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Horn of Africa Bulletin (April 2008)

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Item Type	Journal volume
Authors	Life and Peace Institute
Publisher	Life & Peace Institute
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Download date	2026-07-16 07:32:58
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/187934



HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Analyses

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- ▶ **Secession of the south, chaos in the north?**

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Building sustainable peace in Northern Uganda

As we write this, the peace process to end the 22-year war in northern Uganda is at an uncertain, perilous juncture. Brokered by the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan, nearly two years of contentious, complex negotiations have produced a comprehensive peace agreement signed by delegations from the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M). On 10 April, LRA/M leader Joseph Kony was to have added his signature, and four days later, President Museveni was to have done the same. In confused circumstances reflecting serious divisions both between and within the rebel delegation and fighters – including rumours of internal fighting that reportedly killed the rebel's second in command (Okot Odhiambo) and the firing of the top rebel negotiator (David Matsanga) – Kony did not sign.

This is certainly disappointing, with serious potential consequences. However, Kony's request for more time to clarify the "traditional" and legal proceedings that he and his fighters face, as well as the signs of internal dissension among the LRA/M (often linked to questions concerning Matsanga), make the current delay in Kony's final signing of the peace agreement not entirely surprising.

It is also important to note that Kony's failure to sign does not necessarily mean that LRA activities in northern Uganda will resume. Most LRA fighters are simply too far away from north-central Uganda for this to be a viable option, and unless South Sudan descends into renewed chaos and violence, the LRA will unlikely be able to re-establish bases there.

At the same time, however, diplomats and others in the international community need to make every effort to get the talks back on track, as well as keep the GoU from initiating any military moves. There are innumerable reasons for this, but among the most important is that the failure to fully ratify the peace agreement will give the GoU an excuse – as they can blame this on the rebels – for abandoning the many serious commitments they have signed up for in the current agreement. Such abandonment, should it occur, will make real peace and reconstruction of the north unlikely, even impossible.

The most wide-ranging of these commitments are included in Agenda Items 2 and 3 in the agreement. Agenda Item 2, on "comprehensive solutions," addresses not

only specific rebel concerns such as integrating former LRA fighters into the army, but also broader issues such as inclusive and democratic governance, assessing and remedying regional disparities in government institutions, assisting people's voluntary and secure return from the internally displaced persons camps, and implementing recovery programmes for northern Uganda. Agenda Item 3 on accountability and reconciliation is equally far-reaching. It identifies a combination of local and national justice mechanisms – already in place or to be instituted – to promote reconciliation and address issues of accountability for wrongs committed by both rebel and state actors (with indications that it was hoped that this combination of mechanisms might induce the International Criminal Court to suspend its arrest warrants against the indicted rebel commanders).

The tabling of all of these far-reaching issues by the rebel delegation, and the success in getting them incorporated into a peace agreement signed by the GoU, have been crucial achievements of the peace process. Local political grievances have finally been given attention as *national* political grievances.

This development, however, is paradoxical. Even if the LRA/M has been building a political platform ever since the talks began, many Ugandans, including those in the north, would hesitate to conclude that the LRA/M is a legitimate representative of their grievances with the Ugandan Government. In Juba the rebel delegation, against pressure from all sides (the GoU, the mediators, and the international community), has been able to table issues of national importance. The lived complexities are well captured by Norbert Mao, a northern politician who throughout the years of war has been an outspoken critic of the GoU. “We in northern Uganda also have our grievances against the LRA just as we have issues to sort out with the Uganda Government,” Mao said in a recent interview. “But we can not denounce a good idea simply because it is coming from the LRA. If the LRA says northern Uganda is not well represented in decision-making organs of the Ugandan Government, if it is true it is true.”

As we wait for the current situation to be resolved and a final agreement signed, we would like to stress that implementing the agreement will be an arduous, grass-roots project that will require the sustained attention and support of the outside world. A so-called “post-conflict situation” can often be more violent than a conflict itself, and we need to be prepared, emotionally and practically, for problems and setbacks. It is essential to acknowledge that a peace agreement must be won over and over again, on an everyday basis, in people's everyday lives, as the difficult and often painful experiences of Palestine and Northern Ireland demonstrate.

Therefore, it is not cynicism but the recognition of these complex lived realities that led one of our long-term fieldwork associates to describe the upcoming reconstruction of northern Uganda as “a new war [that] has just started.” The lucrative business of war may easily turn, for a privileged few, into an equally lucrative business of peace, rather than into a peaceful life for the masses. Indeed, throughout the war, the problem on the ground has not really been the lack of international funds, but rather a lack of opportunity for the Ugandan citizenry to hold either international organizations or their own government accountable for the uses and misuses of such funds. The international community, with its uncritical support of Museveni's government and, since 2001, its global “war on terror,” has failed most Ugandans in the war-zone, who feel that they are denied many of the most mundane and everyday aspects of citizenship that we in the West take for granted. They feel excluded from Uganda's wider developments, and even the country's future. Sustainable peace and reconstruction in northern Uganda will require that people there be reintegrated with the rest of the country, and feel that this is the case.

Implementing the peace agreement already signed by representatives of the LRA/M and GoU and reintegrating the people of northern Uganda back into the country as a whole are just two of many challenges facing post-war Uganda. Meaningful reconstruction and sustainable peace will also require that government and aid agen-

cies listen to people in the war-torn north, and then respond to people's expressed needs with major – and expensive – economic and infrastructural development. Public trust will have to be rebuilt, basic physical security, devastatingly absent for so long, will have to be re-established, and perhaps most important of all, security of tenure and access to land will be absolutely crucial.

Each of these issues on its own (and there are more) pose daunting challenges for post-war Uganda. Taken together, the problems are bigger than merely having them listed and addressed one by one. Rather, the problems that post-war Uganda faces form a complex reality in which past and future grievances cross-breed with one another. For example, the many years of experienced marginalisation in northern Uganda often breed even deeper feelings of marginalisation, and tensions and concerns over land often breed more tensions and conflicts. More importantly, however, such feelings and tensions cross-breed in the most complex ways.

Here we only have space to discuss briefly one of these problems – concerns over land access and security. Especially in Acholi, the epicentre of the war with the largest percentage of people displaced, most people have still not felt enough of a sense of security to leave the camps into which they were forced by the Government to move and, until recently, to stay. In the camps today there might be breathing space, but no peace of mind. Many Acholi are worried about whether or not they will regain access to their land once they leave the camps. Such worries are exacerbated by a myriad of related concerns: the many years of forced displacement and absence of the land; the passing of knowledgeable and respected elders after so many years of war; the unprecedented numbers of widows and orphans; the heated public debate over the future of Acholi land being conducted in the newspapers and elsewhere; strong central government pressure, most notably from the President, to alienate 40,000 acres of land for a private sugar plantation; and the establishment already of other large-scale commercial farming ventures on communal Acholi land, sometimes protected by the Ugandan army.

Unfortunately, the combination of a mass of Acholi people debilitated by war, displacement, and extreme poverty; a weak, underdeveloped civil society; an under-resourced local government; a central government that often appears disinterested or even malevolent towards Acholi; and powerful interests seeking to obtain land for large-scale, commercial farming could easily produce new conflicts. A crucial first step in reducing that risk is a moratorium on any alienation of communal land for “investment” or “development” until people are peacefully resettled. Acholi parliamentarians, civil society organizations and leaders, and local government leaders have frequently reiterated this position..

Such a moratorium could provide an increased sense of security that could limit conflicts as people leave camps and begin reestablishing sustainable livelihoods, a crucial component in reconstructing northern Uganda and building – however difficult – a sustainable peace. To whatever degree this process is successful, it could generate a positive cross-breeding that would lessen, rather than accelerate, the many interrelated problems facing post-war northern Uganda.

This is our hope.

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Secession of the south, chaos in the north?

Those who oppose independence for southern Sudan are fond of predicting that the country will collapse into chaos if it secedes. This argument claims that Southerners cannot govern themselves. Ethnic conflict would overtake the country, and anyway the challenges for a land-locked war-ravaged new state to build up its infrastructure from zero would be insurmountable. All of this is a possibility, and the National Congress Party (NCP) will certainly do what it can to undermine a newly independent south. Southerners, however, reject these arguments and are confident that they will overcome the admitted challenges of creating a new country.

Few people worry about what will happen to the north after the south has seceded. After all, it is a long-established country with a functioning infrastructure. Its national revenue will be reduced somewhat when the south secedes with most of the oil, but some of the oil is in the north (and the NCP may well succeed in gerrymandering the borders to maximise that) and the pipeline will raise revenue as southern oil passes through the north en route to the outside world.

But is the north a stable state? Almost twenty years ago, Peter Woodward wrote an excellent book called *Sudan, 1898-1989: The Unstable State*. Already now there is a major war in Darfur. The people of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile and Abyei do not want to be part of the north. There are tensions even amongst the non-Nuba people of Kordofan. There is a fragile peace deal on the eastern front, and the Nubian (not to be confused with Nuba) people of the far north are beginning to complain about marginalisation. The country is governed by an unrepresentative Islamist regime that is deeply unpopular and survives largely due to its security organs. It has long been recognised that Sudan is controlled by a small riverain elite, and that this “centre-periphery” dynamic is one of the key root causes of all the conflicts in Sudan. People on the margins do not receive their fair share of power, development and resources, and are often treated as second (or third) class citizens. The oil revenue has turned Khartoum into a thriving modern city, but the rest of northern Sudan has not benefited at all.

There is a real danger that if the south secedes (as it almost certainly will if the desire of the southern people is respected), the north could descend into chaos. The Darfur war will continue and other latent tensions are very likely to escalate into open conflict. Political repression will harden as the regime struggles to stay in power, or stages a fake coup to instal a military regime. Opposition parties may or may not get the chance to take over, but even if they do, it does not necessarily solve the basic problem. Although they may be Islamic rather than Islamist, which would represent a small step forward for the millions of ordinary Muslims in northern Sudan, they are nevertheless part of the same political elite that has constantly marginalised the peripheries. These elites too are part of the problem, not the solution.

A failed northern state would certainly not serve the interests of the US, which played a major role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) following 9/11. Sudan was seen as a state that not only harboured and trained “terrorists” (Carlos the Jackal and Osama bin Laden being the two highest profile names) but also held a lot of information that could help the US in its “war on terror”. The USA would like to see a stable Sudan, both as a vindication of the CPA, which was hailed as the Bush Administration’s only success in its dealings with Muslims, and in order to safeguard Sudan’s cooperation. As Somalia has demonstrated, a failed state could easily fuel US fears that it might become a safe haven for those labelled as “terrorists”, even though research suggests that this is not the case, and that they encounter the same problems as other external actors in Somalia.

The other main international player in Sudan, China, needs oil. While a newly-independent southern state would probably still deal with the Chinese, the Chinese might not enjoy the same dominance that they currently hold, and the new contracts might not be as sweet as the old ones.

If southerners vote for independence in 2011, there could therefore be a great deal of ambiguity in the international community as to whether the decision of the southern Sudanese people should be respected or not. For both the US and China there are real advantages to a united Sudan. Southerners in the Government of National Unity give it a measure of international respectability. Southern oil fuels the national economy (and the war in Darfur). The eastern front, the Nuba, southern Blue Nile and Abyei remain relatively quiescent as long as the major combatant, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), remains in the national government, and the major war zone, the south, remains peaceful.

Up to the time of Dr John's death, the situation might have been rescued more easily.. Ordinary northerners were not very excited by the CPA. Their problem was not the war in the south but oppression by a military dictatorship intent on imposing its own brand of Islam on them. The CPA did not resolve this – indeed it legitimised the ruling regime as a partner in the new government. However, in Dr John they saw a potential solution. He was a strong advocate of a new, united, democratic, secular Sudan – just what they wanted. They looked to him to solve their problem and get rid of the NCP – and they would probably have voted for him and the SPLM.

When he died so tragically that opportunity evaporated, and the SPLM is now struggling to build its power base in the north. It has also become increasingly clear to northerners that the south will vote for independence, so they cannot look to the SPLM to solve their political problems – they must do it themselves. They did so in 1964 and 1985, by peaceful *intifada* (uprising), but it remains to be seen whether northern civil society has been too emasculated by the NCP's security state to do so again.

If the SPLM wants to carry out the will of the southern Sudanese people in 2011, and if it wants to secure the support of the international community (which funnily enough has welcomed Kosovo's independence, refused Somaliland's, and is ambiguous about southern Sudan's), then it must at least take an interest in northern politics during the remainder of the CPA's Interim Period. The SPLM must proactively manage change in the north and develop an exit strategy (to use NGO jargon) to facilitate a smooth transition from a united Sudan to two stable independent states. Southern Sudan will not prosper with a failed state on its northern border.

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NEWS

SOMALIA

Somaliland: controversial extension of presidential term

The President of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was awarded a controversial one-year term extension by the House of Guurti, the upper chamber of the Somaliland Parliament. In the session of 10 April, 61 of 65 lawmakers voted for extending the term of Riyale and his Government that would have expired in May. The presidential elections – originally scheduled for May 2008 - were however postponed by the President in order to allow for a completion of the voter registration process.

The term extension is a bone of contention that divides the ruling party and the opposition parties (Kulmiye and UCID). The latter issued a joint statement condemning the term extension as “illegal” and warned that Mr. Riyale “will not be recognised as President after May 15”.

In recent weeks Hargeisa has seen three explosions, including a bomb blast in the Parliament building (9 April) and a grenade attack targeting the home of a Somaliland Cabinet minister.

Garowe online

Somalia: debates over oil legislation

On 19 March, with the presence of a total of 48 Members of Parliament (MP), Puntland's lawmakers in the regional capital of Garowe voted on the controversial oil law submitted by the Administration of President Adde Muse. A 21-21 tie on the oil law, with 6 MPs abstaining, caused Speaker Ahmed Ali Hashi to weigh in his "casting vote" authority in order to break the even vote earlier than legally permitted. This move resulted in the passing of the law, but was described as illegal by a number of MPs. Since the controversial vote, Parliament has been closed. A request by the Speaker to President Adde Muse to revote the law has so far been refused and Adde Muse considers the law to be legal. According to sources in Garowe, the Government of Puntland seems to have been under tremendous pressure by foreign companies intending to explore for unproven reserves of oil in northern Somalia to approve the oil law.

The law has also influenced Puntland's relationship with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Mohamed Ali Salah, Somalia's Minister for Minerals and Energy, had rejected the Puntland oil law, arguing that only the TFG has the constitutional mandate to manage the country's resources. Coinciding with the political debate in Puntland, lawmakers in Somalia's Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) debated whether or not a national oil law governing the country's natural resources should be established. In a vote on 10 April, 119 MPs voted in favour of establishing such a national oil law, 22 rejected and 2 abstained. TFP-Speaker Sheikh Adan "Madobe" Mohamed said the law was needed in order to stop "illegal agreements" signed with "small ineffective companies".

Garowe online

International NGOs call for more commitment of the international community and UN develops scenarios for greater involvement

On 26 March, 40 non-governmental organisations issued a joint statement aimed at raising the awareness of the fact that "the crisis engulfing Somalia has deteriorated dramatically while access to people in need continues to decrease". The attacks on and killing of aid workers, the looting of relief supplies and the lack of respect for international humanitarian law were pointed out as the main obstacles. The statement called on the international community to "urgently focus their attention on the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Somalia."

Earlier in March, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon identified a "unique opportunity for proactive engagement of the international community" despite the critical security and humanitarian situation in his report to the Security Council (see Resources). Based on a fact-finding mission in January 2007, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) developed four scenarios that together could lead up to a possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping force; the relocation of UN staff from Nairobi to Somalia; the relocation of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) headquarters to Somalia; an impartial stabilisation force allowing the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops following a broad-based political agreement; and eventually – in case broad-based political and security arrangements would have been reached – the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation to Somalia.

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia (14 March 2008); BBC; Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA); UN News Service; www.reliefweb.int

SUDAN

Muslim alliance calls Arab League to take action on Darfur

A global alliance of Muslim groups has urged the Arab League (AL) to address the crisis in Darfur. The appeal was published in an open letter to the League's Secretary General Amr Moussa in the context of the meeting of the AL's foreign ministers in Damascus, Syria (29-30 March). The coalition, comprising over 20 Muslim groups from various countries, criticised the lack of attention paid to the crisis by Muslims so far. The coalition acknowledged that intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state is difficult, however, "recognising the gravity of the situation, it becomes incumbent on organisations like the Arab League to find a viable solution, as it is quite clear that Sudan itself needs outside support."

The letter furthermore accused the Sudanese Government of blocking the full deployment of the UN – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and urged the AL to pressure for an end to the obstructions to the deployment. Also, the AL was requested to contribute more to the humanitarian operation and to speak out against violence and demand a ceasefire from all sides.

www.reliefweb.int; CISA, Sudan Tribune

International ecumenical solidarity visit to Sudan

An international team of church representatives paid a solidarity visit to Sudan. It was organised by the World Conference of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and hosted by the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). From 26 March to 2 April, the group of international ecumenical representatives split into four teams to visit Khartoum, Darfur, Yambio and Rumbek. The visit aimed at being an opportunity for the international ecumenical representatives to express solidarity with the Sudanese people and to listen to the churches in the country. The delegation met with local Christian communities, civil society organisations, internally displaced people, humanitarian agencies and political representatives in order to learn about their concerns, hopes and needs. The delegation also talked to Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir, who reaffirmed that the SPLM remained committed "to work side by side with the churches".

The visit ended in Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan, where all of the visitors joined some 50 Sudanese church representatives – leaders, women and youth – for a three-day conference. Speaking at the closing session of the conference, Rev. Dr Samuel Kobia, World Council of Churches (WCC) General Secretary, portrayed the situation of Sudanese churches as standing at the crossroads: facing on the one hand post-conflict challenges and on the other hand living in a country where Islam and Christianity cross paths and their relationship is vital.

WCC news (www.oikumene.org), CISA

Darfur attacks violated international law says UN report

A report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNAMID states that attacks on four West Darfuri villages in January and February 2008 violated international humanitarian and human rights law. The attacks were carried out in the context of a major military campaign in an attempt to drive the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) out of the northern corridor of West-Darfur. This followed activities of JEM that, according to the Darfur Ceasefire Commission, violated the 2004 N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement. Military attacks involved aerial bombardments accompanied by ground offensives by militia and Sudanese armed forces.

The attacks killed at least 115 people, including elderly and disabled people, women and children, and more than 30,000 people were forcibly displaced. The report furthermore describes extensive looting and destruction of property during

and after the attacks, and catalogues “consistent and credible accounts” of rape. The information gathered clearly indicates that the attacks violated the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives.

Ninth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan; IRIN, UN News Service, Press Release OHCHR

DJIBOUTI

New Government in Djibouti

On 27 March the composition of the newly formed Government of Djibouti was revealed. The new Government is the result of parliamentary elections held in Djibouti on the 8 February. It includes eight new ministerial posts that deal with issues such as the promotion of women, Islamic affairs, employment, youth and sports, infrastructure, energy, international cooperation and national solidarity. Two women are found within the 65 posts available in the new Government. The 65 posts are all held by members of the Union for Presidential Majority (UMP), and according to Djibouti’s minister of Interior, the election participation was as high as 72.5%. At the same time it needs to be noted that only 148.000 persons, out of a population of 805.000, were registered as eligible to vote. The elections were boycotted by the opposition who argued that the current election system de facto guarantees that UMP wins all the 65 seats in the Government.

AFP and Agence de Presse Afrique NEWS (APANEWS)

KENYA

Kenya first country in the region to mark small arms and light weapons

Kenya became the first country in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region to mark its small arms and light weapons (SALW). During a symbolic ceremony coinciding with a regional workshop on SALW marking and data management, equipment belonging to the Kenyan police was marked.

Marking the firearms makes it easier to trace illegal weapons in the region and hence scale up the war against crime. According to the Executive Secretary of the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), Mr. Francis Sang, the event was a landmark achievement. He also said that guidelines would be given to light weapons manufacturers that imported weapons, which should be marked with specific country codes. The marked weapons, he added, would have their codes entered into a database. This would make it easier to trace firearms from manufactures to the eventual owner.

East African Standard, Nairobi

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia arrests 8 suspects in 2007 oilfield attack

According to the state-run Ethiopian news agency, on 30 March Ethiopian security forces arrested eight men suspected in connection with an attack on a Chinese-run oilfield in April 2007 that killed 74 people. The detainees are said to belong to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The ONLF denied the arrest, stating that all members that participated in the attack were safe. The ONLF say they are fighting for autonomy for the ethnically Somali region. Both the Government and the ONLF accuse each other of grave human rights abuses, and aid workers say nearly a million people need humanitarian aid.

Reuters, Sudan Tribune

Two prisoners of conscience freed

Two Ethiopian activists jailed for inciting post-election violence in 2005 in a case that triggered condemnation of human rights groups were freed from prison in late March. Daniel Bekele and Netsanet Demissie were the last two defendants after a high profile trial that originally charged 131 journalists, politicians and civil society leaders with offences ranging from genocide to treason. Most of them were already freed in 2007. Both Bekele and Netsanet had been involved in deploying observers at polling stations in and around Addis Ababa during the elections. Amnesty International welcomed the release of the prisoners, but also called for compensation for the time they were jailed.

Reuters, Amnesty International Press Release (28 March)

RESOURCES

GENERAL

“Responses to pastoral wars. A review of violence reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya”

published by the Small Arms Survey in September 2007.

www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%20%20Responses.pdf

“Microfinance in post-disaster and post-conflict situations: Turning victims into shareholders”

(Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université libre de Bruxelles, 2007) M. Hudon and H.D. Seibel explore the role of member-owned institutions (MOI) in the provision of reparations to victims of human rights abuses or reconstruction in post-conflict or post-disaster situations.

www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/conflict-and-security&id=36083&type=Document

“Traditional justice and reconciliation after violent conflict – Learning from African experiences”

Based on comparative case studies (Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda), the International IDEA report offers a sober, evidence-based assessment of both the strengths and the weaknesses of traditional conflict management mechanisms.

www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/index.cfm

SUDAN

“Creating a peace to keep in Darfur” (March 2008)

The joint report by the ENOUGH project and the Save Darfur Coalition was written by John Prendergast and Jerry Fowler.

www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/%20Sudan%20peace%20process%20.pdf

UN report on recent human rights violations in Darfur

The “Ninth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan” was issued by OHCHR in collaboration with UNAMID.

www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/WestDarfurreport2003.pdf

"Investing in tragedy. China's money, arms and politics in Sudan" (March 2008)

Human Rights First is a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organisation based in New York and Washington D.C.

www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf

Human Rights Watch report on sexual violence in Darfur

The report "Five years on. No justice for sexual violence in Darfur" draws on interviews with survivors of sexual violence and other actors. It analyses the occurrence and patterns of sexual violence in Darfur since 2007 and provides a list of recommendations.

<http://hrw.org/reports/2008/darfur0408/darfur0408web.pdf>

SOMALIA

Refugees international report "Somalia. Proceed with caution" (31 March 2008)

Patrick Duplat and Erin Weir provide an update on crucial issues such as challenges to political reconciliation, security and peacekeeping.

www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/10534

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 14 March 2008

www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm

"Somalia – A nation without a state", April 2008

This report summarises a seminar series conducted by the Nordic Africa Institute and the Life and Peace Institute (in collaboration with ABF Stockholm) in October and November 2007. Lecturers were Nuruddin Farah, Roland Marchal and Asha Hagi.

http://www.life-peace.org/sajt/filer/pdf/other_publications/Somalia%20a%20nation%20without%20a%20state.pdf

Grant Dawson: The "big leagues"? A case study of failed state stabilization and reconstruction in Somalia, 1992-1993. (2007)

www.hsrgroup.org/images/stories/Documents/ISA2007/isa07_proceeding_178460.pdf

KENYA

Human Rights Watch report "Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance"

This report describes the main patterns of violence since Kenya's December 2007 general election and also outlines the underlying causes of the violence.

www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/

Report from the United Nations office of the High Commissioner for the Human Rights Fact-finding Mission to Kenya (6-28 February 2008)

www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/OHCHRKenya-report.pdf

"Kenya, Horizontal Inequalities and the Political Disturbances of 2008"

Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity // University of Oxford

www.crise.ox.ac.uk/copy/Kenya%20note%20for%20discussion.pdf

“Implementing community-based policing in Kenya”, Saferworld report 31Mar-2008

www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/306/implementing_community_based_policing_in_kenya

ERITREA

“Afar: The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability”,

by T. Behre and Y. Adaye, Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue/Institute for Security Studies

The article lists the reasons for the conflict in the Afar region and makes a number of recommendations on how to best address the conflict.

www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/CPRDPAPERAFAR.PDF?link_id=&slink_id=4452&link_type=&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3

UGANDA

“Where Are The Girls? Girls in fighting forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their lives during and after war”

by S. McKay and D. Mazurana, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. This study contributes to what is currently known about the experience of girls in fighting forces as distinct from those of boys. It is meant to assist policy makers in developing policies and programmes to help protect and empower girls in situations of armed conflict and post-war reconstruction.

<http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/publications/index.php?lang=en&subsection=catalogue&id=1401>

Reports from the international conference “Building a future for peace and justice” 25-27th of June 2007

A number of papers from the conference explores, among other things, the polarisation of peace and justice and the respective roles of traditional justice and the ICC in Northern Uganda. The papers are available at

<http://www.peace-justice-conference.info/documents.asp>

Papers from the Annual convention of the International Studies Convention 26-29 March 2008

“Civil war and State Building in Uganda”

T. McLauchlin

www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/4/4/p254446_index.html?phpsessid=fdaa0016fefe9017768b12c176466949

“The ICC Africa Experiment: The Central African Republic, Darfur, Northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo”

By C.L. Sriram

www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/7/2/p251725_index.html?phpsessid=a549a0df8e32586e944179980942ba9c

Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 20, No.4, April 2008

Editorial information

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editors are Charlotte Booth, charlotte.booth@life-peace.org, and Kristina Lundborg, Kristina.lundborg@life-peace.org. For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org. For a link to HAB and more information see www.life-peace.org

Editorial principles

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

