

# Globethics Repository

The logo for Globethics, featuring the word "Globethics" in white, sans-serif font centered within a solid blue rectangular background.

Through the vortex of wars using a “Trojan horse” . Tracking the rise to prominence of the global governance concept: An Overview.

This page was generated automatically upon download from the Globethics Repository. More information on Globethics see <https://www.globethics.net>. Data and content policy of Globethics Repository see <https://repository.globethics.net/pages/policy>.

Item Type	Preprint
Authors	Lynch, Rolandson
Publisher	Rolandson Lynch
Rights	Creative Commons Copyright (CC 2.5)
Download date	2026-07-07 02:15:45
Link to Item	<a href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/187071">http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/187071</a>

**Title:** Through the vortex of wars using a “Trojan horse”. Tracking the rise to prominence of the global governance concept: An Overview.

Rolandson N. Lynch ([rolandson@hotmail.com](mailto:rolandson@hotmail.com); 1 473 405 4440)

Ministry of Social Development,

Government of Grenada,

1<sup>st</sup> Floor Ministerial Complex,

Botanical Garden,

Tanteen,

St. George’s,

Grenada.

### **Abstract**

*This article tracks the rise to prominence of the global governance concept. It locates the origins of such a concept in the aftermath of the 1<sup>st</sup> European war (formally known as World War I). The critique then suggests how the institutions birth out of the Bretton Woods conference after World War II give philosophical shaped and guidance to global governance. The collapse of communism and subsequently the cold war necessitated the “Trojan horse”, that is to say the Supra international political economic institutions of Bretton Woods solidified and reinforced this concept. Reference is made to the challenges face by the architects of the global governance concept in the form of economic power houses China & India, and accommodations that will have to be considered.*

**Key Words: Global Governance, International Political Economic Institutions, Bretton Woods, Ethics of Political Economy, Globalisation, Trojan Horse.**

### **Introduction**

Governance has long been an inquiry of political science literature, and has been engaged to describe the ‘self-organising, interorganisational networks which, in addition to governments, help to authoritatively allocate resources, exercise control and coordinate social activities (Rhodes, 1997). Presently, some commentators are of the opinion that the degree and sophistication of cross-border economic interactions results in some type of transnational coordination and cooperation between individual governments, a functional necessity, if the processes associated with globalisation are to be managed beneficially

(Cerny, 1995). Hence, it is logical to assume that the concept of governance would employ a global dimension persona.

Since the 1990's, the concepts of global governance have emerged as new investigative frameworks for the analysis of international relations. The proponents who advance these notions have argued that we are observing a paradigm shift in global politics through the synchronized paradoxical dynamics of integration and fragmentation. The result of this oxymoronic dynamic is a shift away from the state as the primary authority and actor in international affairs, thus challenging the state-centric theoretical perspectives that had developed during the Cold War (1945-1991). Although states retain a central role, the literature on global governance suggests that a growing number of international organisations and private actors, such as Multinational Corporations (MNC's) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGO's), are taking on functions ranging from the making, to the implementation of international policies (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Finkelstein 1995). Moreover, in addition to sectors, such as those involving international finance, economics, and the environment, the proponents of the governance concept suggest that the fragmentation of policymaking capabilities and authority among state and non-state actors are also increasingly observed in the international arena (Young 2000; Hall & Biersteker 2002). The purpose of this discourse is to track the evolution of global governance and its attending tendencies and suggest how it rose to prominence as a concept.

### **Global Governance Problematic: Definition & philosophical approach.**

There are conflicting philosophies battling for "space" as it relates to global governance. On one side of the debate there are individuals who have recognised the erosion

of Constitutional principles in recent years. Correspondingly, there is a tidal wave of United Nations (UN) organisations and agencies, reinforced by a mass of non-government organisations (NGO's), sweeping across the globe, submerging societies with the concept that problems can be solved only through remedies offered by and imposed through the massive UN system. Concomitantly, weighting in on the issues is the Castro-Chavez antagonism along with the success of the Asian states namely China and Singapore, who have frontally challenged constitutional principles erosion with the counter of state constitutional garrisoning, in relation to the sovereignty of state governance.

The 20<sup>th</sup> century is no different from any other: Marxism, Socialism, Liberalism or Realism, reflects some of the ideas which clashed for ideological space in the 1900's. The competition still exist albeit cloak in "sheep's clothing" in this the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The key players change as do the words that describe the various "battlefields", but the competing ideas remain the same. One of the competing philosophies is the idea that people are born free, totally free and sovereign and choose to surrender specified freedoms to a limited government to achieve mutual benefits, a social contract philosophical debate (see Rousseau, 1968; Bodin, 1955; Locke, 1988). Another assumption is the idea that government must be sovereign in order to distribute benefits equitably and manage the activities of people and the state (Classical Keynesian debate). In order to discuss the concept global governance, its issues and international organisations with some confidence, consideration must be given to the atmosphere of world politics after the Cold War. In addition to the end of the Cold War, the debate on globalisation has been an important source of commentary on the emergence of theories

on global governance. Economic globalisation, for example, leads to a power shift from state to market, which is an important factor contributing to the emergence of global governance. According to Rosenau (2000), adjacent to the globalisation of economies, other changes became apparent, such as the surge of global social movements, the shrinking of political distances by microelectronic technologies, and the mushrooming of global interdependencies fostered by currency crisis such as HIV/AIDS and terrorism, all of which touch upon the subject of global governance.

In the global context, global governance means “governance in the global arena,” referring to all the governance that occurs throughout the global order (Latham, 1999). Therefore, global governance implicitly indicates the global shift from statism to integration as well as the fragmentation of actors in the international arena (Wang & Rosenau, 2009). There is a possibility of a global transformation from the primacy of “government” to that of “governance.” However, the term “global governance” is yet to be defined by a coherent authoritative meaning. Consequently, a clarification of the term drawn from several definitions proposed by important international organisations and scholars will be discussed at this point in the discourse.

According to the Commission on Global Governance (1995), global governance can be defined as the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. Gordenker & Weiss (1996), define global governance as “efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond the capacities of states to address individually” (p. 17). In other words, the term global governance reflects the current

situation in which declining state power provides non-state actors with the capacity and opportunity to assert their interests.

However, a discerning voice on a working definition of global governance can be heard in Keohane (2002), who postulated that the term “global governance” refers to rule-making and power-exercise at a global scale, but not necessarily by entities authorised by general agreement to act (Note! OECD for example). Global governance can be exercised by states, religious organisations, and business corporations, as well as by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations. Since there is no global government, global governance involves strategic interactions among entities that are not arranged in formal hierarchies. Further, since there is no global Constitution, the entities that wield power and make rules are often not authorised to do so by general agreement. Therefore, their actions are often not regarded as legitimate by those who are affected by them.

In sum, global governance is a term adopted to account for the foregoing changes in the increasingly globalising international arena in the post-Cold War era. It underscores the search for the co-existence of a wide variety of international actors without privileging any one specific actor, such as states; a theoretical assumption. Hence, it must be borne out that the theory and practice in global politics are in antagonistic “corners” on this issue.

In the present period of rapid and extensive global change, the Constitutions of national governments and their treaties have been undermined by the increasing demands and solidarity of ethnic and other subgroups. Although the concept of global governance is relatively new, an understanding of its complexities (“if any”) must be informed by

theoretical framework. Consequently, three (3) schools of thought namely realism, liberalism and constructivism will be briefly consulted. It is noted that within these philosophical themes there are variations. However, academic efforts will be made to remain within the overarching parametrical constraints within the mentioned perspectives on the issue under review. These theoretical perspectives were chosen because they seek in a practical way to explain power, order, norms and change which are considered to be the “real” dynamics informing global governance.

According to Walt (1998), realism assumptions of global politics tend to emphasise how states use power to maximise their national interests. The realism approach suggests that the most important international actors are sovereign states, which are rational, and operate in an inherently competitive, anarchic and self-help environment. Realism assumes that sovereignty makes states functionally similar (Mastanduno, 1997). Waltz (1979) emphasises that they also accentuate strategies that states devise in efforts to improve their standing in international economic competition and influence weaker states or compete for international prestige. Thus, this approach will take into account or focus on military balancing and ‘positional competition’ in economic, technological and other non-military matters. Realism acknowledges the existence of globalisation, civil society and transnational forces, but they make no room for them in their analyses (Mastanduno & Kapstein, 1999). While realism may be helpful in highlighting the role of power and self-interest in global governance, it discounts the function of ideas, culture, institutions and norms, except as instruments in power politics.

At a glance, liberalism would appear the most appropriate approach to consult in the study of global governance given, as Doyle (1997) has observed, it identifies with an

essential principle, the importance of the freedom of the individual. Liberalism would adequately explain the interactions of states, civil society, MNCs and International Global Organisations (IGOs) in global governance (Walt, 1998). The liberal perspective on global politics posits that there is at the minimum a heterogeneous state of peace and war' which could become a state of global peace, in which the expectation of war disappears' (Doyle, 1997). Liberals consider that IGOs, such as the UN, play a vital role in world politics. They acknowledge that 'states live under international anarchy', and argue that 'states are inherently respectful of international law' and that 'they do not experience a general state of war' (Doyle, 1997, p.211). Liberals reject the realist claim that states are functionally similar units. Generally, liberals maintain that the interests of states extend beyond security and include the protection of human rights.

Constructivism is concerned with the way norms, rules and institutions constitute the identities and interests of states and other international actors (Walt, 1998). It claims that the structures of human association, including the international society, are determined primarily by shared ideas and culture rather than material forces. While realists claim that it is the distribution of capabilities that determines the nature of the international system, constructivists argue that those capabilities have meaning only because of the ideas attached to them. Constructivists assert that it is the distribution of ideas and culture that determines the shape of the international system (Reus-Smit, 1999). As constructivism focuses on the roles of norms, ideas and culture in constructing international structures, it would have significant input on how global governance is constituted.

As indicated global governance is about norms and power and as such is constituted by ideas, culture and material forces. Global governance involves states and non-state actors,

and it affects life at the local and global sphere. However, to understand the system of global governance and the role institutions play in determining the way norms and power are interpreted, and given the reality of the present global political environment (notwithstanding the role of the “core” hegemony), (neo) liberal theoretical approach is a useful unit of analysis.

The condensed commentary on theoretical approaches to understanding global governance has illuminated the “foot loose” and paradoxically the rules based mode of operations underpinning the role of the **Bretton Woods Conference**, the **New World Order** and the **Washington Consensus** in creating the nexus of global governance. That is to imply that the aforementioned institutions were created with a philosophical doctrine that perpetuates (neo) liberal notions to governance.

### **Rise of the Global Governance concept: The “Trojan horse”**

The Bretton Woods Conference was held to reshape and reorganise global capitalism after the debacle of the 2<sup>nd</sup> European war (commonly referred to as World War II). The task (led by a relatively unscathed US), was to build institutions and establish frameworks that would facilitate market driven capital accumulation, instead of the European,- Britain in particular-state driven capital accumulation. Accordingly, Keynesian economic approach was shelved for an enforced doctrine; a rule based, tariff reduction, market driven policy to state enterprise (the Harry White drafted U.S. blueprint for international access to liquidity). The Institutions planned at Bretton Woods to oversee this doctrine included the **World Bank** (WB), launched in 1945 and officially called the **International Bank for Reconstruction and Development** (IBRD). WB was intended to provide long-term loans to states for reconstruction after the devastation of the War.

The **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) launched in 1946 was intended to finance short-term imbalances in international payments, and help maintain fixed exchange rates linking all currencies to gold via the Dollar Standard. Finally, in 1947 the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT) the forerunner to the **World Trade Organisation** (WTO) was created to oversee the dismantling of trade barriers. According to Pilling (1986), the basic features of Bretton Woods were:

1. All currencies were pegged to the dollar, and their exchange rate could only be altered by international agreement; in effect by agreement with the Americans. The dollar replaced sterling as the dominant currency, a point soon underscored when, in 1949, sterling was devalued from its initial parity of \$4.03 to \$2.80.
2. The dollar was to be linked to gold by the American guarantee to purchase dollars throughout the world at a fixed rate of \$35/1 oz fine gold. Thus was the dollar said to be 'as good as gold'; indeed some went further, declaring that as dollar holdings, unlike gold, attracted a rate of interest, the American currency was in fact superior to gold.
3. Under Bretton Woods a central pool of reserves was established, to be administered by the Fund (IMF), which would make loans available on a temporary basis to countries in balance of payments difficulties. Each country contributed according to an agreed scale, with the lion's share being put in by the Americans. In short the IMF was from the outset firmly under American control.

4. As one condition for their participation, the Americans insisted on trade liberalisation. Tariff barriers were to be run down, a move designed to facilitate the dominance of American capital in the markets of the world. Noted economist John Maynard Keynes rightly saw this as a frontal attack on what was left of the British Empire and the privileges which it had afforded British capital.

The establishment of Bretton Woods' institutions allowed the US Government to run a huge state deficit. However, the first cracks began to appear in the early 1960s when the British got into trouble. The troubles related to, in the first instance, the erosion of the British Empire. Secondly, the government's debt was crippling and British industry was antiquated. Thirdly, the role of Pound Sterling as a secondary support to the US dollar under the Bretton Woods arrangement soon started to reveal structural cracks, transmitting more pressure on to the US (Bordo, 1993). Bordo further explains that the capacity for continued expansion began to exhaust itself. In the midst of the social crisis, which broke out in 1968, French President De Gaulle demanded that French dollar holdings to be honoured in gold. This was an impossible request even though the US held 3/4 of the world's gold. Further, there was nowhere near enough gold to match the quantity of US dollars circulating in the world economy at US\$35/oz. This resulted in the collapse of Bretton Woods in its original structure, and necessitated its designer(s) to reinstitutionalise the major financial institutions of the conference.

The Washington Consensus is a phrase initially coined by John Williamson in 1989 to describe a relatively specific set of ten (10) economic policy prescriptions that he considered to constitute a "standard" reform package (Stiglitz, 2008). According to

Williamson (2005) this so called reformed package was encouraged, mostly under duress, by Washington based institutions such as the IMF, WB and **U.S. Treasury Department** for countries that encountered economic crisis most notably at the time, Latin American countries. These polices in summary were:

- Fiscal discipline
- A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure
- Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base)
- Interest rate liberalisation
- A competitive exchange rate
- Trade liberalisation
- Liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment
- Privatisation
- Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit)
- Secure property rights

The term Washington consensus has since acquired a secondary connotation, being used (usually in a pejorative sense) to describe a less-precisely stipulated range of policies, broadly associated with expanding the role of market forces and constraining the role of the state, sometimes also described as neo-liberalism or market fundamentalism.

The Washington Consensus, especially in this second broader formulation, has been the target of sharp criticism by some commentators and groups who argue that it opens vulnerable economies to investments by large MNC's and their cronies in advanced First

World economies, which critics view as negative development (Williamson, 2004). Critics of trade liberalisation, (Noam Chomsky, Susan George, and Naomi Klein) see the Washington Consensus as a mechanism to open the labour market of underdeveloped economies (i.e. Latin America, Caribbean, Africa, in particular) to exploitation. The prescribed reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers allow the free movement of goods across borders according to market forces. However, hypocritically, labour is not permitted to move freely due to tough immigration laws and policies.

This creates an economic climate where goods are manufactured using cheap labour in underdeveloped economies, then exported to rich First World economies for sale at what the critics argue are huge mark-ups. The balance of the mark-up is said to accrue to large MNC's. That is, a perpetration of prostituting tendencies on the part of underdeveloped economies. The problematic created here is that labour in Third World economies remain poor and underdeveloped. Conversely, while labour in First World economies become unemployed; the bourgeois owner of the MNC's become even wealthier. This reality presents a problematic because Third World economies caught in this tsunami will not develop a culture of effective negotiating or resistance against the status quo. Consequently, the exercise of international relations will become one of rubber stamping. Anti-globalisation antagonists further claim that First World countries impose the consensus' neo-liberal policies on economically vulnerable countries through organisations such as the WB and the IMF by political pressure and bribery (see Stiglitz, 2002). Antagonist argue that the Washington Consensus has not, in fact, led to any great economic boom in the Third World economies, but rather, to severe economic crises and the accumulation of crippling external debts that render the target country beholden to

First World “masters”. Many of the policy prescriptions (e.g., the privatisation of state industries/enterprises, tax reform, and deregulation) are criticised as mechanisms for ensuring the development of a petite bourgeois indigenous elite in the Third World who will acquire or maintain political clout and also have a vested interest in maintaining the local status quo of labour exploitation.

The term New World order has been used to refer to a new period of history witnessing a dramatic change in world political thought and the balance of power. The first usages of the term surrounded Woodrow Wilson's (President of the USA, 1913-1921) Fourteen (14) points call for a League of Nations following the devastation of the 1<sup>st</sup> European war (World War 1) (Levin, 1968). The phrase was used cautiously at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> European war when describing the plans for the UN and Bretton Woods system (the necessary institutions for global governance), in part because of the pessimistic relationship to the failed League of Nations the terminology would evoke. In hindsight though, many critics have applied the term retroactively to the order put in place; the “real” reference point of the new world order. That is to say, the institutionalisation of the new world order project.

The most widely discussed application of the new world order in recent times came at the end of the Cold War. Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush used the term to try to define the nature of the post Cold War era, and the spirit of great power cooperation that they hoped might materialise (Oberdofer, 1990). Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the list of the world's great powers was predictably short: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and north-western Europe. The 21<sup>st</sup> century will be different however, as China and India are simultaneously emerging as economic and political

heavyweights (not to be forgotten is Brazil) (Dobson, 2010). China has accumulated over a trillion dollars in hard currency reserves, while concomitantly, India's high-tech sector is growing by leaps and bounds. Both countries have also realised nuclear capabilities and are developing blue-water navies (Drezner, 2007). Drezner highlights that the National Intelligence Council, a U.S. government think tank, projects that by 2025, China and India will have the world's second and fourth largest economies respectively. Certainly this will have some implications for the governance polarity in world politics.

This tectonic shift will pose a challenge to the U.S. juggernaut of global institutions that have been in place since the 1940s (the creation of global governance through Bretton Woods). Unless growing powers the likes of China and India are incorporated into this framework, the future of these international regimes will be uncomfortably uncertain to say the least. According to Drezner (2007), in an attempt to ensure that these countries believe in the core tenets of the U.S. created world order, Washington has tried to augment their profiles in forums ranging from the IMF to the World Health Organization (WHO), on issues as diverse as nuclear proliferation, monetary relations, and the environment. Certainly, the European Union (EU) has made its own bilateral accommodations and has been contented to cooperate with emerging countries in response to American unilateralism. Developing countries located on the periphery of global economy can be expected to back Europe in resisting U.S.-led reform efforts. Nevertheless, European states have been less willing to reduce their overrepresentation in multilateral institutions.

Global institutions cease to be appropriate when the allocation of decision-making authority within them no longer corresponds to the distribution of power and that is

precisely the situation today. The United Nations Security Council is one obvious example; the G-7 is an even more egregious one. The G-7 states took it upon themselves to manage global macroeconomic imbalances in the 1970s. They were moderately successful at the job during the 1980s, when they accounted for half of the world's economic activity. However, even today when they meet with Russia (as the G-8) the body cannot be effective without including in their deliberations the economic heavyweight; China.

Governance cannot be considered as a set of regulatory mechanisms to allocate limited resources only with looser boundaries. If this would be the case, then it is counterproductive engaging in debates which distinguish government from governance. The growing interest in literature, and in the use of the governance concept, implies there is something different and new that develop from recent societal transformations. Governance can be thought of as an “other way” of thinking about political regulation within globalization processes which are synthesized by several authors. The synthesis suggest that the process is characterized by; the shifting in the location of authority, the trans-nationalization of financial and economic activities, the emergence of global civil society and epistemic elites and other cleavages (Held 1999). Certainly, a distinction can be made between government (governing) and governance.

Kooiman, (2003, p.4) defines governing as “the totality of interactions, in which public and private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities”, where governance develops as “the totality of theoretical conceptions of governing.” What makes the governance concept a useful analytical tool in the observation of today’s international political development is the fact that, (1) it refers to

processes, (2) it develops through negotiation and consensus building, as well as through decision-making, (3) it involves a plurality of actors and levels, and (4) it is based on interactions (Padovani & Nesti 2002). In this sense, the preparatory process of the World Summit on the Information Society, in spite of not being itself a policy-making situation, can be considered an opportunity to reflect on some of the features of developing global governance (Padovani & Tuzzi 2003).

Governance is not a monolite, but deploys through different elements, modes and orders, which relate differently and intersect with the subjects taking part in the process, and modes of interaction taking place. Kooiman (2003) offers an articulated framework to describe this complexity, starting from the assumption that governance is grounded on societal interactions which can be defined as “mutually influencing relations between two or more actors or entities” (p. 231). This occurs within an intentional (actor/action) level, and a structural (contextual) level can be distinguished. Moreover, interactions are of different types: interferences (relatively open, flexible and spontaneous), interplays (horizontal, semi-formalized) and hierarchical relations (vertical and formalized). This allows an articulated reasoning on different modes and orders of governance, and is mixed in reality and involves societal institutions such as state, market and civil society.

In addition to the problematic of other actors-than the state as an origin of these rules-the objective of the governance effort possibly comprises not only regulation of state-behaviour, but also additional or alternative areas of application, such as civil society or even the individual. Whether global governance concept highlights the emergence of a global civil society, with social movements oriented toward a worldwide scale of activity, organization and the perceived need for an autocratic extension of democratic space, or

points to the increasing predominance of a global elite oriented toward a 'hyper-liberalism'. The state-based perspectives are conflated, fragmented, or replaced by a focus on new social forces and additional actors shaping the rules, policies and control mechanisms of a global governance system (Cox, 1987; Held, 1996; Lipschutz, 1992; Wapner, 1997).

### **Conclusion**

The present state of global governance is a cause of concern given the vulgar and unequal mode of operations. In the modern world and certainly in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the emergence of global governance as a concept could be located just after the 1<sup>st</sup> European war; however, it was loosely defined. Nevertheless, a more coherent concept of the "quest" global governance emerged with the Bretton Woods conference and the setting up of global institutions to achieve this objective. These institutions now play a critical role in maintaining the status quo in core, semi core and periphery vortex operating in international politics.

There is a perception in the Third World that the institutions of global governance, that is to say, the Bretton Woods supra international political economic network and the various elitist institutions (G-8, OECD, UN Security Council, OPEC, etc.) have been conceived by the West and works to the detriment of non-Western interests. Some of these criticisms came out at the 1993 UN conference on human rights in Vienna, where China and developing countries described the universalisation of human rights as a conspiracy by Western governments to pressure non-Western states to change their identities and political and economic systems. The constraints of global governance in this millennium require the core to rethink its norms, structures, procedures and practices. If a difference

and legitimacy to global governance is to be considered, then there needs to be a rethink, in a serious way, of the democratisation of agencies. That is to infer, a demand for transparency and popular participation.

## Reference

- Bodin, J. (1955). [1576] *The Six Books of The Commonwealth*. Oxford. Abridged & translated by M. J. Tooley. Oxford: The Alden Press.
- Bordo, M. (1993). "The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview." Pp. 3-108 in *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cerny, P. G. (1995). Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action. *International Organization*, 49(4):595-625.
- Commission on Global Governance (United Nations). (1995). *Our Global Neighbourhood*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cox, R. W. (1987). *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dobson, W. (2010). *History Matters: China and Global Governance*. Paper presented at PAFTAD 34: China's Role in the World Economy. Beijing. (December).
- Doyle, M. (1997). *Ways of War and Peace*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Drezner, D. W. (2007). The New World Order. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86(2):20-25.
- Finkelstein, S. L. (1995). What Is Global Governance? *Global Governance*, 1(3):367–372.
- Gordenker, L., and Weiss T. (1996). *NGO's, The UN and Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Hall, B. R., and Thomas, B. J. (Ed.). (2002). *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Held, D. (1996). *Models of Democracy*. Oxford/Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Held, D. (1999). Rethinking Democracy. *Theoria*, 94:30-47.
- Hoge, J. F. (2004). *A Global Power Shift in the Making*. Lecture given at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University's, Washington, D.C. (April).
- Keohane, R. O. (2002). *Global Governance and Democratic Accountability*. North Carolina: Duke University.
- Kooiman, J. (2003). *Governing as Governance*. California: Sage Publications.
- Latham, R. (1999). "Politics in a Floating World: Toward a Critique of Global Governance." Pp. 23-53 in *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Levin, N. G. (1968). *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lipschutz, R. D. (1992). Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society. *Journal of International Studies*, 21(3):389-420.
- Locke, J. (1988). [1689] *Two Treatises of Government*. Edited by P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mastanduno, M. (1997). Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War. *International Security*, 21(4):49-88.
- Mastanduno, M., and Kapstein, E. B. (1999). "Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War." Pp. 1-27 in *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Oberdorfer, D. (1990). *New World order, galloping into position*. The Washington Post, pp. 22-25. February, 25<sup>th</sup>.
- Padovani, C., and Nesti, G. (2002). *Looking at European Policies for the Information Society: Communication about Governance and the Governance of Communication*. Paper presented at the IAMCR Conference in Barcelona, (July).
- Padovani, C., and Tuzzi, A. (2003). *Changing modes of participation and communication in an inter-national political environment: Looking at the World Summit on the Information Society as a communicative process*. Paper presented in the Political Communication section of the IPSA Congress in Durban, (July).
- Pilling, G. (1986). *The Crisis of Keynesian Economics: A Marxist View*. London: Croom Helm.
- Reus-Smit, C. (1999). *The Moral Purpose of the State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rhodes, R. (1997). *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Rosenau, J. N. (2000). "Change, Complexity and Governance in Globalizing Space." Pp. 167-201 in *Debating Governance Authority, Steering and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenau, J. N., and Czempiel, E. O. (Eds). (1992). *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rousseau, J. J. (1968). [1762] *The Social Contract*. Abridged & translated by M. Cranston. New York: Penguin Classics.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: Norton.

- Stiglitz, J. E. (2008). "Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?" Pp. 41-56 in *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Walt, S. M. (1998). International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy*, 110:29-46.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Wang, H., and Rosenau, J. N. (2009). China and Global Governance. *Asian Perspective* 33(3):5-39.
- Wapner, P. (1997). "Governance in a Global Civil Society" Pp. 65-84 in *Global Governance. Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Williamson, J. (2004). *A Short History of the Washington Consensus*. Paper presented at Foundation CIDOB conference held in Barcelona. (September).
- Williamson, J. (2005). The Strange History of the Washington Consensus. *Journal of the Post Keynesian Economics*, 27(2):195-206.
- Young, O. R. (2000). *Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.