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GLOBALISATION IN THE AGE OF DIFFERENCE

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The Cordoba Foundation
Cultures in Dialogue.

The Complexities of Place (2008) Discarded Excavation Soil, Industrial bonding agents, pigment on hessian on a wood frame.

The picture on the cover of this issue of Arches is by Steve Pratt, which is part of a series of paintings `Conflicts of Place' for which the starting point was E.S Carson's 'History of a Philosophy of Place', UCLA (1998).

The central idea being that in the foregrounding of persona we tend to mythologise place – and yet without place we simply cannot function as people.
The painting measures 200cms x 220cms x 3cms. The painting surface is made of waste soil Steve Pratt gathered from a building project in Lapland, Finland. He finely processed the elements of the soil and mixed it with an industrial bonding agent to make a pliable paint like solution to create a surface; ground as surface. He then used natural pigments to provide colour and line.

The idea in the painting is to show that people and places are inseparable – that the soil we tread is part of who we are therefore – the soil cannot be regarded as a simple discarded substance – as it provides the ground support upon which we stand and operate interdependently – in this context Globalization or universalisation can be read as a succession of local and interdependent operations (see also Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (1958).

An example of this interdependent complexity can be seen in the Cordoba Initiative proposal for an Islamic cultural centre/mosque at Ground Zero in New York – in that is an idea of a fantastic opportunity to progress peace and understanding amongst peoples – that people and places come together to breathe new life into place – to create communication amongst diverse peoples in a uniting space.

INTHISISSUE

LITERATURE PROMOTIONS:

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FROM THE EDITOR

It gives us immense pleasure to present the summer 2010 edition of Arches, addresses the current debate on globalisation. We explore numerous perspectives on globalisation in an age of increased difference and divergence, while at the same time, witnessing noticeable convergence around ideology, faith and beliefs -- which, incidentally, are all by-products of globalisation.

> [Globalisation] came to be used widely only in the 1960s and ever since, it has manifested as a double-edged sword.

Whilst the use of the term globalisation is often attributed to the 1930s as a comprehensive human experience in education, American Charles Taze Russell in 1897 used 'corporate giants' as manifestation of globalisation. Yet others, like the economist Andre Gunder Frank suggests a form of globalisation existed since the rise of trade links between Sumer and the Indus Valley Civilisation in the third millennium B.C. Setting aside its historical roots, globalisation came to be used widely only in the 1960s and ever since, it has manifested like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it has been associated with information and technological advancement, economic prosperity and rising living standards as well as greater cultural awareness across countries and continents. However, on the flip side, globalisation has been commonly associated with inequality, volatility in the financial markets and financial imperialism, environmental degradation and geo-political domination, and exploitation of the weak and poor leading to a wider gap between the "have" and "have nots".

When viewed from the point of view of faith communities such as the Islamic World, globalisation is perceived mostly negatively, and is commonly attributed to the 'Americanisation' (also referred to as 'McDonaldization') or 'Westernisation' of Muslim cultures, breeding poverty, corruption and immorality. Peter Mandaville in *Global Political Islam*, states that for 'many Muslims, globalisation is still associated with Westernisation and new forms of hegemony'. Some of the recent Islamophobic attacks on Muslims in Europe (such as on their religious practices, institutions and leaders) by sections of the media, politicians and certain racist elements, can be linked to the anti-Muslim hatred emboldened by globalisation. Viewed in this light, globalisation lends itself to the politicisation and radicalisation of Muslims expounded by D. Brumberg:

"Globalisation has reinforced such paranoia by expanding the gap between the haves and have-nots. Globalisation's losers fill the urban slums of Rabat, Algiers, Cairo… creating an enormous pool of potential recruits for illiberal Islamism."

Such is the opposition to globalisation today, people and organisations representing a wide array of interests and agendas are often clustered as the anti-globalisation movement.

This critique and its attendant loathing of globalisation are not unique to Muslims but extend to other communities and societies who feel the negative side-effects of this phenomenon. However, not everyone views globalisation as pernicious and corrupting. Rather people around the world embrace

globalisation for its many positive aspects. In 2008, the Religion Compass journal featured an article entitled 'Islam in the Age of Globalisation' which reviewed the extent of change witnessed in the Muslim world as a result of globalisation, suggesting that globalisation actually brought about many positive developments in Muslim societies. Ziauddin Sardar, among other Muslim thinkers, identifies Muslims as 'global citizens' who promote good governance, innovation, openness and pluralism as congruent with, and natural to, Islamic beliefs and traditions.

Whilst the origins of 'globalisation' as a term may be contested, its effects can be felt throughout the globe, in cities, towns and remote villages thanks to far-reaching information technology. Globalisation is a reality today and cannot be just washed away by its critics, nor should it be allowed to encroach on peoples lives unchecked. Attempting to strike such a balance, contributors in this issue of Arches discuss globalisation and its impact today.

We are delighted to enlist the contributions of academics and writers renowned for their expertise on the subject, including Professors Mary Kaldor and David Held, who explore the idea of a global civil society and the contentious politics of globalisation. Riva Kastoryano attempts a detailed analysis of nation space and territory, whilst Amjad Saleem offers some thoughts on globalisation and pluralism. Shamim Miah explores a related theme, the rhetoric of integration in a globalised community and Peter Oborne, addresses with the collapse of political integrity in Britain.

Halim Rane, Alex Glennie, and Richard Jackson discuss the relationship and effects of globalisation on Muslim communities, in particular the role of political Islam and Western policy, dialogue efforts and new approaches to the study of terrorism. Useful case studies from around the world are also provided: Sabby Dhalu explains the rise of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred in Britain; Peter Marsden on the US-led war in Afghanistan, and Goh Chok Tong reflecting on the realities and challenges of Muslims living in multi-cultural societies with particular reference to Singapore. Finally, breaking with tradition we have an important segment in this issue of Arches by a former SAS soldier and artist, Steve Pratt, who with the help of his unique paintings provides a lens into the war of images.

We are indeed grateful to all the contributors, for enriching the content of this issue of Arches which we hope you will enjoy digesting.

Thank you

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HEAD OF RESEARCH
THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

*Abdullah Faliq helped set-up The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) and has been its Head of Research since 2005. He edits Arches and in 2009 published a media manual for TCF, *Working with the Media.* In 2001, Faliq helped provide the launching pad for the Grand Mufti of Bosnia Dr Mustafa Ceric's "Declarations of European Muslims." Having studied Arabic and conducted research in Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Palestine & Bosnia, he has a Masters in Middle East Politics (Durham University), and is currently defending a doctorate on British and Arab political Islam (University of London). Active in the British Islamic scene since the 1980s, Faliq was a member of the National Interim Committee for Muslim Unity (NICMU) – the precursor to the Muslim Council of Britain and currently a trustee of the London Muslim Centre and Deputy Secretary-General of Islamic Forum of Europe.

FOREWORD BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

If ever there was a need for proof of the immense impact and expanse of globalisation, the global economic crisis provided that on a mammoth scale.

The whole world watched in awe as major corporations, institutions and even governments collapsed within the span of a few days as a result of the fall of major financial institutions in the United States. What was also awesome was that the effects of the initial fall reached virtually every corner of the globe, and almost nobody was spared -- including the hundreds of millions, billions even, who might have never even heard of those crumbling corporations yet still fell victim thereof nevertheless.

The domino effect of the financial downfall came as a stark reminder to the entire world of how the world has effectively become the `small village' it had long been described as, with the fate of one corner thereof tied intrinsically if not organically to another.

Globalisation, has proven itself as a fully-fledged reality rather than a wish or a dream born by some.

Global warming and climate change have long been proving to all doubters how the actions and behaviours of one nation could have an immense impact on the lives, livelihoods and environments of another on the other side of the world.

Globalisation, has proven itself as a fully-fledged reality rather than a wish or a dream born by some. While the jury is still out on whether the negatives outweigh the positives, this issue of Arches examines the issue of globalisation within the context of conflict and conflict resolution, political Islam, inter- and intra-faith relations and governance.

We are delighted that this issue provides a fulsome discussion on the impact of globalization on different communities and how individuals, groups and societies view and respond to the effects of globalisation at a time of change.

*Anas Altikriti
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*Anas Altikriti, CEO of The Cordoba Foundation, is an internationally accredited translator and interpreter by profession and a postgraduate lecturer in the same field. He was a leading figure of the British Anti-War Movement and Chair of the 2-million Iraq demonstration in February 2003. Altikriti helped successfully negotiate the release of Western Christian peacemakers taken hostage in Iraq in 2005. He is a media commentator and writer in Arabic and English, as well as an advisor and consultant to numerous UK and international organisations on Muslim politics, East-West relations, combating extremism, negotiations, and dialogue. He is former President of the Muslim Association of Britain, a founding member of the British Muslim Initiative and an advisor to the European Muslim Research Centre. Altikriti is also completing a PhD in Political Studies at the University of Westminster, London.

The Idea of Global Civil Society

*PROFESSOR MARY KALDOR

After the end of the Cold War, terms like 'globalisation' and 'civil society' entered the political lexicon. They were an expression of the optimism of the 1990s, the idea that people could come together to overcome international divisions, as they had done at the end of the Cold War, and find shared solutions to the common problems of our time – war and violence, poverty and disease, or environmental degradation.

This paper explores the evolution of the idea of global civil society and asks whether it still has relevance on the more sombre atmosphere of the early twenty-first century – a time of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, economic crisis, as well as seemingly multiplying natural and manmade disasters. Starting with a thumbnail sketch of the changing meaning of civil society, I shall describe the reinvention of civil society simultaneously in Latin America and Eastern Europe, how it differed from earlier meanings. I then want to say something about how the idea has changed again in the 1990s and finally, and making the case for its continuing relevance.

CHANGING MEANINGS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society is a modern concept although, like all great political ideas, it can be traced back to Aristotle. For early modern thinkers, there was no distinction between civil society and the state. Civil society was a type of state characterised by a social contract. Civil society was a society governed by laws, based on the principle of equality before the law, in which everyone including the ruler (at least in the Lockean conception) was subject to the law, i.e. a social contract agreed among the individual members of society. It was not until the nineteenth century that civil society became understood as something distinct from the state. It was Hegel who defined civil society as the intermediate realm between the family and the state where the individual becomes a public person and through membership in various institutions is able to reconcile the particular and the universal.

For Hegel, civil society was 'the achievement of the modern world – the territory of mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune and where waves of passion gust forth, regulated only by reason glinting through them'. Thus Hegel's definition of civil society included the economy and was to be taken up by Marx and Engels, who saw civil society as the 'theatre of history'.

The definition narrowed again in the twentieth century, when civil society came to be understood as the realm not only between the state and the family but between the market, state and family -- in other words, the realm of culture, ideology, and political debate. The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, is the thinker most associated with this definition. He was preoccupied with the question of why it was so much easier to have a communist revolution in Russia than in Italy. His answer was civil society. In Italy 'there was a proper relation between state and society and, and when the state trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed'. His strategy for the Italian Communist Party, which, in fact, was followed right up until the 1980s, was to gain positions in civil society – in universities, in the media and so on – so as to challenge the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

Despite the changing of the content of the term, I suggest that all these different definitions had a common core meaning. They were about a rule-governed society based on the consent of individuals, or if you like, a society based on a social contract among individuals. The changing definitions of civil society expressed the different ways in which consent was generated in different

periods and the different issues that were important. In other words, civil society, according to my definition is the process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against, or agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly. Thus in the early modern period, the main concern was civil rights-freedom from fear. Hence civil society was a society where laws replace physical coercion, arbitrary arrest etc. In the nineteenth century, the issue was political rights and the actors in civil society were the emerging bourgeoisie. In the twentieth century, it was the workers movement that was challenging the State and the issue was economic and social emancipation – hence the further narrowing of the term.

Civil society…is the process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against, or agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic authority.

Not only did all these definitions have this common core of meaning, but also they all conceived of civil society as territorially tied. Civil society was inextricably linked up with the territorial state. It was contrasted with other states characterised by coercion – the empires of the East. It was also contrasted with pre-modern societies, which lacked a state and lacked the concept of individualism – Highlanders, or American Indians. Above all, it was contrasted with international relations, which was equated with the state of nature because it lacked a single authority. Indeed, many civil society theorists believed that civil society at home was linked to war abroad. It was the ability to unite against an external enemy that made possible civil society.

THE REINVENTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The revival of the idea of civil society in the 1970s and 1980s broke that link with the state. Interestingly, the idea was rediscovered simultaneously in Latin America and Eastern Europe. I was deeply involved in the East European discussions and always thought it was they who reinvented the term. However, subsequently, I discovered that the Latin Americans had used the term earlier. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former President of Brazil, was one of the key people to use the term. Indeed, it is a fascinating task in the history of the ideas to explore the way in which this concept proved useful in two different continents at the same time but as far as I know with no communication between them – on the contrary, there seems to have been widespread mistrust since by and large the Latin Americans were Marxists and the East Europeans were anti-Marxists.

In both cases, the term 'civil society' proved a useful concept in opposing militarised regimes. Latin Americans were opposing military dictatorships; East Europeans were opposing totalitarianism – a sort of war society. Both came to the conclusion that overthrow of their regimes 'from above' was not feasible; rather it was necessary to change society. Michnik, in his classic article, first published in 1978, 'The New Evolutionism', argued that attempts to bring change from above (Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968) had failed and that the only possible strategy was through change from below, by changing the relationship between state and society. What he meant by civil society was autonomy and self-organisation. Thus the emphasis, and this was shared by the Latin Americans, was on withdrawal from the state – creating islands of civic engagement – a concept shared by both East Europeans and Latin Americans. East Europeans also used terms like 'anti-politics', 'living in truth' – the notion of refusing the lies of the regime or 'parallel polis' – the idea of creating their own Aristotelian community based on the 'good' i.e., moral, life.

As well as the emphasis on autonomy and civil organisation, civil society also acquired a global meaning. This was a period of growing

interconnectedness, increased travel and communication, even before the advent of the Internet. The emergence of 'islands of civic engagement' was made possible by two things:

a) Links with like-minded groups in other countries. The Latin Americans were supported by North American human rights groups. The East Europeans made links with West European peace and human rights groups, who supported them materially and publicised their cases, and put pressure on governments and institutions.

b) The existence of international human rights legislation to which their governments subscribed and which could be used as a form of pressure. For Latin America, it was the human rights legislation that was important. For East Europe, the Helsinki agreement of 1975 in which East European governments signed up to human rights provided a platform for new groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia or KOR (Workers' Defence Committee) in Poland.

In other words, through international links and appeals to international authorities, these groups were able to create political space. Keck and Sikkink, in their book on transnational activism, talk about the 'boomerang effect' whereby instead of directly addressing your government, appeals to the international community bounce back as it were and put pressure on governments to tolerate certain activities.

This transnational or global aspect of the new understanding of civil society has been widely neglected by Western commentaries on the period perhaps because they understood civil society within their own traditions of thought. Yet it was stressed by the new thinkers themselves, certainly in East Europe. George Konrad, the Hungarian writer, and my favourite of these thinkers, used the word 'globalisation' in his book Anti-Politics written in 1982. Vaclav Havel understood our current predicament as a consequence of the 'global technological civilisation'

Thus the new understanding of civil society represented both a withdrawal from the state and a move towards global rules and institutions. The groups who pioneered these ideas were central to the pressures for democratisation in Latin America and the 1989 revolutions. It is sometimes said that there were no new ideas in the 1989 revolutions – that they just wanted to be like the West. But this new understanding of civil society was the big new idea, an idea that was to contribute a new set of global arrangements in the 1990s.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE 1990S

In the aftermath of 1989, the concept of civil society changed its meaning and was understood in very different ways. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish three main meanings or different ways in which the term is used.

'Civil society' provided a platform for the new social movements, a legitimisation of their activities.

First of all, the term was taken up all over the world by the so-called 'new social movements' – the movements that developed after 1968 concerned with new issues, like peace, women, human rights, environment and with new forms of protest. The language of civil society seemed to express very well their brand of non-party politics. Ideas about the public sphere or the notion of communicative action that had been pioneered by Jurgen Habermas, seemed to resonate well with the concept of civil society.

The term 'civil society' provided a platform for the new social movements, a legitimisation of their activities. The concept was enthusiastically taken up South Asia, Africa, especially South Africa and Western Europe. Because of the context in which these movements operated, they addressed not just the state – indeed they often felt blocked

at state levels because of the dominance of political parties –but layers of institutions (local, national and global). A new phenomenon of great importance during this period was the emergence of transnational networks of activists who came together on particular issues – landmines, human rights, climate change, dams, AIDS/HIV, or corporate responsibility - and had a significant impact on strengthening processes of global governance, especially in the humanitarian field. Notions of humanitarian norms that override sovereignty, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, strengthening of human rights awareness – were very important in the construction of a new set of multilateral rules – what we might call a humanitarian regime.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the emergence of a so-called anti-globalisation movement – concerned with global social justice – used the concept of civil society in the same way. I call this understanding the 'activist version'.

Secondly, the term was taken up by the global institutions and by western governments. It became part of the so-called New Policy Agenda. Civil society was understood as what the West has; it is seen as a mechanism for facilitating market reform and the introduction of parliamentary democracy. I call this the 'neo-liberal version'. In contrast to Habermas and the public sphere, this understanding built on American ideas about the 'third sector' (Salamon and Anheier), communitarianism (Etzioni) or social capital (Robert Putnam). In particular, Robert Putnam's work seemed to demonstrate that thick associational activities, ranging from bowling clubs and picnics to churches and trades unions is conducive to democracy and economic development. This understanding of civil society is much less political and more passive than the concept of the public sphere. Civil society is primarily about self-organisation rather than communication; it offers a substitute for the state, an alternative to excessive state interference, rather than a way of influencing the state.

These thinkers trace their ideas back to De Tocqueville and his insight that 'if men are to remain civilised or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio as the equality of conditions is increased.'

The key agents of this version of civil society are not social movements but NGOs. NGOs can be regarded as 'tamed' social movements. Social movements always rise and fall. And as they fall, they are either 'tamed' – institutionalised and professionalised – or they become marginal and disappear or turn to violence. 'Taming' means that you become the respectable opposition – the partner in negotiations. Historically, social movements were tamed within a national framework. Campaigners for the suffrage or for anti-slavery in the nineteenth century became absorbed into liberal parties. Labour movements were originally universalist and internationalist but became transformed into official trade unions and Labour and Social Democratic parties.

What was significant in the 1990s was that the new social movements became tamed with in a global framework. There have always been International NGOs like the Anti Slavery Society or the International Committee of the Red Cross, but these increased dramatically in the 1990s often as a result of official funding. (For numbers, see the data we have collected in the yearbooks we publish at LSE). Indeed NGOs increasingly look both like quasi-governmental institutions because of the way they substitute for state functions and, at the same time, like a market, because of the way they compete with each other. The dominance of NGOs has led some activists to become disillusioned with the concept of civil society. Thus Neera Chandhoke, a civil society theorist from Delhi University says civil society has become a 'hurrah word' and 'flattened out'. Mahmoud Mamdami, the African political scientist says 'NGOs are killing civil society'.

Yet a third concept of GCS can be called the post-modern version. Social anthropologists criticise the concept of society as euro-centric, something borne of the Western cultural context (according to this argument, Latin America and Eastern Europe are culturally part of Europe). They suggest that non-Western societies experience or have the potential to

experience something similar to civil society but not necessarily based on individualism. It is certainly true that all cultures have traditions of human dignity, tolerance and the use of reason and public deliberation. In his autobiography, Nelson Mandela tells how his understanding of democracy derived from the debates in his village as a child. Likewise much of the thinking of classical Islam in the medieval period – the heyday of Islam – anticipates the ideas of civil society in the Western Enlightenment. Thus the classical distinction between the realm of Islam and the realm of war paralleled the distinction between civil society and the state of nature in Enlightenment thought and, indeed included a notion of a social contract Bay'a. The Arabic term for civil society, Al-Mujtama'a Al-Madani, derives both from the word for city and from Medina, the city where Mohammed first established his Islamic society/city state.

It is sometimes argued that civil society is different from this concept of Islamic society because it is a secular notion that can apply to all human beings. But Islam was also a universal creed that claimed global relevance to any human community. In practice, however, both were bounded concepts. Civil society was bounded by territory and Islamic society was bounded by belief and by territory, even if it adopted some measures of religious pluralism. Within these communities, there was a presumption of non-violence, a notion of peace with justice, and this was contrasted with the external world of violence.

Thus post-modernists argue that that global civil society must engage with other traditions and recapture notions of civility that can enrich the secular, modernist, individualistic notion of civil society. For post-modernists, new religious and ethnic movements that have also grown dramatically over the last decade are a significant component of global civil society, including the extremist variants who need to be involved in dialogue. Global civil society can't be just the 'nice, good Northern movements'.

Civil society has always had both a normative and descriptive content. My definition is normative: civil society is the process through which consent is generated, the arena where the individual negotiates, struggles against, or debates with the centres of political and economic authority. Today, those centres include global institutions both international institutions and companies. In descriptive terms, all three versions need to be included. It could be argued that state funded NGOs should be excluded since they are not autonomous from the state. It can also be argued that compulsory communalist groups, which may be the case for religious and nationalist movements, should be excluded because central to the concept of civil society is individual emancipation or that groups that advocate violence should be excluded. But this would mean confining the definition to the activist version and only including autonomous, non-violent, voluntary, and politically engaged groups –in other words a narrowly activist version.

If the term global civil society is to have any purchase on global developments, it needs the neo-liberal and post-modernist versions. The neo-liberal version makes the term respectable, providing a platform in which more radical groups can gain access to power (both 'insiders' like NGOs and 'outsiders' like social movements). The post-modernist version offers a basis for many of the most excluded people in the world. In practise, moreover, in actually existing civil society, it is almost impossible to draw boundaries between who is included and who is excluded.

In other words, global civil society is a platform inhabited by activists (or post-Marxists), NGOs, neo-liberals, as well as national and religious groups in which they argue about, campaign for (or against), negotiate about, or lobby for the arrangements that shape global developments. There is not one global civil society but many, affecting a range of issues – human rights, environment and so on. It is not democratic – there are no processes of election, nor could there be at a global level since that would require a world state. Such a state, even if democratically elected, would be totalitarian. It is also uneven and Northern dominated. Nevertheless, the emergence of this phenomenon does offer a potential for individuals – a potential for emancipation. It opens up closed societies

as happened in Eastern Europe and Latin America and it offers the possibility to participate in debates about global issues.

THE GLOBAL CRISIS

What happened in the 1990s was the increased visibility of a system of global governance, which involves both states and international institutions. It is not a single world state but a system in which states are increasingly hemmed in by a set of agreements, treaties, and rules of a transnational character. Moreover, these rules are based not just on agreement between states but on public support, generated through global civil society. Of particular importance, is a growing body of cosmopolitan law, by which I mean the combination of humanitarian law (laws of war) and human rights law. Cosmopolitan law is international law that applies not just to states but to individuals – something earlier international relations theorists considered to be impossibly utopian. This broadening and strengthening of cosmopolitan law, both immediately after World War II and in the 1990s, it can be argued, was largely a consequence of global civil society pressure.

Global civil society offers the promise of bringing the 'inside' outside.

The early twenty first century seems very different. We seem to be in the midst of successive crises – the Haitian earthquake, the Greek debt crisis, the BP oil spill, the continuing violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somali, Pakistan… No sooner does one crisis disappear from the headlines, than another pops up in a different part of the world. Perhaps this is just because we are more aware of crises in faraway places than in the past. The explosion in information and communications technologies has allowed us to receive and indeed experience images and texts not only from the media but from friends and families and indeed anyone with a camera or a mobile and access to the Internet, and, at the same time, to be able to blog, twitter and comment upon what appears to be instant reportage from whatever crisis zone dominates airwaves at that particular moment.

But there is more to successive crises than growing communication – important though that is. It can be argued that these interconnected crises have to do with the failure of national institutions to cope with global challenges. The War on Terror could be viewed as an attempt to return to the kind of geo-politics that was characteristic of most of the twentieth century. Yet the process of globalisation cannot be reversed. The consequences of trying to reimpose order based on polarisation, as in the case of the War on Terror, or of adopting protectionist approaches to economic crisis are even more uneven, anarchic, and wild forms of globalisation. We can no longer separate the 'outside' of international relations, at least in a realist conception, from the 'inside'; civil society cannot be insulated from what goes on outside be it terrorism, financial meltdown, or climate change – a perverse boomerang effect. The distinction between war and domestic peace made by the classical theorists of civil society no longer holds. Global civil society offers the promise of bringing the 'inside' outside.

What happens depends on politics, on the agency of people who make history. The idea of global civil society is an emancipatory idea, which allows every individual the potential to engage in the debate about how to find just solutions to the mindboggling challenges of our time. It is about constructing a social contract that supplements the social contracts at national level and, indeed, gives them more meaning. The same communicative innovations that make us aware of global crisis also offer new possibilities for new forms of global activism and debate –for a virtual space in which such a contract might be negotiated.

There is no other way out of the current dangerous impasse than trying to establish a set of global rules based on consent to pursue the 1990s project of global civil society. We have to find ways to minimize violence at a global level, in the same way that early modern thinkers envisaged civil

society as a way of minimising violence at domestic levels. And we have to find ways to address such issues as financial regulation, healthcare, and saving our planet that can be broadly accepted. This means opening up the conversation about what might be done.

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The Contentious Politics of Globalisation

*PROFESSOR DAVID HELD

It is has become apparent in recent years that political debate has been reinvigorated by questions about whether, or how, to resist, contest, manage or adapt to globalization. Far from globalization bringing about the death of politics, as some fear, it is reilluminating the political terrain. This paper explores this new terrain by mapping the principal normative visions and theories concerning the proper nature and desirable form of globalization and governance in the twenty-first century. Figure 1 identifies the six leading positions in the debate to be discussed in this paper, although it will become apparent that, as well as marked differences of view, there are areas of common ground.



Figure 1. Variants in the politics of globalization

One way of understanding the contentious positions in the politics of globalization is to draw on the distinction between cosmopolitan and communitarian, and globalist and sceptical, thinking developed in my book with Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization (2007). Cosmopolitan thinking here refers to those lines of thought which hold our ethical attachments to a 'single world community' to be fundamental, and by communitarian thinking, those which give national and local communities primacy in our ethical judgments. Globalist thinking refers to those lines of thought which consider the concept of globalization to have a certain descriptive, analytical, and theoretical purchase, while by sceptical thinking I am referring to those that do not.



Figure 2. The great globalization controversy: political configurations

Figure 2 locates each of the six positions I will discuss according to their underlying cosmopolitan or communitarian sensibilities and the extent to which they coalesce around a globalist or sceptical argument. The political projects listed differ not only in substantive terms but also with respect to their radicalism (from reform to rejection) and political strategies (from lobbying to protest). Here the focus is necessarily limited to a brief overview of each and how they define the parameters of a politics of globalization.

Moreover, while there remain avid defenders

of a free market globalized capitalism or, alternatively, a radical relocalization of social life, the locus of contention has come to revolve increasingly around the questions of how contemporary globalization can be regulated, or transformed, or alternative types of globalization pursued. The discussion starts with the neoliberals.

NEOLIBERALS

Advocates of neoliberalism have, in general, been committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative (see Hayek 1960, 1976; Nozick 1974). Accordingly, a laissez-faire or free market society is the key objective, along with a 'minimal state' that refrains from 'excessive' intervention in the economy and social life.

The project of neoliberalism has been pursued, first and foremost, through a powerful agenda of economic reform, commonly referred to as the 'Washington Consensus'. This agenda is focused on free trade, flexible exchange rates, market-determined interest rates, the transfer of assets from the public to the private sector, the tight focus of public expenditure on well-directed social targets, balanced budgets, tax reform, secure property rights and the protection of intellectual property rights. It has been the economic orthodoxy for a significant period of the last twenty-five years in leading OECD countries and in the international financial institutions.

The 'Washington Consensus' was first set out by John Williamson (1990, 1993). But the term acquired a very particular conservative connotation as it became linked to the economic and political agendas of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, with their emphasis on free capital movements, monetarism and a minimal state that does not accept responsibility for correcting income inequalities or managing serious externalities. I use the term 'Washington Consensus' in this latter sense, although it is important to note that in recent years the original 'consensus' has been augmented by policies designed to improve public and private institutional effectiveness and competence.

For the advocates of a neoliberal world order, globalization defines a new epoch in human history in which traditional nation-states are becoming unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global economy (Ohmae 1995: 5). In the view of these thinkers, we are witnessing the emergence of a single global market alongside the principle of global competition as the harbinger of human progress. In this increasingly 'borderless' economy, successful national governments must become flexible transmission belts for global market forces. Those states that fail to make this adaptation will fall behind and stagnate, eroding the opportunities of their peoples.

Governance of this order is conducted principally through the discipline of the world market combined with minimal forms of international governance designed to promote global economic integration through the dismantling of barriers to commerce and investment. Economic power and political power are becoming effectively denationalized and diffused (Ohmae 1995: 149). As a result, globalization has come to embody the potential for creating a radically new world order which, according to neoliberals, will encourage human freedom and prosperity unencumbered by the dictates of stifling public bureaucracy and the power politics of states.

LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISTS

Recognising the challenges posed by growing global interconnectedness – as opposed to a world shaped ever more harmoniously by global competition and global markets – liberal internationalists consider that political necessity requires, and will help bring about, a more cooperative world order. Three factors are central to this position: growing interdependence, democracy and global institutions. First, leading liberal internationalists have argued that economic interdependence generates propitious conditions for international cooperation between governments and peoples (see Hinsley 1986). Since their destinies are bound together by many serious economic and political issues, states,

as rational actors, come to recognize that international cooperation is essential to managing their common fate. Secondly, they have argued that the spread of democracy establishes a foundation for international peace. Democracies are constrained in their actions by the principles of openness and accountability to their electorates, and, as such, are less likely to engage in secretive politics, to pursue manipulative geopolitics or to go to war (Howard 1981). Thirdly, they maintain that through the creation of international law and institutions to regulate international interdependencies, greater harmony between states can be maintained.

In the twentieth century, liberal internationalist views played a leading role in the aftermath of both the First and Second World Wars. The creation of the League of Nations, with its hope for a 'world safe for democracy', was infused with such ideology, as was the foundation of the UN system. In the context of the New World Order after the Cold War, liberal internationalist ideas acquired renewed vitality but have been adapted to fit new circumstances (Long 1995). One of the most systematic statements of this position can be found in the report of the Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood (1995). The report recognizes the profound political impact of globalization, which is transforming the world into a neighbourhood, and its main concern is to address the problem of democratic governance in this new 'global neighbourhood'.

To achieve a more secure, just and democratic world order the report proposes a multifaceted strategy of international institutional reform. Central to this position is a reformed United Nations system buttressed by the strengthening of regional forms of international governance, such as the EU. Through the establishment of a peoples' assembly and a Forum of (Global) Civil Society, both associated with the UN General Assembly, for instance, the world's peoples are to be represented directly and indirectly in the institutions of global governance. Democratic forms of governance within states are also to be nurtured and strengthened through international support mechanisms, while the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are to be adapted 'in ways that recognize the need to balance the rights of states with the rights of people, and the interests of nations with the interests of the global neighbourhood' (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 337).

Finally, binding all these reforms together is a commitment to the nurturing of a new global civic ethic based on 'core values that all humanity could uphold: respect for life, liberty, justice and equity, mutual respect, caring, and integrity'. And central to this global civic ethic is the principle of participation in governance at all levels from the local to the global.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS

The management of the social, economic and political dislocation arising from contemporary processes of globalization is the starting point of a key strand of work focused on radical institutional reform, anchored in the United Nations Development Programme's initiative on providing global public goods (see Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999). Public goods, the UNDP programme maintains, can no longer be equated with state-provided goods alone. Diverse state and non-state actors shape and contribute to the resources and rule systems of public life – and they need to do so if some of the most profound challenges of globalization are to be met. Moreover, since these challenges reach across the public domain in all countries and regions, it is only through an extended public dialogue about the nature and provision of public goods that a new, more accountable and just global order can be built.

Many of today's global public policy crises… can be understood best through the lens of public goods theory.

Advocates of this view argue that many of today's global public policy crises

– from global warming to the spread of AIDS – can be understood best through the lens of public goods theory, and that the common interest is often best protected by the provision of such goods at the global level. However, the existing institutions of global governance do not enable the effective provision of global public goods because they are weakened by three crucial gaps: a jurisdictional gap – the discrepancy between a globalized world and separate national units of policy-making, giving rise to the problem of who is responsible for many pressing global issues, particularly externalities; a participation gap – the failure of the existing international system to give adequate voice to many leading global actors, state and non-state; and an incentive gap – the challenges posed by the fact that, in the absence of a supranational entity to regulate the supply and use of global public goods, many states will seek to free ride and/or fail to find durable collective solutions to pressing transnational problems.

Addressing each of the gaps provides an agenda for enhanced multilateral cooperation. The jurisdictional gap can be closed by extending cooperation among states through the establishment, for example, of clear 'externality profiles', which could become the basis for enhancing reciprocity between them and for the internalization of externalities by all parties. If such initiatives could be linked to establishing clear maps of the jurisdictional challenges created by transnational public problems, then a basis might be established not only for holding states to account for the external problems they generate but also for gleaning where new institution building must take place.

The participatory gap can be addressed by adopting an approach to decision-making in which governments share the opportunity for a voice with civil society and business. As Kaul et al explain, 'All actors must have a voice, have an appropriate opportunity to make the contribution expected of them and have access to the goods that result' (1999: xxix). Leading agents of politics, business and civil society must become active participants in the setting of public agendas, in the formulation of policy ideas and in deliberations on them.

Finally, the incentive gap can be closed by creating explicit incentives and disincentives to overcome the frictions of international cooperation, through the full provision of information, effective surveillance to reduce cheating and ensure compliance, an equitable distribution of the benefits of collaboration, a strengthening of the role of epistemic communities as providers of 'objective' knowledge and information, and through encouraging the activities of NGOs as mechanisms of accountability when they name and shame weak or failing policies. No one incentive package will fit all issue areas, but without such mechanisms global policy problems will be much harder to solve (see also Kaul et al. 2003; Held 2004: ch. 6).

GLOBAL TRANSFORMERS

There is considerable overlap between some of the principles and objectives of the liberal internationalists, institutional reformers and the fourth position to be set out here, referred to as that of the 'global transformers'. This position accepts that globalization is neither new nor inherently unjust or undemocratic (see Held et al. 1999). Rather, the issue it poses is one about its desirable form and distributional consequences. The argument is that there is nothing inevitable or fixed about its current form, marked by huge asymmetries of power, opportunity and life chances. Globalization can be better and more fairly governed, regulated and shaped. This distinguishes the global transformers from those who argue for alternatives to globalization – whether through protectionism or localism – and those who simply seek to manage it more effectively.

Advocates of the transformationalist position maintain that recasting globalization needs to be conceived as a 'double-sided process': the deepening of political and social reform within a national community, involving the democratization of states and civil societies over time, as well as the creation of greater transparency, accountability and democracy across territorial borders (see Held 1995; Linklater 1998; Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998; Held 2004). Democracy

must allow citizens to gain access to, and render accountable, the social, economic and political processes which cut across and transform their traditional community boundaries. Each citizen of a state will have to learn to become a 'cosmopolitan citizen'. Citizenship in a democratic polity of the future, it is argued, is likely to involve a growing mediating role: a role which encompasses dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the horizons of one's own framework of meaning and prejudice, and increasing the scope of mutual understanding. Political agents who can 'reason from the point of view of others' will be better equipped to resolve, and resolve fairly, the new and challenging transboundary issues that create overlapping communities of fate.

The core of this project involves reconceiving legitimate political activity in a manner which emancipates it from its traditional anchoring in fixed borders and delimited territories and, instead, articulates it as an attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic democratic law which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on in diverse self-regulating associations – from cities and subnational regions to nation-states, supranational regions and wider global networks. And alongside new ways of fostering democracy and social justice beyond borders, the global transformers argue that there is a need for new modes of administering and implementing international agreements and international law, as well as new income streams to both fund these developments and create the basis, in principle, for autonomous and impartial political authority at the global level.

STATISTS/PROTECTIONISTS

The position referred to here as statist/protectionist is, of course, very different from the above. More than the other political positions discussed so far, it is best seen as representing a range of views, only aspects of which overlap. In the first instance, many strong arguments for the primacy of national communities, nation-states and multinational states in the world order are not necessarily protectionist in the sense of being hostile to an open world economy and free trade. These arguments are often more about the essential means to ensure successful participation in open markets and good governance arrangements than about withdrawal or delinking from the rest of the world (Cattaui 2001). Second, these arguments are frequently associated with a marked scepticism about globalization. This scepticism concludes that the extent of contemporary 'globalization' is wholly exaggerated (Hirst 1997; Hirst and Thompson 1999). Moreover, it holds that the rhetoric of globalization is seriously flawed and politically naive since it underestimates the enduring power of national governments to regulate international economic activity.

Hand-in-hand with this view is an emphasis on the necessity of enhancing or reinforcing the capacities of states to govern. The priority is to build competent state capacity; that is, to deepen it where it already exists in the developed world and to nurture it where it is most urgently needed – in the poorest countries. Without a monopoly of the means of violence, disorder cannot be checked, and the welfare of all in a political community is likely to be threatened. But even with a monopoly of violence, good government does not necessarily follow: corruption has to be checked, political skills acquired, human rights upheld, accountability assured, and investment in the infrastructure of human development – health, education and welfare – maintained. Without strong national governing capacities, little can be achieved in the long run.

Statist and protectionist positions become more closely connected when the politics of national communities is associated with a hostility to, or outright rejection of, global links and institutions, especially when they are perceived to be driven by American, Western or foreign commercial interests. Aspects of the latter are often thought of as posing a direct threat to local or national identities or to religious traditions. What is uppermost here is the protection of a distinctive culture, tradition, language or religion, which binds people together and offers a common ethos and sense of fate. If the latter is tied to a political structure which

defends and represents a community, it can clearly have huge symbolic and national significance. This can give rise to a spectrum of political positions, from the secular nationalist (represented by strong national cultural traditions) to fundamentalist religious groupings (such as radical Islam).

But even if a clash of cultures or civilizations is not behind antipathy to global forces, statist/protectionist positions can be linked to deeply rooted scepticism or antipathy to Western power and dominance. In this respect, the argument tends to interpret global governance and economic internationalization as primarily Western or American projects, the main object of which is to sustain their primacy in world affairs. According to this view, only a fundamental challenge to dominant geopolitical and geo-economic interests will produce a more pluralist and legitimate world order in which particular identities, traditions and worldviews can flourish unhindered by hegemonic forces. In this regard, it has much in common with the last set of positions to be explored below.

RADICALS

While the advocates of liberal internationalism, institutional reform and global democratic transformations emphasize the necessity of strengthening and enhancing global governance arrangements, proponents of the radical project stress the need for governance mechanisms based on the establishment of accountable and self-governing communities (cf. Burnheim 1985; Walker 1994; Falk 1995; Beetham 2005).

For many radicals, the agents of change are to be found in existing civil society movements, including new social movements such as the environmental movement, the women's movement and the anti-globalization or Social Justice movement. According to Mary Kaldor (2003), 'global civil society' emerged against the backdrop of the spread of demands for democratization around the world after the end of the Cold War and with the intensifying process of global interconnectedness. It reflects a demand for greater personal autonomy and self-organization in highly complex and uncertain societies, where power and decision-making increasingly escape national boundaries. Kaldor interprets this not as a call to abolish states or the state system per se, but rather as an aspiration to extend the impact and efficacy of human rights, to deepen the international rule of law guaranteed by a range of interlocking institutions, and to develop citizen networks which might monitor, contest and put pressure on these institutions.

Other radical thinkers find in the emergence of global activism a firmer attachment to the achievement of social and economic equality, the establishment of the necessary conditions for self-development, and the creation of self-governing political structures (Klein 2002). The radical model, thus understood, is less about 'pressuring' the state system to open up and change, and more about a 'bottom up' vision of civilizing world order. It represents a conception of 'humane governance' as opposed to the individualism and appeals to rational self-interest of neoliberalism and of current voting systems.

Radical thinkers in general are reluctant to prescribe substantive constitutional or institutional blueprints for a more democratic world order, since this represents the centralized, modern, 'top down' statist approach to political life which they reject. Accordingly, the emphasis is typically on identifying the principles on which politics might be constructed irrespective of the particular institutional forms it might take. Through a programme of resistance and the 'politicization' of social life, the view is that social movements are defining a 'new progressive politics' which involves 'explorations of new ways of acting, new ways of knowing and being in the world, and new ways of acting together through emerging solidarities' (Walker 1994: 147–8).

While the politics of radicalism is rooted in protest-driven concerns and, frequently, in single-issue campaigns, there are signs that elements of contemporary protest movements are moving beyond this agenda, and developing institutional reform programmes not unlike those found among the institutional reformers and global transformers. At the meeting of

the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, for instance, several recommendations for restructuring aspects of globalization were put on the agenda, from improving corporate governance and placing limits on the freedom of capital, to measures to protect core labour standards and safeguard the environment. The focus of attack of these proposals is 'unfettered globalization' and 'unrestricted corporate power', rather than globalization per se. A new emphasis on working with, and the reform of, the UN system creates other fruitful avenues of overlap with elements of some of the other positions set out above. However, overlap in this regard will never be complete, since some radical positions do not seek common ground or a new reconciliation of views.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS COSMOPOLITAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The extreme ends of the political spectrum are deeply problematic. Whereas neoliberalism simply perpetuates existing economic and political systems and offers no real solutions to the problems of market failure, the radical position appears wildly optimistic about the potential for localism to resolve, or engage with, the governance agenda generated by the forces of globalization. But, as Figure 1 shows, there are important points of overlap.

I refer to this overlapping ground as the domain of cosmopolitan social democracy. This is because it seeks to nurture some of the most important values of social democracy – the rule of law, political equality, democratic politics, social justice, social solidarity and economic effectiveness – while applying them to the new global constellation of economics and politics. Accordingly, the project of cosmopolitan social democracy can be conceived as a basis for uniting around the promotion of the impartial administration of law at the international level; greater transparency, accountability and democracy in global governance; a deeper commitment to social justice in the pursuit of a more equitable distribution of the world's resources and human security; the protection and reinvention of community at diverse levels (from the local to the global); and the regulation of the global economy through the public management of global financial and trade flows, the provision of global public goods, and the engagement of leading stakeholders in corporate governance.

[the] common ground in global politics contains clear possibilities of dialogue and accommodation between different segments of the political spectrum.

This common ground in global politics contains clear possibilities of dialogue and accommodation between different segments of the political spectrum, although this is clearly contested by the positions at either end. In addition, some of the positions represented by the statists/protectionists could be part of the dialogue; for clearly 'cosmopolitan social democracy' requires strong competent governance at all levels – local, national, regional and global.

The common ground represented by cosmopolitan social democracy provides a basis for optimism that global social justice is not simply a utopian goal. In a world of overlapping communities and power systems, global issues are an inescapable element of the agenda of all polities and many organizations. The principal political question of our times is how these issues are best addressed or governed - how global justice and security can best be provided. Cosmopolitan social democracy provides a framework for progressive thinking and political action on these questions, in a context of shared global concerns which unite a diverse array of political opinion.

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Global Forces and the Emergence of Second Generation Political Islam

*DR HALIM RANE

When political Islam emerged on the world stage in the late 1970s it was viewed by many Western observers as a peculiar phenomenon. The preceding centuries had witnessed the retreat of religion from a once prominent role in politics. Religion had been relegated to the private sphere and the modern world was one characterised by the rule of secular governments. Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 was seen by the Carter administration in the United States as an 'absurd' contradiction to the entire modern Western tradition of secularisation. The subsequent Reagan administration was no more accepting of an increasing role for Islam in Muslim politics but was pragmatic in embracing the Afghan mujahideen to fight a proxy war against the Soviet Union. By the 1990s, the first generation of Islamist political movements and parties were already in power in Sudan via a military coup; making significant electoral gains in Egypt, Jordan, and Malaysia; and had won the parliamentary elections in Algeria. Additionally, the mujahideen in Afghanistan had claimed victory against the Soviet Union, and secular Iraq had failed to dislodge Islamic rule in Iran as hoped by Britain and the United States.

Unlike most of their first generation counterparts, 2G Islamist parties advocate positive relations with the West.

Characterised by policies concerned with enforcing Islamic morality and opposition to the West, the first generation of Islamist political parties became seen as an affront to a progressive, secular, modern world. However, political Islam has matured over time and a second generation of Islamist political parties (2G) has emerged. Among this second generation are Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), Malaysia's People's Justice Party (PKR), and Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). These parties are Islamic in orientation and identity but base their political programs on universal principles of democracy, social justice, rule of law, human rights, pluralism, and government accountability, rather than crude appeals to implementing punitive aspects of shari'a law or creating an Islamic state in the modern, conventional sense.

Also, unlike most of their first generation counterparts, 2G Islamist parties advocate positive relations with the West, apparent, for instance, in the AKP's commitment to achieving EU membership for Turkey and in the PKS' memorandum of understanding with the Australian Labor Party. It should be highlighted that the AKP does not regard itself as Islamic or Islamist but rather a conservative democratic party. However, Islamic beliefs and values are a deeply important part of the identity of most Turkish people and the success of the AKP in Turkey is due to the fact that this party and its leadership respects and reflects the beliefs and values of the people. Individual members of the party acknowledge the consistency between their party's policies, Islam's higher objectives, and what have become universal norms and ideals.

Three key factors have been central to the development of the 2G Islamist political parties. The first is internal socio-political factors, including growing support for Islam and demand for Islamic beliefs, values, and principles to play a role in the socio-political context; and the failure of

first generation Islamist political parties to reach a sufficiently broad cross-section of the electorate and satisfy their expectations, needs, and aspirations. The two central counts concerning the failure of the first generation as observed by Olivier Roy have been political Islam's inability to provide an effective blueprint for an Islamic state based on the shari'a and the abandonment of the pan-Islamic or caliphate model and contentment with a world order based on nation-states.

However, this is largely a failure only to the extent that it has not met the vision of such post-colonial Muslim thinkers and leaders as Abul A'la al-Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. The implementation of shari'a is not the central challenge for political Islam. Even when shari'a (in its modern, conventional conception) is fully or near-fully implemented, as in the case of Afghanistan under the Taliban, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Sudan, the state is not closer to Islamic ideals in terms of establishing a just and ethically-based social order. Such states are among the poorest in term of performance on key social economic and political measures. No positive correlation is observable between a more full or comprehensive implementation of shari'a and progress towards a more just and equitable social order in terms of political stability, good governance and government accountability and transparency, economic advancement, equitable distribution of wealth, educational attainment or national prosperity in general.

In large part, the problem is that these values, goals and standards were not the emphasised priorities of the modern conventional conception of shari'a. Rather, they were often associated with the West, devalued, dismissed by first generation Islamists and not included as part of their Islamic agenda.

In recent years, first generation Islamist political parties across the Muslim world have been losing the confidence of the Muslim electorate due to their lack of an effective response to the major social, political and economic problems of their respective Muslim countries; their inability to connect with non-Muslim minorities and secularists; and the suspicion and opposition they evoke from Western powers. Today, Muslims do not necessarily vote on the basis of religious identity but according to their values and interests. If Islam is to contribute positively at the social and national levels in Muslim countries, an alternative approach is needed that is inspired by or derived from Islam but integrates Western democratic political institutions.

The second factor concerning the emergence of 2G Islamist political parties is the external political context, including policies of Western governments, namely the United States, that are perceived to be hostile towards Islam and Muslims as well as the use of violence and terrorism by certain extremist Islamist groups. The former has facilitated the positioning of 2G Islamist parties towards the centre of the political spectrum in their respective countries leaving their more secular-liberal opposition to become more marginalised, while the latter has become increasingly unappealing for a growing majority of Muslims around the world, which has increased the appeal of the relatively moderate yet Islamic policies of the 2G Islamist parties. The election of Barak Obama as president of the United States and his policy of a new beginning with the Muslim world has given the space and legitimacy to 2G Islamist political parties' policies of maintaining positive relations with the West, not only diplomatic and economic but also in the military context.

The United States issued its first policy document on political Islam in June 1992. The then Assistant Secretary of State, Edward Djerejian, delivered an address at Meridian House entitled 'The United States, Islam, and the Middle East in a Changing World' that outlined the two major goals of the United States in the Near East as: 1) 'a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and all her neighbours, including the Palestinians'; and 2) 'viable security arrangements which will assure stability and unimpeded commercial access to the vast oil reserves of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf'. These two goals have remained the enduring pillars of US foreign policy towards the Muslim world.

…in the development of 2G Islamist political parties is the growing acceptance of more contextual and higher objective or *maqasid*-oriented approaches to interpretation in Islam.

About half-way through the address, a third pillar of US foreign policy was added: 'support for human rights, pluralism, women's and minority rights, and popular participation in government and our rejection of extremism, oppression, and terrorism'. However, this pillar has consistently remained a distant third. The acceptance of Islamist parties or governments by the United States depends on three central factors: strategic value to the United States; acceptance of the United States economic and strategic goals; and lastly, commitment to democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and human rights. This explains why such undemocratic regimes as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which have a poor record on human rights, continue to be regarded as friends and allies by the United States. These factors have remained constant over time even during the Obama era. The difference between Obama and US presidents of previous decades is that, particularly in contrast to presidents Carter and Reagan, US foreign policy under Obama has accepted the reality of Islam in Muslim politics. Recent events have demonstrated, however, that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to threaten relations between even 2G Islamist parties and the United States.

The third factor in the development of 2G Islamist political parties is the growing acceptance of more contextual and higher objective or maqasid-oriented approaches to interpretation in Islam. This approach has given contemporary norms and principles concerning democracy, pluralism, and human rights an Islamically legitimate and authentic means of incorporation into Islamic thought and the policies of 2G Islamist parties. Since the turn of the century an emerging trend has been towards the adoption of a maqasid-oriented approach, which emphasises public interest and well-being, rejects literal readings of sacred texts, and gives priority to the spirit of the message. As opposed to reading verses of the Quran in isolation, the maqasid approach required a comprehensive reading of the text as an integrated whole in order to identify the higher objectives.

The maqasid can be traced back to administrative approach of the second caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab, and the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, which emphasises public interest or maslaha. The concept of maqasid was developed by the 11th century theologian Al-Ghazzali in reference to five fundamental protections. However, this conception was revised and expanded in the 14th century by Ibn Taymiyyah and was developed as a new philosophy of Islamic law by Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi. The 13th century was a period of turmoil for the Muslim world, particularly for those regions that suffered the invasion of the Mongols. By contrast the 14th century was a period of relative peace and political stability that allowed intellectual activity to resume. Much of this work sought to re-evaluate tradition in light of the social, political, financial, commercial, and religious changes that had occurred. Correspondingly, the great social, political, and economic turmoil endured by the Muslim world in the 19th and 20th centuries has seen a resurgence of interest in the maqasid approach since the dawn of the 21st century. This approach allows for a more authentic and viable contribution to contemporary Muslim society and state based on Islamic values and objectives.

A maqasid-oriented approach has become the preferred perspective of a number of parties around the Muslim world. Parties such as Malaysia's PKR and Indonesia's PKS are deeply committed to policies that advance justice, human rights, education, government accountability and transparency and economic development, which they regard as the maqasid or higher objectives of Islam. In an interview I conducted in February 2010 with Muhammad Nur Manuty, head of the PKR's Bureau for Religious Understanding, I asked him what an Islamic state means for his

party in the 21st century. Manuty replied that today an Islamic state should be understood as one in which 'people have full equal rights, there is democracy, plurality, human rights are respected, and there is education for people, health care, and welfare services.' He contends that the PKR's commitment to maqasid is central to its identity and is what distinguishes the party from the first generation of Islamist parties in Malaysia.

Similarly, the maqasid approach is central to the politics of the PKS in Indonesia. In the words of Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, president of the party who I interviewed in April 2010, 'the international community is now concerned about the [issues] similar to the maqasid, the universal values. It's time to declare the original objectives of Islamic teaching… the maqasid shari'a. We are now moving to that…' He goes on to explain that the main priorities of the PKS are education, public service, health-care, income levels, and the standard of living. Ishaq contends that 'there are a lot of countries that declare the name of Islamic state, like Sudan, like Pakistan, but...we learned that it is not necessary to have the name, but move to develop, to serve the interests of the communities of the nation then you do the Islamic value, the Islamic thoughts. We are with this idea. Just serve the nation, the basic needs should be fulfilled, the services should be prepared well. This is Islam'.

Both the PKR and PKS have not only established themselves as major opposition parties in their respective countries but have become instrumental in promoting an Islamic democracy based on the maqasid approach. Through a maqasid approach, they have not only demonstrated the consistency of Islam with good governance and socio-economic development but have shown that such an approach is attractive to a broad constituency that includes non-Muslims and Islamists.

Although both nominally Muslim countries, Indonesia's political mood is strongly secular in spite of being the world's most populist Muslim nation, while Muslims in Malaysia constitute only 60 percent of the population. Manuty contends that the maqasid is gaining ground as the preferred approach to Islam among Islamist political parties because 'the traditional approach has failed and pressures from the realities of non-Muslims where we are now living in a very globalised world and it is inter-connected with other parts of the world'. On this point, Syed Husin Ali, deputy president of the PKR who I interviewed in February 2010, adds that for an Islamically-oriented political party in a pluralistic society, the maqasid 'is the best approach because I think it can be easily understood not only by the Muslims but by the non-Muslims alike. If you approach from a fundamentalist angle then it becomes very difficult to explain'.

In addition to providing the PKR and PKS the scope and flexibility to effectively operate amidst diverse and competing internal social forces, the maqasid approach also allows these parties to avoid attacks from external forces that generally hold pejorative views and are suspicious of Islamically-oriented parties. PKS president Lutfi Hasan Ishaq conveyed to me in an interview in April 2010 that 'the neighbours and European communities, American and Western communities have trauma about the Islamic state, so if we talk about that, we make our project of how to develop our nation fail before starting'. Ishaq acknowledges that Western countries such as the United States and Australia are better able to identify with Islamist party such as the PKS that adopt the universal values enshrined in the maqasid rather than the first generation Islamists that retain literalist views of shari'a and an Islamic state. The Islamic values derived from a maqasid perspective, he explains, as 'al-Ma'ruf, the acceptable values [that] everybody will accept even if they don't believe in God'.

However, a maqasid approach does not necessarily translate into a wholesale adoption of policies that are conciliatory or compatible with the West. The one issue that even 2G Islamist political parties remain at odds with the United States is the Israel-Palestine conflict. In large part, this is due to an internalisation of and commitment to such principles as peace, justice, freedom, and independence. Former MP and founding member of the AKP in Turkey, Huseyin Kansu who I interviewed in February 2010 explains:

"What we want in the region and in the world is peace and serenity... Israel should leave all those areas occupied after the 1967 war – the Golan Heights, West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. Still they control Gaza. Israel should leave all these lands and Palestine must be an independent state. Both Israel and Palestine must respect their borders, and peace should come to the region; they should live in a civilised way"

Similarly, when I asked the Deputy-President of Malaysia's PKR about where the party's policies are at odds with those of the United States, he referred to the Israel-Palestine conflict, stating that Israel must withdraw [from the occupied territories] before talks. He elaborated:

"We are clear on that, we are clear on that. We would like to have a peaceful resolution to the problem, but we don't want to see the continued injustices there that are perpetrated and the colonisation, occupation that is still being perpetrated"

When I posed the question of 'how the Western world can improve relations and alleviate tension with the Muslim world', founding member and leader of the PKS youth wing, Rama Pratama, responded by saying that 'the roots is coming from the condition of Palestine. That must be resolved first, because the roots of all the problems between the West and Islam lie there. Pratama adds that the reason the condition in Palestine is so significant in terms of Islam-West relations is because it continues to be seen by Muslims as 'the centre of the injustice and instability of the world'.

When I asked the president of Indonesia's PKS where his party's policy differs most significantly with United States, he responded with reference to the Israel-Palestine conflict and emphasised its commitment to freedom and independence:

"Under the Indonesia constitution, and the Indonesian government, we stand with the independence movement and against any aggression or colonisation in the world so we stand with this one...We are with American policies on Iraq and Afghanistan but not with them in Palestine. We are with the European community on Iraq and Afghanistan but not with them on Palestine, because nothing changes in Palestine, no positive development...So we stand with them [the Palestinians] until they get their independence in the near future, insha'allah."

In sum, Turkey's AKP, Malaysia's PKR and Indonesia's PKS demonstrate the viability of Islamic democracy; they show that Muslim political parties can uphold both the principles of democracy and Islam while maintaining positive relations with both the Muslim world and the West. While the AKP has proven itself through democratic ascension to power and re-election without reference to Islam or Islamic concepts, other parties, namely the PKR and PKS, are following on this path but define their approach more explicitly in terms of the maqasid.

Collectively, these parties represent a second generation of Muslim political parties that are inspired by Islam and committed to advancing justice, human rights, education, good governance and economic prosperity in the interest of their respective people. They are not only redefining the concept of Islamic democracy and political Islam but also the fate of Islam itself in the socio-political context. Additionally, second generation Islamist political parties advocate positive relations with the West and their policies are broadly consistent with those outlined in US foreign policy documents. However, these parties display a high level of self-confidence, are acutely aware of and responsive to the sentiments of their constituencies, and are disinclined to support US foreign policy where it is in disagreement with their values and principles.

This paper has touched upon one of the themes of my new book *Islam and Contemporary Civilisation: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations*. The book deals with the most complex issues facing Islam today, including those concerning Islamic law, human rights, democ¬racy, jihad, and the Israel–Palestine conflict in the context of Islam-West relations. In approaching these issues, the book seeks to find a resolution on the basis of the Qur'an, interpreted through

a contemporary methodology involving a contextualised reading of the text in terms of its higher objectives. I term this approach the contextual-maqasid methodology. This methodology maintains the integrity and relevance of Islam based on the Qur'an as the primary source, while allowing the faith to respond constructively to the challenges and realities of modernity.

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BOOK REVIEW

Islam and Contemporay Civilisation: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations

In Islam and Contemporay Civilisation: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations, Dr Halim Rane examines the complex debates and dilemmas facing Muslims today. These include both internal issues and Islam's relations with Western civilisation. Dr Rane provides a concise, comprehensive introduction to Islam and modern developments in Muslim thought, and tackles questions of Islamic law, human rights, democracy, jihad and the on-going Israel-Palestine conflict.

The Cordoba Foundation recommends this book as a definite read for anyone wishing to develop a broader understanding of issues and challenges experienced by Muslims today.

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Dialogue Across Borders: Rethinking Western Policy Towards Arab Political Islam

*ALEX GLENNIE

On 11 September 2001, the phenomenon of 'political Islam' came crashing into global public consciousness. There had been some awareness of Islamist movements before this, particularly following the 1979 revolution that brought a theocratic government to power in Iran, and during the series of bombings carried out by the violent Egyptian al-Jihad and Jamaat al-Islamiyya groups in the 1990s. But Islamists only became the subject of sustained attention after the dramatic strikes against New York and Washington, D.C. that were orchestrated by the radical al-Qaeda movement. Since then, terrorist attacks against western governments and civilians in Spain and the UK, and against Western-linked targets in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bali and Egypt, have confirmed the beliefs of those who argue that the struggle against Jihadi Islam has become one of the defining foreign policy challenges of the twenty-first century.

But how do Islamist parties that aim to achieve change through legal and non-violent participation in politics fit into this narrative? Until recently, Western policymakers and academics have tended to focus on those movements and parties that operate at the violent end of the Islamist spectrum. However, this has obscured the fact that across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), contemporary politics are being driven and shaped by a more diverse group of 'mainstream' Islamist movements[1]. Western policymakers therefore have a clear interest in better understanding their values and their goals, and in developing a consistent approach to engaging with them.

This paper assesses some of the tradeoffs involved in these policy debates. It looks first at the role being played by Islamist parties and movements in the MENA region (focusing particularly on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco). It then considers some of the barriers to sustained engagement with these groups and offers some thoughts as to what a strategic rethink of Western policy towards mainstream Islamist movements and parties might look like in practice.

BROTHERS IN ARMS?

With parliamentary elections due in the fall and presidential elections scheduled for 2011, this year and next could see significant change in Egypt. The 82-year old President Hosni Mubarak is believed to be grooming his son Gamal to step into the leadership role, which would mark the first change in executive power in 30 years. Meanwhile, Egyptian politics have recently been shaken up by the decision of Cairo-born Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to return home and establish a new non-party-political movement called the National Association for Change: a broad coalition of Egyptian citizens and civil society groups in favour of reforming the political system to make it more pluralistic and representative. ElBaradei has not confirmed whether he will run for the presidency, and there are substantial constitutional and political obstacles that may yet prevent him from doing so. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that Egypt's weak opposition movements will make the most of this challenge to the stagnant political status quo, and press harder for increased political openness.

Opposition to Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) has historically been fairly feeble. The country's left-leaning political parties have been disorganised and have failed to build a mass movement around a coherent vision of reform, while

civil society groups such as the Kifaya ('Enough') movement have found it difficult to sustain the momentum behind their calls for democratisation (Ottaway 2010). However, one exception to this picture of political malaise is presented by the Muslim Brotherhood. Heavy crackdowns by the regime and growing internal dissent within the movement's leadership have served to diminish its strength over the past few years. But it remains a significant political force within the Egyptian political system.

While regimes in Morocco and Jordan have long sought to marginalise and undermine their Islamist opposition movements, they have stopped short of banning them outright.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamist movement of the twentieth century, founded in 1928 by a teacher named Hassan Al-Banna who believed that religion was the solution to the range of political and economic ills facing Egypt at that time. In its early years, the Brotherhood was a relatively loose group that was driven more by personalities than by policies. It also maintained a paramilitary wing which it mobilised to influence domestic politics. At this time, key figures in the movement spanned a broad ideological spectrum – from those who favoured peaceful political activism, to radical figures like Sayyid Qutb. But by the 1970s, the Brotherhood had taken a decisive step to focus on building an organised and non-violent political force.

The political space that Egyptian Islamists operate within is heavily circumscribed by the government. While regimes in Morocco and Jordan have long sought to marginalise and undermine their Islamist opposition movements, they have stopped short of banning them outright. However, the Muslim Brotherhood is designated as an illegal organisation under Egyptian law, which prohibits the formation of political parties on the basis of religion. During the 1980s and 1990s the Brotherhood found a number of ways to circumvent these rules. Members of the movement campaigned in national elections – usually in partnership with other legal political parties – and were also active in the professional syndicates and unions. But the group deliberately limited its attempts to enter the formal political system in order to avoid unnecessary clashes with the government.

This uneasy status quo changed at the end of the 1990s, as an erosion of the government's popular legitimacy forced it to reform some of Egypt's restrictive political structures. In 1999, President Mubarak pledged to support a Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that called for judicial supervision of elections. He also promised to oversee a free and fair parliamentary electoral process in 2000. These developments were beneficial for the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had reached a conclusion that the movement should adopt a more proactive political strategy if it wanted to have any say in the policymaking process. To this end, the Brotherhood fielded a number of independent candidates in the 2000 parliamentary elections, winning 17 seats. Building on this success, it ran more candidates in the 2005 elections, winning an unprecedented 88 out of 444 seats.

Unfortunately, this did not give the Brotherhood the influence it had hoped for, since the NDP maintained its stranglehold on the parliamentary system and its ability to control the passage or rejection of legislation. The Brotherhood's unexpected gains in the 2005 elections also led the regime to reverse some of its earlier liberalisation measures, and in 2007, a series of constitutional amendments were pushed through that outlawed all political activity by groups with any kind of religious frame of reference.

This has given the Egyptian government more freedom to arrest and detain Brotherhood members on the charge of belonging to a banned group, and it has used these powers liberally. Nevertheless, the movement's inclusion in parliament since 2005 has given it experience of direct political

participation and, contrary to expectations, the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc has focused less on pushing through conservative religious legislation and more on coordinating with other opposition groups to tackle a broader range of political and social challenges facing Egypt. However, there remain a number of ambiguities in the Brotherhood's positions on other issues which have not yet been satisfactorily addressed by the group's public statements of policy.

In 2007, the Brotherhood released a draft version of a comprehensive political platform that provided considerable detail on the Brotherhood's ideas about economic development, political reform and civil society. But instead of reassuring the movement's critics, it prompted a re-emergence of concerns about the Brotherhood's stance on equalities and human rights, since the document included the assertion that non-Muslims and women should not be allowed to hold senior leadership roles within the state. Equally contentious was its suggestion that adherence to Shari'a law might best be ensured through the creation of a council of religious scholars that would be have the final word over the legislative and executive branches in matters of religious law. This alarmed many external commentators, who regarded it as evidence of the movement taking a regressive step in a theocratic direction (Brown and Hamzawy 2008). It also appeared to take more moderate members of the Brotherhood's guidance council by surprise. A fierce public debate on the issue subsequently broke out among different wings of the movement, which was highly unusual for a group that prides itself on presenting a unified face to the outside world.

Although the Brotherhood has retreated from these controversial positions since 2007, the public airing of internal disputes has had a negative impact on the Brotherhood's internal cohesiveness, and has damaged its reputation as a deliberative and democratic movement. In conjunction with increasingly aggressive crackdowns by the regime, it has also led the movement to seriously rethink its strategy of engagement in electoral politics. Those amongst its leadership that think the Brotherhood should follow the example of Islamist parties in Morocco, Jordan, Yemen and Kuwait by establishing a formal party have lost a great deal of ground to those who believe it should return to its proselytising roots and prioritise social and religious issues.

Participation in government has not delivered significant benefits to many … [Islamist] groups, while some have even seen a drop in their popularity.

This dilemma is not unique to the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2005 and 2006 many commentators were predicting that an 'Islamist tsunami' would sweep across the region following strong electoral showings by the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and Hamas in Palestine. However, this has failed to materialise. Participation in government has not delivered significant benefits to many of these groups, while some have even seen a drop in their popularity. For example, after becoming the third largest party in government in 2002, some observers thought that the PJD in Morocco would win enough seats in the 2007 elections to effectively control the parliament. In the event, it only added four seats to its previous tally, and was shut out of governance by a coalition of establishment parties. The Islamic Action Front in Jordan experienced a similar reverse in fortunes in 2007, winning only 6 seats in parliamentary elections that it had been expected to do well in.

In part, these results are an indication of widespread dissatisfaction with the general state of politics in Morocco and Jordan. Despite some moves towards economic and social modernisation in both of these countries over the past decade, unemployment and poverty levels remain high and efforts to

promote democracy have stalled. This is not entirely the fault of government – both Morocco and Jordan have highly centralised monarchical systems that rely heavily on patronage networks to sustain themselves, and political parties are frequently unable to influence the direction or content of policy in these circumstances. The outcome of this has been a decline of faith in the ballot box as an instrument of political change. Voter turnout in Morocco was a paltry 37 per cent in the 2007 elections, compared with 51 per cent in 2002 and 58 per cent in 1997. But the failure of the PJD and the IAF to capitalise on earlier political gains may also reflect a feeling amongst their constituencies that by taking part in government, they have relinquished some of the moral legitimacy that they enjoyed while in opposition.

Encouragingly, neither party seems to have given up on political participation in reaction to electoral defeat. The PJD has redoubled its efforts to achieve constitutional reforms and put an end to electoral corruption. And while more hardline figures have come to the fore within the Islamic Action Front since 2008, they have still attempted to work constructively with the government on a range of domestic political issues and have been instrumental in brokering a more positive relationship between the Jordanian government and Hamas. Although serious questions remain about the political and social values of these movements, their behaviour both inside and outside government goes some way to challenge those who believe that Islamist parties only pay lip service to democracy as a means of achieving power.

THE CHALLENGE FOR WESTERN POLICY

Western policymakers have often been criticised for their tendency to treat political Islam as a monolithic and uniformly negative force, and for their failure to appreciate the role that non-violent Islamist parties might play in addressing political stagnation in the region. This charge is no longer as fair as it used to be. More robust research on both sides of the Atlantic and in the MENA region has led to increasing recognition of the fact that political Islam is not a fixed ideology with a clearly identifiable set of values and objectives, but rather a fluid phenomenon that encompasses a range of movements with different philosophies, principles and agendas. But an improved understanding of these groups has not yet produced a coherent account of how Western policymakers might engage with them politically.

Islamist parties are frequently more vocal in their support for democracy than their secular rivals.

This is particularly true of European policy, which has been driven by the sense of many officials within the European Union that it is nether feasible, nor desirable to come up with a unified position on engagement with non-violent Islamists. This springs from an unwillingness to jeopardise important security and economic relationships in the region by being seen to legitimise movements that oppose governing regimes, as well as from a belief that this issue is more appropriately handled through bilateral diplomacy with the MENA countries in question. However, this policymaking paralysis also results from valid concerns about the persistent 'grey areas' in the political and social platforms of many mainstream Islamist movements. Of these, four in particular deserve careful consideration:

POLITICAL PLURALISM

When challenged about their reluctance to develop more formal contacts with Islamist parties and movements, many Western policymakers express the concern that opening the door to Islamist participation in politics might result in a situation of 'one person, one vote, one time'. In determining which Islamist parties to engage with, European and North American governments should of course be looking for movements that believe in the concepts of free and fair elections and rotation of power. But they should be careful not to assume that Islamists

are simply biding their time until they are in a position to establish a system of one-party rule. This ignores the fact that across the Middle East and North Africa, Islamist parties are frequently more vocal in their support for democracy than their secular rivals.

Even Islamist movements that do not enjoy legal recognition, such as the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) in Kuwait and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have tacitly agreed to abide by the arbitrary rules on political participation that are imposed by authoritarian regimes, and have consistently made the most of any opportunities they are given to participate in national or local legislatures. Other groups, including the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Islah Party in Yemen have demonstrated their willingness to share political power by entering into alliances with other – often secular – opposition groups in an effort to achieve their goals. Western policymakers should take this kind of political behaviour into account as they decide which Islamist groups they feel able to engage in dialogue with.

GENDER AND MINORITY RIGHTS

While members of Islamist parties frequently profess their support for the idea of universal citizenship, there remain a number of inconsistencies between their rhetoric and actions. For example, the PJD in Morocco were initially resistant to proposed changes to the country's social code that aimed to revise some of the most conservative structures governing family life. And while the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood claims to believe in equal rights for women and for Egypt's minority population of Christian Copts, the group's recent policy platform indicated that it would not accept the election of a woman or a Copt to the position of the country's president. Progressive policymakers and civil society organisations concerned about the promotion of equality and human rights in the MENA region may find these ambiguities difficult to square. But this only makes the case for engagement stronger, both as a means of advancing the debate about how to reform some of the more repressive political and social structures in the region, and in order to better understand the various currents of thought within Islamist movements on these issues.

It is important to note that there is a diversity of opinion both within and between these movements on the issue of gender equality. For example, interviews with members of the Islamic Action Front revealed that while some believed the position of women in Jordanian society was already good, others felt that there was considerable room for improvement of women's rights in social and political life, with one arguing that 'women's rights to hold public posts in the various departments of the state, including education, health and the judiciary, should be secured' (Glennie 2007). This suggests that there may be room for a more constructive debate between Western policymakers and Islamists around the promotion of human rights.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND RELIGION

For many Western policymakers, one of the most troubling aspects of the political platforms of Islamist opposition parties is their lack of clarity on the relationship between religion and politics. For decades, 'Islam is the solution' has served as the campaign slogan for many Islamist groups in the region, while the PJD describes itself as a political party with an 'Islamic frame of reference'. Neither of these statements shed much light on how Islamic values would apply to practical policy problems, suggesting that there is a need to push these parties to be much more explicit about their views on this subject.

That being said, there are a few notable exceptions to this widespread reluctance to discuss difficult questions around the political application of religious values. For example, a team of reformist scholars at Ankara University in Turkey, acting with the support of the mildly Islamist governing AKP party and the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which oversees the country's 8,000 mosques and appoints imams, has been undertaking an ambitious project that aims to reinterpret parts of the Hadith (one of the key sources

of Islamic law). While the 'Hadith Project' has yet to issue a final report, its intention is to contextualise or excise some of the more contentious aspects of Islamic teachings, and to offer a revised approach to issues like the treatment of women and the use of the death penalty (Traynor 2008). If realised, this initiative could serve as a model for how a modern and progressive interpretation of Islam could potentially be incorporated into the public political sphere.

THE USE OF VIOLENCE

Most Islamist parties that engage in formal political processes have now renounced the use of violence as a means of achieving domestic political change. The notable exceptions to this are Hamas and Hezbollah, which maintain armed paramilitary wings, and which have both been involved in internal struggles for power over the past few years. However, there remains a deeply entrenched belief amongst Islamists throughout the region that violence is legitimate when directed against an 'external occupier', particularly in the context of the Palestinian struggle for independence from Israel. So while the Islamic Action Front in Jordan has adopted a reasonably clear stance against responding to state repression with aggression, there is a significant faction within its ranks that identifies very closely with Hamas, and backs violent forms of Palestinian resistance against Israel.

This poses a serious dilemma for Western policymakers. Refusing to engage in dialogue with any group that does not unequivocally reject the use of violence in all circumstances would leave them with few options, given the persistence of conflict between Israel and both Palestinian and Lebanese opposition movements. But agreeing to enter into relations with political Islamist parties that are willing to tacitly support armed resistance, including against innocent civilians, is also decidedly problematic. The key here may be to develop contacts with more moderate individuals within these groups, as a means of holding a more constructive debate about difficult foreign policy issues, without legitimising the views of those on the more extreme end of the political spectrum. It also reinforces the urgency of finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not least so as to remove an ongoing source of grievance among Islamists and Muslim populations more broadly.

CONCLUSIONS

Given that the power and popularity of mainstream Islamist parties in the Middle East and North Africa appears to be on the wane, it could be argued that there is no longer a pressing need for Western governments to try and understand these groups better, or to engage with them on a more regular basis. This would certainly be the easy option, in light of the ideological and political differences of opinion outlined above. But ignoring these groups would be a mistake for those who genuinely want to see more pluralism in the region's politics. Despite recent electoral reverses, Islamist movements and parties remain one of the relatively dynamic political forces in the MENA region, and have succeeded in mobilising considerable levels of support amongst populations that are frustrated with the failure of their leaders to deliver on promises of meaningful political and economic reform, and the failure of Western governments to hold them to account for this.

This does not mean that Islamists do not need to be singled out for preferential treatment. But at the very least, they should be included more consistently in debates about political reform in the region, alongside all other actors who have a stake in this. In March 2009, David Miliband, then-Foreign Secretary UK, argued in a speech on relations between the West and the Islamic world that peace and security would only be achieved through an emphasis on building the broadest political coalitions possible, which would sometimes include 'groups whose aims we do not share, whose values we find deplorable, whose methods we think dubious' (Miliband 2009). While the United States has been less enthusiastic about the idea of direct public engagement with Hamas and Hezbollah, President Obama has also spoken of the urgent need to recalibrate relations with the Muslim world,

which will necessarily involve talking to a range of actors whose political values differ substantially from those of the US. If faith in Western policies in the MENA region is to be rebuilt, these statements must become more than just rhetoric.

Too often, conferences and debates about political Islam fail to involve representatives of Islamist parties themselves, and rely instead on the opinions of external commentators.

To this end, more opportunities for 'track two' or informal dialogue should be created, since they can serve as a lower-risk form of engagement and confidence building. Too often, conferences and debates about political Islam fail to involve representatives of Islamist parties themselves, and rely instead on the opinions of external commentators. It is time to start speaking directly, in forums that are able to provide Islamist politicians and activists with the opportunity to voice their own concerns about Western policy in the MENA region, while also allowing Western policymakers to challenge them on issues where their position remains vague or inconsistent. On its own, talking will not overcome all of the substantive disagreements that separate policymakers in the West from their Islamist counterparts. But if it helps each side to have a more accurate and less fearful view of the other, it must surely be worth engaging in.

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

Building Bridges, Not Walls

Since the 9/11 attacks there has been an explosion of interest in political Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa region. Until recently, analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of the Islamist spectrum.

However, this has obscured the fact that across the region contemporary politics are being driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of 'mainstream' Islamist movements. We define these as groups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes of their countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence to help realise their objectives at the national level, even where they are discriminated against or repressed.

This report by Alex Glennie argues that dialogue with non-violent political Islamist parties and movements should be an urgent priority for the Obama administration and its allies, including the UK, as key to achieving long-term stability in the region.

This report builds on the EMRC's London case study launched at the LMC in January 2010 and marks the start of a ten year research project on Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime in the UK and across Europe.

Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: UK Case Studies

Dr Robert Lambert and
Dr Jonathan Githens-Mazer
Directors, EMRC, University of Exeter

Sat 27 Nov 2010 | 11am
London Muslim Centre (1st Floor)
46 Whitechapel Road, London E1 1JX
Nearest tube: Aldgate East / Whitechapel

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Other speakers

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Director, Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding
Georgetown University, New York

Peter Oborne
Columnist, Daily Telegraph

Salma Yaqoob*
Councillor, Birmingham Sparkbrook Ward and Leader, Respect Party

Seumas Milne*
Columnist and associate editor, The Guardian

Dr Chris Allen
University of Birmingham

** Attendance to be confirmed*

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Globalisation and Religious Pluralism – Meeting the Challenges

*AMJAD MOHAMED-SALEEM

The presence of many a world conflict today with many different causes (some local and some international), seems to unearth a common thread of supremacist notions of the religious 'self' and negative images of the religious 'other' which are deeply-rooted in dominant understandings of religion[1] . The world, thus, is often seen through the lens of 'good' and 'evil' and an 'us' versus 'them' attitude.

This prevailing unhealthy and uni-polar view, congruent to a 'Clash of Civilisation' theory, leads to ambiguities and complexities concerning the perception of current global conflicts and the pivotal role played in the popular mobilisations against the West from sections of the disaffected Third World Opinion. Old questions are being reframed about religions' impact on peace and violence, democracy and human rights, and economic and social development.

> Globalisation is a phenomenon and a process that cannot be easily undone

Many will argue still that in today's globalised world such rivalry, competition, conflict and ultimately violence are a necessary tool to preserve the 'values of freedom'. However the violence we have seen to date has been perpetuated from deeply delusive and divisive assumptions of single exclusive identities by sectarian activists, who want people to ignore all affiliation and loyalties in support of one specific identity. Such exclusive identities are negative, stressing difference rather than belonging and 'opposition to' rather than 'support for' something. Unfortunately whilst faith may rarely be the original source, it often becomes the arena in which conflicts are played out. The result is that conflicts manifest in rumours, hearsay and generalisations which are the first steps towards the stereotyping of people (their faith, their culture and identity) and the denial of a diverse, lived reality, the opposite of respect, understanding and acceptance. As a consequence, faiths (beliefs and traditions), culture and identity become judged by the attitudes and actions of small and aberrant minorities.

Whilst some may deeply believe this paradigm, most people in reality believe and live in hope, that opposing ideas work together, enrich our understanding of each other; strengthen our humanity and do not end in a grand clash as espoused by Samuel Huntington. Organisations involved in dialogue and understanding, such as The Cordoba Foundation strive to revive the spirit of Cordoba, the city, civilisation and people, which remain a living testament of the ability of minds and aspirations to meet, collaborate and strive for the common goal of advancement and success. Hence our quest should be to understand the role of Religion and religious pluralism in contributing a human dimension to the current phenomena of globalisation.

REDEFINING GLOBALISATION?

Ironically, it was the anti-globalisation movement that really put globalisation on the map (Jeffrey 2002), bringing it out of the financial and academic worlds (in which it had existed since the 1960s) into everyday current affairs jargon.

Globalisation is a phenomenon that means different things to different people. One definition given by academics describes a process by which regional economies, societies, and cultures have become integrated through a global network of communication, transportation, and trade.

However, globalisation is more commonly recognised as being driven by a combination of economic, technological, socio-cultural, political, and biological factors.

To its supporters globalisation is about the process of doing business that in a business model could have more than just an economic impact on the parts of the world that it touched. Hence with the spread of communications, it could allow people to interact with each other from different parts of the world.

For its opponents though, it is a process that orders people's lives and controls them from overseas and in effect, means a surrender of power to the corporations, or a means of keeping poor nations poorer and in their place. Low-paid sweatshop workers, GM seeds pressed on developing world's farmers, selling off state-owned industry to qualify for IMF and World Bank loans and the increasing dominance of US and European corporate culture across the globe, have come to symbolise globalisation for some of its critics.

Radakrishnan (2004) talks about the disruptive effects of globalisation on religion, in particular:

1) the transmogrification[2] of traditional religions and belief systems,
2) the beginning of the disintegration of the traditional social fabrics and shared norms by the invasion of consumerism, cyber culture, newfangled religions, social fads, and changing work ethics and work rhythms,
3) allowing people to fall back on religion for moral and social support, attributing to religion the creation and acceleration of extremist, fundamentalist, and terrorist tendencies in the third world countries, which are intended to destabilise them, and strike at the root of their civilisation, and multicultural and pluralistic nature.

This is the danger of a globalisation process, currently being driven mainly by economic engines, unchecked and unguided, which can threaten to eliminate religious and cultural practices of "less developed" countries. This 'cultural erosion' (Shrader 2006) is already largely taking place in the form of a reinterpretation of traditional practices of one culture in terms of concepts and categories, characteristic of a different (more familiar) religion / culture. According to Esposito (2010) throughout much of the twentieth century, the symbols and benchmarks of modernising societies were Western in origin such that judgements were made as to whether a society was 'developed' by looking at its modern art and architecture, its Western political, legal, educational or social institutions and the dress and language of its people.

However in the course of the debate today, globalisation is a phenomenon and a process that cannot be easily undone. In the light of advancements in aspects of social networking like Facebook and Twitter, the demands of the global community on its citizens are more complex, less clear, and arguably less reasonable. But it is precisely in this scenario with the world experiencing such kind of turmoil, that there are calls for new solutions. These new solutions need to look for answers outside of the box that be centred on refining our attitudes towards globalisation as well as defining a new terms of reference for globalisation.

Thus if we want to define "globalisation" to mean something other than imposing a single set of uniform, unexamined, and unchallengeable ideas on the entire human race, then there must be ways to incorporate concepts of difference, freedom and religious pluralism.

Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen in Identity and Violence (2006) maintains that the key to good citizenship and social cohesion is the encouragement and retention of multiple identities. People have several enriching identities: nationality, gender, age and parental background, religious or professional affiliation. They identify with different ethnic groups and races, towns or villages they call home, sometimes football teams; they speak different languages, which they hope their children will retain, and love different parts of their countries.

Hence a new definition of globalisation will have to challenge people to accept this diversity and create equal opportunities for diverse communities, ethnicities, traditions,

cultures and faiths, to add richness and variety to diversity and pluralism as part of a common wealth that needs to be celebrated in the global civil society -- and integrated into life as a positive force for development.

Hence there is a need to rethink globalisation in terms of:

1) human nature (especially with regards the age-old search for spiritual values and religious truths),

2) the complex and often murky relationship between religion and culture,

3) the competing, confusing, or ill-defined concepts of tolerance, diversity, and freedom.

In short, there is a need to redefine the functions that religion or religious identity perform in the public sphere which have been made vastly more complicated as a result of globalisation.

UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

Religious pluralism is the interaction of religious actors with one another and with the society and the state around concrete cultural, social, economic, and political agendas. It denotes a politics that joins diverse communities with overlapping but distinctive ethics and interests. Such interaction often involves sharp conflict. However, although the history of organised religion is replete with examples of conflict, oppression, and forced conversion, it is also a history in which people have struggled honestly and openly with religious and cultural differences.

Religious diversity has thus been a fact of life in national and international politics. Major world religions have grown and changed as they have spread borders generating far flung networks with varied regional and local expressions. For a millennia, they were the vehicles through which the message of One Humanity traversed the barriers of geography, culture and language and supported the nonviolent coexistence of different traditions characterise much of the world over, long stretches of time. Spain and the Ottoman Empire for example were marked by significant periods of peaceful coexistence among Muslims, Jews and Christians. These periods were defined often by[3]:

- Common Values - major faith traditions united in the values which espouse the notion of a shared humanity. These fundamentals help to define a framework for dialogue, constructive debate and joint action, first to confront that which is an affront to civilisation, namely the persistent scourge of material poverty, and the malaise of bigotry, intolerance and inequity, whether based on religion, nationality, race, culture or gender and then to address creatively the challenges of globalisation and take advantage of the opportunities it may offer.

- Social Responsibility - diversity, like creation itself, is purposeful. The reality of its prevalence is reason enough for people, whatever their origin or background, to come together in an effort to know one another. This coming together or dialogue, can only be sustained if merit or virtue is associated with the quality of one's conduct, irrespective of one's creed, race, colour, gender or material status in society. Abstractions of good, just as protestations of righteousness, are of no avail unless translated into practical, good deeds. Without active social responsibility, religiosity is a show of conceit. Helping the weak and marginalised, being just, even at the expense of one's own or one's family's apparent welfare, repelling evil and inequity with that which is good and equitable, are real marks of piety.

- Articulating Social Justice, Ethics and Values - justice, compassion, ethics generally, endure only when they are part of a lived spirituality, mirroring a soul at peace. Injustice, corruption, pride, tyranny, untrustworthiness, immoral conduct generally, by contrast, are an outward reflection of a spiritual malaise. Justice, thus defined, is the bonding principle of our common or universal ethic that is the only way to ensure a human dimension to policies and strategies pertaining to globalisation.

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND GLOBALISATION

In a post-colonial and post-1945 era, with the dominance of a Cold War secular and ideological superpower competition, there was less of an appetite for the growing salience of religion in international affairs. However with the end of East-West ideological competition and the collapse of the USSR, transnational religious communities have once again emerged as sources of identity and engagement. Faith communities have attained more organisational strength and transnational reach since the 1980s and have begun to interact more with one another and with secular forces within state and society across multiple issues. In the last decade and in particular, religious pluralism that goes beyond mere diversity to encompass the interaction of religious communities is deepening in the context of globalisation propelled forward by the contemporary dynamics of globalisation: the near instantaneous worldwide sharing of information through modern communications technology and the global spread and institutionalisation of the idea of universal human rights.

Religious pluralism poses a double challenge for identity politics

New communications create and sustain transnational religious communities such that, a loose amalgam of faith inspired groups is emerging to meet the demand to translate spiritual and ethical values, into social and political action in areas such as poverty, environmental protection, etc. In addition, there is also a tendency to foster an internal diversification of religious traditions and the reformulation of religious identities and ethical commitments at a global level. The individualisation of religious/spiritual identities, a trend parallel to the expansions of global consumer culture is a striking development of recent decades, providing an anchor for identity within a churning world. Within Islam in particular, the internet has proved a particularly powerful medium in the creation and contestation of transnational identities, in the absence of transnational hierarchical structures. Al-Qaeda is one example of a broader trend that has benefited from this medium.

With the onset of better communications, there is now a space for the free discussion of religion, human rights, equality and so on. Global norms of human dignity and human rights have dovetailed with the ethical commitments of all religious traditions. Banchoff (2008) quotes that 'The modern human rights revolution has helped to catalyse a great awakening of religion around the globe. In regions now marked by democracy and human rights, ancient faiths once driven underground by autocratic oppressors have sprung forth with new vigour'

A conference held in 2006 entitled 'The New Religious Pluralism in World Politics'[4] sponsored by the Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace and World affairs at Georgetown University highlighted the following six dimensions as important to overcome in charting religious pluralism in world affairs amidst globalisation's dual impact - through communications technologies and legal political shifts. This forms the basis of any interesting discussion in the future on this topic.

1) Fragile Identity Politics

Religious pluralism poses a double challenge for identity politics. Domestically it can unsettle identification of the nation state with the predominant religious or secular tradition. In the face of economic and cultural globalisation, majority traditions can strive for a closer identification of religious and national identity with divisive political consequences. Internationally, states sometimes restrict transnational religious communities as perceived threats to national and local identities effectively curtailing their presence, in the process internationalising their national identity politics with consequences for international diplomacy.

This political explosiveness of religious identity and national identity is being heightened in a world where globalisation is

unsettling the latter. Religious pluralism is a salient backdrop for national identity politics defined as struggles over representation and recognition in multicultural contexts. Where there has been one dominating religion, this has determined the national identity and provided the narrative for citizens to be bound to the state, however with globalisation today (and the flow across borders of people and ideas), a space is being created for political challenges by minority communities, especially as they invoke the issue of human rights.

Thus to manage this, there is a call for a cultivation of a 'cosmopolitan' ethos centred on the dignity and freedom of human beings. Such an ethos is best cultivated not against but within religious traditions. Dialogue between cosmopolitan adherents of different communities is the best way to manage religious diversity and avoid violence. This is also one of the ways to address the particularly sensitive issue of the intersection of religious pluralism and identity politics – international religious freedom and proselytism as well as the growth of missionary activity in the context of globalisation.

2) Strong Ethical Commitments

As aforesaid, religion is more than just a powerful source of individual and collective identity. It also espouses strong ethical commitments that inform particular actions. Thus the flourishing of a religious community is about the promotion of common values such as human freedom, equality, solidarity and peace.

In the context of religious pluralism and globalisation, the common ground is increasingly extending from discourse to practice. Exploiting global communications and national and local trends towards greater respect for democracy and human rights, communities across traditions are also increasingly grappling with core issues of conflict, human rights, and economic and social development. The experiences of several decades shows that religious peace building in particular works through the agency of long term actors dedicated to the reconstruction of civil society, and the strengthening of relationships across ethnic and religious boundaries.

3) International-National-local linkages

Globalisation has challenged the familiar national/international polarity by transforming relationships between what was considered global and local aspects of politics, culture and society. As religions can transcend class, ethnic and cultural divisions, religious leaders can serve as an important if informal representative function. For example, the social location and cultural power of religious leaders can make them critical players in any effort to build sustainable peace. Not only trust and networks but also local knowledge which can make such religious groups valued partners. Members of the same religious community, anchored in different parts of the world, can also have greater capacity to increase their cultural, social and economic links with one another, and with other religious and secular partners in different parts of the world.

Religious identity also serves as a powerful bond amid the vicissitudes of globalisation – a bond reinforced by ethical commitments embedded within a particular tradition. At the same time, it is important to note that the spread of individualism - a cultural thrust of globalisation – encourages religious adherents to exercise freedom in choosing and defining their religious identity, thus undermining and undercutting established religious authorities. Islam in particular, will be affected by this as it does not have a clearly defined religious leadership, rather allows for a range of religious expressions to flourish.

For Islam, globalisation means the further decentralisation of an already decentralised religious tradition. The multiplication of new ideas and new leaders buttressed by the internet and other communication technologies has led to a new unstable authority structures linking individuals and religious leaders locally, nationally and internationally. Ironically, the rise of religious pluralism amid globalisation has also strengthened the hand of organisations such as Al-Qaeda, who are revolting against globalisation and are intent on destroying pluralism.

4) Inter and Intra Faith Dynamics,

As religious traditions mobilise more globally within and across nation- states, they interact increasingly with one another. The result is a complex mix of competitive and cooperative dynamics. Though there are enough forums for dialogue (such as World Parliament of Religions, Religions for Peace, etc),there are increasing calls for interfaith action around global policy challenges such as in education, transitional justices, aid work.

The Commonwealth People's Forum in November 2007, in Uganda, called for 'programs to support intercultural and inter and intra and cross faith interactions for enabling joint programmes targeting development and good governance'. A conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in March of 2010 highlighted the need for religious minorities to become active partners in peace building with government assistance, and to foster deeper appreciation for the spiritual bases for peace in all religious traditions.

It is important to note that interfaith interaction is not equated with cooperation, but a mutual understanding of working on something that is commonly understood and agreeing to differ disagreements to afterwards. The key issue is how to keep these differences from overtaking the real issues. The concept of cosmopolitanism as promoted by Appiah (2006) – openness to other traditions and what they can teach us, ensures a decent respectful engagement with cosmopolitans of a given tradition. This critique should take place within traditions as well as hand in hand with efforts to promote more positive understandings of the 'other'. In short, while most conflicts involving people of different religious communities are rooted in political and economic factors, they cannot be reduced entirely to them. The crucial role that negative, exclusivist, intolerant and supremacist understandings of religion and the religious 'other' play in creating, and in fanning these conflicts cannot be denied and must be understood.

5) Secular and Religious Interactions

Religious – secular interaction is important as secular actors tend to set the global agenda. The main lines of conflict (for power and wealth) and cooperation (such as the War on Terror, the World Trade Organisation, global warming) within all systems and across them also provide a context for religious involvement in the public sphere.

Thus, there is a need to overcome the tensions that exist with this interaction. In particular, there is a need to address cultural suspicion based on the perception of different identities and beliefs: the view of religion by secular institutions such as the World Bank, being irrational and parochial, and the hostility towards a perceived technocratic pro-market bias of secular institution. This is also manifested at the institutional and organisational level with lack of professionalism apparent in religious organisations, which hampers collaboration with secular actors in practice. Thus there needs to be a pragmatic problem solving ethos and organisational and professional skills. In addition to this, secular actors will need to re-examine their views on religion as a purely private affair, and to explore the relevance of its role across policy challenges including economic and social development, as well as human rights.

6) The Centrality of the United States

There is also attention paid to the power asymmetries that frame and inform the intersection of religious pluralism, globalisation and world politics, especially with the United States in terms of its economic and security influence. The fact that the United States is a Christian-majority country with a significant Jewish community should not pass un-noticed as the influence of the latter and the former are multiplied. This has been reinforced by the attacks of September 11 and the resulting War on Terror. Under George Bush in particular, domestic and foreign policy shaped religious pluralism in world politics along multiple dimensions. For there to be progress, there needs to be a positive redirection of the role of religion within US policy. This cannot eliminate the tensions at the intersection of

religion and world politics, but will certainly help to channel discussions in a positive way.

CONCLUSION

The above perspectives are certainly not mutually exclusive since for example, the fragile politics of national identity in India is shaped by international-national-local linkages; strong ethical commitment in religious traditions can sharpen identity politics but also form the basis of inter and intra faith collaboration.

We must learn to listen closely to one another... because it is just possible that we might learn something important about ourselves, and build a better global village in the process.

Thus the potential for collaboration around economic and social development agendas needs new dimensions and paradigms. The key issue is not surviving globalisation but reacting, changing, evolving, redefining in response to the new context. The spread of ideas and movements has been accelerated by globalisation and thus communities become more global and issues such as human rights, democracy and social development become globally entrenched norms. Thus religious pluralism can lead to an absence of violence mainly due to better understandings and interaction but more importantly, it opens a space for discussion, dialogue and engagement.

In short, we must learn to listen closely to one another, not simply because it is polite, but because it is just possible that we might learn something important about ourselves, and build a better global village in the process.

The story of Tau Sen, the master musician at the court of the Mogul Emperor, Akbar, sets an example of how listening can build understanding. He had some fifteen musical instruments in the Emperor's chamber, which he had tuned to one frequency. Upon playing just one instrument's musical note, the other fourteen started to resonate, to the astonishment and delight of the audience. Ideally this story serves a metaphor for how communities can work in harmony to achieve an enlightened result. Not everyone sees it that way. Certainly not every faith community is tuned to the same frequency, indeed, not every faith community has achieved harmony within itself but an opportunity exists through the promotion of linking to faith communities, to harness more cross-community collaboration, in the interest of peace, tolerance, and wellbeing.

In *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, Kwame Anthony Appiah, writes eloquently of the urgent need for 'ideas and institutions that allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become' (2006: xiii). The roots of all global crises can be found in human denial of the eternal principle of peace and in order to fight this denial there needs to be self-critical reflection. He quotes Sir Richard Burton who once wrote that 'All Faith is false, all Faith is true: Truth is the shattered mirror strown In myriad bits; while each believes his little bit the whole to own' (The Kasidah of Haji Abdu El-Yezdi), where he meant that you will find parts of the truth everywhere and the whole truth nowhere. This shattered mirror concept enables us to see that 'each shard reflects one part of a complex truth from its own particular angle'.[5] Our mistake in the world today is to consider 'our little shard can reflect the whole' (Ibid: 8).

Thus we need to be cognisant of the other shards so that we can come together on issues of commonality, as opposed to focusing on our differences. In the analogy of Appiah, addressing the challenge of religious pluralism in a globalised world requires careful positioning of these shards to create a compelling mosaic. Addressing these challenges offers an antidote to sectarianism and the polarisation of different faiths in multi-cultural societies. This will never be easy, but remains vitally important for, as Appiah illustrates, it involves creating the

very 'ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become'.

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ENDNOTE

1 This is currently evident in the current scenarios being played out in New York City and the rest of the United States with the controversy surrounding the 'Ground-Zero' mosque, where a line has been drawn between two sides.

2 Transmogrification can be defined as the act of changing into a different form or appearance (especially a fantastic or grotesque one)

3 This is articulated more by Vellani (2001)

4 More can be obtained from Banchoff (2008)

5 In developing this analogy, Appiah draws on the ideas of the nineteenth century adventurer and polyglot Sir Richard Francis Burton. Among other exploits, Burton managed in 1853 to gain entry to Mecca and Median as a pilgrim, helping to communicate the complexity and richness of Islamic culture to Victorian Britain.

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARENA OF DIALOGUE AND CIVILIZATIONS


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Nation Space and Territory in a Globalised Reality

*DR RIVA KASTORYANO

In 1992, with the signing of the Maastricht treaty, when the European Union counted 12 member-states, leaders of immigrant voluntary associations involved in building transnational solidarity networks described themselves as the "13th population"[1]. Such a description suggested a feeling of collective belonging through transnationality and a will to consolidate ones solidarity as a political community that transcends member-states. However the "13th population" concept also pointed to the emergence of a "transnational community[2]" on a European level.

In a broader sense such a community will also take into account the context of globalization and economic uncertainty that facilitates the construction of worldwide networks[3].Increasing mobility and the development of communication however have intensified trans-border relations, leading to social and political mobilizations beyond boundaries. Thus the mode of action of such a community remains de-territorialized even if the references remain territorial. The rhetoric of mobilization recentralizes, in a non-territorial way, the multiplicity of identities[4] that are fragmented yet represented in such a structure. Together they point to the existence of a new type of nationalism that is transnational, that is expressed and developed beyond and outside the borders of the state and its territory, thereby (1) returning to arouse nationalist sentiments in the country (2) creating new expressions of belonging and a political engagement that reflects the nationalization of communitarian sentiments guided by an "imagined geography", leading to a transnational nationalism that is non-territorial, and which can be considered as a new – historical – step in the study of nationalism.

> The European Union… represents a political space that differs in fundamental ways from national political spaces thereby introducing a new type of transnationalism

Many questions with regard to membership, allegiances and affiliations of these communities thus arise such as: what becomes of the relationship between citizenship and identity; between territory and the nation-state; between rights and identities, culture and politics, states and nations? However the main question is how does this new type of nationalism give strength to the national question and become a stake of legitimacy in the international system?

THE EMERGENCE OF TRANS-NATIONALISM

Transnationalism portrays the bonds of solidarity based on an identity[5] across national borders. The concept is in large part the result of the development of means of communication, the appearance of large regional groups and the increased importance of supranational institutions. Intensified by the magnitude of international migration, transnational networks favour not only cultural, social, political or ideological transfer but also guide the activities that link the countries of origin to countries of current residence and give migrants "the illusion of non-permanence"[6] in the latter.

The emergence of transnational communities logically derives from the application of cultural pluralism and identity politics. Liberalism theories which

favour ethnic pluralism have privileged the cultural activities undertaken by immigrant associations, to gain recognition from the state.[7] The fragments of national identity amongst immigrant associations repressed at the time of the creation of the unitary nation-state that tends towards political and cultural homogeneity in their countries of origin, re-emerges due to a multiculturalism applied in western democracies that tends to organize and give a public voice based on associations recognized by the state. Thus these associations acquire a political legitimacy in the countries of immigration that redefine these solidarities whilst attempting to institutionalize their links with the country of origin.

All existing literature[8] on this subject agree that the transnational community is constructed out of solidarity networks across national borders from populations displaying a communal identity. In addition, there are the economic networks[9] and the associative networks claiming the universality of rights[10], which constitute –the underpinnings of solidarity and transnational communities.

The immigration experience binds together two national spaces where these networks intersect and where new forms of interaction occur, creating new symbols and engendering identities which seek to assert themselves in the two countries.[11] According to this perspective then, trans-nationalism corresponds to a new identity space relying on cultural references of both the county of departure and country of arrival, creating a new space of identification.[12]

The European Union (EU) however represents a political space[13] that differs in fundamental ways from national political spaces thereby introducing a new type of transnationalism. It is thus an open space where various associative networks through migration can converge in networks of information, influences and interests which favour action across national borders and give rise to identification with a new, developing political entity under construction. As a result, in the context of the EU, transnational communities transcend the boundaries of the member states relating a vast European space, to the country of origin of immigrants. The emergence of this European space is linked to multiple and complex interactions between states and the collective identities expressed by immigrants.[14] Actors engaged with these transnational networks such as leaders of volunteer associations, business persons or activists thus have to develop strategies beyond nation-states[15] which create a space, where new solidarities and forms of political participation are drawn, and a new community characterized by its internal diversity emerges. This diversity is "recentered" around norms and values influenced by European supranational institutions which in turn become legitimate on the international stage, especially via an inclusive discourse developed by transnational activists founded on human rights, the fight against racism or any other form of social, political and cultural exclusion.[16]

The same diversity finds itself also "recentered" around a common identity such as religion[17]. Religion has always been the origin of the most elaborate and institutionalized transnational networks.[18] For Steven Vertovec, religion is better adapted to the problem of transnationalism, since it acquires the indices of transformation in modes of religiosity, enabling it to follow the evolution of the importance of religion acquired from the country of origin thereby informing the identity of the non-European minority in Europe. However, a transnational community founded on religion is in essence a multiethnic community[19]. Moreover, religious communities have always been stimulated by secularization to organize themselves in pressure groups and take action in the domain of international relations, as demonstrated in treatises governing minorities from the 1648 treaties of Westphalia until the 1878 Berlin Conference, partially resumed by the Leagues of Nations in the issue of World War I.[20]

However, it is primarily with Islam as a minority religion that communities formed in Europe attempt to legitimate their demands for recognition and to spawn a pluralist politics.[21] In this perspective, it is rather the countries of origin or international organizations which activate the religious loyalty of Muslim populations residing in

different European countries. Their strategies seem contradictory, insofar as the countries of origin aspire to a supranational recognition, and the international organizations seek to rise above the national cleavages of Muslims in Europe in order to create a single identification, that of being Muslim in Europe, and from there, the recognition of Islam by European institutions.

TRANSNATIONAL NATIONALISM AND DIASPORA NATIONALISM

This new community[22], seeks self-affirmation across national borders as a deterritorialized nation in search of an inclusive (and exclusive) center around a constructed identity or experience. It aspires to legitimacy and recognition by both the state and supranational or international institutions. This pursuit produces new tensions "between a state, the source of absolute power on the inside, and the reality of a state bound to constraints and mobilizations coming from the outside".[23] These tensions crystallize around the question of minority nationalism - national, territorial, ethnic or religious. A form of nationalism is born out of their mobilization across national borders and reinforces the interdependence between the states' internal political developments and the engagement of transnational actors in the international political system.

This concept of transnational nationalism can also be linked to the concept of diaspora nationalism or "long distance nationalisms", as formulated by B.Anderson.[24] At the source of the concept of diaspora lies the dispersion of a people. Initially used in reference to the concept of Jews "in exile"[25], the concept of diaspora has been extended to apply to all "victim" populations suffering from expulsion, persecution and forced migration for religious, political and economic reasons. For W. Saffran, this migration is from a center – an ancestral land or a *homeland*. Diasporization operates when the population in question feels excluded from their surrounding society and they retain the memory of the center – now idealized and mythologized – thereby making plans to return.[26] The mobilization surrounding this plan is at the heart of diaspora nationalism.

Thus a group that has been perceived as a minority due to its religion or language is consequently excluded from state nationalism and bureaucracy. Diaspora nationalism hence has as its objective the endowment of the diaspora with its own state on a specific territory. This territory is either that of the country of origin or that which must be conquered or re-conquered so as to build a state, the homeland. This leads to a group of urban, educated "foreigners" who have no political power, but who nonetheless enjoy an economic power and mobility which they use to fund nationalist activities. The classical examples refer to the experience of Central European Jews and Zionism, a mobilization by Jews in various countries, their organization and cross-border activities to create a territorialized state and endow it with legitimacy in the international system[27]). Diaspora nationalism is thus interpreted as a territorialization or a re-territorialization. If history supplies the classical example of the Jews and Armenians, then the exile of most Palestinians after 1948, has engendered the birth of a Palestinian nationalism developed in Diaspora[28].

The transnational community was also born out of a movement of populations and their dispersion[29], butut contrary to the concept of Diaspora in which dispersion precedes the state, the transnational community is constituted of migrants belonging to different nation-states (of origin). As with Diasporas, the 'diasporization' of the transnational community, consists of maintaining a link with the country of origin (real and not mythical), perpetuating its culture and language (national and sometimes regional) with the eventual hope of returning there. In both cases it involves a nationalism that develops and is expressed outside of and beyond the borders of the state of origin and its territory.

However transnational nationalism differs from diaspora nationalism in two ways. Firstly, it appears as an extension of state nationalism of the home country. It also defines itself as a movement seeking a "new center", unterritorialized and denationalized in relation to the countries of origin, in order

to "recenter" itself according to claims and representations of "reappropriated" identities within immigration countries.

Diasporas refer to the notion of the nation as a unified collective organized around a single ideal since departure. They rely on the symbols of a common past and planning a future with the same myths. In transnational nationalism, the nation is entangled in the dynamics of interaction between the states of emigration and immigration which make transparent the cultural and national heterogeneity of the population that composes it. In other words, the intention of unification around a common project within the diaspora is replaced by the search for recognition and legitimacy by both the state and supranational institutions in the transnational community.

The unity of the transnational community is… sustained by the desire to belong to a "people" through a process of nominal appropriation of its actions and discourses and a sense of participation in its "destiny"

The second aspect is when a new *élan* is given to nationalist sentiments which redefine the transnational community by unifying or "recentering" all national diversity to develop an active identity according to discourse of legitimacy which surpasses that of both states, of immigration as well as of residence, to produce a unity in the identification of its members. This evolution results from a mobilization and participation of a number of national spaces and of closer relations between the countries of origin and countries of immigration. It also stems from the emergence of associations, themselves transnational, organized around an identity which seeks to define itself in the circulation of ideas, norms and demands for recognition in the space of different political spaces. Such is the body of work of new actors born of immigration, who are themselves transnational, proving that their very integration in the country of immigration is capable of manipulating the codes of numerous political spaces.

The unity of the transnational community is thus sustained by the desire to belong to a "people" through a process of nominal appropriation of its actions and discourses and a sense of participation in its "destiny". This gives birth to new subjectivities which accompany the imagined geography of the "transnational nation". Its territorial frontiers are not disputed. On the contrary, its non-territorial borders follow the web of networks which transcend the boundaries of state and national territories thus engendering a new means of territorialization. This also produces a political community in which the individual's actions inside the network become axioms of a transnational nationalism, non-territorial that seeks to strengthen itself by employing discourses, symbols, images, and objects.

NATION, SPACE AND TERRITORY

The question of territory has always been at the heart of nationalism. It is because of territorialization that a community becomes a geopolitical reality and an autonomous nation in which territorial frontiers coincide with political and cultural boundaries[30]. It is the territory itself which makes the nation; its self-determination(a combination of cultural and territorial autonomy) is often the source of conflicts within and between states/nations.

This begs the question then of what is a nation without territory?[31] How can one detach nationalism as a historical concept, from its territorial context specific traits?

The example is offered of the case of the Roma who define themselves as a group which has formed its entire national consciousness in the absence of territory and today claim the right to non-territorial self-determination and its recognition in the international system.[32] Dispersed across

and beyond the entire European continent,[33] the Roma are becoming quite vocal in the international arena.[34] They call themselves a nation without state or without a territory. For the Roma there is not, nor has there ever been, a question of territoriality. Their claims overlap with those of immigrant populations and political refugees, including in issues of human rights, racism and discrimination and integration, especially in schools in the country of immigration.

The question of non-territoriality continues in the current debates on multiculturalism. Baubock supposes the possibility of imagining "a cultural autonomy as an alternative to territorial arrangements" and defends the idea according to which cultural liberty is meant to correspond to a non-territorial base, even though the territorial base of self-determination of peoples cannot possibly be ignored[35]. Such a scenario does not consider the diversity of groups demanding cultural rights.

In fact, in the current contexts, the issue of non-territoriality makes it difficult to discuss about Diaspora nationalism, i.e. a dispersed population demanding national and culturally territorialized autonomy, perhaps with the exception of the Palestinians. In the case of transnational nationalism however, the ethnic communities recognized within the institutional framework of nation-states of residence have no planned strategy of self-determination in the traditional sense. Contrary to plans for self-determination which the Diasporas founded on a re-territorialization or a "restoration" of a real or mythical territory, the construction of a "transnational nation" relies on the identification of its members with an imagined entity based on a multiplicity of belonging (national, territorial, religious, linguistic) as well as common experiences (colonization, exile or emigration) with reference to a non-territorial "us", as a nation that settles into the so-called "Diaspora spaces". In the self-determination of such a nation, it is personal autonomy which dominates and manifests itself through the network of individuals' relationships.[36]

Self-determination of the transnational community thus does not imply cultural autonomy on territorial foundations but rather recognition within the structural framework of the state, and "institutional assimilation" as a base of equality for differences that may arise in the public space of western democracies[37]. In this model, the demands for recognition take on a racial, ethnic or even religious character with the goals of interaction with the state of residence of the community in question relying on forces external to the state territory. The terms of this recognition vary from state to state according to the definition each gives to its minorities and the mobilization thereof for equal rights. These include rights like the expression of religion within a secular France, or of nationality as ethnic minority confronting an until-recent restrictive citizenship in Germany, and particularly the debates on dual nationality.[38]

Recent studies in the United States have developed other concepts such as that of "pan-ethnicity". Y.L. Espiritu, sees "pan-ethnicity" as "the generalization of solidarity among ethnic groups generated in the mind of outsiders which constitute a political resource for insiders. It becomes a basis for mobilization as a way of being responsive to grievances and agenda.[39]" In the context of Europe, could Islam, the common denominator of a large group of the post-colonial immigration population, give way to similar interpretations? Could it foster an understanding of a combined identity which transcends differences?[40] This means the concept of *Umma* (community of religious) reinterpreted as "reframing" all internal diversity into an "imagined community" which loses its religious content in order to define itself as a single cultural nation, giving rise to a nationalism which defines itself more as a cultural nationalism than as an ideological state nationalism,[41] a pan-Islam so to speak.[42]

In Europe currently, religious associations cover the European space as with other social and cultural associations and professional networks, but in the absence of any formal networks, the most militant actors mobilize to build informal networks which are introduced into the European system and coexist with social and cultural associations,

all at the local level of various countries of immigration. They operate in concert with the countries of origin or with the assistance of international organizations, or both at once. Under their auspices, nationalities, ethnicities and religions intermingle and build their unifying discourse on the experience of "being Muslim in Europe."

The countries of origin not only rely on family ties consolidated by cultural, commercial and associative exchanges with their citizens' different counties of residence but they support the initiatives of immigrants in native language education or the opening of religious or community schools. The ease of communications brought about by globalization means that a religious identity begins to form and a culture is expressed as "different" within the networks. As far as international organizations are concerned, these transnational networks promote a European Islam which seeks to "homogenize" national differences. Taking advantage of religion's importance to the immigrants, and of its ability to mobilize, these organizations seek to overcome the national diversity of Muslims residing in Europe to publicize a unique identification based on a common religion. This creates a transnational solidarity founded on Islam, despite the opposition of countries of origin who reject the politicization of Islam (the source of conflict with the government) which its organizations endeavour to promote. This feeds into a "global Islam" as a product of networks where countries of origin lose their controlling role and become nothing more than a long-distance reference.[43] The new actors who construct themselves as protectors, advocates or financiers of minority Islam around the world are not even necessarily themselves products of immigration. It is the individuals who act on behalf of the promoting countries of Islam in the world, i.e. Saudi Arabia, or even Islamic NGOs who make the shift from charitable actions to political mobilization.[44]

These types of organization reflect the notion of modernization dear to Gellner and his theory of nationalism in that modernization is "the passage from a closed, stable and culturally diversified community to a society of mass anonymity, standardized and mobile". This implies organizational changes and the adoption of different modes of functioning, but nevertheless remains a quite radical conception of the nation[45].

The politicized modes of organization in Islam concern only one infinitesimal part of the Muslim population in Europe. But Islamic associations play an altogether larger role in the development of an "ethnic" pride and a sense of community whose attributes are drawn out of Islam (its practices, traditions, values and power) to create the foundations of a "moral identity." Its administrators also become the principal speakers of public government, as the recognition of Islam in the name of other religions in various European countries gives a legitimacy to their actions and organizations. The debates on Islam as a religion, a philosophy, a doctrine; the debates on "the present questions concerning Muslims, like the Rushdie affair or the headscarf affair, or even broadly, the Israel-Palestine conflict", are as much a part of their activities as studying the Qu'ran or learning Arabic. Islam thus becomes a "refuge" or source of identification with the causes that "trouble the world" at the local as well as transnational or global level. Mobilization around the Israel-Palestine conflict has reunited not only Islamist and religious associations, but the most secular factions of Muslims as well. Other political groups also consequently align themselves with the same cause such as the socialists and anarchists. This opening towards "the universal" gives a greater legitimacy to the "identity recentralization" of Islam.

This process of "identity recentralization", in addition to any longer-term political arrangements, also expresses itself in everyday life; it develops in different domains and territories – real or symbolic – which endeavour to re-establish social relationships and a communal identity. Appadurai views de-territorialization as a central force of political modernity. "Delocalised" populations, he writes, invent themselves as new spaces which he calls "ethnoscapes" and which he defines as a non-localized territory and which he perceives as the sheer product of imaginary resources[46].

This concept thus involves two levels of analysis which are in fact interconnected, and two interdependent modes of identification: local (territorial) and global or transnational (non-territorial). A population delocalized with respect to the country of origin finds itself relocalized in a new environment, producing new references within new "identity territories".[47] Moreover, an even more abstract identification of a globalized "moral community" that replaces territory is fed by external occurrences (like wars, that occur "elsewhere"), that transform old grievances into fresh expression. This identification manifests itself through violence in the name of a "cause" which either directly or indirectly feeds into an image of Islam as "globally victimized", reinforced by the rhetoric of humiliation and domination by the West. After 1989, following the Rushdie affair in Great Britain there have been multiple examples such as the headscarf affair in France. 9/11, the war in Iraq, as well as other international events have contributed to producing heroes and victims among the youth, influenced their manner of dress, their discourse and their actions as a form of localized revenge.[48]

However it is most of all the Israel-Palestinian conflict that furnishes elements of analysis for territorial and non-territorial belonging, of local and global conflict, of state and transnational nationalism, and of their complex intertwined relationship.[49] The question of self-determination of the Palestinian people, and the recognition of a territorialized Palestinian nation-state, identifies the conflict as a war between nations. However its implications, which exceed its local and geographic scope, transform the idea of nation (simultaneously Palestinian and Israeli) into a religious community which engenders identifications – voluntary and otherwise – and equally transforms the territoriality of conflict into the extraterritoriality of nationalist tensions. It could also be in this perspective that the rhetoric of the *umma*, loses its uniquely religious content and presents itself as a nation (transnational and non territorial, in which ideas and values are diffused via what is known as *global media*).[50] National and regional manifestations of Islam thus develop through state discourses and strategies that target both economic growth and political nationalism as the only sign of their westernization or modernization, which are accompanied by the affirmation of an "ethnic pride". Rhetoric surrounding Islam, both localized and non-territorialized, appears as the underpinnings of a "liberation" movement, a new movement of national emancipation, with the effects of identification with a new entity, while keeping a territorial reference with regard to the homeland.

It is not only wars and conflicts which give birth to extraterritorial identity. Not just within the sphere of immigration does Islam contribute local and non-local elements of identification. Nor is it only Islam that develops modes of non-territorial belonging. Non-territoriality integrates itself into a process of globalization and more generally affects religions altogether.

THE RELATION TO THE STATE

Nationalisms that emerge from mobilization and participation in political spaces reject the existence of multiple loyalties: loyalty to the country of residence, the source of rights; loyalty to the country of origin, source of identity and emotion; and loyalty to the permeable space of the two states or beyond, across which the imagined transnational community circulates like a de-territorialized "nation".[51] Globalization, and more specifically the construction of a political European space thereof, has introduced a fourth pivot point: supranational institutions as a new source of rights and legitimacy beyond the state, and the support of transnational nationalism.[52]

It has been pointed out that the *homeland* (the state of origin or of reference) , is often a source of mobilization and collective action. In the case of Diaspora nationalisms, it becomes the goal. In the case of transnational communities, the state of origin, intermingles with the consciousness of the emigrated population across its consular network as well as other associations, to inform a new and official state nationalism. This consciousness designates official interlocutors from state to state, and attributes an intermediary

role to political actors who are a product of immigration. These actors reconnect private and public, economic, social, cultural and political spaces across familial, commercial and associative networks in Europe and the countries of origin.

State-supported transnational nationalism now constitutes an important element in states' foreign policy as evidenced in relations between the Maghreb and North Africans in France.

The 'state of origin' contributes to the definition of a Diaspora, and the identification of its citizens with a "diasporic" identity. This is interpreted by changes in nationality law and the creation of a special statute for dual nationality. In the case of Turkish immigration, for example, the 4 million persons dispersed throughout Europe constitute, in the eyes of the political class and the Turkish media, a new category called "foreign Turks". Ankara's goal is to assure the émigrées' subscription to the national ideology voiced by Kemalist rhetoric – a perpetual allegiance linked to secular Islam and to a nation unified and submitted to control of state. This maintains the idea of a Turkish citizenship. It is however an extra-territorial citizenship as a means of maintaining a link between citizenship and nation, a citizenship linked to the nation of origin or, inversely, a nation linked to citizenship.[53] More generally, state-supported transnational nationalism now constitutes an important element in states' foreign policy as evidenced in relations between the Maghreb and North Africans in France.[54]

The relationship of the state to the transnational community is tripartite in nature based on an interaction between the state of departure, the state of residence and the transnational community itself. Each of these elements is transformed through the dynamics of the interaction. Regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious identities, concealed in the country of origin at the time of creation of the Nation-state with homogenizing tendencies, reappears in the form of immigration thanks to identity politics applied in democratic states. But in most cases, a political engagement in both countries frames the transnational community, as with the example of Haitians in New York and Montreal who have organized a transnational community on the basis of political combat directed against the regime of Duvalier in Haiti, and against the discrimination and unemployment in which second-generation Haitian youth in Canada and the United States become victims.[55]

Another example pertains to the Kurdish movement in Europe, which has acquired legitimacy in the cadre of European supranational institutions like the European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Justice and is seeking recognition in Turkey and other countries of immigration. The same goes for the expression of Kabyle and Berber identities and their reverberations in countries of origin. In the same manner, Islam, in which political expression is fought in the immigrants' countries of origin, finds support in émigré populations as a basis of their cultural identity and returns in countries of origin with a legitimacy acquired in Europe in order to formulate the same demands.

Thus, transnational nationalism is particularly realized through "social transfers" that involve the circulation of ideas, behaviours, identities and other elements of social capital from one state to another.[56] The identities return to the national territory with the same demands of recognition and representation as in the countries of immigration. They are transferred by associative activists in the country of origin to give new meaning to the country's nationalism, leading the state of origin in the same process of transnationalization of nationalism in its efforts to confront these new demands."[57] Transnationalism thus introduces a new relationship with the state characterized by "mutual dependence" to use an expression coined by J. Armstrong,

a mutual dependence between a liberal, plural state and the "mobilized diaspora." Since Diasporas occupy an important place in international commerce in pre-modern states, "mobilized Diasporas" are, according to Armstrong, in a position of "international negotiation" of political decisions[58]. The interdependence gained between dispersed populations and the states, simultaneously of origin and residence and even beyond, is registered in a system of global and complex interactions and is submitted to a process of internal and external negotiations.

Transnationalism, a product of liberal states, engenders negotiations between transnational actors and states.[59] From the point of view of the actors, transnationalism becomes a means of pressure or a link of political force. From the states' point of view, this involves either negotiating the means of including in their political strategies the identity expressions born of their relations with populations in a minority situation and "re-territorializing" their action, or developing strategies of "de-territorialized" power in order to maintain the bonds and loyalty of individual state citizens despite expressions of nationalism which elude them. This involves the states behaving as transnational actors in permanent interaction within a global de-territorialized space or encountering cultural and political specificities of national associations with multinational activities. It entails a mode of integration on behalf of the states in the process of globalisation.

Transnational nationalism inscribes itself in a global space… produc[ing] an identity and generates a mode of participation across borders.

Hence there lies the paradox, since nationalism beyond borders contributes to weakening the nation-state, the states remain the primary force of globalization. Despite more and more limited autonomy due to interventions of supranational institutions and a larger interdependence between the internal and external in power relationships and political decisions, the state remains the principal actor in the negotiations, defending its interests in the international and national domain[60]. Moreover, it remains the only legal framework of citizenship, indispensable for the protection of individuals, despite the practice of dual nationality, a practice which institutionalizes transnationalism, as has been previously shown. But transnational nationalism maintains its relevance as an affective source of identification, resistance and mobilization. The question to be asked then is its de-territoriality the ultimate source of new tensions between states and communities or, more generally, a source of tensions within the international system?

CONCLUSION

Transnational nationalism inscribes itself in a global space that *does not translate* but *produces* an identity and generates a mode of participation across borders. In reflecting to the states their "deficiency" in human rights, or citizenship as a foundation of democratic equality, the actors seek to channel the loyalty of individuals from the territorialized political community towards a non-territorialized political community, thus redefining the terms of belonging and allegiance to a "global nation". This global nation finds comfort in the rhetoric of diffused unity thanks to modern technology, producing a single *langage* – images – or a single *langue* – English as a language of participation of internet sites and email exchange.[65]

The expression of this form of nationalism does not exclude the states. On the contrary, the individual or collective actions target nation-states and their symbols – the (economic) power or their founding myth. The discourse of such actors highlights their relationship to the states of origin and of residence and their knowledge of the principles of two countries with their weakness and their strength. These actors are often socially and institutionally assimilated, and in the majority of cases, juridicially invisible, as even legal citizens of two states. As for their actions, they range from the most extreme practices, such as terrorism, to the most culturally profound,

such as the opening of schools or instruction in the native language and in the language of residence, manifesting the importance of universal, particularly religious values. These so-called transnational actors, in a permanent interaction in the new global space where the cultural and political specificities of national societies combine with multinational actions themselves, define as a last resort the Nation-states as adversaries of their imaginary geographic community.

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ENDNOTES

1 Other descriptions included 13th state or 13th nation. The fact is that in the early 1990s, more than 13 million "foreigners" (non-Europeans) were living legally in the 12 countries that constituted the European Union. 60% of the foreigners in France and 70% in Germany and in the Netherlands were citizens of countries outside the European Community. Of this group, France had absorbed most of the North Africans (820,000 Algerians, 516,000 Moroccans, 200,000 Tunisians), and Germany had taken the largest number of Turks (almost 2 million). In the Netherlands, the Turks (160,000) and the Moroccans (123,000) constituted most of the non-European immigrants, while Great Britain was characterized by the preponderance of groups from India (689,000), the West Indies (547,000), and Pakistan (406,000) (SOPEMI-OCDE; Eurostat 1999; INED 1997).

2 A transnational community is one structured by individuals or groups settled in different national societies, sharing some common references – national, ethnic, religious, linguistic – and defining common interest beyond boundaries.

3 Its institutionalization requires a coordination of activities based on common references – objective or subjective – and common interest amongst members; a coordination of resources, information, technology and sites of social power across national borders for political, cultural and economic purposes (Held et al. *Global Transformations*, Cambridge, Polity Press.)

4 These identities are national, regional, religious, ethnic or linguistic in nature.

5 Ibid.

6 This expression was utilized by Myron Wiener in "Labor Migration as Incipient Diasporas", pp. 47-74 in Gabriel Scheffer (ed.), Modern Diasporas in International Politics, London, Croom Helm, 1986, cited by Nicholas Van Hear, New Diasporas. The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities, London, UCL Press, 1998, p.5.

7 Reappropriated identities (organised and redefined) inform such cultural activities of these associations (R. Kastoryano, 'Réseaux d'immigrés en Europe', Esprit, March 1994.)

8 It would be nearly impossible to cite all the literature on the phenomenon of trans nationalism since the 1990s.

9 These networks govern the transfer of funds and goods.

10 These rights cut across which cultural activities, ideologies and ideas circulate between the country of origin and country of immigration.

11 Cf.T. Faist, "Transnational social spaces out of international migration. Evolution, significance and future prospects", European Archives of Sociology XXXIX (2), 1998, pp. 213-247 ; see also L. Pries (ed.), Migration and Transnational Social Spaces, Adelshot, Ashgate, 1999; L. Basch et al., Nations Unbound…, op.cit.

12 In their study of Haitians in New York and the multiple links they develop with their fellow citizens back in Haiti, Nina Glick Schiller and her co-authors show how, for the immigrants, these two spaces in effect constitute one single space (Ibid.)

13 This is characterised by Europe, "a space with no internal borders" in which, according to the 1986 Single European Act, "the free circulation of goods, assets and capital is guaranteed", is a de facto transnational space.

14 This can be true for any other kind of interest group which strives to imprint its independence on the state.

15 This is often done by expressing their solidarity through transnational networks based on a common identity or interest, and often both.

16 The fight against racism and the exclusion was originally the official motivation of the European Parliament which, in 1986, had formed the Immigrants' Forum. Dissolved in 2001, the Forum sought out "a place of expression for the non-community populations established in Europe, through which they could establish their claims and disseminate information from European authorities." (Exception and complimentarity in Europe, in Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 10(1), 1994,pp.95-109).

17 In particular Islam emerged as this common identity mainly because it is the religion of the majority of post-colonial immigration in Europe.

18 Cf. A. Colonomos, Eglises en réseaux, op. cit.

19 Cf. S. Vertovec, Religion in Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism, Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis, Vancouver Center of Excellence, 33p. (Working Paper Series, no.02-07).

20 Cf. J. Jackson Preece, *National Minorities and the European Nation-State System*, London, Oxford University Press, 1998.

21 Cf. S. Hoeber-Rudolf, "Religion, State and Transnational Civil Society", in S.Hoeber-Rudolf, J.Piscatori (eds), *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, Boulder Colorado, Westview Press, 1997 (see the introduction).

22 This new community can be imagined either out of a religion or an ethnicity which encapsulates linguistic and national differences.

23 Cf. John Breuilly, op.cit.

24 Cf. "Long Distance Nationalism", in Spectres of Comparisons. Nationalism in Southeastern Asia and the World, London, Verso, 1998, pp. 58-74

25 The usage of the Hebrew term specifically rejects the concept of exile (galuth).

26 Cf. W. Saffran, "Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return", Diaspora 1(1), 1991, pp. 83-99.

27 This has led J.A. Armstrong to develop the concept of "mobilized Diaspora" supporting the example of Jews as the "archetype" of diasporas. The literature attributes to Armenians, Chinese and Indians living outside their national territories a status of Diaspora historically comparable to that of the Jews. For Armstrong,

however, this constitutes a "Diaspora of location". Indians in Africa and other places overseas and Chinese dispersed throughout Asia were also mobilized to protest the rights which they were denied, but their mobilization had no nationalist perspective; these situations rather involved interest groups trying to pressure the local authorities (Cf. H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States.

29 I borrow M. Mandelbaum's metaphor and invert it. The author calls new Diasporas "national minorities" dispersed in numerous states of Europe and the East. "The older 'classical' Diasporas of the Jews, the Chinese, the Indians, and the Germans were created when people moved. The new Diasporas were created when borders moved." (p.2).

30 Cf Y. Lacoste, "Les territoires de la nation", Hérodote, 62-63, 3rd quarter 1991, pp.1-21.

31 This question of non-territoriality was posed at the beginning of the twentieth century in Austria-Hungary by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer who extolled the virtues of Social-Democracy in search of an alternative to minority and Diaspora nationalism. For Otto Bauer, national autonomy founded on the principle of territoriality was undoubtedly a means of delimiting national spheres of power, of abolishing national struggles for power.

32 Cf. C. Fayes, "Towards a new paradigm of the nation. The case of the Roma", Journal of Public and International Affairs, 1997.

33 The Roma have never had any territorial reference nor even acknowledged a country as their genesis.

34 They are recognized by the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union which in particular supports the Roma populations in Central and Eastern Europe, where they represent 5% of the population, and enact mechanisms and programs to improve their situation.

35 Rainer Baubock, for example, in recent work investigates the possibility of imagining cultural autonomy as an alternative to territorial arrangements, in Multinational Federalism: Territorial and non territorial, (paper presented at the conference "Nationalism, Liberalism and Pluralism", Paris, CERI-Sciences-Po, February 5-6, 2001)

36 Through a number of precise actions and rhetoric, they try to both construct identity boundaries transcending those of the states and to create a non-territorial political unity.

37 Cf. R.Kastoryano, Religion and Incorporation, in International Migration Review, (forthcoming).

38 Cf. R.Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities. *States and Immigrants in France and Germany*, Princeton, Princeton U. Press, 2002.

39 The concept here refers in particular to the Asian population within the United States, which manifests an internal diversity in terms of nationality, language or religion.

40 Be they national, linguistic, ethnic, political or religious (in the case of brotherhoods).

41 Typology conceived by C. Gans, in *The Limits of Nationalism*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003 (chap.1).

42 From an organizational point of view, such a community is constructed by associative networks.

43 Cf. O.Roy, *L'islam mondialisé*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2002.

44 The coordination of networks around Islam in Europe is also a difficult case, not just because of associations which seek a common identification through collective action.

45 Cf. E. Gellner, op.cit., p.83.

46 Cf. A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large…, op.cit.

47 These territories are suburb and/or ethnic enclaves , ghettos, all those places where foreigners and poverty go together, where unemployment among youth is far above the national average, are presented as conflict zones between civil society and the forces of order, between generations and cultures and between national, local, and community institutions (R. Kastoryano, La France, l'Allemagne et leurs immigrés, op.cit. (See chapter 3).)

48 Cf. Les rapports d'activité sur La lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie, Paris, La Documentation française, 2001 et 2002.

49 In the meanwhile, it is important to note that identification with the Islamic world does not necessarily implicate identification with the Arab world. The attitudes vis-à-vis conflicts often constitute the line of demarcation between Muslim national communities. In Britain, for example, most Muslims of South Asian origin do not identify with Arab nationalism. In Germany, Turks were especially taken with the war in Kosovo, one which brought back an identification with Bosnians because of their historical and cultural ties. Bosnians, converted to Islam during the time of three-century Ottoman occupation, represents in the collective imagination of Turks the modern and European side of Islam, as a projection of themselves. The tragic fate of these "blue-eyed blond brothers", persecuted because of their religion, in this case reinforces the Islamic dimension of an ethnic identity lived in solidarity across borders.

50 Even in countries where Islam is the religion of the vast majority of the population and where belonging is strongly territorialized, discourse is developed in the same fashion, transcending national borders. A. Ong shows how, in the example of Malaysia, the discourse of Islam develops in a mode parallel to Asian values, forging a "pan-Islamism" that blends with the development of a "pan-Asian" identity (A. Ong, op.cit., pp.226-228)

51 This so-called triangular relationship is also analyzed by R. Brubaker in his study of national minorities. The author establishes a pivot between the minority community, the state of residence and the external homeland, the reference state sharing the same cultural traits as the minority, op.cit.

52 The claims accompany a territorial and/or regional nationalism in reference to a state relying on the principles of human rights and minority rights, legitimate nationalism is supported by European institutions. They find a justification in the European charter of regional languages, in reference to "languages deprived of territory" which encourage the nationalist actions of minorities. R. Kastoryano, "Le nationalisme transnational turc, ou la redéfinition du nationalisme par les 'Turcs de l'extérieur'", in A. Dieckhoff, R. Kastoryano, Nationalismes en mutation…, op.cit.

See also M. Mandelbaum, op.cit.

53 In both cases, there is a de-territorialized belonging. This bond becomes an important resource for negotiating the role of Turkey in the European Union or in the international system (R.Kastoryano, "Le nationalisme transnational turc", op.cit)

54 Cf C. King, N.J. Melvin, op.cit.

55 Cf M. Labelle, F. Midy, "Re-reading citizenship and the transnational practices of immigrants", Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25 (2).

56 Cf P. Levitt, Transnational Villagers, op.cit.

57 This necessitates, according to N. Schiller and E. Fouron, a "reconstruction of the concept of the state so that both the nation and the authority of the government it represents extends beyond the states' territorial boundary and incorporate dispersed population (N. Glick-Schiller, G. Eugen Fouron, op.cit.)

58 Cf. J. Armstrong, op.cit.

59 Cf. R. Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities, op.cit.

60 The argument that Samy Cohen strongly defends in his last book, La résistance des Etats, Paris, Seuil, 2003.

65 Regarding Islam on the Internet, see the work of Olivier Roy, op.cit.


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Why Cordoba?

The Collapse of Political Integrity in the Age of Globalisation

*PETER OBORNE

The true worth of a poet can never be known till subsequent generations have delivered their verdict. So it is with politicians. Heady contemporary reputations can vanish. The perspective of time can magnify the significance of apparently secondary figures. It can convert failure into heroic struggle, and all too often change what looked like success in contemporary eyes into a story of cowardice and squandered opportunities. The real test of a statesman is whether his ideas remain as alive after their death as they were during their lifetime.

Sir Keith Joseph passes that test. It is now 15 years since Sir Keith died, and there is no greater tribute to the historical and moral legacy bequeathed to us by Sir Keith than the fact that his enormous political achievement has never been so relevant.

The reason for this, however, is disturbing. We are living through a period of economic collapse, social degradation, and desperate political uncertainty. One epoch – the era inaugurated in 1979 by the Conservative administration led by Baroness Thatcher – has come to an end. However, the future is menacing and opaque. No new settlement has emerged.

Most political leaders are asked to do little more than administrate conventional wisdom and to express the spirit of the age. At times of crisis, such as the one through which we are now living, they need themselves to create the conventional wisdom and themselves to define the spirit of the age. This is a far more arduous, rigorous and perilous undertaking. It calls for wisdom, raw nerve and depths of moral courage which remain untapped during ordinary times.

It was exactly these superlative qualities that made Sir Keith Joseph such a very great man. Thirty five years ago he was the first politician to provide a coherent response to the collapse of the post-war economic settlement. Our ruling elite continued to analyse the financial and social catastrophe of the mid-1970s in traditional terms. But Sir Keith – in an act of quite astonishing courage from a front rank politician - departed from the orthodox. This meant that he was misrepresented, he was insulted, and in career terms he may have paid a heavy price. In those lonely speeches made in those now far off times, Sir Keith Joseph invented a revolutionary new political economy. In doing so he changed British history and saved us from stagnation and disaster.

Today, as in the 1970s, our economic system has collapsed and once again our political class is trapped by defunct paradigms. Once again we urgently need a fresh analysis. So far many high reputations have been destroyed. But no powerful and original voice has emerged to guide us out of the crisis. In what follows are lessons we can learn from the heroic example of Sir Keith Joseph.

I will start by isolating the personal qualities which Sir Keith brought to British politics. I need to do this because, without them, Sir Keith would never have been able to discern the truth about human affairs in the way that he did in the 1975.

I will then ask a very troubling question. Does nobody now possess the qualities which Sir Keith brought to British public life? Or do they still lurk there somewhere – and is it something about the structure of our contemporary politics which prevents a figure of Sir Keith's remarkable integrity making a mark on the public stage?

Finally I am going to set out the nature of the economic and moral conundrum which confronts Britain today, and argue that Sir Keith's sharp and clear-sighted prescriptions of 30 years ago are still utterly relevant, timely, and cannot be ignored.

But first: Keith Joseph the man. I have been a reporter at Westminster over almost twenty years. During that time I have realised that British politics is governed by two almost infallible rules. The first is this: the nastier a politician appears to be, the nicer he really is. This rule works equally well in reverse.

'Go around smiling at everyone and get other people to shoot them' – *Tony Blair.*

Indeed it was spelt out quite explicitly by Tony Blair in conversation with then Foreign Secretary David Miliband just as he was about to enter parliament for the first time.

This is what Blair told Miliband: 'go around smiling at everyone and get other people to shoot them.' This appalling anecdote appears in Chris Mullin's diaries. The book contains a wealth of further material on Political Class behaviour. And while I am on the subject of Blair anecdotes, I cannot resist passing on the response by Lord Butler, who worked very closely for three prime ministers, when asked how they reacted when he disagreed with them.

Robin Butler says that Maggie Thatcher would hit the roof. John Major would say nothing, just look very hurt. Tony Blair would pause for dramatic effect and then say: 'I so agree with you.'

But there is also a sound structural reason why agreeing with everyone you deal with is very dangerous. You get forced into a whole series of contradictory positions, and therefore are forced towards deception and betrayal.

Sir Keith, by contrast, was agonisingly honest in his personal dealings. This straightforwardness did make him seem unbending and austere, and accounts in part for why a large number of people who did know Sir Keith hated him so much that they would seek to physically attack him. Yet this refusal to hide behind artifice and deceit was utterly consistent. A key test for any member of the Political Class is how they handle day to day transactions with non-combatants. There is huge testimony about Sir Keith's endless courtesy. He never spoke to anyone as if they were a non-person. He never insisted on his own status. He was often drawn into elaborate conversations with people of no public consequence. He completely grasped the distinction between his own private role and the grand offices of state that he occupied. Oliver Letwin, who was Special Adviser to Sir Keith Joseph when he was Secretary of State for Education recalls how 'he had the habit of explaining his own actions by saying not, 'I must do such and such' but rather, 'the holder of my office must do such and such.' – as if to deny that he was himself, by anything but chance, the holder of his own office.'

This indifference to the trappings of power meant that Sir Keith never lost touch with voters or – like so many ministers - locked in a cocoon. It meant that he was free from the jealousy and careerism that scars so many political lives. He could never have abused his office for private gain – as so many cabinet ministers, and it is very important to acknowledge, Tory MPs do today. Sir Keith would never have briefed against a colleague. To quote Oliver Letwin again, 'Keith's politics may have been on occasion eccentric, but they were never sullied by the slightest obeisance to the expedient or the slightest demagogic appeal or the slightest concern with his own advancement.'

Above all, this indifference to his own interests liberated Sir Keith. Instead of serving himself, he could serve his country – and above all he was a servant of the truth, and therefore possessed the mettle to serve up the truth to the British people at a moment of national crisis.

This brings me onto my second rule. Never pay much attention to what a politician says: watch what he or she does. If a front bench spokesman says on the Today Programme – and they do, about half a dozen times a week - that their position on such and such is very clear, what they really mean is that it is unclear. So-called 'radical' reforms are a certain sign of timidity. New Labour once announced an 'ethical' foreign policy. It now emerges that this was the prelude to the systematic smashing of the Geneva

Convention, and the re-introduction of the barbaric practice of torture as a basic tool of our foreign and security policy. Several years ago Gordon Brown, when still Chancellor of the Exchequer placed the slogan 'a budget for the family' on top of the copious literature accompanying his annual financial statement.

This was the budget that abolished the married couple's allowance. Tony Blair even announced that his government would eradicate sleaze. There are literally thousands of such examples, and from all political parties.

Yet Sir Keith Joseph was an exception to this rule. You could never distinguish what he said from what he did. Indeed he possessed an agonised personal integrity. The question is this: has something gone so horribly wrong with the parameters of modern public discourse that honesty and mainstream political activity are no longer compatible?

Here is Sir Patrick Neill's description of how, as Warden of All Souls, he travelled to London to attend a meeting summoned by Sir Keith to discuss the future of universities.

Somebody round the table raised a novel point. Keith treated the point with deep respect. A silence followed. He buried his head in his hands. I cannot tell for how long he was quiet. Such silences seem to trespass on eternity. Then he raised his head and gave expression to a fully considered and entirely convincing response.

Had Keith had tried this creative, civilised and thoughtful method of discourse on BBC Newsnight or the Today Programme he would have been represented as deranged and his career destroyed. Instead of responding in an intelligent and candid way, modern politicians must at once emerge with a fluent response. That means a trite and dishonest response.

Or consider Sir Keith's speeches. They are so – readable 21st century political discourse essentially has two modes. One is the staccato construction– full of short, verb-less sentences - used by modern political leaders for addressing a mass or televised audience. The other is the obscure technocratic gobbledegook reserved for experts.

Sir Keith's lectures of the mid 1970s remind us that there is another political language available out there. It's the kind of discourse that Radio 4 at its best still does so well. It does not patronise, shares certain cultural assumptions between speaker and audience, and uses the ordinary rhetorical techniques of serious general conversation.

Half a century ago most of British political debate was conducted through this kind of language, and I would suggest that a rich electoral reward awaits the first mainstream politician who returns to it.

But it is not just the style of these speeches that demands examination. Of even greater interest is Sir Keith's intellectual method.

Sir Keith would set out to discover the facts, establish a profound grasp of the principles, test his own beliefs to destruction, and only then reach a conclusion

This was remorselessly empirical, as one would expect from a scholar of jurisprudence at Oxford. Sir Keith would set out to discover the facts, establish a profound grasp of the principles, test his own beliefs to destruction, and only then reach a conclusion.

It was because he adopted this austere, painful and rigorous methodology that he was able to look so very deeply into the nature of things. Remember, Sir Keith was only interested in the truth, over and above paltry party advantage. When he was opposition spokesman on employment in the late 1970s, unemployment kept surging up. A conventional opposition spokesman would have made much of this. However, Sir Keith had studied the facts and concluded that the employment figures of the day greatly magnified the problem of joblessness because they included several hundred thousand members of a transient working population who were claiming benefit because they were between jobs. So, to the

mortification of colleagues, Sir Keith always played down the official figures. This is, of course, the exact opposite of the technique used by contemporary ministers, who, as has become depressingly well-documented, automatically distort or invent statistics that will help them make their case.

There is also reason to doubt whether, supposing Sir Keith were alive today, he would even be able to obtain the facts he needed. Not in the too distant past, in a pamphlet for the CPS, the Tory MP Brooks Newmark set out to discover the true scale of the National debt, as opposed to than the fabricated number used in the prime minister's public utterances and in Treasury press releases. He did the best he could but, as Newmark acknowledges, the task was beyond him. The figures covering the private finance initiative, public sector pension liabilities, and other numbers essential for a realistic understanding of our contemporary financial predicament, simply do not exist. This state of affairs is changing for the better, and I would like to pay tribute to the independence of mind shown Sir Michael Scholar since his arrival as chairman of the UK Statistics Authority. Sir Michael appears to have consistently resisted government pressure to collaborate in the distortion or suppression of statistics, and this is a new and remarkable development.

And at least there are grounds for believing that the handful of Treasury statistics which Brooks Newmark was able to access were reliable. This is not the case in other government departments, where Sir Keith Joseph's careful method – based around the proposition that there is a known body of facts around which an informed public debate can take place – has simply become impossible. Schools standards are an example of this. Here we have entered a sophisticated zone of intellectual enquiry where our feet have left the ground and the ability to make any kind of rational argument has therefore been lost. The basis and nature of the data has been changed so often and in so many different ways that it is no longer possible to have any confidence in what is being measured. Those who try to cope with departmental accounts tell me that these are another very striking example.

When Sir Keith was in opposition and these annual documents were reasonably clear, informative and easy to understand. Today they are opaque, poorly written and scripted for purposes concealment. White papers are another case in point, and I would commend the analysis that Sir Christopher Foster has done in this field, drawing attention to sloppy drafting and inadequate marshalling of evidence.

'facts are sacred, comment is free' – *CP Scott, Guardian editor*

The great Guardian editor CP Scott famously noted: 'facts are sacred, comment is free.' The great thing that has changed in British public life since CP Scott shut up shop is that facts are no longer sacred. This novel state of affairs calls into question the very possibility of democracy which depends on uncontested facts around which political opponents can then enter a well-informed public debate.

I once met an accountant who was doing business with certain companies that were connected with the mafia. He told me that these companies kept three sets of books. One was for public consumption, and was a total fabrication. A second was for the benefit of the taxman and, though some of its claims were slightly easier to verify, it was nevertheless largely false. The third was the real set of accounts, and my auditor friend had made some informed guesses about what they might contain; he had never managed to obtain access to these.

Britain is not a public company, and nor is it run by the mafia.

Nevertheless the same sort of general distinction can be made between a false public ledger and the real one, between the remorselessly upbeat official world where educational standards are rising, knife crime is falling, public finances are under control, and British agents are never complicit in torture – and the real one.

And the emergence of this fraudulent

official ledger means that something really interesting has taken place in Britain. We have abandoned the idea that there is an independent reality which is out there and subject to independent verification – and adopted instead a different kind of political epistemology. The purpose of public argument has moved right away from truths that can be proven to narratives that can be constructed. This is formally recognised by the ruling elite. Peter Mandelson, one of the inventors of the new politics, speaks of the need to 'create the truth'.

Apologists for the new ruling elite celebrate this proposition. Here is the Cambridge University lecturer in political philosophy David Runciman in his recent and very well-received book on political hypocrisy:

"it is never a question of truth versus lies; it is, at best, a choice between different kinds of truth against different kinds of lies."

Appearance and reality has become identical. The surface counts for everything. Government therefore ceases to be about getting things done… but being seen to get things done.

So we have entered a postmodern public discourse populated by rival truth claims. I will try and sketch out the effects of this discourse on British government. The core insight is that appearance and reality has become identical. The surface counts for everything. Government therefore ceases to be about getting things done – it's about being seen to get things done.

To give just one example quite a large part of the civil service is no longer dedicated to administrative tasks. All departments now contain a group of dedicated individuals whose role – though it is never described in exactly this way – is actually the manipulation of outcomes to ensure that government targets are met. Ten years ago, before the fraudulent energy group Enron went bust, investors would be taken to visit the companies trading floor in Houston, Texas. They would see a large room full of apparently busy people. Actually they were generating no wealth at all.

Appearance had taken over from reality. That is what has happened to quite large parts of our civil service.

This has led to a startling state of affairs. Britain has never enjoyed such an apparently active central government as over the last ten years.

There have never been so many initiatives, press releases, New Deals, action plans. The key thing to understand is that all of this activity carries on almost entirely independent of life as it is lived by ordinary people.

Despite official statistics produced by state employees to prove that they work, this blizzard of activity is actually part of a parallel universe.

Douglas Carswell and Daniel Hannon have noted this phenomenon of virtual government in their new book and they summon up Tony Blair's toe-curling memo calling for 'eye-catching initiatives' as evidence. 'The memo contains one sentence which bears particular contemplation,' the authors note: 'We also need a far tougher rebuttal or, alternatively, action' As Carswell and Hannan observe: 'Blair had grasped that, in the contemporary political climate, rebuttal is action.'

This phenomenon is not merely confined to initiatives, press releases, government announcements and similar epiphenomena. It has also captured the legislative process. The Times columnist Matthew Parris was I think the first observer to note the emergence of declamatory legislation.

'New laws and proposed new laws,' Parris accurately noted in a Times article early last year, are being touted around as if they were a specialised branch of advertising, rather than rules to be interpreted, enforced and obeyed.' These laws, he noted, 'do not so much do the right thing, as say the right thing.' The Hunting Act was one example. Hunting has carried on unabated. During the previous government, Harriet Harman's

equalities legislation was a manifestation of the same phenomenon, clearly designed to make a public statement, and not containing any practical measure that would have any effect on everyday life. A related version of the same basic phenomenon is the Act of Parliament which the government has no intention of putting into practice. Tony Blair promptly set about undermining the Crime and Security Act of 2001 which banned bribery overseas. The moment a case came up – the alleged BAE kickbacks to Saudi Arabia – the prime minister blocked the police investigation. Similarly with the Freedom of Information Act; ever since its introduction ministers have worked flat out to thwart the information commissioner, by refusing to publish cabinet minutes ahead of the Iraq War, prevent the disclosure of MPs expenses, and in all kinds of other ways. David Blunkett now admits that his early schools legislation was unnecessary, and was only put on for show.

The economic crisis has also produced a wealth of fresh examples of this fabricated political activity.

Gordon Brown spoke of creating '100,000' new jobs. Upon examination, this figure fell apart. It emerged that the prime minister only meant 'up to' 100,000 jobs and then that he was also referring to the protection of existing jobs.

Then came the announcement of 35,000 apprenticeships. But that figure swiftly collapsed as it emerged on BBC Newsnight that employment minister Tony McNulty 'didn't know' if they were new apprenticeships.

On Wednesday the prime minister was in Liverpool with the cheerful news that the government was unveiling £35 million extra to help business start-ups. But then came the depressing revelation that this wasn't new money after all.

Friday saw Gordon Brown go to Swindon to open a school. But that wasn't new either. The school had originally been opened eighteen months before.

A very nice example is the vast amount of government effort devoted to Fred Goodwin's pension – For tonight I've stripped him of his knighthood.

Huge attention, from the former Prime Minister, inside the cabinet, and among Treasury civil servants, has been devoted to this subject and it dominated the news agenda at the time. Yet it had no bearing on the profound economic crisis. What was going on was a classic exercise in manipulation. The core concern of government is not, as one would hope and expect, to get Britain out of a mess. It is to divert attention onto Fred Goodwin – and to get itself out of a mess.

There are all kinds of other examples of this kind of fabricated political activity. And even though we are talking about illusory activity, there is an effect on the real world. Passing legislation that you never mean to enforce undermines respect for the rule of law, because it sends out the message that law-breaking has been sanctioned by the government.

Announcing and re-announcing initiatives to solve pressing problems facing ordinary people that are never designed to take effect may gain an incumbent government a short term advantage. But in the medium to long term this constant building up of false expectations causes ordinary voters to lose their faith in politics, and to look elsewhere.

Much – rightly so – has been made of the ideological contrast between Conservative and Labour, even though sometimes I find it rather hard to detect.

But I very much hope that there will also be a very strong philosophical distinction between the two parties. New Labour cannot be fully understood until it is grasped that it is Britain's first post-modern government. The movement which surged to power in 1997 was formed less by Marx and Methodism and more by Foucault, Derrida and Richard Rorty.

If the coalition is to govern effectively over the next decade they need to turn their back on a philosophical doctrine that first took root in French philosophical salons in the 1970s. Instead of constructing the truth, as New Labour has constantly sought to do, the new coalition can start to reclaim the truth, and look back to their own roots in the British empirical tradition

For the new coalition government this

means two things: one a matter of detail, and one an issue of deep principle. First of all, they must dismantle the apparatus of postmodern government. Above all that means restoring the administrative function of the British civil service and downgrading its dominant presentational function.

> In politics, integrity really lies in the conviction that it's only on the basis of truth that power should be won – or indeed can be worth winning

But it also means looking truth in the face- and the success of David Cameron as prime minister will depend upon whether he has the courage and rigour to do this. I want to end this article by quoting Margaret Thatcher:

"In politics, integrity really lies in the conviction that it's only on the basis of truth that power should be won – or indeed can be worth winning".

I think what Margaret Thatcher was saying here is that does not pay to secure power through clever positioning or strategic alliances. That was the tragedy of New Labour- it was not honest about what it would do in office, which is why it failed as a government. David Cameron, I would guess, must be very straightforward with the British people. And that means putting out a much bleaker and tougher message of what he will do in power than he has tried to do so far.

Sir Keith Joseph's speeches in the 1970s spelt out in much greater detail how to do that, and much of his social and economic analysis in those distant times remains directly applicable today. But that is a subject for another article.

* Peter Oborne is an English journalist and political commentator. He was educated at Sherborne and Cambridge. A columnist for the Daily Telegraph, Oborne has been a prolific political commentator with the pen as well as on camera. Author of *The Rise of Political Lying* (2005), *The Triumph of the Political Class* (2007), two biographies, and a political pamphlet critical of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe entitled 'A moral duty to act there'. He has been critical of the treatment of Muslims in Britain, most notably as presenter of 2008 Channel 4 documentary 'It Shouldn't Happen to a Muslim' and as co-author of 'Muslim's Under Siege'. He is particularly known for his acerbic commentary on the hypocrisy and apparent mendacity of contemporary politicians.

Muslims Living in Multi-Cultural Societies: Realities and Challenges

*GOH CHOK TONG

RISING MULTICULTURALISM

Throughout history, great civilisations and communities have always reached out to others. Through trading routes and networks like the Silk Road, civilisations such as China, India, Egypt, Persia, and Arabia flourished with the flow of ideas and commerce. Today, the metaphorical Silk Road has been replaced by countless silk threads interwoven into a global whole. It is not just products and ideas that are criss-crossing the globe, but people, including economic migrants in search of jobs and a better life. Multicultural societies consequently are increasingly becoming the norm all over the world.

This diversity in beliefs presents societies with new challenges. Achieving social harmony in a multicultural society requires active management, the experience of European countries is a case in point. They experienced a large influx of Muslim immigrants who arrived during the economic boom after the Second World War. Only recently the Swiss President told me that within the last decade or so, the number of Muslims in Switzerland grew 10-fold from about 40,000 to 400,000.

Initially, it was believed that these immigrants in Europe would be naturally socialised and hence gradually take on European values and ways of life. While many of them did pick up new languages and some aspects of European culture, many amongst the second or subsequent generations, continue to maintain and protect their distinct identities. This is not unique to Muslim communities. But their size and distinctiveness have led to unease and misunderstanding. So the Swiss voted in a referendum to ban the building of minarets while the French government banned the wearing of burqas (aka niqab) in public places. European leaders now realise that they need to re-examine their approach towards the Muslim minorities in their societies.

This soul searching also extends to the Muslim minorities in those countries. They are grappling with how they can co-exist with the non-Muslim majority without having to loose their cultural and religious identity. This discussion today is therefore very timely as it serves as a platform for Muslim and other communities from different countries to share their experience of embracing diversity and forging a harmonious multicultural society.

CONTEXT OF SINGAPORE

Not being a scholar, let alone a religious one, I will not presume to lecture on what followers of religions should or should not do to live as minorities in multicultural societies. Instead, I shall take a practical rather than a philosophical or ideological approach whereby I will share my thoughts on how Singapore builds trust and religious harmony between the different communities. In doing so, I add that Singapore is open to learning from others as well.

For Singapore, multiculturalism was what we were blessed with at our independence in 1965. We were approximately 75% Chinese, 14% Malays, and the remaining 11% Indians and others. All the major religions in the world were also present here. As we took in immigrants from other parts of the world, our languages and religious beliefs became even more diverse. We are therefore extremely conscious that racial and religious fault lines could be exploited and passions inflamed, sometimes by external sources and events which had nothing to do with our domestic situation. This is not hypothetical. Racial and religious fault lines were exploited, and politically motivated violent riots took place in the 1960s in Singapore. Many of

who witnessed the bloodshed then were determined to prevent such clashes from ever happening again in Singapore.

Ours is a secular society, which allows us to treat all religions equally and no one religion is regarded by the state as superior to others. To ensure religious harmony, the attitudes and roles played by the Muslim minority, the 75 percent Chinese majority, and the government are very important.

ROLE OF MUSLIM MINORITY

Our Muslim community understands and appreciates that Singapore is a multi-racial and multi-religious country with a common and secular space for all. The challenge is in contextualising and adjusting some of their religious practices according to their unique circumstances in Singapore.

Singapore, being a city state, is one of the world's most densely populated countries. With people living in high-rise apartments and in close proximity, the call of prayer or the adhan amplified through loudspeakers at mosques during the early dawn or in the evening had to be modified. If not, it would have been an issue with the majority non-Muslims and would make it difficult for them to accept the building of new mosques in their vicinity.

At the same time, Muslims in Singapore had to be convinced that any changes to their public call for prayer were not aimed at curbing the practice of their religion. The changes were also made incrementally. First, the loudspeakers were tilted inwards and away from nearby houses, and limits were set on their volume levels. Later, a radio frequency was allocated to allow the call to prayer to be broadcast over the radio. In this way, all Muslims who wished to receive the call to prayer simply tuned in to their radio. Over time, the mosques did away with loudspeakers. This was a clear illustration of pragmatism of the Muslim community and their sensitivity to the feelings of non-Muslims.

Other religions too have had to make adjustments. For example, the Taoists in Singapore had a long-standing practice of burning giant joss or incense sticks during their festival celebrations, not only in temples but also in the open. These joss sticks would burn for hours. However, because of Singapore's high-density living, the smoke from joss sticks caused irritation to a large number of people -- many of whom were not Taoists. As a compromise, the Taoists agreed to limit the number and size of joss sticks and confine them mostly to temples.

If the majority uses its dominance to over-ride the interests of the minorities, we would not enjoy the social cohesiveness that we have today

ROLE OF NON-MUSLIM MAJORITY

It takes two hands to clap. So beyond what the Muslim community in Singapore could do to contribute to religious harmony, the attitude and role of the non-Muslim majority, in particular the Chinese, are also important. Their actions set the tone and provide an affirmation of the trust and respect needed to establish peace and harmony. If the majority uses its dominance to over-ride the interests of the minorities, we would not enjoy the social cohesiveness that we have today. Fortunately, our non-Muslim majority is tolerant and accommodative.

This spirit of acceptance is reflected in the many little accommodations made in our day-to-day lives. To illustrate, most non-Muslim Singaporeans are sensitive to the dietary requirements of their Muslim colleagues. So halal food is made available at functions or events where Muslims are present. Non-Muslim employers accommodate and allow Muslim men time-off needed to attend weekly Friday Jumu'a prayers at the mosques. When a Muslim employee intends travel to Makkah to perform Hajj, pilgrimage, as every Muslim tries to do at least once in their lifetime, many non-Muslim employers and their colleagues try to facilitate this through long leave. Such an understanding

outlook by the non-Muslim majority is a major contributing factor to our social cohesiveness.

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Promoting dialogue and interfaith understanding

It is my belief that we must start by opening hearts and minds through sincere dialogue. In 2007, MUIS and the Diocese of Singapore jointly invited the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, to speak in Singapore at a Building Bridges Conference. During his lecture, he shared that the world can construct a new and more inclusive history by first accepting our religious diversity through dialogue. This did not mean, according to Dr Williams, that we should ignore the sources of tension in our pursuit to weave a cohesive society of diverse communities. Indeed, the opposite is true as we must face these tensions in open dialogue with an abundance of fairness, mutual respect and restraint.

To strengthen inter-faith understanding and to strengthen our networks of trust, we formed the National Steering Committee on Racial and Religious Harmony, where apex religious leaders converge to discuss significant issues which impact communal relations. Beyond the religious leaders, followers and members of each religious community must also learn to work with other communities to build a strong bond. This creates a multiplier effect beyond the first-tier of leadership, connecting the ethnic and religious communities and providing opportunities for co-operation.

We have also set up Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs) at the grassroots level to provide a platform for confidence building and developing deeper friendship and trust between communities. While similar platforms exist in many parts of the world, our IRCCs are unique in that they include almost every religious and ethnic leader in the communities. This ensures that the dialogue that takes place is inclusive, and does not only involve people who already believe in inter-faith dialogue.

I believe that having fair and balanced interfaith communication through such visible platforms has helped set the tone on the ground. For example, when the anti-Islamic film Fitna was released in March 2007 by Dutch politician Geert Wilders, Muslims in Singapore reacted calmly to the film despite the deep offence the film had caused. The non-Muslim public also rejected the views contained in the film and more importantly stepped up to make their stand known. The measured response and mutual respect are indeed exemplary steps towards overcoming the challenge of religious diversity.

ENSURING SECULAR COMMON SPACE

Because we are a multi-religious society, we must ensure that we have secular common space where Singaporeans can feel comfortable whatever their beliefs. Our schools, workplaces, hospitals, community centres and the such, for example, are all places where any person can expect to be treated in the same way regardless of one's religious background. Organisations that receive government funding or enjoy double tax deduction donations must similarly ensure that nobody is denied services due to his beliefs, and that no proselytisation occurs without explicit consent. By keeping religion out of the public square, we make it safe for everyone to congregate. This creates opportunities for interaction, mutual understanding and accommodation.

HOLDING THE RING

The government must be even-handed so as to be trusted to hold the ring if conflicts arise. We have enacted the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act which enables the Minister for Home Affairs to restrain any person from causing ill feelings between the different religious groups. It signals the seriousness with which we view religious harmony and how fragile it could be. The Act is there to be used as a last resort, and fortunately, we have not had to invoke it throughout its 21-year history.

Despite our best efforts, tensions can still boil into the open from time to time. Religious fervour is rising here in Singapore, as it has all over the world with all faiths. Just this year alone, several incidents here

have hit the headlines. For example, there were reports of Church youths evangelising to unaccompanied children at playgrounds. There were also cases of Church Pastors trivialising and belittling Taoist and Buddhist beliefs. All these naturally caused great annoyance and potential tension. In one case, after the Internal Security Department intervened, the Pastor apologised for the offence he had caused. In other cases, the churches and Pastors responsible, on their own, also regretted the incidents, apologised for causing offence, counselled their young members and explained the guidelines of evangelism to their congregations. These go a long way to defuse the tension and avert potential conflict.

We must accept that religious pluralism will increasingly be the norm of the modern world.

Singapore's religious harmony is the result of continuous and conscious effort with various stakeholders playing critical roles. At a personal level, Singaporeans of all faiths must continue to show tolerance and understanding, and adopt a live-and-let-live approach to life. In addition, Singaporeans must remain vigilant of disparaging remarks, or divisive or radicalised ideas by religious leaders. Followers have a social duty to speak out against those who hold offensive views towards other religions or communities. It is only through such swift and categorical rebuttals that people from other religions can be reassured that the offensive views are not held by the religion's mainstream members.

> Adapted from a keynote address by Goh Chok Tong at the Internatinoal Conference on Muslims in Multicultural Societies, Singapore,14-16 July 2010.

*Goh Chok Tong became Prime Minister of Singapore in 1990, succeeding the man regarded as Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew. Tong was already a prominent member of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), having served as senior minister for trade and industry, finance, and health, among other positions. Tong continued as Prime Minster throughout the 1990s, and in 2004 was named Senior Minister of the Prime Minister's office.



BOOK REVIEW

7/7: Muslim Perspectives

7/7: Muslim Perspectives, edited by Murtaza Shibli, explores and articulates the insights, reactions and experiences of a number of ordinary British Muslims following the 7/7 London Bombings. The book explores how British Muslims negotiate their own positions within the mainstream society and with each other in the aftermath of this tragic incident.

Hailing from diverse cultural and professional backgrounds, the contributors in this book provide a rich mosaic of lived experience, subjective accounts of people's hopes as well as their anxieties and fears. The book serves equally well to put into perspective extremist ideologies to be found in the fringes of the Muslim communities in Britain.

7/7: Muslim Perspectives presents compelling testimonies for those with an interest in the lives of Muslims in Britain, from students, community workers and activists to journalists, politicians and policy makers.

Themes that feature prominently in the book in the form of short essays by Muslims include the shock and disgust of the actions of the perpetrators which was felt across religious communities in Britain; that Muslims too were victims of the 7/7 atrocities; and the actions of these misguided zealots did not succeed in dividing the community.

Editor and former Public Affairs and Media Officer of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Murtaza Shibli said "The voice and views of the ordinary British Muslims have been lost amongst the endless debates and analysis. This book offers a chance to find out what normal people experienced and how this watershed event has had an impact on their lives both as British citizens and as Muslims."

7/7: Muslim Perspectives was launched on 7 July 2010 at the House of Lords, which was supported by the Universal Peace Federation and European Muslim Research Centre, University of Exeter.

Published by Rabita Ltd, The Cordoba Foundation recommends this timely book which provides compulsive insights into the reactions, feelings and experiences of British Muslims in the aftermath of the 7/7 London Bombings.

Available in all good bookshops

A War of Images: Through the Lens of an Artist

*STEVE PRATT

Dear reader,
Forgive me for breaking with the convention of academic argument so informatively practiced within the pages of this essential little Quarterly, but in order to illustrate further the context of the *"Squalor of War"* (1) - I must resort to the artist's (illusory) viewpoint of a fragmented memory (2) and experience - to reconstruct a simple reflective narrative for you to consider. A narrative that touches on the hidden workings of the fearful imagination (3) to re present images of fear (4), and how that anticipation of public and private dread, is acted out in the war scenario as being the result of catastrophic neo conservative political decision making (5).

We continue to be The Fearful Consumers of Images.

State of Affairs = Picture in the mind = Behaviour

The image as the Driver that trumped all images of the fearful imagination requires no external visual reminder – since it already springs to mind the moment 9/11 is quoted (and (re) visualised)

The image witnessed on that fafeful day held as memory within the fearful imagination - returns in sensory High Definition to bring back that iconoclastic image of death and destruction - the (fearful collapse) of (western civilisation) - to experience (again) the screams, and to choke on the septic dust to create a fearful response that informs, and confirms our experience of the world around us. This is a text – of an event you witnessed – re presented as an image – which was consumed repeatedly – and which was re enforced with text to feed the fearful imagination – please note, the picture remains – but the text can be adjusted – although the use of the picture and supporting text remains the site of dramatic struggle – as the war of images (as text).

To mention 9/11 therefore is to return to the fearful imagination.

An image as a lived experience that launched the War on Terror (6) - a war against an emotion – a war on fear, fed by fear; a war without any identifiable enemy, territory or direction (until Iraq, Afghanistan, Al Qaida and the Taliban came into the frame) other than to feed the imagination with yet more anxiety .

In a separate slice of Space and Time

A suicide bomber is recieving his final instructions

This fact requires no explanation other than to wonder at the Logistics and Strategies to administrate such a method of warfare

And the situation on the ground that resulted in this perambulate modus operandi – the imbalance between the military powers on

each side – the need to hit back – effectively – with maximum effect

And to wonder at the aspirations of the boy (a volunteer) (like me aged 14½ years)

The boy carries an image in his mind – an image of him as a complete person and not the one of him blown apart or the devastation he is about to cause

The boy has no doubts about what he has to do – ***but in a separate slice of space and time*** – the boy has a fearful dread

The Unreasonable Lightness of Being

In a separate slice of Space and Time

The Ministry of Defence have been alarmed by the number of casualties being taken in Afghanistan

They have issued an order to commanders in the field "to avoid taking casualties at all costs"

The implication is that a tour of duty with no casualties would show exemplary leadership and bring reward in the form of a medal along with recognition within the military establishment

This is a little known fact

In a separate slice of Space and Time

A battalion commander – a colonel - has issued strict orders to his men not to take unnecessary risks when coming into contact with the local population – particular emphasis is placed on the security of his men and to maintain distance and safety when dealing with the local population

A junior patrol commander – a corporal - has noticed that this order effects his capability of winning the hearts and minds of the local population

In a separate slice of Space and Time

At a vehicle checkpoint in Afghanistan

A soldier has in mind 2 recent intelligence reports of the threat of a suicide bomber on a motorcycle in and around their position

The soldier has in mind the image of the devastion caused by a suicide bomber

Because

In a separate slice of Space and Time

The moment before an earlier explosion the fearful imagination was nowhere identifiable

Neither can the detonation itself be remembered – only the silence of the aftermath

Along with the dust and the heat of the day - making him sweat - that and the instant stench of death

All avenues in the selective memory - lead back to this point – this is how the fearful imagination works – it creeps along and reinvents itself as a (kind of) living experience in the context of today – a transformation that only occurs when you're not really aware of anything in particular although you might have been contaminated by the horrors of war – such as a photograph or a media clip or a latent interview with a victim

of war or even the feeling of things being somehow 'unjust'
Away from the body, can be seen the glistening ginger hairs on a gleaming white foot with the perfect whiteness of bone sticking out at the top

It has been told ***someone buried the foot*** (in a later slice of space and time)

But the stench of death prevails

Mother and Child

An explosion somewhere just now

None of which has any bearing on the picture in front of you although it might have if you have been in the wrong place at the wrong time – that is to say if you were close to where it happened

The media networks are undecided about the position they must take because the information provided by the military does not explain the large number of civilian casualties

The first loyalty of the media networks is with their subscribers and those who hold the purse strings and it must be that the media networks require the co operation of the military to enable them to get their one sided stories disguised as news

So that in their indecision they decide to leave the story partially untold

The gap between The Picture, The Writing and The Truth is so enormous it's incomprehensible to determine

You would need a boat to cross the Ocean of Lies Semi Lies and Deceipts

In a separate slice of Space and Time

And as a response to an internal fear

A soldier aims and fires his rifle (first as warning shots and then repeatedly) because in that particular moment its safe to assume that he can say that his life is under threat – but the motorcycle continues – he fires continuous shots (5.56mm) into the largest mass – and the motorcycle crashes

On close inspection the driver of the motorcycle is confirmed as dead and not a suicide bomber

The body is brought to the nearest hospital with multiple gunshot wounds to the chest

Event closed - 1 Killed Local Civilian (7)

In a separate slice of Space and Time

A senior civil servant in The Home Office is gazing at the wording for the RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR HM FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

The text requires updating since there seems to be so many civilian deaths being reported from particular units on the ground, and this fact has not gone unoticed in the corridors of power - This latter fact was a State Secret but someone made the reports available to the press, and the once secret news has become public for the first time.

This matter should not be discussed outside this office – And the fact remains that 'war crime' is not a term anyone in the military or the government wants to hear

In a separate slice of Space and Time

The battalion commander – a colonel – ensures by the delegatory use of orders to his junior officers that the statements from the earlier shooting are in order

It is not in the mind of the colonel that he or his men or units of the British army are capable of war crimes

War crime refers to earlier moments in foreign history such as The Holocaust and (Srebrenica)

In a separate slice of Space and Time

An artist makes a painting "about the war in Afghanistan" because a certain picture caught his mind's eye whilst surfing on the internet (in the quiet safety of his home) and this combined with a convenient text to feed his fearful imagination as an idea for a painting. He has several images that he wants to merge together (for maximum effect) but its the way he uses the paint that seems to be the controlling feature – that - and the believablility of the image itself - which suggests its more about painting (8) than a vision of the war

The artist has doubts about what he is doing and whether it has any relevance in the wider scheme of things because in his mind's eye is ***'the war as a kind of adventure'***– as a continuum of Empire – in the pursuit of influence and power for the dwinding resources abroad – such as oil, and genetically modified poppies to make grade 1 morphine – and stories for the news industry – along with other opportunists – and deceivers – and poseurs of the defence related industries – to 'cut their teeth' and make their name - so to speak

The juxtaposition of clean white walled gallery space and broken civilian bodies do not seem to fit – there is only squalor and discomfort in the site of the dead therefore artworks about (war) only alert us to the lethal nature of war unless they provide us with an uncomfortable perspective on the senseless terror of war – this comes as a re assuring thought to the artist (9)

In a separate slice of Space and Time

A television reporter attends a secret meeting with home office officials to provide feedback about 'what she saw' – this fact is a secret – which she will take to her grave – unless someone finds out first and exposes it to the world

In a separate slice of Space and Time

A group of television network executives are discussing their bias – in relation to the prevailing political status quo and their cultural specificity as being determinant of their content

In a separate slice of Space and Time

An Afghan mother is present at the washing of her dead child

Her dead child is wrapped in the best white cloth they can find, and laid out on a bearer

The body is taken to the doorway and the men carry the child out on their shoulders to the burial site

The head of the dead child faces Mecca

The child's name has no relevance to the Western Media

The child's mother's name is not known by the Western Media

At exactly the same time

A British soldier's body is repatriated from the war zone to RAF Lyneham

The soldier's coffin is covered in the Union Flag, his belt beret and medals are pinned to the flag

The soldier's coffin is ceremoniously carried by pall bearers from the aircraft to the hearse

The hearse drives through the centre of Wotton Bassett where family and friends are gathered to witness the repatriation

24 hour news channels posing as the conscientious voice of the nation are in attendance

They provide a running total of soldiers killed since hostilities began in 2001

War veterans from earlier conflicts line the route to (unconsciously) validate the war

In a separate slice of Space and Time

At a help workshop for refugees and asylum seekers

16 years old Ahmed wants to know why he must make so many pictures when at the beginning he had said "I cannot draw"

He says he finds it difficult to think beyond the English course which he must pass if he has any chance for survival in his newly adopted country of residence

When asked to visualise his life beyond the English course – when he makes a drawing depicting him enjoying life with friends in a new home - life seems to take an additional focus – he says he wants to be a teacher "God willing"

This final pronouncement is not lost on those present

At exactly the same moment in time

At a help workshop for victims of post traumatic stress

A former British soldier has been relieved of the burden he carried around with him for so long

He has finally been able to express his fear – the fear he never even knew existed because in his previous life – as a soldier – to present fear was to present a weakness – when he should have been looking out for the safety of his mates in his platoon – the fear he had was that he would let his mates down in the face of battle – **but this was not the real fear**

In a separate slice of space and time

As he goes out on patrol – the fearful imagination of a pending explosion returns – and he prays for his life to be spared because it's the only thing available for him to do - and this fact – the visualisation of this haunting spectre of death – seems to be the cause of his fear - and the cause of his fearful behaviour – although he would not admit it – until now

In his nightmare the motorcycle is travelling towards him – but in the confusion he has dropped his rifle – and every time he moves to pick it up – the rifle is unreachable – again and again - the motorcycle is closer and the rifle is unreachable - until the threat has subsided and everything returns to normality

In a separate slice of space and time

An image of peace and tranquillity

*Steve Pratt was born in Skipton, North Yorkshire in 1949. He attended private preparatory school education. When his parents divorced and the funds to keep him at school dried up he was taken to the Army Recruitment office to sign up as a Junior Leader aged 14. Pratt served in the Special Air Service from 1969–81. He describes his 17-year military career as a period of 'service to a false ideology'. Warned at his final medical on leaving the army that he may attempt suicide within a year of leaving the military, Pratt writes "For more years than I care to remember that statement hung over me like a death sentence, and when the Hungerford shooting occurred in 1987, I thought I was heading for the same outcome simply on the basis of my background. My training to use a weapon in a variety of questionable anti-terrorist situations, combined with a lack of understanding about the normality of everyday life situations made for a very angry individual. For a long time I thought I was

some kind of 'dangerous individual' waiting to implode.

Pratt lives and works in northern Finland and London. He is working on a themed series of paintings to expose the hidden lived realities of 'Conflict', including:
'Military Conflict' (1987–) presents paintings which offer a dark, tumultuous insight into the terror of war.
'Victims' (2009–) are paintings that vividly represent the hidden realities of war such as the death of innocent children and civilians as well as the ordinary soldier on both sides of the conflict.
'Conflicts of Place' (2005–) exposes the politicization of space and place to reveal how we mythologise the connections between persona and place.

Pratt has exhibited in Finland, Sweden, Berlin and the UK. More recently he has developed a creative programme to enable people and organisations to understand more about their world, and create new tools to move forward creatively.

ENDNOTES

1. I quote Julian Assange; his use of the term as evidenced in the WikiLeaks press conference of 25 July 2010. A term used with some irony as WikiLeaks published online 92,000 leaked documents about the War in Afghanistan.
"The real story is that...this is war...the continuous deaths of children, insurgents, allied forces, people - this is the story ...of the everyday squalor of war"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kxnyNgVWYZ0&NR=1
2. That memory is invested with all kinds of national, cultural, ideological, religious, economic and political contexts, along with historical and emotional values, and these "identity forming narratives provide insights into the ways through dynamic social forces we formulate cultural memory". Judith Madeleine Gerson, Diane L. Wolf 'Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: memories and identities in Jewish diasporas; P39.
3. See Hannah Arendt's use of the "the fearful imagination" in her widely quoted 'Origins of Totalitarianism'... "Such thoughts are useful only for the perception of political contexts and mobilisiation of political passions." Reprinted in Lawrence & Karim; On Violence – a reader; Duke University Press, 2007, p433.
4. For a valid theory concerning "the fear of images" and how images work, you cannot do better than to seek out WJT Mitchell, Iconology; Image, Text, Ideology, University of Chicago, 1986 and Picture Theory; University of Chicago, 1995.
5. See also Arches volume 3, issue 5; Dr Jonathon Githens-Mazer 'Militarisation of Civil Life and the Invasive Nature of Counter-Insurgency' in the wake of 9/11 – "an imagined world where threat looms around every corner, where the binary of good and evil is obvious, and where insidious threats from fifth columnists loom behind every turn..." http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/attach/ARCHES-VOL3%20EDITION5.pdf
6. See M. Merleau-Ponty; Phenomenology of Perception; Routledge (2002 edition) – the parallels between the role of expression and perception in film present a strong analogy to the description of the lived experience. This is to suggest that the visual image of a film is like the "visual image" that one sees in the lived experience.
7. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/afghanistan/warlogs/733A452F-C9F3-4A25-AEAA-980BC16FDA1E
8. See M. Merleau-Ponty, GA Johnson, MB Smith; Merleau-Ponty aesthetics *Reader: Philosophy and Painting*, NW University Press, (1993) p127
9. Refers to the doubts raised by Robert Reimer on how "the beauty of the form may overpower the horror of the content" quoted by Elisabeth Krimmer; The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 to the Present, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p8.

The Rhetoric of Integration in a Globalised Community

*SHAMIM MIAH

'Integration is not publicly debated. It is a categorical imperative, a general norm that is imposed on everyone but particularly one group: immigrants and all those gravitating around them' (Narcira Guenif Souilmas[1])

'The best form of integration is assimilation' (Otto Schily[2])

Integration, assimilation and acculturation are all idioms that are frequently used interchangeably within public discourse. One of the many critical ways of looking at the topic of integration is to view the current discourse as a rhetorical one. This rhetorical discourse is best understood through a detailed analysis of the variety of ways in which integration is represented as a normative construct, which is aimed at achieving certain socio-political objectives. Writers within this tradition do not view integration as a linear progression with 'outsiders' gradually embracing the cultural or social traits of the host nation and becoming 'insiders', nor do they view integration as a social or moral imperative.

> Integration is [viewed] as a highly politicised construct… riddled with paradoxes, contradictions [and] politically-motivated interest convergences

Instead, they view integration as a highly politicised construct, which is riddled with paradoxes, contradictions[3], politically motivated interest convergences[4] and above all lacking in empirical evidence[5]. They all share the view that integration as a category should be subjected to rigorous systematic analysis and critique.

Thus it is assumed that the lack of Muslim integration in Europe is somehow responsible for the resurgence over the last decade of Muslim radicalisation in general and Muslim identity politics in particular. The debate on Muslim integration and the emphasis on Anglo-conformity have recently taken a particular importance following the *burqa* debates in the West with the banning of wearing the veil in public in France and an impeding ban in a number of other European countries. Despite public perception saying otherwise, Muslim integration within Europe has been widely discussed by the Muslim communities. Whilst some Muslim writers[6] have attempted to demonstrate the coexistence of Islam within Europe as a 'theological, cultural and a social imperative', other commentators have attempted to use survey data to demonstrate a 'new perspective' on national and religious identity -- demonstrating how both of these ideas are not mutually exclusive but mutually enriching and that Muslim integration should be seen through the lenses of citizen cooperation rather than citizen conformity[7].

Hence it is clear that the Muslim discourse on this topic has contributed to a nuanced debate on Muslim integration in the West; nevertheless it is felt that these debates have failed to acknowledge the racialised nature of the discourse on integration. It is the author's intention in this paper to explore the pervasive discussion on integration in a different manner.

INTEGRATION IN HISTORY

The current debate on integration is best understood as a discursive feature of political speech used by the host society against minority groups throughout history. In fact today's criticism of Islam and Muslims as

'anti-modern, fundamentalist, illiberal and undemocratic religion and culture echoes the nineteenth century criticism against Catholicism'[8]. The Polish sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman provides a useful theoretical framework in understanding the discourse of integration and its association with modernism. Bauman argues how one of the main objectives of modernity is maintaining public order in society. One of the ways in which modern nation states achieve this order is by ensuring that all migrant communities are fully assimilated into the dominant cultures of the nation state. Bauman(1991), using the Jewish experience of pre-war Germany, highlights how assimilation can lead to a sense of contradiction, spiritual isolation and loneliness and most importantly a feeling of ambivalence:

"Acculturation did not incorporate the Jews into German society, but transformed into a separate, ambivalent and incongruous, non-category category of 'assimilated Jews', prised from the traditional Jewish community as much as from native German elites... The assimilating Jews acted under the pressure to prove their German-hood, yet the very attempt to prove it was held against them as the evidence of their duplicity and, in all probability, also of subversive intentions"[9]

One of the most important features to the contemporary debate on integration in Europe has been the recognition that the concept of integration needs to be 're-examined not as a description of immigration history but as an analytical category constructed…over different time frames'.[10] In other words, the focus should be less of whether migrant communities have adopted the cultural traits of the host society but rather on the ways in which the debate is formulated to talk about migrant communities.

In fact, as sociologist David Gillborn (2008) has shown in his review of educational policy relating to race in the UK, contemporary discourses on 'integration' and 'cohesion' are best understood as code names for contemporary assimilation[11]. This has been confirmed by a number of other writers, who have shown how, integration is far from being a neutral term; in fact the idea is politically motivated and a hermeneutically loaded concept which is used to mean cultural assimilation[12] and socio political domination.[13]

In sum, most writers who view integration as a rhetorical discourse see the function of integration as a device by which the West is projected within a reified construct whilst the 'other' cultures are viewed through the pessimistic lenses of essentialism.[14]

MUSLIM INTEGRATION AS PUBLIC POLICY

One of the many areas that the debate around integration has been most vocal is around education and the Muslim communities. Given that education is an important agent of socialisation, it is thus not surprising to note that this has been one of the hotly contested areas in public debate. One only needs to look at the public discourse on Muslim schools or Muslims in state schools with its focus on 'self segregation', 'parallel lives' 'Muslim ghettos' and sleepwalking to segregation'[15] debate in the UK or the debate following the Stasi Commission in France which led to banning of the wearing of the headscarf's in French schools to get an idea of the intense and sustained pressure around the integration of Muslim communities in the West[16].

David Gilborn's idea of aggressive 'majoritarianism' is perhaps a very helpful way in understanding some of the current trends within Europe. 'Aggressive majoritarianism' occurs when, 'majority dislike and prejudice towards minorities such as the Muslim communities are enforced in the name of commonsense, integration and even security'[17].

Whilst the above examples focus on the macro debates on integration, recent research[18] on young Muslim experience of schooling outline some of the micro abuses of the integration debate. This research highlights the ways in which teachers will use 'integration' as a tool to criticise Muslim pupils for not mixing with their white peers, attending school trips or participating in extra-curricular activities- even though these

actions were motivated by a complex set of factors including; acceptance, anti-Muslim prejudice, racial harassment by both staff and pupils.

With the rise of Globalisation and the shift of economic power from the West to the East, the discourse of integration is set to intensify

DEBATING INTEGRATION IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

One of the most important challenges facing the West is what integration means in a rapidly moving globalised world and the transformation of geographical landscapes into hyper-diversity. For some – the timing of the recent debate on British values is particularly poignant. Paul Gilroy[19] has described the current rise in the interest of Britishness and the praise and longing of the Empire through 'Churchillian lenses' as a form of post-colonial melancholia. It is safe to assume with the rise of Globalisation and the shift of economic power from the west to the east- the discourse of integration is set to intensify. One of the pertinent questions that has been raised by a number of writers facing the West is not how Muslims adopt on conform to the socio-cultural landscapes of the West; but rather how the West integrates into a shifting landscapes of the globe?[20]

*Shamim Miah is a senior lecturer in Religion and Education at Huddersfield University, United Kingdom. He has been involved in a number of community projects in Manchester and Oldham

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

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The US-led Military Intervention in Afghanistan Within the Context of Globalisation

*PETER MARSDEN

Afghanistan's strategic position between the Middle East, Central and South Asia has given it an often pivotal role in shifting global dynamics. Alexander the Great sought to annexe it as part of his ambition of extending his empire eastwards. It served as the launch pad for the establishment of the Mughal dynasty by Zahir-ud-din Muhammed Babur, in the 16th century. For Britain and Russia, during the 19th century, it represented a key access route to the other's dominions.

The Soviet military intervention of December 1979, was a response to fears that the US would seek to exploit the unrest generated by the over-zealous reform programme of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan government. Moscow was understandably concerned that the US, having recently lost its military presence in Iran in the wake of the Ayatullah Khomeini's assumption of power, would threaten its soft underbelly by establishing military bases in Afghanistan.

The US saw Afghanistan as the cradle of Islamic radicalism, and therefore, the source of the attacks of September 11th 2001. The intervention of October 2001 also fitted well with the neo-conservative goal of creating a network of what were termed forward operating bases around the world with which to contain the growing power of China, in particular[1]. By establishing a military presence in Afghanistan, the US could also hope to move further towards an encirclement of Iran as well as keep a close eye on Islamic radicalism in Pakistan and also, oil interests in Central Asia.

Yet, there was a period, when the Taliban first embarked upon their conquest of Afghanistan from 1994 onwards, when Afghanistan appeared to turn inwards and ignored the world outside. The Taliban, in thus seeking to establish their own Islamic utopia, were largely ignorant of global dynamics and were also dismissive of other initiatives to create Islamic States, on the basis of Shari'a law, as being necessarily inferior to their own. When asked how the Afghan model of an Islamic State compared with those in countries such as Iran and Sudan, the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, commented: "We do not look at other governments. We do not have enough information on those States' systems".[2]

However, the isolationism of the Taliban was difficult to maintain. In a situation in which their origins lay in the refugee camps in Pakistan, where many had attended madrasahs funded by Saudi Arabia, or linked to Pakistan-based radical Islamic parties such as Jamiat al-Ulema al-Islami, their rejection of the doctrinal in-fighting between the Mujahidin parties in favour of a simplistic vision of an Islamic State was, nonetheless, influenced by the Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia and the Deobandi thinking of the Indian subcontinent[3].

Moreover, the refugee environment in which the Taliban were created was inextricably linked to the Mujahidin resistance to the Soviet military intervention, and arising from this, to the emergence of a cadre of volunteers from the wider Islamic world under the aegis of the Saudi recruiting office known as Al-Qaida. Thus, when in August 1998, the US launched air strikes on Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Taliban already had a global network on which to build its own response.

The fact that Osama bin Laden had established himself in Afghanistan in 1996, following his expulsion from Sudan, and that the US called for him to be handed over

to them gave the Taliban no choice but to take him under their wing. To have done otherwise would have deprived them of their support base in Jamiat al-Ulema al-Islami, and elsewhere. Yet their steadfast defence of their guest thrust them very visibly onto the global stage and made it possible for them to attract many more volunteers, from the wider Islamic community, to fight alongside them in their efforts to complete their conquest of Afghanistan.

These international volunteers increasingly influenced thinking within the Taliban and radicalised positions so that the previous declaration of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, that he would respect the Buddhist statues in Bamyan was overturned in favour of their destruction, in March 2001. Furthermore, Mullah Omar, issued a statement which was published in *Al-Hayat*, in April 2002, in which he made a specific reference to Palestine. This was noted in an article dated 15 April 2002, on the website of Al-Bawaba under the heading "Mullah Omar condemns American "crusade" in Afghanistan, Palestine:

"Fugitive Taliban leader mullah Mohammad Omar has condemned a "crusade" launched by the United States in Afghanistan and continued in the Palestinian territories, according to a Monday report in a London-based daily.

"The massacres of Palestinians by the Israeli army is proof that the war against Islam and Muslims is an open crusade," the Arabic daily *Al-Hayat* quoted Omar as saying in a statement.

"After America launched its war against Islam in Afghanistan ... the Jews are doing the same today against Muslim people in Palestine," he said.

"All of it is carried out with American weapons, American money and backed by American decisions," added the statement to *Al-Hayat*.

"Who can believe that America wants to fight the terrorism she herself practices in such a shameful way?" Omar asked, vowing to pursue his struggle against the United States.

"Do the Americans want us to see the colonizers live in security ... without us fighting those who have taken away our rights?"

Thus, by the time of the US-led military intervention of October 2001, the Taliban were already conscious of being an Islamic movement with global links. The US-led military intervention in Iraq of March 2003 greatly increased the Taliban movement's self-consciousness of itself as a global movement and also made it much easier to present its response to the international military presence in Afghanistan as part of a global resistance, within the Islamic *Umma*, to a perceived Christian crusade.

This self-image was greatly enhanced when President Bush made an explicit reference to a Christian crusade when he stated, in September 2001, that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take awhile."[4] It was further enhanced by an unfortunate statement by the Pope and by the appearance of cartoons in a Danish newspaper which were clearly offensive to the Prophet Mohammed.

The presentation, by the Taliban, of their movement as one of resistance to the international military presence made it increasingly easy to raise funds in mosque collections around the world, and from wealthy benefactors and also to recruit volunteers from the wider Islamic world. These global links also enabled the Taliban to draw on expertise on the use of explosive devices and also on new technology. Thus, from being a movement in which the education level of its adherents was extremely low, it developed a capacity to create highly effective websites and other electronic media mechanisms to transmit its messages to the Afghan population. This was noted in a report published by Cooperation for Peace and Unity in August 2009[5]:

"The rhetoric of this Taliban group, and particularly its didactic tone, …was somewhat similar to the rhetoric of religious and jihadi groups in Pakistan interviewed for previous studies. But there was one major difference: the Afghan Taliban group was much less learned and scholarly. Those interviewed in Pakistan could quote sura from the Qur'an and specific hadees [*Hadith* / Prophetic Tradition] to back up their arguments but the Taliban in Afghanistan simply said 'the

Qur'an says…' followed by the argument they wanted to put forward. It seems likely that most of their religious training has been from the Taliban's own extensive propaganda machine via their combatant peers and not from study with a theological scholar. As discussed in the literature review, the Taliban have invested heavily in technology for radicalisation purposes and are now extremely adept at both the technical side and in creating powerful propaganda messages"

The battle for hearts and minds is being fought on the basis of highly sophisticated techniques, which the more unwieldy communication systems of the international military cannot match.

Thus, the battle for hearts and minds is being fought on the basis of highly sophisticated techniques, which the more unwieldy communication systems of the international military cannot match.

It may be interesting, therefore, to reflect on the extent to which hearts and minds in Afghanistan have been influenced by global factors. It is very clear that, to the population of Afghanistan, Islam is a central element in their lives. Furthermore, while adherence to the precepts of Islam has not manifested any obvious radicalism within the public at large, Islam has been the rallying cry in response to all external military interventions. This was very much the case in what are now the Tribal Areas of Pakistan when the Pushtun tribes stood opposed to the British presence in India. When the British intervened in Afghanistan in 1839 and 1878, Mullahs preached against them in the mosques. It was the radical Islamic parties which emerged from Kabul University in the 1960s and 1970s, which claimed leadership of the spontaneous resistance to the Soviet intervention and took on the collective name of the Mujahidin. Similarly, it is the Taliban which has taken upon itself the role of leading the popular resistance to the US-led military presence. The population is therefore inclined to defend their country against a military intervention by the Christian West, by reference to their defence of Islam.

However, the population is also influenced by other factors, including civilian casualties brought about by US air strikes, insensitive house searches by the US military, government corruption, a predatory police force and the use of Bagram airbase as a detention centre for Afghan nationals in which, those detained have no right to challenge their detention in a US court.

Yet the publication of the Danish cartoons provoked simultaneous demonstrations across Afghanistan on 6th February 2006, in which three people died. To what extent, therefore, would the population be influenced by a resolution of, for example, the Palestinian issue? It is interesting to reflect on the findings of the report published by Cooperation for Peace and Unity in August 2009[6], in this regard. This noted, in paragraph 2.9:

"Many respondents talked of a western 'crusade' against Islam and Afghan traditions – with religion and culture presented as complementary and interdependent. Religious messages therefore did have resonance for the majority. However, our assessment is that is primarily because they were couched in terms of respondents' two more pragmatic grievances: the corruption of the state and occupation by foreign forces…

There was little evidence of pan-Islamic sentiment in any location. Few respondents made any reference to a 'global' attack on Islam' only three respondents (out of 192) mentioned western attacks against Muslims in other countries."

It is clear, therefore, that it is internal factors which are driving the insurgency, even if it is strengthened by the availability of volunteers from the wider Islamic world.

However, the concerns of the population with regard to corruption within the government will not be easily addressed, in a situation in which corruption has been endemic to the governmental process in Afghanistan over many decades. The

determined efforts of the international community to build a professional police force will also face very considerable challenges, but the level of investment recently committed to this process at least gives some hope of a positive outcome.

Yet it is the presence of international military forces in Afghanistan which the international community can most easily influence. While there would appear to be a consensus that these forces should not remain indefinitely, with a deadline of the end of 2014 recently agreed for Afghan National Security Forces, to "lead and conduct military operations in all provinces"[7], there is also a strongly held view that the process of withdrawal should be carefully managed and be clearly linked to efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan army and the Afghan police.

There would also appear to be an acceptance, by the international military, that major military offensives tend to alienate the population more than they provide it with ambient security. Thus, in the light of experience earlier in the year in the district of Marjah, in Helmand Province, the previously planned offensive in Kandahar appears to have been replaced by a much more low key effort to build the capacity of the Afghan security forces within the city.

Therefore, if the international forces can reduce their operations to the point where they are barely visible to the population, the political space can be created through which Afghanistan's many actors can engage constructively with each other without a constant eye to their simultaneous engagement with the international community.

Such engagement will necessarily involve Afghanistan's neighbours. They have been key players for a very long time and any attempt by the international community to disregard their legitimate interests in Afghanistan, will risk having these competing interests acted out on Afghanistan's soil.

For Pakistan, the fear that India will build up sufficient influence with the Karzai Government to threaten its own security interests is a very real one. A political accommodation between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, would go some considerable way towards easing these fears, given the strong links which continue to exist, albeit covertly, between Pakistan and the Taliban. If Pakistan continues to feel paranoia over Indian influence, it will inevitably seek to fill any vacuum which a reduction in US involvement creates.

However, Pakistan's historical links with certain radical Islamic groups, including the Taliban, represent a source of potential instability within its own borders. The power of these groups is being greatly enhanced by the very dominant role which the US is playing in Afghanistan, by fears that it will seek to retain its military presence on Afghan soil and by the use of drones to target suspects in Pakistan.

While Afghanistan cannot avoid being caught up in the maelstrom which surrounds it, consciousness of global issues within the population… is very much secondary to internal concerns

The situation in Iran is also potentially explosive. Any armed intervention, by Israel or the US, against Iran could have a major radicalisation effect on Pakistan and the ripple effects of this are likely to be felt in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Iran has the potential to destabilise Afghanistan by supporting an insurgency from its own side of the border, and also by immediately expelling the million or so Afghans who continue to maintain a tenuous existence within the Iranian black economy.

It is thus the case that, while Afghanistan cannot avoid being caught up in the maelstrom which surrounds it, consciousness of global issues within the population at large is very much secondary to internal concerns. The international community must address these concerns if it is to secure anything resembling a face-saving exit from Afghanistan. Concrete outcomes, in this

regard, would include an early cessation of combat operations by the international military and a commitment, by the US, that it will not seek to retain its military bases in Afghanistan for any longer than is necessary to support its training role, with the Afghan army and police. Early attention will also need to be given to the continuing existence of US detention facilities on Afghan soil.

At the same time, the continuing failure of the US to address the Palestinian issue, as arguably the dominant pan-Islamic grievance, in a manner which has serious regard to the various UN resolutions on this question will continue to provide a justification for resources and volunteers to flow to the Taliban, from across the Islamic world including Islamic communities in Europe and North America, because their resistance to the US military presence in Afghanistan is viewed in pan-Islamic terms externally, even if it is not seen in such terms, to any great degree, internally.

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Islamophobia, Racism and the Far Right

*SABBY DHALU

One of the most concerning developments in international political and social relations over the last decade, has been the dramatic rise of Islamophobia and racism directed against Muslim communities. Furious international debates have been raging over the last few years about Muslim women's right to wear religious dress, offensive cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed and acts of terrorism committed by minority sections of the Muslim community used to negatively portray Islam and billions of Muslims around the world.

Islamophobia has provided the cutting edge of the growth in support of far right and fascist organisations across Europe. In Britain the British National Party (BNP) has polled the highest votes for a fascist organisation in British history and for over a year the English Defence League (EDL) has been demonstrating against Muslim communities and mosques, reminiscent of the National Front demonstrations against Black, Asian and immigrant communities in the 1970s. *One Society Many Cultures* is a new national campaign formed to combat the rise of Islamophobia and all manifestations of racism, and defend freedom of thought, conscience, religion and cultural expression.

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE

A Europe-wide campaign against a Muslim woman's right to wear the *Niqab* and *Burka* (face and full body veil) is advancing. In July this year, the lower house of the French Parliament voted for a ban on the *Niqab* and the legislation will be voted on in the Senate in September. The bill would make it illegal to wear garments such as the *Niqab* or *Burkas*, which incorporate a full-face veil, anywhere in public. It proposes fines of 150 Euros for women who break the law and 30,000 Euros and a one-year jail sentence for men who force their wives to wear the *Burka*.[1] A similar law was passed in the lower house of the Belgian Parliament in April, where those1 who break the law could face a fine of 15-25 Euros or a seven-day jail sentence.[2]

In June, the Mayor of Barcelona, Jordi Hereu announced a ban on the Niqab in municipal offices, public markets and libraries, but not the streets, which is due to take effect in Autumn this year.[3] In 2009, a referendum in Switzerland voted in favour of banning the construction of minarets.

FERTILE GROUND FOR FAR RIGHT AND FASCIST ORGANISATIONS ACROSS EUROPE

The growth of Islamophobia has provided fertile ground for the far right and fascist organisations, the most notable example being the Front National in France. Sarkozy's attacks on Muslim communities over the last three years have resurrected the Front National. In the 2007 Presidential elections, the FN's vote fell dramatically compared to the vote it received in 2002, when Le Pen pushed the Socialist Party's Leonel Jospin into second place. However in this year's regional elections, the FN received 12 per cent, a massive increase from the 6.8 per cent it mustered in the European elections last year and the 4.3 per cent Le Pen polled in the 2007 presidential vote.

There have been similar patterns in other European countries, where Islamophobia is leading to electoral victories for the extreme right. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders PVV polled 15.5 per cent giving it 24 seats. In Switzerland, the far right SVP/UDC was the largest party in the October 2007 elections.

BRITAIN AND THE RISE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

Although no such legislation has been

There are worrying signs of an increase in Islamophobia across British society

passed in the British Parliament, there are worrying signs of an increase in Islamophobia across British society. All mainstream political parties have opposed legislation banning the *Burka* or *Niqab*, but prior to May's General Election, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the BNP included a ban on the *Burka* in their election manifestos, and both far right parties polled a combined 1.5 million votes.

Since the vote in France, Britain is engaged in continuing discourse about whether the *Burka* or *Niqab*, should be banned. The Home Secretary Damian Green described such a move as "un-British". However Phillip Hollobone MP for Kettering has introduced a Private Members Bill seeking to ban the *Burka*, and has said that he would refuse to speak to a constituent wearing the *Niqab* visiting his surgery. Liberty has announced it would represent any of his constituents that he refuses to meet and warned him that the UK's Equality Act and the European convention on human rights (ECHR) oblige him to avoid discrimination. Since his ban would only affect Muslim women, it would also amount to indirect sex discrimination. Hollobone's bill is not likely to be passed, with government opposition, but the existence of such a bill alongside recent opinion polls, indicate growing Islamophobia.

A YouGov poll for Channel 5 showed that 67 per cent of respondents surveyed were in favour of a ban on the full face veil in Britain.[4] Of greater concern is an opinion poll that coincided with the launch of the "Inspired by Muhammad"[5] campaign, commissioned by the Exploring Islam Foundation[6], that showed 58 per cent said they associated Islam with extremism and 50 per cent with terrorism.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, RELIGION AND CULTURAL EXPRESSION UNDER ATTACK

Islamophobia must be vigorously opposed. It is a grotesque attack on the freedom of thought, religion and cultural expression of Muslims. Views once considered extreme or racist, are now becoming more widespread and are legitimising groups like the BNP and the EDL. Furthermore, it has provided a framework for broader attacks on the above rights, impacting on other visual symbols of religion.

The ideological justification for a ban on the *Burka*, is that it is 'liberating' Muslim women from a so-called oppressive religion, dominated by men. In reality such bans are an attack on freedom of thought, and indeed women's freedom to choose what they choose to wear. This goes against the classical ideas of liberalism and enlightenment upon which Western European states were built.

The foundations of liberalism and multiculturalism were outlined in one of the most famous political essays in British history. John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*:

"The sole end for which mankind are warranted ... in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection ... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a ... community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."

This, the formulation of liberalism, is frequently paraphrased as, 'You should be able to do anything you want to provided it does not interfere with others'.

Such liberal principles were hard won and are once again under attack and must be defended. The One Society Many Cultures campaign has been set up to campaign against Islamophobia and defends these freedoms.

THE GROWTH OF THE EDL AS A RESULT OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

One of the most extreme examples of the attack on such freedoms is the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL is an organised fascist movement with links to the BNP, Combat 18 and other such fascist organisations. Football hooligan groups like Casuals United are also linked to the EDL. The EDL is essentially an embryonic fascist pogrom movement and its sole aim is to intimidate Muslims and other minorities.

Whist the Muslim rights are under attack,

simultaneously the BNP and the EDL's rights of freedom of speech and expression are being defended. Griffin and others in the BNP have made numerous appearances on various media programmes attacking Muslims, Black and immigrant communities, even though Griffin was previously convicted for incitement to racial hatred. More shockingly the EDL have been allowed to 'demonstrate' on the streets.

Organisations like the EDL, the BNP and UKIP have benefited the most from the rise of Islamophobia. Although the BNP suffered a major defeat at this year's elections, it is still receiving more votes than any other fascist organisation in British history. UKIP and the BNP polled the fourth and fifth largest vote respectively, in this year's General Election. In the 2009 European elections, UKIP polled the third highest vote, pushing Labour into fourth place. The BNP also made its first ever national political breakthrough, by gaining two MEPs.

One of the most striking consequences of this breakthrough,has been the growth of the EDL. Fascists now feel emboldened to demonstrate on Britain's streets in ways not seen since the 1970s National Front demonstrations. Extreme double standards are taking root. For over a year the EDL has organised many demonstrations explicitly targeting mosques and Muslim communities. If there were demonstrations against churches and the Christian community, or synagogues and the Jewish communities, these would quite rightly be met with widespread condemnation and anger. Unfortunately, this has not been the response to the EDL.

Worse still, these demonstrations have been used by the EDL to riot and violently attack not only Muslims and mosques, but all ethnic minority communities. At both demonstrations in Dudley, the EDL broke through police lines and went on to attack a Mosque, Gurdwara (Sikh temple) and Hindu temple. They smashed windows of Asian businesses and intimidated the communities. Like most fascist organisations before it, although the EDL is against all minority ethnic communities, it focuses its attack on the particular form of prejudice that chimes with what is encouraged in the media and by some politicians - Islamophobia.

Politicians… have failed to instruct or apply pressure on the police to ban demonstrations, and in some cases have made concessions welcomed by the EDL

Similar events took place in Stoke, where even a police officer was violently attacked. An EDL member was sentenced to eighteen months in prison following this attack. Such events have not been reported widely in the media. Instead the media has focussed its attack on Muslims and Islam. Research such as *Muslims Under Siege* by Peter Oborne and James Jones[7] and *Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime* by Dr Robert Lambert[8], show how negative media coverage has encouraged violent attacks on Muslims and have helped give legitimacy to far right and fascist groups.

Those that have the power are refusing to take action against the EDL. The police have powers under the Public Order Act to ban demonstrations – either marches or static assemblies – if there is a clear danger to public order and safety. The police have a wealth of evidence indicating exactly this in relation to the EDL, except for two demonstration in Luton (2009) and Bradford (August 2010), EDL demonstrations have not been banned.

Politicians – national and local government – have failed to instruct or apply pressure on the police to ban demonstrations, and in some cases have made concessions welcomed by the EDL. For example, the EDL called a demonstration outside Wembley Arena against a conference which was to host Zakir Naik, a prominent Indian Imam The Home Secretary, Theresa May, in response to this, instead of using her powers to instruct the police to take action against the EDL, banned Zakir Naik from entering the country. Subsequently, the EDL called off their demonstration, claiming victory. Earlier

this year the previous Home Secretary Alan Johnson reversed a ban on Geert Wilders entering Britain, allowing him to present his hatefield and Islamophobic film *Fitna* at the House of Lords. Simultaneously, the EDL were given permission to march to Parliament celebrating Wilders's entry to the country.

Similarly, a *UK Islamic Conference* in Tower Hamlets was cancelled after the EDL called a demonstration. This was after the council issued a statement calling for the cancellation of the conference. The EDL called off its demonstration, again claiming victory. In reality the EDL's target was not the conference that was due to take place, but a front to the biggest concentration of Muslim communities in Britain, notably Whitechapel and The East London Mosque. This is indicated by the EDL's numerous impromptu visits to Whitechapel, which resulted in violence against the local Muslim community, even after they had cancelled their planned demonstration.

These examples show that Islamophobia is so endemic in society that those with power are willing to take action such as imposing bans on the Muslim community – when there is no danger to the public – but aren't willing to take the same action against fascist groups, when they actually represent a clear danger, not just to the public but even the police in some cases.

> If there is no organised response to the EDL, then there will be disorganised response [and potential] violence which the EDL are ultimately seeking.

Following the BNP's breakthrough in the European elections in June 2009, in addition to the emergence of the EDL, many serious violent attacks on Muslims have occurred. These have included a gang attack, including stabbings in November 2009 on Muslim students at City University who were leaving a prayer room. The murder in September 2009 of a Muslim pensioner, Ikram Syed ul-Haq; an arson attack in June 2009 on Greenwich Islamic Centre and an attack on a woman wearing a Hijab in Rochdale who was almost blinded by a supporter of the BNP.

EDL'S BRADFORD DEMO

The EDL scheduled another demonstration in Bradford on Saturday 28 August. This was recently banned but the EDL still plan to go ahead with a static protest. This is extremely provocative as Bradford is one of the most multicultural cities in Britain with a large Muslim population. Bradford was also the scene of riots in 2001 provoked by the far right and fascists, which triggered the BNP's electoral rise. UAF, along with local communities, is organising the *"We Are Bradford"* event celebrating the diversity and multiculturalism in Bradford. Voicing opposition to the EDL, when they demonstrate, is important for two reasons. Firstly, if the EDL demonstrate without any opposition, they are more likely to return to these communities. This is a dangerous precedent to set. Secondly a peaceful, organised event reduces the possibility of violence and confrontation, as it allows people to voice opposition to the EDL in a constructive way. If there is no organised event in response to the EDL, then there will be a disorganised response from the many angered by the EDL's presence. Such a scenario is more difficult to police and can lead to violence and unnecessary confrontation, which the EDL are ultimately seeking.

CHALLENGING THE ELECTORAL THREAT OF THE FAR RIGHT

In addition to campaigning against the EDL, UAF will be continuing the electoral campaign against the BNP. Although the BNP was defeated in this year's elections, they still represent an electoral threat. We have already seen the major impact of the election of 2 MEPs to the European Parliament, with increased media coverage of the BNP, the rise of the EDL and violent racist and Islamophobic attacks. Therefore, continuing the campaign against the EDL is a priority.

The next set of major elections will be the 2011 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections. In the previous elections the BNP's vote increased by ten-fold in the Scottish Parliament and they marginally missed being elected to the Welsh Assembly. There will also be local elections in the Metropolitan boroughs. UAF will be organising rallies around the country in target areas, through leafleting and other campaigning activities.

ONE SOCIETY MANY CULTURES

The aim in Britain must be to prevent what has happened in other European countries, both in terms of significant electoral breakthroughs by the far right and fascist organisations and through an advance of Islamophobia. Such Islamophobia is reflected in the rising hostility to Muslim communities, the branding of all Muslims as 'extremists', campaigns against the building of mosques, the banning of religious dress, the construction of minarets and so on.

The One Society Many Cultures campaign brings together Muslim communities, with other faiths and communities. It believes that a movement opposing Islamophobia must ensure that the Muslim communities are at the centre of it – those who are most under attack must have the clearest voices in how to resist these attacks. They must also be supported by other faith groups, the labour movement, politicians from all parties, civil libertarians and all those of goodwill, who defend the values of our multicultural and diverse society.

In addition to campaigning against Islamophobia, defending the freedom of religion and cultural expression, the campaign will assert the benefits of a society where every one is free to express their faith and culture how they choose, socially, economically and politically.

*Sabby Dhalu has been Joint Secretary of Unite Against Fascism since the campaign started in 2003, and an active campaigner against racism with the National Assembly Against Racism for 10 years. She serves as the Secretary of One Society Many Cultures coalition.

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The Study of Terrorism: A New Approach

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The study of political terrorism is today one of the fastest growing areas of academic research in the world, producing literally thousands of new publications annually, as well as new study programmes, research projects, PhD theses, research institutes, think-tanks, conferences, and other academic activities. As a sub-field of academic research, the study of terrorism has its origins in the late 1960s. However, it was the events of 11 September 2001, followed by the terrorist attacks in Bali, Madrid and London that really galvanised the contemporary study of political terrorism and animated a whole new generation of scholars.

Along with its growth, it has emerged as a politically important field of research because a number of terrorism scholars have direct and regular access to policymakers and their research informs the way in which governments formulate counter-terrorism policies.

Political terrorism [study] is today one of the fastest growing areas of academic research in the world.

As reviews have consistently shown over the years,[1] however, the terrorism studies field is beset with a number of problems and challenges. *Firstly*, there has been a failure within the field to develop rigorous theories or even to agree on a definition or set of identifying criteria for the field's primary concept. There are currently over two hundred different definitions of 'terrorism' used in the literature, and many more used by different governments. Clearly, it is a challenge to produce reliable research when there is no agreement on the nature of the subject being studied.

Secondly, terrorism is treated by many scholars as an objective, stable phenomenon that can be easily studied using traditional social scientific methods, rather than an ideologically loaded and controversial term which depends on the perspectives of the researcher.

Third, there has been a noticeable over-reliance on secondary sources and a frequent failure to undertake primary research in terrorism research, particularly in terms of face-to-face engagement with individuals and groups named as 'terrorists'. The fact is the vast majority of 'terrorism experts' have never met a terrorist or conducted research among groups who support violent struggle. Further, a great many terrorism scholars rely on official sources of information about terrorism without questioning whether they are being fed propaganda designed to advance a particular political agenda.

Fourth, there is a failure to appreciate the cultural-ideological biases inherent to Western academic and political discourses of terrorism, and the way it tends to follow the priorities of governments. This has led some commentators to describe much Western terrorism research as 'counter-insurgency masquerading as political science'.[2] In other words, the field sometimes functions as a direct source of support for state counter-terrorism efforts.

Fifth, there is in the literature a restricted set of specific research topics that scholars tend to study. Most studies focus on non-state forms of terrorism and ignore state terrorism, for example, and today a great deal of research is focused on so-called 'Islamic' or 'Islamist terrorism'. *Finally*, the field is characterised by a large number of new scholars who lack adequate grounding in the extensive existing literature on

the wider study of political violence and social movements, and who tend to treat the current terrorist threat facing certain Western states as unprecedented, highly threatening and exceptional.

Terrorism research… tends to reinforce and reproduce (rather than challenge) many of the dominant myths about terrorism.

Moreover, some critically-minded scholars argue that the field must face up to a number of specific political and normative problems. For example, it is a fact that there is in much contemporary terrorism research a strong ideological bias, including a tendency to focus on groups and states with which Western states are currently opposed to, and a tendency to prioritise research topics tailored to the demands of policy-makers for practically useful knowledge in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, there is a simultaneous failure to study the terrorism practiced by Western states and their allies, or the political violence experienced in the developing world.

Much of the terrorism research also tends to reinforce and reproduce (rather than challenge) many of the dominant myths about terrorism put forward by the state and the popular media, including the myths that terrorism poses a major threat to international security, that terrorism is caused by religious extremism, and that terrorists are mentally unstable. Many terrorism scholars also fail to appreciate and reflect upon the politics of labelling in regards to 'terrorism' or to consider the real-world consequences of terrorism research for particular communities and individuals. Conducting terrorism research on Muslim communities, for example, can reinforce the notion of Muslims as a 'suspect community' in the mind of politicians and the wider public, which then has serious social consequences for individuals in that community.

It is in this context that I and a growing number of colleagues have argued that we need a distinctly 'critical' approach to the study of terrorism, as a way of overcoming many of these weaknesses and challenges in the traditional field. What we have called 'critical terrorism studies' (CTS) has been discussed in detail elsewhere,[3] especially our new book entitled *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*.[4] . Some its main commitments and attitudes are as follows. *First*, we believe that terrorism researchers need to maintain an acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling and take extreme care in using the term during any research. Simply following this rule would, we believe, alleviate a great many problems with contemporary terrorism research. *Second*, we argue that there must be an acceptance that 'terrorism' is primarily a label for certain kinds of political violence, and not a hard fact or an objective phenomenon. This means that who or what counts as 'terrorism' can change over time and place according to political and cultural perspectives. A former 'terrorist' such as Nelson Mandela, for example, can later go on to become a Nobel Peace Prize winner. *Third*, we believe terrorism scholars need to make a strong commitment to transparency regarding their values and political standpoints, particularly as they relate to the geo-political interests and values of the states they work in. This means recognising that terrorism research does not occur in a vacuum, nor can it be conducted completely objectively. Rather, it is always deeply embedded within the politics and struggles of its own society.

Fourth, we believe that terrorism researchers should be willing to expand the focus of their research to include topics often ignored by scholars, such as the use of terrorism by states, gender dimensions of terrorism, the impact of counter-terrorism on communities, historical lessons of previous terrorism campaigns, and the political reasons which drive violence – among others. *Fifth*, we argue for scholarly adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various users of terrorism research, including the 'suspect

communities' from which terrorists often emerge and the populations who bear the brunt of counter-terrorism policies. Related to this, we believe in the value of primary research, especially in terms of being willing to 'talk to terrorists' and their supporters to discover what they are struggling for or against. *Finally*, we are committed to the promotion of normative values and the improvement of human security over the prioritisation of narrow ideas of national security.

We believe that these kinds of commitments make CTS very different from most traditional approaches to the study of terrorism, and they go beyond the simple call for better research. They are also crucial for trying to influence policymakers into taking a more responsible approach to devising counter-terrorism policies.

The call for the establishment of a new more 'critical' kind of terrorism studies is a self-conscious and deliberate attempt to try and overcome some of the problems that have been noted about the broader field of terrorism studies, and to attract scholars who study terrorism but are uncomfortable associating with a field that has historically been closely aligned with the state. In addition to our new book, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, we have also initiated a number of other important activities. First, we have convened a new Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group (CSTWG) within the British International Studies Association (BISA).[5] The intention of the working group is to establish an international network of critically-oriented terrorism scholars, to generate and coordinate new kinds of research activities, and to organise papers and panels for conferences. In terms of teaching, a number of openly 'critical' terrorism studies modules and programmes have been established at Aberystwyth University, the University of Kent at Canterbury, the University of Manchester, and elsewhere.

Perhaps most importantly, in early 2007 we launched a new peer-reviewed academic journal entitled *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.[6] The aim of the journal is to provide a focal point for the publication of explicitly 'critical' research on terrorism, to provide a forum in which critical and orthodox accounts of terrorism can engage in respectful debate, and to review and influence developments in the wider field of research.

The arrival of critical terrorism studies heralds an exciting new era in terrorism research.

In conclusion, we believe that the arrival of critical terrorism studies heralds an exciting new era in terrorism research which opens up the possibility for new kinds of approaches and questions to this controversial subject. A crucial remaining question however, is whether the growing plurality of perspectives within the field will be reflected in the kinds of advice given to counter-terrorism policymakers. Will they listen to the new insights provided by critically-oriented scholars or will they continue to rely on experts and scholars wedded to the traditional field? The outcome could be critical to the future stability of societies affected by political violence.

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ENDNOTES

1 Some of the best reviews of the terrorism studies field which discuss these problems and challenges include: Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature, Oxford: North Holland; Herman, E. and O'Sullivan, G. (1989) The 'Terrorism' Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terror, New York: Pantheon Books; George, A. (ed.), (1991) Western State Terrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press; Zulaika, J. and Douglass, W. (1996) Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism, London: Routledge; Silke, A. (ed.), (2004). Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, London: Frank Cass; and Ranstorp, M. (ed.), (2006). Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction,

London: Routledge.
2 Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature, Oxford: North Holland, p. 182.
3 See Gunning, J. (2007). 'The Case for a Critical Terrorism Studies?', Government & Opposition, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 363-94; Jackson, R. (2007). 'The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies', European Political Science, vol. 6, no.3, pp. 244-51.
4 Jackson, R., Breen Smyth, M., and Gunning, (eds.), (2009). Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, London: Routledge.
5 The working group's website can be accessed at: http://www.bisa.ac.uk/groups/7/index.asp.
6 The journal's website and the contents of the first issue can be viewed at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=g791259001~db=all.





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
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