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Theological Leadership in Christian-Muslim Encounters

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THEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP IN CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM ENCOUNTERS. AN INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE

Yahya Wijaya, Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world (160-180 mio); yet it is also home for more than 20 million Christians. The most well-known of its islands, Bali, is characteristically Hindu. There are also adherents of Buddhism, various folk religions and Chinese popular religions in a significant number. Such plurality has been made a part of the identity of the modern nation of Indonesia since its inception, as demonstrated in the national motto: *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). The founding fathers were well aware that when this reality of plurality is denied, it is the existence of the nation is be at stake. To accept that fact, however, is not easy for religious groups having a history of conflict and rivalry, notably those of Islam and Christianity. In Indonesia, attempts to overcome the difficulties in accepting the reality of plurality can be seen in three areas: theological reinterpretation, political consensus, and interreligious dialogue and relationships.

1. Christian Reinterpretation of Uniqueness

Many religious leaders in Indonesia realise that one obstacle in accepting the reality of plurality are the particularistic perspectives developed from religions. For instance, both Islam and Christianity are strong enough in emphasising their own truth claim, the claim that the real truth or salvation is exclusively related to the belief of that community. Such claim motivates energetic and ambitious mission works of those religions, which contributes to their global expansion. Despite their constructive achievements, mission works of both Islam and Christianity, aiming at the conversion of other believers, create uneasy relationships between adherents of the two religions. The truth claim also fosters a sense of pride in believers, which drives them, to a certain degree, into a situation of conflict when meeting with people of other religions.

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Reinterpretation of the truth claim has been attempted by Christian as well as Muslim theologians. The works of John Hick and Paul Knitter, among others, have provoked discourses regarding the need to develop a theology of religions which is more sensitive to the context of plurality. Knitter's typology of exclusive, inclusive and pluralist positions has helped many theologians to self-evaluate their theology of religions. There is a tendency among theologians of mainline Christian communities to leave behind the exclusive position and take either an inclusive or pluralist one. Having been aware of the difficult social and moral consequences of the exclusive position in the experience of Indonesian society, several Indonesian theologians are enthusiastic in contributing to the development of a more sympathetic theology of religions.

E.G. Singgih, biblical scholar at Duta Wacana Christian University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, is one of those theologians who participate in the reconstruction of a Christian theology of religions, by suggesting a reinterpretation of the biblical concept of the 'chosen people'. Singgih affirms that the concept of the chosen people contradicts the recently growing spirit of 'interreligious ecumenism', since the first shows a particularistic attitude whilst the later is universalistic in nature.¹ He also agrees that the traditional interpretation of the chosen people implies a superiority feeling, which results in creating prejudices toward the others. To show historical evidences proving the negative implications of that concept, Singgih points to the experience of the people of South Africa. According to him, South Africa's apartheid system is a fruit of the idea of the chosen people which was developed among the white ethnic group, the Boer. That idea was generated by this Dutch descendant group who called themselves reformed Christians, but also enhanced by their unhappy encounters with the indigenous ethnic groups and the British in their attempt to control the rich natural resources.²

Singgih notes that the concept of the chosen people in the Old Testament reflects a paradox in the way Israel defined its identity. On the one hand, the concept indeed shows exclusivity as an expression of the feeling of being loved by God. The chosen people is thus meant as a subjective language of love, to be understood in terms of the relationship between the people and God. The reason of being the chosen people has nothing to do with either the moral quality of Israel or their spirituality. God's unconditional love is the only reason. There is therefore no reason for being superior. However, since a loving relationship can be exclusive, its expression in practice includes rejection and intolerance against other peoples. On the other hand, it is obvious that the status of the 'chosen people' is not to be taken for granted. Rather, it works only when Israel lives a faithful life, showing good conducts and responsible morality. There is also a notion that the

election of the people is not for the honour of that people, but for their service. Referring to Isaiah's picture of the Suffering Servant of God, which suggests the suffering experience of Israel as a model for other nations, Singgih contends that there was a stream of spirituality in the Old Testament that challenges the emphasis of the dominant tradition on exclusivity and superiority of Israel.

From an exploration of the Old Testament's idea of the chosen people, Singgih goes on to investigate the concept of *ecclesia* (church, community of Christians) in the New Testament. According to him, the concept of *ecclesia* is parallel to the Old Testament's chosen people, in the sense that it points to a group of people who claim to be elected because of the love of God. Yet, *ecclesia* is far from the notion of exclusivity, superiority or intolerance, since it is related to the major themes of justice and service to the poorest in Matthew's Sermon on the Mount. However, later as recorded in Revelation, this service-oriented *ecclesia* was reinterpreted, under the experience of persecution, to reflect the desire of the people to gain justice and ultimate victory at the expense of punishment of the persecutors. For Singgih, this shift should be carefully recognised in order that the original idea of *ecclesia* is not left behind.

Reinterpretation of the concept of the chosen people has also been suggested by Wesley Ariarajah, a Sri Lankan Methodist theologian, whose work *The Bible and People of Other Faiths*³ has been translated into Indonesian by a well-known Indonesian theologian and ecumenical leader, Eka Darmaputera.⁴ Ariarajah argues that the 'chosen people' idea should not be understood apart from a theology of creation, in which God is the God of all creatures. This implies that there is no history, culture or spirituality which is isolated from the creation and providence of God. As with Singgih, Ariarajah points to several biblical stories that, he believes, correct the exclusive concept of Israel's God as a God with no relationship with people of other nations.

Ariarajah goes even further by discussing 'sensitive issues' such as the concept of Jesus as the only way of salvation. He contends that the claim of the uniqueness of Jesus in terms of salvation should be understood as a language of faith rather than as a social statement. That language of faith is originally meant as a defence of the Christian community against the pressure to prove the authenticity of their faith. That claim, according to Ariarajah, also indicates a shift in the community's centre of faith from God to Christ, which is parallel to the Buddhists' adoration of Gautama. For Ariarajah the claim of the uniqueness of Jesus thus is not relevant in the context of dealing with other religions. The real call for Christians, he believes, is not to make exclusive claims, but to show a clear commitment to open their lives to other people.

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Another reinterpretation of the concept of Jesus as the only way of salvation is suggested by Iones Rakhmat, a minister of the Indonesian Christian Church and former lecturer in New Testament at Jakarta Theological Seminary.⁵ Rakhmat suggests an 'interrelation approach' which joins the uniqueness claim with the Christian belief that the One God works with God's grace and speaks in all areas of human religions. Underlining the Christian belief in the uniqueness of Jesus as a true confession based on the Word of God, he calls Christians to realise the fact that God allows non Christian beliefs to exist. According to Rakhmat, this means that the uniqueness of Jesus does not imply any idea of negating other beliefs but that Jesus Christ, the unique revelation of the Word of God, is basically the same Word who reveals himself as the Creator God, 'the light of humans who enlightens every human being' (John 1:4,9).

Rakhmat goes on to argue that the Word's revelation in the human flesh of Jesus does not at all reduce his status as the universal God. Indeed, after the events of the cross, resurrection and ascension, he returns to his status as the Word with 'the glory he had owned before the world existed' (John 17:5), and with 'all power in him both in heaven and on earth' (John 17:2; Matt 28:18). The Christian belief in Jesus as the only saviour, Rakhmat suggests, does not reduce the inclusive work of the Word in the universe before and after the age of the New Testament.

2. Muslim Reinterpretation of Uniqueness

From the Muslim side, a group of theologians have produced an extensive theological reinterpretation in a collaborative work, *Fiqih Lintas Agama* ('Interreligious Dogma'), published by Paramadina Foundation in cooperation with the Asia Foundation.⁶ Paramadina is a scholarly Islamic organisation led by a prominent Muslim figure, Nurcholis Madjid. *Fiqih Lintas Agama* (FLA) challenges uncritical uses of traditional Islamic dogmas that overlook their relatedness to particular social and cultural contexts. According to the authors, such non contextual dogmas lead to narrow-minded social and political concepts. The attempt to return to the Jakarta Charter (which requires Indonesian Muslims to practice Shariah as positive law) is an example of such narrow-mindedness.

According to FLA, Islam assumes that the core of all religions is the same, and all prophets are like children of one father but different mothers. The differences between religions are part of the nature of God's creative work, which dislikes total sameness. The authors argue that the Koran celebrates plurality as an opportunity to compete in doing goodness, living peaceful coexistence, struggling for justice

and working for fairness. The Koran, thus, is unique in the sense that it contains 'all inclusive' teachings respecting other religious beliefs and their prophets.

FLA suggests an understanding of the terms 'Islam' and 'muslim' as first of all in their generic meanings, not in the spirit of sectarianism or communalism. In this sense, Islam means total submission to the One God, and muslim means the attitude of total submission to the purity, holiness and truth of God. Such an attitude is basically in accord with natural law, and therefore is not necessarily related to a particular religious institution. The terms Islam and muslim thus cover all people, who show total submission to God, regardless of religion. The origin of the terms, according to the authors, should be traced back to the story about the debate regarding the religion of Abraham. In that story, the Koran asserts that Abraham is neither Jewish nor Christian. The Koran employs the terms '*hanif*' and 'Muslim' for Abraham in their generic sense, precisely to reject sectarian and exclusivist claims raised by some Jews and Christians regarding Abraham. In this generic interpretation, the term 'Islam' refers not to a particular religious institution, but to all religions, since the call to submission and obedience to God is at the heart of religions. FLA's authors thus argue that the Koran's claim that Islam is the only true religion must be understood in this generic sense.

In Indonesia, Christians use the term 'Allah' for God. Some groups of Muslims as well as a particular group of Christians have raised their objections, arguing that the term refers exclusively to the Muslim God. They ask (some even warn) the Indonesian Bible Society and Christian leaders to stop using the term 'Allah' and find instead another term consistent with the biblical accounts. The term 'Yahweh', for instance, is suggested. FLA, however, rejects such a sectarian interpretation of the term 'Allah'. The authors assert that the term 'Allah' is nothing but the Arabic word referring to the idea of the true God, namely the Only One God, on whom all religions centre their worships and praises. The core meaning of that term is a rejection to the worship of false idols, not necessarily a rejection of a particular religion.

FLA challenges many rules (*fatwa*) issued by the Indonesian Council of Clerics, such as that of 1980 which leads Muslims to a difficult situation when encountering followers of other religions. According to the Council's *fatwa*, it is forbidden for a Muslim to greet Christians with the Islamic greeting *Assalamu'alaiku*, let alone to say 'Happy Christmas' or to come to a Christmas party. That *fatwa* is based on a sacred story (*hadith*) by Abu Hurairah, a friend of the prophet Mohammad, in which the prophet urged his followers not to start greeting Jews or Christians, but rather to push them aside when they meet these people on their ways. Similar stories are found in

some other *hadiths* told by Bukhari, another friend of the prophet. FLA explains that the reliability of Abu Hurairah's *hadiths* are doubtful since he is known not only for his carelessness, but also his laziness.

Hurairah's *hadiths* also contradict many *hadiths* told by other friends of the prophet, including those by his most beloved wife, Aisyah. FLA contends that Hurairah's *hadiths* do not fit well with the basic character of Islam, which emphasises peace, hospitality and tenderness. In the case of Bukhari's *hadiths*, FLA explains that those *hadiths* reflect the situation when several Jewish people tried to humiliate the prophet by manipulating greeting words. There are many other *hadiths*, reflecting more principle characters of Islam, which advise Muslims to greet other people nicely, and treat them with hospitality and respect. FLA's authors thus believe that to greet 'people of the book' (meaning Jews and Christians) is not only allowed but also suggested and could even be compulsory.

3. Political Consensus: Indonesia's Pancasila

One of the most fundamental questions faced by the concept makers of the modern nation of Indonesia was: 'On what ideology would the new nation be based?' Two major options were suggested: Islam or Western-like secularism. Each was supported by a significantly strong camp. The debate on that issue in the Committee set up for preparing the independence of Indonesia had lasted for 3 days, when Soekarno offered a compromising draft in his speech on 1 June 1945. The draft offered was called *Pancasila* (The Five Principles) as the foundation of the nation. *Pancasila* covers both democratic principles implied in Western-like secularism and the most basic religious interest, which is belief in God. Soekarno therefore suggested that with *Pancasila* as the ideological foundation, Indonesia would be neither a secular country nor an Islamic one. Soekarno's draft was accepted to be followed up by an appointed committee, which then produced the second draft. This committee's draft, named as the 'Jakarta Charter', not only made the principle of Belief in God the first in order, but also added a phrase to that principle, namely '*with the compulsory to implement the Islamic Syariah* [Shariah] *for its adherents*'.

The addition was obviously made to accommodate the aspiration of the Islamic camp, who was not satisfied with the first draft's neutral description of religious belief. However, non Muslim groups raised their objection, arguing that such a principle of the national ideology should have not contained a reference to a particular religion, be it the majority one or else. The final draft, therefore, dropped

the reference to the implementation of the Syariah [Shariah], and the formula of the religious principle became: *Belief in the Most One God*.⁷ The formula, together with the other four principles (*a just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy led by the wisdom of consensus and representation, and social welfare for all people of Indonesia*), was widely accepted. Since then *Pancasila* has been made the basic reference for maintaining the unity and accepting the plurality of the nation.

Since the consensus to accept *Pancasila* has been crucial in preventing the state from being formed as an Islamic one, Christians face no problem at all in following that consensus. For the Christian minority, an idea of a more Christian-coloured state is obviously unrealistic. It is therefore not difficult for them to understand *Pancasila*, which implies a notion that religious freedom is guaranteed, as the best available option. Many Christian leaders even emphasise the importance of *Pancasila*, not particularly for the protection of the Christian community, but for the continuing existence of the modern nation of Indonesia. T.B. Simatupang, a former army general turned church leader, urged Christians to subscribe to *Pancasila* wholeheartedly, since there is no contradiction between *Pancasila* and the Christian faith. Rather, the relations between the two could be synergistic: Christians should be inspired and motivated by their faith to participate in the life of the nation according to the norms embedded in *Pancasila*.⁸

Simatupang's insistence has been reasserted by Eka Darmaputera, who wrote his PhD dissertation in Boston College on *Pancasila*. Referring to Simatupang, Darmaputera believes that *Pancasila* is the only option for Indonesia to maintain its unity and plurality.⁹ Despite the fact that Islam is the religion of the majority in Indonesia, he argues, any attempt to replace *Pancasila* with a concept of an Islamic state would put the existence of the nation at stake. The same can be said about the idea of replacing *Pancasila* with a concept of a secular state, as has been attempted by the Indonesian Communist Party.¹⁰

The belief that maintaining *Pancasila* is crucial for the existence of the nation is also common among Muslims, despite the attempt to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia by certain groups of Muslims. Azyumardi Azra, professor of history and the rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, observes that 'overwhelming Muslims have accepted *Pancasila* as the final ideological basis of the Indonesian state'.¹¹ Considering the groups proposing the Islamic state as 'either splinters or fringes', Azra shows historical evidence proving that such groups have never been supported by the dominant Muslim community. According to him, the reasons of the Indonesian Muslims for not supporting the idea of an Islamic state are not merely political, but first of all related to the nature of Indonesian Islam itself,

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which 'has a number of distinctive characters *vis-à-vis* Middle Eastern Islam'.¹² What Azra means is the tendency of Indonesian Islam to moderation and embrace, as a result of its mixture and amalgamation with elements of the indigenous religious traditions in the early history of Islam in Indonesia.

Rejection of the idea of an Islamic state has also been asserted by Abdurrahman Wahid, a prominent leader of the largest Islamic organisation, Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), and former president of Indonesia. Wahid's rejection is based on his analysis of the broader Islamic tradition, in which he does not find strong evidence that Islam provides a blue print of an Islamic state.¹³ Wahid argues that the place of Islam, and religion in general, in relation to the state should be in the area of social ethics. For Wahid, the idea of an Islamic state degrades the dignity of religion. Relying on the power of the state in achieving religious aims, he argues, is a real process of secularism, which implies permission for the state to become more powerful than religion.¹⁴

Wahid sees two trajectories in recent development of Islam in Indonesia. The first is the *exclusivist trajectory*, which offers Islam as a total life system covering a uniquely Islamic civil law, economic system and institutions, and other elements of social and personal lives. According to Wahid, this trajectory is not originated in the early history of Indonesian Islam. Instead, it emerges as a reaction to the challenge of modernisation promoted by the West to the whole world. It is such a trajectory which leads to the formation of Islamic states in countries like Iran, Sudan, Libya and Pakistan.¹⁵ Among the advocates of this trajectory in Indonesia are the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia: ICMI),¹⁶ and a number of Islamic mass and youth organisations that Imdadun Rahmat and Khamami Zada call 'new Islamic movement', namely those having characteristics of 'militant, radical, scripturalist, conservative, exclusive, hardliner and making politics part of religious faith'. It is important to note that a new Islamic party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), which gained a dramatic increase of votes in the recent General Election, is rooted in that movement. Rahmat and Zada suspect that despite its campaign for humanitarian issues, the PKS is the political channel for the groups committed to that movement.¹⁷

The second trajectory is that of the *pluralist*. The pluralist trajectory emphasises universal values of humanity and recognises the rights of minority groups to a treatment and status equal to those of the majority. Consequently, the advocates of this trajectory see a uniquely Islamic social system, such as formalised Syariah [Shariah], irrelevant for a plural society like Indonesia.¹⁸ It is obvious that Wahid himself represents the advocates of the pluralist trajectory. Indeed, his leadership in Nadhlatul Ulama contributes much to the development of this organisation into an enhanced tolerant and

inclusive position. Another prominent figure of the pluralist group is Nurcholis Madjid, the founder of the Paramadina Foundation. Madjid, who received his PhD from the University of Chicago under the supervision of a well-known Muslim scholar, Fazlur Rahman, provokes a strong reaction from the exclusivist camp when delivering his speech in 1970, in which he states his disagreement with the existence of Islamic parties. In that speech, he asserts his political motto: 'Islam yes, Islamic party no.'¹⁹

The pluralist trajectory can also be seen in the emergence of 'a new generation of pluralist Muslims', working particularly in various non-governmental organisations (NGOs).²⁰ One of those organisations is Jaringan Islam Liberal (the Liberal Islam Network), which promotes its mission through the media. Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) is led by young Muslim scholars, including Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Luthfi Assyaukani, and focuses its mission on four major agendas: political maturity for determining an appropriate state system; theological development appreciating plurality and equal rights for all human beings; women emancipation; and freedom of opinion.²¹

Despite the fact that the attempt to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia has failed to attract enough support from Indonesian society, the exclusivist groups are far from dying. As has been stated above, one of the Islamic party representing those groups, PKS, has gained significant votes in the 2004 General Election, an achievement that led to the instalment of the president of PKS, Hidayat Nurwahid, as the chairperson of the People's Consultative Assembly, the highest legislative body. Yet, such an achievement would have not been made without a shift in the themes promoted by that party. The success of PKS has depended heavily on its policy to leave behind the mission to return to the Jakarta Charter, and to emphasise instead moral issues such as clean governance and simplicity. As such, PKS appears at least an exterior form similar to that of the pluralist. Many observers are, however, afraid that PKS just changes the strategy, not the ideology or the core mission, which is to establish an Islamic state.²²

4. Interreligious Dialogue and Practical Relationships

Although personal and social relationships between people of different religions have long been a daily experience in the level of the common people, systematic interreligious dialogue in Indonesia had not been developed before the 1960s. It was the New Order (Suharto's regime) government which initiated the first formal dialogue between leaders of different religions in 1967, after a series of conflicts broke out between Muslim and Christian groups as a result of their enthusiasm in doing their proselytising missions.²³ The government's moti-

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vation was obviously political, namely to establish political stability needed for economic development of the country. Although that government-initiated programme failed to reach an agreement on the issue of religious mission, it sparked the spirit to carry out a further, more developed dialogue. Leaders of different religions, particularly those of Islam and Christianity, started to explore more fundamental basis for dialogue, realising that political reasons are not strong enough for establishing a constructive dialogue. Whilst the government continued its programme for reinforcing interreligious harmony in a more institutionalised form, e.g. by founding the interreligious Consultative Forum²⁴ in 1980, various civil society forums on interreligious dialogue and relationships are set up by religious scholars and leaders. An institution specifically dedicated to interreligious dialogue is the Institute of Interfidei, which has not only conducted seminars and conferences on interreligious themes, but also produced a series of publications on such themes.

The spirit of dialogue also drives churches and Islamic communities to review their concepts and practices of mission. This meets the ongoing passion within the Christian community to develop a contextual, post-colonial theology. Although the evangelical wing of Indonesian Christianity is still unaffected, the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (CCI), the umbrella of more than 80 percent of the Protestant denominations, gives a clear sign of shifting the traditional, proselytising concept of mission into a more plurality-sensitive one. The annual Seminar on Religions conducted by CCI provides rich resources for churches to practice new forms of mission.

Better relationships between Muslims and Christians are also attempted at the level of local communities. Although local conflicts between groups of Muslims and Christians do sometime happen, particularly in certain areas of Indonesia, their solutions involve mutual support between religious groups of both religions. It is not rare that a group of young Muslims, particularly those belonging to the youth organisation of Nadhlatul Ulama, do voluntary work to protect churches against the physical threat from Muslim extremists. A recent case (2004) happened in a suburb of Jakarta, where a group of people, claiming to represent the local community, built a wall to block the entrance access to 'Sang Timur', a Roman Catholic school campus. The group objected to the use of a building in that campus for Sunday mass service. Asserting the right of the Catholic community to do the worship, Abdurrahman Wahid came to the location and warned the government to demolish the wall, or he would bring the case to the court. After the local government cleared the access, a Muslim youth group, on Wahid's order, guarded the Catholic campus for several days.

Islamic and Christian theological institutions make important contributions to the progress of interreligious dialogue and relationships in Indonesia. The practice of exchanging lecturers and sharing resources between Islamic and Christian academic institutions have become quite common. For instance, the Faculty of Theology at Duta Wacana Christian University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, both in Yogyakarta/Java, have established a long-term formal cooperation in both teaching and research activities. It can be said that the reputation of the study of religions in those institutions depends heavily on the maintenance of their mutually constructive cooperation. Indeed their cooperation has attracted several universities abroad, not only to learn from them, but also to participate in the relationships.

Relationships between Muslim and Christian academic institutions have also transformed the approach of the study of religions employed in those institutions. Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, for instance, has been a pioneer in introducing the critical textual study of the Koran and the phenomenological study of religions. Figures such as Prof. Mukti Ali, a former rector of that institution, and Prof. Amin Abdullah, the present rector, contribute much to the development of such approaches within the Islamic academic circle. In the case of Duta Wacana Christian University, its Centre for the Study of Religions not only conducts collaborative research projects involving Muslim partners, but also the annual 'Studi Institut Tentang Islam' SITI (Institute of Studies on Islam), aiming at equipping Christian leaders with fresh knowledge on Islam learnt directly from Muslim scholars and leaders. In 1996, the centre conducted a seminar, inviting other Christian theological schools in Indonesia, in which curricula regarding religious studies in Christian theological seminaries were reviewed, with a perspective on interreligious dialogue in mind.²⁵

Conclusion

Leadership in the context of Muslim-Christian encounters should take account of the need to reinterpret theological resources of both religions, since the early constructions of those resources contemplated a situation with a lesser degree of plurality than that of today. Theological reinterpretation is not only necessary to make those resources meaningful for the present communities, but it is also crucial for the different religious communities to reach political consensus. Although a moderate, tolerant attitude may have been rooted in the traditional culture of the people, political consensus is still needed to prevent political interests from contaminating the culture.

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Theological reinterpretation and political consensus should not be merely matters of the elite, but rather be practised on the level of local communities.

In an age badly affected by terrorism and the rise of religious fundamentalism, genuine dialogue and relationships between communities of different religions, based on a thoughtful theological reinterpretation and fair political consensus, would be an alternative to prejudice and self-centred mission practices.

NOTES

- ¹ Singgih, E.G., 'Ideja umat terpilih dalam Perjanjian Lama: Positif atau negative?', in: Sumartana, Th. *et al.*, *Dialog: Kritik dan Identitas Agama*, Yogyakarta: Dian/Interfidei, pp. 32-53.
- ² The World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) excluded this church from the alliance because WARC called the justification of apartheid a sin and heresy.
- ³ Ariarajah, Wesley, *The Bible and People of Other Faiths*, Geneva: WCC publications, 1985.
- ⁴ The Indonesian title is *Alkitab dan Orang-orang Berkepercayaan Lain*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1987.
- ⁵ Rakhmat, Ioanes, 'Adakah Firman Allah di luar Alkitab?', in: *Penuntun* 1:2, 1995, pp. 130-149.
- ⁶ Sirry, Mun'im A. (ed.), *Fiqh Lintas Agama: Membangun Masyarakat Inklusif-Pluralis*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 2004.
- ⁷ For a short history concerning the 'birth' of *Pancasila*, see Darmaputera, Eka, *Pancasila: Identitas dan Modernitas, Tinjauan Etis dan Budaya*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1987, pp. 104-117. The English version of this book is titled *Pancasila and the Search of Identity and Modernity. A Cultural and Ethical Analysis*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987.
- ⁸ Simatupang, T.B., *Iman Kristen dan Pancasila*, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1985, p. 206.
- ⁹ Darmaputera, Eka, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
- ¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 131.
- ¹¹ Azra, Azyumardi, 'Recent development of Indonesian Islam', in: *The Indonesian Quarterly* XXXII:1, 2004, pp. 10-18.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- ¹³ Wahid, Abdurrahman, *Mengurai Hubungan Agama dan Negara*, Jakarta: Grasindo, 1999, pp. 63-66.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- ¹⁵ Wahid, Abdurrahman, 'Hubungan antar agama: Dimensi internal-eksternalnya di Indonesia', in: Sumartana, Th. *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-12.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ¹⁷ Rahmat, M. Imdadun/Zada, Khamami, 'Agenda politik gerakan Islam baru' in: *Tashwirul Afkar* 16, 2004, pp. 26-43.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ¹⁹ See Liddle, R. William, *Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996, p. 276.
- ²⁰ See Suaedy, Ahmad, 'Muslim progresif dan praktik politik demokratisasi di era Indonesia pasca Suharto', in: *Tashwirul Afkar* 16, 2004, pp. 6-25.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22-23.
- ²² Rahmat, M. Imdadun/Zada, Khamami, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
- ²³ See Taher, Tarmizi, *Aspiring for the Middle Path. Religious Harmony in Indonesia*, Jakarta: CENSIS, 1997, p. 40-41.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- ²⁵ For the proceedings of the seminar, see Duta Wacana's theological journal *Gema* 52, 1997.