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[Human Development Report 2009] How movers fare

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How movers fare



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Movers can reap large gains from the opportunities available in better-off places. These opportunities are shaped by their underlying resources—skills, money and networks—and are constrained by barriers. The policies and laws that affect decisions to move also affect the process of moving and the outcomes. In general, and especially for low-skilled people, the barriers restrict people’s choices and reduce the gains from moving.

How movers fare

People are motivated to move by the prospects of improved access to work, education, civil and political rights, security and health care. The majority of movers end up better off—sometimes much better off—than before they moved. The gains are potentially highest for people who move from poor to the wealthiest countries, but this type of movement is only a small share of total flows. Available evidence suggests that people who move to emerging and developing countries, as well as within countries, also tend to gain.

However, movement does not necessarily yield a direct positive impact on the well-being of everyone. Moving is risky, with uncertain outcomes and with the specific impacts determined by a host of contextual factors. For both internal and international mobility, different aspects of the process—including the proximate causes of moving and the resources and capabilities that people start out with—profoundly affect outcomes. Those who are forced to flee and leave behind their homes and belongings often go into the process with limited freedom and very few resources. Likewise, those who are moving in the face of local economic crisis, drought or other causes of desperate poverty, may not know what capabilities they will have; they only know that they cannot remain. Even migrants who end up well off after a move often start out with very restricted capabilities and high uncertainty.

The human development outcomes of moving are thus profoundly affected by the conditions under which people move. These conditions determine what resources and capabilities survive the move. Those who go to an embassy to collect a visa, buy a plane ticket and take up a position as a student in, say, the United Kingdom, arrive at their destination in much better shape than someone who is trafficked—arriving with no papers, no money and in bondage. The distance travelled (geographical, cultural and social) is also important. Travelling to a country where one does not speak the language immediately devalues one's knowledge and skills.

This chapter examines how movement affects those who move, why gains are unevenly distributed and why some people win while others lose out. There may well be trade-offs, such as loss of civic rights, even where earnings are higher. The costs of moving also need to be taken into account. We review evidence about these impacts in turn, to highlight the main findings from a vast literature and experience.


The key related question of how moving affects those who don't move, in source and destination places, is addressed in chapter 4. These distinct areas of focus are of course inextricably linked—successful migrants tend to share their success with those who stay at home, while the policy responses of destination places affect how non-movers, as well as movers, fare. Home and host-country impacts are interconnected. Socio-economic mobility in a host country and the ability to move up the ladder in the homeland are often two sides of the same coin.

3.1 Incomes and livelihoods

It is important to recall at the outset that estimating the impacts of migration is fraught with difficulties, as we saw in box 1.1. The main problem is that movers may differ from non-movers in their basic characteristics, so straight comparisons can be misleading and the identification of causal relationships is problematic.


That said, the most easily quantifiable impacts of moving can be seen in incomes and consumption. We begin with these, then turn to review the costs of moving, which must be subtracted from the gross benefits.

Figure 3.1 Movers have much higher incomes than stayers
Annual income of migrants in OECD destination countries
and GDP per capita in origin countries, by origin country HDI category



Source: Ortega (2009).

Figure 3.2 Huge salary gains for high-skilled movers
Gaps in average professional salaries for selected country
pairs, 2002–2006



Source: Source: Clemens (2009b).

3.1.1 Impacts on gross income

The evidence consistently reflects very large average income gains for movers. Commissioned research found large differences in income between stayers and movers to OECD countries, with the biggest differences for those moving from low-HDI countries (figure 3.1). Migrant workers in the United States earn about four times as much as they would in their developing countries of origin,¹ while Pacific Islanders in New Zealand increased their net real wages by a factor of three.² Evidence from a range of countries suggests that income gains increase over time, as the acquisition of language skills leads to better integration in the labour market.³

Gains arise not only when people move to OECD countries. Thai migrants in Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan (Province of China), for example, are paid at least four times as much as they would earn as low-skilled workers at home.⁴ In Tajikistan, when the average monthly wage was only US\$9, seasonal earnings of US\$500–700 in the Russian Federation could cover a family's annual household expenses in the capital city, Dushanbe.⁵ However, these average gains are unevenly distributed, and the costs of moving also detract from the gross gains.

Gains can be large for the high-skilled as well as the low-skilled. The wages of Indian software engineers in the late 1990s, for example, were less than 30 percent of their United States counterparts, so those who were able to relocate to this country reaped large gains.⁶ Figure 3.2 illustrates the wage gaps, adjusted for purchasing power parity, between high-skilled professionals in selected pairs of countries. A doctor from Côte d'Ivoire can raise her real earnings by a factor of six by working in France. Beyond salaries, many are also often motivated by factors such as better prospects for their children, improved security and a more pleasant working environment.⁷

Internal migrants also tend to access better income-earning opportunities and are able to diversify their sources of livelihood. Commissioned research found that internal migrants in Bolivia experienced significant real income gains, with more than fourfold increases accruing to workers with low education levels moving from the countryside to the cities (figure 3.3). We also found that in 13 out of 16

countries internal migrants had higher incomes than non-migrants.⁸ In Brazil and Panama, a series of studies controlling for education found income gains for indigenous groups who move.⁹ Studies across a range of countries suggest that internal migration has enabled many households to lift themselves out of poverty, as discussed further in the next chapter.


The segmentation of labour markets in developing countries affects how movers fare. Sometimes this can be traced to administrative restrictions, as in the *hukou* system in China (box 3.1) and the *ho khau* system in Viet Nam. However, segmentation is also widespread in other regions, including South Asia, Africa and Latin America, through barriers that, while not imposed by law, are nonetheless deeply entrenched through social and cultural norms.¹⁰ For example, rural–urban migrants in India are predominantly employed in industries such as construction, brick kilns, textiles and mining, which entail hard physical labour and harsh working and living environments; in Mongolia, rural–urban migrants typically work in informal activities which are temporary, strenuous and without legal protection.¹¹ In Asia, recent low-skilled migrants from rural areas tend to occupy the lowest social and occupational rungs of urban society and are treated as outsiders.

As we saw in chapter 2, most movers from low-HDI countries are living and working in other low- or medium-HDI countries, in part because barriers to admission are often lower and the costs of moving are less. At the same time, the conditions may well be more difficult than in rich countries and there are risks of both exploitation and expulsion.

Labour market opportunities for migrant women from developing countries tend to be highly concentrated in care activities, paid domestic work and the informal sector.¹² Such women may become trapped in enclaves. For example, in New York City, Hispanic-owned firms were found to provide low wages, few benefits and limited career opportunities to Dominican and Colombian women, reinforcing their social disadvantages.¹³ Similar results were found among Chinese migrant women workers.¹⁴ Most Peruvian and Paraguayan women in Argentina (69 and 58 percent respectively) work for low pay on an informal basis

Figure 3.3 Significant wage gains to internal movers in Bolivia, especially the less well educated

Ratio of destination to origin wages for internal migrants in Bolivia, 2000



Source: Molina and Yañez (2009).

in the personal service sector.¹⁵ Difficulties are compounded where migrant women are excluded from normal worker protections, as is the case for domestic workers in the GCC states.¹⁶ Although practices are changing in some countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), migrants are legally prohibited from joining local unions, and even when this is allowed, they may face resistance and hostility from other workers.¹⁷ NGOs may provide services and protection to migrants, but their coverage tends to be limited.

Labour market discrimination can be a major obstacle to migrants. This is reflected in low call-back rates to job applications where the applicant has a foreign-sounding surname.¹⁸ Yet the picture is often complex, and ethnicity, gender and legal status may all come into play. In the United Kingdom, some studies have found discrimination in hiring migrants in terms of lower employment rates and payments, whereas other studies found that people with Chinese, Indian and Irish backgrounds tended to have employment situations at least as good as white British workers.¹⁹ Our analysis of the 2006 European Social Survey reveals that the vast majority of migrants (more than 75 percent) in this region did not report feeling discriminated against. However, in the much larger country sample provided by the World Values Survey, there was widespread support among locally born people for the proposition, “Employers should give priority to natives when jobs are scarce”, albeit with considerable differences across countries (see section 4.2.5).

Box 3.1 China: Policies and outcomes associated with internal migration

Modelled after the Soviet *propiska* system, albeit with roots dating back to ancient times, China's Residence Registration System operates through a permit (*hukou*), needed to gain access to farmland in agricultural areas and to social benefits and public services in urban areas. Until the mid-1980s, the system was administered strictly and movement without a *hukou* was forbidden. Since then, China has liberalized movement but formally maintained the *hukou* system.

As in other areas of reform, China chose a gradual and partial approach. Beginning in the mid-1880s, it allowed people to work outside their place of residence without a *hukou*, but did not allow them access to social benefits, public services or formal-sector jobs. A two-tier migration system analogous to the points system in some developed countries was designed: changes in permanent residency are permitted for the well educated, but only temporary residence is granted for less-educated rural migrants. Many city governments have offered 'blue-stamp' *hukou* to well-off migrants who were able to make sizeable investments.

The evidence suggests that the human development gains for internal migrants and their families have been limited by the persistence of the *hukou* system, along the dimensions illustrated below:

Income gains. In 2004, on average, rural-urban migrants earned RMB780 (US\$94) per month, triple the average rural farm income. However, due to the segmentation created by the *hukou* system, temporary migrants typically move to relatively low-paid jobs, and their poverty incidence is double that of urban residents with *hukou*.

Working conditions. Low-skilled migrants tend to work in informal jobs that have inadequate protection and benefits. According to one survey in three provinces, migrants' work hours are 50 percent longer than locals, they are often hired without a written contract and fewer than 1 in 10 have old-age social security and health insurance, compared to average coverage of over 70 percent in China as a whole.

Occupational hazards are high—migrants accounted for about 75 percent of the 11,000 fatalities in 2005 in the notoriously dangerous mining and construction industries.

Access to services. Children who move with temporary status pay additional fees and are denied access to elite schools. An estimated 14–20 million migrant children lack access to schooling altogether. Their drop-out rates at primary and secondary schools exceed 9 percent, compared to close to zero for locals. Access to basic health services is limited. Even in Shanghai, one of the better cities in terms of providing social services to migrants, only two thirds of migrant children were vaccinated in 2004, compared to universal rates for local children. When migrants fall ill, they often move back to rural areas for treatment, due to the costs of urban health care.

Participation. Many migrants remain marginalized in destination places due to institutional barriers. They have few channels for expressing their interests and protecting their rights in the work place. Almost 8 out of 10 have no trade union, workers' representative conference, labour supervisory committees or other labour organization, compared to one fifth of locally born people. Long distances also hinder participation: in a survey of migrants in Wuhan City, only 20 percent had voted in the last village election, mainly because they lived too far away from polling stations.

Discussions about *hukou* reform are reportedly ongoing, while some regional governments have further liberalized their systems. Legislative reforms in 1997 significantly improved the rights of all workers—including migrants, and measures to provide portable pensions for migrant workers were announced in 2008. Other signs of change come from Dongguan, Guangdong, for example, where migrants are now referred to as 'new residents' and the Migrants and Rental Accommodation Administration Office was relabelled the 'Residents Service Bureau'.

Source: Avenarius (2007), Gaige (2006), Chan, Liu, and Yang (1999), Fan (2002), Meng and Zhang (2001), Cai, Du, and Wang (2009), Huang (2006), Ha, Yi, and Zhang (2009b), Fang and Wang (2008), and Mitchell (2009).

One problem facing many migrants on arrival is that their skills and credentials go unrecognized.²⁰ Coupled with language and other social barriers, this means that they tend to earn much less than similarly qualified local residents.²¹ The extent of this problem seems to vary across sectors. Information technology firms tend to be more flexible on credentials, for example, whereas public-sector organizations are often more closed. The failure to fully deploy their skills can cause new immigrants to incur significant costs. The Migration Policy Institute recently estimated that up to 20 percent of college-educated migrants in the United States were unemployed or working in low-skilled jobs, and

in Canada, despite the points system, this problem is estimated to drain US\$1.7 billion a year from the economy.²² In response, the Canadian government has launched programmes to speed up the recognition of credentials earned abroad.

Incomes do not depend solely on labour market earnings. In countries with established welfare systems, social transfers reduce poverty rates among disadvantaged groups through unemployment benefits, social assistance and pensions. Whether or not a programme benefits migrant families depends on the design and rules of the system. There are obvious differences across countries in the generosity of these programmes, as their scale tends to be more

limited in developing countries due to budgetary constraints. Since most developing countries do not have extensive systems in place, the question of equality of access does not arise. The focus here is therefore on developed countries.

Our policy assessment found that nearly all developed countries in the sample granted permanent migrants access to unemployment benefits and family allowances. However, people with temporary status are less likely to be able to access assistance. Some countries, including Australia and New Zealand, have imposed waiting periods before various benefits can be accessed. And in efforts to avoid welfare dependency, countries such as France and Germany require that applications for family reunification demonstrate that the applicant has stable and sufficient income to support all family members without relying on state benefits.

The Luxembourg Income Study and the European Survey of Income and Living Conditions allow estimates of the effects of social transfers on poverty among families with children.²³ For all 18 countries in the sample, migrant families are more likely to be poor than locally born families. Based on market incomes before social transfers, poverty rates among children exceed 50 and 40 percent among migrant families


in France and the United Kingdom respectively. The redistributive effect of social welfare in these countries is significant, since transfers more than halve these rates for both migrant and locally born children (figure 3.4).²⁴ In contrast, in the United States the poverty-reducing effect of social transfers for both local and migrant families is negligible, because transfers overall are relatively small. At the same time it is notable that in Australia, Germany and the United States rates of market-income poverty are much lower than in France and the United Kingdom, suggesting that migrant families are doing better in the labour market in those countries.

3.1.2 Financial costs of moving

The gross income gains reported in the literature typically do not account for the monetary costs of moving. These costs arise from various sources, including official fees for documents and clearances, payments to intermediaries, travel expenses and, in some cases, payments of bribes. The costs appear regressive, in that fees for unskilled workers are often high relative to expected wages abroad, especially for those on temporary contracts.²⁵

Substantial costs may arise for those without basic documents. Around the world, an

Figure 3.4 Poverty is higher among migrant children, but social transfers can help
Effects of transfers on child poverty in selected countries, 1999–2001



Source: Smeeding, Wing, and Robson (2008).

Figure 3.5 **Costs of moving are often high**
Costs of intermediaries in selected corridors against income per capita, 2006–2008



Source: Bangladesh to Saudi Arabia: Malek (2008); China to Australia: Zhiwu (2009); Colombia to Spain: Grupo de Investigación en Movilidad Humana (2009); Philippines to Singapore: TWC (2006); Viet Nam to Japan: van Thanh (2008).

Figure 3.6 **Moving costs can be many times expected monthly earnings**
Costs of movement against expected salary of low-skilled Indonesian workers in selected destinations, 2008



Source: The Institute for ECOSOC Rights (2008).

estimated 48 million children, often from very poor families, lack a birth certificate. The main reason is the fee for obtaining such documents and related factors such as distance to the registration centre.²⁶

Lengthy application processes and, in some countries, payments of bribes for routine services can make applying for vital records and basic travel documents very expensive.²⁷ In the Democratic Republic of the Congo passport applicants can expect to pay up to US\$500 (70 percent of average annual income) in bribes.²⁸ Other countries with limited bureaucratic capacity and corruption in the issuance of travel documents reportedly include Azerbaijan, India and Uzbekistan.²⁹

Intermediaries, also known as ‘middlemen’, perform a specific function in the global labour market. They help to overcome information gaps and meet administrative requirements (such as having a job offer prior to visa application) and sometimes lend money to cover the upfront costs of the move. There are a large number of agencies: in the Philippines alone there are nearly 1,500 licensed recruitment agencies, while India has close to 2,000.³⁰ The cost of intermediary services appears to vary enormously, but often exceeds per capita income at home (figure 3.5).


The example of Indonesia illustrates how the costs can vary by destination, with moves to Malaysia and Singapore costing about six months’ expected salary and to Taiwan a full year (figure 3.6). Legal caps on fees charged by recruiters are generally ignored, as migrants routinely pay much more.³¹ The difference between wages at home and expected wages abroad is perhaps the most important determinant of the price of intermediary services. Where relatively few jobs are available, intermediaries who are in a position to allocate these slots are able to charge additional rents. There are cases of abuse and fraud, where prospective movers pay high recruitment fees only to find later on (at the destination) that the work contract does not exist, there have been unilateral changes to the contract, or there are serious violations related to personal safety and working conditions.³² Some migrants report that employers confiscate their passports, mistreat their employees and deny access to medical care.³³

Extensive regulations and official fees can encourage irregularity. For Russian employers,

Figure 3.7

The children of movers have a much greater chance of surviving

Child mortality at origin versus destination by origin country HDI category, 2000 census or latest round



Source: Ortega (2009).

the administrative procedure to apply for a license to hire a foreign worker is reportedly so time-consuming and corrupt that it frequently leads to evasion and perpetuates irregular employment practices.³⁴ In Singapore, employers of low-skilled migrants must pay a levy, which they in turn deduct from workers' wages.³⁵ Under agreements between Thailand, Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, recruitment fees are equivalent to 4–5 months' salary, processing time averages about four months and 15 percent of wages are withheld pending the migrant's return home. In contrast, smugglers in these corridors reportedly charge the equivalent of one month's salary. Given these cost differences, it is not surprising that only 26 percent of migrant workers in Thailand were registered in 2006.³⁶

3.2 Health

This section reviews the impacts of movement on the health of those who move. Gaining better access to services, including health care, may be among the key motivations for moving. Among top high-school graduates from Tonga and Papua New Guinea, 'health care' and 'children's education' were mentioned more often than 'salary' as reasons for migrating, and answers such as 'safety and security' were almost

as frequent.³⁷ However, the links between migration and health are complex. Migrants' health depends on their personal history before moving, the process of moving itself, and the circumstances of resettlement. Destination governments often rigorously screen applicants for work visas, so successful applicants tend to be healthy.³⁸ Nevertheless, irregular migrants may have specific health needs that remain unaddressed.

Moving to more developed countries can improve access to health facilities and professionals as well as to health-enhancing factors such as potable water, sanitation, refrigeration, better health information and, last but not least, higher incomes. Evidence suggests that migrant families have fewer and healthier children than they would have had if they had not moved.³⁹ Recent research conducted in the United States using panel data, which tracks the same individuals over time, found that health outcomes improve markedly during the first year after immigration.⁴⁰

Our commissioned study found a 16-fold reduction in child mortality (from 112 to 7 deaths per 1,000 live births) for movers from low-HDI countries (figure 3.7). Of course these gains are partly explained by self-selection.⁴¹ Nonetheless, the sheer size of these differences suggests that

Barriers to health services arise due to financial constraints as well as status, cultural and language differences

similar outcomes would have been very difficult to realize at home. For comparison, as reported in the 2006 HDR, families in the richest quintile in Burkina Faso had a child mortality rate of about 150 deaths per 1,000 live births.

Not surprisingly, given the poor health services, water quality and sanitation in rural areas, studies suggest that migrants to urban centres significantly improve their chances of survival relative to rural residents.⁴² The size of this effect has been correlated with duration of stay, which was itself associated with higher incomes and improved knowledge and practices. Sometimes migrants use health care services more than urban locals, suggesting that the availability of these may have motivated their move in the first place. However, the health outcomes associated with urbanization are variable: a broader study found that internal migrants' outcomes were worse than those of urban natives, due to their socio-economic disadvantage, and our commissioned research found that internal migrants had higher life expectancy than non-migrants in only half of the countries studied.⁴³

Detailed studies in a number of OECD countries have found that migrants' initial health advantage tends to dissipate over time.⁴⁴ This is believed to reflect the adoption of poorer health behaviour and lifestyles as well as, for some, exposure to the adverse working, housing and environmental conditions that often characterize low-income groups in industrial countries. Separation from family and social networks and uncertainty regarding job security and living conditions can affect health. In several studies, migrants have reported higher incidence of stress, anxiety and depression than residents,⁴⁵ outcomes that were correlated with worse economic conditions, language barriers, irregular status and recent arrival. Conversely, other studies have found positive effects of migration on mental health, associated with better economic opportunities.⁴⁶

Poor housing conditions and risky occupations can increase accidents and compromise health, which may be worse for irregular migrants.⁴⁷ There are well-documented inequalities in health care and status between vulnerable migrant groups and host populations in developed countries.⁴⁸ The health of child migrants can also be affected by their type of work, which

may be abusive and/or hazardous.⁴⁹ In India, for example, many internal migrants work in dangerous construction jobs, while working conditions in the leather industry expose the mainly migrant workers to respiratory problems and skin infections.⁵⁰ Yet these jobs are well paid compared to what was available at home, and interviews in rural Bihar indicate that such jobs are highly sought after.⁵¹

Not all types of migrants have the same access to health care.⁵² Permanent migrants often have greater access than temporary migrants, and the access of irregular migrants tends to be much more restricted (figure 3.8). Movement sometimes deprives internal migrants of access to health services if eligibility is linked to authorized residence, as in China. In contrast, permanent migrants, especially the high-skilled, tend to enjoy relatively good access, while in some countries health care is open to all migrants, regardless of their legal status, as is the case in Portugal and Spain. In the United Arab Emirates coverage varies by emirate, but both Abu Dhabi and Dubai have compulsory insurance schemes to which employers must contribute on behalf of their workers. In Canada all residents are entitled to national health insurance, and the provincial authorities determine who qualifies as a resident.

In practice, barriers to health services arise due to financial constraints as well as status, cultural and language differences,⁵³ especially for irregular migrants. In France, Germany and Sweden there is a 'responsibility to report' the treatment of an irregular migrant, which can lead to a lack of trust between providers and patients and deter migrants from seeking care.⁵⁴ If single female migrants in the GCC states are found to be pregnant, they are deported.⁵⁵

In less-wealthy destination countries there is a tension between the ideal of granting health care access to irregular migrants and the reality of resource constraints. In South Africa many non-nationals report not being able to access antiretroviral drugs against AIDS because facilities deny treatment on the basis of 'being foreign' or not having a national identity booklet.⁵⁶ Given that South Africa has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, combined with improved but still limited access to antiretrovirals, it is not surprising that

irregular migrants represent a low priority. But more positive examples are found in other parts of the world. Thailand, for example, provides antiretroviral treatment to migrants from Cambodia and Myanmar, with support from the Global Fund on AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Thailand also provides migrants with access to health insurance, and efforts are under way to reach irregular migrants.

3.3 Education

Education has both intrinsic value and brings instrumental gains in income-earning potential and social participation. It can provide the language, technical and social skills that facilitate economic and social integration and intergenerational income gains. Movement is likely to enhance educational attainment, especially among children. Many families move with the specific objective of having their children attend better and/or more advanced schools. In many rural areas in developing countries education is available only at primary level and at a lower quality than in urban areas, providing an additional motive for rural–urban migration.⁵⁷ Similarly, international migration for educational purposes—school migration—is rising.⁵⁸


In this section we review the evidence concerning school completion levels at places of origin and at destinations, whether migrant children can access state schools and how well they perform relative to children born locally.

School enrolments can change for a number of reasons when a family relocates. Higher incomes are part of the story, but other factors, such as the availability of teachers and schools, the quality of infrastructure and the cost of transport, may be important as well. A natural starting point when measuring education gains is a comparison of enrolment rates. These present a striking picture of the advantages of moving (figure 3.9), with the crude differences being largest for children from low-HDI countries. Two familiar notes of caution should be sounded, however: these results may be overestimated due to positive selection; and mere enrolment guarantees neither a high-quality education nor a favourable outcome from schooling.⁵⁹

The importance of early stimulation to the physical, cognitive and emotional development

Figure 3.8 Temporary and irregular migrants often lack access to health care services


Access to health care by migrant status in developed versus developing countries, 2009



Source: Klugman and Pereira (2009).

Figure 3.9 Gains in schooling are greatest for migrants from low-HDI countries

Gross total enrolment ratio at origin versus destination by origin country HDI category, 2000 census or latest round




Source: Ortega (2009).

Note: Gross total enrolment includes primary, secondary and tertiary education.

Figure 3.10 Migrants have better access to education in developed countries

Access to public schooling by migrant status in developed versus developing countries, 2009



Source: Klugman and Pereira (2009).

of children, and the associated importance of early childhood development (ECD) programmes, is well established.⁶⁰ Research from Germany indicates that ECD can bring the children of migrants to par with native children with the same socio-economic background.⁶¹

However, due to traditional norms, language and cultural barriers and sometimes uncertain legal status, these children are generally less likely to enrol in formal ECD programmes, despite the fact that authorities in Europe and the United States often actively reach out to migrant children.⁶² Thailand is among those developing countries that seek to extend informal ECD to migrants, in border areas in the north. Similar arrangements can be found in some other countries; programmes in the Dominican Republic serve Haitian children, for example.

In some countries migrant children may not have access to state schools or their parents may be asked to pay higher fees. Our policy assessment found that developed countries are more likely to allow immediate access to schooling for all types of migrant—permanent, temporary, humanitarian and irregular (figure 3.10). Yet a third of developed countries in our sample, including Singapore and Sweden,⁶³ did not allow access to children with irregular status, while the same was true for over half the developing countries in the sample, including Egypt and India. Some specific cases: in the United Arab Emirates children with irregular migrant status do not have access to education services; in Belgium education is free and a right for every person, but not compulsory for irregular children; in Poland education for children between 6 and 18 years is a right and is compulsory, but children with irregular status cannot be counted for funding purposes, which may lead the school to decline to enrol such children.⁶⁴

Poverty and discrimination (formal and informal) can inhibit access to basic services. Even if children with irregular status have the right to attend a state school, there may be barriers to their enrolment. In several countries (e.g. France, Italy, the United States), fears that their irregular situation will be reported have been found to deter enrolment.⁶⁵ In South Africa close to a third of school-age non-national children are not enrolled, for a combination of reasons including inability to pay for fees, transport, uniforms and books, and exclusion by school administrators, while those in school regularly report being subjected to xenophobic comments by teachers or other students.⁶⁶

The steepest challenges appear to be faced by two groups: children who migrate alone,

who tend to have irregular status (box 3.2), and children who migrate within and between developing countries with their parents, on a temporary basis. The first group is unlikely to be able to access education at all, due to social and cultural isolation, strenuous and hazardous work, extreme poverty, poor health conditions and language barriers.⁶⁷ As regards the second group, qualitative studies in Viet Nam and Pakistan have found that seasonal migration disrupts their education.⁶⁸ For instance, the Rac Lai minority in Viet Nam migrate with their children to isolated mountainous areas during the harvest season and their children do not attend school during this period.⁶⁹

Even if migrant children gain access to better schools than would have been available to them at origin, they do not all perform well in examinations in comparison with their locally born peers. In the 21 OECD and 12 non-OECD countries covered by the Programme for International Student Assessment,⁷⁰ which tested performance in science, pupils who were migrants tended to perform worse in this subject than locally born children. However, foreign-born pupils perform as well as their native peers in Australia, Ireland and New Zealand, as well as in Israel, Macao (China) the Russian Federation and Serbia. Likewise, pupils from the same country of origin performed differently across even neighbouring countries: for example, migrant pupils from Turkey perform better in mathematics in Switzerland than in Germany.⁷¹ The next generation—children of migrants who are born in the destination place—generally do better, but with exceptions, including Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.

Part of the educational disadvantage of children in migrant families can be traced to low parental education and low income. Children whose parents have less than full secondary completion—which tends to be the case in migrant households in France, Germany, Switzerland and the United States—typically complete fewer years of school. However, while many migrant families live away from relatives and social networks, a study of migrant children in eight developed countries found that they are generally more likely than local children to grow up with both parents.⁷² This counters a belief sometimes found in the literature that migrant

Box 3.2 Independent child migrants

Trafficking and asylum-seeking are often depicted as accounting for most of the independent movement of children. However, evidence with a long historic record confirms that children also move in search of opportunities for work and education. The Convention on the Rights of the Child goes some way to recognizing children as agents, decision makers, initiators and social actors in their own right. However, the literature and policy responses to children's mobility have largely focused on welfare and protection from harm, and tended to neglect policies of inclusion, facilitation and non-discrimination.

As for other types of movement, the effect of independent child migration is context-specific. Some studies have found a significant link between non-attendance at school and the propensity to migrate to work among rural children, while others find that migration is positively associated with education. A recent study using census data in Argentina, Chile and South Africa shows that independent child migrants had worse shelter at destination, whereas dependent child migrants were similar to non-migrants in their type of shelter. Over a fifth of international independent child migrants aged 15–17 years in these countries were employed, compared to fewer than 4 percent of non-migrant dependent children. Many live with relatives or employers, but shelter and security can be important concerns. Children may be less able than adults to change jobs, find it harder to obtain documents even when eligible, may be more likely to suffer employer violence or encounters with the police, and may be more easily cheated by employers and others.

Source: Bhabha (2008) and Yaqub (2009).

children are often disadvantaged by the absence of a parent.

In OECD countries migrant pupils generally attend schools with teachers and educational resources of similar quality to those attended by locally-born pupils, although there are some exceptions, including Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal. In some cases, the quality of schools that migrant children attend is below national standards, but this is more often related to local income levels generally than to migrant status in particular. Studies on school segregation in the United States suggest that children from migrant families have worse test scores if they attend minority, inner-city schools.⁷³ Studies from the Netherlands and Sweden find that clustering migrant children and separating them from other children is detrimental to school performance.⁷⁴ Even if they are not at a disadvantage with regard to instructional materials and equipment, migrant pupils may need special services, such as local language instruction.

Our interest in schooling is partly due to its value in improving the prospects of future

Box 3.3 The next generation

People who move are often motivated by the prospect of better lives for their children. And indeed the children of migrants can represent a key population group requiring the attention of policy makers. In Brussels, for example, they represent over 40 percent of the school-age population, while in New York they are half and in Los Angeles County almost two thirds.

Obtaining a good education is critical to future prospects. Evidence suggests that the children of migrants typically perform better than their parents, but do not fully catch up with children without a migrant background, even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics. There are exceptions, however, including Australia and Canada, where school performance is close to or exceeds that of native peers. Countries with education systems that involve early streaming, such as Germany and the Netherlands, appear to have the biggest gaps in school performance.

How the children of migrants fare in the labour market also tends to differ across countries and groups. Recent findings suggest that

they have higher employment rates compared to migrants in the same age group, but they are at a disadvantage compared to those without a migrant background. In some European countries youth unemployment rates are worse among the children of migrants. Limited access to informal networks and discrimination (whether origin- or class-based) can contribute to these disparities.

Some children of migrants encounter racism, often linked to limited job opportunities. Studies in the United States, for example, have suggested that there is a risk of 'segmented assimilation', meaning that the contacts, networks and aspirations of children of immigrants are limited to their own ethnic group, but also that this risk varies across groups. Teenage children of Mexican migrants have been found to be at higher risk of dropping out of school, going to prison or becoming pregnant. The same studies suggest that economic and social resources at the family and community levels can help to overcome these risks and avert the rise of an underclass of disaffected youth.

Source: Crul (2007), OECD (2007), Castles and Miller (1993), and Portes and Zhou (2009).

generations. Some evidence on the extent to which this happens is presented in box 3.3.

3.4 Empowerment, civic rights and participation

Moving has the potential to affect not only material well-being but also such things as bargaining power, self-respect and dignity. Empowerment, defined as the freedom to act in pursuit of personal goals and well-being,⁷⁵ can be enhanced through movement. However, the reception in the host country obviously matters, especially when migrants face local hostility, which can even lead to outbreaks of violence.

Human development is concerned with the full range of capabilities, including social freedoms that cannot be exercised without political and civic guarantees. These form part of the dimension of freedom that some philosophers have labelled "the social bases of self-respect".⁷⁶ They can be just as important as gains in income and may be associated with these gains, but are often held in check by deep-seated social, class and racial barriers. In many countries the attitude towards migration is negative, which can diminish migrants' sense of dignity and self-respect. This is not a new phenomenon: in the 19th century, the Irish faced the same prejudices in the United Kingdom, as did the Chinese in Australia.

Movement can allow rural women to gain autonomy. Empowerment tends to occur when migration draws women from rural to urban areas, separating them from other family members and friends and leading them to take paid work outside the home.⁷⁷ Qualitative studies in Ecuador, Mexico and Thailand have demonstrated such effects. For the women in these studies, returning to the old rural way of life was an unthinkable proposition.⁷⁸ Higher labour force participation and greater autonomy have also been found among Turkish women who emigrated.⁷⁹ It is not only women who seek to challenge traditional roles when they move: young migrant men can be similarly empowered to challenge patriarchal structures within the family.⁸⁰

But such positive outcomes are not inevitable. Some migrant communities become caught in a time warp, clinging to the cultural and social practices that prevailed in the home country at the time of migration, even if the country has since moved on.⁸¹ Or the migrant communities may develop radically conservative ideas and practices, as a way to isolate them from the host culture. This can lead to alienation and, occasionally, to extremism. There is a complex dynamic between cultural and community traditions, socio-economic circumstances and

public policies. Recent micro-analysis for 10 Latin American countries found that internal migrants of indigenous origin still faced discrimination in urban areas, even while they gained greater access to services than they had in their rural area.⁸² Another study found that Bolivian women in Argentina were discriminated against, had only limited employment opportunities and continued to occupy subordinate social positions.⁸³

Participation and civic engagement are important aspects of empowerment. Our analysis using the World Values Survey suggests that people with a migrant background are more likely to participate in a range of civic associations. Compared to people who do not have a migrant parent, they are more likely to be a member of, and also tend to have more confidence in, a range of organizations, such as sport, recreational, art and professional organizations. Research also suggests that political participation increases with the ability to speak the host country's language, with duration of stay, education in the destination country, connections to social networks and labour markets, and when institutional barriers to registering and voting are lower.⁸⁴

Institutional factors matter, especially civic and electoral rights. Our policy assessment found that voting in national elections was largely restricted to citizens, although several developed countries allow foreigners to vote in local elections (figure 3.11). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which assesses the opportunities for migrants to participate in public life in terms of collective associations, voting in, and standing for local elections and support provided to migrant associations, found policies in Western Europe to be favourable to participation, but those in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were less so. In Sweden any legal resident who has lived in the country for three years can vote in regional and local elections and stand for local elections, while in Spain foreigners can vote in local elections as long as they are registered as residents with their local authority.


Many people move at least partly to enjoy greater physical and personal security, and to places where the rule of law and government accountability are better. This is obviously the case

for many refugees fleeing from conflict, even if their legal situation remains tenuous while they are seeking asylum. Our analysis of determinants of flows between pairs of countries shows that the level of democracy in a country has a positive, significant effect on migrant inflows.⁸⁵

Yet even countries with strong legal traditions are tested when routine police work involves the enforcement of migration law. As we saw in chapter 2, countries vary in their enforcement practices. In some countries, irregular migrants may be seen as easy targets by corrupt officials. In South Africa police hoping to extort bribes often destroy or refuse to recognize documents in order to justify arrest.⁸⁶ Mongolian migrants in the Czech Republic also report paying fines during police raids, regardless of whether they are authorized or not.⁸⁷ In Malaysia migrants have sometimes been subject to informal enforcement mechanisms, which have led to complaints of abuse (box 3.4).

As we shall see in chapter 4, people in destination places often have concerns about the economic, security and cultural impacts of immigration. In some cases, xenophobia arises. This appears to be most likely where extremists foment fears and insecurities. Outbreaks of violence towards migrants can erupt—such

Figure 3.11 Voting rights are generally reserved for citizens
Voting rights in local elections by migrant status in developed versus developing countries, 2009



Source: Klugman and Pereira (2009).

Box 3.4 Enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia

As one of the most robust economies in South-East Asia, Malaysia has attracted many migrant workers (officially measured at around 7 percent of the population in 2005). The Malaysian labour force at the end of 2008 was almost 12 million, about 44 percent of the 27 million residents, and included about 2.1 million legal migrants from Bangladesh, Indonesia and other Asian countries. The Malaysian government has tended to tolerate unauthorized migration, while regularizations have sometimes been coupled with a ban on new entries and stepped up enforcement.

Since 1972, Malaysia's People's Volunteer Corps (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat or RELA) has helped to enforce laws, including immigration laws. RELA volunteers, who number about 500,000, are allowed to enter workplaces and homes without warrants, to carry firearms and to make arrests after receiving permission from RELA leaders. Migrant activists say that RELA volunteers have become vigilantes, planting evidence to justify arrests of migrants and using excessive force in their policing. The government has recently announced its intention to curb abuses and is currently looking into ways of improving RELA by providing training to its members.

Source: Crush and Ramachandran (2009), Vijayani (2008) and Migration DRC (2007).

as those in Malaysia and South Africa in 2008 and Northern Ireland in 2009, for example—with serious repercussions for both the individuals involved and the societies as a whole.⁸⁸ Experience suggests that such outbreaks typically occur where political vacuums allow unscrupulous local actors to manipulate underlying social tensions.⁸⁹

Ironically, although intolerance often results in resistance to social contact, evidence suggests that increased social contact between migrants and non-migrants can improve levels of tolerance for migrant groups and counter existing biases.⁹⁰ Clearly, moderate politicians, government authorities and NGOs all have a critical part to play in designing and delivering policies and services that facilitate integration and avert escalated tensions. Having legislation on the books is not enough: it must be accompanied by leadership, accountability and informed public debate (chapter 5).

3.5 Understanding outcomes from negative drivers

Some people move because their luck improves—they win the green card lottery, or a friend or relative offers a helping hand to take up a new opportunity in the city. But many others move in response to difficult circumstances—economic collapse and political unrest in Zimbabwe, war in Sudan, natural disasters

such as the Asian tsunami. Moving under these circumstances can expose people to risk, increase their vulnerability and erode their capabilities. But of course in these cases it is not the migration per se but the underlying drivers that cause such deterioration in outcomes. This section reviews the outcomes associated with three broad drivers: conflict, development-induced displacement and trafficking.

3.5.1 When insecurity drives movement

People who flee insecurity and violence typically see an absolute collapse in their human development outcomes. But migration nonetheless protects them from the greater harm they would doubtless come to if they were to stay put. Several forms of protection are available for refugees, especially for those covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention—which defines the criteria under which individuals may be granted asylum by its signatory countries and sets out their associated rights—and thus under the UNHCR mandate. This protection has allowed millions of people to move to new safe and secure environments.

Contemporary conflicts are increasingly associated with large population movements, including deliberate displacement of civilians as a weapon of war.⁹¹ While some are able to flee to more distant places in North America, Western Europe and Australasia, most displaced people relocate within or near their country of origin. Even if camps host only about a third of those displaced by conflicts,⁹² these settlements have come to symbolize the plight of people in poor, conflict-affected regions. A contemporary example is the people of Darfur, Sudan, who fled their villages in the wake of attacks that destroyed their cattle and crops, wells and homes, to join what was already the largest displaced population in the world in the wake of the long-running war in southern Sudan.

When the poor and destitute flee combat zones, they run severe risks. Conflict weakens or destroys all forms of capital and people are cut off from their existing sources of income, services and social networks, heightening their vulnerability. After flight, those displaced may have escaped the most direct physical threats, but still face a range of daunting challenges. Security concerns and local hostility rank high


among their problems, especially in and around camps.⁹³ In civil wars, the internally displaced may face harassment from government and animosity from local people.

Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that conflict and insecurity drive only a small share of all movement—about one tenth of international movement and around one twentieth of internal movement. There are regional differences: Africa has been more extensively affected, conflict being associated with about 13 percent of international movement on the continent. Map 3.1 shows the location of conflicts and major flows of people displaced within and across borders in Africa. While the map paints a sombre picture, we underline that the vast majority of migration in Africa is not conflict-induced and that most Africans move for the same reasons as everyone else.⁹⁴

Beyond continuing insecurity, trying to earn a decent income is the single greatest challenge that displaced people encounter, especially where they lack identity papers.⁹⁵ In commissioned case studies,⁹⁶ Uganda was the only one of six countries where refugees were legally allowed to move around freely, to accept work and to access land. About 44 percent of Uganda's working-age camp population was employed, whereas in all five other countries the figure was below 15 percent. Even if the displaced are permitted to work, opportunities are often scarce.

The human development outcomes of those driven to move by insecurity vary considerably. While the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have raised awareness, internally displaced people—80 percent of whom are women and children—do not benefit from the same legal rights as refugees.⁹⁷ Roughly half the world's estimated 26 million internally displaced people receive some support from UNHCR, IOM and others, but sovereignty is often invoked as a justification for restricting international aid efforts. In 2007, Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe each had more than 500,000 crisis-affected people who were beyond the reach of any humanitarian assistance.⁹⁸ Even in less extreme cases, malnutrition, poor access to clean water and health care, and lack of documentation and property rights are typical among the internally displaced. However, some governments have made concerted efforts

Map 3.1 Conflict as a driver of movement in Africa
Conflict, instability and population movement in Africa



Source: UNHCR (2008) and IDMC (2008).

Note: This map illustrates refugee flows based on official UNHCR data and misses important flows associated with instability, as in the case of Zimbabweans fleeing to South Africa for example.

to improve the rights and living conditions of their internally displaced populations.⁹⁹

The situation of international refugees also varies, but can be bleak, especially in cases of protracted conflict, such as Palestine. Such cases account for roughly half of all refugees. Our commissioned analysis confirmed overall weak human development outcomes, alongside some heterogeneity across groups and countries. The incidence of sexual and gender-based violence is high. Paradoxically, however, women in Burundi and Sri Lanka were reportedly empowered as they adopted new social roles as protectors and providers for their families.¹⁰⁰

Education and health indicators in refugee camps are sometimes superior to those of surrounding local populations. Our study found that the share of births attended by skilled medical personnel in camps surveyed in Nepal, Tanzania and Uganda was significantly higher than among these countries' population as a whole. Similarly, education indicators—such as gross primary enrolment ratios and pupil-to-teacher ratios—were better among camp-based

refugees than for the general population (figure 3.12). These patterns reflect both the effects of humanitarian assistance in camps and the generally poor human development conditions and indicators prevailing in countries that host the bulk of refugees.


As noted above, most refugees and internally displaced people do not end up in camps at all, or at least not for long. For example, less than a third of Palestinian refugees live in UNRWA-administered camps.¹⁰¹ On average, those who relocate to urban centres seem to be younger and better educated, and may enjoy better human development outcomes than those living in camps. Others, usually the better off, may be able to flee to more distant and wealthier countries, sometimes under special government programmes.

Only a minority of asylum seekers succeed in obtaining either refugee status or residency, and those whose request is denied can face precarious situations.¹⁰² Their experience depends on the policies of the destination country. Developed countries in our policy assessment allowed humanitarian migrants access to emergency services, but more restricted access to preventive services, whereas in the developing countries in our sample, access to public health services was even more restricted (figure 3.8).

Finding durable long-term solutions to the problem in the form of sustainable return or successful local integration has proved a major challenge. In 2007, an estimated 2.7 million internally displaced people and 700,000 refugees, representing about 10 and 5 percent of stocks respectively, returned to their areas of origin.¹⁰³ Perhaps the Palestinian case, more than any other, illustrates the hardships faced by refugees when conflict is protracted, insecurity is rampant and local economic opportunities are almost non-existent.¹⁰⁴

In other cases, gradual integration into local communities, sometimes through naturalization, has taken place in a number of developing and developed countries, although refugees tend to be relatively disadvantaged, especially as regards labour market integration.¹⁰⁵

Figure 3.12 School enrolment among refugees often exceeds that of host communities in developing countries
Gross primary enrolment ratios: refugees, host populations and main countries of origin, 2007



Source: de Bruijn (2009), UNHCR (2008) and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2008b).

3.5.2 Development-induced displacement

Outcomes may also be negative when people are displaced by development projects. The classic

case of this occurs when large dams are built to provide urban water supplies, generate electricity or open up downstream areas for irrigation. Agricultural expansion is another major cause, as when pastoralists lose traditional riverine grazing lands when these are developed for irrigated cash crops. Infrastructure projects such as roads, railways or airports may also displace people, while the energy sector—mining, power plants, oil exploration and extraction, pipelines—may be another culprit. Parks and forest reserves may displace people when managed in a top-down style rather than by local communities.

These types of investment generally expand most people's opportunities—in terms of providing yield-increasing technology, links to markets and access to energy and water, among other things.¹⁰⁶ But how the investments are designed and delivered is critical. By the 1990s it was recognized that such interventions could have negative repercussions for the minority of people directly affected, and were criticized on social justice and human rights grounds.¹⁰⁷ One vocal critic has been the World Commission on Dams, which has stated that, “impoverishment and disempowerment have been the rule rather than the exception with respect to resettled people around the world,”¹⁰⁸ and that these outcomes have been worst for indigenous and tribal peoples displaced by big projects.

Among the impacts observed in indigenous communities are loss of assets, unemployment, debt bondage, hunger and cultural disintegration. There are many such examples, which have been well documented elsewhere.¹⁰⁹ The India Social Institute estimates that there are about 21 million development-induced displaced persons in India, many of whom belong to scheduled castes and tribal groups. In Brazil the construction of the Tucuruí Dam displaced an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 people and significantly altered the lifestyle and livelihood means of the *Parakanã*, *Asurini* and *Parkatêjê* indigenous groups. Poor resettlement planning split up communities and forced them to relocate several times, often in areas that lacked the necessary infrastructure to serve both the needs of a growing migrant population (pulled in by construction jobs) and those displaced by the project.¹¹⁰

This issue was addressed in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement mentioned above. The principles provide that, during the planning stage, the authorities should explore all viable options for avoiding displacement. Where it cannot be avoided, it is up to the authorities to make a strong case for it, stating why it is in the best interests of the public. The support and participation of all stakeholders should be sought and, where applicable, agreements should stipulate the conditions for compensation and include a mechanism for resolving disputes. In all instances, displacement should not threaten life, dignity, liberty or security, and should include long-term provisions for adequate shelter, safety, nutrition and health for those displaced. Particular attention should be given to the protection of indigenous peoples, minorities, smallholders and pastoralists.

These principles can help inform development planners as to the social, economic, cultural and environmental problems that large- and even small-scale development projects can create. Incorporating such analysis in planning processes, as has been done for some major sources of development finance—including the World Bank, which has an Involuntary Resettlement Policy—has been an important step forward.¹¹¹ Such policies allow for rights of appeal by aggrieved parties through inspection panels and other mechanisms. Approaches of this kind can enable favourable human development outcomes for the majority while helping to mitigate the risks borne by the displaced minority, though the challenges remain large.

3.5.3 Human trafficking

The images associated with trafficking are often horrendous, and attention tends to focus on its association with sexual exploitation, organized crime, violent abuse and economic exploitation. Human trafficking not only adversely affects individuals but can also undermine respect for whole groups. However, the increasing focus on this phenomenon has not yet provided a reliable sense of either its scale or its relative importance in movements within and across borders (chapter 2).

Above all, trafficking is associated with restrictions on human freedom and violations of basic human rights. Once caught in a trafficking

Above all, trafficking is associated with restrictions on human freedom and violations of basic human rights

Trafficking can be most effectively combated through better opportunities and awareness at home—the ability to say ‘no’ to traffickers is the best defence

network, people may be stripped of their travel documents and isolated, so as to make escape difficult if not impossible. Many end up in debt bondage in places where language, social and physical barriers frustrate their efforts to seek help. In addition, they may be reluctant to identify themselves, since they risk legal sanctions or criminal prosecution. People trafficked into sex work are also at high risk of infection from HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.¹¹²

One basic constraint in assessing the impacts of trafficking relates to data. The IOM’s Counter Trafficking Module database contains data on fewer than 14,000 cases that are not a representative sample, and the same applies to the database of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).¹¹³ The picture that emerges from these data, alongside existing studies and reports, suggests that most people who are trafficked are young women from minority ethnic groups. This is confirmed by other sources—for example a study in South-eastern Europe, which found that young people and ethnic minorities in the rural areas of post-conflict countries were vulnerable to trafficking, as they tended to experience acute labour market exclusion and disempowerment.¹¹⁴ However, this picture may be biased, since it is possible that males are less willing to self-report for fear they will be refused victim status. In addition to social and economic exclusion, violence and exploitation at home or in the home community increase vulnerability to trafficking. So too does naïve belief in promises of well-paid jobs abroad.

Sexual exploitation is the most commonly identified form of human trafficking (about 80 percent of cases in the UNODC database), with economic exploitation comprising most of the balance. For women, men and children trafficked for these and other exploitative purposes, bonded labour, domestic servitude, forced marriage, organ removal, begging, illicit adoption and conscription have all been reported.

Alongside the lack of power and assets of the individuals involved, the negative human development outcomes of trafficking can be partly associated with the legal framework of destination countries. Restrictive immigration controls mean that marginalized groups tend to have irregular status and so lack access to the formal labour market and the protections offered by the

state to its citizens and to authorized migrant workers.¹¹⁵ More generally, of course, trafficking can be most effectively combated through better opportunities and awareness at home—the ability to say ‘no’ to traffickers is the best defence.

Difficulties in distinguishing trafficking from other types of exploitation, as well as challenges involved in defining exploitative practices, further complicate the rights of trafficked people. Problems can arise over enforcement. It appears that trafficking is sometimes very broadly interpreted to apply to all migrant women who engage in sex work. This can be used to justify their harassment and deportation, making them even more vulnerable to exploitation. And once identified, they are virtually always deported or referred to assistance programmes conditional on cooperation with law enforcement.

Anti-trafficking initiatives have burgeoned in recent years. Interventions to reduce vulnerability in potential source communities, such as awareness campaigns and livelihood projects, have been undertaken. Assistance programmes have also provided counselling, legal aid and support for return and reintegration. Some of these programmes are proving successful, such as the use of entertainment and personal stories as community awareness tools in Ethiopia and Mali, or door-to-door mass communication campaigns as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹¹⁶ Other initiatives, however, have led to counterproductive and sometimes even disastrous outcomes, including prejudicial limitations on women’s rights. In Nepal, for example, prevention messages discouraged girls and women from leaving their villages, while HIV awareness campaigns stigmatized returnees.¹¹⁷ Anti-trafficking initiatives clearly raise very complex and difficult challenges, which need to be carefully handled.

The lines between traffickers on the one hand and recruiters and smugglers on the other can be blurred. For example, the business of recruitment expands to include numerous layers of informal sub-agents. These sub-agents, working under the umbrella of legitimate recruiters can reduce accountability and increase costs. The risks of detention and deportation are high. Smuggling costs in some cases include bribing corrupt border officials and manufacturing false documents.¹¹⁸

3.6 Overall impacts

We have studied the discrete impacts of migration on incomes, health, education and aspects of empowerment and agency—and looked at the negative outcomes that can occur when people move under duress. Differences in the HDI are a simple way to capture overall changes.


Our background research found very large average differences between the HDI of migrants and that of non-migrants, moving internally and across borders. We found that, on average, migrants to OECD countries had an HDI about 24 percent higher than that of people who stayed in their respective countries of origin.¹¹⁹ But the gains are large not only for those who move to developed countries: we also found substantial differences between internal migrants and non-migrants.¹²⁰ Figure 3.13 shows that, in 14 of the 16 developing countries covered by this analysis, the HDI for internal migrants is higher than that of non-migrants.

In some cases the differences are substantial. For internal movers in Guinea, for example, the HDI for migrants is 23 percent higher than for non-migrants—only one percentage point lower than for migrants to OECD countries. If these migrants were thought of as a separate country, they would be ranked about 25 places higher than non-migrants in the global HDI.

There are two major exceptions to the overall pattern of improved well-being from internal movement: in Guatemala and Zambia internal migrants appear to do worse than non-migrants. Both these cases underline the risks that accompany migration. In Guatemala most movers were displaced by violence and civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s, while in Zambia migrants faced extreme urban poverty following the successive economic shocks that have hit this country over the past 20 years. In a few other cases—Bolivia and Peru, for example—the overall human development outcome appears marginal despite sizeable income gains, suggesting poor access to services as a factor inhibiting well-being. However, these exceptional cases serve to emphasize the norm, which is that most movers are winners.

These findings for international movers are borne out by evidence on migrants' own sense of well-being (figure 3.14). We analysed data for 52 countries in 2005 and found that self-reported


Figure 3.13 Significant human development gains to internal movers
Ratio of migrants' to non-migrants' estimated HDI in selected developing countries, 1995–2005



Source: Harttgen and Klasen (2009).

levels of happiness and health were very similar among migrants and non-migrants: 84 percent of migrants felt happy (compared to 83 percent of non-migrants), while 72 percent felt that their health was good or very good (compared to 70 percent of non-migrants); only 9 percent were 'not satisfied' with life (compared to 11 percent of non-migrants). The share of migrants reporting that they felt quite or very happy was highest in developed countries. Similar shares of foreign and locally born respondents—more than 70 percent—felt that they have 'freedom and choice over their lives'.¹²¹

Figure 3.14 Migrants are generally as happy as locally-born people
Self-reported happiness among migrants and locally-born people around the world, 2005/2006



Source: HDR team estimates based on WVS (2006).

3.7 Conclusions

The complex effects associated with movement are difficult to summarize simply. The broad findings presented in this chapter underline the role of movement in expanding human freedoms that was outlined in chapter 1. We saw that people who move generally do enhance their opportunities in at least some dimensions, with gains that can be very large. However, we also saw that the gains are reduced by policies at home and destination places as well as by the constraints facing individuals and their families. Since different people face different opportunities and constraints, we observed significant inequalities in the returns to movement. The cases in which people experience deteriorations in their well-being during or following the process of movement—conflict, trafficking, natural disasters, and so on—were associated with constraints that prevent them from choosing their place in life freely.

A key point that emerged is that human movement can also be associated with trade-offs—people may gain in some and lose in other dimensions of freedom. However, the losses can be alleviated and even offset by better policies, as we will show in the final chapter.