obligations should also be carefully considered. Institution building is one of these problematic aspects.

**Information technology and social development.** The communications revolution lies at the heart of globalization. But it would be shortsighted to take this phenomenon, in its present form, as a "given" of contemporary history. Developments in the field of information technology respond to the needs of concrete groups and interests. Decisions are taken daily concerning alternative products, techniques and use of available resources. In other worlds, there are choices to be made that can affect the impact of this "revolution" on people in different parts of the world.

How can information technology be used to improve the conditions of less advantaged groups? What are the basic elements required for promoting an inclusive information society, rather than a world in which communications breakthroughs exacerbate polarization and increase cultural conflict?

> *Markets and rules are two sides of the same coin. Today, Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' is revealed as our own; and game theorists show economists that making rules is just as natural for human beings as making markets.*
> **Hazel Henderson**

**Transnational corporations as "global citizens".** The need for corporate accountability is much mentioned in discussions of global economic, social and environmental trends. What instruments are currently available for encouraging a responsible use of power among these businesses? What initiatives have been developed and to what effect? The international political background for such efforts should be discussed in some detail.

In addition, it would be important to understand the kinds of scenarios for the transformation of international governance currently under consideration in the global corporate world.

**Alternatives to global markets.** Exchange is a social process and therefore not inevitably subject to the impersonal forces of "the market". In fact, as Hazel Henderson noted, there has been a remarkable expansion in alternative trade arrangements over the past few years, within developed and developing countries and across the globe. How has this process evolved, what are its principal characteristics and what is its future? What does its development have to say about the nature of citizenship in a global age?

**"Global civil society" and international organizations.** Since so much of the discussion on reforming the United Nations system (and international financial institutions) assumes a greater role for "global civil society", it is obviously necessary to analyse the degree to which conditions exist for such innovations. What, exactly, is "global civil society" and how does it

interact with national governments, parliaments, organizations in other countries, and the international system? There is room for empirical work in this area.

> *'Citizen' translates as 'citoyen' and 'cittadino'. It does not, I am told, translate as 'shimi'. This would suggest that [it is essential] to try to understand the different traditions of civic commitment, emerging from different pasts, which must now try to work together.*
> **Alastair Davidson**

**Traditions of civic commitment in different cultural settings.** As Alastair Davidson noted, the concept of "citizen" is difficult to translate in many languages around the world. Nevertheless, every society has a tradition of civic commitment. In an increasingly interdependent world, it becomes especially important to understand these traditions. They are the groundwork on which any global civic ethic must be built.

**Constructing citizenship in societies with weak states.** New citizenship discourses are appearing in parts of the world where state structures are weak and national sentiment relatively "thin". Often this is associated with "late" nation building and/or the struggle for democratic political participation in the midst of civil strife. How does globalization affect the construction of citizenship in such settings? Here the problematic relation between economic reform and democracy might well become an issue.

**Social policy, globalization and citizenship.** Charles Reilly remarked upon the urgent need to "use social policy as a tool of democracy". As rapid change creates new patterns of vulnerability within populations, unprecedented demands are made upon existing forms of social protection. At the same time, entirely new ways of providing for people's needs must sometimes be found. The way social policy is structured in this context will undoubtedly affect the likelihood that citizenship can be constructed or reinforced.

There is ample room for new work in the field of social policy, relating recent developments both to particular processes of social change and to the implications that new approaches to social protection may have for democratic governance.

> *It is very hard to see how any global citizenship in a shrinking world can survive without a deep spirit of respect, curiosity and dialogue.*
> **Johan Galtung**

**Education for citizenship.** There is a "culture of citizenship", as Elizabeth Jelin reminded the group. The values of tolerance and respect for others' rights, as well as the willingness to accept various civic obligations, are learned — both through interacting with others in a society and through formal education. In many situations, this frame of mind does not prevail; and even though legal provisions supporting citizenship may be in place, the daily behaviour of people is not congruent with them.

One indispensable element of democratic reform in many countries is therefore to encourage the development of a culture of citizenship. Television, radio, classroom presentations, neighbourhood meetings — all can play a role in raising awareness of others' rights and explaining the obligations of citizenship. There are many initiatives in this field that would be worthy of analysis and replication — particularly at a time when the message provided by most media is likely to stress the benefits of competition and individual advancement.

**Development assistance and social citizenship.** Could development assistance be reoriented toward ensuring people's rights to certain basic levels of education, health and nutrition? And could this be accomplished in a participatory way, so that demand would be expressed from the grassroots — and conditionality would be reinforced by monitoring, carried out by recipients themselves? What institutional innovations could underpin such an — at present — utopian scheme?

> *We need new indicators. Ideally we should have a flow chart for the world, showing how value is extracted from nature, how value is added, how value flows in all directions and is distributed, so that people can judge for themselves whether the distribution is equitable or not....*
> **Johan Galtung**

**Monitoring globalization: The need for innovative indicators and improved statistics.** Indicators are a political, as well as a technical, tool. They point to certain areas of reality that deserve sustained public attention. If globalization does indeed signal revolutionary economic and social change, then surely there should be new initiatives in the area of information gathering, designed to capture some of the most important new developments at local, national and international levels.

Similarly, as Mike Salvaris stressed at one point in the discussion, the struggle to promote and defend the rights of citizens should be accompanied by new efforts to establish benchmarks and chart progress toward these goals. This is s task in which local-level participation is very important. It is also an area in which networking among concerned citizens in different regions and countries can prove especially useful. It is one of the cornerstones of current efforts on the part of concerned citizens in Australia to "humanize" global economic liberalization.

**Implications for the research programme of UNRISD.** UNRISD is building international research networks in a number of areas just listed above. It now has new programmes on Information Technology and Social Development, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, and Institutional Reform in Crisis-Ridden States. Initiatives in other areas will follow.

# Agenda

***Globalization and Citizenship: An International Conference***
***Geneva, 9-11 December 1996***

**Monday** **9 December**

9:00 - 10:00 **Opening Session**
**Opening statement**
- Dharam Ghai *(UNRISD)*
- Mike Salvaris *(Swinburne University of Technology)*

**Keynote address**
- Anthony Giddens *(London School of Economics and Political Science)*

10:00 - 12:30 **Session One**
**Globalization and Citizenship: The Cultural, Political and Institutional Background**
**Chairperson**
- Dharam Ghai *(UNRISD)*

**The nation state and citizenship**
- Johan Galtung *(University of Hawai'i and Witten/Herdecke University)*

**Discussant**
- Alastair Davidson *(Swinburne University of Technology)*

Half hour of general discussion

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee

**Political economy of the international system**
- Richard Falk *(Princeton University)*

**Discussant**
- Björn Hettne *(University of Göteborg)*

Half hour of general discussion

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch

14:00 - 17:30 **Session Two**
**Global Standards and their Enforcement in Different Cultural and Political Contexts**
**Chairperson**
- Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara *(UNRISD)*

**Political economy of human rights**
- Yash Ghai *(University of Hong Kong)*

**Discussant**
- Mike Salvaris *(Swinburne University of Technology)*

Half hour of general discussion

16:00 - 16:30 Coffee

**Globalization and cultural fragmentation**
- Alain Touraine *(Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales)*

Half hour of general discussion

18:15 - 19:30 Cocktails

**Tuesday** **10 December**

9:00 - 12:30 **Session Two (continued)**
**Chairperson**
- Aleya El-Bindari Hammad *(Health Policy in Development, World Health Organization)*

**Political economy of labour standards**

- Eddy Lee *(International Labour Organization)*

**Discussant**

- Hans Engelberts *(Public Services International)*

**The rights of children**

- Karl Eric Knutsson *(Stockholm University)*

**Discussant**

- Roberto Toscano *(Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations)*

Half hour of general discussion

10:00 - 10:30 Coffee

**Health and reproductive rights**

- Gita Sen *(Indian Institute of Management)*

**Discussant**

- Jane Cottingham *(World Health Organization)*

Half hour of general discussion

**Global environmental citizenship**

- Elizabeth Jelin *(CONICET)*

**Discussant**

- Kevin J. Lyonette *(Sustainable Development Services)*

Half hour of general discussion

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch

14:00 - 16:15 **Session Three**

**A Roundtable on Strengthening the Institutions of Democracy**

**Chairperson**

- Bengt Säve-Söderbergh *(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)*

**A global perspective**

- Bengt Säve-Söderbergh *(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)*

**Regional perspectives:**

- Africa - Yusuf Bangura *(UNRISD)*
- Asia - Rehman Sobhan *(Centre for Policy Dialogue)*
- Middle East - Saad Eddin Ibrahim *(Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies)*
- Latin America - Charles Reilly *(Inter-American Development Bank)*

One hour of general discussion

16:15 - 16:45 Coffee

16:45 - 18:00 **Session Four**

**Future Research Priorities**

**Chairperson**

- Dharam Ghai *(UNRISD)*

**Opening statements:**

- Peter Utting *(UNRISD)*
- Mike Salvaris *(Swinburne University of Technology)*

One hour of general discussion

**Wednesday 11 December**

**Room XVI (5th floor), Palais des Nations**

**Public Meeting**

9:00 - 10:45 **Opening Session**

**Opening statement**

- Dharam Ghai *(UNRISD)*

**Keynote addresses**

**Globalization and Citizenship: Political Institutions and Civil Society**

- Sir Shridath Ramphal *(Commission on Global Governance)*

**Globalization and Citizenship: Social and Economic Dimensions**

- Mats Karlsson *(Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)*

Half hour of general discussion

10:45 - 11:15 Coffee

11:15 - 13:00 **A Roundtable on Citizenship and the International Economic System**

**Chairperson**

- Jean-François Giovannini *(Swiss Development Cooperation, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)*

**Governance of the global economy**

- Ajit Singh *(University of Cambridge)*

**Transnational corporations and global citizenship**

- Hazel Henderson *(Global futurist)*

**Rethinking development assistance**

- E.V.K. FitzGerald *(University of Oxford)*

**The civil society perspective**

- T. Rajamoorthy *(Third World Network)*

Half hour of general discussion

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch

14:30 - 16:30 **A Roundtable on Expanding the Boundaries of Citizenship**

**Chairperson**

- Dharam Ghai *(UNRISD)*

**Citizenship and regional integration: The experience of the European Union**

- Alastair Davidson *(Swinburne University of Technology)*

**Perspective from the Third World**

- Rehman Sobhan *(Centre for Policy Dialogue)*

**The United Nations and global restructuring**

- Daniele Archibugi *(Consiglio Nazionale delle Richerche)*

**Position of the South Centre**

- Branislav Gosovic *(South Centre)*

One hour of general discussion

## List of Participants

***Globalization and Citizenship: An International Conference***
***Geneva, 9-11 December 1996***

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**Ms. Gerd JOHNSSON**
First Secretary

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