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Henry of Ghent and the Inevitable Failure of Divine Illumination^[1]

Yingying ZHANG

(Department of World Religions, Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Author: Yingying Zhang, Department of World Religions, Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Address: No. 11, Changyu Dajie, Fangshan Dist., Beijing 102488, P. R. China. Tel: +86-137-6452-1028. Email: vinessazy@163.com

Abstract: Henry of Ghent attempted to integrate an Aristotelian empiricism, Platonic exemplarism and an Augustinian doctrine of Divine Illumination, to form a firm philosophical basis for Augustine's theory of knowledge, meanwhile trying to restore its theological connotations. However, his new synthesis was doomed to fail, because the tensions between the Christian metaphysical worldview and the epistemological requirements of the Aristotelian system were unsolvable. The need for divine illumination was waning in the face of encroaching Aristotelianism at the end of 13th century.

Key Words: Divine Illumination, Augustine, Platonism, Aristotelianism, exemplar

1. Introduction: Divine Illumination-Augustinian Epistemology before 13 Century

Divine Illumination is the theory of knowledge which St. Augustine appropriated from the Neo-Platonism and combined with Christian faith, to decipher human's cognitive activities. As Timothy Noone put in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (Vol. I): "(Divine Illumination is) the theory of how God's light is required to account fully for how humans are capable of attaining the truth that they manage to attain through their intellectual activities."^[2] St. Augustine developed his view of Divine Illumination in his various writings, but he never systematically illustrated the theory, which results in many conflicting interpretations by both his followers and opponents.

The influence of Neo-Platonism is evident in Augustine's theory of knowledge. Just as Plotinus understands the reality in orders or levels, Augustine's ontology takes an hierarchical structure of reality with God its creator, at the apex and the world of bodies at the lowest level.^[3] In contrast to his ontology proceeding downward, Augustine's epistemology rising upwards, from corporeal (senses), spiritual (imagination), to intellection (reasons). He claims that man begins with sensation

[1] Cf. ,Pan-chiu LAI, "Divine Love and Human Love", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 109-119. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

[2] Timothy Noone, "Divine Illumination," vol. 1 of *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 369.

[3] Ronald H. Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky, 1969), 5.

but attempts to climb by way of reason to the eternal ideas in the mind of God.^[4] In *Soliloquia*, Augustine observes that as in the sensible world all objects to be seen must be illumined, so also in the intelligible world. The analogy of sun is applied. “About this corporeal sun notice three things. It exists. It shines. It illuminates. So in knowing the hidden God you must observe three things. He exists. He is known. He causes other things to be known.”^[5] Therefore, without the light of the sun, our eyes, even if purified, cannot see anything. Without divine illumination, there is no human knowledge, either sense knowledge or intellectual one. It is God that makes knowledge possible just as the light of the sun make it possible to see.

In Augustine’s three early works, *De magistro*, *Soliloquia*, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 46, he suggested that the function of illumination were threefold. “Illumination is the source of the cognitive capacity; it sustains the ongoing process of cognition; and it supplies the very content of thought.”^[6]

However, it seems that St. Augustine never intends to develop a systematic system. Noone claims that before the thirteen century, one might only speak of the theme of Divine Illumination, not the theory of Divine Illumination.^[7] Despite being unsystematic and ambiguous, Augustine’s view of Divine Illumination is rich and appealing, especially to the thirteenth century philosophers and theologians. Undoubtedly, it permeates the medieval Christian tradition. Until Thomas Aquinas, the theory of Divine Illumination had played a prominent role in all the most influential medieval theories of knowledge, including those of Anselm, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, and especially Bonaventure.^[8]

St. Bonaventure believed that the divine light actually guided human’s intellectual cognition as regulating and moving cause, present in all our acts of intellectual knowledge. He didn’t deny the role of sense knowledge and abstraction, which are partial causes, cooperating with the divine light. This is the standard Franciscan interpretation. Simply put, a priori concepts coming from Divine Illumination do not afford the actual knowledge, but regulate the process of cognition to ensure the concepts generated by mind correspond to the divine ideas about reality and are therefore absolute certain.

The introduction of Aristotle’s most important works to the medieval west Europe brought on revolutionary changes in the thirteenth-century thought, but at the expense of declines of some doctrines. The growing dominance of the Aristotelian theory of cognition quickly made Augustinian theory of Divine Illumination seem superfluous.^[9] However, the condemnation of 219 propositions by Etienne Tempier, the year of 1277 witnessed a revival of Augustinian thought and a move away from the increasingly popular Aristotelianism. Henry of Ghent was the most representative of such

[4] Ibid. ,5.

[5] J. H. S. Burleigh, ed. , *Augustine, Early Writings* (London: SCM, 1953) ,32.

[6] Lydia Schumacher, “Illumination, Divine.” In *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine.* : Oxford University Press, 2013. Accessed on Nov. 5, 2018. <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199299164.001.0001/acref-9780199299164-e-390>.

[7] Timothy Noone, “Divine Illumination”, 369.

[8] Robert Pasnau, “Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination”, *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 49, 1 (1995): 50.

[9] Ibid. ,49.

Neo-Augustinian thought in the late thirteenth century.

2. Henry of Ghent's New Synthesis

Henry of Ghent (? -1293), also known as Doctor Solennis, was secular master in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris from 1276 to 1292. As a panel member of the papa commission under Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277, he has long been viewed as the leading conservative philosophical force at the University of Paris in last quarter of the 13th century.^[10] In his epistemology, he attempted to integrate an Aristotelian empiricism, Platonic exemplarism and an Augustinian doctrine of Divine Illumination. He also tried to restore the theological connotation to Divine Illumination. In the years between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent is certainly most influential philosopher. His work became the starting point and the target of criticism for Duns Scotus. It should also be noted that it is John Dun Scotus who virtually brought the theory to the end. It's reasonable to proclaim Henry of Ghent as the last forceful defender of the theory of Divine Illumination in the Medieval Ages. However, Henry's adaption of Divine Illumination is doomed partly in his own theoretical synthesis.

The years around and after the condemnations, the defenders of Augustinian tradition, in particular the theory of Divine Illumination, were faced up the increasingly critical and controversial climate. Various attempts were made to explain how the divine light interacted with ordinary powers of human understanding. Henry of Ghent, as Tempier's panel member in 1277 and a leading influence at Paris between 1277 to 1293, was fully aware of the difficulties of the traditional philosophy. It is interesting to note that Henry began his Summa with a question whether it is possible to know anything at all. It signals a departure from his predecessors, since they had begun their works with questions on God's nature. After Henry, it became common for Franciscans to follow, asking the question about the possibility of knowledge at the outset of major theological works.^[11] Logically, the question "can man know truth?" is prior to investigations into the subject of how man know truth.

2.1 The Knowledge of the True and the Knowledge of Truth

Henry thinks that apparent superfluity of Divine Illumination is merely apparent and tries to build a solid epistemological basis for maintaining the theory. Different from Augustine, however, Henry claims that Divine Illumination is not required for all knowledge. His defense of the theory of Divine Illumination rests on a distinction between the knowledge of the true and the knowledge of the truth (*veritas syncera*).

To the first argument on the other side, that human beings can through their

[10] John Marenbon, ed. *Medieval Philosophy*. Routledge History of Philosophy, v. 3. London; New York: Routledge, 1998, P. 483. Cf. Pasquale Porro, "An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent", *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), P. 393.

[11] Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (West Sussex, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 187.

own activity acquire knowledge, it should be said that this is true [as regards knowledge] of natural things in knowing what is true as regards the thing. But God teaches this, by giving a natural capacity for judgment through which one discerns the things to be known. Pure truth, however, or any truth that must be cognized supernaturally, or perhaps any truth at all, cannot be known without God himself doing the teaching. ^[12]

Henry thinks human being is capable of acquiring knowledge of the true, that is, what is true as regards natural things. It is likely that Henry has had Aquinas in mind in his original efforts to face up with the challenges. Explicitly, Henry opposed Aquinas' position that ordinary (or natural) Divine Illumination amounts merely to a naturally innate capacity to know the truth. ^[13] For Aquinas, the first principles come from the divine light by the impressing its light on human agent intellect. This happens at the creation of the human soul and it is the natural endowment of the agent intellect. Aquinas denies any further need for the divine light to concur with the human intellect beyond the creation. For Henry, Aquinas overestimates the power of human intellect and fails to distinguish between the truth that can be obtained from sense-based images and the eternal truth. ^[14] Henry does recognize the dignity and perfection of the created intellect. He believes that natural objects can be known purely naturally, while the knowledge of the truth is acquired on the indispensability of the Divine Illumination. In contrast, acknowledging the natural illumination and special illumination, Thomas Aquinas believes that the very nature of the rational soul enables us to know certain kinds of truths through sensible things, and other truths such as future contingents and truths of faith that transcend the faculty of reason cannot be naturally known without special illumination-prophecy, in other words, or revelation. ^[15]

To justify his claims, Henry first distinguishes between the two sorts of knowledge as follows:

...still it is one thing to know of a creature what is true with respect to it, and another to know its truth. So, there is one cognition by which a thing is cognized, another by which its truth is cognized. For every cognitive power that through its cognition apprehends a thing just as it has existence in itself, outside the cognizer, apprehends what is true in it. But through this it does not apprehend the thing's

[12] "Ad primum in oppositum, quod homo potest proprio motu acquirere scientiam; dicendum quod verum est de rebus naturalibus, sciendo id quod verum est in re; quod tamen deus docet; dando naturale iudicium quo scienda discernit. Sinceram autem veritatem, aut aliquam veritatem super naturaliter cognoscendam, aut forte veritatem quamcumque, non potest scire sine ipso proprio docente"; Ghent, Summa 1. 7 ad 1; 17rM. Henry of Ghent, Summa (Questiones Ordinariae), art. 1-5, in Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, ed. G. A. Wilson (Leuven; Leuven University Press, 2001). Article one and two of Henry's Summa have been translated by Robert Pasnau in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. 3: Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002); all five questions of article one have been translated by Roland J. Teske in Henry of Ghent's Summa of Ordinary Questions (Article One): The Possibility of Human Knowledge (South Bend; St. Augustine's Press, 2008). The quotations used in this paper are taken from The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. 3: Mind and Knowledge, translated by Robert Pasnau.

[13] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 55.

[14] Noone, "Divine Illumination", 1:382.

[15] Ibid., 52.

truth. For the senses even in brute animals apprehend well enough concerning a thing

what is true in it—for instance, a true human being, true wood, a true stone, and especially the proper objects with respect to which the senses are necessarily true. But still they apprehend or cognize the truth of no thing, because they cannot judge regarding any thing what it is in actual truth—e. g., concerning a human being, that it is a true human being, or concerning a color, that it is a true color?^[16]

Accordingly, to know the knowledge of the true involves a cognition that represents the object as it is, based on the senses or natural conception. According to Henry, both humans and animals which lack of reason can grasp something in this way.

2.2 The Created Exemplar and the Divine Exemplar

To know the truth, however, is more complicated. It involves the mechanism of two exemplars: human ideas and divine ideas. Henry explains that the truth of a thing “can be cognized only by cognizing the conformity of the cognized thing to its exemplar.”^[17] Therefore, there are two ways of grasping the truth.

A thing’s truth has two ways of being cognized by a human being, with respect to two exemplars... The first exemplar of a thing is its universal likeness [species] existing within the soul, through which the soul acquires a cognition of all the individuals it stands for. This exemplar is caused by the thing. The second exemplar is the divine art containing the ideal formulations of all things.^[18]

The first exemplar is created by human intellect on the basis of sense experience. The second is an uncreated one that subsists in the divine intellect. On the one level, the truth of a thing requires a conformity of a cognition of that thing in human intellect to the thing. On the another level, the truth of a thing requires the thing’s conformity to the divine intellect. In other words, the thing matches the divine exemplar. It is a little misleading when Henry says a thing’s truth may be cognized in two ways. It suggests we might know the truth of a thing either by comparing our own ideas to the

[16] “Aliud tamen est scire de creatura id quod verum est in ea et aliud est scire eius veritatem: ut alia sit cognitio qua cognoscitur res, alia qua cognoscitur veritas eius. Omnis enim virtus cognoscitiva per suam notitiam apprehendens rem sicuti habet esse in se extra cognoscentem apprehendit quod verum est in ea. Sed non per hoc apprehendit eius veritatem. Sensus enim etiam in brutis bene apprehendit de re quod verum est in ea. Sed tamen nullius rei veritatem apprehendit sive cognoscit; propter quod de nullo potest iudicare quid sit in rei veritate, ut de homine quod sit verus homo, vel de colore quod sit verus color”; Ghent, *Summa* 1. 2; 4vC. Translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3; *Mind and Knowledge*, 115.

[17] “Intentio enim veritatis in re apprehendi non potest nisi apprehendendo conformitatem eius ad suum exemplar”; Ghent, *Summa* 1. 2; 5 vE. Translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3; *Mind and Knowledge*, 117.

[18] “Duplex tamen ad duplex exemplar veritas rei habet ab homine cognosci... Primum exemplar rei est species eius universalis apud animam exis teras, per quam acquirit notitiam omnium suppositorum eius; et est causata a re. Secundum exemplar est ars divina continens omnium rerum ideales rationes”; *Summa* 1. 2; 5vE. Translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3; *Mind and Knowledge*, 118.

thing, or by comparing the thing to the divine ideas. However, it is the latter conformity that makes the thing true.^[19] The truth of a thing lies in the relationship between the thing and divine intellect. The match between a thing and the divine exemplar is that of the things' essence with the exemplar. "And so since every creature is a kind of image of a divine exemplar, the truth of every creature is cognized most truly and completely in its quiddity by seeing the divine essence uncovered."^[20] For Henry, the truth of an object just is the object's essence. Knowing the truth is the grasping the essences of the object. Therefore, the image can be cognized (a priori) through an exemplar, and conversely, the exemplar can also be cognized (a posteriori) through the image. Henry concedes that human beings have the ability to know what is true. He even concedes that our sense are reliable and thus give us veridical awareness of the external world.^[21] However, Henry still claims that we are unable to go beyond superficial appearances by senses and grasp the essence of what it is to be a certain kind of thing. He accepted the Aristotelian position that "we do have fixed knowledge of changeable, particular, sensible, natural things through their universals existing in the intellect."^[22] However, Henry denies that this effort could lead to the essences of a object. It is not possible for human beings on their own to go beyond the senses and progress to the deepest understanding of the essences of creatures.^[23] The knowledge of truth is possible for human beings, only on the condition of the aids from Divine Illumination.

In the process of cognition, Henry distinguishes two ways of utilizing the exemplar as the object of knowledge or as the means of knowing. According to Henry, the divine exemplars of Being, unity, truth, and goodness, are imprinted or poured on the mind through special illumination.^[24] These uncreated exemplars check the truth of the exemplars that have been created by the mind and thus confirm that they are absolutely certain. That is to say, Divine Illumination doesn't offer knowledge, but regulates the cognition.

The claim that we are unable to grasp naturally the truth of things distinguishes Henry from Aquinas and the Aristotelianism of his age. Aquinas believes that the natural light of agent intellect suffices to get behind the appearance and reach the true nature of reality.

2.3 Three Ways of How Divine Illumination Works

As mentioned above, the classic form of Divine Illumination attempted to resolve the dual problems of how the mind generates the ideas and how the mind makes the judgment of the true and certain knowledge from the false one. As Gilson points out, the intellect operations involve criteria and ideogenesis. To Augustine, the judgmental function of Divine Illumination far outweighed ideogenesis.^[25] In other words, the light plays more important normative role in human knowledge of

[19] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 58.

[20] Henry, *Summa*, translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge*, 124.

[21] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 60.

[22] Henry, *Summa*, translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge*, 105.

[23] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 62.

[24] Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, 190.

[25] Etienne Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934), 321-31.

the pure truth. It seems that Henry was well aware of Augustine's statements and tied to integrate them into three ways of explication of how Divine Illumination works in human's knowledge of true truth. According to Henry, the function of God performed in human's cognition serves as spiritual light, a form or species and a figure or mark, a kind of divine art.^[26] Steven Marrone thought that Henry didn't reject the multiple functions of Divine Illumination he found in the writings of Augustine, and however, took much greater care to be precise of the explication.^[27]

First, God acts as an intellectual light illuminating the mind, not directly enabling it to see the pure truth, but sharpening and cleansing it to see clearly^[28]. The divine light doesn't get involved in man's actual cognitive process, but prepares the way for it. The mind is believed to be clouded by the base affection of the flesh and sin, just as the bodily eyes need to be purged so that they could receive the visible images. Interestingly, it is noted that purging the receptive cognitive power is one of two roles Henry attributed to the agent intellect. Moreover, in his later works, Henry did describe God as the second agent intellect in the natural processes of coming to know the objects in the world.^[29] Such agent intellect is external of the mind, and God illuminated the intellect indirectly. As Steven Marrone presumed that in Henry's understanding, what happened was that the divine light diffused itself on the intelligible species of things, and they carried it to the mind, where it then did its work of cleansing and healing.^[30]

Second, God acts as a form and species, which actually engages in mind's cognitive process and transforms the mind to see the pure truth.^[31] Unlike the spiritual light elaborated above, the second role offers the mind the species and forms to come to know the pure truth. Henry used the analogy of blurred vision. The eyes would know only that there are some object presented to them, but would not know what they are actually seeing. In the context of Henry's theory of truth, it isn't hard to understand. There are two species, one is taken from the external object by the senses; the other is the exemplar in God, the cause of the thing. The mind has to compare the two species in order to form the perfect word, the actual psychological manifestations of the pure truth in its understanding.^[32] The knowledge of truth is the conformity of the object to its divine exemplar in the divine mind. The impressed species drawn from the object is not perfect and precisely correct, accounting for the mind's initial confrontation via senses. The mind is still insufficient to come to the pure truth, still relying on the Divine Illumination for the second species, the divine exemplar to flow into it. There is a contradiction. According to Henry, the mind in this life normally couldn't see the divine exemplar as an object, instead, means of cognition.

Third, God acts as a figure or a mark. God contains the eternal reasons of all things in the world,

[26] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 9r-v[D]).

[27] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Medieval Academy of America, 1985, 31.

[28] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 9vD). "Est enim primo ratio cognitionis ut lux, mentem solummodo illustrando; ut ad intuendum sinceram veritatem rei acuatur; non ut team intueatur et iam videat."

[29] Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (II, 129v-130r[E]).

[30] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 32.

[31] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 9vE and F). "Secundo modo dicitur est ratio cognitionis ut forma et species mentem immutans ad intuendum."

[32] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rG). See also Summa, art. 1, q. 4 (I, 12vD).

like a storehouse of exemplars or divine ideas. In this way, God is like an art (ars), impressing, sealing and marking the mind with its images.^[33] This is, Henry believed, more direct and perfect than the first two modes. However, it is hard to explain how this mode is distinct from the other two. Using the traditional analogy to a signet ring, which made its mark on the sealing wax, Henry echoed Augustine in *De Trinitate*, literally indicating the divine illumination impressing the image onto the mind through an impression. Henry believed that the knowledge of truth is a word or concept drawn from the object in conformity with divine exemplar. The word or the concept is simply the noetic marker for the knowledge of similitude that constitute truth. The pure truth turns out to be the adequation between the concept in the intellect and God. However, this is not what Henry intended. He took pains to emphasize that the perfect concept of truth was formed in the mind by divine exemplar, but the whole process could not occur without the use of a created exemplar drawn from the external object in the world.^[34] Therefore, Henry claimed that once the mind had attained the knowledge of an external object by means of the created species, the divine exemplar shone upon this knowledge and thus led the mind to perceive the pure truth.^[35] Here the function of God in the cognitive process is defined as “art”, not offering new species to form concepts, instead, molding the concepts the mind had already devised from the created exemplar. To be more precise, the mind takes two steps, first using the created exemplar taken from the external object to form an incomplete concept or word (imperfect and still in need of adjustment), and then by impressing the second divine exemplar molding and shaping the word to be the perfect word of pure truth. The external object is the impression in the material world of the divine exemplar; the concept in the mind receives the impression from the same exemplar from God, and thus the truth which the concept signifies reflects the creative relationship between the created object and God. As Henry explained that once the word in the intellect had been marked by the seal of God’s divine exemplar, it became the more perfect similitude of the object, because both of them were now impressions left by the same seal.^[36]

So far, Henry had developed a general outline of the theory of human knowledge. Based on the distinction between the knowledge of the true and the knowledge of truth, Henry offered his solution to skepticism. On the level of truth in the light of two exemplars, Henry believed the mind could enter the realm of science and with aid of the special illumination, the mind could attain the knowledge of truth of varied certitude and perfect sense. Only in the divine light could the human intellect reach the pure truth (*sincera veritas*). As Henry himself claimed, his philosophy offers a synthesis of Aristotle and Plato in the Augustinian tradition.^[37] Clearly, Henry is a true Augustinian, but he didn’t make concessions to an ever-encroaching Aristotelianism. Instead, he perceived the inadequacy in Aristotelian theory of knowledge and turned to Divine Illumination for the solution.

[33] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rF). “Tertio modo est ratio cognitionis ut exemplar atque transfigurans mentem ad distincte intelligendum: et hoc ratione aeternarum regularum in divina arte contentarum.”

[34] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 36.

[35] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rF and 10vG).

[36] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rG).

[37] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 4 E.

3. The Ontological Basis for Henry's Synthesis

It's evident that Henry believed that the mind can reach some kind of truth, but had a problem explaining how that could be. In Aristotelian terms, our natural way of acquiring knowledge is through sensation. An exemplar created by abstracting from phantasms would be sufficient to know the truth for Aristotle, while Henry wouldn't accept it because Henry and his contemporaries inhabited a different metaphysical universe than Aristotle; their theological commitments entailed that they would have different starting points than those of Aristotle.^[38] The divine exemplar would be required for Henry for the knowledge of pure truth, and divine illumination which was pervasive in the Christian tradition could help solve the dilemma.

Many scholars have noticed that Henry's thoughts had went through changes. Theophilus Nys first detected Henry's move and reorientation in his stance on noetics and epistemology. Nys demonstrated that Henry made extensive use of the Aristotelian notion of an intelligible species impressed on the mind in intellection as a means of knowing simple objects in his first twenty articles of *Summa*. In *Quodlibet IV*, Nys showed, Henry for the first time definitely and irrevocably, rejected the recourse to impressed intelligible species.^[39] In *Quodlibet V*, Henry laid out his mature theory of word (*verbum*) to substitute the intelligible species. Steven P. Marrone proposed a three-stage development hypothesis: the first stage revealing Henry as an Augustinian; the second manifesting a turn to Aristotelian formalism; the last presenting an exquisite integration of the previous two.^[40] Another convincing proof is Henry's silence on Divine Illumination in his middle years. However, Henry seems simply to have reverted to his earliest position, going back on the Aristotelian innovations of the middle years to reaffirm the purely Augustinian doctrine of a divine light.^[41] In his most mature thoughts, Henry had come full circle. He returned to the image of illumination and the idea of godly intervention in his very early works, but it was not to repeat and resurrect the same image and idea. The new synthesis of Divine Illumination is somehow old and new at the same time. Henry tended to elaborate God's action as an art (*ars*), a storehouse of forms working on the material of the artifact.^[42] Henry's metaphysics insights are supposed to be examined to account for the development in Henry's epistemology.

From the beginning, Henry took a stance other than Thomas Aquinas, firmly rejecting any real distinction between being and essence. They are different, but not different enough to refer to two different things (*res*) to form a third or composite one.^[43] As to the reality of created things, Henry proposed two kinds of state of being: the being of essence (*esse essentiae*) and the being of existence (*esse existentiae*). The former indicated it participated in a divine exemplar through its essence, while

[38] Patrick J. Connolly, "Henry of Ghent's Argument for Divine Illumination Reconsidered", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 89, No. 1, 65-66.

[39] See Theophilus V. Nys, *De psychologia cognitionis humanae secundum Henricum Gandavensem*, Rome, 1949, 9, 34, and 42.

[40] Steven P. Marrone, "Henry of Ghent in Mid-career as Interpreter of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas", *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, 194-195.

[41] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 99.


[42] *Quod. IX. q. 15* (ed. Macken, P. 265): "...agens enim qui Deus est, agit sicut ars quae ponit formam in materiali artifici; agens vero qui est potentialis animae, agit sicut lumen circa phantasmata..."

[43] *Summa*, art. 21, q. 4 (I, 127vS).

the latter means each thing has a real object existence in the world, as an effect of divine creative act based on the exemplars. Very uniquely, it seemed Henry also proposed a third level of reality, that is the cognitive being (*esse rationis*). Simply put, the cognitive being indicates the created things existed in the mind.

By using the broadest metaphysical category that Henry formulated a framework to analyze the reality. The most inclusive thing (*res*) includes being (*ens*) and non-being (*non ens*), which was identified by Henry as *res a reor reris*. There were things which could have existed in the world, because they all possessed or related to the exemplars in the divine mind, which are the basis for all creation and the foundation for actual being in the world. Henry associated this level with nature (*natura*) and essence (*essentia*), and identifying as *res a raturidine*. A third level lay within the second one, including things which had actual existence in the real world, either in the real world or in the mind. Henry identified it as *res existens in actu*.

A diagram can best explain Henry's metaphysical framework:



In the second circle, things being an essence possessed exemplars in God, therefore, and are objects of the intellect. The essence didn't mean that it had been actualized. In the third circle, with being of existence added, things are made actually existing objects. On the level of essence, there was a relation with God, consisting the core of the created things. With Henry's metaphysical framework, let's examine how his theory of being and essence was integrated into his epistemology. Essence reflected a correspondence to a divine exemplar, and also gave each thing its truth. If essence offered the foundation for things' truth, it also provided the basis for the truth of human knowledge. In other words, essence not only lay at the ontological core of the things, but at the core of human knowledge. The mind perceived the truth with the ultimate ontological basis in God. Therefore, the mind didn't have to shift from two different things; the created exemplar and the divine exemplar, to obtain the pure truth, but pushed further towards the ultimate metaphysical basis, the absolute essence. God acted as a divine art, impressing a form on the mind. Coming to truth is grasping the essence, which was at heart perceiving the relation to God. The mind could only seek the truth from the being of essence, instead of being of existence. All in all, taking the Aristotelian path to the scientific knowledge entailed coming to recourse the traditional Augustinian terms and theology. Henry had pushed a way to resolve the conflicts between the Aristotelian path and the Augustine one of explaining truth. By incorporating his innovative theory of distinction of essence and being, he found the unity of the path from the existing object to the essence and finally to God. To some extent, he was genuine Platonism, using explicitly Augustinian language. With the analytical tools from

Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Henry still maintain his theological and epistemological position. Steven P. Marrone was quite right in claiming the theory of being and essence had not only bridged the gap between the created world and God's ideas, thereby eliminating the need for any explicit theory of two exemplars in the mind; it has also made Henry's two types of truth, the scientific truth of the analytical mind and the pure truth of the illuminated intellect, the same. ^[44]

4. Conclusions

Being an Augustinian, but with a considerable difference, Henry was willing to accept Aristotle when no essentials are at stake and is a sympathetic reader of Avicenna. ^[45] In his epistemological system, he abides by the Augustinian principle that no pure truth can come by means of the senses, while the natural knowledge acquired based on senses is, in normal circumstances, true, despite being not pure and full truth. Still, it becomes increasingly difficult to defend the theory of Divine Illumination philosophically. Despite Henry's challenge to the growing influence of the Aristotelian account and his synthesis of an Aristotelian empiricism, Platonic exemplarism and an Augustinian theory of knowledge, the theory of Divine illumination declined inevitably. The tension between the Christian metaphysical worldview and the epistemological requirements of the Aristotelian system is unsolvable. The need for divine illumination is waning in face of encroaching Aristotelianism. Henry would never thought his synthesis had a limited influence in the coming age. His theory of Divine Illumination is, to certain extent, doomed. In the predicament of later 13th century, the conservative theologians, or at least those of their number who belonged to the order of Friars Minor, began to receive an assistance from the genius of Duns Scotus. ^[46] John Duns Scotus is an empirical Aristotelian, who rejected the role of Divine Illumination in ordinary cognition, and limit it as the source of knowledge about God. That is, in natural cognitive processes, Divine Illumination ceases to get involved. The mind attains knowledge by abstracting the essence from the objects presented by the senses, thus attaining the concept. Scotus claimed that human intellect was competent to attain the truth without any direct divine illumination. Virtually, the theory of Divine Illumination declined after John Duns Scotus. Historically speaking, the non-illuminationist account of mind, first advocated by Aquinas and developed into a thoroughgoing theory by Scotus, displaced illuminationism. The focus of epistemology shifted from the problem of eternal truth and certainty to the topic of universal knowledge analyzed through competing versions of intuitive and abstractive cognition. ^[47]

[44] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 140.

[45] David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought*, 2nd ed. D. E. Luscombe and C. N. L. Brook (London and New York: Longman, 1988), 275.

[46] *Ibid.*, 276.

[47] Noone, "Divine Illumination", 1:382.

中文题目:

根特的亨利和注定失败的光照论

作者:张迎迎, 上海立信会计金融学院外国语学院讲师; 中国社会科学院研究生院世界宗教研究系博士生, 本文系上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题“‘光照论’在欧洲中世纪哲学史中的流变及影响考论”(批准号: 2020BZX010)阶段性研究成果。上海文翔路2800号1号楼209办公室, 201620, 电话: +86-137-6452-1028。电子邮箱: vinessazy@163.com。

摘要:根特的亨利试图整合亚里士多德的经验主义、柏拉图的范型主义和奥古斯丁的光照论, 为奥古斯丁的认识论建立坚实的哲学基础, 同时试图恢复其神学内涵。然而, 他的新综合是注定失败的, 因为基督教形而上学的世界观和亚里士多德体系的认识论要求之间的张力是无法解决的。在 13 世纪末, 面对不断侵蚀的亚里士多德哲学, 对神圣光照的需求日趋衰减。

关键词:光照论; 奥古斯丁; 柏拉图主义; 亚里士多德主义; 原型