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HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

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Editorial principles
The Horn of Africa Bulletin is a regional policy periodical, monitoring and analysing key peace and security issues in the Horn with a view to inform and provide alternative analysis on on-going debates and generate policy dialogue around matters of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily express the views of the LPI.

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About Life & Peace Institute

Since its formation, LPI has carried out programmes for conflict transformation in a variety of countries, conducted research, and produced numerous publications on nonviolent conflict transformation and the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding. The main focus of our work has been on Africa, with the Horn of Africa Programme being established and well-known in the 1990s, not least our work in Somalia. Other initiatives have been carried out in Congo-Brazzaville, Croatia, Sri Lanka and East Timor. We have strengthened the capacity of our civil society partners to address the conflicts in their own context, in some of the most difficult and war-torn countries.

Currently, we run conflict transformation programmes in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions in partnership with local civil society organisations and universities in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and the DRC. There is also a common programme including publications, policy work and methodology design based in Sweden.

Will CVE work where CT has failed?

The Horn of Africa has witnessed its share of attacks by movements designated as terrorists. The rising incidence of these attacks, the endurance of the Al Shabaab in Somalia and the expansion of its activities into Kenya, point to the continuing relevance of efforts to counter terrorism. Prevailing socio-economic and political conditions in the Horn also provide many of the structural pre-conditions for terrorism[1]. This would suggest that the Horn is susceptible to the emergence of new armed movements.

The emergence of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) agenda is a global phenomenon and arguably points to the realization that conventional Counter Terrorism (CT) efforts have exhausted their potential. The recent announcement of the United Nations 'Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism' and Western governments developing their own CVE programs and lending support to CVE projects in other parts of the world, signals a shift in the more than decade long 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT)[2]. International intergovernmental organizations and Western countries have also lent support for CVE efforts in the Horn[3].

A key mantra in the discourse on CVE and the justification for regarding it as a seismic shift in the effort against terrorism is its supposed emphasis on the 'drivers' or 'root causes' of terrorism. The emphasis on root causes is in many ways a case of 're-inventing the wheel'. Even today, very little is understood about the precise linkages between root causes and radicalization* in the long run, and it is not all clear that these factors inevitably lead to radicalization[4]. Practicality also suggests caution in terms of the emphasis on root causes. As Purdy points out, issues of intractability, practicality and political will have often led to the downgrading of 'root causes' as an area of intervention in CT efforts[5]. The emphasis on root causes could also lead to situations where valuable resources could be siphoned away from development and humanitarian efforts.

The articles in the current issue of the Horn of Africa Bulletin address different aspects of the problem of terrorism in the Horn in general and CVE as an emerging approach. The incisive and critical article by Tuemay Aregawi interrogates and unpacks the notion and practices associated with CVE. He argues that the shift from CT to CVE is a welcome development, but also alerts us to the fact that CVE is embroiled in definitional and conceptual ambiguities. He cautions against the ambitiousness of the CVE agenda, which could lead to impractical goals, and the dispersal of efforts. Towards the end of his article, he discusses on-going CVE projects in several countries of the Horn and critiques the absence of coordination and context-specific programs and projects. He concludes by underlining the urgency and necessity of national and regional-level CVE strategies.

The jointly authored article by Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake takes an unusual angle, by outlining public opinion poll data regarding perceptions and attitudes that would have critical impact on the success of future CVE programs. The data points to critical variations in terms of perceptions towards security forces and CT efforts in the East African region. The data also points towards marked sub-national (provincial and ethnic) differences in relation to attitudes towards the security sector, state CT policies and other religious communities. This paper is a reminder of the necessity for interventions to be evidenced-based but also at the same time suggests that issues and challenges posed by terrorism will necessitate the development of innovative research tools that would allow practitioners to better understand the processes of radicalization.

The useful article by Selline Korir discusses an on-going CVE program, *Kenya Tuna Owezo* (KTU), led by Global Communities, that targets communities in informal settlements in Nairobi. According to the author, the KTU program incorporates elements that go beyond the standard peace-building toolkit. Selline argues that the successes of the KTU also derive from the care taken to develop context-specific approaches and the partnership with local communities. It is however vital to point out in this context that the KTU initiative was originally a peace-building initiative that focused on inter-ethnic tensions which was later re-designed with a CVE frame. This is a reminder of the difficulty in maintaining a balance between local needs and donor priorities which would be a critical issue in terms of CVE. The article by Ayalew Getachew provides an overview of the threats that extremism and terrorism pose to children and youth both as victims and also as coerced or duped collaborators. He argues that children and youth are not only threatened by the actions of extremists but also by the CT efforts of the state. He concludes by urging actors in the CT and CVE sphere to adhere to the 'The Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples Rights while countering Terrorism in Africa'. George Kut's article rounds this issue of the Horn of Africa Bulletin by suggesting that CVE interventions in the Horn would benefit from the inclusion of Community Tension Monitoring as a tool in the early warning and response aspect of CVE.

Demessie Fantaye

Editor

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*Radicalization is a term that is open to competing interpretations. Some would argue that it should be further problematized as perceptions of radicalization are inherently subjective.

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Countering violent extremism: Challenges in policy and practice

By Tuemay Aregawi Desta

The Horn of Africa sub-region is highly prone to terrorism. Almost all countries of the sub-region have been victims of terrorist attacks and have been responding unilaterally and collectively. Multinational organizations and donor countries have been engaged in various counter terrorism (CT) initiatives particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States of America as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) led by the United States (US) Government and its allies in the region and beyond. It is important to note terrorist organizations have been operating in the sub-region well before 9/11. Increasingly, global CT efforts have come to be perceived as ineffective and/or counterproductive for many reasons including flawed policies and practices that prioritized militarized and law enforcement responses discounting local contexts and driving factors and catalysts to violent extremism[1]. Home grown terrorist acts have also become more prevalent in the West. This has encouraged the policy community and practitioners to look for alternatives, which in turn explains the 'emergence' of the discourse and practices associated with 'Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). CVE has now become the primary focus of intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union and donor countries. CVE has not replaced the entirety of CT measures but should be rather understood as a subset of the fight against terrorism focusing on 'soft' and grassroots approaches engaging communities and civil society organizations that the GWOT had previously overlooked.

This article will discuss the emergence of CVE, its merits and the challenges in addressing violent extremism in practice. CVE has ushered in some positive changes in the form of a comprehensive and inclusive approach focusing at grassroots community engagement and state-civil society partnerships. On the other hand, CVE also reiterates some old approaches. This article argues that CVE is devised to delink the perception that the GWOT targets Islam and its civilization and seeks to encourage allies from the Arab world and moderate Muslims to partner in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. That is, CVE, in some ways, is being used to rebrand or revitalize the less popular GWOT[2].

In practice, CVE would be a difficult, long term effort and ambitious in its intent to address the 'root causes' and change ' minds and hearts'. The fact that CVE lacks a persuasive definition has led to multiple interpretations of concepts and terms that can make it a 'catch-all' rather than a clear field of practice[3]. In spite of its limitations and challenges, CVE can positively contribute to the prevention and countering of terrorism and violent extremism, if policy community and practitioners are committed to the tenets of CVE.

CVE's Tenets: A new paradigm or evolving approach?

In the wake of the 9/11 attack, members of the international community led by the US

government, responded in a heavy handed and militarized way to terrorism. This simplistic approach viewed terrorism as a form of criminal and subversive activity that targeted the West and its values. A more measured approach would have viewed terrorism as a complex and evolving social problem that requires addressing the structural and functional causes (political, economic and social grievances) that drive and catalyze individuals and groups towards violence.

Counter Terrorism (CT) practices increasingly showed a proclivity for grave violations of human rights and international law. Some countries have also manipulated CT measures to silence political opposition and criticism[4]. The acts committed by US security personnel in *Abu Ghraib* prison in Iraq, the widespread practice of illegal detentions and renditions, decades of arrest without charge in Guantanamo are all manifestations of the failures of the GWOT. Terrorist attacks and fatalities have dramatically increased, more powerful terrorist groups have been created, the landmass controlled by terrorist groups has expanded, the number of foreign fighters crossing borders to join terrorist groups has surged, and terrorist attacks have reached new heights of cruelty and depravity in the last few years[5].

There has been a conscious effort not to link terrorism with Islam by avoiding terms such a 'jihad', 'mujahedeen', 'Islamic extremism' in the CT policy discourse with a view to not offend Muslim countries and entice moderate Muslims[6]. However, other observers believed that this dilemma has been a counterproductive in the fight against terrorism[7].

As a result of the growing perception that GWOT approaches have been inefficient and counterproductive, policy makers and security advisors have sought alternatives. In a nutshell, this arguably explains the emergence of CVE. In the last few years, CVE has been at the top of CT discourses in governments, multinational organizations and non-state actors. The February 2015 White House Summit on CVE that brought together more than 60 countries and intergovernmental bodies is a showcase of the mainstreaming and growing priority of CVE. The Summit recognized the need for comprehensive and integrated response other than militarized and law enforcement actions[8].

CVE is conventionally understood to be comprehensive, inclusive, demand driven (contextualized) and supposedly incorporates preventive and anticipatory measures. In its preventive domain, CVE is intended to address structural causes and aggravating factors (catalysts) sometimes referred as push/pull factors and enabling environment[9] that create grievances and thereby violent extremism. This approach is not novel or ground breaking. The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (2006) clearly articulated that CT should address 'conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism'. The conditions stipulated in the UN strategy include among others conflicts, lack of rule of law, human rights violations, discriminations and marginalization. However, the causal relationship with regard to what factors cause grievances that lead individuals to violent extremism are often assumed[10].

In its early warning/response measures, CVE seeks to identify vulnerable individuals and groups, and early signs of radicalization and mitigate the risks through engagement, education and counter-narratives[11]. The anticipative role also serves as an input to identify and address the push/pull factors and enabling environment. This practice is actually borrowed from the wider concept of risk management.

In addressing violent extremism, CVE assigns greater emphasis to community engagement, the role of civil society organizations, partnerships between state and non-state actors and the call for context specific responses. In particular the emphasis on resilient communities invulnerable to recruitment and lacking sympathy with violent extremists and who are able to deter and disrupt extremist recruitment and mobilization can be considered as a fresh contribution. The growing consensus that 'ideology cannot be defeated by guns/bullets but by better ideas' is a promising initiative. These 'soft' approaches are promising and a relatively new development in the CT sphere.

CVE's revitalized principle of 'do not stigmatize' is somewhat derived from the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC's) 'do not harm' principle.

In summary, CVE has ushered in some new and positive developments into the CT space; at the same time it has to be acknowledged that much of the approaches are predominantly borrowed from different fields such as community policing, governance, risk management, social work, and peace-building. In this regard, CVE is not so much a paradigm shift in the fight against terrorism, but much more an adaptive response to evolving security threats and challenges of violent extremism that seeks to transcend the limitations of the traditional 'securitized' CT response. CVE has brought something new but also pursued old approaches.

CVE challenges

CVE faces a multiplicity of challenges. Some of the terms associated (mostly taken-fo--granted without clear and agreed definitions) with CVE in policy discourses and practice such as extremism and radicalization are often contentious. The unfortunate prevalence of active 'Islamic' terrorist groups has made interpretations and use of terms very difficult and often associated with Islam or Muslims. There are no clear indicators to determine whether someone is radicalized or even to determine vulnerability. As discussed above, the lack of clear definitions of CVE itself has complicated its implementation in practice. What is not defined and has no clear indicators cannot be measured or evaluated.

Another critical problem centres on the lack of consensus regarding what constitutes radicalism or extremism and the possibility that attempting to define it, could encroach on the very basic notion of freedom of expression. This makes agreement on a set of clear and measurable standards with regard to what is extreme or radical problematic. Extremism is a relative concept which is best articulated (even if simplistically) in the cliché that 'someone's freedom fighter is a terrorist for others'.

CVE is considered as a 'whole of government' response involving many sectors of a

government demanding intra/interagency cooperation and coordination to address the structural causes of terrorism. Bringing together such a diversified set of actors together is a daunting job. For obvious political, economic and cultural differences, the same is even truer for cross-border cooperation that CVE demands given the fact that terrorism is a transnational phenomenon.

The critical and central dilemma is that addressing root causes is seemingly impossible at the global level and a long-term effort, and thus governments, intelligence and law enforcement communities tend to respond reactively using traditional hard power. Evaluations of existing CVE programs reveal that CVE only enjoys a fraction of the overall budget allocated for CT – 7.5% in the US State Department, less than 3% in the UK's Office for Security and CT and about 1% in Canada's Police[12]. Thus, one could very well question whether CVE is still rhetoric or a mature CT agenda?

With respect to the Horn of Africa and its countries, the challenge of CVE is that there is no mapping of violent extremism to determine realistic and context specific actions. Intergovernmental bodies operating in the sub-region and member states have yet to develop their own CVE strategies. As CVE is predominantly a Western driven initiative[13], countries of the Horn are pressured to implement initiatives based on assumed problems and their root causes rather than evidence based interventions.

CVE initiatives in the Horn of Africa

In the past few years, multinational agencies and donor countries have funded various CVE initiatives in the Horn of Africa. The US government, European Union and Global CT Forum (GCTF), which is an informal group of 29 States including the EU have been engaged on CVE programs with the Inter-governmental authority of Development (IGAD) and bilaterally with Member states. Among others, following the statements of the White House CVE Summit held in February 2015, experts of the Horn sub-region agreed to establish a regional CVE and Counter Messaging Hub under the auspices of IGAD. This initiative was reaffirmed in the 30 September 2015 Experts meeting held in New York following the agreement of leaders reached in the 29th September White House Summit on 'Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism'. This initiative is a work in progress and so too early to assess. It can be considered as an indication of progress, if the regional CVE hub is established taking into account the specificities of the of the region best practices. The GCTF, Horn of Africa Desk, engaged in capacity building measures is another initiative supported by the EU and donor countries. The EU through its program 'Strengthening Resilience to violent Extremism' in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE),focuses on capacity building and civil society engagement in Somalia and Kenya. International organizations including USAID, DFID are also actively engaged in CVE related projects[14].

The challenge of these initiatives is that they lack coordination and they provide the support based on their own specific policies on CVE rather than developing an agreed regional policy and strategy that is contextualized to fit the specific situations and threats of VE in the sub-region and its member states. The efforts are also being

implemented in an ad-hoc and piecemeal manner. However, this does not necessarily mean that the efforts are not contributing at all to CVE. In fact as Brett (2015) shows, the initiatives implemented in Somaliland, Puntland and Kenya have contributed to building community resilience and brought state and non-state actors together in addressing CVE.

Conclusion

It could be argued that that there is nothing inherently wrong with the intentions of CVE whether it is merely changing terminology to make it more inclusive and mitigate misperceptions or the attempt to address new dimensions. The author asserts that the role of CVE, in spite of all the challenges, would contribute to remedying the negative perceptions that the GWOT has caused, if and only if it is implemented properly. At a higher level of expectation, CVE can also play a significant role in countering terrorism through soft measures, if it is designed in a context specific manner, ensures real ownership among actors and ultimately if governments (both donors and recipients) are committed to the core values.

Otherwise, it will only amount to a semantic shift instead of a change in content. The US government and its allies seem to be more interested in CVE in a bid to replace the name of the ill-fated 'GWOT'. However, CVE should be defined in a clearer and comprehensive way at least at the national level and if possible at regional/sub-regional levels. The states in the Horn of Africa, through their intergovernmental arrangements should develop a regional policy framework and a platform to share their experiences, information and exert mutual assistance in CVE.

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AFRICA

Violent extremism in the Horn: Regional dynamics and public opinion

By Rorisang Lekalake,Stephen Buchanan-Clarke

Over the past two decades, violent extremism has grown to become the central security concern of several African states. East Africa, and the Horn in particular, are especially vulnerable to the spread of both indigenous and international terrorism and, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, became a strategic focal point for the American-led "War on Terror." Porous borders, poor governance, corruption, as well as a history of enduring ethnic conflict have created conditions in which terrorist groups have been able to thrive.

Al Shabaab originated in 2005 out of the now defunct Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. However, in the decade since, its operational reach has expanded throughout the Horn. The group's first major international attack was a twin suicide bombing in July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda, that left 76 dead and 70 injured. The group stated publicly that the attacks were retaliation for Ugandan support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – a regional peacekeeping force mandated to support transitional government structures and assist in improving the security environment. Since then, Al Shabaab has targeted regional troop-contributing countries to AMISOM and has carried out attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania. Attempted Al Shabaab attacks have also been thwarted in Ethiopia.

It is increasingly clear that security forces, trained to fight in conventional wars, are poorly equipped to deal with the diffuse and clandestine nature of modern terrorism. The large-scale deployment of armed forces in weak states has done little to reduce the threat and has, in several cases, been counter-productive. Security forces have had to adapt their way of operating with an increased focus on intelligence gathering, enlisting and maintaining local support, and the use of special operations units rather than conventional expeditionary forces.

In 2011, for example, Kenya launched Operation *Linda Nchi* ("protect the nation"), a combined military operation between Kenyan and Somali forces to take "coordinated pre-emptive action" against Al Shabaab in southern Somalia[1]. Before 2011, there had been no significant al Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil. However, in the subsequent period, Al Shabaab attacks within the country have increased year on year. In 2015, 16% of all Al Shabaab attacks occurred within Kenya, resulting in 250 civilian deaths and hundreds more injured[2]. Furthermore, a considerable portion of Al Shabaab militants are currently believed to be recruited in Kenya, including both nationals and immigrants/refugees[3].

Governments and regional bodies around the world are in the process of developing strategies for countering violent extremism (CVE) that will define their national and foreign policy for years to come. In April 2015, following a Washington summit, the

American government drafted an action agenda that outlines its approach to CVE internationally. The European Union has laid out its CVE steps in the EU Strategy on Prevention of Radicalization and Recruitment.

The subsequent shift in international donor funding has seen several targeted CVE initiatives take shape in Africa. In Kenya, the USAID-funded Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) has launched a specialized CVE programme that targets vulnerable communities along the country's east coast. Several other initiatives have been developed throughout the Horn.


It is perhaps too early to tell if this new approach to combating the spread of violent extremism has been or will be effective. The preventative focus of CVE means that results will be difficult to quantify, other than a gradual reduction in the appeal and spread of violent extremist groups. In order for CVE to have the best possible chances of success, it needs to be implemented in the most "at-risk" communities. Furthermore, it needs to be instituted from the bottom up, rather than taking a top-down approach, and be informed by the public rather than forced upon it.

Public opinion and security in East Africa

Public opinion data provide important insights into the impact of violent extremism on ordinary citizens by presenting the prevailing attitudes, evaluations, and policy preferences in a given country. Recent analysis from the Afrobarometer survey indicates that security is not a top priority for most Africans: On average, only 15% of citizens across 32 countries cite "crime and security" as one of the top three problems in their respective nations[4].

East Africans' views vary widely by country: While crime and security is the leading national priority for Kenyans (40%), it is not in the top three for Burundi (18%), Uganda (8%), or Tanzanians (5%) (Figure 1). However, this proportion increases considerably in Burundi if one also includes other security-related concerns, such as political violence and civil war (to 34% of citizens).


Figure 1: Most important problems | crime and security | East Africa | 2014/2015[5]



Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?*[6]

Public views of investment priorities follow a similar pattern: More than one-third of Kenyans believe that security (e.g. police and military) should be either the first (18%) or second (15%) priority for any additional government spending, followed by Burundians (20%), Tanzanians (14%), and Ugandans (12%) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Support for prioritizing security investment | East Africa | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: *If the government of this country could increase its spending, which of the following areas do you think should be the top priority for additional investment? And which would be your second priority?*

Public trust and confidence in security forces has a profound effect on the chances of success or failure of security-led initiatives to combat violent extremism. Local communities are often best situated to understand the distinct dynamics of conflict in their region and are an important source of information.

Afrobarometer data indicate that East Africans' confidence in security forces is highest in Burundi and lowest in Kenya (Figure 3). Generally, the army enjoys considerably higher public trust (79%, on average) than the police (57%). The largest gap in the proportion of citizens who say they trust the army "a lot" or "somewhat" and those who say the same for the police is in Kenya (32 percentage points), followed by Uganda (22 points), Tanzania (21 points), and Burundi (16 points). Less than a quarter (23%) of Kenyans think that "none" or only "some" police are corrupt, the lowest proportion in the region. However, 60% of respondents say the same for members of the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF).[7]

Figure 3: Confidence in security forces | East Africa | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked:


1. *How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:*
   - *The police?*
   - *The army?*

(% "somewhat" or "a lot")

2. *How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The police? (% "somewhat" or "a lot")*

The most recent Afrobarometer surveys in Kenya and Uganda asked respondents to assess the government's efforts at fighting terrorism in their respective countries. Ugandans are significantly more satisfied with government efforts than their Kenyan counterparts. While eight in 10 (83%) Ugandans say their government is doing "fairly well" or "very well" on fighting terrorism, only 44% of Kenyans say the same, while half (51%) give these efforts a negative rating.

Figure 4: Evaluations of counter-terrorism efforts| Kenya vs. Uganda | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: *How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting terrorism in [country]?*


CVE, as a departure from the security-led response exemplified by Kenya's Operation *Linda Nchi* and Operation *Usalama* Watch, needs to take into the account the socioeconomic and political drivers of violent extremism. However, it is often difficult to determine which factors contribute the most. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) uses a data set of more than 125,000 terrorist incidents to analyse global patterns and determine correlates of violent extremism. The GTI (2015) identifies poverty, intergroup cohesion, group grievance, marginalization by the state, and state-sponsored violence among the top correlates.

Public opinion and potential drivers of violent extremism in Kenya

Cross-national analysis of levels of "lived poverty," an experiential measure of poverty based on the frequency with which citizens or their families go without basic necessities, indicates that material deprivation has declined in a large number of African countries, including Kenya, since 2011/2013[8]. Furthermore, Kenyans' levels of lived poverty are lower than the average for 35 countries. As with most other nations, the lack of a cash income is the most prevalent form of lived poverty in Kenya (74%), followed by medical care (48%), food (46%), clean water (42%), and cooking fuel (30%)[9].

In 2014, 30% of respondents or their family members lacked these five measures of material deprivation at least "several times" in the previous year (Figure 5). Further analysis by province (Kenya's administrative unit until 2013) indicates significant differences in levels of lived poverty across the country. While only 15% of residents of Central province went without these basic necessities, six in 10 (59%) residents of North Eastern province did so. Average material deprivation in the other six provinces ranged from 27% (Western) to 36% (Coast).

Figure 5: Average material deprivation| by province | Kenya | 2014



Respondents were asked: *Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without:*

- *Enough food to eat?*


- *Enough clean water for home use?*
- *Medicines or medical treatment?*
- *Enough fuel to cook your food?*
- *A cash income?*

(average % who went without these five necessities "several times," or "often," or "always")

Al Shabaab has managed to exploit and gain support within certain populations of Kenya's North Eastern province. The territory was carved out of the Jubaland region of present-day Somalia by the British colonial administration and is primarily inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Analysis of Kenyans' evaluations of government counter-terrorism efforts, public attitudes toward the intervention in Somalia, and key potential drivers of extremism provides preliminary evidence that ethnic Somali citizens hold views distinct from those of other Kenyans [10].

Opinion data show that Kenyans' levels of social tolerance are high: Only 8% of survey respondents say they would "strongly dislike" or "somewhat dislike" having a neighbour of a different ethnicity, while 10% say the same for those of different religions and 19% for different nationalities (Figure 6). Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake (2015) show that intolerance levels are significantly higher among Somali Kenyans for ethnic and religious differences (by approximately 20 percentage points)[11].

Figure 6: Social tolerance | Kenya | 2014




Respondents were asked: *For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care:*

- *People of a different religion?*
- *People from other ethnic groups?*
- *Immigrants or foreign workers?*

Analysis of Kenyans' perceived marginalisation by the government shows that ethnic Somali citizens are the most likely to believe that they are "always" or "often" treated unfairly (51%, compared to an average of 23%) (Figure 7). These perceptions are borne

out by reports from Human Rights Watch (2015)[12] showing that government security initiatives to combat violent extremism within the country, such as Operation *Usalama* Watch, have unfairly targeted Somali Kenyans and resulted in gross human rights violations. These reports include instances of extortion, arbitrary arrest, forced relocations, torture, and extra-judicial killings.

Figure 7: Perceived government marginalisation | by ethnicity | Kenya | 2014



Respondents were asked: *How often, if ever, are [respondent's ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?*

Conclusion

Public opinion data show that security is a leading concern for ordinary Kenyans and that only 44% were satisfied with government counterterrorism efforts in 2014. The findings also show that although there is high overall social tolerance, there are significant inequalities in economic outcomes and in different groups' perceptions of marginalisation. Ultimately, the success of CVE as a new strategy to combat violent extremism will be determined by governments' ability to address these perceived root causes.

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[4] Afrobarometer is a non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys in 36 countries across the continent. This publication primarily employs data from the Round 6 survey in Kenya. The survey, led by the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi, interviewed 2,400 adult Kenyans between 12 November and 5 December 2014. A sample of this size yields country-level results with a margin of error of +/-2% at a 95% confidence level. Previous surveys have been conducted in Kenya in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2011.

[5] Fieldwork dates: Burundi (September-October 2014), Kenya (November-December 2014), Tanzania (August-November 2014), Uganda (May 2015).

[6] NB: Respondents could list up to three problems. This chart provides the sum of multiple responses.

[7] This question was only asked in Kenya.

[8] Mattes, R., Dulani, B. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2016). Africa's growth dividend? Lived poverty drops across much of the continent. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 29. Available at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno29_lived_poverty_declines_in_africa_eng.pdf.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Buchanan-Clarke, S. and Lekalake, R. (2015). Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37. Available at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno37.pdf..Given the small size of the Somali Kenyan subsamples (5% of the total 2014 sample,

n=124), the resultant wider margin of uncertainty surrounding generalizations about Somali

Kenyans calls for caution in interpreting associated numerical results.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Human Rights Watch. (2015) Kenya: Counterterrorism Operations Undermine Rights. Published: 29 January 2015. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/kenya-

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KENYA

A community-based approach to increasing the peace in Nairobi's informal settlements

By Selline Korir

Violence and conflict have always threatened vulnerable communities, but in a world defined by globalization, urbanization, and other developments fuelling the rapid movement of people across the globe, the capacity for violence today has the potential to destabilize countries and lead to regional and even global crises. Perhaps no region better exemplifies this than the Horn of Africa, where conflict, poverty, and radicalization have all intersected, contributing to increased risk of violent extremism. The nexus for most of these trends are the informal settlements in cities like Nairobi that already bear the greatest burden of societal ills, and are at risk of political and ethnic manipulation.

To be sure, violence is not a new phenomenon in informal settlements. Residents endure high unemployment, cramped living space and isolation from mainstream society. Ethnic and religious differences are exacerbated by lack of access to basic services. Politicians regularly manipulate residents of the settlements, especially youth, to influence the outcome of elections by committing acts of violence. The Kenyan national elections of 2007 pushed tensions over the brink, shattering the country's peace, killing thousands, displacing hundreds of thousands, and further intensifying ethnic conflict. Even after the initial violence ended, many youth found themselves continuing lives of crime from which there was no escape.

It was in this environment that USAID partnered with Global Communities on Kenya Tuna Uwezo ("We have the power" in Kiswahili), or KTU, to prevent future violence. When it started in 2012, the program focused mainly on inter-ethnic violence between Kenyans, but after seeing its success, the program expanded to help counter violent extremism in informal settlements.

The KTU approach

KTU is different from standard peace-building practices as it integrates conflict mitigation and civic education approaches. Civic education is key to addressing the rights of groups that have been disenfranchised and ignored, empowering them with constitutional knowledge, human rights knowledge, and information on how to engage with their government to address the grievances that are driving them into conflict and radicalization. Many are aggrieved because they are ignored by their government and feel excluded, marginalized and frustrated. For example, the vetting process for ID issuance seems to take longer people of certain communities and/or regions of the country compared to others which makes them feel noncitizens. But helping them understand their rights and responsibilities and facilitating dialogues/platforms in which

aggrieved communities (especially youth) meet in a safe space with government enables communities to work together effectively, and to appreciate their diversity and address Issues that have divided them.

Most CVE approaches address CVE from a security perspective and sees communities as the problem, exacerbating mistrust, suspicious and marginalization. KTU takes a community-based conflict management approach that affirms that there is a security problem but that those who are part of the problem are also part of the solution and are able to come up with their own approaches to achieve the same goal. In one dialogue with youth who were perpetrators of violence declared "we are people, we are the problem, we are the solution." Moments like these demonstrate that people want to identify with the solution but often are not given the opportunity to. You need to give people the space, confidence and the ability to lead the effort. They are the experts.

The approach used by KTU is based on the realization that grievances, real or perceived, cause conflicts. These grievances can be economic, social, tribal, ideological, personal, political, historical etc. The intervention has to be customized to the particular source of the grievance—it is not a "one size fits all" approach – and it must be developed and implemented with the input of the aggrieved community. Staff do not assume that they have all the solutions and are the experts but rather, they are collaborators on the solution. This approach enables the program to be flexible and bring in approaches and organizations outside of the standard peacebuilding practice.

Striking the balance between root causes and pathways to extremism

The Eastleigh neighbourhood in Nairobi faces many of the same socio-economic challenges that plague other urban settlements. Home to a significant immigrant and Muslim population of which most are of Somali background, Eastleigh also has had a long history of marginalization and police harassment particularly after terrorist attacks.

This negative profiling and often heavy-handed tactics by security officers, coupled with marginalization particularly among youth and the military actions in Somalia and elsewhere, are seen to have contributed to growing radicalization and extremism in Eastleigh.

Whilst the reasons why specific individuals join extremist groups and engage on actions related to violent extremism differ, experts agree that no single intervention can be effective in addressing violent extremism, and that interventions need to be contextualized and designed to apply to local specificities and need to have a real impact.

Global Communities through KTU addresses this cyclical violence by strengthening social networks of community members and civil society groups to provide safe spaces to discuss grievances aligned to the factors that 'push and pull' individuals into violent extremism, ensure acceptance of peace-building initiatives and provide alternatives to violent extremism. Communities lead the charge as they know best their own liabilities, assets and dynamics. KTU staff understand that while lack of viable livelihoods is an

important driver, it is not enough to simply give someone a job. Violence in Kenya's is often born out of poverty and a lack of opportunity, but it also comes from previous conflicts, resentments, perceived or real discrimination, political manipulation, emulation of peers, and other factors. KTU helps provide people with economic opportunities, but first it seeks to change mind-sets so that the change provided by such an opportunity is sustainable.

At the centre of the program is a focus on youth, since they exhibit high rates of unemployment and criminal activity. KTU gives youth both an outlet to air their grievances and methods to help resolve them. Many youth are often both victims and perpetrators simultaneously, resorting to crime or violence due to social pressure and threats. Mind-sets can only be altered when motivations are first understood. Especially in communities fraught with ethnic and religious tension, identity becomes a battleground, leading many youth to seek out the acceptance of groups, regardless of whether their activities are legal or not. Similar to the impact of job placement, while economic concerns can drive criminal activity, it can also be a desire to gain leadership, respect, and belonging. These same motivations can be made into a force for positive change and peace-building.

It is by engaging with these members of the community and harnessing their energy for peace-building instead of violence that KTU is able to have an impact. The same motivation to lead as part of a gang has many times been parlayed into leadership roles in peace groups, and the same persuasion skills that can convince a young person to commit crime are used instead to convince a youth to abandon drugs, violence, and other crimes that plague the informal settlements. This path is then cemented by appropriate training, opportunity and compensation.

Participants form subgroups – of Change Agents and Cohesion Champions – who serve as liaisons in their communities, bringing stakeholders together. Then they educate other youth about the dangers of violent extremism, radicalism and other criminal activity. KTU coordinates with community leaders to identify and communicate with viable contacts, including young people, to develop alternatives to violent extremism in the slums. The program gives the youth the chance to realize and display their talents, and to engage in meaningful communication engagement that will lead to training and/or employment. These youth then have legitimacy when they speak to those engaged in crime and help convert them into Change Agents, thereby increasing the program's sustainability and reach.

Today, Eastleigh and other communities are more peaceful as a result of KTU's community-based conflict management approach. KTU has been proactive in helping youth who are often harassed by police and common criminals too.

To counter radicalization and reduce conflict in the settlements, KTU offers counselling and courses in entrepreneurship, leadership, and conflict resolution. Its outreach focuses on training youth on the dangers of gang violence and violent extremism and where it inevitably leads – usually prison or death. It has also made great strides in

improving relations between youth and law enforcement officials, mainly by getting the two groups together and having them know and collaborate with each other to fight crime in the slums.

Additionally, KTU helps strengthen the role of women. In Eastleigh and some other predominantly Muslim communities, women are not allowed to speak publicly, even in their own settlements. But excluding women from these conversations has been a missed opportunity: women often head their families and generally spend more time with their children since they are their primary caregivers, and they spend much of their time in the settlement. For these reasons, they are often the holders of key information related to the men and boys in their lives. KTU has worked closely with families in the community to persuade them of the helpful role of women in reducing conflict and making the communities safer, as well as spurring economic opportunities for youth in Eastleigh and other settlements in Nairobi.

By providing a safe platform, dozens of women, are now free to speak openly and honestly about the problems in their community, and offer their ideas to solve them. KTU also holds forums to bring people of different backgrounds together, and give them the chance to air their grievances. The vast networks of support including women and many others has helped advance efforts to engage young people and help them lead productive lives, regardless of their past, and the networks have given women who previously have been silent or ignored a voice to help make peace in the settlements. These networks have helped connect previously marginalized individuals and helped build their confidence and their capacity, thus increasing their involvement in community matters.

Kebale Bonyaya, of Somali origin, joined KTU to help make peace in her community. Before KTU, she was afraid to walk through Mathare (a neighbouring community) because people accused her of being affiliated with Al Shabaab. “You have no idea how painful that is. Now they don’t call me that because they know the good work I’m doing for them too,” she says. “Now I have a platform to be seen by the community as a positive agent for change rather than as a terrorist.” And in the aftermath of the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, many young people from the informal settlements who normally do not engage in efforts outside their community volunteered to give blood to the victims. Kebale attributes this to the important role assigned to Change Agents and Cohesion Champions, the seriousness with which they take those roles, and the influence they have over others who used to commit crimes.

Kebale’s story is not unique. Other participants in KTU have reported that prior to the program they were unemployed, part of criminal gangs, and often approached to become suicide bombers. Providing some guidance for their lives helped these individuals forge a new path that did not rely on violence. Some participants have organized a variety of awareness raising events, promoting cross-cultural communication and emphasizing the humanity of Somalis living in Kenya. Perhaps most importantly, the strengthened social networks are able to intervene in crises and help prevent tragedies before they occur. In one case, Change Agents were able to intercede in the wake of attacks on houses of

worship, stopping the cycle of violence before it could begin.

KTU's success shows the power of CVE programs to have a positive impact. However, these transformations would not be possible if Global Communities attempted its work without the benefit of key relationships in the community. By working with local partner organizations, civil society groups, and experienced Kenyan peace-builders, KTU has formed and sustained solid relationships – in the informal settlements, in the government sector, with law enforcement and other important areas of influence – that help foster the communication and collaboration required to curb violent extremism. It is through this multi-stakeholder, partnership approach that the community-driven peace-building efforts are supported by a network of organizations and relationships. It is this approach, strengthening communities that helps alleviate the underlying drivers of violence, ultimately leading to cohesion and peace.

Lessons learned

Among the lessons learned from KTU is that understanding of CVE is still low; therefore, much work must be done to convey accurate information in a way that moves communities to positive, collective action. KTU is an effective way to address violent extremism through a community-based, peace-building framework that focuses on human rights, economic needs, and religious and political factors. Effective interventions show the best promise when informed by evidence-based research and accompanied by a strong advocacy component.

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KENYA

Radicalization of children and youth in Kenya: A new challenge to child protection

By Ayalew Getachew

The war in Somalia pitting the Al Shabaab against the Somalia Federal Government and the forces of the AMISOM is spilling over into many neighbouring countries with Kenya being one of the affected countries. Terrorist attacks have increased in Kenya in recent years. Looking at the years between 2011 and 2014, there have been more than 70 grenade and gun attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa counties[1]. The most brutal attack occurred on the 2nd of April 2015, when gunmen stormed the Garissa University College in Garissa, Kenya, killing 148 people and injuring 79 or more. The incident at the Westgate shopping centre in September 2013, which left some 70 people killed and more than 200 injured, is also another significant manifestation of the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya. Besides the attacks and killings, it also appears that Al Shabaab is seeking to radicalise and recruit children from various communities in Kenya.

This article, therefore, focuses on this recent phenomenon of radicalization of children in Kenya into Islamic extremist groups. The article attempts to briefly explore the impacts of radicalization of children in Kenya as a new challenge in relation to the discourse of child protection. With a view of curbing the harm on the lives, well-being, survival and development of children in some parts of Kenya, the article also includes general remarks to be considered in the fight against radicalism.

Radicalization of children in Kenya: aggravated vulnerability

Children in African societies are amongst the most vulnerable segment of the civilian populations during conflicts and crises. Wars and conflicts put children in a situation where every right of a child could be violated. Children are killed or injured, usually in the context of clashes between opposing forces, and children have also been directly targeted in many cases[2]. In the chaos of war and other crises, many children become separated from their families, which results in loss of parental care and protection at the time when they most need it. In the context of conflicts, children are exposed to the risk of abuse and exploitation and their very survival is threatened. Children also face the threat of being recruited as soldiers not only by terrorist groups but also by other armed actors including the forces of the state.

Recent trends in armed conflict have resulted in new challenges for the protection of children. Previously armed conflict involved confrontations between states, whereas currently intra-state conflicts are more frequent. As battle lines become blurred and fragmented, armed groups increasingly rely on improvised explosive devices and suicide missions, as well as the use of children to carry out attacks. Both boys and girls have been targeted for recruitment and use by such groups, which indoctrinate and manipulate in order to coerce or force children to participate in hostilities, including acts of extreme violence. Girls and boys are often unaware of the actions or consequences of the acts they are manipulated or coerced to commit, which explains the current situation in some parts of Kenya.

Radicalization in Kenya is a real threat with the target group for the militants varying in age. There are reports that a swoop carried out in Mombasa's Musa Mosque by security agents rescued over 200 children as young as 12 years said to be undergoing radicalization[3]. A report by Regional News Service (June 2015) estimates that 255 persons have left to join the terrorist group since 2013. Other reports may however give an indication that this figure could be higher as in Isiolo County in Eastern Kenya alone, an estimated 200 children were reported missing since 2014 and assumed to have crossed over to Somalia[4]. The target group for the recruiters are children and youth between ages of 15-30 and mostly boys.

Children and young people can be drawn into violence or they can be exposed to the messages of extremist groups through a range of means. These can include exposure through the influence of family members or friends and/or direct contact with extremist groups and organisations or, increasingly, through the internet. Children are easily vulnerable to exposure to, or involvement with, groups or individuals who advocate

violence as a means to a political or ideological end[5]. Looking at the case in Kenya, a number of interrelated social, political and economic factors are fuelling the radicalization of children. Geographically, the epicentre of radicalization appears to be the Northern Province of Kenya which is dominated by ethnic Somalis, and by most accounts, it is considered to be the worst victim of unequal development[6]. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, the Northern Province has a history of insurgency, misrule and repression, chronic poverty, massive youth unemployment, high population growth, insecurity, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services, which resulted in the bleak socio-economic and political conditions. The rate of poverty is significantly higher in the areas where radicalization of children is rampant, thus the vulnerability of children and young people being lured to join these groups. Moreover, the unfolding conflict in neighbouring Somalia has also had a largely negative effect on the province. Reports also reveal the existence of a high level of small arms flow across the Northern Kenya, which provides a conducive environment for the extremists to easily arm their recruits.

Impact of radicalization on the rights and welfare of children

Radicalization affects the life of children in many ways. It results in grave violations of children's rights including killing, sexual violence, displacement and denial of health services. Particularly, its impact on education has become a worrying trend as children are being denied the chance of going to school and tragically the number of reported attacks on educational facilities is rising. There are indications that in some places schools are closed down for considerably long time as parents have stopped sending their children to school for fear of attacks by Al Shabaab[7]. These are wide-reaching implications for children in the North-eastern part of Kenya that are not even the target of radicalization efforts. There are students who have not reported to schools for long time and no one seems to know their whereabouts. As captured in the continental study on the impact of armed conflict on children in Africa, by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), in Isiolo county of Eastern Kenya, at least 200 children had not reported to school in 2015[8].

Besides its impact on education, there are alleged reports of detention of children suspected to be radicalized. A Human Rights Watch report (2014) indicated there was strong evidence that Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit had carried out a series of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances[9]. In 2007 and 2008, Human Rights Watch and Muslim Human Rights Forum separately documented the involvement of the unit and other Kenyan security forces in the arbitrary detention and unlawful rendition of at least 85 people including 19 women and 15 children from Kenya to Somalia[10]. Besides, during the raid of Masjid Mosque in Mombasa, reports indicate that at least 30 children who were rescued during this operation were detained and then placed in remand homes. This act of arbitrary detention is clearly contrary to international and national laws which prescribe every individual's rights to liberty and the security of his or her person.

Towards a Kenya fit for its children

Radicalization of children in Kenya is increasingly causing harm to children and this is seriously compromising, their lives, wellbeing and survival and development from a number of different angles. The Kenyan experience of radicalisation of children is an eye-opener to the new challenge of child protection facing Africa and should therefore receive close attention by African States in general and the Government of Kenya in particular. The challenge calls for the need to develop a more hands-on approach by the Government of Kenya through the relevant ministries in dealing with radicalization. There is a need to have a well-coordinated approach in the fight against terrorism and radicalization. Moreover, there needs to be a mechanism to address the long-standing grievances held by marginalized groups or communities and enhancing the inclusion of these groups in socio-economic and political activities.

More importantly, formulating and executing sound counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies before it is too late must be a priority. In this regard, due reference, *inter alia*, should be made to the Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples' Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa. These Principles and Guidelines were adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights during its 56th Ordinary Session in Banjul, Gambia in April 2015[11]. The Principles and Guidelines include a set of fourteen general principles, such as prohibition of arbitrary detention and guidance on specific issues that the Commission regarded as being particularly relevant to the protection of human rights while combating terrorism, which could also be applied on matters related to children's rights accordingly.

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REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Embedding policies on community tension monitoring

By George Kut

Recent developments in violent extremism in the Horn of Africa have seen security and peace practitioners, the academia and governments institutions seeking to understand what precipitates terrorist activities in the region. Terrorism exacerbated by increased radicalization of young people is emerging as a serious threat to states and societies in the Horn. What makes the situation even more critical is that the region is already afflicted by many other conflicts and vulnerabilities. The fear and threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the region now supersedes and galvanizes international concern more than any other form of violence.

So what is it that the Horn of Africa needs to do differently to counter violent extremism in the midst of the 'usual' violent conflicts? The on-going violent conflicts and escalating violent extremism provide the communities of the Horn of Africa with the opportunity to confront hard questions regarding their social, political, cultural, religious and economic realities. The very fact that violent extremism is expanding rapidly in the region indicates that it is hinged on an enabling environment – a breeding ground and vulnerable context.

It seems that the stakeholders in the security sector and civil society have for long lived in denial with regard to critical questions of violent extremism deriving from community tensions. In the past, there was also a notable absence of local-level initiatives which recognized violent extremism as an intrinsic problem requiring proactive rather than reactive responses.

However with the popularization of the notion of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), stakeholders in the region have identified weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, corruption, porous borders and in some cases, state security complicity in terrorist activities, lack of central authority, and grievances stemming from social, economic and political injustices as the main factors for violent extremist groups emergence and taking root in the region[1]. There is also a growing realization of the importance of countering terrorist narratives and investment in regional programs including in the areas of intelligence, law enforcement, investigation and prosecution, judicial capacities, border security, countering violence extremism financing and public participation in countering violent extremism. However, encouraging as these analyses and proposed interventions might be, the escalating nature of extremist violence in the region calls for a mechanism that monitors and responds to the underlying factors that feed extremist violence.

Community Tension Monitoring as the answer?

In seeking to actualize proactive measures to counter violent extremism we must continuously remind ourselves that it is in embedding Community Tension Monitoring that we can significantly enhance an effective response to countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. In this quest, I begin by conceptualizing the meaning of Community Tension Monitoring in the Horn of Africa region and explain how community tensions are a breeding ground for violence extremism.

The Institute of Community Cohesion based at the Coventry University in United Kingdom describes community tensions as a state of community dynamics which may potentially lead to disorder, threaten the peace and stability of communities or raise the levels of fear and anxiety in the whole, or a part of the local community[2]. Strained relationships may build up within or between communities, or against particular groups and institutions, based on real or perceived events or information on fears, prejudices, circumstances or specific actions. In the Horn of Africa region, the recent expansion of violent extremism builds on the long-standing (perceived and actual) injustices which have strained relations and are inflamed and sustained by push factors for violent extremism including marginalization, corruption and nepotism, low levels of education, human rights violations, discrimination based on religion or ethnic ground and politically instigated violence.

Violent extremism driven by community tensions in the Horn of Africa and aggravated by inequalities will create a breeding ground for terrorism if factors which produce cohesive communities are not fostered, where there is a common vision and sense of belonging, where diversity of backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and

positively valued, where those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities and, where strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds and circumstances in the communities, worship and workplaces, in learning institutions and in cross-border areas.

Although the proposal at hand is countering violent extremism by addressing community tensions, it is also important to note that community tensions are not inherently negative . Depending on the cause, community tensions can be characteristic of peaceful coexistence. For instance, community activism and public protest are legitimate and potentially creative activities, though they may cause tensions. These can often be positive means of promoting social change, legal expression, and may produce tension. Community Tension Monitoring as a way of countering violent extremism seeks to prevent violence that is borne out of radicalization which in turn is rooted in more structural dynamics.

Fleshing out Community Tension Monitoring using Galtung

Johan Galtung[3], a Norwegian Peace Researcher propounds three types of violence which could be adapted to operationalize the Community Tension Monitoring tool. These are; direct violence which entails visible physical acts of violence, structural violence built into governance systems and determines injustices, and, cultural violence which refers to aspects of culture that make violence acceptable, normal or even glorify it.

Accordingly, direct, structural and cultural violence provide us with lenses to analyse community tensions as conduits for violence extremism and provide interventions. Tension Monitoring, could be done using the Experienced-Evidenced-Potential[4] system with levels of violence:

- Experienced – how do communities feel? What do communities think is happening to them? Are their feelings expressing issues relating to cultural violence, historical factors, and marginalization?
- Evidenced – what has happened or is happening? These are narratives of manifestations of direct violence that are extreme
- Potential – what might happen or has the potential to happen? Are there signs and signals embedded in real and perceived structural violence? What is the composition of security institutions and predicted or planned activity?

Tension Monitoring should inform local policy action, foster a measured partnership and a multi-agency approach to improve communication, information sharing and community engagement to manage tensions leading to violent extremism. Through Tension Monitoring, good quality comprehensive information and intelligence about terrorist and extremist activities can be garnered by the partnership pooling their knowledge and expertise. It is clear that community tensions result from strained relations due to the absence of resilience factors. There is therefore a need to build ‘resilience’ factors which require developing a common vision and sense of belonging, ensuring religious, ethnic, political diversity in the Horn of Africa is appreciated and positively valued recognizing that those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities.

Policies spelling out synergies among the public institutions, non-state actors, peace practitioners and the academia can play an important role in Community Tension Monitoring and countering violent extremism. Complacency and not listening are not responsible approaches to achieving a cohesive community.

Community tensions and violent extremism: Synergy and responses

So what causes community tensions and in the process creates conducive environment for terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa? A *Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa*, held in Ankara, Turkey on the 11th of February 2014, identified porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, corruption and in some cases state complicity in terrorist activities, lack of central authority, and grievances stemming from social, economic and political injustices as the main factors for Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups emergence and taking root in the region. These structural factors further disenfranchise communities from their rights, perpetuate poverty, unemployment and vulnerability. Extremist groups exploit this kind of environment and can fill a void for those vulnerable groups most impacted by these circumstance especially youth and adolescents. These factors underlie community tensions necessary for violence extremism to thrive.

CVE programs in the Horn of Africa have seen development partners investing in programs in the areas of intelligence, law enforcement, investigation and prosecution, judicial capacities, border security and public participation. Such programs can benefit by drawing on the Community Tension Monitoring tool. Programs, such as the National Counter Terrorism Centre in Kenya, which targets government departments, for example, could include Tension Monitoring. The Kenyan National Counter Terrorism centre has a pilot programme focusing on coastal region and involving a number of key government departments with the objectives of building capacities for the authorities involved to develop long-term measures to counter radicalization and violence extremism[5]. The initiative seeks to build a bridge between the classical coercive approach to counter-terrorism and a social and crime prevention approach by combining traditional security with early-warning, preventive security measures. The other programs which target wider society and especially the youth in specific locations in the country could also include Tension Monitoring to inform programming. Such programs involve civil society organizations, inter-faith groups and government agencies in addressing mainly inter-religious tensions, sensitization and awareness creation on safety from violent extremism and terrorism.

One example of incorporating the Community Tension Monitoring tool in programming is ACT! Kenya' project on Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) in Malindi, Kilifi County with objective to respond to the threats of violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya[6].

The most efficacious approach to countering violent extremism in the region would be to institutionalize Community Tension Monitoring and dialogue. This would then call for a

framework for understanding those community tensions in Horn of Africa region that predetermine opportunities for extreme violent activities like radicalization and terrorism.

Conclusion

The result of inclusive Community Tension Monitoring and Countering Violent Extremism will be the prevention of terrorism and the promotion of positive community relations and regional cooperation. In a best case scenario and if Community Tension Monitoring is adapted and utilized effectively, it could lead to a situation where the peoples of the region achieve well-being and can live in peace and feel safe and secure.

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References

[1] Refer to summary report of the Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group Workshop on Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa, 11 February 2014, Ankara. Available at www.theGCTF.org[i]

[2] Institute of Community Cohesion (2010) *Understanding and monitoring tension and conflict in local communities: A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies*. 2n edn. Coventry: Coventry University. *Available at www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk*

[3] See Johan Galtung's classic, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization.* (London: Sage, 1996)

[4] See EEP Framework – Institute of Community Cohesion (2010) *Understanding and monitoring tension and conflict in local communities: A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies*. 2n edn. Coventry: Coventry University. *Available at www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk*

[5] Also see counterterrorism.co.ke

[6] Also see www.act.or.ke