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# HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS



## Analyses

- Peacebuilding in Somalia – continued role of the grassroots communities
- Chaotic Somalia: options for lasting peace
- Somalia: twenty years after

## News and events

## Resources




## Peacebuilding in Somalia – continued role of the grassroots communities

Beneath the apparent homogeneity at the national level, the Somali society remains divided, not only by social and occupational stratifications, differences between urban and rural sectors, but also by clan forms of social organization to which Somalis belong. Without getting into details of the conflict, the current situation is that the country is still going through a deep crisis with a socio-political and economic fabric completely destroyed by almost two decades of armed conflict. The internationalization of the conflict (e.g. piracy and perceived threats of terrorism) together with the multiple stakeholders interests are reasons behind the endless search for peace in this country.

John Paul Lederach describes conversation which took "place between two Somali friends over how the house of peace should be built in their war-torn homeland". One argued that "the head needed to be established in order for the body to function. The other suggested that the foundation of the house had to be laid if the roof was to be held up" (Lederach, 37, 1999). He continues to argue that two opposite theories are derived from this conversation about how to "understand and approach the peace building within a population. Using a mixed metaphor from the same conversation, one argued that peace is built from the top down; the second suggested that it is constructed from the bottom up"

"Constructing a peace process in deeply divided societies and situations of internal armed conflict requires an operative frame of reference that takes into consideration *the legitimacy, uniqueness, and interdependency of the needs and resources* of the grassroots, middle range, and top level"( Edwards, 8, 2008). The same is true when dealing with specific issues and broader systemic concerns in a conflict. More specifically, an integrative, comprehensive approach points towards the functional need for *recognition, inclusion*, and *coordination* across all levels and activities. This confirms what Spreitzer says when he argues that, "stakeholder theory moves managerial action toward a more external focus beyond stockholders to key strategic stakeholders - that is, anyone who can affect or is affected by the achievement or the activities of an organization" (Spreitzer, 1079, 2007)

Keeping in mind the need for an interactive and comprehensive approach and remembering what Galtung indicates when he argues that there are "tasks for everybody" in the pursuit of peace and that includes both positive peace, overcoming structural violence, and negative peace, overcoming direct violence (Galtung, 319, 1980), this article analyses the role that the grassroots can play in building peace in Somalia. In other words what can the grassroots do so as to achieve a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour, and ways of life that rejects violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups, and within the Somalia nation?

### The role of grassroots in Somalia

Using Lederach's analysis, the grassroots in Somali represent ''the mass, the base of the society where life is characterized, particularly in settings of protracted conflict and war such in Somalia, by survival mentality. Most of people found in this category are victims and involved in day-to-day effort to find food, water, shelter and safety'' (Ledearach, 42, 1999). He continues to argue that the grassroots people ''understand intimately the fear and suffering with which much of the population must live and they also have an expert knowledge of local politics and know on a face-to-face basis the local leaders'' of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the opposition.

Several peace efforts aiming at ending the current conflict in the divided Somalia have been unsuccessful. If in the past the complexity of the conflict was among other reasons due to the existence of many actors resulting from rivalry and competition opposing different clan elders/leaders and groups in the search for their political and economical hegemony, this time around the conflict is officially known to be evolving with the TFG on one side and armed opposition groups on the other. Taking into account the intractable nature of the ongoing conflict, C. Zelizer indicates that in this case, ''peacebuilding work can play a vital role in building connections between the mid-level and grassroots level of society, to show that there is an alternative and perhaps to keep pressure on leaders to take positive steps''(Zelizer, 14, 2009).

Strategies that would bring positive peace through the grassroots consists of bringing together religious scholars, women, youth and influential persons from all the regions and all the divided parties who long for peace in their country to be given the responsibility for implementing seminars discussions on religious contextual perspectives on war and peace. The objective of these strategies would be to discuss and facilitate exchange among grassroots leaders so as to influence the top leadership.

What was once successfully achieved and implemented in Somaliland, the northwestern part of the country by initiating numerous local peace conferences throughout the region and cumulated in the Grand Borama Conference, which brought together more than five hundred elders, can be replicated as it promotes inclusiveness. In doing so, a peacebuilding program targeting the grassroots leadership in Somalia would follow the successful example of peacebuilding initiatives efforts which took place in Mozambique and emerged from both the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) and the United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF). The grassroots techniques properly and continuously implemented in Somalia can also become essential to the advocacy and influencing toolkit to end the ongoing conflict in Somalia as they successfully achieved their goal in Mozambique.

"The CCM program in Mozambique began with a national seminar in summer 1991 that brought together church representatives from all the provinces; these representatives were then given the responsibility for implementing seminars at local levels. The seminars took an integrated approach for discussion to include topics such religious perspectives on war and peace and church involvement in conflict resolution, to issues of youth displaced persons and their return, land reform, public health, human rights and the impact of violence and war on children"(Lederach, 54, 1999). The UNICEF project aimed at dealing innovatively with the conflict, vio-

lence and militarization facing local communities, especially the youth" (Lederach, 54, 1999). One would ask if this can be achieved in the case of Somalia particularly with the threat and intransigency of armed opposition groups.

Aljazeera broadcasted an interview with a Somali refugee in Yemen. The man mentioned that he had to run away from his country because Al Shabaab forced him to join their group in the fight against the TFG and he refused. We do believe that there are many of such Somalis based in neighbouring countries who are against the ongoing war who can be used in such grassroots initiatives. One way to proceed is to follow the peace process path that started in Kenya and finally Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that culminated in the current TFG. This can be done through dialogue e.g. convening workshops, seminars, conferences that would involve Somali youth, women, elders, religious scholars, based in neighbouring countries so as to discuss and develop idea on active neutrality and build peace from outside to within their country. With the support of the international community notably the African Union (AU) and IGAD, such continued grassroots initiatives are likely to successfully achieve a positive outcome.

As far as the threat of opposition armed groups is concerned, one needs to understand that such initiatives are not without facing challenges with the real dangers posed by all opposition groups and ultimate prices are expected to be paid. Consequently, not only do people need to get prepared, but also, such initiatives merit special attention, protection and assistance from within and outside the country, the reason being that there are many factors that are beyond the control of the local population that can undermine those grassroots initiatives. This was notably the case of Colombia in 1996, "when the local population decided to do away with long time suffering from active presence of and clashes between the armed actors". Despite the threat from the armed groups requesting them to either ''join their groups, leave the area or die, the local population with the support of the Catholic Church and Colombian NGOs decided to resist these options by creating a neutral zone and refusing to collaborate with any of the armed actors". The population held a ''ceremony to declare them a 'Peace Community' in the hope that the armed actors would respect them and allow them to continue living in their hands" (Durán, 2004).

The community subsequently benefited from the active accompaniment and assistance of a local NGO, the Commission for Justice and Peace. As it has been the case for Colombia, such initiatives for Somalia would be costly but beneficial as they would emphasize on civil resistance to structural violence and armed conflict. They however must be inclusive processes involving all stakeholders especially the youth. This needs to be done by keeping in mind that no one level is capable of delivering and sustaining peace on its own. There is need to recognize the interdependence of people and activities across all levels of the society pyramid. Despite the fact that such a transformative approach to peace is not without its dangers, the single most important aspect of encouraging an organic perspective notably in the case of Somalia is in "creating a genuine sense of participation, responsibility and ownership in the process across a broad spectrum of the population", (Knox, 26, 2000). In order words, peacebuilding in Somalia involving the grassroots level needs to be considered as a social inclusion and citizen participation at the community level.

Furthermore, it is also important to keep in mind that grassroots peacebuilding is a complicated process. ''It can take several years to achieve grassroots effectiveness (Fleisher, 373, 2003) Approaches used at the grassroots level face different challenges from those confronting the top- and middle levels. "First, at this level are massive numbers of people. At best strategies can be implemented to touch the leadership working at local and community levels, but more of often than not, these strategies represent points of contact with the mass rather than a comprehensive program for reaching them. Second, many of the people at this level are in a survival mode in which meeting the basic human needs of food, shelter, and safety are a daily struggle" (Lederach, 51-52, 1999).

### Conclusion

Conclusively, we acknowledge that many local initiatives have taken place in Somalia involving the grassroots leadership as this article advocates. Though the future of peace building in Somalia remains uncertain, it is believed that a continued engagement with the grassroots leadership and an emphasis on home-grown reconciliation and continued international support will have profound impacts on peacebuilding process in the country. The same way the lengthy indigenous grassroots peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in Somaliland in the early 1990s provided a secure foundation which successfully established a government and political institutions, the continued role of the grassroots and support from the international community can translate into a positive outcome for the country.

This means that the peacebuilding process with the grassroots leadership must go beyond a mechanical strategy. It must rather be considered as a continued process "whose framework must address and engage the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding"(Lederach, 24, 1999), such as the case of Northern -Ireland peace process which finally achieved a positive outcome in term of peace and peaceful coexistence between the Catholics and the Protestants.

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## Chaotic Somalia: options for lasting peace

A number of peace attempts have been made in order to restore law and order back to a country which has not known such since the state collapse in Somalia in the early 1990s. The anarchy and outlawry affected all Somalis from all walks of life particularly the youth who were brought up in the lawlessness and clan conflicts throughout the country. To-date, all the past peace attempts made were seen to have been the right steps to the right direction. Nonetheless, none of them did take root or succeed in helping establish legitimate governments: from Mahdi in 1991, to Aideed in the mid 1990s, to Abdiqassim in 2000, to Yusuf in 2004, to Sharif in 2009. However, there have been or at least some sort of limping and functioning systems in Somalia.

There have been some form of transitional arrangements in Mogadishu and some functioning regional enclaves with relative (but superficial) peace, stability and development. In 'Somaliland,' it's more of civic responsibility while in 'Puntland,' it's about sub-clan homogeneity and responsiveness to clan loyalties in order to avoid

repeating what's been done in most of South-central Somalia. One thing is clear. Most of the peace attempts were considered to have applied an exclusive approach, where a few people and/or groups dominated the conferences and all of them did not enjoy either the required local Somali recognition or the respect of the international community.

### Some analysis

This is a country where most previous forecasts made by Somali and non-Somali observers and political analysts are becoming a reality. The threats emanating from and/or facing the country, the region and the international system at large are real. Most critical of all, Somalia, at least for the past four years, witnessed the worst suicide bombings, abductions of foreign and Somali aid workers as well as journalists and other targeted assassinations on both 'government' and civil society officials. The conflict has somewhat to do with politics as well as shifting ideological thinking. In other words, the conflict seems to have moved from clanism to Jihadism with US-backed Somali transitional regimes imposing law and order in parts of Mogadishu, the capital. This kind if political Islam and/or *Jihadism* is also a new paradigm and it is exclusive to Somalia; maybe a leaf being borrowed from pre-9/11 Afghanistan or post-2003 Iraq.

The political environment is extremely unstable despite the efforts by the few aid organizations still operating in Somalia. Mass displacement exists and humanitarian access and space are almost non-existent in the country's South-central parts. Civil society organizations are almost targeted on daily basis. Forces of the Mogadishu-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG), with support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), are unable to stabilize the capital let alone spreading out to control the rest of the country. With the exception of the northern sub-clan enclaves, this made the country divided into fiefdoms controlled by hardcore Islamists (at present no warlords are in control in Somalia) that are answerable to no authority but to themselves. Human rights violations exist throughout Somalia including the northern parts and radicalism is both everywhere and is the rise.

AMISOM is bombing the famous *Bakara* market on a regular basis arguing it's only responding to the insurgents' bombings each accusing the other of human rights violations against the unarmed civilians. Piracy is also on the increase with Spanish trawlers illegally and over-fishing on the Somali waters this time with alleged foreign protection.[1] The causes of piracy are debatable but we all agree whatever is being done now is only tackling the consequences and not the root causes.

Despite this gloomy picture, there are also some bright spots to be happy about. Very recently, the TFG reconciled and agreed to share power with the Sufist *Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a* religious group. For better or worse, the government is also grappling with security in Mogadishu with war plans readied. Drums for war aside, the TFG seems to have realized that it cannot do it alone and that there is a need to appreciate other (at least) non-armed groups. In this case, there are targeted diplomatic initiatives by the TFG in re-engaging the diaspora (*Jaaliyadda*) and the civil society.

### The way forward

"Enough is enough" is a term echoed by many Somalis from all walks of life. In fact, it is pretty tied to the fatigue of a majority of Somalis as a result of the continued two-decade old internal armed struggle in the country. Regional as well as international interests are also competing along Somali interests. Splinter groups within the armed Islamists – i.e. *Alshabab* vs. *Hisbul Islam*; *Alshabab* vs. *Milatu Ibrahim* among others – contribute more to the mess.[2] The TFG is backed by the US, Ethiopia and others while the Islamists are allegedly supported by Asmara. It's the common man that suffers but his destiny is no in his hand either.

What is the way forward? The TFG needs to continue engaging all other Somali actors including the regional administrations outside its control. Diplomacy is the only way out for Somalia to get out of its current mess and shape. Civil society will

have to be allowed to play its catalyst role and so is the *Somali diaspora (aka Jaaliya-dda in Somali)*? And finally, human rights violations will have accounted for both by Somali and non-Somali actors. Most important of all, the role of traditional elders will have to be recognized and strengthened. While it's only the Somalis who will by the end of the day find lasting solution to the Somali problem, Somalia must change and there must be options for lasting peace masteminded by the Somalis themselves.

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[1] Ali Musa Abdi (AFP), Somali pirates want $4 mln for Spanish trawler – Oct 14, 2009

[2] Milatu Ibrahim (the religion of Prophet Abraham in Arabic) is a breakaway group within Alshabab that is more radical.

## Somalia: twenty years after

### Introduction and background

Despite the less reporting from Mogadishu and much of South-central Somalia and the relative stability and development in the northern regions, Somalia is more or less the same as it was in the early 1990s. Various 'Somali' groups are competing for power and wealth; the difference this time being the approach. After more than a year in office, the Mogadishu-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is still grappling with security and is in charge of less than a third of the capital; the opposition in the South are yet to either take over or diminish for good; the other regional administrations in the north are also shaken with insecurity emanating from the South: from piracy to invisible *Alshabab*-related security cases in addition to poverty and corruption. There are also daily attacks on areas held by the government and the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM). The parliament tried to sack its Speaker for allegedly 'overstaying' in office shortly before the president and members of the international community intervened. Aid agencies have access problems in much of South-central Somalia including the capital and the diplomatic community is just back from Cairo for another round of talks on Somalia issuing another press release.[1]

Interestingly, the TFG's war plan seems to have been shelved after the military chief complained of lack of 'enough' resources.[2] The armed opposition groups also declared that they would instead attack and get rid of the government. Whichever the case, there is a lull at least for an all-out-military war on any group by the other. Based on this, one can argue that from warlordism to war economy to organized crime to piracy to unending transitional arrangements, it is like Somalia is back to square one. However, even with such a confusing picture on the ground, there are also some positive developments outside Somalia. The first workshop of its kind was recently held in the United States by a number of Somali civics arguing that it was time for multi-party politics in Somalia; falling short of declaring one. There are also consultations in various Somali and non-Somali circles on a way out. This is supported by the fact that the current transitional arrangement will end on August 2011 and because there is not much time left, there is already too much focus on the end of the term.

### Brief assessment

In a brief assessment, it is difficult to answer one big question: what is different now than the past two decades? An attempt is made all the same.

First, there is now a US-backed (or at least morally supported) transitional government in Mogadishu fully protected by the AU-mandated AMISOM mission in

Mogadishu, the capital. Second, despite the relative fatigue by the public due to the TFG's incapability, there is still a degree of popular support not necessarily a critical mass. Third, the TFG has good relations with regional actors i.e. Kenya, Egypt and Ethiopia. Fourth, there is a vibrant civil society that can be consulted by both Somali actors and others interested in Somali affair. Fifth, there exists a transitional Charter with two supplements as a basis for political settlement and/or power-sharing: the Djibouti agreement (June 2008 - January 2009) and the Addis agreement (March/ April 2010) which means the door is open for any new group including civil society. Sixth, with possibility of either a new TFG leadership and/or a subsequent cabinet reshuffle, the expectation is that there can be a more compatible and easy to manage cabinet that is up to its tasks. Finally, probably the new government can be pushed to complete a number of strategically-selected transitional tasks including the drafting and passing of a *Sharia*-compliant Somali constitution.[3]

With all the above positive issues in mind, there is hope for the country. As one Somali politician recently said "if it was this easy to get to power, I could have challenged the late Siyad Barre long time ago," signaling how determined one should be upon the call of national duty. It is time for Somali nationalists to challenge the TFG and other Somali actors and call for the installation of a nationalist government through non-violent means.

**Recommendations**

Efforts to reconstruct the Somali state have proven counterproductive, as they reinforce what divides Somalis rather than what has historically united them.[4] With the era of warlords gone and the need to bring an end to the unending transitional arrangements that plagued any hopes for lasting peace, reconciliation, reconstruction and development for Somalia becoming much more important than ever before, what is left is the inclusion of civil society. Of course, there are challenges facing this group including the fact that term civil society is foreign in the Somali context, the overdependence of it on external aid, and the lack of a conducive environment for them to operate among others. Although most of the past transitional regimes have emerged from influence outside Somalia, civil society has played a major role either in holding the processes together and providing national leaders from within the movement.

This means that there is a general agreement that it is now time for civil society to wake up to the challenges of the existing Somali leadership crisis; take its tasks seriously and produce the next government which should hopefully be the 'Somali government' we all waited to see. The 'how' question should start with the need to broaden the current ongoing consultations on a way out; selection of candidates should be based on merit and competence; and there should be visionary leaders emerging out of such caucusing.

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[1] For the April 23 communiqué issued by the ICG in Cairo and other daily updates on developments in Somalia, visit various Somali websites including the famous hiiraan.com.

[2] For an analysis of the TFG's war plan, see Chris Harnisch "Operation Briefer: The Upcoming Battle for Mogadishu" *CRITICALTHREATS*. April 1, 2010.

[3] There is a debate on what validation mechanism to adopt after the draft constitution is ready. For example, people like Ould Abdalla, Ban ki-Moon's representative to Somalia, argue that there should be no national referendum but a validation exercise by the current parliament in Mogadishu.

[4] Waters, Hillary. "Evaluating Islam in Somalia: Building Civic Nationalism and State Security" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA, March 26, 2008.

# NEWS AND EVENTS

## ETHIOPIA

### EU agrees to observer status in May 2011 Addis polls

The European Union (EU) has agreed to observer status in Ethiopia's general election scheduled for May 2011 after it reached a compromise with the Ethiopian government. Dino Sinigallia, the EU representative in Ethiopia said the decision was made by EU officials in the Union headquarters in Brussels. Previously, the EU was strongly opposed to the government's proposed code of conduct for election observers, and according to the deal, the European Union election monitoring team will adhere to some of the Ethiopian government rules but will be guided by EU guidelines.

The EU assigned Dutch parliamentarian Thijs Berman will head the observer mission to Ethiopia. Mr Berman recently headed the EU monitoring team to Afghanistan. The EU said that it would deploy 220 election monitors in 40 thousand polling stations. Meanwhile the main Ethiopian opposition party coalition, Mederek, has hit out at the African Union calling it weak and incapable of observing elections after it said it would have observers too. Prof Beyene Petros, the chair of the coalition said African Union election observers were only in it for the allowances they would receive rather than to ensure a free and fair election process. "It is a picnic for them (the AU officials), which is useless for us."

African Union chief Jean Ping dismissed the accusations and said the AU has success in election monitoring.

## KENYA

### Disarmament begins in northern Kenya

More than 4,000 policemen have been sent on 26 April to northern Kenya to seize illegal guns. The operation started nearly two months after an amnesty for pastoralists in the area to willingly surrender their weapons expired. Some 1,200 guns and more than 13,000 bullets were handed in during the amnesty period that ended on February 20. However, security officials in the area say this is a drop in the ocean and there were still thousands of guns in wrong hands. Speaking in Isiolo during the launch of the operation, Eastern provincial police boss Marcus Ochola asked people in the region to cooperate with police.

Mr Ochola allayed fears that police would use excessive force on civilians. Scores of women and young girls have fled the area fearing sexual attacks during the operation. Mr Ochola warned of stern action against any officer implicated in abuses. Area MPs are opposed to the impending mop-up. Samburu East's Raphael Letimalo said he saw no need for the operation since his constituents had surrendered their guns. The government should use the Provincial Administration and elders to collect any remaining weapons, he said.

The operation will disrupt the ongoing voter registration, it is feared. "People here easily get scared of police presence and will flee," Mr Letimalo said. North Horr MP Ganya Chachu said the government should agree with neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Sudan to forestall cross-border incursions since disarming Kenyans will make them vulnerable to attacks from rival warriors from these countries.
*Daily Nation*

## SOMALIA

### Two Somali radio stations shut down

The Transitional Federal Government on 20 April ordered the closure of two radio stations in Mogadishu. The affected independent media, Somaliweyn and Tusmo,

operate in the section of the capital controlled by the government. Abukar Kadaf, the Director of Somaliweyn in North Mogadishu said security agents produced a warrant, ordering him to close the radio station. Tusmo Radio Director, Abdirashid Deel was also given the letter to close down.

However, sources told the *Nation* that the two stations were reopened after the TFG's Minister for Information, Dahir Mohamud Ghelle intervened. The Secretary General of the TFG's Mogadishu Administration, Abdikafi Hilowle Osman, ordered broadcasters in the government side of the capital to start playing music and other lyrics. He criticised the stations for obeying an order from Islamist group, Hizbul Islam, banning radios and TVs from playing music or even including tunes to regular programmes and advertisements.

*Daily Nation, Reuters*

## SUDAN

### Sudan, Egypt opposed to Nile sharing deal

Sudan and Egypt have refused to sign the agreement on the sharing of the Nile waters. Although Uganda and the rest of the Nile Basin countries were ready to sign the protocol called the Cooperative Framework Agreement, Egypt and Sudan held on to their "historical rights" over the Nile as spelt out in two colonial agreements of 1929 and 1959.

At the talks held at Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt, Ugandan environment minister Maria Mutagamba on 14 April said the seven member countries of the Nile Basin "also disagreed with Egypt and Sudan". The other countries are the DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi. She added that the colonial agreements, which guarantee downstream Egypt with the lion's share of the Nile waters, have been contested by the upper Nile states over the years and were blocking development of the water resources. Despite this, she argued, the Nile Cooperative Framework entails more than sharing water. "We have a lot at stake including trade and conservation of wetlands and forests, which act as reservoirs of the water in the River Nile," Mutagamba said.

The countries decided to move on to the next stage signing the agreement starting on May 14. This will remain open for signing for not more than one year. After that, the countries will engage in the ratification process. This is the second time the countries are disagreeing over the issue within one year. In May last year, the seven countries decided to honour the cooperative framework. They also proposed that the areas of disagreement would be resolved later.

*New Vision*

## UGANDA

### Electoral commission launches new voter registration system

The Electoral Commission (EC) launched a new voter registration system that captures biometrics details of voters - like fingerprints. The biometrics system was inaugurated on 8 April in Kampala by EC chief Badru Kiggundu will be implemented by a German firm, Muelhbauer High Tech International. Dr Kiggundu said the new system, which targets 3.5 million new voters, to bring the total number of registered voters to 13.5 million, will also help weed out multiple registrations. The exercise will run from May 3 to June 4 this year.

The biometrics system was piloted in Kamwokya, a Kampala suburb, with 14,000 voters. A total of 50 pairs of duplicates managed to make through the trial process. The German firm's projects manager, Mr Ritter Mathias, said they would double check the existing database to erase multiple registrations. Meanwhile, Speaker Edward Ssekandi yesterday said he would defer Parliament's recess to ensure amendments to electoral laws are disposed of. The laws are currently before the parliamentary committee on legal and parliamentary affairs, which has closed public

hearings and is working on a draft to present to the House. Committee chairman Steven Tashobya, said the Bills would be tabled next week.
*Daily Monitor*

### UN injects $3.8 million into Northern Uganda

The United Nations on 14 April launched a project to bolster efforts to achieve sustainable recovery in the conflict-affected Lango sub-region of northern Uganda. The $3.8 million Northern Uganda Early Recovery Project is jointly funded by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations World Food Programme and the World Health Organisation. The press statement said the two-year project would target 16 sub-counties in Lira and Oyam districts as well as Barr sub-county in Lira District. Working closely with the government, the UN will address health, nutrition, HIV/Aids, local governance, peace building, conflict resolution, the environment and the rebuilding of livelihoods and infrastructure.

Mr Theophane Nikyema, the UN Resident and Humanitarian coordinator, said the project is a contribution to the peace, recovery and development plan for northern Uganda, which the government launched in 2009. The project, which is to be funded through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, will have the three agencies jointly target an estimated 230,000 people with integrated service delivery. The project has been designed to address the transitional needs of returning populations in northern Uganda. With the return of relative peace in northern Uganda, the UN is now shifting its support from humanitarian and emergency relief toward rehabilitation and sustainable development, the statement added.
*Daily Monitor*

## RESOURCES

### GENERAL

#### "The responsibility to protect minorities and the problem of the kin-state" (February 2010)

This policy brief by the United Nations University suggests that genocide and ethnic cleansing have all-too-clearly demonstrated the dangers of failing to protect minority groups. A "kin-state" with strong ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic links to a minority population abroad, may be well-placed to assist in its protection. But unilateral interference by kin-states can raise tensions with host-states, endangering international peace and security. If a state neglects its primary responsibility to protect minorities under its jurisdiction, the subsidiary responsibility lies with the international community as a whole, not the kin-state in particular.
*http://www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2010/UNU_PolicyBrief_10-02.pdf*

#### "Trends in electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa" (March 2010)

Peace Brief (report) provides an overview of some characteristics of electoral violence and identifies some responses taken by national governments and the international community to address electoral violence.
*http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB13Electoral%20Violence.pdf*

#### "Sexed pistols: the gendered impacts of prolific small arms" (January 2010)

This policy brief examines the connection between guns and gender and discusses methodological challenges and priorities in gendered small-arms research, policy

and advocacy. Stereotypes have to give way to an understanding of the multiple roles of both small-arms users and victims, as gender is only one among many social categories defining individuals' approaches to and experience of small-arms violence. Fortunately, new and encouraging policy initiatives have emerged, although significant gains are yet to be made towards achieving inclusive policy implementation and improving weapons collection programmes; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and security sector reform (SSR) activities. It is written by Vanessa Farr, Henri Myrttinen and Albrecht Schnabel.
*http://www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2010/UNU_PolicyBrief_10-01.pdf*

### "Resource scarcity and the prevention of violent conflicts" (April 2010)

This article by Renée Gendron and Evan Hoffman argues that resource scarcity creates multiple impacts on conflicts. It can increase the chances that a nonviolent conflict will become violent and it can re-trigger violence in a previously resolved conflict. Thus, the authors argue that resource scarcity plays an important role in both the monitoring of and response to situations where violent conflict is to be prevented. In terms of monitoring, resource scarcity can be used as an indicator to help provide warnings that a nonviolent conflict is likely to become violent. In terms of responses, dual policies aimed at fair and equitable resource sharing plus managing resources in a manner that helps alleviate poverty may be the most effective for preventing the outbreak of violent conflict. In the case of preventing new violence in a previously-resolved conflict, peace agreements should address resource management issues by building mechanisms for this into the agreement.
*http://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=18&entrada=90*

## KENYA

### "Winning hearts and minds? Examining the relationship between aid and security in Kenya" (April 2010)

This case study on Kenya, researched and written by Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, is the first in a series of publications presenting the findings of a two-year FIC comparative study on the relationship between aid and security in north-eastern Kenya and in five provinces of Afghanistan. The overall study has focused in particular on trying to determine the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives, including by helping to "win hearts and minds" of local populations. This paper examines the effectiveness of one aspect of those efforts, namely the aid projects implemented by US Civil Affairs teams deployed from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Garissa and Wajir districts in North Eastern province, and Lamu district in Coast province.
*https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/34807224/Winning-Hearts.pdf?version=1*

## SOMALIA

### "Harsh War, Harsh Peace" (April 2010)

This 62-page report by Human rights Watch finds that al-Shabaab forces have brought greater stability to many areas in southern Somalia, but at a high cost for the local population - especially women. Based on over 70 interviews with victims and witnesses, the report describes harsh punishments including amputations and floggings, which are meted out regularly and without due process.
*http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/04/13/harsh-war-harsh-peace*

## SUDAN

### "Sudan - no easy ways ahead" (April 2010)

As the six-year transitional period defined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement draws to a close, Sudan is sliding into another crisis. The agreement has largely failed to realize democratic transformation and to make the unity of the country attractive. Political tensions in the run-up to the elections this year indicate that older conflicts still persist – a bad sign for the referendum on the future status of South Sudan that is scheduled for January 2011.

The Heinrich Böll Foundation, which has been working both with civil society partners in Sudan and on Sudan-related issues in the German context for several years, has put together this publication in order to reflect on such scenarios. The publication has contributions by Alex de Waal, Atta El-Battahani, Marina Peter, John Yoh, Roland Marchal, and Peter Schumann.
*http://www.boell.de/downloads/2010401Sudan_publication.pdf*

### "Southern Sudan: the new kid on the block? Assessing the neighbourhood on the threshold of Southern Sudan's self-determination referendum" (March 2010)

As Sudan has entered the final and most critical year of its post-war transition period, the other countries comprising the Horn and central Africa are on the alert. Southern Sudan's self-determination referendum, scheduled for January 2011, could result in partition of the country and may possibly prompt the resurgence of violent North-South conflict. In any case, the emergence of an independent South would have profound regional implications. With the stability of the entire Horn and central Africa on the line, this policy brief offers a preliminary assessment of how Southern Sudan's bordering states are likely to position themselves with regard to this potential 'new kid on the block', and explores various political-economic interests that could come into play.
*http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CLINGENDAEL_SouthernSudan_TheNewKidOnTheBlock.pdf*


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**Editorial information**
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**Editorial principles**
The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.