Rebuilding wartorn societies

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD)

REBUILDING WARTORN SOCIETIES

Report of the workshops on The Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies and The Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia

Geneva, 27-30 April 1993

UNRISD

Geneva, September 1993

Preface

In April 1993, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) held two workshops in Geneva on **The Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies** and **The Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia**. They focused on the effectiveness of international interventions in establishing peace in countries torn apart by civil war, strategies for reconstructing wartorn economies and civil society, key social problems that require urgent attention, and future research priorities. This report presents a synthesis of the themes and findings of the two meetings.

The workshops were a first step towards establishing a new research programme on social development in post-conflict situations. For several years, UNRISD has been co-ordinating research programmes in many parts of the world on a variety of related themes, in particular, the causes of ethnic conflict, the dynamics of political violence, and the return of refugees to their homelands. The idea of launching a new area of research, concerned with generating a better understanding of what happens when wars end, emerged in part out of the findings of these three programmes.

The two meetings brought together a diverse range of people involved in peace-keeping and rehabilitation activities. The 70 participants included aid workers, national planners, grassroots and human rights activists, as well as representatives of academic institutions, multilateral organizations and national and international NGOs.

The workshops provided an opportunity for the participants to talk openly about their experiences, hopes and frustrations. Some of the discussions were very disturbing, both because they involved accounts of awful events, and because they revealed the ineffectiveness of many initiatives of international agencies to end suffering and assist those who have survived.

Inevitably there were some fundamental disagreements about interpretations of particular events and of appropriate ways forward, but it became clear that there was knowledge available about what might be done to improve certain aspects of even the most atrocious situations. However, the discussions also revealed the pressing need for further research in this field on a range of key issues, such as post-conflict economic strategy, the social consequences of troop demobilization, the socio-psychological effects of war, appropriate forms of foreign aid and delivery mechanisms, and the roles and responsibilities of

different types of local, national and international institutions involved in processes of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

It is hoped that this report will be read by a wide international audience, for it exposes a number of serious problems which require urgent attention. From the perspective of an international agency such as UNRISD, which has begun to take a comparative look at the issue of peace-making and post-conflict reconstruction, one thing is painfully clear: the international community needs to think long and hard about the way in which it is attempting to forge peace and a new future in wartorn societies.

September 1993

Dharam Ghai
Director

Acknowledgements

The Institute would like to express its appreciation to several organizations and individuals whose contributions made it possible to hold the workshops and prepare this report. Contributions from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Swiss government helped finance the workshop on wartorn societies. The Danish government provided funding for the Cambodia workshop.

At UNRISD, Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Hubert Morsink, Matthias Stiefel and Peter Utting were closely involved in the planning and organization of the workshops. Wendy Salvo and Josephine Grin-Yates were responsible for administrative aspects. Tim Allen and Peter Utting prepared this report. Jenifer Freedman and Rhonda Gibbes provided editorial assistance. Adrienne Cruz was responsible for disseminating the conclusions of the workshops.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

An increasing number of countries in the world are being torn apart by violence and, in many more, war-weary peoples are attempting to construct a fragile peace. Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia are currently in the headlines but there are over 30 civil wars being fought in the world. United Nations agencies and peace-keeping forces, national programmes of humanitarian assistance and a large number of private relief organizations are involved in the attempt to end fighting, assuage suffering, and promote rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Despite these efforts, remarkably little is known about what happens to economies, societies and cultures in the aftermath of war. As the attention of the international community turns increasingly towards the complex questions of conflict resolution and post-war rehabilitation, it is crucial to take stock of recent experiences and to address a number of key questions. For example, what happens to a society when numerous international agencies and thousands of foreign peace-keeping and civilian personnel suddenly intervene? What are the effects on longer term development when foreign aid is focused on short-term humanitarian relief? What happens to national and local institutions, including state administrative structures and community forms of organization, when multi- and bilateral agencies and international NGOs assume a dominant role? Who, in such situations, determines priorities concerning how aid should be used and assumes responsibility for different aspects of rehabilitation and reconstruction? Which interests or social groups participate in negotiating or decision-making processes and who is left out?

These are questions about which relatively little is known. Worse still, lessons gleaned from running peace-keeping and relief operations in one place are rarely remembered when a similar situation emerges elsewhere. While several operations have achieved some notable successes, many have resulted in negative impacts and in some cases even undermined the possibilities for long-term development.

This report highlights some of the key issues, problems and recommendations that emerged during four days of discussions at two workshops held in Geneva in April 1993. Although there was a great deal of overlap between the two meetings, they were organized very differently. The first, on **The Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies**, was more loosely structured with participants encouraged to talk freely about a wide range of issues. Most of the specific cases discussed were of African wars although references were also made to conflict

situations in Central America and South-East Asia. The second workshop on **The Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia** was structured around papers dealing with the economic and social impact of the United Nations presence, the role of NGOs, and the specific situation of women, children and returning refugees.

The report is divided into three parts. The first highlights a number of key issues discussed by participants at the workshop on The Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies. Divided into three main sections, it examines the changed nature of wars in the post-Cold War era, the question of how to end conflicts and maintain peace, and issues related to the rehabilitation and rebuilding of wartorn economies and civil society.

Part II presents the main findings of the workshop on The Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia. It takes a more focused look at what happens to an economy and society when there is a sudden influx of international agencies and peace-keeping personnel. Key problems identified include the distortionary effects of aid, the missed opportunities for assisting the process of rehabilitation, the lack of participation of Cambodians in certain decision-making processes, and problems associated with the quality and behaviour of United Nations peace-keeping and administrative personnel. Twelve recommendations are also presented, several of which are relevant to the United Nations role not only in Cambodia but also in several other wartorn societies.

Part III sets forth some ideas concerning research approaches and priorities.

Part I
THE CHALLENGE OF REBUILDING WARTORN SOCIETIES

The Changed Nature of War

• The end of the Cold War and a shift in ideologies

It is a common assumption that wars will end within a relatively short time frame. Indeed, principles of international law, including those of the Geneva Convention, implicitly assume that a war is a discreet event. Wars "break out", are waged, and are formally stopped by a treaty or by the recognition that one side has been victorious. In practice, many conflicts have not been waged in a way that neatly fits this model. But an effect of the Cold War was that the numerous wars fought in various parts of the world from the 1950s until the 1980s were at least partially regulated.

Some humanitarian organizations, notably the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), were able to work in situations of war because of international agreements about what wars ought to be like. When wars were not fought according to the rules, it was sometimes possible to apply political pressure on protagonists to make them conform. When nothing could be done on the ground to apply limits to the violence, complaints could be made in Moscow or Washington. Most armies were supported either by the United States or the USSR, and many armed conflicts were at least in part "proxy wars" between the two main world powers. This is no longer the case. Now international organizations have to talk to all parties and have much less control.

In several regions fighting has broken out partly as a consequence of the ways in which ideologies and political order had been imposed from outside for so long. According to International Alert, there are currently around 32 civil wars being fought in the world, many of them being the legacy of Cold War politics. In Central America, North-East and Southern Africa, Eastern Europe and South-East Asia, externally supported régimes have fallen and there has often been a proliferation of small armed factions, all seeking a voice in the processes of rapid social change.

Civil wars have specific characteristics. Inter-state wars may end with an attempt to return to the political circumstances before hostilities commenced, or occasionally there may be a victory for one side over the other, perhaps resulting in the giving up of territory. But with a civil war there is rarely a possibility for a resolution based on the circumstances of the past. Civil wars usually last much longer than inter-state wars, and they normally result in transformed societies.

In civil war it is also unlikely that any very clear sense of victory is possible. If one faction manages to seize power, it normally has to accept the tight controls of a structural adjustment programme in order to secure loans for economic rehabilitation and it either has to share power with its former enemies or continue to use force to impose its will.

Civil wars are also likely to involve severe forms of mass social trauma. Relatively few soldiers tend to be killed. The civilian population becomes the object of the fighting and bears most of the cost. The protagonists also know each other, and know how to hurt each other in subtle ways. Often the worse suffering lies behind what outsiders see. Atrocities are fine-tuned. Being forced to undress in public, rape, leaving the dead to rot in the open, and even cannibalism may all lead to a long-standing sense of pollution. This may be more crippling for an individual than the actual loss of a relative or physical mutilation.

In some contemporary wars this use of moral revulsion is taken to extremes. In Mozambique, for example, RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) have made children kill their own parents and branded or marked them in some other way to indicate what they have done. They are then taken away and incorporated into the guerrilla army. They know that they can never go home. Similar tactics have been used in Angola, Sierra Leone, Uganda and in several other countries.

The ideologies associated with such conflicts often compound the problem. Whereas enemies used to be under pressure from their United States or Soviet allies to label each other as ideologically misguided, now they can vigorously promote views of each other as inherently inferior or evil.

There is of course nothing new in antagonists demonizing each other, and it is important not to separate such tendencies from more general political, economic and other processes. The defining of populations in terms of certain cultural values is usually something fluid, and often quite a new development. African "tribes", for example, are mostly colonial introductions which were formed as a consequence of certain notions of "indirect rule", and contemporary tribalism has a great deal to do with competition for scarce resources and the activities of unscrupulous politicians.

Nonetheless, participants at the workshop expressed concern that the ethnic and/or religious hatreds of contemporary wars are more pronounced than they have been in the recent past, and are particularly worrying because there seems to be little to stop them spreading to currently peaceful regions. Moreover, the ready availability of cheap and effective weapons, and the influence of the media, tend to encourage wider participation (see below).

Once an ethnic or religious conflict gets out of hand it is extremely hard to control. Virtually all international forms of mediation assume that warring factions are "rational" according to generally accepted norms. But this is clearly not always the case. Many present-day wars involve groups with spiritual rather than temporal goals, and sometimes the degree of antipathy between factions

has reached such a level that no compromise seems tenable. A few guerrilla forces appear to be uninterested in any conventional notion of victory, but kill and maim for what seem to be metaphysical purposes alone. The Holy Spirit movement in Uganda is one such example. Its leaders have suggested that war is a form of healing which involves the killing of bad people on both sides. There is unlikely to be much middle ground between an ethnically linked, religious uprising and a military régime trying to maintain control of a nation state. In such circumstances, third party mediation seems doomed to failure unless linked to meaningful threats of force or effective sanctions.

- **Weapons and armies**

A major difficulty in trying to stop or limit wars is the profitability of the arms trade. Industrialized (and even some newly industrializing) countries make huge amounts of money from selling military hardware. Cutbacks on military spending have also led to a market in discounted products, and several countries are becoming heavily armed with equipment purchased from countries of the former USSR.

Moreover, although it is feasible that political pressures may lead to more adequate controls being imposed and maintained on the use of large and expensive weapons, such as tanks, heavy artillery, airplanes and nuclear bombs, most modern wars are not fought with these weapons. By and large guerrilla campaigns and anti-insurgency operations are fought with cheap small arms. These are now very widely available and are being manufactured in numerous locations around the world. Little is known about the global trade in small arms. It often operates through the informal sector and powerful criminal networks. It also appears to be supported in some places by multinational enterprises interested in exploiting insecurity to obtain valuable commodities, such as mahogany and other timbers, diamonds and gold.

In many places an automatic rifle can be obtained relatively easily. In parts of Ethiopia and the Sudan, a few head of cattle can buy an AK47. In a region of West Africa, an AK47 is assessed to have the same value as a cassette radio. Land mines are also readily obtained and easy to use. Millions of them are now active (one estimate puts the figure at around 100 million), and their effect can be devastating. In some wars large numbers of people are blown up, most of them civilians. An estimated 80 per cent die on the spot and thousands of survivors are seriously maimed. Once the mines are in place, it is difficult to locate and remove them. In Cambodia, for example, large areas of agricultural land are unusable because of mines.

The people using these weapons are often young. Combatants are commonly teenagers led by adult officers, and sometimes they are no more than children. In certain instances they are taken out of society, deliberately desocialized and made to perform atrocities. In this way the traditional powers of elders to limit the violence of young men is undermined, and turned to short-term military advantage. In other instances, children and teenagers are deliberately imbued with a code of ethics which sanctions violence only in specific circumstances.

They are taught to act in a way that is recognized as morally acceptable. This latter strategy was adopted by the NRA (National Resistance Army) in Uganda during the mid-1980s, and also by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in their long campaigns against Ethiopian government forces.

The ethnic dimension of armies also varies. Many armed groups represent ethnic interests, and are entirely comprised of people from one kind of collective identity, such as Christian, Tamil or Eritrean. Other armies are more heterogeneous, and in some countries (e.g., India), the national army may be one of the few non-ethnically based institutions in the country. This may become an important factor in peace-keeping if a political settlement eventually proves possible.

Another important aspect of contemporary wars is the use of mercenaries and militias. The services of well-trained professional soldiers are becoming increasingly available, especially from Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Mercenary officers are now much more common than they used to be in the past. They are, however, relatively expensive. For less well-endowed governments and guerrilla armies, the use of local militia is a more viable option.

This approach has been used effectively in the Sudan, where some of the worst atrocities have been perpetrated by undisciplined outfits raiding in the south, with arms and resources provided by successive régimes in Khartoum. Such groups may be unlikely to remain loyal to their backers, but their activities lead to a general breakdown in local security. Banditry becomes as much of a problem for the population as the fighting in the war. Militias are also used by commercial companies wishing to exploit local resources in a war situation. Indeed, in places like Liberia and Sierra Leone, some of the most effective guerrilla outfits are the armed retainers of mining concerns.

In many situations where there is a general breakdown in security, the only viable form of protection is under the patronage of the men who control armed units. These are often referred to as "warlords". Some participants in the workshop stressed the importance of targeting aid carefully, so that the power of such individuals is not enhanced. There was considerable criticism of some aspects of the United States' role in Somalia, which was viewed as having given warlords a credibility which they had not formerly enjoyed.

However, other participants pointed out that automatically castigating warlords may be naive. In some circumstances a patron with a gun may be the only viable form of security. Few people are likely to believe that the international community will intervene to support them over the long term. Warlords may be violent and ruthless individuals, but they may also be the only available basis for creating civil society. It is often unlikely that the community leaders of old will ever be able to re-establish order, and warlords may be persuaded to act in beneficial ways. There is a need to have a discriminating look at what is going on in specific circumstances.

There were also marked differences in views among participants over the issue of what to do with warlords and armed factions when strategies for peace-making and peace-keeping are being implemented, or a viable peace settlement has been reached.

• **The media**

Nowadays civilians can be killed very quickly by anyone who has the inclination, with the consequence that local conflicts quickly take on wider dimensions. This problem is compounded by the degree to which populations may vicariously participate in violent events through the media. Even those who do not immediately become involved in the fighting will be kept informed through a now widespread access to newspapers, radio and television, and the use of these media in sensational and propagandistic ways.

Several participants expressed serious concern about the role of the media in present-day situations of conflict. It was pointed out that, quite apart from the use of the media by governments and guerrilla groups for political purposes, supposedly objective and independent journalism has become immensely powerful, and so have violent films marketed as videos.

It needs to be recognized, however, that the media is not a homogeneous phenomenon and, as one journalist pointed out, the media rarely abuses its sources as much as its sources abuse the media. Nevertheless, coverage in the international media now influences or even dictates the agenda of confrontations, the pace of escalation and the response of the international community. In some cases, use of the media has become a technique which supersedes all other strategies. The principal aim of a particular attack can be to seize the headlines, and the principal aim of aid agencies working in situations of conflict can be to seek publicity for fund raising purposes.

To make matters worse, most media coverage of wars can be exceedingly superficial. It is often not based on investigation among local people, but on inquiries made within the expatriate community. In Somalia, for example, the bulk of media coverage is derived from interviews with aid workers. This can lead to an over-emphasis on cultural factors in explaining what has occurred and thereby have the effect of exacerbating ethnic or religious differences.

The gratuitous resort to violent images in both fictional films and news coverage is also cause for concern, although its influence is very difficult to quantify. The teenagers who make up most armies have often spent a great deal of time watching extremely violent films. Warlords often make sure their followers have a constant supply of videos at their bases, even in remote forests.

Ending Conflicts

• Kinds of peace settlement

Participants at the workshop agreed that, once a peace settlement had been made, international assistance ought to occur as a matter of course, partly to alleviate suffering and partly to ensure that hostilities do not break out again. Aid will need to be tailored to the specificities of the post-war situation, and it needs to be recognized that these can be fundamentally different from one place to another. Looking at peace settlements during the past two decades, they may be classified according to six categories.

First, wars fought between states may end in victory for one side over the other, although this may not mean very much in practice and has become a rare occurrence. The Tanzanian victory over Uganda in 1971, and the wars between India and Pakistan, are examples. The Vietnamese victory over the United States is probably another. The termination of inter-state wars tends to lead to large-scale population movements, either of returnees or refugees. In most respects, the costs of victory are likely to be almost as high as those of defeat. Loans and aid may therefore be requested by both sides.

Second, peace can be effectively imposed either by the international community or by foreign states. Attempts are currently being made to do this in Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia. Such solutions are likely to require the long-term maintenance of peace-keeping forces, and the political independence of the occupied territory will be severely constrained.

Third, peace may occur due to the exhaustion of both sides rather than because underlying conflicts have been resolved. This happened in the Sudan during the 1970s and more recently in El Salvador and Nicaragua. This scenario certainly creates a window of opportunity to resolve disputes but such agreement may not hold for more than a few years. A probable prerequisite is sustained improvement in living standards. This did not happen in the Sudan, and in several respects the present war is worse than the previous one. Neither has it occurred in Nicaragua where 26 armed groups have emerged since the war formally ended in 1990. Here the question of what happens to demobilized troops is important. Both the post-war administration and certain donor governments failed to provide the levels of assistance promised to demobilized soldiers and the country, respectively.

Fourth, the end of a war may immediately result in divisions opening up within the warring parties. This may lead to new fighting, waged between smaller groups. Afghanistan is an obvious example of this kind of situation.

Fifth, a civil war may end by one faction gaining the upper hand, and then imposing its authority on a country as a whole. This has happened in Uganda since 1986. Loans and humanitarian assistance may be very helpful, but it is important to appreciate that a government attempting to assert control in such circumstances is likely to resort to anti-insurgency measures and possibly

human rights violations. The armed forces will inevitably take up a large part of the national budget.

Sixth, a war may end with the birth of a state, as in the case of Eritrea, Namibia and Zimbabwe. This is the most hopeful kind of peace settlement, but it creates a crisis of expectations among the population, a large part of which is likely to have been internally displaced within the country or to have returned from exile abroad. New conflicts may emerge as expectations are not dealt with, particularly if one group begins to feel that it has been marginalized by the national government.

Although basic principles for international intervention in these varied situations need to be established, appropriate responses will inevitably differ. There is a need to understand what is happening on the ground, and to avoid or seriously question standard assistance formulas. It may be valuable to work towards the acceptance of the idea that war-damaged countries must be analysed differently from other countries, in order to create space in which existing strategies can be revised.

• Making peace happen

There was a great deal of discussion at the workshop about international involvement in attempts to make peace happen quickly. Since its inception, the United Nations has been involved in peace-keeping. United Nations forces have been deployed for this purpose on several occasions, with mixed results. But until recently the United Nations has not been much involved in promoting or making peace. It has tried to keep peace only after a settlement has been reached. This is now changing.

In several parts of the world, United Nations agencies are providing humanitarian assistance in the form of relief and development aid in ways linked with peace-making operations. The Secretary-General and his representatives have additionally been engaged as peace brokers. In Bosnia, the United Nations has used humanitarian assistance as a means of applying pressure for a political solution. There was considerable debate at the workshop about these developments, with participants approaching them from very different premises.

Some spoke forcefully against any linking of peace-making with humanitarian assistance, and expressed concern that the current attempts to do so, particularly in Bosnia, undermined the neutrality of international organizations. Participants taking this view argued that humanitarian assistance should be kept clearly distinct from any political interventions, and international agencies should work as much as possible with non-aligned local organizations. In Somalia, the ICRC has managed to maintain a neutral status, and has been very successful in running its relief programme in collaboration with national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Significantly, the ICRC compound in Mogadishu has not been looted, unlike those of United Nations organizations, because it has been protected by local groups.

There was agreement that the ICRC record in Somalia and elsewhere was impressive, but several participants argued that the Red Cross was exceptional, and that a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and political influence was untenable. Some argued that all international interventions were political, and as many resources as possible should be committed to stopping the fighting. The nature of most modern wars is such that notions of neutrality are outmoded. But even those most enthusiastic about promoting peace accepted that examples of well-planned and well-run peace-making operations were few and far between, and there were basic disagreements about what kinds of strategies were the most appropriate to improve this situation.

One argument put forward against many of the present peace-making operations was that they terminated hostilities too soon for any settlement to be viable. There is a danger of premature peace. As one participant put it, "there is a time for tearing and a time for healing ... maybe there is a need to finish tearing first". In Angola, for example, it is possible that peace has been imposed too soon and the agreement will not hold. Perhaps long-term peace has in fact been delayed by all the international interference.

Several participants emphasized the need to work more closely with grassroots organizations and support grassroots initiatives. They felt that it was crucially important to make the warlords hear the voices of representatives from such groups as women's organizations, elders and small traders. These are the people who will rebuild civil society. They should be supported before peace is established, and incorporated in peace negotiations. Every effort should be make to enhance their influence and to weaken that of people who are doing the killing. To this end, international organizations should also prioritize disarmament within the peace-making process.

In contrast, there were participants who were rather dismissive of this participatory approach. They maintained that any well-meaning search for consensus was unlikely to achieve results and that efforts to impose peace could not work effectively unless there was a permanent military commitment to maintain social order. This is rarely forthcoming, partly because of the expense, but also because it is likely to lead to human rights abuses. It was noted, for example, that the so-called pacified zones in the Philippines, which are sometimes presented as success stories, involve population displacement, detentions without trial, executions and enforced conscription into the local militia.

Participants of this second persuasion argued that civil wars only ended when one faction had established a monopoly of arms. In situations of chronic insecurity, guns are essential and taking them away only facilitates the killing of the disarmed. Disarmament is likely to make the situation worse, unless it is done voluntarily and the faction that retains its weapons (i.e. the national army) is trusted. It should only be attempted when the peace process is well established. Moreover, in most situations, the involvement of traditional leaders and representatives of grassroots organizations in the peace negotiations can only be cosmetic. If peace is possible, it is likely to lead to a new social order, one in which the warlords are very influential. This does not mean that no attempt should be

made to support "progressive" elements and to assist grassroots initiatives, but it is naïve to imagine that peace will be constructed out of altruism. Social order necessitates the capacity to use force.

Post-War Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

• Humanitarian relief and development aid

There was agreement among participants at the workshop that while aid was likely to be necessary in the aftermath of war, particularly where devastation was extensive and a large refugee population was returning, in practice too many operations were ineffective or even counter-productive. Lessons from past failures have not been learned, and mistakes are repeated time after time. Many participants were critical of the activities of all kinds of international aid agencies, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

There was a consensus at the workshop that in post-war situations there was a clear need for several United Nations organizations to become involved in providing assistance, but examples were quoted in which highly paid United Nations staff appeared not to have been qualified for work they were doing. There were also numerous complaints about poorly planned programmes, time wasting, unnecessary logistical bottlenecks and too much bureaucracy. For example, sometimes food aid is delivered too late to save lives, and emergency and relief operations are seldom linked to long-term development needs. Also the co-ordination between United Nations agencies often leaves much to be desired.

Some participants also pointed out that more multinational agencies ought to be involved in post-war situations than is currently the case. Organizations with responsibility for food and agricultural development, for example, should be playing the role of maintaining local crop varieties, and helping to develop new hardier strains appropriate to difficult post-conflict conditions rather than promoting high yielding varieties requiring irrigation and considerable amounts of fertilizers.

The main response made to these criticisms of the multilateral agencies at the workshop was to draw attention to a major funding crisis. Following the end of the Cold War, heavy responsibilities have been thrust on the United Nations as a whole, but operations rarely receive adequate financial support. Much of the funding is tied by donor governments to particular programmes in particular countries. In these circumstances it can be impossible for the United Nations to provide a swift and adequate response when the need arises.

Partly due to the limitations in the United Nations system, international NGOs are playing an increasingly prominent role. As one participant put it, "development is conceivable without the United Nations agencies, but not without NGOs". Huge amounts of money pass through these organizations, and their influence on international thinking and policy-making is likely to

grow. They already channel more money into the Third World than the World Bank.

It was argued that in several respects this may be a positive development. International NGOs have a reputation for being flexible and for being able to respond rapidly to emergencies. Some NGOs are recognized for their professionalism and have sometimes managed to make a real impact on people's lives, even under extreme circumstances. In addition NGOs can work closely with a local implementing partner, and they are sometimes able to act as advocates for vulnerable or oppressed groups. This may provide a degree of protection to a population being oppressed by its own government, and NGO lobbying can also make a difference in loan conditionality negotiations and national planning.

However, grassroots projects have only marginal macro-economic effects, and the positive perception of international NGOs is based on the work of the best. Many international NGOs are not well established or credible. Some are of dubious status, and may secure aid funds for questionable purposes, such as promoting a Christian sect or obtaining good salaries for European and American "experts" and administrative staff. Moreover, numerous agencies purporting to be NGOs are not actually non-governmental organizations at all. Far from being independent, they receive a large percentage of their funds directly from the official aid budget of their home countries, and should really be considered part of intergovernmental aid programmes. It is therefore worrying that there are no adequate means of holding international NGOs to account for what they do, even though there is plenty of evidence that they can make situations worse.

The tendency to use organizations calling themselves NGOs as a means of distributing bilateral and multilateral funds is becoming more prevalent, particularly in situations of upheaval. The present arrangements often seem to be that a large donor accounts for funds by allocating them to an international NGO. The international NGO then accounts for the money by showing that it has been spent. There is rarely a serious effort to assess programmes in terms of what has been achieved for and by populations who are supposed to be the beneficiaries.

Even the best NGOs have been forced to obtain funds in this way. A consequence is that several international NGOs compete with each other for money and areas of operation. It is common for organizations to be deeply distrustful of each other and to refuse to co-operate in the planning of interventions.

In Somalia, for example, numerous international NGOs have become involved in relief work at least partly because there has been a great deal of media coverage. They hope to obtain a high profile and concentrate on dramatic assistance schemes involving food distribution. Thousands more Somalis have died due to diseases rather than famine, but public health programmes are not a priority, and even mass inoculation of children against measles has not been

attempted. NGOs are competing with each other to give out food relief, and some have even gone to ludicrous lengths to "steal" customers from each other. Incentives have been offered to people so that they will attend a particular agency's feeding centre rather than go to those run by others. In some cases T-shirts have been distributed so that agencies can publicize their activities when the international media films their projects. The most irresponsible NGOs do all they can to preserve emergencies rather than resolve them, and actively discourage local capacity building. The target population has to be presented as helpless, incapable and childlike.

A few participants pointed out dangers that arose even when international aid efforts were ostensibly successful. It has already been noted that some participants were concerned about the linking of humanitarian aid with peace-making. This may undermine the neutrality of the United Nations. Some took this argument a stage further, suggesting that no aid was impartial. It accords recognition to the populations receiving assistance, and when programmes are successful they may end up supporting war by keeping the combatants well fed. The Biafran war, for example, would almost certainly have ended faster had aid agencies not become involved. Similarly Obote's régime in Uganda during the 1980s would not have survived to perpetrate atrocities on an appalling scale had aid agencies not provided humanitarian assistance to the country as a whole.

There is no obvious solution to this dilemma, but other problems associated with humanitarian aid could be dealt with if there were really a will to do so. The arbitrary distinction between relief and development is a prime example. It has become almost a cliché to assert that relief work needs to be turned into sustainable development initiatives. The issue has been debated for years, but almost nothing has been done. Several multilateral agencies and numerous international NGOs persist in defining themselves as emergency oriented, and therefore tend to set aside the long-term consequences of what they are doing. They commonly establish parallel bureaucracies and leave nothing behind when they pull out. Moreover the need of staff on short-term contracts to maintain their salaries means that they tend to keep an emergency running for as long as possible, or until it is clear that there is an emergency somewhere else that is going to receive publicity and substantial funding. Such attitudes lie behind the remarkable lack of institutional learning in the aid world.

It was suggested that a step towards improving the work of aid agencies would be to set up better ways of finding out what was actually happening among the people being assisted. The artificiality of compound life means that even aid workers who claim knowledge of a particular place may in fact be ignorant, and misconceptions may be reinforced by information provided by local people. The difficulty is to find the right individuals and groups to listen to and work with. It is not always helpful to make a simple distinction between expatriates and locals. In situations of social turmoil it is unlikely that all local people have the same attitudes. It is also likely that some will be very unpleasant characters, who have killed and tortured and would like to go on doing so. There is therefore a need for international organizations to form alliances with particular groups, and to assist them in their struggles with other factions. This

is likely to involve working with local human rights organizations or other lobbying groups. Whatever the case, international aid agencies should know who they are supporting and what they are doing.

In too many instances humanitarian assistance in post-war situations has been made available only for a short period, and relatively large amounts of money have had to be spent much too quickly. This means that projects can be completely inappropriate. In addition there can be destabilizing effects on the fragile national economy, which can be as damaging in the long run as the war itself.

• **Economic reconstruction**

There was general agreement among participants that it was important to establish specific kinds of economic programmes appropriate for war-damaged countries. There is a tendency for international financial agencies to impose conditions on loans for rehabilitation in a manner which may not be useful in many post-war situations, and there is a comparably misconceived tendency for humanitarian aid to be provided in a high budget, short-term way which can be counter-productive. In war-damaged countries there is usually a need to establish a viable, stable economy. Rapid growth is often untenable or unhelpful, particularly if it leads to serious imbalances in the economy.

War-damaged countries are among the poorest in the world. Many of them have little prospect of rapid transition to an efficient market economy, and humanitarian aid appears to have a very limited capacity to establish sustainable and acceptable living conditions. What are the requirements in post-war situations, and how can basic survival economies be promoted?

War has serious economic consequences. In rural areas, animal herds may have been lost, fields not planted, and processing facilities, bridges and roads destroyed. In towns, housing may have fallen into decay and some factories may have sustained bomb damage. Many people may have been maimed, and thousands may have been tortured or killed. All these things can look very dramatic, as are the images frequently used to depict the effects of war in the media. But it is possible to restock herds, open fields, repair factories and rebuild bridges quite quickly. Humanitarian aid can be used effectively for this purpose. The maimed can also be assisted, and families, whatever their sufferings, can usually reproduce themselves. In most instances, potential production capacity can therefore be rapidly revived, and this should be an immediate priority.

Other problems are more intractable, and require a longer term approach to economic planning and humanitarian aid than is often adopted. Infrastructure can be rehabilitated with international assistance, but the disarticulation of production takes considerable time to rectify and requires the active participation of local people. Large parts of the population are likely to have been displaced by the fighting. Networks of social support, local decision-making, trade and credit will have been disrupted and will have adapted to difficult, possibly extreme, circumstances. The construction of relationships between

people, the establishing of accountability and trust between neighbours, will take time. It is not simply a question of families being shifted back to their home areas.

In some locations, particularly urban environments and border regions, there may be a disarticulation of the wholesale and financial system. It is likely to have been replaced by an "informal" sector which, while providing for basic survival, can become an obstacle to national reconstruction efforts. Disarticulation may also extend to trade and banking links with other countries (in many cases exacerbated by commercial embargoes). Pre-war trade relations may no longer be viable, as a demand for a commodity has been met by a competing producer.

In addition the state will have expensive commitments. Apart from infrastructural repair, there may be thousands of returning refugees needing building materials, seeds, agricultural implements and immediate provision of basic welfare services. It is also essential to meet the costs of maintaining the national army so that soldiers are committed to keeping the peace, and retired soldiers and other ex-combatants need to be usefully employed or adequately pensioned. Ways have to be found to placate groups which have gained little or nothing from the war. The alternative is likely to be a continuation of guerrilla activities, necessitating expensive anti-insurgency measures. The fighting in Uganda following the NRA takeover has occurred partly because the soldiers in the former national army and in other guerrilla groups have not been able or willing to return to farm labouring, and have had no alternative means to secure a livelihood than banditry. Similarly, the return to full-scale civil war in the Sudan has partly been a consequence of the failure to meet the needs of the Anyanya fighters following the 1972 peace agreement.

Participants at the workshop argued that it was crucial for governments and international agencies to recognize these constraints and build on what actually existed. It should be anticipated that a great deal of economic activity will remain in the informal sector, and government revenues from taxation will rise only gradually. A large part of the state's resources will be spent on education, health and the armed forces, and cut-backs in spending on these sectors may be disastrous. There is a need for a stable economy, and a slow but sustainable rate of growth, which means that channelling large-scale inflows of aid into a country during a short period can be counter-productive.

Several specific recommendations regarding economic strategy were presented at the workshop:

- It is crucial for planners to define "basic needs" in terms of the ways vulnerable groups perceive their own priorities. This may involve promoting grassroots initiatives, but it will also require providing public services, such as the repair of feeder roads and public transport facilities, which may be regarded as crucial by local people.

- In a post-war situation it is even more difficult than usual to classify people according to their means, and targeted income transfers are

therefore hard to administer and open to political manipulation at both national and local levels. It may be better, for example, to use resources for generalized short-run support to poor food producers in remote areas, who may find it impossible to compete with cheap aid-subsidized imports.

- Clear and simple "rules of the game" need to be established in production and distribution, enabling the private sector to respond to supply requirements for both home consumption and export. Priority should be given to mobilizing working capital to restore existing capacity, rather than investing in the creation of new capacity.

- An appropriate exchange rate policy is essential. This should help maintain the profitability of the export sector (particularly for small producers) and avoid aid-induced economic destabilization.

- The establishment of a balanced budget based on simple operating rules is essential to allow an effective market to emerge. It will also be required to obtain external financial support without unwelcome conditionality. Simple rules for monetary management should be applied to avoid inflation.

- Attempts should be made to co-ordinate aid programmes. Ideally there should be a reconstruction plan which avoids piecemeal acceptance of donors' own agendas. A relatively low level of sustainable aid which reduces uncertainty about future funding is probably preferable to higher, but uncertain, levels.

Not all participants were convinced that all such aspects were feasible. It was pointed out, for example, that restoring export capacity might be the wrong strategy if markets for particular commodities had been irredeemably lost. In Uganda, for example, it was probably a mistake to have invested heavily in restoring cotton gins and storage facilities. Some participants went further, arguing that civil wars lead to such radical social transformations that attempts to build a new economy on past precedent were not going to work.

• Healing the social wounds of war

Many participants at the workshop were very concerned about the issue of healing, not so much in terms of the curing of diseases, but in the sense of the collective healing of a community, and of psychological rehabilitation. These have been neglected topics in work on wartorn societies.

Apart from anthropologists who have studied issues of social and moral accountability among specific groups, very little research has been carried out on the local experience of social upheaval. It is commonly assumed by aid workers that there will be a community with which to work. Often grassroots development strategies take this as a given. But particularly in war and post-war situations this may not be the case.

Social life has to be made and remade constantly, and it is very difficult to understand what comprises it. Society is made up largely of small things, little gifts and visits between neighbours, the exchange of plant cuttings, dances and religious rituals. It takes time to establish the network of trust which makes civil society possible. Wars can be socially transforming, and old certainties may have been set aside. Some populations may have gained a notion of communality only as a consequence of recent experience, in exile, of shared sufferings at the hands of marauding soldiers, and such elements of mutuality may not be sustained following a peace settlement. Also, many of those who have been in armies will be unable to go back home, either because they cannot accept the constraints of working for people who formerly exercised authority over them (like a father or father-in-law), or because they have behaved in ways that cannot be forgiven.

There is a need to establish systems of accountability, so that justice can be visibly meted out to those responsible for suffering and, perhaps more important, so that the living can come to terms with the dead. It is not surprising that there are often outbreaks of religiosity associated with wars and with the subsequent coming to terms with events. In many parts of the world it is necessary to perform special rituals to cleanse those who have killed before they can return to normal life.

It is possible that certain things may speed up the process. It is important to see how trauma is being understood in local terms, and to avoid treating the processes of coming to terms with it as pathological. Suffering in local terms must be accepted as a positive social accomplishment, not as something to be hidden. In this respect, religion may play an important role. But religious leaders may be a factor in exaggerating disputes, and their activities may have to be controlled. Annual ceremonies of remembrance which stress a moral revulsion against war can help; and, because the sources of conflict are linked to myth, there is a need to draw upon religious and humanitarian symbols of forgiveness. On a more mundane level, it may be of value to prioritize the rebuilding of court-houses and other places where afflictions can be discussed in public, and disputes resolved without recourse to unregulated force. It is additionally worth bearing in mind that the perpetrators of violent acts are often young men. It is therefore essential to find ways of channelling their energies into socially constructive activities, and to provide forms of local entertainment other than violent videos.

Very little research has been attempted on mental health in non-Western cultures, and understanding of mental trauma even in the West itself is very limited. This may be in the process of changing, because recent findings from World Bank-sponsored surveys on public health indicate that mental health needs to become a major priority.

Participants tended to emphasize the importance of recognizing mental health problems associated with trauma, and the need to carry out further investigations, rather than provide firm recommendations. It was pointed out that often those who seem to have been most adversely affected are not those who have been maimed and tortured, but those who have witnessed atrocities.

Demands for vengeance usually come from such spectators. It was additionally noted that the experiences of individuals can take years to come to light. People will commonly wait for as much as a decade or even longer before talking about the awful things that have happened to them. This is an important point to reconsider, because evidence from studies carried out among traumatized people in Western countries indicates that, without treatment, these people are likely to end up inflicting pain on others.

A further issue, raised at the workshop, which should be of more concern to aid agencies than is presently the case, has to do with the fact that expatriates thrown into extreme circumstances will sometimes react in strange ways. Little is known about the mental health of relief workers, but the regular consumption of large amounts of alcohol, anti-social behaviour, a high-handed attitude towards local people, and a retreat into the artificial environment of a fenced compound are all very common. Many long-term aid workers are maverick characters, some of whom can no longer fit into their own cultures. At least some of them are likely to be in need of therapeutic help.

Part II
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN CAMBODIA

Background

During the past 25 years, the Cambodian people have experienced prolonged periods of civil war, genocide, foreign intervention and international isolation. The period of Khmer Rouge rule in the latter half of the 1970s left the Cambodian economy and social fabric in ruins, much of the population traumatized, and millions suffering from hunger and disease.

Despite ongoing military conflict and an almost total political and economic embargo, some progress was made in re-establishing basic public services and reactivating productive sectors of the economy in the 1980s. The signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991, and the subsequent deployment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to oversee the peace process, raised hopes that the fighting would end and people's living standards would improve.

Recent years have seen, however, a rapid escalation of social problems. There has been an increase in lawlessness, banditry, corruption, xenophobic tensions and violence; a sharp growth in prostitution and the incidence of HIV/AIDS infection; a rise in the number of street children; and a further deterioration in the situation of vulnerable groups, which now include segments of the returnee population. This period has also witnessed a serious decline in essential social services, notably health and education, while high rates of inflation have eroded the purchasing power of much of the population.

Cambodia is today one of the poorest countries in the world. Life expectancy is only 49.7 years. Just 12 per cent of rural Cambodians and 20 per cent of urban dwellers have access to safe drinking water. A relatively large proportion of the population consists of extremely vulnerable groups comprising widows with families, single elderly people, orphans and the disabled. Four of every 1,000 persons are disabled. Women in particular must shoulder heavy burdens and responsibilities. They account for nearly two thirds of the population and head one third of all households.

It is generally agreed that the peace process has offered the country the best and possibly only hope for an end to war. UNTAC has brought an end to the country's international isolation and facilitated access to foreign aid and technical assistance. It has stimulated trade, construction, infrastructural repairs, employment generation, training and new private enterprise activities. Two

programmes in particular - the repatriation of refugees and electoral education/ registration - have achieved their objectives and been widely acclaimed for their efficacy. Under extremely difficult and often dangerous circumstances, many thousands of peace-keeping troops, United Nations volunteers and other international agency personnel have played a constructive role in attempting to bring about a peaceful and democratic transition in Cambodia.

It is apparent, however, that the sudden influx of international agencies and aid has contributed to serious social and economic problems. The second workshop sought to explore the nature of these problems and consider possible solutions and alternative approaches.

Given the enormity of the task which UNTAC had to assume and the limited experience of the United Nations in mounting mega peace-keeping operations, it was obvious that many problems and policy errors would arise. Almost instantly, UNTAC, in collaboration with various specialized agencies of the United Nations, was supposed to oversee the process of demilitarization and cease-fire verification; maintain law and order; guarantee a neutral political environment by controlling the activities of numerous agencies and offices of the existing administrative structures; organize elections and the resettlement and reintegration of 370,000 refugees; foster an environment conducive to the respect of human rights; oversee the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction by identifying needs, mobilizing foreign aid, co-ordinating donor assistance and monitoring the rehabilitation process; and mount major civic education campaigns in such areas as human rights, mine awareness and electoral matters.

The inability of UNTAC to secure peace, and its limited achievements in the field of rehabilitation and development, are also closely tied up with the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to participate in the peace process and the failure of the different factions which make up the Supreme National Council (SNC) to work for compromise and national reconciliation.

Many of the problems relating to the peace process are, of course, of a transitory nature and will become a distant memory once a functioning government is restored and the presence of international agency personnel declines. Others, however, are much more serious. They may have undermined the credibility of UNTAC and the capacity of the United Nations to secure peace. They may also have served to transform the Cambodian economy and society in such a way as to retard or distort the development process for many years to come.

The Problems of Urgency and Scale

Many of the problems and destabilizing effects associated with the peace process have to do with the conditions of urgency and scale surrounding the involvement of international agencies in Cambodia. The speed of events - the rapid influx of 20,000 UNTAC personnel, 8,000 vehicles, over 100 international organizations, and hundreds of millions of dollars in salaries, per diems and aid

-resulted in serious problems of planning and co-ordination. Moreover, it meant that the return of 370,000 refugees had to conform to a tight electoral schedule rather than to a set of objective criteria concerning the conditions they were likely to experience upon their return.

Several speakers were of the opinion that this sense of urgency had led to an excessive emphasis on short-term humanitarian relief aid and insufficient concern for essential forms of development assistance. It also resulted in the hasty design and implementation of projects. As a result, action has often been taken without an adequate assessment of needs, priorities, resource availability and impacts. There has been a lack of real consultation with the Cambodian authorities to determine priority needs or to develop policy options for the country's further reconstruction and development. Many donors have chosen to follow their own development assistance agendas which do not necessarily coincide with either the country's rehabilitation priorities or the time frame of the transitional period. As a result, actual project implementation will take place only towards or after the transitional period. Most donors appear to have rejected forms of aid or mechanisms for delivery which would have resulted in so-called quick-impact assistance, including activities directed to the maintenance of basic services.

UNTAC and the Economy: Distortionary Effects

One of the most important messages to come out of the workshop concerned the fact that the influx of foreign aid and UNTAC expenditures have resulted in serious destabilizing effects on the local economy. One speaker indicated that the recovery process of the 1980s had been achieved with extremely low levels of Western assistance and that moderate levels of foreign aid, well spent and supplied on a long-term basis, would have been sufficient to sustain the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. In contrast, relatively vast sums have entered the country and have been pledged by donors during the past two years. In 1992 alone, UNTAC spending in Cambodia amounted to approximately 200 million US dollars while the total cost of the UNTAC operation, including expenditures outside the country, is estimated at up to three billion US dollars. In June 1992, the international community pledged 800 million US dollars for the rehabilitation of Cambodia, with the bulk of such funding to be disbursed over a relatively short period.

Although not the primary cause of inflation, UNTAC expenditures have contributed significantly to the rise in certain prices. Competition between UNTAC and other international agencies for local labour and accommodation has pushed up local wages and the price of housing. More importantly, perhaps, the UNTAC presence has diverted labour and investment away from the production of essential goods towards tertiary sector activities providing services essentially for foreigners living in Cambodia. While the future of the country will depend to a large extent on the performance of the agricultural sector, several speakers noted that relatively little attention had been paid to the reactivation and development of this sector.

Recruitment by international agencies of some of the relatively few trained and experienced Cambodians working in the public administration, particularly those at the provincial and district levels, has further debilitated the country's administrative structures. This has negatively affected the efficiency of the public service and has further compromised the delivery of essential services such as health care and education. The country's deteriorating economic situation also has forced many civil servants to "moonlight" or seek other sources of income. The possibility of earning higher incomes with international agencies has also encouraged professional or skilled people, such as medical staff, to withdraw from their areas of specialization to work, for example, as translators.

Much of the humanitarian and development assistance, as well as UNTAC expenditures, has been concentrated geographically in and around the capital, Phnom Penh, and in the four north-western provinces. Eastern and southern areas of the country have been largely neglected. The increase in economic activity and the presence of dollars in the capital have fuelled rural to urban migration, particularly of youth. The emphasis on short-term humanitarian assistance, targeted largely to the returnee population, has tended to distort the rehabilitation process by ignoring the pressing needs of the bulk of the country's population.

Given that the underlying cause of inflation is primarily the printing of money by the State of Cambodia to cover the budget deficit, several speakers raised the question of whether more external assistance should have been provided for budgetary support or whether some sort of indirect tax on foreigners' expenditures should have been levied. A stable, functioning economy, with lower rates of inflation, would have greatly facilitated the task of re-integration and rehabilitation. It would also have reinforced the credibility of UNTAC whose image has been tarnished as a result of the failure to secure a real cease-fire, its own limited ability to contribute directly to the process of re-habilitation, and popular perceptions concerning both the misconduct of United Nations personnel (see below) and the connection (whether real or not) between UNTAC dollars and inflation.

Missed Opportunities

It emerged from the workshop discussions that the Cambodian peace process has paid only limited attention to pressing social and economic problems. Rather than directing efforts towards an improvement in the situation of the country and its people, the Paris Agreements emphasized control of the existing administrative structures so as to ensure a neutral political environment. This has meant a decline in essential social services and increased hardship for much of the population. It has also permitted the Khmer Rouge to expand the territory under its effective control.

Several participants noted that more time and resources could have been fruitfully employed in carrying out baseline studies assessing needs and resource availability in different economic sectors and areas of the country and

gathering vital statistical information which is extremely poor and outdated. The process of registering people over the age of 18 for the elections, for example, could have been extended to the whole population to provide vital demographic statistics.

The transitional period has seen a sudden increase in private and foreign investment. While this has led to rapid economic growth, it has also resulted in the expansion of numerous activities which are likely to harm both people and the environment. Little effort, however, has gone into developing a legal framework which would regulate investment. Neither has there been much attempt to incorporate the private sector in the tax régime.

Many thousands of peace-keeping troops and other United Nations personnel have skills which could have been channelled towards reconstruction and community development. Such skills, however, were rarely employed. Some United Nations volunteers did go beyond their brief of electoral education and engage in rehabilitation and development activities but such contributions tended to be spontaneous rather than part of a coherent strategy.

Lack of Cambodian Participation and Control

With relatively little Cambodian participation in the design of policies, programmes and projects associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation, there are indications that Cambodians have lost control over their own development process during the transitional period. This problem has arisen partly as a result of the shortage of trained Cambodians, the limited capacity to absorb large amounts of aid, weak planning and management infrastructure and the absence of a central Cambodian aid co-ordination mechanism. It also reflects a lack of sensitivity on the part of many agencies and donors to the question of Cambodian participation.

Political considerations concerning UNTAC neutrality have not only meant that crucial government services administered by the State of Cambodia have been neglected, but also that Cambodians have not been sufficiently consulted in the decision-making and design process associated with rehabilitation programmes and projects. As a result, the types of actions proposed often conform more to donor agendas and priorities than to those of the Cambodian people.

The way in which international agencies gather information also came under scrutiny at the workshop. Scores of fact-finding missions have entered the country. While they have absorbed much of the time of Cambodian officials and resource persons working in the country, they have rarely integrated Cambodians as team members. Neither have they generated much new knowledge, choosing instead to recycle information contained in a few reports or obtained from interviews often conducted with the same people. What knowledge has been acquired has often left the country. It is rarely disseminated within Cambodia, let alone translated into Khmer.

The workshop discussions on the role of non-governmental organizations in Cambodia revealed that many international agencies by-pass or do little to strengthen local institutions which could play an important role in the reconstruction process. Instead there has been a tendency to create parallel structures which undermine local institutions. Little is known about the traditional forms of social organization and power in Cambodian society, of how much has changed and what remains.

In the absence of such knowledge, there is a tendency on the part of the donor community to look around for new NGOs to support. While several well-intentioned and competent local NGOs have been established during the past two years, there is a danger that opportunism and the availability of foreign funding will stimulate the creation of NGOs whose intentions are largely divorced from the real needs of Cambodia's people. Several international NGOs with considerably more experience in Cambodia than the bi/multilateral agencies and an informed appreciation of Cambodian needs, priorities and capacities, have been involved, to some extent, in policy discussions and in the planning and design phases of certain projects. All too often, however, they have been regarded and used by donors simply as implementing agents for programmes and projects designed by the donors themselves.

The Quality and Behaviour of UNTAC Troops and Personnel

The conditions of urgency, scale and lack of previous experience with mega peace-keeping operations have meant that insufficient thought has gone into questions concerning the recruitment, briefing, training and discipline of United Nations personnel.

Workshop discussions revealed the dangers arising from this situation. Many security and certain professional personnel lack the skills and qualifications necessary to carry out their jobs effectively. Numerous problems have arisen concerning the behaviour of United Nations troops and security personnel and their relations with the host population. These have included disrespect towards Cambodians and their customs, sexual harassment of women, the rapid growth of the sex industry and reckless driving of United Nations vehicles. Inadequate procedures and long delays characterize the investigation of cases of malconduct.

The influx of troops and other foreigners has contributed to an increase in prostitution. While this was to be expected, the scale of the phenomenon was not. Neither was the 10-fold increase in the incidence of HIV/AIDS infection in 1992. The growth of the "rest and recreation" industry has had an impact not only on women but also on children. There is some evidence to suggest that children are increasingly being used in the sex industry, partly to minimize the risk to clients of becoming infected with HIV or other diseases. The "attractions" of Phnom Penh, when combined with the decline in the education system and the need of many families to mobilize all potential income earners, have fuelled a growth in the numbers of street children. Many are exposed to a life of crime, begging,

pornographic and violent videos, as well as an incipient drug culture which is likely to expand rapidly in the near future.

These developments have important implications not only for the Cambodian people but for the feasibility and success of the peace-keeping operation itself. Unlike an invading army, the United Nations is restricted in its capacity to establish credibility on the basis of force. It must rely to a large extent on its image, its capacity to negotiate peace, promote national reconciliation, organize free and fair elections, and its ability to minimize the suffering of people in the host country. The behaviour and abuses of certain of its personnel, and the relative lack of corrective action by the UNTAC authorities, have undermined the credibility of UNTAC and made the task of the United Nations in Cambodia all the more difficult.

Recommendations

During the course of the workshop many recommendations were put forward to deal with the host of problems that were exposed. Now that elections have been held, and UNTAC and several other international agencies have begun to wind down their activities, it is too late to act on some of these proposals. Nevertheless, they highlight a range of alternative approaches and policy options that are extremely relevant in other contexts where the United Nations suddenly steps in to oversee the transition from war to peace. Above all, they point to the need for the international community to pause and reflect upon the implications for economic and social development of the way it goes about the business of peace-making and rehabilitating wartorn societies.

Minimizing the distortionary impacts of aid. More objective analysis is required of the distortionary effects on the local economy of United Nations mega-operations and the sudden influx of international aid and personnel. Particular attention should be focused on how to minimize debilitating effects on public administration and on the delivery of social services as well as how to retain or otherwise encourage labour and investment in vital economic sectors such as agriculture.

The need for moderate but sustained levels of aid. More consideration should be given to the question of how to achieve economic rehabilitation and stability on the basis of moderate levels of aid provided on a sustained basis rather than large commitments disbursed over a short time frame.

Achieving a better balance between humanitarian and development assistance. It is important to achieve a better balance between short-term humanitarian assistance and development aid by channelling more resources toward small-scale community-based projects and quick impact assistance designed to rehabilitate agricultural production and essential social services. Longer term development assistance should focus less on large-scale capital intensive projects and more on human resource development, capacity building

within the public administration, infrastructural repair and safety nets for vulnerable groups.

Budgetary support and fiscal reform. More attention should be focused on providing budgetary support, and reforming the tax régime as two ways to reduce the budget deficit and therefore lower inflation. The imposition of an indirect tax on certain forms of expenditure of United Nations and other agency personnel should have been considered more seriously.

The need for an effective aid co-ordination mechanism. It is necessary to establish a more effective mechanism for co-ordinating the efforts of hundreds of agencies now working in the country, as well as the efforts of UNDP and UNTAC.

Improved impact assessment. More time and resources should be allocated to monitoring both the local level impacts and macro effects of projects, as well as the situation of vulnerable groups and the reintegration of refugees.

Greater training and participation of Cambodians. Cambodians must assume increased responsibility for the nature and direction of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, including prioritization of needs and approval of donor-funded development projects and programmes. The international aid community should expand opportunities for training Cambodian counterparts to plan their own development. Greater efforts should be made to encourage and facilitate Cambodian participation in sectorial meetings and other co-ordinating and policy-making bodies. The numerous fact-finding missions undertaken by international agencies should make a greater effort to incorporate Cambodians as team members.

Improved data gathering and dissemination. The transitional period should be used to carry out sectorial studies and statistical surveys which could provide a more solid data base for defining priorities and designing more appropriate development strategies, policies and projects. Such studies should generate findings and information which are disseminated widely in Cambodia. There should be a greater effort on the part of the United Nations and other donor agencies to translate studies into Khmer.

Greater reliance on local knowledge and institutions. There should be greater reliance on local institutions and resources and, in the absence of donor community knowledge about local society and culture, more research to determine the strengths and limitations of existing institutions, what remains of traditional community or support structures, and what institutions are re-emerging which could contribute to social cohesion, psychological rehabilitation and basic needs provisioning.

The quality and behaviour of United Nations personnel. Much stricter guidelines governing the recruitment, briefing and training of peace-keeping and professional personnel should be drawn up. Special attention should be given to the question of social relations with the host population. More thought

should be given to the provision of on-base recreation facilities and to the possibility of testing peace-keeping troops for HIV/AIDS before entering the country, as well as upon leaving.

Involvement of United Nations personnel in community development. United Nations personnel associated with peace-keeping and electoral education should become more involved in activities associated with community development in order to have a more direct input into the rehabilitation and reconstruction process and to improve relations with the local population.

An effective Code of Conduct. It is important to redefine and strictly implement a Code of Conduct for United Nations peace-keeping personnel, with clear indications concerning sanctions for offenders. There is a need to establish a monitoring unit to assess the conduct of peace-keeping personnel and public perceptions concerning the behaviour of United Nations security personnel. It is also important to establish an office (or ombudsman) with sufficient resources and powers to investigate complaints concerning behaviour, and to deal promptly with them.

Part III
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

The Need for Research

The workshops were a step towards establishing links between researchers and operational agencies with knowledge and research experience of problems of conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction. It emerged that, while researchers and policy makers were increasingly focusing their attention on such issues, there remained important gaps in our knowledge. Moreover, the work conducted to date had generally remained fragmented and there had been very little feedback between researchers, policy makers and NGOs.

Participants agreed that there was an urgent need to monitor current events. Some argued that systems had to be put in place to predict and prevent conflicts. Prevention has become something of a "buzz word" in discussion of conflicts. Everyone thinks it is a good idea, but it is hard to be specific about what might really be involved. Nevertheless, it is possible that tragedy in certain places could have been avoided if the warnings of those who were following local politics had been heeded earlier. It is clear that research has an important part to play in improving the capacity of international organizations to respond in time, or to alleviate suffering if mediation fails.

The workshop discussions brought out the urgency of rethinking strategies and policies aimed at peace-making and rebuilding wartorn societies. There is today a general feeling among policy makers, NGO activists, scholars and the public at large that the international community's efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations are not efficient, produce too few positive results, are costing too much and are politically ambiguous. Moreover, lessons are rarely drawn from previous experiences and errors are repeated again and again.

The international donor community has now become acutely aware of these problems. There has been considerable discussion, for example, of the need to integrate short-term relief measures into a long-term development perspective. So far, however, this remains little more than a wishful policy statement. Little is known of what this would imply in terms of concrete changes in present approaches, institutions and practices of humanitarian aid and development co-operation.

In this endeavour to redefine peace-making and reconstruction strategies, social science research has a crucial role to play. Any new approach must be based on a thorough comparative analysis of present experiences and practices.

Indeed, past experience, from the Cold War era and before, is of limited value given the changed nature of conflicts, the new international division of power and the evolving role of multilateral agencies. There is as yet little analytical understanding of these new realities and the way in which they condition prospects for peace and reconstruction.

It is clear from the observations made in this report, then, that we need to know more, and we need to challenge the very premises of what we think we already know.

Key Issues

Numerous observations were made at the workshops about priority issues which require further research. In particular, participants stressed the following concerns:

The role of the international community and foreign aid. The sense of urgency surrounding peace-making initiatives and economic rehabilitation often results in an excessive emphasis on short-term measures such as rapid military intervention or emergency relief, as opposed to policies and projects aimed at longer term development and consensus-building. Reliance on short-term remedies, however, poses a serious threat to the rehabilitation and stability of many countries emerging from conflict. The scale of foreign involvement in wartorn societies, in particular, the sudden influx of peace-keeping troops and international agencies, can also have damaging economic and social effects. Research should be undertaken to examine such impacts and to design appropriate forms of aid and delivery mechanisms. It is also important to study the nature of the relationship between foreign agencies, on the one hand, and state and local institutions, on the other, as well as the extent to which the latter are strengthened or undermined by this relationship.

Economic strategy. Countries emerging from war face the formidable challenge of restoring physical and productive infrastructure, reactivating production, and re-establishing both commercial networks and a national financial system. Research is urgently needed to understand how to go about tackling these tasks in a coherent manner and to rebuild a national economy in a long-term perspective while responding to immediate needs and demands. It is particularly important to address two sets of problems which have characterized the experience of post-conflict reconstruction in several countries. First, how to promote economic growth while avoiding distortions and excesses associated with speculation, corruption, inflation and aid dependency. Second, how to ensure that social cleavages are not exacerbated and prospects for a lasting peace are not undermined by the process of economic reconstruction or by the effects of economic stabilization and liberalization.

Social provisioning systems. A considerable proportion of the population in post-conflict societies is likely to consist of extremely vulnerable groups, including widows with families, orphans, the disabled, the single elderly and

returning refugees. It is important to examine how social provisioning systems which enable such groups to access essential goods and services, such as food and health care, can be recreated and strengthened. In this context, it is necessary to identify appropriate roles and responsibilities of multilateral and bilateral agencies, the state, NGOs and community institutions. Given the crucial role of the informal sector in wartorn economies, it is also important to examine what happens to this sector in a post-conflict situation.

Social solidarity and post-traumatic stress. More research is needed on the socio-psychological effects of war. It is crucial to examine how people cope with psychological disorders associated with violence, uprootedness and the breakup of families and communities, and how they recreate a sense of identity and social cohesion at the local level. It is also important to understand the circumstances, resources and institutions which enable some individuals, families or communities to cope better than others.

Demobilization and the military. Peace-making strategies generally promote rapid demilitarization. Research is needed to examine what happens to the military and to combatants when the fighting stops. It is important to address the question of whether rapid disarmament and troop demobilization are appropriate strategies in contexts where land, credit, government support services and employment opportunities are in short supply. It is necessary to explore ways in which the military can contribute to the process of reconstruction. It is also crucial to examine the ways in which demobilized combatants are reintegrated into civilian society and their impact on receiving households and communities.

What Type of Research?

There was considerable debate concerning the type of research required. Should the research community respond to the urgency of the situation and the immediate needs of policy makers by engaging in studies which yield quick results or should the complexity of the issues involved give rise to longer term and more in-depth research?

International agencies are often forced to act quickly, and require immediate access to information. For this reason they usually want short reports based upon existing data and insights, or are prepared to fund rapid research in the area of intervention. Many academic disciplines have evolved ways of responding to these demands, particularly in the social sciences. Various rapid appraisal techniques can provide answers to certain kinds of questions in a short time.

Several participants, however, pointed out the major limitations of this approach. Questions requiring answers are usually dictated by problems arising in existing policies, and they have to be resolved within that framework. The danger is that rapid research often does not address more fundamental issues. There is also a danger that rapid research will rely on information gathered from local "spokespersons", be they community leaders, government officials or aid

workers. Very often their perceptions, concerns and priorities differ from those of other social groups at the local level. Longer term research is required to understand the heterogeneous nature of local societies.

It is also unlikely that rapid research will build up local capacities. In 1987, for example, 120 fact-finding missions in Sri Lanka made little or no use of the national universities. A similar situation has recently characterized data gathering and needs assessments conducted by international agencies in Cambodia.

The disadvantages of longer term research from the point of view of policy makers is that it takes too long. It may also be threatening to entrenched interests, since it can, and often does, challenge existing assumptions. However, it does not necessarily have to be expensive, can be very valuable in a post-war situation in supporting local educational institutions, and may be therapeutic in helping people to reflect openly on their experiences.

When findings based upon such research become available, it is important that they be presented in a way that renders them accessible to non-specialists. Assuming good will and good intentions, there is much that policy makers, aid practitioners and donors could learn from field reports.

Ultimately it has to be recognized that research will not always provide clear answers, and that, even if it does, many decisions related to the reconstruction of wartorn societies will be made primarily for political reasons. But a research input into policy-making should improve the basis upon which decisions are made. It should open up new options for dealing with situations by exploring parallels with what has happened elsewhere. It could, in addition, lead to more adequate ways of assessing the effect of operations, and perhaps help improve ways of holding international agencies accountable for their activities.

Appendix I

Workshop on the Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies

AGENDA

Tuesday 27 April 1993

9.00 - 9.30	Welcome Background on UNRISD work in this field (Dharam Ghai, Director, UNRISD) Introduction of participants
9.30 - 10.00	**An overview of the problem** Rebuilding wartorn societies: Some key issues and their implications for policy-oriented research (Matthias Stiefel) Brief discussion of the organization of the seminar. Participants have worked in a large number of wartorn societies, including Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Uganda. They will be asked to draw upon this experience in their contributions to discussion in the following sessions.
10.00 - 10.30	COFFEE BREAK
10.30 - 11.30	**Political and institutional elements of reconstruction (Part I: The peace process)** The nature of the peace process. Aspects of mediation and political reconciliation. Overcoming ethnic hatred. The role of internal and external actors. The role of humanitarian assistance. **Speakers:** Kumar Rupesinghe Rakiya Omaar
11.30 - 12.30	**Political and institutional elements of reconstruction (Part II: Longer term reconstruction)** Questions related to the nature of the old and new political and judicial system. Recreating legitimate institutions. Rebuilding administrative capacity. Re-establishing the financial basis of the state. Designing territorially based spheres of autonomy. **Speaker:** Martin Doornbos

12.30 - 13.45 LUNCH

13.45 - 14.45 **Problems of demobilization and demilitarization**

Disarming the combatants, demining, redefining the identity and livelihood of soldiers, dealing with the arms trade, reconstructing the legitimate forces of order, and other elements in restoring and guaranteeing internal and external security.

Speaker: Pierre Gassmann

14.45 - 15.15 TEA BREAK

15.15 - 17.15 **Issues of economic reconstruction**

Rebuilding the economy. Controlling inflation, overcoming shortages, promoting markets, regulating speculation, encouraging investment. Reconstructing the financial system. Integrating foreign development aid and humanitarian assistance into national plans for relief and reconstruction.

Speaker: E.V.K. FitzGerald

Wednesday 28 April 1993

9.00 - 10.30 **Rebuilding the bases of community and solidarity (Part I: Resettlement of displaced persons)**

Problems surrounding the return and resettlement of internal and external refugees. Issues of access to land and/or housing, employment, basic social services. Environmental problems. Community organization. Defusing ethnic rivalries. Providing for widows, orphans and the disabled. Dealing with psychological trauma.

Speakers: Tim Allen
Murray Last

10.30 - 10.45 COFFEE BREAK

10.45 - 12.30 **Rebuilding the bases of community and solidarity (Part II: Strengthening civil society)**

Stimulating the creation of citizens' organizations and drawing them into the process of reconstruction. Problems of co-ordination among local, regional, national and international actors, and among private voluntary organizations. Building participation from the bottom up.

Speakers: Paul Richards
Gaim Kibreab

12.30 - 13.45 LUNCH

13.45 - 15.00 **Research on rebuilding wartorn societies: Where do we go from here?**
(Part I: The issues)

Drawing conclusions from the previous discussions: What are the crucial issues to be addressed in future research on wartorn societies? Where are the greatest gaps in knowledge and what areas could most usefully be addressed through future efforts to encourage structured dialogue and debate? What role should UNRISD play in this process?

15.00 - 15.30 TEA BREAK

15.30 - 17.00 **Where do we go from here?**
(Part II: How should we proceed?)

Discussion will centre on concrete steps which can be taken to design a research and networking strategy on rebuilding wartorn societies. The seminar will consider how to establish mechanisms permitting regular feedback between those engaged in social science research, on the one hand, and those involved in implementing operational programmes, on the other.

Appendix II

Workshop on the Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

- Mr. Mario A. ADAUTA DE SOUSA
  Acçao para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Luanda, Angola)

- Mr. Tim ALLEN
  The Open University (Milton Keynes, United Kingdom)

- Ms. Eva ARNVIG
  (Virum, Denmark)

- Mr. Gian-Battista BACCHETTA
  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Johan BALSLEV
  Lutheran World Federation (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Yusuf BANGURA
  UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Ms. Amelia BONIFACIO
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. CHEM Widhya
  (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Mr. Juan Pablo CORLAZZOLI
  PRODERE Subprogramme in Guatemala (Guatemala City, Guatemala)

- Mr. Jeff CRISP
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Edward DOMMEN
  RDP/UNCTAD (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Martin DOORNBOS
  Institute of Social Studies (ISS) (The Hague,Netherlands)

- Mr. Dag EHRENPREIS
  Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) (Stockholm, Sweden)

- Mr. E.V.K. FITZGERALD
  Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre, University of Oxford
  (Oxford, United Kingdom)

- Mr. Peter FUCHS
  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Pierre GASSMANN
  International Commitee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Dharam GHAI
  UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Ms. A. GONZALO CASTELLANOS
  Commission of the European Communities (Brussels, Belgium)

- Mr. A. GORELIK
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Moscow, Russian Federation)

- Ms. Cynthia HEWITT DE ALCANTARA
  UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Randolph C. KENT
  UNDHA-UNDRO (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Abdul Ghani KHALIL
  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
  (UNRWA) (Vienna, Austria)

- Mr. Gaim KIBREAB (London, United Kingdom) or University of Uppsala (Uppsala, Sweden)

- Mr. Murray LAST
  University College London (London, United Kingdom)

- Mr. Robert H. LAWRENCE
  Permanent Mission of Canada (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Larbi MEBTOUCHE
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Hubert MORSINK
  UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Enrique NEUHAUSER
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (New York, USA)

- Mr. A. NEVES DA SILVA
  Commission of the European Communities (Brussels, Belgium)

- Mr. H. OLESON
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Ms. Rakiya OMAAR
  African Rights (London, United Kingdom)

- Mr. Alexandre ORLOV
  Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Michael PLATZER
  United Nations Office at Vienna (Vienna, Austria)

- Mr. Paul RICHARDS
  Department of Irrigation and Soil & Water Conservation, Wageningen
  Agricultural University (Wageningen, the Netherlands)

- Mr. Zia RIZVI
  Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Ms. ROS Serey
  International Department of the Women's Association of Cambodia
  (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Mr. Ghassan Michel RUBEIZ
  Christian Children's Fund, Child Europe (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Kumar RUPESINGHE
  International Alert (London, United Kingdom)

- Ms. Elizabeth SALTER
  World Council of Churches (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Richard SNELLEN
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (New York, USA)

- Mr. Matthias STIEFEL
  The Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Ms. Necla TSCHIRGI
  International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (Ottawa, Canada)

- Mr. Peter UTTING
  UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

Appendix III

Workshop on the Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia

AGENDA

Thursday 29 April 1993

9.15 - 10.00	Welcome address: Dharam Ghai (Director, UNRISD)	
	Overview of objectives and structure of workshop (Peter Utting, Project Co-ordinator)	
	Introduction of participants	
10.00 - 10.30	**Session 1: The social and economic situation in Cambodia - An overview**	
	Speaker:	Grant Curtis - Cambodia during the transitional period
10.30 - 11.00	COFFEE BREAK	
11.00 - 11.30	**Speaker:**	E.V.K. FitzGerald - The social consequences of the emerging market economy
11.30 - 12.30	**Discussants:**	Chem Widhya Harald Wie Joseph Thurman
	Open discussion	
12.30 - 14.00	LUNCH	
14.00 - 14.30	**Session 2 : Refugees and returnees - The reintegration of displaced persons**	
	Speaker:	Vance Geiger - The reintegration of the Border Khmer
14.30 - 15.30	**Discussant:**	Andrew Mayne
	Open discussion	
15.30 - 16.00	TEA BREAK	

16.00 - 16.30	**Session 3: Women, children and human rights**	
	Speaker:	Eva Arnvig
16.30 - 17.45	**Discussants:**	Ros Serey Margaret de Monchy Thun Saray
	Open discussion	

Friday 30 April 1993

9.15 - 9.45	**Session 4: The role of NGOs and community organizations**	
	Speaker:	Eva Mysliwiec - NGOs and the reconstruction of Cambodia
9.45 - 10.30	**Discussant:**	Roger Newton
	Agency perspectives: Commentaries by representives of several development agencies	
10.30 - 11.00	COFFEE BREAK	
11.00 - 11.30	Open discussion	
11.30 - 12.30	**Session 5: Future research priorities**	
	Open discussion	
12.30 -	Closing remarks:	Dharam Ghai

Afternoon Session: 14.00 - 18.00

. Follow up on ideas for future research
. Using and building research capacity in Cambodia

Appendix IV

Workshop on the Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

- Mr. Tim ALLEN
  The Open University (Milton Keynes, United Kingdom)

- Ms. Eva ARNVIG
  (Virum, Denmark)

- Mr. Johan BALSLEV
  Lutheran World Federation (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Joern BECKMANN M.D.
  Odense University Hospital (Odense, Denmark)

- Mr. Niels BENTZEN
  Danish Refugee Council (Copenhagen, Denmark)

- Mr. Nigel CANTWELL
  Defence for Children International (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. CHEM Widhya
  (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Mr. Jeff CRISP
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Grant CURTIS
  United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Ms. Margaret DE MONCHY
  United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

. Mr. E. V. K. FITZGERALD
Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre, University of Oxford
(Oxford, United Kingdom)

. Mr. Vance GEIGER
University of Florida (Gainesville, Florida, USA)

. Mr. Dharam GHAI
UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

. Mr. Andrew HARDING
United Nations Volunteers (UNV) (Geneva, Switzerland)

. Ms. Cynthia HEWITT DE ALCANTARA
UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

. Ms. Ann HOWARTH
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
(Geneva, Switzerland)

. Ms. F. MAROTTA
United Nations Centre for Human Rights (Geneva, Switzerland)

. Mr. Andrew MAYNE
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
(Geneva, Switzerland)

. Mr. Hubert MORSINK
UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

. Ms. Christine MOUGNE
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
(Geneva, Switzerland)

. Ms. Eva MYSLIWIEC
Cambodia Development Resource Institute (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

. Mr. Roger NEWTON
OXFAM-UK (Oxford, United Kingdom)

- Ms. ROS Serey
  International Department of the Women's Association of Cambodia
  (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Mr. Jukka SAILAS
  World Health Organization (WHO) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Bo SCHACK
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Bent SOERENSEN M.D.
  International Rehabilitation and Research Center for Torture Victims (IRCT)
  (Copenhagen, Denmark)

- Mr. Matthias STIEFEL
  The Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. THUN Saray
  Cambodian Human Rights Association (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Mr. Joseph E. THURMAN
  ILO Regional Office for Asia and Pacific (Bangkok, Thailand)

- Mr. Peter UTTING
  UNRISD (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. Harald A. WIE
  United Nations Volunteers (UNV) (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)

- Mr. Kanni WIGNARAJA
  United Nations Volunteers (UNV) (Geneva, Switzerland)

- Mr. François ZEN RUFFINEN
  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Geneva, Switzerland)

The **United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)** is an autonomous agency that engages in multi-disciplinary research on the social dimensions of contemporary problems affecting development. Its work is guided by the conviction that, for effective development policies to be formulated, an understanding of the social and political context is crucial. The Institute attempts to provide governments, development agencies, grassroots organizations and scholars with a better understanding of how development policies and processes of economic, social and environmental change affect different social groups. Working through an extensive network of national research centres, UNRISD aims to promote original research and strengthen research capacity in developing countries.

Current research themes include **Crisis, Adjustment and Social Change; Socio-Economic and Political Consequences of the International Trade in Illicit Drugs; Environment, Sustainable Development and Social Change; Integrating Gender into Development Planning; Participation and Changes in Property Relations in Communist and Post-Communist Societies; Political Violence and Social Movements; Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies; Rebuilding Wartorn Societies; and Economic Restructuring and Social Policy.**

A list of the Institute's free and priced publications can be obtained from the Reference Centre.

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland

(41.22) 798.84.00/798.58.50
Fax (41.22) 740.07.91
Telex 41.29.62 UNO CH

ISSN 1020-1092