Globethics Repository

Beneficiaries of the illicit drug trade

This page was generated automatically upon download from the Globethics Repository. More information on Globethics see https://www.globethics.net. Data and content policy of Globethics Repository see https://repository.globethics.net/pages/policy.

Item Type	Book
Authors	Tullis, LaMond
Publisher	UNRISD
Rights	With permission of the license/copyright holder
Download date	2026-07-07 01:18:22
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/179434

UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Discussion Paper 19

BENEFICIARIES OF THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE:

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY AT THE INTERSECTION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND

by

LaMond Tullis

UNRISD Discussion Papers are preliminary documents circulated in a limited number of copies to stimulate discussion and critical comment.

March 1991

The **United Nations Research Institute for Social Development** is an autonomous body which conducts research on key issues of contemporary social development. Current research themes include **Crisis, Adjustment and Social Change; Environment, Sustainable Development and Social Change; Ethnic Conflict and Development; Social and Development Indicators; Political Violence and Social Movements; Refugees, Returnees and Local Society; Socio-economic and Political Consequences of the International Trade in Illicit Drugs** and **Social Participation and Changes in the Ownership of the Means of Production in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union.**

A list of the Institute's free and priced publications can be obtained from the Reference Centre.

United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland

✆ (41.22) 798.84.00/798.58.50
Fax (41.22) 740.07.91
Telex 41.29.62 UNO CH

ISSN 1012-6511

The designations employed in UNRISD publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNRISD concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by UNRISD of the opinions expressed in them.

Preface

Over the past few years, the production, trade and consumption of narcotic drugs have expanded to a point where tens of millions of persons are affected as producers, consumers or traffickers. Revenues from the sale of drugs have been estimated at several hundred billions of dollars. The activities of the various parties involved in the drug industry have far-reaching social, economic and political consequences. Many of these consequences derive from the fact that the operations of this industry are illegal in most countries of the world.

While there has been a considerable amount of discussion on the impact of the consumption of narcotic drugs and on the policy alternatives to deal with the problem in the industrialized countries, especially in the United States, very little is known about the impact of production, commerce and consumption of the drugs in the developing countries. Likewise, while policy discussions, proposals and actions have concentrated for the most part on methods to control the production and trade in drugs, much less attention has been given to efforts to influence the demand for them. It was because of these biases in the policy discussions and the relative paucity of information on the wide-ranging social and economic consequences of the production and consumption of illicit drugs in developing countries that UNRISD decided to launch research on this topic.

The first phase of the project comprised a review of the existing literature on the socio-economic and political impact of the production, trade and consumption of narcotic drugs covering both the producing and consuming countries. The intention was to prepare an annotated bibliography and a review monograph based on the literature survey. This phase has now been completed with the forthcoming publication of a book by LaMond Tullis, **Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences** (Greenwood Press, Westport). The next phase of the project, which is being carried out jointly with the United Nations University, comprises in-depth case studies of 10 developing countries with significant production facilities.

The present paper focuses on the beneficiaries of trade in narcotic drugs and traces some of its political consequences in producing countries. The huge trade in narcotic drugs has created a large and diverse network of beneficiaries ranging from big name traffickers to humble peasants and petty traders and support staff. Starting as a cottage industry only a few years ago, the drug business has taken more and more characteristics of a highly organized enterprise. While several traffickers have acquired fabulous wealth, millions of peasants have also drawn substantial material benefits from their participation in the industry.

Exports of narcotic drugs have also generated substantial economic benefits for the countries and the regions concerned. Apart from foreign exchange earnings, the drug industry has provided a boost to several depressed economies and has created employment for large numbers of persons. Peru's past president, Alan García, has spoken of his country's coca exports as "the only raw material that has increased in value" and that "the most successful effort to achieve Andean integration has been made by the drug traffickers". At the producer level, production of drug crops constitutes a highly labour-intensive and remunerative activity which injects new sources of demand for food and other goods and services in previously stagnant economies.

The drug industry has also had significant political consequences. The rising incidence of violence and terrorist activity and subversion of established authorities have been some of these consequences. The revenues from the drug business have also financed insurgency movements, civil wars and political parties and régimes.

Perhaps less known are changes in the power relationships of different groups and in social prospects for individuals involved in the industry. The author points to important realignments of balance of political forces in countries such as Peru and Bolivia which have led to a strengthening of the position of peasant associations and workers' unions. At the individual level, earnings from the drug industry either as producers, petty traders or support staff, have contributed to upward social mobility. New patterns of migration towards remote producing areas, frontier regions, forests and jungles have partly replaced the earlier movements from rural to urban areas.

The author of this paper is the co-ordinator of the research project on drugs. He is also Associate Academic Vice President of Brigham Young University in the United States and is currently a Visiting Fellow, Center of International Studies, Princeton University. He has done research in Latin America and has published on food security, politics, social change and rural development in Third World countries.

March 1991

Dharam Ghai
Director

The demand for and supply of illicit drugs, along with law enforcement efforts to reduce both, have combined to create new national and international régimes of social, political and economic exchange. This exchange has produced an unusual array of benefits and beneficiaries alongside its liabilities and victims.[1] Described and analysed herein are market suppliers and the ways by which some of them, and even some countries in which they live, have become exchange beneficiaries. Some of the political consequences of this exchange are examined, particularly with the prospect that national and international measures to reduce demand and supply if not suppress traffickers and deal humanely with drug addicts may at some point be successful.[2] Accordingly, this article seeks to look beyond current drug policy debates[3] to a moment in time when the long-term political effects of the new exchange régimes, not just the régimes, will command policy makers' attention.

Aside from big-name traffickers, among the beneficiaries are thousands of small-plot growers of the principal agricultural precursor crops (coca leaves, cannabis plants, opium poppies). Beyond the growers are the industry's ground support personnel operating in producer countries: *mulas* (couriers), *pisadores*,[4] field chemists, contact men, hawkers, lookouts, airfield clearers, conventional guards, paramilitary forces, protection agents, petty bankers, provisioners and traders. All have acquired new sources of income, substantial for some. Loathe to lose it, they have fanatically resisted domestic and international tampering with their work. This is one reason why cannabis plants, opium poppies and coca bushes have always been sufficient to meet whatever market demand traffickers have been able to satisfy. Traffickers, for their part, have been ingenious in devising ways to by-pass law enforcement controls.

What would likely happen to these politicized economic entrepreneurs should demand for their work - for whatever reason - precipitously decline?[5] What international policy implications would appear to lie "beyond success" in the drug war, for example, assuming that it may be forthcoming?

I

An examination of beneficiaries of the illicit drug trade necessarily begins with a discussion of the traffickers who supply the market and a description of their operational patterns. Trafficker patterns important to this analysis are both significant and distinguishable as to, first, the level of activity (whether traffickers are wholesalers, middlemen or retailers); second, the degree of organization (e.g., have payrolls or enforceable "personnel policies", develop specialized departments, have vertical integration, build or struggle over regional or countrywide market shares); third, which drug is being dealt; fourth, whether traffickers are allied with

insurgent or terrorist groups; and, finally, how organized traffickers approach market competition over market shares.

Early in the current drug use wave, much drug distribution was akin to a cottage industry - small-time traffickers, including tourists, picking up a few score grams of heroin or cocaine or a kilo of marijuana from a producer and distributing the product directly to casual but trusted contacts and personal friends, who in turn passed small amounts along, some of it for financial gain.

Some of the traffic is still carried out in a cottage-industry way. However, trafficking is increasingly "organized", particularly at production, wholesale and middleman levels, pronouncedly so for cocaine and heroin (apparently less so for marijuana). This appears to have pushed most of the small-time dealers into strictly retail street sales, with evidence that even here "organization" is taking place, at least in the United States where isolated "cottage industry" street vendors who buy from a wholesaler and then peddle their wares appear to be in decline in favour of more elaborate distribution networks. For example, some dealers now use children as fronts in order to take advantage of lenient juvenile crime laws, even when children are heavily and purposefully engaged in adult crimes.[6]

Some large, vertically integrated, multinational illicit drug distribution organizations existed as early as the 1930s. The "French Connection" (between refiners and traffickers headquartered in Marseilles and Turkish opium growers) supplied heroin to American addicts from the 1930s until 1973, when the Connection was terminated by an international law enforcement effort that destroyed not only the French laboratories but ultimately also put Turkish opium growers out of business.[7] The resulting shortage of heroin enabled Asian, Mexican and Pakistani traffickers to penetrate the American market as well as increase production to cover supply shortages elsewhere.[8]

Other early drug pushing organizations meeting their demise or falling on hard times are mentionable. The Sicilian "Pizza Connection" fell in 1984 as a consequence of law enforcement efforts.[9] One loose knit group making money from smuggling marijuana into the United States was "The Company". As of 1984, law enforcement penetration of this group was the largest ever in terms of number of indicted defendants, size of asset forfeitures to the government and the area covered by law enforcement covert operations.[10]

Of course, the main American Sicilian mafia dealing in drugs continues on, damaged from time to time, but nevertheless highly effective, particularly in the heroin market where it controls a worldwide network. The Sicilian mafia is also trying to carve out territorial control for itself in several cocaine markets.[11]

While the French, Pizza, Company and other connections have been put out of business by law enforcement efforts or were eclipsed by later comers - there being no shortage of people willing to organize

to meet market demand[12] - the old Sicilian mafia, albeit weakened, lives on. So also do a good many later comers - Chinese Triads[13] that are beginning to replace traditional organized crime networks in the Asian heroin market,[14] the Mexican mafia that specializes in cocaine, marijuana and Mexican heroin,[15] the Colombian cocaine cartels that, although somewhat loosely structured, nevertheless export violence along with their product and efficient organization wherever they operate,[16] the Japanese Yakuza that are now pushing narcotics (heroin, principally), with networks in Hawaii and the western United States,[17] Jamaican Posses, who have a high propensity for violence and like to traffic in large volumes of drugs (wholesale and retail) and firearms throughout the United States and the Caribbean,[18] the Aryan Brotherhood, the Texas Syndicate,[19] and additional statewide as well as many small regional groups.

The first United States federal reports on the corporate structure of the illegal drug trade identified 43 major groups operating in the United States.[20] Organized groups now involve rural operatives and Los Angeles street gangs.[21] These later comers are increasingly gravitating towards sophisticated organizational and distributional techniques, using all the high technology that is currently available to law enforcement agencies as a protective counter measure to increasingly refined law enforcement efforts.[22]

Aside from trafficking organizations that extend into or are based in principal consumer countries, evidence - both hard and soft - of substantial organized production and marketing networks is advanced for most of the "producer" or "transiting" countries not discussed above - Afghanistan,[23] Bolivia,[24] Laos,[25] Myanmar (Burma),[26] Pakistan,[27] Peru[28] and Thailand.[29] Sophisticated organizations have either existed or appear to be cropping up in countries "peripheral" to the drug trade - Argentina,[30] the Bahamas,[31] Brazil,[32] Bulgaria,[33] Canada,[34] Costa Rica,[35] Cuba,[36] El Salvador,[37] Haiti,[38] Honduras,[39] Panama,[40] Paraguay,[41] Turkey,[42] Turks and Caicos Islands,[43] Venezuela[44] and West Africa.[45]

Given the near universal illegality of current trafficking in clandestine drugs, it is understandable that the descriptor for organized drug groups is "organized crime".[46] Currently, it is hard to imagine any organized criminal group not having at least a portion of its operations dedicated to drug trafficking; the income is enormous and the prospects for more are staggering.

As of 1989, there appeared to be a growing tendency for some organized groups (when they were not fighting each other over market shares) to collaborate in co-operative arrangements to facilitate their work. It is reported that New York mafia "families" have strong ties to Colombian and Cuban dealers in the Miami area; they also work with Asian groups, some motorcycle gangs,[47] and the Italian mafia.[48] The so-called "Jamaican Posses", with around 10,000 members, traffic not only in marijuana but also in Colombian cocaine; they appear to be developing relationships with Los Angeles street gangs, themselves on the move into America's heartland

because of increased competition and apparent market saturation in Southern California.[49] The largest and best-known Colombian groups have developed important facilitating arrangements with "five Mexican families" and have a considerable distribution network (involving many Colombian nationals) in the United States and in Western Europe.[50]

Frequently questioned is whether terrorist or insurgent groups are really allied with any of these organizations (or the organizations themselves involved in terrorist activities), either to finance their operations, to prosecute an ideological position, to gain political support or to undermine an existing government. This seems particularly important to sort out, given that the United States government has long argued that such links and activities do indeed exist.[51]

A number of terrorist or insurgent organizations - whatever else drives them - deal in drugs for pragmatic reasons.[52] Several, particularly in coca growing regions of South America, use their support of the cocaine trade to bolster political positions and acquire operating funds even though they may be ideologically opposed to the drug trade itself.[53] A not-so-ideologically motivated group is protecting the new surge of opium poppy growing in Western Guatemala.[54] Colombian political terrorists are now said to be financing much of their operations through the drug trade, which has caused some "conventional" drug barons to explode in retribution.[55] This has contributed to the Colombian drug cartels' "drug terrorism", which they spawned in an effort to find a secure position for themselves in Colombian society.[56] An Ecuadorian terrorist group, which is said to be working in co-ordination with groups in Colombia and Peru, is also reported to be co-operating with regional drug traffickers.[57] Separatist terrorists in Sri Lanka are said to have become engaged in the drug traffick in order to finance their arms and ammunition purchases.[58] The United States-supported "*Contras*" in Central America were repeatedly accused of linking with drug traffickers in order to supplement their United States subsidies,[59] just as the rebels of Afghanistan did during the Soviet Union's occupation of their homeland.[60]

Some Colombian drug cartels are arming peasants in Bolivia in an effort to keep drug production sources open[61] and have even paid Colombian rebel groups, such as M19 guerrillas, to protect their laboratories and to eliminate their domestic opposition.[62]

Some insurgent groups, particularly in Myanmar and Thailand, are involved in a civil war.[63] Thus there is concern that the drug/terrorism connection will increasingly encourage terrorist groups to force agendas on governments, destabilize democracies, spawn anarchy and export revolution.[64]

There are even allegations that one government - Bulgaria - has dealt in drugs, weapons and terrorism in an effort to subvert Western governments in ways that allegedly were orchestrated in

Moscow. The matter prompted one United States senator to introduce a bill in congress that would have directed the president of the United States to conduct a comprehensive review of American policy toward Bulgaria.[65]

The better organized and perhaps more vertically integrated a group, the more likely it is able to vigorously prosecute its interests. This is particularly so when societies take strong counter measures to protect their own affairs. But to gauge the effect, trafficker activities must be cast against the political fabric of a nation. Where political institutions are relatively strong, traffickers appear to be a troubling but not strongly disruptive influence on national life. In other countries, drug traffickers are on centre stage and impose on the countries in which they operate a struggle, if not for a nation's institutional life, then certainly for discrete subnational territory and the lives of many citizens over which governments, not terrorists, are supposed to have jurisdiction. It therefore appears that criminal power resides best with those who can organize and fund the activity of crime **and** who operate in "weak" states. Under these circumstances, such activity is extremely lucrative.

All this notwithstanding, while currently the cocaine cartels seem to be the most efficient and profitable in their activities, this may derive not so much from impressive marketing organization (the heroin groups likely get the nod here) as from the product they peddle riding waves of increased demand - less so in the United States now, but more so in Europe and the Soviet Union. Moreover, owing to accidents of history and geography, cocaine production is relatively localized (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru) rather than being spread over various regions throughout the world. Vertical integration is therefore more possible, and control, even from "loose cartels", is more easily accomplished. Should the demand for cocaine subside, Colombia's cartels - their profits notwithstanding - would fall on abundantly hard times. In the meantime, however, they are strong enough to be more than just a "troubling influence" on Colombia's national life.

Marijuana traffickers are the least globally organized (even though marijuana is more widely used) which, coincidentally, is associated with marijuana's worldwide production geography ("anybody can grow it") and with what looks to be marijuana traffickers' relatively reduced power against and threat to societies that have criminalized their work.

The most vaunted beneficiaries of the illicit drug trade are, of course, the traffickers themselves. Their sudden rise to fortune, their conspicuous consumption, their multiple villas, ranches, retreats, estates, bunkers, hotels, apartment complexes, money laundering institutions, legitimate businesses, private armies, aircraft, ships, communications equipment and personal toys (e.g., private zoos) have all been discussed in the press.

Khun Sa, one of the opium warlords of the Golden Triangle, even holds news conferences to boast of his large fortune.[66] Roberto Suárez was, before his capture and incarceration in Bolivia,[67] sufficiently endowed economically to offer to pay off two thirds of his country's foreign debt (then running at $3,000,000,000) in exchange for government "tolerance".[68] The Colombians from the Medellín cartel - Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Jorge Ochoa, González Rodríguez Gacha (now deceased), Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela - have all been particularly conspicuous about their consumption.[69] Carlos Lehder (now serving a multiple life sentence in a Miami jail) was among the first not only to flaunt his wealth but to employ it for power.[70] And, in Mexico, Rafael Caro Quintero lavished on friends the kind of money that almost every Mexican appeared to covet.[71]

The major traffickers like to see themselves - and wish others would, too - as local entrepreneurs who create jobs and generate wealth for their countrymen.[72] It is true that communities have sometimes benefited immensely from the barons' largesse. The traffickers thereby win over the people in patterns of loyalty and dedication that protect them from the authorities.[73]

Drug demand produced the drug marketers; illegality turned them into national and international criminals who have copied the behaviour of age-old secret combinations. The social, economic and political havoc they have heaped on producer and consumer societies has few parallels; in the process their chiefs and numerous subalterns have become fabulously rich.

The secret drug combinations' success lies in part in the relative failure - cyclical exceptions notwithstanding - of drug control policies intended to cripple their abilities and incapacitate their criminal offshoots. That they continue to flourish in spite of efforts to undo them is testament either to their resiliency, to the relative incapacity of law enforcement and drug control agencies, to the inadequacy of international agreements, to the inappropriateness of present drug control policies or to the difficulties democracies and even some dictatorships have in implementing scorched-earth responses against corrosive enemies, particularly when the enemies are their own citizens.

Even so, traffickers and their associated organizations are relatively few and thrive only because of the "crime tax" that illegalizing laws make possible and which the traffickers are determined to collect. Remove the structure of laws that assures traffickers' profits and they would migrate from the drug business to other illegal or legal business pursuits. Indeed, it has been mentioned that good United States families were thus integrated into American society following the repeal of the prohibition amendment to the United States constitution.[74] But can the same kind of felicitous prospects for economic if not political integration be said of the small growers and associated low level employees in the drug trade?

II

The prospects of integrating masses of drug workers in supplier countries absent much of a drug trade are intimately and inversely tied to the patterns of integrating them under its existence. The current drug régime offers benefits - economic, social and political - to entire countries and to segments of society that are otherwise outside the pale of power, prestige and economic security. Hardly anyone is able to think of a quick substitute, or any substitute.

Consider countries' benefits, usually referenced as being a general economic boom filtering throughout a nation as a new export commodity gains rapid ascendancy. Thus, aside from growers' and ground support personnel's incomes, we read about foreign exchange earnings,[75] multiplier employment effects, more buoyant (or perhaps just less catastrophic) national economies, and, of course, stunning opportunities for local politicians to enjoy the Midas touch by turning their public trusts into private gain.

Peru's immediate past president Alan García has spoken of his country's coca exports as "the only raw material that has increased in value" and said that "the most successful effort to achieve Andean integration has been made by the drug trafficker".[76] Both successes imply benefits for the entire country. Still, García generally favoured the anti-drug war but wanted the United States to pursue a course of demand reduction and income replacement for peasant growers rather than emphasizing crop suppression and anti-drug law enforcement strategies.[77]

At the producer level, the illicit drug industry is labour intensive, decentralized, growth-pole oriented, cottage-industry promoting and foreign exchange earning - desirable features of rural development in economically stagnating areas. Even under illicit marketing conditions, the drug traffic heavily infuses capital into backwater areas, turning frontier towns into regional shopping centres and improving employment at many levels.[78]

There is an odd economic back flow into producer countries' urban areas, an irony of considerable visibility. For centuries many nations have disproportionately taxed their rural populations in favour of urban dwellers. For example, prices paid to peasant producers for basic food stuffs have usually been "fixed" or "controlled" at artificially low levels. Now, however, bankers fly to backwater areas to, in effect, beg for "drug dollars" for their foreign exchange starved banks so that urban customers may continue to import their accustomed consumer goods.[79] More than just peasants and traffickers are benefiting from illicit drugs.

Income linkages develop among the lower classes that spread the drug trade's benefits throughout many rural societies. For example, food produced in South America's Andean villages finds its way to coca growing regions in exchange for money, coca and cocaine. Impoverished villages thereby become commercial

providers of the foodstuffs required for specialized coca growing labour to continue. While the "caloric exchange ratio", that is, the ratio of food exported to benefits received, is relatively exploitative of the highland peasants,[80] it appears to be less than the alternative exploitation that highlanders have historically suffered. In any event, villagers engage in the trade with abandon.

This array of economic benefits from supplying an international market has become quite substantial in some areas. If they originated in a legitimate economic development model, the world would herald them as a positive sign of progress and improvement in the lesser developed regions of countries such as Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand.

While the income source is criticized, and aside from many traffickers themselves becoming unbelievably wealthy, several million people heretofore marginalized from their countries' national societies, economies and polities, have benefited from the illicit drug trade. As a consequence, they have earned more money, experienced more social mobility and exercised more power over their destiny and their children's than perhaps at any time in this century.

Consider Pakistan. The country's hill tribes have imported chemists from Asia to teach them how to convert opium into heroin - opium, itself, being undesirable for illicit international trade. The tribes now produce enough heroin to make their country the world's leading heroin exporter, including being the principal provider for the North American market.[81] They also supply a rapidly growing domestic market.[82] The tribes operate a sufficiently good intelligence programme to rebound from their central government's unevenly applied tough suppression measures,[83] in part because they are successful in corrupting some of Pakistan's military officers assigned to drug duty.[84]

It might seem unusual that the tribes could orchestrate all this on their own. Yes, they needed a link to international markets, a service provided by what Yev Yelin describes as "the International Narcotics Mafia".[85] The result? By anyone's standards the incomes of tens of thousands of these people have become relatively substantial, made possible by the confluence of demand, supply, illegality, ready traffickers and international drug control policies.

In the neighbouring hill country that divides Pakistan from Afghanistan, opium poppies have proven to be a quick, reliable source of money for necessitous Afghans. Poppies are particularly attractive, owing to the relative absence of alternative income sources in the region.[86] The economic facts are quite simple. With an illicit trafficker-serviced market, peasants and isolated villagers can usually earn more cash income than with any other cash crop they could plant or product they could produce.

Until early 1990, when the effects - probably temporary - of the Colombian internal wars between government and traffickers were finally felt in Bolivia in the form of reduced coca markets, the economic returns in the coca industry were quite attractive for every involved Bolivian. Not surprisingly, therefore, the export value of the coca trade rose to exceed the value of all other exports combined.[87] While the traffickers have kept much of their earnings outside the country, they have returned enough to make coca growing a relatively lucrative farming operation. Some people now conclude that the principal problem for the Bolivian authorities is not the suppression of coca production and the criminal activities associated with it but rather recognizing that coca cultivation is the peasantry's principal source of income.[88] Currently, there is hardly any other viable income replacement for tens of thousands of people.[89] Small wonder that peasant growers vigorously resist eradication of their crops. More than a dozen peasants in Bolivia's Chapare have been killed defying drug control operations there.[90] Similar encounters have taken place in Peru.[91]

If the nexus of illicit drug demand, supply, ready traffickers and international drug control policies has boosted rural incomes, the increased income itself has produced its own consequences. Among these are peasant and labour migration to open up frontier lands and social mobility for some rural families. Internal migration and social mobility have returned to further enhance rural people's income and begin to increase their political power (usually through unionization or by joining insurrectionist groups). These relationships are suggested in flow chart 1 below.

Flow Chart 1

Further Beneficial Consequences for Producer Countries' Peasantry



III

Let us consider the impact of the drug economy on internal migration, and, in turn, migration itself as producing "beneficiaries" in ways that will greatly complicate post-drug bonanza political integration in major producing countries.

As a preface, it should be pointed out that migrations of peoples have been fundamental to the history of humankind, having occurred for millennia and for multiple reasons. Sometimes people are driven by war, pestilence, governments, overcrowding and poverty. Sometimes they are "pulled" by prospects of a bonanza.

Migration in Myanmar illustrates one of these factors. In a programme sponsored by the United States, the government of Myanmar (then Burma) attempted to eradicate poppy fields by aerial spraying in its sector of the Golden Triangle. As a consequence of crop destruction, a massive influx of hill tribe refugees into Thailand has alarmed human rights organizations.[92] Yet, replacement opium poppy fields are being planted, both in Myanmar and in Thailand. And, in Bolivia, some 1,000 unemployed tin miners and their families marched en masse 120 kilometres from La Paz to the coca growing region of Chulumani where they threatened to take up the illicit activity if the government declined to assist them.[93] On the other hand, people sometimes migrate in response to resource finds - land, gold, climate, economic opportunity - and all the anticipation and hope accompanying such news. "Push" and "pull" factors that work in tandem are not uncommon.

These many factors acknowledged, we note that "cocaine migrations" combine both push and pull. True, migrations into recently settled South American drug growing areas began before their utility as coca incubators became widely known.[94] And, existing colonists turned to the drug trade when it became profitable. However, as the profits derived from the trade became well known, increased colonization and further coca production resulted as people fled impoverished highland villages and city slums, drawn to the prospects of relative fortunes in what Edmundo Morales has called a "white gold rush",[95] particularly in Peru and Bolivia.[96]

In the latter half of this century, resource poor ancestral villages have generally disgorged their surplus populations to regional and primate cities, turning these into burgeoning shanty towns and slums. In recent years, the cities have become less and less attractive as a magnate for rural migrants. Many of the more recent village emigrés are therefore turning to frontiers, forests and jungles, still driven by poverty but now also by the prospects of relative wealth. Where potential suitable land resources exist as, for example, in South America's western Amazonic basin, wholesale migration is occurring. Bolivia's Yungas and Chapare areas have blossomed, as has Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley.

Market transport costs are irrelevant in drug-related migrations because of the high unit value per weight of the product sold. While growers' incomes are but a fraction of total drug trade value, the economic incentives, and therefore the "pull" factor in migration, has been relatively strong.

The economic incentives are not only strong but increase with each successful migration. On the frontier, land is available for small purchase or for the taking (squatting). With hard work, a trafficker-serviced market, and some luck, family income increases substantially. Consumerism that generally accompanies economic improvement rises, with commensurate investment in self pride and self assurance, both of which combine to limit the degree to which governments, traditional land barons, and a traditional regional political/economic élite can successfully intimidate the new colonists and, more particularly, their children.

Colonists send money back to their villages. This, together with increased emphases on educational opportunities for children who migrate and those who stay with relatives in their home villages combine to offer the successful agrarian entrepreneur a kind of social mobility - a rise in social and eventual occupational status - that heretofore only "others" could dream of. Some even become traffickers themselves, thereby completing the round of new social mobility. This effect has been particularly noted in Bolivia.[97]

Whether migration is required for increased income, or whether drug crops are substituted for food crops on old lands (as in the hill tribes of the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle), success breeds a heady optimism and lends people's enthusiasm for exercising political power against oppressors which, in the cases under study, usually mean central governments. More ominously, even temporary success creates opportune conditions for credible demands to be made on governments should the bottom fall out of the drug market.

The best indicators known to this reviewer of the event sequencing suggested in flow chart 1 are the insurgent activities of Khun Sa (discussed in notes 26 and 29) in Myanmar and Thailand, and the coca growers' unions in South America (see note 100). One might include the *Sendero Luminoso* (see note 53), but this organization has imposed itself on the peasantry as much as the peasantry has embraced it. So it might not be a candidate.

Peasant agrarian unions (in which coca growers have taken a prominent role) have become so powerful and their demands so convincing that Peru's past president, Alan Garcia, even tried to introduce one peasant leader to President George Bush at the Drug Summit in Cartagena, Colombia, attended by the presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and the United States. García wanted to impress Bush with Peru's need to deal not just with drugs but with hundreds of thousands of politicized growers who supply the botanical ingredients. Bush refused the proffered meeting, a disappointment to more than 200,000 peasants of Peru's growers' union.[98] In the

afterglow of hindsight, the refusal will likely be seen as a diplomatic mistake, even if García's principal intent, as alleged, was to embarrass Bush. Taking this cue, the current Peruvian régime of Alberto Fujimori has taken an accommodationist stance to drug growers and has proposed to legitimize their work as a means by which to wean them from coca in favour of alternative agricultural pursuits.[99]

In Bolivia, the most effective opposition to coca leaf eradication is from the peasant unions, most of which are closely tied to the national labour movement.[100] In fact, in 1983 the unions forced the Bolivian government to reassess its United States-backed coca eradication programmes in the Andes,[101] and has since imposed an entirely new agenda on the current Bolivian government.

Peasants who can force agendas, negotiations and their own leaders on national governments may likely, in time, oblige their societies to an involuntary restructuring. Migration and social mobility have contributed to this possibility, and both have been facilitated by the increased income, functional integration and social cohesion derived from provisioning the drug market. All, ultimately, is made possible by illicit drug demand, and by traffickers who link supplier with user, however high the risk.

The poignancy is best understood by reflecting on the international political implications of what would likely happen should the "drug war" really succeed in suppressing production or dramatically lowering consumption. The loss of benefits to net producer societies' underclasses would probably unleash events that consumer countries' sworn political enemies would exploit. Alternatively, events could provoke a wholesale emigration of hundreds of thousands of people, many as illegal immigrants into countries such as the United States. Thus some argue that the consequences could imperil some consumer countries' national security interests.[102]

There is precedent: In spite of substantial help from the United States and UNFDAC (United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control), the Thai government has been wary to move against some of its more recalcitrant opium poppy growers, remembering that it was an earlier destruction of opium fields that allowed Communist cadres to infiltrate and win over many hill tribesmen to an anti-government cause.[103] Destruction of Mexican marijuana and poppy fields has probably enhanced illegal immigration into the United States. While the lure of communism has no doubt faded everywhere, migration has not. Indeed, absent an ideological justification for staying home, emigration will be viewed as the only, not just the last, resort for politicized drug suppliers freshly out of work.[104]

The logic of "restructuring" from below could lead eventually to an alteration in the economic and political power bases in net drug producer countries in ways that open them for expanded leadership recruitment and greater citizen involvement in the use of productive resources. The process could occur benignly if income growth continues, but could well turn exceptionally violent if it is

suddenly withdrawn.[105] In many cases, substantial internal structural change is centuries' overdue. It is ironic that illicit drugs may, where other avenues have failed, force the issue of such change before the close of this century. By the same token, a substantial departure from the current international political economy of illicit drugs would probably introduce "shocks" in producer countries that could have interesting political outcomes.

Many people will not mourn the passing of "old social and political orders" in producing countries now benefiting from the illicit drug trade. But will these same people herald the replacements? That may depend on what drug consumer countries do (beyond lowering illicit drug demand or legalizing its consumption at home or suppressing its production abroad) with people who will be vigorously pressing for a reordering of the institutional fabric of the lands in which they live.

IV

If either demand reduction or crop suppression policies are successful, what will net producer country governments and their international sponsors do with angry, hungry drug growers and the industry's affiliated ground support personnel? Quite aside from the drug industry being a substantial source of employment and producer income, in several countries it has either developed or is associated with a large popular political base.[106] That base is already reflected in insurgent movements in Colombia, Myanmar and Peru.

Until the February 1990 Andean drug conference in Cartagena, the United States appeared to view almost all benefits filtering down to agricultural growers of illicit drugs as illegitimate, "unintended", and therefore of small public policy consideration for replacement should the anti-drug war actually succeed. Producer countries' obligations were to control drug supply and suppress traffic. The economic fallout was largely their problem. However, the Latin Americans impressed Bush with the need to work more vigorously on demand in his own country *and* to understand the imperative of discovering income replacement opportunities for their coca growing peasantry.[107]

What lines of international or multilateral policy response to principal producer countries might be considered in the light of these findings? Three basic ones come to mind: Do nothing; do something for humanitarian reasons; do something for donor countries' utilitarian concerns (e.g., to reduce internal social and political upheaval and emigration).

The first - one frequently advanced on "talk and commentary shows" - is to let the peasantry and all the producer countries' drug profiteers "be hung out with the wash". It is they who jumped for the quick income. Just as players on the stock market or at the tables in Las Vegas or Monte Carlo, they must accept odds of failure and not whine when they materialize.

The second - humanitarian assistance - is defensible in its motives but frequently counterproductive in its outcomes. Not only does such assistance frequently fail to assist those to whom it is directed, but it usually has the perverse effect of countering the very internal reforms that such societies almost always desperately need.[108]

The third - utilitarian assistance - has tended in the past to produce the same socio-economic and political outcomes as humanitarian assistance and is, therefore, no more likely to produce the desired results, although it can, for a time, bolster existing governments' resistance to the political demands of the masses.

On both fronts - humanitarian and utilitarian - economic assistance has had a rough historical experience. Its record in assisting lesser-developed countries to overcome their economic backwardness is mixed, with probably more failures than successes to report. Its long-term effect has been as likely to contribute to internal wars and emigration as attenuate them. To use this vehicle to address a new round of "economic dislocations" attached to the drug trade will likely not improve the record. Nevertheless, there will be compelling reasons to try to "do something".

The most likely proposals from the United States will probably not depart from its historical record and will likely therefore be advanced within utilitarian categories - how to avoid political upheaval, how to discourage heavy emigration, how to maintain stability in the international economy, how to think about "development" in ways conducive to a realization of all of the above. The proposals will probably be couched in some form of development assistance and military aid worked out in collaboration with existing governments and institutions.

The historical record attests to great difficulties in this line of reasoning. As such, getting development assistance to economically demobilized drug growers and industry support personnel in order to prevent unacceptable political fallout - violence, revolution, wholesale emigration - deriving from a post-bonanza collapsing illicit drug economy will probably be unsuccessful. In many instances, the successful tendering of such aid would require by-passing existing governmental institutions and going directly to the growers and other personnel. As this would, in most cases, be subversive of existing régimes and governments, most will likely resist such channelling. Logically, in these cases, such aid ought not to be given. As donor giving has lived more on the hope of influencing recipient governments to change than in changing them, "doing something" informed by the conventional past is an impoverished idea.

On the other hand, if utilitarian assistance can acceptably be given in ways that allow it to make an economic difference in the countryside and thereby meet the utilitarian criteria for which it is tendered, the large challenge for donor drug consuming nations will

be to identify how to tender such assistance successfully. This will be a considerable test. The "New World Order" that Iraq and the fall of communism have bequeathed might make such a discovery possible within the framework of collaborating nations working on the right issues for the right reasons.

Acknowledgements

For support I am grateful to the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, where I spent 1990-91 as a visiting fellow, to the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and to the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham Young University. To all I give thanks but burden none with responsibility for views expressed herein.

Notes

1. An extensive review may be found in LaMond Tullis, **Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socio-economic and Political Consequences** (Greenwood Press, Westport, forthcoming), section on "Consequences".

2. So far, supply suppression results have been quite unsatisfactory. Demand suppression results are still open. United States consumption may now have "peaked", although, if it has, few people outside the United States government credit supply restriction as a cause. On the other hand, Europe is preparing to deal with aggravated drug problems. Crime syndicates dealing in cocaine and heroin have now turned their attention to the continent (including Eastern Europe and the European areas of the Soviet Union as quickly as national currencies have become even marginally convertible or hard currencies "disposable"). Radical changes in global demand are not therefore imminent. However, radical changes in consumer populations and their market preferences could nevertheless presage the political considerations I am raising even if demand does not decline. Regardless, planners assume that their policies will at some point prove successful; this article invites them to look beyond success and contemplate some of the political consequences of its realization. See, also, the discussion in note 3 .

3. America's domestic demand control debates focus on effectiveness/ineffectiveness of law enforcement approaches to control demand, public costs of prohibition laws and their application, and "legalization". Debates about supply control policies also focus on law enforcement effectiveness/ineffectiveness but, more broadly, on the considerable social, economic, and political costs law enforcement policies impose on principal producer countries and their citizens. In the first category, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Drug prohibition in the United States: Costs, consequences, and alternatives", **Science,** 245 (1 September 1989), pp. 939-947; Murray E. Jarvik, "The drug dilemma: Manipulating the demand", **Science,** 250 (19 October 1990), pp. 387-392; James Q. Wilson, "Against the legalization of drugs", **Commentary,** 89:2 (February 1990), pp. 21-28; John Kaplan, "Taking drugs seriously", **The Public Interest,** 92 (Summer 1988), pp. 32-50; and James B. Jacobs, "Imagining drug legalization", **The Public Interest,** 101 (Fall 1990), pp. 28-42. In the second category see Ethan Nadelmann, "U.S. drug policy: A bad export", **Foreign Policy,** 70 (Spring 1988), pp. 97-108); Bruce M. Bagley, "The new hundred years war? U.S. national security and the war on drugs in Latin America", **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs** 30:1 (1988), pp. 161-182; Edith T. Mirante, "A rare look at America's opium war - from the ground up", **Earth Island Journal,** 30 (Winter 1989); Mark Fraser and Nance Kohlert, "Substance abuse and public policy", **Social Service Review,** March 1988, pp. 103-126; and Rensselaer W. Lee III, **The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power** (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1989).

4. Literally, "stompers". In bare feet and legs they stand in ground vats "stomping" alkaloids from coca leaves bathed in kerosene and other petrochemicals.

5. This scenario's precipitating circumstances could derive from three sources: Success in the "drug war", demand reduction for reasons other than fear, and legalization. Wholesale production suppression and interdiction coupled with draconian pressures on consumers could destroy the economic base now driving drugs. Drug war success of this kind will unlikely be forthcoming, but there could nevertheless be a depressing income earning effect of long-term duration. Reduction in demand for reasons other than fear (of being caught or hurt) or law enforcement effectiveness could derive from consumer shift in products desired (e.g., to "designer drugs"), from compelling economic incentives to be "drug free", or from distancing oneself from the drug culture as a matter of new value preference (e.g., drug culture avoidance) or pragmatic preference (e.g., disease avoidance). Production legalization could well work to recreate the *latifundia* in Latin America and, in any event, augur toward agribusiness appropriation of the industry with substantial elimination of labour-intensive, decentralized and highly mediated income earning jobs.

6. See Gina Kolata, "In cities, poor families are dying of crack", **The New York Times**, 11 August 1989, A1.

7. John Bacon discusses the French Connection and those who dominated it, speculating about a possible resurrection of the French criminal underworld ["Is the French Connection really dead?", **Drug Enforcement,** Summer 1981, pp. 19-21]. The negotiations between the United States and Turkey, and the effectiveness of the opium ban laws in Turkey following the demise of the French Connection, are discussed in two United States congressional hearings [United States Congress House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, "The effectiveness of Turkish opium control" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1975); and United States Congress House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Turkish opium ban negotiations" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1974)].

8. James Van Wert [**U.S.-Mexican aerial opium eradication program: A summative evaluation**, doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1982] gives a helpful overview of the development of Mexico's capacity to address market demand in the United States. As of 1986 Pakistan had developed into the world's biggest exporter of heroin ["Heroin brings more trouble", **The Economist,** 20 December 1986, pp. 51-52], more than half of which ends up in the U.S. market ["Pakistan tribes a big hurdle in drive to limit heroin trade", **Narcotics Control Digest,** 10 July 1985, pp. 5-6]. See also Cait Murphy, "High times in America", **Policy Review**, 39 (Winter 1987), pp. 46-50.

9. See Ralph Blumenthal, **Last Days of the Sicilians** (Times Books, New York, 1988).

10. See Wayne Greenhaw, **Flying High: Inside Big Time Drug Smuggling** (Dodd, Mead, New York, 1984).

11. Sean McWeeney ["The Sicilian mafia and its impact on the United States", **FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin**, February 1987, pp. 1-9] reviews the Sicilian mafia's relationship to heroin and cocaine trafficking. Paul Houston ["201 in U.S., Italy charged in drug trade", **The Los Angeles Times**, 2 December 1988, p. 4] describes one of the recent "busts" involving several individuals in the Sicilian mafia.

12. A recent example on the heroin/cocaine/marijuana trail involves Mexico. In 1989, two notorious drug barons were arrested (Rafael Caro Quintero and Angel Fêlix Gallardo). As soon as they were removed from circulation, their lieutenants and others shifted drug operations to other places encompassing a different set of people but servicing the same market [see Larry Rohter, "As Mexico moves on drug dealers, more move in", **The New York Times**, 16 April 1989, E2].

13. Frank Robertson [**Triangle of Death: The Inside Story of the Triads - The Chinese Mafia** (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977)] characterizes the Chinese triads as criminal offshoots of a once vast patriotic organization formed to rid China of the Manchu overlords, the Ching Dynasty, and establish a republic - China's Triad Society. The original triad society still exists, the author says, in fragmented form in Hong Kong and in almost every sizeable Chinese overseas community. While the overwhelming majority of its members are lawful and hard-working citizens, there is a criminal minority, organized into some 1,500 gangs worldwide. The criminal offshoots from Hong Kong - extremely close knit brotherhoods, difficult to penetrate - are specializing in heroin distribution in Great Britain, all of Europe and the United States [Fenton Bresler, **The Trail of the Triads: An Investigation into International Crime** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980]. See also Emily Lau, "Brotherhood of extortion", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 27 December 1984, pp. 49-53; William Overend, "Violence feared as Asian heroin influx soars", **The Los Angeles Times**, 25 February 1988, p. 3; and Ian Buruma and John MacBeth, "Asia's organized crime jigsaw and the Western connection: An East side story", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 27 December 1984, pp. 34-47. The triads are moving into Australia along with their heroin network and have hurt the Chinese community's image there. The resident Chinese have nevertheless been unwilling to inform on gang members [Carl Robinson, "The day of the triads: Hong Kong's gangs move in on Australia", **Newsweek**, 7 November 1988, p. 72]. They are said, now, to dominate the New York heroin trade with their connection known as the "China White Trail" [Peter Kerr, "Chinese now dominate New York heroin trade", **The New York Times**, 9 August 1987, p. 1].

14. Keith Richburg, "More heroin said to enter U.S. from Asia: Chinese gangs replacing traditional organized crime networks", **The Washington Post**, 16 March 1988, A16. These Chinese groups now dominate the New York heroin trade, made possible not only by their own aggressive marketing "strategies" but by the weakening of traditional organized crime there through generational divisions and a series of major prosecutions. A vacuum developed, and the triads filled it [Kerr, note 13].

15. In general, in Mexico, organizations are mentioned by their leaders' names or simply as "families". For example, William Overend speaks of

"seven major drug families of Mexico" who are developing a partnership with Colombian cartels to use Mexico as a transhipment point for cocaine in transit to the United States and Canada ["Cocaine floods southland via Colombia-Mexico link", **The Los Angeles Times**, 31 December 1987]. One of these is the "Herrera Family" [see Peter Lupsha, "Drug trafficking: Mexico and Colombia in comparative perspective", **Journal of International Affairs**, 35:1(1981), pp. 95-115]. Of named organizations, there is the Caro Quintero group (responsible for the torture murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena) and whose maximum leader has just been sentenced to over 40 years in a Mexican jail. Perhaps hundreds of articles, journalistic and academic, have been written on this man and his organization. Representative are two articles by John Fialka ["Death of U.S. agent in Mexico drug case uncovers grid of graft", **The Wall Street Journal**, 19 November 1986, p.1; and "How the Mexican trail in drug agent's death yields cache of 'crack'", **The Wall Street Journal**, 20 November 1986, p. 1], and one by Michael Isikoff ["Informer ties top Mexican to drug deals: Allegations revealed in DEA affidavit", **The Washington Post**, 4 June 1988, A3], which emphasize the endemic corruption among Mexican authorities; a Caro Quintero on-the-drug-trail biography, of sorts, by Luís Méndez [**Caro Quintero al Trasluz** (Plaza & Janês, Mexico City, 1985)]; and a description of popular ballads and films glorifying Caro Quintero, who appeared to have become a legitimate "antihero" for Mexico's impoverished masses [John Ross, "Mexican youth make folk hero out of drug lord", **Latinamerica Press**, 18 June 1987,p. 7]. Angel Fêlix Gallardo's group is also placed among the highly active Mexican operators [see William Branigin, "Mexicans arrest prime drug suspect: Fêlix Gallardo led DEA's wanted list", **The Washington Post Weekly**, 14-20 March 1989, p. 7; Brook Larmer, "Mexico's corruption clampdown: arrest of corrupt officials along with drug baron may root out graft", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 13 April 1989, p. 1; and Larry Rohter, "Mexicans arrest top drug figure and 80 policemen", **The New York Times**, 11 April 1989, A1]. Mexico became a funnel for South American cocaine [see Dan Williams, "2 nations stymied in efforts to shut off flow: Mexico a funnel for U.S. bound cocaine", **The Los Angeles Times**, 3 December 1985, p. 17; and William Branigin, "The Mexican connection", **The Washington Post Weekly**, 14-20 March 1988, p. 7] long before Colombians moved to Mexico to personally take over much of the cocaine operations there [see Brook Larmer, "Colombians take over 'coke' trade in Mexico", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 9 January 1989, p. 1].

16. Discussions of the Colombian cartels are applied (e.g., examination of their impact on society and on both supply-side and demand-side drug traffic), theoretical (e.g., whether they are vertically integrated in a conventional business sense or by intimidation and terror - there being hardly any disagreement that some kind of vertical integration exists), how many cartels there are, what their international characteristics are, how much legitimate business enterprise they are taking over, the degree to which they are corrupting the judicial and political systems of, particularly, Colombia, their economic impact on the larger society, who their principals are, how powerful and rich they are, and so forth. For example, in two articles, Merrill Collett describes the way the Medellín cartel, in particular, has used its "business wizardry" to create an economic boom in Colombia and how the cocaine barons have made vigorous efforts to have themselves accepted as successful entrepreneurs rather than as criminals.

Unsuccessful here, the lords have amassed a "state-within-a-state" organizational apparatus complete with narcoarmies that are, in many instances, better equipped than the Colombian military ["Colombia's sophisticated drug traffickers trigger economic boom, political violence", **Latinamerica Press**, 29 September 1988, p. 3; and "Colombia's losing war with drug kings", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 13 May 1988, p. 9]. The cartels' sanguinary assaults are reminiscent of prior chapters in a turbulent history of violence in the country [Jonas Bernstein, "Bitter convulsions in a nation under the influence of drugs", **Insight**, 25 September 1989, pp. 30-31]. Fabio Castillo looks into the way the cartels have infiltrated the law enforcement and judicial administrations [**Los Jinetes de la Cocaína** (Editorial Documentos Periodísticos, Bogota, 1987)]. There appear to be four Colombian cartels ["U.S. has 43 big drug groups", **The Miami Herald**, 4 August 1989, 5A] of which Medellin and Cali are the best known. Their murderous assault on each other is described by such as James Brooke ["A report from the front lines in Colombia: The drug war will be long", **The New York Times**, 18 September 1989, A4], **The Economist** ["Colombia: All fall down", 3 September 1988, pp. 42-43], Heather Dewar and Lori Rozsa ["Cartel figure arrested", **The Miami Herald**, 10 June 1989, B1] and Pedro Pablo Camargo, ["Luchan los narcos por el control de las plazas; Destruyen centro comercial y matan un alcalde", **Excelsior**, 9 May 1989, 2A]. Jeff Leen chronicles the cartels' prominent murders and their intimidation of politicians and rivals ["Bush lauds Colombia drug battle", **The Miami Herald**, 20 August 1989, p. 1], a theme further developed with Guy Gugliotta [**Kings of Cocaine: Inside the Medellin Cartel** (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989]; and Joseph Treaster ["Colombia's Cali drug cartel: The less flamboyant competitor of Medellin", **The New York Times**, 19 September 1989, A6] analyses the social psychology and social history of the respective members. The United States Senate examined a host of these and related issues in one of its committee reports [Unitede States Congress, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control and the Congressional Research Service, Report, **Combating International Drug Cartels: Issues for U.S. Policy** (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1987)].

17. There is some redundancy in the term, for Yakuza simply means Japanese organized criminals. They have a mafia-like drug trafficking organization operating outside Japan (the unwavering Japanese police force and a close-knit Japanese society that readily co-operates with the police being something of a deterrent for extensive drug operations on home soil [see Daniel Sneider, "How the Eliot Ness of Japan's drug world gets the job done", **The Christian Science Monitor,** 23 July 1987, p. 1]). The President's Commission on Organized Crime [**Organized Crime of Asian Origin, Record of Hearing III**, 23-25 October 1984 (The Commission, Washington, D.C., 1984)] received testimony of these groups creating enclaves of terror in various parts of the United States. Much of the extortion, corruption and protection rackets fostered by these groups were said to be associated with illegal narcotics. In 1985, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency picked up top leaders of the Yakuza operating in Hawaii and the western United States, but it was not thought that they would be leaderless for long ["DEA smashes leadership of Yakuza: New wars predicted", **Organized Crime Digest**, September 1985, pp. 9-10]. Ian Buruma and John MacBeth (note 13) also discuss the Yakuza (along with the Chinese triads). See, also, "Japan's gangsters: Honourable mob", **The Economist**, 27 January 1990, pp. 19-22.

18. See Phillip C. McGuire, "Jamaican Posses: A call for cooperation among law enforcement agencies", **The Police Chief**, January 1988, p. 20. Bernard Headly ["War in 'Babylon': Dynamics of the Jamaican informal drug economy", **Social Justice**, 15:3-4 (1988), pp. 61-86] argues that "dependent development" in Jamaica has produced such a scarcity of socially acceptable work that a substantial part of the Jamaican population has been economically marginalized. To extricate itself from that marginalization, some Jamaicans join gangs, emigrate to the United States, and become involved in the international drug traffic. It is thought that the Posses working in the United States have about 10,000 members ["U.S. has 43 drug groups" (note 15). The gangs deal in cocaine (through contacts with the Medellín cartel) and in marijuana, some of which is transhipped from Jamaica. Marshall Ingwerson ["Jamaican drug gangs stake out turf in U.S.", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 13 August 1987, p. 1] describes the groups as being close knit, heavily armed, residing mostly in south Florida but now extending their operations to such unlikely cities as Kansas City, Missouri and Newport News, Virginia. The Posses have extended their operations and coverage into other southern cities. They appear to be particularly adept at moving crack cocaine into northern cities. They appear to make higher profits than other drug distributors because they cut out middlemen [George Volsky, "Jamaican drug gangs thriving in U.S. cities", **The New York Times**, 19 July 1987, p. 17].

19. The Aryan Brotherhood and the Texas Syndicate, along with many other groups, are discussed in the President's Commission on Organized Crime, **The Impact: Organized Crime Today** (The Commission, Washington, D.C., 1986).

20. Reported in "U.S. has 43 big drug groups" (note 15).

21. Rural areas in Ohio and Wyoming are particularly noted for expansion activities of drug trafficking organizations, with increasing attention being paid to rural Georgia and South Carolina [Julie Johnson, "Drug gangs are now operating in rural states", **The New York Times**, 4 August 1989, A1]. Mention is also made of the organizations' establishing rural operatives ["U.S. has 43 big drug groups" (note 15)]. As for street gangs, the most frequently mentioned are Los Angeles gangs, particularly because they have now taken their activities nationwide [Scott Armstrong, "Los Angeles gangs go national", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 19 July 1988, p. 3], even into rural United States states that appeared to be somewhat immune to the excesses of organized drug trafficking. See, also, Tom Morganthau et al., "The drug gangs", **Newsweek**, 28 March 1988, pp. 20-27; Overend (note 13).

22. See, for example, Michael Mecham, "Drug smugglers prove elusive targets for interdiction forces", **Aviation Week and Space Technology**, 30 January 1989, pp. 34-36.

23. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, opium and heroin production appeared to increase (opium poppies being a cash "war crop" less easily destroyed by an occupying force bent on pacifying a rebellious countryside). Enough "freedom for manoeuvre" existed that when Pakistan began a large interdiction effort in 1985, a number of Pakistani heroin labs

moved to Afghanistan, thereby helping that country increase its drug making technology and productivity ["Pakistan tribes a big hurdle in drive to limit heroin trade (note 27)]. I do not have further evidence of organized trafficking in Afghanistan, but one must suppose, no doubt, that the highly effective pan-village organizations created to prosecute a sustained war against the Soviets would have given villagers sufficient organizational expertise to produce and market drugs. In any event, Afghanistan certainly has a healthy and growing opium production industry.

24. The strength of the networks vis-à-vis the Bolivian judiciary is discussed by Shirley Christian ["Drug case raises doubts in Bolivia", **The New York Times**, 5 May 1988, A3], and the ability of the networks to launch "contract killings" is described in "Colombianization", **World Press Review**, February 1989, p. 40.

25. The United States has considered the Laotian government itself to be heavily involved in the production and export of heroin [Peter Kerr, "U.S. says Laos government is deeply involved in drugs", **The New York Times**, 11 May 1988, B3] or at the very least is condoning it [Tasker (note 29)]. Hong Kong crime syndicates are thought to be operating in Laos as well as in Myanmar [Scott (note 29)]. However, friendlier relations were noted in January 1990 [Henry Kamm, "U.S. and Laos are getting friendlier", **The New York Times**, 31 January 1990, A3]. Laos initiated moves for better relations (and economic aid) and the United States' initial response was favourable. The principal agreement is to co-ordinate efforts to fight the narcotics trade. See, also, Stephen Brookes, "The perilous swim in heroin's stream", **Insight**, 5 February 1990, pp. 8-31.

26. Vichai S. ["Warlords of the poppy fields", **Bangkok Post**, 24 February 1983, p. 60], describes them simply as "warlords" of the type abundant in the China of old and as being alive and well in the hills of Burma (Myanmar). Khun Sa and others are discussed. They have the ability to engage an entire military establishment. Described here are Thai armies forcing Khun Sa from his mountain stronghold [Paisal Sricharatchanya, "Beating a retreat", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 16 April 1987, p. 29]. See, also, the discussion in note 29.

27. Terence White, "The drug-abuse epidemic coursing through Pakistan", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 13 June 1985, pp. 97-99; David Kline, "From a smugglers' paradise comes hell", **Maclean's**, 8 November 1982, p. 14; "Pakistan tribes a big hurdle in drive to limit heroin trade", **Narcotics Control Digest**, 10 July 1985, pp. 5-6; Richard Weintraub, "Pakistani drug drive seen in two major hauls: Military officers held in seizure of heroin", **The Washington Post**, 31 July 1986, A27; Yev Yelin, "Why the 'Golden Crescent' still flourishes", **The New York Times**, 28-31 July 1985.

28. Marcial Barrõn identifies the principal Peruvian traffickers [**El Infierno Blanco** (Lima, 1984]; Tyler Bridges claimed that in 1987 Colombian traffickers controlled the entire northern part of the Upper Huallaga Valley, where most of the country's coca production is carried out ["Drug traffickers, guerrillas curtail Peru's antidrug efforts", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 28 April 1987, p. 9]; some of the highest officials in the Belaûnde administration were said to be involved in 1985

["Cocaine scandal hits Lima", **Latin America Weekly Report**, 16 August 1985, p. 3]; Peruvian traffickers are organized enough to launch a full-scale attack on a principal Peruvian drug enforcement agency ["Cocaine traffickers kill 17 in Peru raid on antidrug team", **The New York Times**, 19 November 1984, A10]; and Edmundo Morales reports not only the existence of organization but a fairly rigid hierarchy even among low-level producers ["Coca culture: The white cities of Peru", Thesis I (CUNY Graduate School Magazine) 1:1(Fall 1986), pp. 4-11.

29. Aside from basing much of his operations in Myanmar, Khun Sa also operates in Thailand [Daniel Burstein,"The deadly politics of opium", **Maclean's**, 6 December 1982, pp. 10-16; Barbara Crossette, "An opium warlord's news conference spurs Burma and Thailand to battle him", **The New York Times**, 22 February 1987, p. 18; Rodney Tasker, "Chasing the red dragon", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 13 August 1987, pp. 28-31]. Bertil Lintner ["Orchards and opium", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 6 September 1984, pp. 30-31] describes how remnants of the Chinese Kuomintang, who entered Thailand as a defeated army in 1946, are now much less interested in practicing military matters than in doing business in opium in the Thai mountains. Hong Kong crime syndicates are believed to be operating in Thailand, just as they are in Myanmar [David Scott, "Surging sales for Golden Triangle: Many drug enforcement officials believe Hong Kong crime syndicates are responsible", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 6 January 1989, p. 4].

30. Arthur Shapiro ["Drugs and politics in Latin America: The Argentine connections", **The New Leader**, 27 June 1988, p. 9] makes a connection between right-wing military and allied interests and the international drug trade. The former military dictatorship in Argentina helped to install the drug trafficking García Mesa régime in Bolivia in return for an agreement that García would not sell cocaine in Argentina. In 1988, however, the political right (very much on the defensive in Argentina) appeared to be financing itself through drug dealing and therefore using its good organizational offices to facilitate drug movements. See, also, **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report** (note 39), which expresses increasing concern that Argentina is becoming a refining and transit centre for cocaine.

31. Aside from transit, the Bahamas is believed to have developed a highly sophisticated money laundering infrastructure [U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing, "Narcotics issues in the Bahamas and the Caribbean" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1987].

32. Vittoria Bacchetta ["Brazil: Drug trafficking gangs vie for control of Rio's impoverished favelas", **Latinamerica Press**, 24 September 1987, p. 3] describes the movement of organized "drug lords" into the outskirts of São Paulo, where the residents defend their new benefactors (they play a "Robin Hood" role) from the police. Brazil has become vital in the cocaine trade as a transit country for Andean traffickers and as a producer of precursor chemicals, and, we can add, as an emerging coca cultivator [U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report**, March 1989].

33. Juliana Pilon ["The Bulgarian connection: Drugs, weapons and terrorism", **Terrorism** 9:4(1987), pp. 361-371] advances evidence to support her thesis that the Bulgarian government, intent on subverting western governments in ways that appeared orchestrated in Moscow, dealt in drugs, weapons and terrorism. See, also, **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report** (note 39).

34. Asian triads, with a fairly sophisticated hierarchical organization, are alleged to have much of the Canadian heroin trade [Fenton Bresler, **The Chinese Mafia** (Stein and Day, New York, 1981)]. The Colombians have acquired a substantial ascendancy in the cocaine trade [Marcus Gee et al., "Montreal's deadly new traffic in cocaine", **Maclean's**, 24 March 1986, pp. 24-26]. See, also, the discussions by R.T. Stamler et al., "Recent trends in illicit drug trafficking from the Canadian perspective", **Bulletin on Narcotics** 35:4(1983), pp. 23-32; R.T. Stamler et al., "Illicit traffic and abuse of cocaine", **Bulletin on Narcotics** 36:2(1984), pp. 45-55; R.T. Stamler et al.(eds.), **RCMP National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1984/85** (Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Drug Enforcement Directorate, Ottawa, 1987); U.S. Congress, "Narcotics review in South America" (note 41); and Volsky (note 18).

35. See Richard Bordreaux, "Scandal spotlights Costa Rica's battle on drugs", **The Los Angeles Times**, 19 February 1989, p. 8; J.D. Gannon, "Tiny Costa Rica gamely tackles drug trafficking", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 30 January 1989, p. 1; Guy Gugliotta, "Costa Rica drug probe taints élite with scandal", **The Miami Herald**, 25 June 1989, A12; Tina Rosenberg, "Miami south", **The New Republic** 194:3717(1986), p. 10; United States Congress, "Narcotics review in South America" (note 41).

36. Cuba presents a case where the trafficking organization, with or without Fidel Castro's official blessing (and this is arguable), operated at the highest levels of government and used whatever portion of the governmental apparatus was required for its activities. In any event, after repeated allegations beginning as early as 1983 alleging the Castro government's involvement in smuggling of illegal narcotics into the United States [e.g., **Castro's Narcotics Trade** (Cuban-American National Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1983), and James Michel, "Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking", **Department of State Bulletin** 83:2077(1983), p. 86], Castro finally acknowledged the problem within his government (earlier knowledge of which he denied), had the principals tried and executed [Don Bohning,"Cuba ties officers to drug ring", **The Miami Herald**, 23 June 1989, 1A; Pablo Alfonso, "Expertos sobre Cuba dudan que Castro desconociera narcotráfico", **El Nuevo Herald** (Miami), 25 June 1989, 13A; David Brock, "Drug smuggling runs deep in official Cuban connection", **Insight**, 14 August 1989, pp. 34-37; Don Shannon, "High-level drug case rocks Cuba", **The Los Angeles Times**, 26 June 1989, p. 5; Robert Pear, "Cubans disclose a drug network", **The New York Times**, 24 June 1989, A1; Guy Gugliotta, "Castro learns tough lesson about the business of drugs", **The Miami Herald**, 1 July 1989, A1], and then made an offer of collaboration with the United States government in drug interdiction efforts [Michael Isikoff, "Cuba seeks U.S. cooperation in curbing drug flights", **The Washington Post**, 19 July 1989, A3].

37. Right-wing business circles attached to Roberto d'Aubuisson are discussed as having attachments to the cocaine trade within El Salvador [Craig Pyes and Laurie Becklund, "Inside dope in El Salvador", **The New Republic**, 15 April 1985, pp. 15-20].

38. There has been much official complicity in drug transhipments from Latin America destined for markets in the United States [Jim Hodgson, "Dominican Republic, Haiti struggle against smuggling of basic food items, narcotics", **Latinamerica Press**, 30 June 1988, p. 6]. However, by 1989 Haiti's new president was receiving praise for his efforts to combat narcotics "an effort that may have been a factor in recent coup attempts against him" [Robert Pear "U.S. praises Haitian on drug efforts", **The New York Times**, 11 April 1989, A3]. See, also, **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report** (note 39).

39. In Honduras the organized trafficking appears to be within higher officer levels of the military [Thomas Anderson, "Politics and the military in Honduras", **Current History**, December 1988, pp. 425-431; Robert Collier, "Honduras: Mounting evidence implicates armed forces in cocaine trafficking", **Latinamerica Press**, 9 June 1988, p. 5] or to be closely tied to those military officers [Brook Larmer, "Honduran drug kingpin poses dilemma for U.S. pursuers", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 7 March 1988, p. 9]. See, also, the country discussion in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report**, March 1989.

40. Vigorous denunciations of the now infamous General Manuel Noriega, nominal dictator of Panama until December 1989, began in the early 1980s [see, for example, Linda Feldman, "Hearings tie Noriega to Contras and drugs", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 11 February 1988, p. 3; "Panama: corruption, drug charges hurt but fail to unseat Noriega", **Latinamerica Press**, 3 March 1988, p. 1; Steve Ropp, "General Noriega's Panama", **Current History**, December 1986, pp. 421-432; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing, "Issues in United States-Panamanian Anti-narcotics Control" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1986); U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Hearing, "Panama" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1986); U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing, "Narcotics review in Central America" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1988); U.S. Congress, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing, "Drugs and money laundering in Panama" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1988); **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report** (note 39); and E.A. Wayne and Linda Feldman, "Panamanian leader linked in testimony to drug trafficking", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 29 January 1988, p. 3].

41. For several years reports have been surfacing about Paraguay as a transhipment point for ether, acetone and hydrochloric acid for use in refining cocaine, with allegations that high-level officials in the Stroessner administration were implicated, as also members of the present administration [see Kai Bird and Max Holland, "Paraguay: The Stroessner connection", **Nation**, 26 October 1985, p. 401; Joel Brinkley, "Paraguay pledges action on cocaine", **The New York Times**, 23 January 1985, A4; "Cocaine route turns north", **Latin American Weekly Report**, 18 January 1985, p. 5; "Paraguay refuses to destroy cocaine production chemicals", **Narcotics**

Control Digest, 9 January 1985, pp. 10-11; Alan Riding, "Paraguay's leader denies ties to drugs", **The New York Times**, 7 February 1989, A6; United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing, "Narcotics review in South America" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1988)].

42. Whereas Turkey used to be a major producer tied to the "French Connection" (see note 7), it now facilitates the explosion in the heroin traffic moving west from eastern sources. One must presume, we suppose, the existence of a fairly sophisticated organization to accomplish this [Alan Cowell, "For heroin, Turkey is land bridge to West", **The New York Times**, 14 July 1987, A14].

43. Some government personnel have organized to carry out the traffic [see, for example, "Island in a stew", **The Economist**, 23 March 1985, p. 42; and "Open palms among the palm trees", **The Economist**, 11 October 1986, p. 47]. By 1986, the matter had become so grave that Britain virtually reimposed direct rule on these dependencies.

44. Venezuela appears to have a "home grown" mafia that is tied to the drug trade (helping the Colombians use Venezuelan ports for export) ["'Anti-mafia' law follows exposes", **Latin America Regional Reports**, 14 December 1984, p. 3; Germán Carias, **La Mafia de la Cocaína** (Tipográfica Amazonas, Venezuela, 1986); "Increased concern over trafficking", **Latin American Weekly Report**, 18 December 1986, p. 2; and Alan Riding, "Cocaine finds a new route in Venezuela", **The New York Times**, 18 June 1987, A15].

45. Nigeria is implicated: James Brooke, "West Africa becomes route for heroin trade", **The New York Times**, 26 July 1987, p. 9. See, also, Michael De Sanctis, "Nigerians becoming more active in the smuggling of southwest Asian heroin in the U.S., Europe", **Narcotics Control Digest**, 20 March 1985, pp. 2-4; and, the African section in Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations Secretariat, "Review of Drug Abuse and Measures to Reduce the Illicit Demand for Drugs by Region", **Bulletin on Narcotics** 39:1(1987), pp. 3-29.

46. For a discussion of the relationship of criminal behaviour and prohibition régimes, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society", **International Organization** 44:4(Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526.

47. See "U.S. has 43 big drug groups" (note 16); and Rachel Ehrenfeld, "Narco terrorism and the Cuban connection", **Strategic Review**, Summer 1988, pp. 55-63.

48. Cathy Booth, "Tentacles of the octopus; The mafia brings Europe's worst drug epidemic home", **Time**, 12 December 1988, p. 48.

49. "U.S. has 43 big drug groups" (note 16).

50. See Larmer (note 15); William Overend, "Cocaine floods southland via Colombia-Mexico link", **The Los Angeles Times**, 31 December 1987, p. 8.

51. Elliott Abrams, in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations, made the Reagan administration's brief for the existence of an alliance between drug traffickers and terrorists ["Drug wars: The new alliance against traffickers and terrorists", Department of State Bulletin, April 1986]. See also Clyde Taylor, "Links between international narcotics trafficking and terrorism", **Department of State Bulletin**, 1985. Affirming the connection was the general tenor of several United States congressional hearings [e.g., United States Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, "Drugs and terrorism, 1984" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1985); United States. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary, joint hearing, "International terrorism, insurgency, and drug trafficking: Present trends in terrorist activity" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1985; and, United States Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "Drugs, law enforcement and foreign policy" (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1988)].

52. See, for example, James Adams, **The Financing of Terror** (New English Library, London, 1986). Robert Cribb shows how the Indonesian independence movement (1945-1949) was financed in large part through the sale of opium when the Dutch trade blockade suppressed normal commerce in rubber and sugar ["Opium and the Indonesian revolution", **Modern Asian Studies**, 22:4(1988), pp. 701-722]. Grant Wardlaw argues strongly against the linkages being understood in political or ideological terms. Drug connections are, on the whole, for practical economic reasons rather than ideological ones ["Linkages between the illegal drugs traffic and terrorism", **Conflict Quarterly**, Summer 1988, pp. 5-26].

53. The best example is Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. This band of guerrillas entered the Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru's principal coca growing region, as early as 1984 and successfully turned regional opinion against a United States-backed coca eradication programme into a campaign of anti-government violence. In the process, the guerrillas have gained something of a sanctuary and considerable peasant support [Jonathan Cavanagh, "Peru rebels threaten U.S. drug program", **The Wall Street Journal**, 10 August 1984, p. 29]. It is of considerable interest that whenever Shining Path takes over a village, it cleans up streets, improves public services and imposes a bloody but effective brand of justice in a region that the central government, as far as municipal services and government are concerned, has largely abandoned. The guerrillas, by protecting the peasants, facilitate the production of drugs, but they prohibit their use in the areas they control [Merrill Collett, "Maoist guerrilla band complicates antidrug war in Peru", **The Washington Post**, 4 June 1988, A21; and Merrill Collett, "Peruvians flock to Upper Huallaga Valley to cash in on expanding coca bonanza", **Latinamerica Press**, 29 September 1988, p. 6]. Collett, who shows Shining Path to be involved in coca growing regions for income producing and ideologically expanding ways nevertheless decries arguments attempting to show a collaborative relationship between the guerrillas and actual drug traffickers [Merrill Collett, "The myth of the narco guerrillas", **The Nation**, August 1988, p. 1]. Richard Craig takes a slightly different view on Shining Path, suggesting a more explicit connection ["Illicit drug traffic: Implications for South American source countries", **Journal of**

Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29 (Summer 1987), pp. 1-35]. Monte Hayes ["Peru rebels profit from drug ties", **The Los Angeles Times**, 27 December 1987, p. 32] argues that since early 1987 the Shining Path has worked in a "deadly alliance" with drug dealers and peasants involved in the drug trade, motivated by the coca trade having become a principal source of income for the terrorists. In effect, the Senderistas impose a tax on the Colombians (probably absorbed to some extent by peasant growers). See, also, Michael Isikoff, "U.S. suffering setbacks in Latin drug offensive: Violence mounting as coca production soars", **The Washington Post**, 27 May 1989, A1; Cynthia McClintock et al., "Peru's harvest of instability and terrorism", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 19 March 1989, p. 19; Alan Riding, "Peru's two complex battles: Drugs and terror", **The New York Times**, 23 August 1987,p. 8; Alan Riding, "Rebels disrupting coca eradication in Peru", **The New York Times**, 26 January 1989, A10; Ronald Berg, "Sendero Luminoso and the peasantry of Andahuaylas", **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs** 28:4 (1987), pp. 165-196; James Smith, "Peruvian guerrillas unite peasants, set social order", **The Los Angeles Times**, 5 March 1989, p. 1; and David Werlich, "Debt, democracy and terrorism in Peru", **Current History** 86:516 (1989), pp. 29-37. Robin Kirk ["Peru: Ayacucho relief work faces multiple obstacles", **Latinamerica Press**, 28 May 1987, p. 3] describes the "home country" of Shining Path (its abode before it got into the drug trade).

54. Wilson Ring, "Opium production rises in Guatemala mountains", **The Washington Post**, 30 June 1989, A25.

55. Scott MacDonald, **Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama** (Praeger, New York, 1989). The never ending spiral of violence has caused some peasant growers to conclude that the economic returns are simply not worth the risks [Mark Uhlig, "Colombia's war on cocaine: Farmers' fears help cause", **The New York Times**, 3 July 1989, pp. 1-2].

56. See, for example, Leslie Wirpsa, "Colombian mafia hurt by testimony of key deserter", **The Miami Herald**, 12 June 1989, 4A.

57. Robert Baratta, "Political violence in Ecuador and the AVC", **Terrorism**, 10(1987), pp. 165-174.

58. See D.P. Kumarasingha, "Drugs: A growing problem in Sri Lanka", **Forensic Science International**, 36 (1988), pp. 283-284.

59. Jonathan Kwitny, "Money, drugs and the Contras", **The Nation**, 29 August 1987, p. 1.

60. **The Washington Post**, 17 December 1983, A2.

61. See Dave Miller, "Drug mafia arms campesinos", **Latinamerica Press**, 14 July 1988, p. 6; and, "Probing into the underworld", **Latin America Regional Reports**, 4 March 1983, pp. 3-4.

62. Timothy Ross, "Colombia goes after drug barons", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 12 January 1987, p. 9.

63. See Crossette (note 29); and Lucy Komisar, "Solving Burma's guerrilla war would end the opium trade", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 30 March 1988, p. 13. Edith Mirante ["Burma - Frontier minorities in arms", **Cultural Survival Quarterly**, 11:4 (1987), pp. 14-17] shows that the opium trade has allowed insurgent groups to obtain better weapons than those of the army of Myanmar (Burma). There has been considerable discussion that the civil war in Myanmar is drug driven rather than equity driven, that is, that insurgency exists because drugs exist as an end rather than as a means. The contrary view is expressed by Josef Silverstein ["Foreign mediation could help end Burma's civil war", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 19 May 1988, pp. 28-29]. With still another view, David Westrate ["How are drug trafficking and terrorism related?", **Narcotics Control Digest** , 15:11(1985), pp. 1-4] compares Myanmar with Colombia. One of the fallouts in Thailand is considerable official attack on the Hmong and other minorities, all justified on the basis of the Hmong being "opium producers", "insurgents" and "destroyers of the environment", accusations to which Nicholas Tapp takes strong exception [**The Hmong of Thailand: Opium People of the Golden Triangle** (Anti-Slavery Society, London, 1986].

64. This point is advanced by Michael Satchell, "Narcotics: Terror's New Ally, **U.S. News and World Report**, 4 May 1987, pp. 30-37. Mark Steinitz ["Insurgents, terrorists, and the drug trade", **The Washington Quarterly**, 8:4 (1985), pp. 141-156] examines the evidence of terrorist involvement in the drug trade in Latin America, South-East Asia, the Middle East and Europe, examining factors behind the linkages, and, in particular, changing patterns of the international drug scene that have brought insurgency, terrorism and the drug trade into closer geographical proximity.

65. See Juliana Pilon, "The Bulgarian connection: Drugs, weapons and terrorism", **Terrorism**, 9:4 (1987), pp. 361-371.

66. Crossette (note 29). See also Kim Gooi and John McBeth, "High priced high", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 20 February 1986, pp. 28-29; Vichai S. (note 26); Sricharatchanya (note 26); Burstein (note 29); Tasker (note 29); Lintner (note 29); Scott (note 29); and Denis Gray, "A deluge from the Golden Triangle", **The Nation**, 2 February 1989.

67. "Now let's slay the other dragon", **The Economist**, 30 July 1988, pp. 42-43.

68. "Bolivian leader starts a fast", **The New York Times**, 27 October 1984. See, also, the discussion by Warren Hoge, "Bolivians find patron in reputed drug chief", **The New York Times**, 15 August 1982, p. 1.

69. See Leen (note 16); Bernstein (note 16); and Miguel Varon, "Drug trade brings in $2 billion annually: Despite crackdown, Colombian drug barons control economy", **Latinamerica Press**, 26 November 1987, p. 6.

70. Alan Riding, "Cocaine billionaires: The men who hold Colombia hostage", **The New York Times**, 8 March 1987.

71. Méndez (note 15).

72. Merrill Collett, "Colombia's sophisticated drug traffickers trigger economic boom, political violence", **Latinamerica Press**, 29 September 1988, p. 3.

73. See, for example, William Long, "Drug lords rule over Rio's slums", **The Los Angeles Times**, 16 October 1987, p. 6; Hoge (note 68); Bacchetta (note 32); and Ross (note 15).

74. For example, the Kennedys and the Fitzgeralds.

75. Hard-currency earnings are of some obvious assistance if a shortage exists. Laos allegedly promotes cultivation and export of marijuana in order to earn desperately needed foreign exchange [Barbara Crossette, "Thai officials say Laos turns to marijuana to help budget", **The New York Times**, 11 July 1987, p. 2]. Debt is said to drive the pursuit of drug related foreign exchange earnings [Peter Hakim, "Debt and drugs: Deadly partnership", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 1 May 1987,p. 18]. See, also, Kevin Healy, "Bolivia and cocaine: A developing country's dilemmas", **British Journal of Addiction** 83 (1988), pp. 19-23; and Rensselaer Lee III, "The drug trade and developing countries", **Policy Focus**, 4 (May 1987), pp. 2-10. Some observe that such foreign exchange earnings facilitate middle and upper classes' importation needs.

76. William D. Montalbano, "Latins push belated war on cocaine", **The Los Angeles Times**, 2 December 1985, p. 4.

77. See Andrew Rosenthal, "Three Andean leaders and Bush pledge drug cooperation: 'First anti-drug cartel'", **The New York Times**, 16 February 1990, p. 1.

78. LaMond Tullis "Cocaine and food: Likely effects of a burgeoning transnational industry on food production in Bolivia and Peru", in W. Ladd Hollist and F. LaMond Tullis (eds.), **Pursuing Food Security: Strategies and Obstacles in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East**, (Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 1987), pp. 257-258. See, also, Marlise Simons, "Cocaine means cash in Bolivia bank", **The New York Times**, 21 July 1984, p. 2.

79. Everett Martin, "A little cattle town in Bolivia is thriving as a financial center", **The Wall Street Journal**, 17 February 1983, p. 1.

80. Edmundo Morales, "Land reform, social change, and modernization in the national periphery: A study of five villages in the Northeastern Andes of Peru", Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1983. Morales holds, nevertheless, that "the direct economic relationship between peasants, the urban poor and the underworld brings a plethora of negative effects that disturb the traditional life in the countryside" (p. 136).

81. Kline (note 27); David Kline, "The Khyber connection", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 9-11 November 1982; **International Narcotics Control Strategy Report**, 1989, 1990 (note 39).

82. White (note 27).

83. "Pakistan tribes" (note 27).

84. Weintraub (note 27).

85. Yelin (note 27)

86. Henry Kamm, "Afghan opium yield up as Pakistan curbs crop", **The New York Times**, 14 April 1988, A16.

87. LaMond Tullis (note 78).

88. Carlos Norberto Cagliotti, "La economía de la coca en Bolivia", **Revista de la Sanidad de las Fuerzas Policiales**, 42:2 (1981) pp. 161-165.

89. Clara Germani, "In Bolivia, the hard reality of coca; even bold antidrug measures can't beat the economic facts", **The Christian Science Monitor**, 12 August 1988, p. 7. See, also, Hakim (note 75); and Healy (note 75).

90. "Bolivia under paz estenssoro", **Latinamerica Press**, 20 October 1988, p. 6.

91. Alan Riding reports on the continuing surges of anti-government/ anti-United States violence in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley (note 53) as does Merrill Collett (note. 53). Richard Craig picks up themes of production increases and violence in both Bolivia and Peru (note 53).

92. Bertil Lintner, "The Deadly Deluge", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 12 November 1987, pp. 54-55.

93. "Bolivia: Laid-off miners survive by growing coca", **Latinamerica Press**, 17 March 1988, p. 1.

94. See, for example, Ray Henkel, "The move to the Oriente: Colonization and environmental impact", in J.R. Ladman (ed.), **Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and Prospects for the Future**, (Center for Latin American Studies, Tempe, Arizona State University, 1982); and D.A. Eastwood and H.J. Pollard, "Colonization and cocaine in the Chapare, Bolivia: A development paradox for colonization theory", **Tijdschrift Voor Economishe en Sociale Geografie** 77:44 (1986), pp. 258-268.

95. Edmundo Morales, **Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru** (University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1989).

96. D. A. Eastwood and H.J. Pollard, "The accelerating growth of coca and colonisation in Bolivia", **Geography**, 72 (1987), pp. 165-166.

97. **Efectos del narcotráfico: Temas de política social** (Editorial Offset Boliviana, La Paz, 1988), with particular attention to the contributions by Federico Aguiló.

98. Joseph Treaster, "A Peruvian peasant fails to see Bush", **The New York Times**, 16 February 1990, A9. See, also, David Werlich, "Peru: García Loses His Charm", **Current History**, January 1988, pp. 13-16.

99. James Brooke, "Peru's leader proposes a market to fight coca", **The New York Times**, 28 October 1990, p. 12; James Brooke, "Peruvian with a vision gets power", **The New York Times**, 27 November 1990, A3.

100. See, for exaple, the observations by Shirley Christian ["Bolivians fight efforts to eradicate coca", **The New York Times**, 27 July 1987, A3]; Lesley Gill [**Peasants, Entrepreneurs, and Social Change** (Westview Press, Boulder, 1987)]; Healy (note 75); Kevin Healy, "Coca, the state, and the peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988", **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs** 30:2&3 (1988), pp. 105-126; "The political ascent of Bolivia's peasant coca leaf producers"]; Michael Isikoff ["DEA in Bolivia", **The Washington Post**, 16 January 1989, A1]; Miller (note 61); James Painter ["Bolivia's new president faces an old problem", **Latinamerica Press**, 24 August 1989, p. 3]; and, Susanna Rance ["Bolivia: New coca control law aggravates tense situation", **Latinamerica Press**, 28 July 1988, p. 6].

101. "Riding high on cocaine", **Latin America Regional Reports**, 24 June 1983, pp. 7-8.

102. Bagley (note 3).

103. John McBeth, "The Opium Laws", **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 29 March 1984, pp. 40-43.

104. Albert O. Hirschman, **Exit, Voice, and Loyalty** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970).

105. The early theoretical literature on these points is reviewed in LaMond Tullis, **Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries** (Wiley, New York, 1973) and LaMond Tullis, **Lord and Peasant in Peru** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970).

106. Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Why the U.S. cannot stop South American cocaine", **Orbis**, 32 (Fall 1988), pp. 499-519.

107. Treaster (note 98).

108. See LaMond Tullis, "Food aid and political instability", in LaMond Tullis and W. Ladd Hollist (eds.) **Food, the State, and International Political Economy** (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1986).

LIST OF AVAILABLE DISCUSSION PAPERS

- DP 1 **Economic Growth, Structural Change and Labour Absorption Africa: 1960-85,**
  Dharam Ghai, December 1987

- DP 2 **The Peasant Question and Development Policy in Nicaragua,**
  Peter Utting, February 1988

- DP 3 **Promoting Youth Employment: Policies and Programmes,**
  Dharam Ghai, May 1988

- DP 4 **Inside Megalopolis: Exploring Social and Spatial Diversity of Provisioning Structures in Mexico City,**
  Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara and Gabriel Vera, June 1990

- DP 5 **Participatory Development: Some Perspectives from Grass-roots Experiences,**
  Dharam Ghai, June 1988

- DP 6 **Some Reflections on Human and Social Indicators for Development,**
  Dharam Ghai, Michael Hopkins and Donald McGranahan, October 1988

- DP 7 **The Crisis of the 1980s in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Impact, Social Change and Political Implications,**
  Dharam Ghai and Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, July 1989

- DP 8 **From "Orthodoxy" to "Reform": Experiences of Dependent Transitional Economies,**
  Peter Utting, July 1989

- DP 9 **Self-Sufficiency and Exile in Mexico (Report on a field study among relocated Guatemalan refugees in south-east Mexico, August-November 1988),**
  Finn Stepputat, August 1989

- DP 10 **The New System of Food Marketing in Pakistan,**
  Sartaj Aziz, May 1990

- DP 11 **Seeking Food and Seeking Money: Changing Productive Relations in a Highland Mexican Community,**
  George A. Collier, June 1990

- DP 12 **Barabaig Natural Resource Management: Sustainable Land Use under Threat of Destruction,**
  Charles Lane, June 1990

- DP 13 **Constraints to Environmental Rehabilitation through People's Participation in the Northern Ethiopian Highlands,**
  Michael Ståhl, July 1990

- DP 14 **Eléments pour l'approche des indicateurs sociaux en Côte d'Ivoire,**
  José Trouvé, July 1990

- DP 15 **Qualitative Indicators of Development,**
  Donald McGranahan, Wolf Scott and Claude Richard, November 1990
- DP15F **Indicateurs qualitatifs du développement,**
  Donald McGranahan, Wolf Scott and Claude Richard, April 1991

- DP 16 **The Social Dynamics of Deforestation in Developing Countries: Principal Issues and Research Priorities,**
  Solon Barraclough and Krishna Ghimire, November 1990

- DP 17 **Refugee Self-settlement versus Settlement on Government Schemes: The Long-term Consequences for Security, Integration and Economic Development of Angolan Refugees (1966-1989) in Zambia,**
  Art Hansen, November 1990

- DP 18 **Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse,**
  Yusuf Bangura, March 1991

- DP 19 **Beneficiaries of the Illicit Drug Trade: Political Consequences and International Policy at the Intersection of Supply and Demand,**
  LaMond Tullis, March 1991

- DP 20 **Organización social y lucha ecológica en una región del norte de México,**
  Julio Moguel and Enrique Velázquez, April 1991

- DP 21 **Illicit Drug Taking and Prohibition Laws: Public Consequences and the Reform of Public Policy in the United States,**
  LaMond Tullis, April 1991

- DP 22 **Greening at the Grassroots: People's Participation in Sustainable Development,**
  Jessica M. Vivian, April 1991

- DP 23 **Ruining the Commons and Responses of the Commoners: Coastal Overfishing and Fishermen's Actions in Kerala State, India,**
  John Kurien, May 1991

- DP 24 **The Social Origins and Impact of Deforestation in Central America,**
  Peter Utting, May 1991

- DP 25 **Development Data Constraints and the Human Development Index,**
  Christopher J.L. Murray, May 1991