

Globethics Repository

The logo for Globethics, featuring the word "Globethics" in white sans-serif font on a solid blue rectangular background.

The counterweight of the performative speech of integrity sciences

This page was generated automatically upon download from the Globethics Repository.
More information on Globethics see <https://www.globethics.net>. Data and content policy
of Globethics Repository see <https://repository.globethics.net/pages/policy>.

Item Type	Book chapter
Authors	Bergadaà, Michelle
DOI	10.58863/20.500.12424/4307050
Publisher	Globethics Publications
Rights	2024 Globethics Publications;Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Download date	2026-07-16 22:25:06
Item License	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Link to Item	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/4307050

THE COUNTERWEIGHT OF THE PERFORMATIVE SPEECH OF INTEGRITY SCIENCES

Michelle Bergadaà

1. Introduction

How can we guarantee the search for academic truth when a current of sensationalism is shaking up both the academic world and the media when it comes to dubious scientific conduct? * Naoyuki Nakao,¹⁰ Diederik Stapel,¹¹ Olivier Voinnet,¹² Didier Raoult¹³... Every country and

* Michelle Bergadaà is Professor Emeritus for the University of Geneva and President of the International Institute for Research and Action on Academic Fraud and Plagiarism (IRAFPA).

How to quote this chapter: Bergadaà, Michelle, “The counterweight of the performative speech of integrity sciences”, in: Bergadaà, Michelle, and Peixoto, Paulo (Eds.), *The New Boundaries of Academic Integrity*, Geneva: Globethics Publications, 2024, pp. 67-86. DOI: 10.58863/20.500.12424/4307050 © Globethics Publications. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International

¹⁰ Samp et al. (2012).

¹¹ Battacharjee (2013).

¹² Schneider (2018).

¹³ Casassus (2022).

every discipline is affected. The numerous scandals of recent years are fuelling civil society's distrust of our profession. Our collective book, *Academic Integrity – A Call to Research and Action* (Bergadaà & Peixoto, 2023) is evidence of this trend.

Since 31 March 2004, the date of our first newsletter to the academic community, 20 years have passed: years in which, through trial and error, we have learned how to publicly express the “sciences of integrity”.

The audience was vast: professors and researchers, as well as heads of institutions, editors of academic journals and books, journalists, and observers from civil society. Considering the urgency of academic integrity issues, it was necessary to adopt a performative approach. By “performativity”, we refer to the work of Austin (1991), for whom performative statements are those that perform, by their very utterance, the action they designate. “I now pronounce you husband and wife”, says the mayor. A statement is performative because it is founded on an institution. These performative acts modify reality, beyond the thought they express (Charaudeau, 2005). The narrative plot, in our case, stems from the fact that IRAFPA was created in 2016, when we had conceptually defined all the devices for transforming speech into fact. Thus, IRAFPA naturally emerged because, little by little, our words had become performative.

To understand how IRAFPA's own style of expression has developed, we analysed comments made in the 92 issues of the IRAFPA newsletter since 2004. With more than 18,000 subscribers, plus IRAFPA's LinkedIn subscribers, self-criticism in terms of expression is permanent: the aim is to gain acceptance for a message that, at least until 2016, ran counter to the institutional *omertà* governing academic misconduct.

Six successive periods have occurred during which turning points appeared in our movement for the science of integrity. The analysis presented below highlights these epiphanies.

2. “Truth-Telling”

Between 2004 and 2008, the years when we discovered our field of research and action, what began as a conversation between peers spread to a wider audience. We soon had 15,000 subscribers to our newsletter. They came from 113 different institutions, 13 countries, and 17 scientific disciplines.

The “truth-telling” we favour is based above all on our refusal to accept the fatalistic reality that the race to publish and obtain funding and the tightening of administrative order in our establishments are detrimental to our mission of creating and disseminating knowledge. We all know this, ever since the first decade of the Internet revolutionized a vocation that is tending to “professionalize” itself with the increased use of quantitative productivity indices.

None of the expressions we use in our messages are the accidental fruit of our creativity. They are all rooted in a contextual analysis that enables our readers/listeners to recognize the “territory” of integrity as their own. For example, since its creation in 2004, our website has been *Responsable.unige.ch*, in reference to Jonas (1984). This philosopher anchors his concept of proactive responsibility by recommending that, before making decisions, we ask ourselves not about our desires but about our fears for a future in danger. Another example: if we opt for the expression “plagiarizer” rather than “plagiarist”, it is because we are studying the pragmatic relationship of the social actor with the object “knowledge”—their active behaviour—whereas the philosopher uses “plagiarist” to designate an attribute of an individual. The expression “knowledge delinquents”, for its part, is chosen in response to directors of institutions who protect themselves by buying licences to operate similarity detection software, then claiming that they are exempt from any suspicion of negligence. Magical thinking or bad faith? “Knowledge

delinquents”, whether students or researchers, act shamelessly until they are named as such.

This “truth-telling” works because we benefit from the stable anchorage of “academic freedom”. For Engel (2020), this academic freedom emerges from the cognitive virtues accepted as the appropriate response in terms of moderation in judgement. Thus, this academic freedom is still constrained by our responsibility. Receiving frequent messages from distressed peers and working with some 50 of them during those first four years, we quickly learned to discipline our emotions.

After all, all our interlocutors expected us to be sympathetic, but above all to clarify their situation. From the outset, our “truth-telling” was based on contextual reframing, specifying the level of apprehension at which our discourse takes place. The aim is to show our interlocutors where the subject under discussion is situated in space (micro, meso, macro) and in time (short, medium, and long term). This initial framing is important, because the behaviour of knowledge offenders always impacts their colleagues, their publishers, and their environment.

This objective contextualization of cases is radically different from that of the legal system. Lawsuits brought by victims of plagiarism last so long that those victims become exhausted. On 15 July 2007, we set the tone for what would become our anchor point—an anchor point we would reaffirm in newsletter 90, 15 years later. We wrote:

“I no longer believe in those who exclusively adopt the causal logic dear to the legislator. I think it is futile to consider only the safeguarding of local systems, by punishing particular cases revealed by chance. Moreover, it is hypocritical to keep sanctions ‘personal and confidential’. The only result is to hurt the person who receives them; their effect on the system is insignificant. On the contrary, I advocate the logic of consequence, a sense of responsibility towards the societal future in progress, the

intelligence of the situation, without concessions and without pointless refuges. More than an international perspective, I call for a global one. [our translation]”

Our freedom of expression quickly exasperated some members of the academic community, who sought to gag us. Faced with the generalized *omertà* of the system and the threats of these “people of certainty”, who believe they are acting from conviction, we will always remain unmoved. Threats have never advanced democratic debate. They only show the weakness of those who make them. And so, the clearer the threats became, the more convinced we became that our academic freedom obliged us to speak with the utmost rigour.

3. The Effectiveness of Whistle-Blower and Researcher Discourse

The years from 2008 to 2012 were just as intense as the previous period. Our effectiveness increased because, although there were still few of us talking about academic misconduct, we were all aware of our effectiveness: we now knew how to express ourselves to animate a system that had been frozen in a posture of systemic *omertà*.

And so, on 13 April 2010, we resolutely put our words into action, inspired by Austin (1991):

“I say unto you that a ‘researcher’, Deputy Director General of a major French school and editor of a scientific journal, translated word for word a chapter of a book published by a doctoral student with a French publisher, then published it at McGraw-Hill under his own name.

I say unto you that the French publisher, the legal owner of this original work, would have preferred not to face such a confrontation with McGraw-Hill.

I say unto you that the higher education institution where this dishonest colleague practises cannot sanction students who plagiarize until it has settled this case.

I say unto you that all representatives of major schools and university presidents are concerned. They must now reassure us of their determination to protect knowledge, to protect us, and to protect our students. [our translation]”

It may sound grandiloquent, but it worked, because 48 hours after this publication, the offender was dismissed.

During these years of awakening of the academic community, a permanent democratic and dialectical debate, in the sense of Hegel (1993), took place. In Germany, a wiki open to the public¹⁴ allowed over ten thousand people to go over the 475 pages and 1,200 notes of Defence Minister Guttenberg’s thesis with a fine-tooth comb. It was publicly revealed that 67.94% of the work had been borrowed from other authors who were not cited (or were misquoted). The thesis was revoked by the University of Bayreuth on 23 February 2011. In France, the situation is quite different. This led to the Derambarsh affair, masterfully covered by Soufron (2023).

In 2008–2010, a determined whistle-blower named Hervé Maisonneuve created a blog that is widely read in the medical community.¹⁵ He raises the alarm by describing situations that have just occurred, such as articles retracted due to fraud or plagiarism. Another whistle-blower, Jean-Noël Darde, single-handedly breaks the codes of *omertà* with his accusatory blog,¹⁶ which relentlessly denounces academic misconduct in the field of plagiarism. In return, the violence of the attacks by some of his colleagues is staggering: some accused him of

¹⁴ GutenPlag Wiki: https://gutenplag.fandom.com/de/wiki/GutenPlag_Wiki.

¹⁵ Revues et Intégrité: <https://www.redactionmedicale.fr>.

¹⁶ Archéologie du ‘copier-coller’: <http://archeologie-copier-coller.com>.

being “just a lecturer”, and therefore a failed researcher who is not part of their world. While Jean-Noël Darde was denouncing the excesses of a system, his opponents reduced his actions to an inter-individual conflict. In human and intellectual terms, this is inappropriate.

We therefore decided to remain a *full professor* protected by the system, so as to be able to denounce its abuses and leave the major high-profile cases to newspapers and whistle-blowers.

Our aim is to enable our peers to present their experiences and stories of misconduct in the routine of everyday life. Our empirical research-interaction method helps our readers and listeners to move continuously from the real world to its interpretation through anonymized cases, whose narrative resembles that of a *Cluedo*-style¹⁷ detective story. For each case written up as an investigation, we obtain over a hundred responses, which allow us to conduct an inductive analysis. The transcripts were used to illustrate one of our first books (Bergadaà, 2015; translated as Bergadaà, 2021). One of our best-known contributions was the profiles of knowledge delinquents as they relate to the values and norms of our profession (Bergadaà, 2012b). We published some 25 of our case analyses in the following years, either as working papers or as articles in scientific journals.

On 23 January 2012, one of these studies enabled us to identify institutional managers as being responsible for the total social fact—in Mauss’s (1973) sense—of academic misconduct. We reveal the central ambiguities that taint the university’s knowledge-related mission, as well as the decision-making ambiguities that constrain the profession of professor-researcher (Bergadaà, 2012a). It is up to the leaders to resolve these ambiguities. Ten years later, at the ethics committee¹⁸ of Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour (UPPA, in France), we are still using this

¹⁷ The game known as *Clue* in North America.

¹⁸ UPPA: <https://organisation.univ-pau.fr/fr/organisation/instances/comite-d-ethique.html>.

dynamic method of presenting anonymized cases and open-ended questions, in a stylized manner (Uhaldeborde, 2023).

4. Sincerity, Truth, and Veracity

The years from 2012 to 2015 saw a real turning point in our performative speech. We had acquired the fragile certainty that no knowledgeable delinquent would ever dare attack us, because it was common knowledge that we told the truth... Then occurred our worst emotional experience of the last 20 years, but also the most constructive.

On 1 June 2014, we published a case under the title [translated] “The heavier it gets, the more make-or-break the situation is” and introduced it with these words:

“Here’s a case that was submitted to us a little over two years ago. It’s a ‘heavy’ case, because the alleged plagiarizer is currently vice-president, research at a university with over 18,000 students. The person is an outstanding professor in France. We therefore proceeded as usual: on the basis of the work of experts in this scientific field. We asked them to analyse three samples of this author’s output, one recent, one dating back at least 20 years, and one from 10 years ago. This allows us to identify the roots of the *modus operandi*, and how it changed over time. That’s where our research ends. [our translation]”

And, to prove our point, we placed anonymized samples from the case on our site. What we then thought was a demonstration of the tools to be used to prove the facts and avoid rumours turned out to have the opposite effect. After all, specialists in the field quickly recognized their discipline and identified the accused plagiarizer. They circulated the information widely, and it was picked up by the media. The person in question sued me, thanks to the functional (legal) protection of his institution, claiming

€150,000 in damages for defamation, plus the costs of inserting the forthcoming judgement in the newspapers that reported the case (*Le Monde*, *Libération*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, and *Le Dauphiné libéré*).

What a lesson! A sender says what they believe to be true. But the story is always relative to the person living it and telling it. Our human culture (and this transcends cultural relativism) demands this veracity, this posture of authenticity recognized by receivers (Williams, 2006), who will forgive errors and omissions if they are unintentional. Even stupidity is excused as long as it is sincere. So, when an offender says loud and clear that he is the victim of jealous colleagues, he is vouching for this truthfulness on behalf of people close to him.

With some excellent lawyers,¹⁹ we discovered the intricacies of the legal world and learn two new terms related to *veracity*. In all countries, there are, with varying degrees of ease, two possible defences when one is sued for defamation: the “exception of truth” and, if that is not upheld, “good faith”, both of which constitute “supporting facts”. The exception of truth—or *exceptio veritatis*—will be accepted if it is certain and based on the facts for which one is accused. Proving this is very difficult, and acquittals based on the exception of truth are very rare.

Because we were sued in France, a group of researchers specializing in our adversary’s field adopted and fine-tuned our working methodology. I am extremely grateful for the work of these “lapidaries” of the French, Italian, and English languages (depending on the source of the “borrowings”). These researchers masterfully demonstrated plagiarism in seven separate publications produced between 1989 and 2012. They compiled a 228-page file of comparative tables. In their foreword, they wrote: “*In the absence of national and international mechanisms for dealing with plagiarism and scientific fraud, professional security is not guaranteed for the many researchers who have compiled this dossier.*”

¹⁹ Thanks to the legal protection of the canton of Geneva, where I am a civil servant.

They prefer to remain anonymous” [our translation]. So, these experts expressed themselves “sincerely”, freely, and without apprehension... anonymously.

After that, things moved fast. The file enabled the press to make up its mind about the “truth” thus told, for instance in a column in *Le Monde*. Then, an administrative investigation was launched against the researcher who was attacking us by their university. And then we heard no more about a libel suit. We published the methodology in the book that identified us in the eyes of everyone—academics and the general public—as an expert in academic plagiarism (Bergadaà, 2015, 2021). The violence of this affair enabled us to publicly establish our reputation for “veracity”.

And we became extremely adept at detecting sincerity in the words of those who came to us as either victims or witnesses. We know how to explain to them that the “veracity” of their testimony depends solely on the “truth” of the facts they are denouncing, and that this analysis of the facts must be understood as an “etic” (external and objective) posture, and not an “emic” (internal and subjective) one. This first encounter with the legal order showed us, if proof were needed, that when violence does not destroy us, it makes us stronger.

5. The Power of Collective Talk

In 2015 and 2016, IRAFPA’s performativity became a collective work, formalized by the creation of a scientific association on 18 June 2016.

Many researchers are attracted by the IRAFPA network. Although opportunists do not stay long, it is more difficult to identify and retain the genuinely motivated. Theories of *motivation*, along the lines of Nuttin (1996), consider that if the “ideal stage of self” is not too distant from the “perceived current stage”, there is no recognition of a problem and

therefore no motivation to act. It is usually when one is a victim of, or witness to, academic delinquency that one becomes aware of the problem. But all motivation is accompanied by obstacles to action, such as availability in the face of demands from all sides, or the need to publish for a young researcher. So the initial excitement quickly fades, if it is not stimulated anew. We try to rekindle it with regular publications on our LinkedIn and Web TV channels.

Involvement is a much more interesting concept for defining academic integrity. Since the seminal work of Becker (1960), we have known that, if an object is not very involving for a person, a conative (or action) reflex will operate. Thus, even an uninvolved researcher will reflexively apply ethical standards that have been imposed upon them. On the other hand, if the object becomes truly involving for the individual, they grasp it cognitively. They start to think about it and want to discuss it. The different facets of involvement that are activated vary from person to person: curiosity about a new and stimulating field, concern, self-image, etc. We easily recognize peers with different levels of involvement in our debates and symposia.

The *mobilization* of IRAFPA members is of an altogether different nature. It is rooted in the very identity of the researcher-actor. For Lahire (1998), humans in society are not uniform. Over the course of their existence, everyone incorporates their experience into patterns of action that are activated according to the new contexts that arise. From this point of view, social action stems from identity (socio-psychology), rather than the other way round (psycho-sociology). Our research has shown four main dimensions of identity (Bergadaà, 2020, chap. 5) when it comes to academic integrity. Compassion and generous impulses generate bonds. From Aristotle to Lévinas, this perception of the other implies that we do not have to reason in terms of duty or choice. The victim of misconduct triggers in us a compelling intent towards solidarity.

At another level, the social bond in Mauss's (1973) sense is based on a principle of reciprocity. This total social fact transcends the interests of the individuals who enact it. The social bond is *de facto* broken by knowledge delinquents who, by deceiving the people around them, also deceive the academic system. A third dimension of identity is the preservation of the academic ideal in people who commit themselves to the defence of integrity. You do not *do* research; you *are* a researcher. The perspective of an abstract and universal humanity is conceived of as communion with a human "whole" (Komter, 2005). A fourth dimension is social justice, which is not dependent on an abstract community as before. Here, the aim is always greater social equity, and actors who see institutions—academic or social—as incapable of re-establishing justice apply this perspective of solidarity. They act to reduce arbitrariness (Godbout & Caillé, 2000), since fraudsters present curricula vitae enabling them to take the place of more honest researchers. In so doing, they also seize power in our system.

6. Accuracy and the Power of Terminology

In the years from 2016 to 2020, we found that democratic debate could only take place if everyone shared the same corpus of values. Otherwise, it is a dialogue of the deaf: since the dawn of time, philosophers, sociologists, jurists, and scientists have sought to impose their own definitions of *ethics* and *integrity*. It is confusing. We know that we cannot develop the integrity sciences without a solid foundation, even though we come from such diverse cultures and disciplines. This determination to find the right terms together is essential.

Our first collective decision was to identify ourselves as researchers and actors *for* academic integrity, not just as activists *against* academic misconduct.

Conceptually, this seems trivial, because if you do not call misconduct by its name, you cannot talk about integrity. Of course, we had defined what we call *academic misconduct* carried out by *knowledge delinquents* years earlier. But the semantic consolidation of integrity sciences is a different matter. Why? Because, for example, numerous French institutions use the term *integrity referents*, while others, in the medical sciences, prefer the use of *ethics*, and this same term can transform itself into *virtue ethics*, become standardized or professional ethics, and so on.

At IRAFPA, the search for the right term is carried out very classically, using a structuralist approach, in line with Charaudeau's (2005) proposals, which enable us to build up a stable corpus and homogenize our essential vocabulary: *ethics*, *responsibility*, *integrity*, *morality*, but also *knowledge delinquent*, *manipulator*, *fraudster*, *cheater*, as well as *central ambiguity*, *action ambiguity*, not to mention *motivation*, *involvement*, *mobilization*, etc.

In line with Peirce (1978), we examine the triadic relationship between “interpretant (or its signified)”, “objects of reference addressed” and “the sign as signifier”. For example, if “I” (the interpretant) want to say “integrity” (the signified), I will define its facets by their relationship with the “objective/subjective” and “system/individual” axes. Just as the “knowledge delinquent” incorporates four “root” objects: manipulator, fraudster, cut-and-paste tinkerer, and cheater. These are defined by their relationship to the “norms” and “values” axes.

We have therefore defined integrity on our website²⁰ in two parts:

I – *Integrity is defined as: “State of a thing, of a whole, which is whole, which has all its parts”* (CNRTL, France).²¹ Thus, we define the research object “Integrity” by its four dimensions:

²⁰ IRAFPA Guidelines for Academic Integrity: <https://irafpa.org/en/about-us/rules-of-academic-integrity/>.

²¹ Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales: <https://www.cnrtl.fr>.

morality, deontology, formal ethics and responsibility. If only one of them is affected, integrity breaks down. But not every instance of integrity failure impacts all of its dimensions. Fortunately, otherwise we would not be able to bring any mediation to a successful conclusion.

II – *Integrity is defined as: “Character, quality of a person of integrity, incorruptible, whose conduct and actions are irreproachable”* (CNRTL, France). Thus, we aim—in our teaching and our certifications of institutions—to develop and enhance these qualities in all those who wish to do so.

Some terminology takes years to become stable. Other terms are immediately adopted and validated by our community. Our corpus is constantly evolving. For example, what is an *academic sanction*?

7. Frankness or Freedom?

The years 2020 to 2022 were dedicated to frankness, especially in IRAFPA’s summer schools. According to Williams (2006), humanity needs to exchange true information in order to survive: in other words, information that gives “meaning”, that is, significance, but also direction for action. It is all about openness. In fact, you can only be frank if the other person asks you to. The challenge is to say what the other person, the receiver, does not always want to hear, or does not yet understand. The sender must have the necessary empathy, knowing how to remain neutral and free from any feeling of sympathy that would hinder frankness. But frankness can only be expressed if it is based on genuine goodwill. Otherwise, the receiver could be needlessly hurt, believing they are losing face.

At our IRAFPA summer schools for “integrity advisers”, we encourage participants to identify other participants’ attitudes towards integrity,

right from the first morning. It is by reciprocally observing their differences and complementarities that they can achieve openness, towards themselves and others (Popescu, 2023). Through this interactive work, we recognize:

- those who refer to a Kantian or virtue ethics type of morality by their belief that objective morality is a law imposed on humanity. Kant (1724–1804) saw morality as the product of a reasoning being. To this end, the philosopher insisted on the freedom to be rational. His moral imperative is ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature’. Kant’s morality is a matter not of choice but of constraint.
- Participants who refer to normative ethics are also situated in the objective morality perspective at the ontological level, but they move beyond individualism to conceive of the social system. For Socrates (469–399 BCE), for example, ethics is the political instrument that enables a government to guide its citizens to a happy life. So, where morality commands an actor, working through their conscience, ethics recommends that they act according to the framework in which they operate. When we speak of ‘objective perspective’ and ‘social order’, we mean that this is where legislators find their sphere of action. *De facto*, it is also the reference space for those of our peers who refer to organizational regulations.
- Meanwhile, our peers who apply a consequentialist view of actions will often refer to professional deontology. The term *deontology* came to the fore in classical utilitarianism, which developed in the wake of the work of Bentham (1748–1832). Its first principle is that action should have as its goal the pursuit of a certain happiness for the greatest number of fellow citizens. To this was added the pragmatic perspective of Peirce (1839–1914): however beautiful an idea, it is the success of the action that will be its sole judge.


Today, deontology is defined as the set of rules and duties that govern a profession, the conduct of those who exercise it, and relations between them and their customers or the public.

- Finally, participants who situate their actions within the framework of an assumed interactionism express themselves more in terms of responsibility. To be responsible, in effect, is to accept that nothing and no one can lessen the consequences of what we do or do not do, because to be responsible is to be accountable for one's actions and non-actions. For Lévinas (1991), we are responsible for others without worrying about reciprocation. Jonas (1984) considers that the unprecedented context of technological transformation no longer allows us to rely on our objective knowledge to act. For the first time in the history of humanity, responsibility has taken priority over formal ethics, deontology, and individual morality.

Visually, we can show these alternatives in Figure 1. On one axis, we present the ontological nature of integrity, depending on whether we adopt an objectivist or subjectivist view of reality, and on the other axis, the voluntarist character of the actor who decides independently of the constraints of the system or the system that takes precedence over purely individual motivation.

Figure 1

The structural roots of integrity



8. Conclusion

IRAFPA's performative speech was not set down in a day. It has been developed over the course of communications, colloquia, summer schools, mediations, and certifications. Collectively, we have measured the power of attraction of these "integrity sciences" that we were in the process of building.

For performative speech can only be a collective act. The hormone oxytocin, which generates trust in human relationships (Kosfeld et al., 2005), is rarely secreted in our establishments. Symbolic violence is

much more prevalent. During our summer schools or colloquia, exercises facilitate *parrhēsia* in the sense in which the Greeks used the term: speech freed from the techniques of rhetoric as Foucault understood it (Rojas, 2012).

Our performativity takes on its full meaning between research and action, between the individual and the community, between the academic space and the social space. So, now that we have outlined the six roots of our performative speech, we look forward to discovering what the future holds for us!

References

- Austin, J. L. (1991). *Quand dire, c'est faire*. Le Seuil.
- Battacharjee, Y. (2013, April 26). The mind of a con man. *New York Times*.
- Becker, H. S. (1960). Notes on the concept of commitment. *American Journal of Sociology*, 66, 32–40.
- Bergadaà, M. (2012a). Petit manuel à l'usage des dirigeants d'établissements universitaires qui n'ont pas (encore) compris le concept de plagiat commis par des étudiants. *Cahiers de Recherche Responsable 2012-001*.
- Bergadaà, M. (2012b). Sciences ou plagiat. In I. Cojan, G. Friès, D. Grosheny, & O. Parize (Eds.), *Expression de l'innovation en géosciences. Une journée avec Bernard Beaudoin* (pp. 51–63). Presses des Mines.
- Bergadaà, M. (2015). *Le plagiat académique: Comprendre pour agir*. L'Harmattan.
- Bergadaà, M. (2020). *Le temps entre science et création*. Éditions EMS.

- Bergadaà, M. (2021). *Academic plagiarism: Understanding it to take responsible action*. Globethics.
- Bergadaà, M., & Peixoto, P. (Eds.). (2023). *Academic Integrity – A Call to Research and Action*. Research Ethics No. 2, Globethics.
- Casassus, B. (2022). French research institute faces criminal charges over ‘serious breaches’. *BMJ*, 337, Article o1117.
- Charaudeau, P. (2005). *Le discours politique. Les masques du pouvoir*. Vuibert.
- Engel, P. (2020). L’idée d’une université et la liberté académique. *European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire*, 2(5), 598–610.
- Godbout, J. T., & Caillé, A. (2000). *L’esprit du don*. La Découverte.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1993). *Phénoménologie de l’esprit*. Gallimard.
- Jonas, H. (1984). *The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age*. University of Chicago Press.
- Komter, A. E. (2005). *Social solidarity and the gift*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kosfeld, M., Markus, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr E. (2005). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. *Nature*, 435(7042), 673–676.
- Lahire, B. (1998). *L’Homme pluriel. Les ressorts de l’action*. Nathan.
- Lévinas, E. (1991). *Le temps et l’autre*. Presses universitaires de France.
- Mauss, M. (1973). *Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques*. Presses universitaires de France.
- Nuttin, J. (1996). *Théorie de la motivation humaine. Du besoin au projet d’action*. Presses universitaires de France.

- Peirce, C. S. (1978). *Écrits sur le signe* (G. Deledalle, trans. with notes). Le Seuil.
- Popescu, M. (2023). Training the sages of integrity. In M. Bergadaà & P. Peixoto (Eds.), *Academic integrity: A call to research and action* (pp. 513–531). Globethics.
- Rojas, M. A. (2012). *Michel Foucault: la 'parrêsia', une éthique de la vérité* [Doctoral dissertation, Université Paris-Est]. <https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00856801/document>
- Samp, J. C., Schumock, G. T., & Pickard, A. S. (2012). Retracted publications in the drug literature. *Pharmacotherapy*, 32(7), 586–595.
- Schneider, L. (2018, September 12). Olivier Voinnet: Not guilty in past, present and future. *For Better Science* [blog].
- Soufron, J.-B. (2023). When whistleblowers need to step in: convolutions in and lessons from a historic case. In M. Bergadaà & P. Peixoto (Eds.), *Academic integrity: A call to research and action* (pp. 363–379). Globethics.
- Uhaldeborde, J.-M. (2023). Les chemins de traverse de l'éthique académique. Presses universitaires de Pau et des pays de l'Adour.
- Williams, B. (2006). *Vérité et véracité. Essai de généalogie* (J. Lelaidier, trans.). Gallimard.