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HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

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Civil militarization in Somalia – causes, factors and issues

From political instability, to piracy off the Somali coast, to *al-Shabab* and other security threats, to the proliferation of regional administrations, to general civil strife, the Somali crisis is far from over. It is now twenty one years old; a two-decade long period of civil militarization and perhaps the longest transitional government. The conflict is multi-actoral, the issues multidimensional and the approaches used to manage are full of not only competing but also contradictory interests harboured by both internal and external actors.

But, the one million Somali shilling question is where did the Somali people go wrong? With an armed opposition against the military government in the late 1980s, the former Somali government was accused of an iron-fisted military rule. Despite the accusations, however, the country fell into a similar number of gruesome militarization: this time one of civil militarization.

This article aims to explain the causes, factors and issues of civil militarization in Somalia: the fall of the military regime in the early 1990s, the subsequent clan warfare and warlordism, the US-led UN intervention in the early 1990s, Ethiopia's intervention, post-9/11 and its effects, the general arms trade, other conflict hotspots in the sub-region, and the general lack of a functioning Somali authority in Mogadishu.

Background

Somalia has been undergoing a two-decade long bitter civil strife which traces its roots in the aftermath of the *Ogaden War*.¹ The defeat led to the disintegration of the national army and the emergence of a number of armed rebel groups turning against the government. The problem was more with the policies of the military regime: marginalization, uneven development and militarization of all sectors of social life. For example, there was no freedom of speech, no representative parliament and almost everything was centralized in and around Mogadishu, the capital city.

From the late 1970s, four key armed opposition groups emerged: the Majerten-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Isaq-led Somali National Movement (SNM), the Hawiye-backed United Somali Congress (USC), and the Ogadeni-led Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Other than their armed opposition against the military regime, these rebel groups have had neither national agenda nor

any form of a strategy for a post-Siyad Barre Somalia. One key explanation, however, is this absence of a national vision as the main cause of civil militarization in Somalia.

There are other explanations to this absence of a national agenda on the part of the Somali rebel groups. One of them is the argument that their own backer, Ethiopia, did not want them to have any. Conspiracy theories aside, the fact that the Somalis are of an oral society and therefore do not write makes another explanation. But, historically, there was also an absence of long-term oriented political organization and planning among the Somali political elites.

Interestingly enough, the rebel groups, like the military regime, were equally armed to the teeth. Other than Ethiopia, it is the Cold War superpower rivalry over the Horn of Africa sub-region to blame. Somalia and Ethiopia went to war over the *Ogaden* in 1977-78.² The two regimes did topple each other with Siyad Barre leaving office in January 1991 and Mengistu following him in May the same year. Of course, the pastoralist nature of the Somalis allowed them to carry arms throughout the sub-region. This is not only for protection but it also has to do with the cultural life of the Somali people, particularly the pastoralist groups, who are found in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and in Kenya. Such armaments included knives, clubs, spears, and sticks before the introduction of modern firearms.

Causes, factors and issues

In addition to the Cold War rivalry and politics which led to the militarization of Siyad Barre and Ethiopia's Mengistu, there are other factors that contribute to the militarization - and more so to the civil militarization - of Somalia and the Somali people. These include: The fall of the military regime in the early 1990s, the subsequent clan warfare and warlordism, the US-led UN intervention in the early 1990s, Ethiopia's intervention, post-9/11 and its effects, the general arms trade, other conflict hotspots in the sub-region, and the general lack of a functioning Somali authority in Mogadishu.

The fall of the military regime in the early 1990s

The fall of the military regime in early 1990 led to massive loss of lives and all kinds of human rights violations. There was mass displacement, large refugee influx and the government armaments (both small and heavy) fell into the hands of civilians. As a result of the lawless situation in the early 1990s and absence of national security structures, private arms markets emerged to fill in the vacuum and operate even today. Some of the local arms (illegal) markets include the famous *Bakara* market in Mogadishu where small arms can easily be acquired by anyone who can afford.

After the fall of military regime, all the armaments of the military regime were shared out among various factions depending on who had access to the armoury. This happened throughout the country and it gave rise to armed violence throughout Somalia. The first Somali transitional government in 1991 did not have the capacity to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Instead, it engaged with clan warfare within itself (between Ali Mahdi and Gen. Aidede) and with other clans and sub-clans from other parts of the country.³

Clan warfare and warlordism

In addition to the four-month old bitter warfare between Ali Mahdi and the late Gen. Aidede along clan lines which led to the green line in Mogadishu, a series number of factional fighting took place in many parts in Somalia: Mogadishu, Kismayu, Baidoa, Gedo and Beletweyne between Gen. Aidede and other political but clan affiliated-factions like the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali National Front (SNF), and the United Somali Congress Patriotic Movement (USCPM) respectively.

This approach was accentuated by the absence of a legitimate and inclusive central government. It was also based on the fact that Somali politics has traditionally

been structured around the clan system. In the absence of a central authority, these clan-based alignments have provided the lines of conflict along which struggles for recognition – for status and prestige but also, and significantly, for social justice and equality – have been fought.⁴

Neither the relevant skills nor the required standards for a conventional warfare were utilized in all this. Instead, faction and other clan leaders drawing their support from the clan membership through clan and other marauding militiamen acquired arms and supplied their militia forces that waged war for their faction leaders and/or defend the clan interests against other clans.

The US-led UN intervention 1992 – 2005

In early December 1992, Mogadishu and its environs woke up to the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) intervention, also known as Operation Restore Hope (ORH). This was followed by the US-led UN Operations in Somalia- UNOSOM I and II and which continued up to early 1995. This led to differences between the US army leadership and the late Gen. Aideed. As a result, eighteen US forces and thousands of Somali civilians were killed.

The anti-US war led by Gen. Aideed attracted clan militiamen across different clans willing to support Gen. Aideed's against a common enemy: the United States and its intervention in Somalia. During this period, there were also allegations that the UN operations massively contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the hands of civilians.

Ethiopia's intervention

Allegations against Somalia's frontline states, namely Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti aside, Ethiopia has been involved in the training, arming and militarily supporting various faction leaders throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s. For example, Ethiopia trained and supported the SNF against *Al Ittihad* in Gedo in the mid to the late 1990s; the SDM which later on turned itself into the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) against Gen. Aideed in 1998/99, and the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) against the Transitional National Government (TNG) in the early 2000s. Ethiopia also supported 'Puntland' and 'Somaliland.' The fact that there is no national army to bilaterally engage and therefore support makes it clear that this kind of Ethiopian or other countries' military support for factions only led to more civil militarization in the country.

Ethiopia has also supported the former TFG under Abdullahi Yusuf militarily and fought the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) along TFG forces in late 2006 up to early 2009. This led to the civil militarization of much of south-central Somalia since the warring parties engaged each other militarily in Mogadishu, Kismayu and in the southern enclave of *Ras Kiamboni* in early 2007. This has also allegedly attracted a power struggle between Ethiopia and Eritrea who wanted to outflank each other on Somali soil.⁵ Eritrea supported the ICU and led efforts to form the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) while Ethiopia supported the TFG and other factions like the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) of Barre Hirale and the more moderate Islamist group of *Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a* (ASWJ).

Post-9/11 and its effects

Although there is no available statistics on how much support has gone to various warlords, the US counter-terrorism efforts in the east and Horn of Africa sub-region has had massive engagements with Somali warlords and other regional entities like 'Puntland' and 'Somaliland.'

Since there is no functional central authority in Mogadishu, such military support, both cash and armaments went to the hands of civilians in search of high profile targets inside Somalia. For example, the US supported a bunch of warlords in Mogadishu and in south-central Somalia as well as the intelligence services of

'Puntland' and 'Somaliland.' It is also believed that not only the United States but that some other countries have their private counter-terrorism militia groups freely operating in and around Mogadishu. Privatization of security and contracting of external actors⁶ has not only had negative impacts on the works of the overall Somali security sector but it has also internally played out.

Arms trade

From the famous Bakara market to the many smaller black markets throughout Somalia, arms trade has been part and parcel of Somali trade from the late 1970s in Somalia and in the east and Horn of Africa sub-region. Arms trade in Yemen, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons from Uganda's Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan Peoples' Democratic Movement (UPDM) and from Ethiopia's Somali and Oromo rebel groups, arms trade in northern Kenya and the prolonged volatility in pre-independent South Sudan have all contributed to a flourishing arms trade in Somalia and in the sub-region.

While both factors of supply and demand were and are still available in Somalia, other developments in the sub-region have also enabled the arms trade to prosper. Although disputed, and sometimes biased against certain groups and countries, the UN Monitoring group has documented many of these developments in the form of violations of the arms embargo on Somalia.

Not only the armed opposition groups of *al-Shabab* and *Hisbul Islam* (before they merged with *al-Shabab*) but also other actors have been implicated in their involvement of arms trade in one way or another. These include the TFG, ASWJ, the AU Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), and Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Yemen.

Other conflict hotspots in the sub-region

Other conflict hotspots in the east and Horn of Africa sub-region have had negative impacts on the Somali conflict. These include rebel activities in Ethiopia by the Oromo and the Ogaden groups which have direct links with Somalia either for support or armaments in addition to accessing the existing arms black markets. Some of their members also get training and other forms of support. Uganda, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have also provided two-way markets for arms traders.

Of late, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has approved member states to militarily engage *al-Shabab*. As a result, Ethiopia has crossed onto the Somalia side of the border as Kenya's Defence Forces (KDF) is accepted to join AMISOM.⁷ Both countries are working with non-state actors: forces of the JVA, those of ASWJ and disorganized TFG forces in Gedo and much of the Jubba Corridor. While this only furthers the ongoing civil militarization and radicalization within Somalia, it is also not the best option partly because of its negative impact on the already complex politics of the Jubba Corridor where you have multiple actors all competing for the resource rich region so that they can use it as a bargaining chip for the national cake.

IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) has been involved in collecting data and advising on low level, cross-border, communal conflicts as opposed to focusing on the real issues: inter and intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa sub-region yet it has a wider mandate for peace and security in the region as a strategy to spur socio-economic and political development.

The lack of a functioning central authority

The lack of a functioning central authority in Mogadishu, which is the epicentre of the Somali crisis, and the subsequent absence of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) regime in-built into the various Somali institutions led to a massive civil militarization in today's Somalia.

Worst of all, other than *ad hoc* arrangements to deal with *al-Shabab* and other anti-government elements, the TFG does not have a national security strategy nor a DDR programme⁸ hence the militarization of the civilian population.

Conclusions

The rebel groups that toppled the former Somali government in early 1991 did neither have a national agenda nor a national vision and that all the subsequent groups have immensely contributed to the militarization of the civilian population. In addition to other factors, many of them external to the Somali crisis, Somali leaders are to blame for not being visionary and nationalistic enough to think about the national interest first. None of the past Somali entities including the current TFG has crafted a clearly stipulated security strategy. If any, they are on paper and they have been initiated, assessed and pushed for by foreign elements either states pursuing their interest, i.e. counter-terrorism, or non-state actors in the form of consultancies.

This means that the two-decade old military regime was only replaced with civil militarization. A clearly-articulated security strategy is the only way out. This does not mean training security forces outside Somalia but it stresses the importance of crafting a security strategy and policy, adopting it and implementing it inside Somalia: one that includes the safety and security of the person and property in addition to a home-grown Somali-owned DDR programme.

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- 1 The term 'Ogaden' is used here to mean all the disputed areas in eastern Ethiopia/western Somalia: *Ogaden, Haud and Reserve Area*. You will also note that the border between Somalia and Ethiopia is not internationally recognized and that it is only an administrative line.
- 2 See Barry Malone, "Troubled Ethiopia-Somalia history haunts Horn of Africa," Reuters, December 28, 2011.
- 3 See Adam Lowther, *Americans and asymmetric conflict: Lebanon, Somalia and Afghanistan* (Westport: Praeger, 2007), p.106.
- 4 See Hussein M. Adam, "Somalia: Militarism, warlordism or Democracy?" *Review of African Political Economy*, Volume 19, Issue 54, 1992.
- 5 See Hezron Nyawachi, "Ethiopia, Eritrea fuelling Somalia War," *allAfrica.com*, 10 February 2010.
- 6 See Ibrahim Farah and Jacqueline Njeru, "Privatization of security in Somalia: Implications for the Horn of Africa," *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, April-May 2011; See also Andre le Sage, "Dynamics of piracy off the Horn of Africa," *African Centre for Strategic Studies*, US National Defense University, 29th June, 2009.
- 7 The AU asked the Security Council to "expeditiously consider and authorise" the request to take advantage of the current pressure on al-Shabab and consolidate security gains. See John Ngirachu, "Kenya gets nod to join AU troops in Somalia offensive," *Daily Nation*, Friday, January 6, 2012.
- 8 Other than the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) developed by Yusuf-Gedi's government for Mogadishu, the capital and the UN-backed security sector assessment report, there is no security strategy or policy for Somalia. However, the 'Somaliland' experience provides the best example of a classical home-grown DDR programme, see *Somalia (UNDP/ROLS DDR Phase I: 2003 – 2007)*.

Armed pastoralists in North Rift Valley – a shift towards reintegration, demobilization and disarmament

Abstract

This paper critically assesses the disarmament exercise in the Kenya's North Rift region and highlights the technical missteps that resulted in a not-so-well-done process. To achieve this, the paper presents the context of North Rift and assesses two previous disarmament exercises carried in the North Rift and why they failed.

Against this background, it builds on the pre-requisites that the process should follow in view of the contexts in the North Rift of Kenya to achieve an integrated goal of sustainable disarmament, peace and development. To this end, the paper suggests a shift from the usual Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) to Reintegration Demobilization Disarmament (RDD) model that is more humane, peaceful and geared towards addressing security concerns.

The North Rift of Kenya context

North Rift is part of Rift Valley province. Rift Valley Province of Kenya extends from the border with Tanzania in the South to the borders of Ethiopia and Sudan in the North. More than half of North Rift's western border is shared with Uganda with the lower third central and Western of Kenya. The North Rift region is generally accepted to comprise of the districts of Turkana, West Pokot, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Marakwet, Baringo, Laikipia, Samburu. These areas suffer from armed violence or violence from cattle rustling both within Kenya and across the border with Uganda. The prevalence of small arms is obvious - almost all households or homesteads in the region have an arm or two. Marginalized under the colonial government and isolated politically and developmentally after independence, the North Rift shares characteristics of pastoralist poverty of other arid districts such as Marsabit, Moyale, Mandera.

The people in the North Rift almost share common language, culture and geographical location. They have almost the same cultural heritage and practices. Ideally, some borders separating these people are more or less political and it is only this element that makes them straddle national borders without any feeling of the trespass at all. The North Rift also shares more international borders than any other province in Kenya – Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. These countries have had or are currently having volatile civil wars, leading to easily accessible arms.

With neighbouring province, North Eastern, having plenty of AK-47s manufactured in the 1960s, these arms are also prevalent in West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Laikipia. It is reported that the region has newer models of Hecklers ad Koch G3 assault rifle indicating a population determined at all cost to arm itself. This is partly as a result of a larger selection from more conflicts and partly because government raiding in attempts to disarm. The loss of old guns spurs the demand for newer ones, creating refreshers market for dealers.

The socio-economic lives of these pastoralists revolve around the preservation and the welfare of their livestock which serves as the primary asset and source of sustenance (Jacob 1965; Silberman 1959) and income. Their way of life has over time been dictated by the severe weather patterns characterized by a climate where temperatures are so high often exceeding 40oC with meagre annual rainfall, too meagre to support anything else other than pastoralism. Through the dry season or times of drought, pastoralists are forced to relocate their cattle in search of water and pasturelands. They set temporary cattle camps (or Kraals) to keep livestock from wandering off and to safeguard them from perennial raids by bordering ethnic communities and to safeguard them from potential raids. Of course in the most of these places, armed raids are inevitable.

The region is mainly dominated by three communities namely: the *Pokot*, the *Samburu* and the *Turkana*. They are fundamentally nomadic pastoralists. They keep cattle, sheep, camel and goats. Due to the number of animals kept and the nature of pastures as well as the climatic conditions of the ASALs, these herders are forced to move around with their stock in search of more pasture and water. Hence the name “nomadic pastoralists” or “mobile pastoralists.” Their movements are unrestricted to one area or country. They even move more freely into and out of neighbouring countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda with the boundaries just being virtually inexistent to them. These movements are of the major sources of misunderstanding and armed conflict between them and their neighbours.

The North Rift expanse is also characterized by aridity and semi-aridity. The land is too arid for any lucrative cultivation hence livestock rearing. There is low rainfall and frequent droughts adversely affect livestock health. Due to this scarcity, the communities are forced to share this resource as well as mineral licks. This common resource often causes conflict among the nomadic pastoral communities. This happens as one community attempts to assert authority and its control over crucial shared resource. Basically there are no solid rules.

Disarmament in the North Rift and Kenya in general

Kenya has not been left behind in the fight against small arms at least not in the beginning of the fight. International attention to the problem of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has been catalyzed by persistent global campaign to proscribe anti-personal landmines. In the late 1990s, such campaign culminated in the signing of the convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personal and on their destruction in 1997. This is what is commonly referred to as “The Mine Ban Treaty of 1997. Although Kenya has no big problem with landmines, it has a thorn in unexploded ordinance (UXO) which can be traced back to as early as First World War – WWI. Kenya became a signatory to this on 5th December 1997.

Most notably in her efforts to probably assert her seriousness and leadership in the fight against small arms, Kenya convened a Ministerial level government conference on small arms in the Horn of Africa and Great lakes sub-region in March 2000. The conference was held in Nairobi and culminated to the birth of the *Nairobi declaration*¹ where 10 government (Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) pledged to work together to implement a coordinated regional action plan to stem the proliferation of small arms. This was to be achieved through harmonizing national legislation with particular attention to legal controls over possession and transfer of weapons and the improvement of institutional capacity of law enforcement bodies.

Kenya was designated the role of coordinating the follow through towards international support to implement the agreed measures. The meeting succeeding the Nairobi Declaration led to taking up of a regional coordinated agenda for action and an implementation plan which detailed the specific requirement for its implementation and mandated the creation of a dedicated sub-regional body – the Nairobi Secretariat to coordinate implementation and information sharing. They also contributed to adoption of a common African position on the SALW problem, known as the Bamako signed in Bamako, Mali for consideration in 2001 United Nations conference.

“Dumisha Amani I” – first disarmament exercise in Kenya (2006)

Staying within this framework, Kenya has conducted a series of disarmament exercises among the communities in the North Rift. In May 2006, the Government of Kenya launched a large scale *military-led operation*² to disarm communities in the North Rift region and subsequently announced its intention to expand the programme to the North East of Kenya. The disarmament exercise was then the Kenya largest in and covered at least seven districts in the North Rift. It came at the same time as Ugandan army led disarmament in the neighbouring pastoralist communities in the North Rift.

The second phase which was also part of Dumisha Amani I, was dubbed “*Operation Okota I*” meaning “collect phase I”. This entailed forceful disarmament of communities and the target was those communities that did not cooperate during earlier phase. The third stage was *Okota II* (collection phase II) a development intervention designed to improve economic conditions in previously armed areas in order to reduce incentive for arms possessions.

The disarmament campaign generated certain visible returns. In total approximately 2 609 firearms and 6 702 rounds of ammunition were collected. Before this however, there had been other series of military operations to repossess guns. In the 1984 operation, for instance, the soldiers and policemen descended on Pokot villages where they terrorized the villagers and confiscated thousands of animals instead of weapons. These were used to blackmail people to surrender arms in return for animals. This was the new Government approach. It left a lot of resentment amongst the Pokots. They felt that the act was unfair, unwarranted and more terroristic than the solution required. In all the instances however issues of insecurity were not sufficiently addressed.

Dumisha Amani II – second disarmament exercise (2010 – 2012)

The Government of Kenya is currently undertaking the disarmament exercise of the communities in the North Rift Kenya. The exercise is dubbed Dumisha Amani II, a follow through of Dumisha Amani I which was the prototype of a ‘well-planned and coordinated’ disarmament in Kenya.

The pastoralist communities in the Northern Kenya, that is Pokot, Turkana, and the Samburu have remained obstinate in surrendering their arms to the authorities. A major reason for this hesitancy has been the communities’ lack of confidence in the authorities to offer security to them and their treasured livestock. They have always felt there is a hidden card among their enemies and therefore surrendering their only trusted protection – firearms, ammunitions and other arms – would be like signing their own death sentences. This lack of confidence in the government authorities to offer security against their perceived longstanding traditional enemies has curtailed co-operation among the actors in the disarmament exercises especially the arms owners.

The need for strengthened cooperation and coordination between and/or among the various actors within and outside the Kenyan boundaries for both effective use of resources and coherence on the ground in implementing the disarmament exercise cannot be overstressed. It is this successful cooperation and coordination among all actors that guarantees successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, of course with proper planning.

The disarmament exercise in Kenya has been conducted in irregular bursts. They have been more of reactive than proactive exercises. They are conducted only when there has been an increase in cattle rustling, banditry and related conflicts in the resident communities. This is unwise and such a process cannot fully address the issue of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALWs) in the North rift regions or indeed any other region anywhere.

There is need to create a fuller and more elaborate systematic approach to the small arms issue; an approach that is sensitive to conflict dynamics and that works to promote peace. The “disarmament exercise II” has also been blamed for escalating ethnically based tensions and conflicts as a result of fear that disarmament would focus on a particular ethnic groups, hence making the members of this particular community vulnerable to attacks by neighbouring communities.

The Dumisha Amani II disarmament process in Kenya has been marred with heavy militarization of the target communities. Consequently increasing military oppression of the locals and creating the impression that the disarmament exercise is a punitive exercise against the target community, triggering negative reaction from the community being targeted in the disarmament exercise. In most cases, these reactions are usually violent and may be directed to the ‘wrong targets’ which often happens to be the enemy ethnic group causing more bloodshed like has been/or was the case during a disarmament exercise in Isiolo in 2010.

Proposed model of reintegration-led disarmament and demobilization (RDD)

The context in the North Rift calls for the Government to rethink the model that instead of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the Government could

begin from the last stage of reintegration – sensitization, peacebuilding and persuasion of the pastoral combatants to leave the bush and for the conflicting communities to reconcile by accepting the combatants back. The re-integration programme could run on the following critical elements:

- The securing of peace pacts by the conflicting pastoral communities.
- Assurance and institution of security frameworks that assures all the communities by the government as a confidence building measure.
- The provision of a range of livelihood options, some of which are also open to non-combatants members of the community.
- Intensive work to persuade communities to receive back former militants, with some cases of reparation programmes where combatants are empowered with skills and engaged in community development initiatives such as employment in initiatives such as build roads, start pastoralist related enterprises and other facilities to benefit the community.
- Building social networks based largely on voluntary effort which sustains the DDR process at a micro level over time.
- Indicators which measure success over the long term, not just at the point where someone exists from the bush and disarms.

The problem with previous disarmament programmes in the North Rift Kenya is the whole question of “sustainable reintegration” of the combatants as one that inculcates in ex-combatants a sense of social belonging and provides them with a long term stake in communities’ economic development, thereby providing powerful incentives for ex-combatants to continue their civilian lives. Two, one that assures communities of their security if their surrender their arms.

Experience notes that the design of reintegration programmes should as matter of priority, include a clear understanding of the social, cultural, economic and political dynamics of both ex-combatants and the recipient communities. An understanding of these aspects should inform the planning of reintegration program and its sustainability. More often, previous programmes, *Dumisha Amani I* and *Dumisha Amani II* were designed with little consideration for either ex-combatants or the communities they were to be reintegrated into.

A suggested paradigm therefore is not DDR but RDD, the whole program design works backwards from *reintegration process*. It is the effectiveness of the community reintegration process that influences ex-combatants to want to disarm, as well as securing their long term demobilization. The programme also creates and sustains social networks.

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1 Nairobi Declaration - The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was signed on 15 March 2000

2 Military Operation – Disarmament process in Kenya and in the North Rift has always been militarized.

Information Communication Technology (ICT) in combat of Small Arms and Light Weapons

According to World Bank, security is a necessity for poor people in all regions of the world and indeed a prerequisite for improving humanity's quality of life. "Better security and safety...translates into lower vulnerability and thus into more robust production..."¹ Small Arms and Light weapons (SALW) pose huge threat to Africa's sustainable development.

Underlying this threat is global trade on SALW and inadequate international technological system to regulate the trade of SALW within and across national boundaries. Adekeye posits that West Africa's conflicts in the 1990s were particularly destructive due to the unregulated spread of armaments throughout the sub region.²

In Eastern Africa, where the AK-47 has become the weapon of choice for insurgents, terrorists, organised criminal syndicates and thugs alike, thousands of deaths have been attributed to the use and misuse of SALW which not only kill and maim, but also undermine all facets of security while diminishing the prospects for economic development.³ In fact, the Institute for Security Studies of South Africa reports that Africa alone has suffered 5,994,000 fatalities in the last 50 years due to mostly SALW.⁴ It is estimated that there are 500 million weapons in circulation world-wide.⁵

The gist of this paper is to contribute to a less-explored angle that complements these efforts. This pertains to the use of information and communication technology (ICT) in the control of the production and supply of SALW.

The challenge of use of ICT

In the last two decades, the international community has been interested in the processes of production and supply of SALW. This interest has been primarily as a result of the dramatic increase in the number, duration and destructiveness of intrastate conflicts, many of which have called for costly United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions.⁶ Unless embargoed by international regime, states have the right to export and import SALW to protect their citizens.

However in isolated security situations, some communities have resorted to illegal ownership of SALW to 'protect' themselves from enemies from within and outside their communities, especially in occasions that the state is slow in responding to their protection concerns. Indeed, it is the misuse of this practice and the relatively recent awareness of the problems caused by the accumulation of SALW that, according to Rogers, has resulted in recognition of the need to better control the transfer of such weapons.⁷

In December 2006 a majority of the UN member states voted to begin a process that could lead to the adoption of a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This is against the backdrop of the assertion that the lack of arms control allows some to profit from the misery of others.⁸ The proposed ATT sets out the principles based upon existing responsibilities of states under international standards as it pulls together relevant international laws and standards which should apply to international arms transfers such as the Geneva Conventions, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention against Genocide.⁹

It is evident that a lot of effort is invested in the state as the monopoly of human security. Limited information on the role of citizenry/community in protection other than community policing is further complicating states efforts in advancing safety and security. In Kenya partnership between law enforcement agencies as exhibited in community policing has yielded girded results. This is partly due to inadequate resources including lack of advanced but easily accessible technological security systems that can detect and contribute to prevention of occurrence of crimes that endanger human security. For example, in Kenya the development of forensic science is at latent stages but is mainly confined to state and formal security systems.

With the growth of technological surveillance criminals and illicit arms dealers are also becoming technologically savvy and are also engaging in complex cyberspace activities. However, proliferation of SALW used in violent crime can be detected and prevented with highly developed technologically guided security mechanisms and systems. To achieve this, the government and civil society and private sector must work together in discovering new frontiers of knowledge and experience in advanced security systems.

Efforts to control the proliferation of SALW

In the last two decades, there have been over 14 regional agreements made on SALW control and numerous policy discussions initiated at the UN and Regional Governmental levels to develop policy frameworks to regulate demand and supply of SALW. Some of the policy frameworks for control of illicit proliferation of SALW include the UN programme of Action adopted in New York in year 2001, Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa signed in 2004 which focused on instituting regulations for reducing demand of SALW.

In addition there have been many more subsequent conferences organised by Civil Society groups and various governments around the world to discuss appropriate strategies for addressing SALW proliferation in Africa and the rest of the world. All past and ongoing discourses on SALW largely focus on development of policies and legislations that limit demand and supply factors of SALW.

Weak enforcement of international agreements to control trade and proliferation of SALW, has partly contributed to the deterioration of human safety especially among pastoralist communities in Kenya including ordinary citizens. The proliferation of SALW has for example shifted the conduct of cattle raids among communities. In the past traditional weapons like spears were used in inter-ethnic conflicts contrary to the present where SALW are the weapons of choice in most conflicts.

The periods from the early 1980's saw the sharp rise in the use of SALW in most tragic conflicts in Africa. At the moment, even sophisticated weapons like laser guided rocket-propelled grenades are at the disposal of some pastoralist communities. Among some communities, respect for traditional authority has waned partly due to youths in different age-sets acquiring SALW which have given them a sense of invincibility. Violent crime in cities like Nairobi has reached spine-chilling levels especially since gangs have become organised and recruit even teenagers to their ranks.

As human security deteriorates, communities have a significant role in complementing government and regional agencies efforts in enforcing normative instruments. Community participation in enforcement of normative instruments is feasible in environments and contexts which are steadily and gradually adapting to new emerging global technologies in human security. For instance use of mobile phone technology and satellites including Geographical Information Systems in crime and community conflict prevention in Kenya and other countries in Africa is a window of opportunity yet to be explored.

Exploring these opportunities will undoubtedly redirect energies expended in violent conflict to security technological enterprises that may proactively engage different community members such as youth who bear greatest blame in fuelling armed conflicts in Africa. Positive energy will be directed at business and commercial initiatives aimed at building and fostering peace across cultures.

New technology in conflict prevention and security

With new emerging technologies in the region and globally, limited information is available on the role of technology in mitigating conflicts especially conflicts that are exacerbated by use of SALW and driven by competition over resources. Haug et al affirm that analysis of the challenge of controlling small arms is frequently premised upon inconsistent, incomplete, and at times unreliable information. They

add that this is because there are a number of significant impediments frustrating attempts to collect accurate, reliable and timely information regarding each of the major aspects of the small arms challenge.¹⁰

Presently there is no international system for the publication or exchange of information on transfers of SALW. Perhaps the only existing mechanism of this kind is the UN Register of Conventional Arms which covers major weapons systems only.¹¹ Poorly manned borders and limited technologically powered surveillance security systems contribute to the massive trafficking and influx of SALW in to Kenya and the neighbouring countries. This was as established by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1997).¹²

The length and porous nature of borders is contributing to the difficulty of monitoring and controlling the proliferation of SALW. South Africa's long and porous borders, as well as its developed banking system, make it easy and profitable environment and this can be manifested through the complex violent crime in South Africa.¹³

Appreciating the essence and significance of existing normative instruments in mitigating circulation SALW in Kenya and by extension Africa, technological surveillance tapping into the role technological infrastructure in Kenya should be explored within a broader framework of empowering communities affected by conflict to use mobile phones to account for illicit use of SALW in their neighbourhoods and report suspected cases of insecurity. Heinzelman et al allude to the existence of a relatively new field of Crisis Mapping, which comprises the use of new technologies to map crisis events dynamically over space and time.¹⁴

New research suggests that early warning systems could be improved if they were combined. This can be backed by the value of geographic information systems (GIS) in analysing and preventing conflicts.¹⁵ Brantmeier and Richardson posit that those who have access to technology are able to use it as a means for political, economic and social ends. A conflict arises when those who do not have access to technology are left out of conversations.¹⁶ For example, in the early 2000's in Kenya the urbanites that had access to the internet were able to use it to advance global business, ideology, information in a relatively faster way (especially using chat rooms) compared to those in far-flung rural areas.

Recently, the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) in Kenya launched a short message service (SMS) platform for early warning. The majority of Kenyan residents have access to cellular phones. These users can now collaborate with security structures by reporting/warnings of incidents related to illicit use of weapons and insecurity using SMS code 108 at no fee.¹⁷ Dubbed Amani Kenya @ 108, this system provided in collaboration with one private communication company uses these various components of reporting to encourage and coordinate peace efforts in Kenya. These components pertain to classification e.g. unusual assembly of youthful raiders in a forest, possession of an illegal firearm by a member or members of a community, among other classifications.

There has also been an interesting study on locating the place of livestock/cattle identification, traceability and tracking in checking livestock raiding/theft related violent conflicts among pastoralist communities in the IGAD sub-region and Tanzania.¹⁸ Initiatives of this nature, if constantly supported and researched, have the potential of generating new ideas that may go a long way in addressing SALW menace and general insecurity in our neighbourhoods and borders.

Because human safety and security threats arising from proliferation of SALW can no longer be resolved by regional agreements and national laws studies should now explore the application of technological regimes like GIS and remote sensing to prevent conflicts. For example in Singapore, security is remotely monitored through a technological system that records every external stress that poses a threat to citizens. In Kenya use of closed-circuit television cameras to monitor movement and secure buildings is gradually gaining momentum. Vehicle tracking gadgets are

awash in the market and indeed have immensely helped in recovery of stolen cars. There have also been reported cases where mobile phone companies have assisted police in apprehending notorious armed robbers.

Therefore, if more innovations can go into technological innovation, heavy business investments will be made in the country and this will contribute to sustainable development in Africa and particularly in Kenya where at times international investors shy away from due to violent crime. Communities who rely on livestock will be able to trade their animals and make more income without fear of their livestock being raided.

Ultimately, in the future, there should be a mechanism put in place that should be able to ensure that SALW henceforth produced are electronically tagged and tracked for purposes of monitoring their movement. Just as it has been happening in Kenya in recent years, untagged SALW could be confiscated and destroyed. The end result would be a situation where production, supply and use of SALW can be effectively controlled thereby reducing the unnecessary and unlawful astronomical loss of lives that have resulted from these weapons.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the adoption of a holistic, multidisciplinary and integrated approach that reiterates innovation and systematic inquiry into the existing technological opportunities in enhancing human security and safety is critical. Further research and collaboration and partnership between government, civil society organizations, universities, research institutions, youth and private sector should be enhanced to protect communities and societies from effects of the use of illicit SALW.

Central to the realization of this partnership is a policy regulative framework that facilitates the growth of talent and innovation in technological discoveries especially on human security. It is appreciated that technological discoveries are not limited to sophisticated instruments. Innovations of social technological solutions that value community wellbeing are crucial to community protection and security.

Other than the communities fighting for territorial control of natural resources like land to take advantage of opportunities presented by vision 2030, they ought to be facilitated by government, civil society groups and civil society organizations to enhance their skills and competence in developing technological solutions both social and economic to prevent and mitigate conflicts in their localities.

Most importantly, there should be national investment in research and development that encourages innovation. Governments in developing countries have tended to pay lip service to investment in research and development. This de-prioritization has ultimately been their Achilles heel.

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NEWS

UGANDA

Peace talks "only viable option" for LRA conflict

Previous military attempts have failed to root out the Lord's Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony and his fighters signal that military confrontations alone will not end the conflict. Panellists and participants in a workshop held in Gulu drawn from diplomatic, political and religious circles affirmed that past interventions by the UPDF and regional armies from South Sudan and DR Congo have instead worsened the situation. Peace talks they reiterated are the only viable option for government and regional leaders to embrace now that military operations have proved fruitless. The ongoing conflict in Gulu has contributed to underdevelopment in the region and to deal with it requires a peaceful environment.

Religious Leaders under the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative have been at the forefront advocating for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. A Ugandan Government Minister who advocated peace negotiations with the rebel group has called for the implementation of the peace agreement mediated by religious leaders in 2006. Religious

leaders also called for an effort to deal with the regional spill over of the conflict.
Source: Daily Monitor - <http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1268126/-/format/xhtml/-/o1qvq4/-/index.html>

KENYA

Peaceful election enormous task

The expected Kenya election which according to the new constitution should be held in 2012 is in contention. The controversy begun with the newly Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission declaration that it was impractical for the election to be held in August 2012 as stipulated in the constitution. The chairman of IEBC cited the delay in setting up the Commission has undermined the level of preparedness required by the institution to conduct the elections as required by constitution.

The Commission will have a task of conducting complex elections based on the proposed devolution structure with national and county representatives in the Senate and Parliament. Devolution will bring into existence a national and 47 county governments all with elected representatives. Thus, the current Commission has enormous task to ensure peaceful, free and fair elections to avoid a repeat of the 2007 post election chaos. A Kenya High Court ruling declared that the election must be held in 2013 unless the government coalition is dissolved earlier.

Source: The Standard - 7/12/2011 and Daily Nation – 17/1/2012

SOMALIA

Kenyan army aims at Kismayo

It is now three months since the Kenyan Army got involved in a military incursion in Somalia in efforts to root out al-Shaabab. As the Kenyan forces pursue the militant group in Somalia, attack and violence incidences are on the upsurge in Kenya particularly regions bordering Somalia. The military and security intervention is allegedly collaboration between the Kenya government and the Transitional Federal Government. Kenya Defence Forces tactic to overcoming the group is to seize regions that are strategically providing revenue for al-Shabaab the main hub being Kismayu. However, Kenyan authorities are appealing for international help in capturing the port city of Kismayu. The military intervention is perceived by Kenyan Authorities as a great contribution to the global war on terror.

Source: The East African – January 16 – 22, 2012

Ecumenical actors

“End all military operations in Somalia”

A group of ecumenical actors with a long history of engagement for humanitarian assistance, development and peace in Somalia have recently met in Nairobi under the auspices of the All Africa Conference of Churches. The platform has in a statement urged all sides to look for non-violent strategies to end the Somalia conflict.

“We call on all parties to end all military operations because they threaten the potential for nonviolent transformation of the conflict in Somalia, integrity and the effect of the humanitarian response to the current humanitarian crisis.”

The ecumenical platform further argues: “The black-listing of one of the main actors in South-Central Somalia discourages governmental and non-governmental actors from engaging with all sides and in all territories. Current policies fail to acknowledge that the Somali society has changed over the last decades, new leaders and political frameworks have emerged, and thinking of solutions just in terms of power sharing deals between clans may not provide sustainable outcomes.”

The group calls for “an all-inclusive process of searching for ways to break the vicious cycle of violence and building peace” and suggests that in this process, all actors of the Somali society must participate have their voices listened to.

UN report: Eritrea did not supply arms to al- Shaabab

A recent UN assessment report has disagreed with allegations that Eritrea supplied weapons to al- Shaabab. The Kenyan Defence Force in late 2011 alleged that several aircrafts landed in al- Shaabab controlled airstrips in Southern Somalia between October and November 2011. Eritrea has denied the allegations and requested a full, fair and independent investigations by the United Nations Security council on this and other related accusations.

Source: allAfrica.com

RESOURCES

New approaches to peacebuilding in Somalia – publication from LPI and Kroc Institute

Policy options discussed by decision makers inside and outside Somalia are based primarily on global and regional security concerns. They tend to overlook the local complexities and the potential for nonviolent conflict transformation that exist in the context. In particular, the black listing of al-Shaabab prevents one of the main stakeholders to participate in the mainstream political process and discourages interest in dialogue from all sides. There is a scarcity of alternative perspectives among policy makers that could encourage the design of an inclusive peace process in Somalia.

These challenges are presented and analysed in a series of articles as a result from collaboration between the Life & Peace Institute and the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA.

Find the publication at <http://www.life-peace.org/resources/publications/other-publications/>

and <http://kroc.nd.edu/>

Comparative database – new resource on Truth Commissions

The TRC database from Georgetown University in the US and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa, is an online tool that offers detailed information about truth and reconciliation proceedings across the world. The overview of some significant truth commissions is intended to provide a cursory introduction, a quick reference, and a teaching tool. The works may possibly be consulted in order to better understand the identity, possibilities and limitations of the commissions included. The database allows you to either compare data from different countries or to select specific topics on Truth Commission proceedings and compare those per country.

For more info see <http://www.ijr.org.za/trc-database.php>

Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader.

This is a UPEACE Africa Programme series of publications. Several years in the making, the book explores the nexus between peace, conflict and development issues generally and Africa specifically. The economic dimensions of civil war, disarmament, demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration are extensively explored. The book is prepared by using some of the most outstanding inputs into the conflict and development discourse. With some of the leading scholars on the topic

providing lead introductions to each chapter; the reader is a useful tool for engaging the discourse on what happens after violent conflict and how can development strategies address reconstruction efforts after civil war.

The publication is intended for students in peace and conflict studies with different specializations ranging from responsible economic management, post conflict reconstruction, governance and state-building after civil war and security sector reforms.

Source: http://www.upeace.org/news/activity.cfm?id_activity=753&actual=2011

New book on peacemaking: From Practice to Theory

The compilation fosters a new appreciation of the art of peacemaking as it is understood and practiced in a variety of contemporary settings. Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory, published by the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, is about seeing, knowing, and learning peacemaking as it exists in the real world. Built on the premise that peacemaking is among the most elemental of human experiences, this seminal work emphasizes the importance of practice and lived experiences in understanding the process and learning what works to nurture peace.

To appropriately reflect the diversity of peacemaking practices, challenges, and innovations, these two volumes bring together many authors and viewpoints. The first volume consists of two sections: “Peacemaking in Practice” and “Towards an Inclusive Peacemaking;” the second of two additional sections: “New Directions in Peacemaking” and “Interpreting Peacemaking.”

As the title states, the work moves peacemaking beyond mere theory, showcasing peacemaking efforts produced, recorded, recognized, and understood by a variety of individuals and institutions. In doing so, it refocuses the study of peacemaking and guides readers to a systematic understanding and appreciation of the practices of peacemakers around the globe.

Source: http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blog/show?id=780588%3ABlogPost%3A684876&xgs=1&xg_source=msg_share_post

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The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Shamsia Ramadhan, shamsia.ramadhan@life-peace.org.

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Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

