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# HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

## ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

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## One year after – a reflection on the causes of the post-election violence and the state of democracy in Kenya

### *Introduction*

One year after the signing of National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement (NARA)<sup>1</sup>, I find myself reflecting on what the year meant with regard to building a stable democracy in Kenya. The post-election violence that was triggered by the announcement of the disputed presidential election results was the most widespread, destructive, and dangerous that the country had ever faced. Official records show that over 1500 people lost their lives and over 350,000 were internally displaced due to the wave of violence. The severity, spontaneity, scale, and scope of the violence revealed that the disputed election results were more the trigger than the cause of the conflict.

### *The National Accord and instituting a “negotiated democracy”*

Following the disputed presidential polls and the violence that ensued, efforts were made to find a political solution to the crisis that was supposed to stabilize the country. The most significant attempt was the mediation effort, which was brokered by the *Panel of Eminent Personalities*, led by Dr. Kofi Annan, under the auspices of the African Union (AU) that resulted in the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement (NARA) on 28 February 2008. Kenya’s 10<sup>th</sup> parliament enacted the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008) and simultaneously revised the Constitution of Kenya in order to entrench the Act. The Agreement also “stipulated the need to convene commissions of inquiry to assess the electoral process and to investigate the post-electoral violence.”<sup>2</sup>

1 Kenya Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (NARA), 28 February 2008, preamble.

2 Tim Murithi, Kenya – A year after the crisis: The Quest for Electoral Reform and Transitional Justice, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), January 2009, p. 2. (accessible at: [www.issafrika.org/dynamic/administration/file\\_manager/file\\_links/SITREPKENYA160109.PDF?link\\_id=14&slink\\_id=7161&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.issafrika.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/SITREPKENYA160109.PDF?link_id=14&slink_id=7161&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3))

The National Accord led to the cessation of violence, the attempt to resettle the displaced Kenyans and highlighted the need to deal with long-term issues such as finding truth and reconciliation through a commission, and the need for a comprehensive review of the Kenyan constitution. The most significant outcome of the mediation was the so-called *negotiated democracy* that saw all major political rivals forming and joining in to what is today known as the Grand Coalition Government. The Orange Democratic Party of Kenya (ODM-K), joined the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in forming the Government of National Unity or the Grand Coalition Government. While the PNU leader Mwai Kibaki retained the presidency and ODM leader Raila Odinga became Prime Minister, the ODMK leader Kalonzo Musyoka became vice president. The Grand Coalition Government has 42 cabinet members, which makes it probably the largest government in the world.

The concept of negotiated democracy involves international mediation that is engineered to end a post-election crisis resulting from a failed and/or corrupted electoral process. This emergent phenomenon is characterised by a situation where incumbents manipulate the electoral systems in their favour because of having lost the elections, and thereby trigger a political crisis. As a solution to the political crisis, a power arrangement deal is brokered with the incumbent retaining most executive power. So far, Kenya and Zimbabwe are the two countries in Africa that are experimenting with this model. The model of negotiated democracy is dangerous. It is anti-democratic as it undermines electoral democracy and thus weakens institutions related to the same. Additionally, this system of government is one that weakens the credibility and the legitimacy of the rulers. In a democracy, rulers are supposed to derive their authority directly from the people. However, within the negotiated democracy model power is negotiated in the boardroom and does not derive from the people. Significantly, this emergent model is also expensive and fraught with corruption. For Kenya, the outcome of this model is a bloated government composed of 42 cabinet ministers and a dual executive seemingly incapable of instituting reforms.

#### *Causes of the post-election violence*

Critical underlying factors for the Kenyan post-election violence were unresolved historical injustices with regards to land ownership that successive Kenyan regimes not only failed to address, but exacerbated for political reasons. In Kenya, land remains a very sensitive and emotive issue. Many of the 42 ethnic communities view land from a cultural and social perspective. Land defines communities' identity and power. Furthermore, land is not just an economic resource but a deeply held and revered cultural gem and heritage. It is from a given geographical land that a community delineates its boundary. Thus, it is common for land in Kenya to be regarded as ancestral. Yet, since independence, many communities have migrated beyond what was and has been perceived as their ancestral land. For instance, the largest ethnic community, the Kikuyu, has migrated from its traditional homeland of the Central province to other areas such as the Rift Valley, Coast, and Western provinces. Due to being close to the political power of the founding father Kenyatta, the Kikuyus migrated to other community's territory, purchased land, or were allocated land by the government. This created a sense of animosity between the Kikuyu and 'original' occupants of the land in these areas. This dynamic was further exacerbated by the ensuing Moi-Government that also promoted unfair distribution of land. In this case, Kalenjin leaders were among the major beneficiaries. Though every election campaign underlined the need for addressing the land issues through a comprehensive policy, this never materialized. This had the effect that at local level inter-communal animosity grew and the gap between the different communities in the Rift Valley continued to deepen over the years. The disputed presidential elections of 2007 triggered violence as a consequence of many

years of unresolved anger and resentment amongst communities living side by side in especially the Rift Valley.

Secondly, the post-election violence revealed the weakness of state formation. While Kenya had been perceived as a strong democratizing country, its institutions of governance remained in fact weak, fragmented, corrupt, and unable to deal with underlying causes of conflict and the emerging violence. Successive Kenyan regimes politicized state institutions and used the various offices as political tools for maintaining a system of patronage. The corruption at highest level of governance created a political, economic, and social barrier between the citizens and their rulers. In the post-election violence, it became clear that citizens refused to recognize the state institutions and legal mechanism for addressing their differences and instead decided to demonstrate their anger by attacking the state and its apparatus. Anger was significantly directed at the state and its symbols.

Thirdly, the post-election violence was part of a conflict between politicians played at both national and local level. At the national level, the different political antagonist, most importantly the PNU and its main competitor ODM disagreed, which was manifested in various political statements and exchanges at the national level. At local level, the conflict was fought more violently, more physically and with deadly weapons. Rival political groups evicted their perceived rivals from their homes, properties were set ablaze, and many were killed in the aftermath. Battles for political supremacy in various parts of the country followed.

*One year after the post-election violence – How have the causes and consequences been addressed?*

With regard to the direct victims of the post-election violence, the government is yet to fully resettle the over 350,000 externally and internally displaced Kenyans. The government started the project called *Operation Rudi Nyumbani* (literally meaning *Operation Go Home*); which did not take into account regional and international instruments that Kenya has committed itself to.<sup>3</sup> According to the Kenya Human Rights Report, the operation disregarded profiling of the IDPs and equally ignored other interventions especially by the non-state actors who were working to assist the IDPs.<sup>4</sup> One year after the post-election violence, the reality is that *Operation Rudi Nyumbani* is yet to be successfully completed as many IDP camps continue to exist in parts of the Rift Valley province with most IDPs now residing in so-called transit camps (that were set up by the Government in order to hold IDPs before final resettlement).

The form and substance of Kenya's politics is largely characterised by ethnic consideration, patronage and occasional anarchy. Political power competition is strictly determined by ethnicity and not ideology or the majoritarian principle. Politics finds its expression through ethnic codification and language. Ethnicity is the tool that is used for recruiting, mobilizing, strategizing, planning, and executing political matters in the country. Over the years, this phenomenon has essentially weakened the national fabric. Elections have often served to advance the ethnic polarization in the country. The 2007 elections were held in an atmosphere of deepened ethnic schism with many political parties recruiting their membership along strict ethnic considerations. One year after the post-election violence, the Grand Coalition Government is yet to address this problem comprehensively. While the National Accord sets as one of the agendas the need for a comprehensive attention to ethnic divisions and national healing. This process has yet to be operationalised. As a first step, the Government set up a department within the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs. The

<sup>3</sup> See Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Cultural Rights. See also Article 14(h) of Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

<sup>4</sup> Kenya National Human Rights Commission, Bi-Annual Human Rights Report. Vol. 9, No. 2, 2007, pp.7-43.

implementation of tangible activities is however yet to be realized. The ministry has been preoccupied with legal and constitutional matters and has not dealt with other, but equally urgent matters for the promotion of national healing and reconciliation. However, different non-state actors in form of civil society organisations, religious group, and the media have been engaged in efforts aimed at promoting healing and reconciliation amongst communities. For instance, Peacenet – a Kenyan national umbrella organisation of NGOs, Community-based organisations (CBOs), religious organisations and individuals in peacebuilding and conflict resolution – has been engaged in peacebuilding and conflict transformation activities through its network across the Rift Valley. Nevertheless, the political space continues to be littered with occasional ethnically expressed prejudices. Salient to the lack of national reconciliation is the nepotism and corruption that over the years has equally been expressed through ethnicity. The Grand Coalition Government has not engaged in promoting a national image with regard to hiring and posting of top positions in the Government. The reality is that positions of power have been divided along ethnic regions and strongholds.

While Kenyans demonstrated faith in the democratic electoral process by registering as voters in large numbers and indeed, by turning out to vote in equally large numbers, many voters remain disillusioned with the result and hold the view that the election was stolen. The mangled manner in which the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) managed the elections was best captured by the Independent Review Commission (IREC). The IREC report indicted ECK and called for the total overhaul of the entire election process and machinery. The IREC Report findings declared the Kenya voter register as “materially defective” in a way that effectively impaired “the integrity of elections results.”<sup>5</sup> Crucially, the IREC Report noted that in the strongholds of ODM as well as PNU implausibly high voter turnouts occurred.<sup>6</sup> As Tim Murithi observes, the IREC Report accused the ECK of incompetence and dereliction of duty in the conduct of the presidential poll. The report argued that, in effect, this made the continued existence of the ECK untenable.<sup>7</sup>

One year after the signing of the NARA, the ECK has been disbanded through requisite constitutional amendment. In its place, plans are underway for the installation of an interim Independent Election Commission. Simultaneously, in the last year, the public has shown very little confidence in the institutions of governance such as the police and internal security apparatus that derive their authority from the office of the presidency. A survey conducted by the South Consulting firm in the framework of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project between 17 and 24 December 2008 shows that 70 per cent of Kenyans believe the political, social and economic situation in the country has become worse after the elections. Also, while in 2007 36 per cent of respondents believed that life was better, now a paltry 12 per cent are of the opinion that things are shaping up for the better. The report adds that the “public perception of the government commitment to implementing reforms is as low as 30 per cent.”<sup>8</sup>

Besides persistent mistrust, power struggles and petty politics, the Grand Coalition has been characterized by significant corruption scandals such as the controversial sale of the former Grand Regency Hotel to a Libyan firm by the Central Bank of Kenya; the scandal at the Kenya Pipeline Company, and the sale of maize from Government reserves to politically connected individuals at the height of famine and starvation. The evidence available shows the snowballing of corruption,

5 Ibid p. 8

6 Government of Kenya, Report of the Independent Review Commission (IREC-The Krieger Commission), p.3.

7 See Murithi (op.cit.), p. 5.

8 South Consulting, Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project Report ([www.dialoguekenya.org](http://www.dialoguekenya.org)).

spreading and engulfing every sector in the Government. The current corruption has present and historical causes. The reality is that the Grand Coalition is composed of members who served under the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party that ruled the country since independence in 1963. Most of these former KANU members perfected corruption under the Moi regime (1978-2002). Another factor that contributes to the snowballing of corruption within the grand coalition is the continued absence of a divide between politicians with power and politicians in business. Politics in Kenya has historically been the vehicle for wealth accumulation. The fusion between business and politics breeds corruption of a grand scale.

The post-election violence, however, also motivated very few positive change processes. First, it increased the momentum for the need for reviewing the country's constitution. The relevant constitutional amendments were passed by parliament in 2008, which was setting the stage for an eventual review and possibly enactment of a new constitution for the country. Second, it led to a negotiated democracy that has institutionalized power sharing as a possible antidote for weak democracies like Kenya. The critique towards the model of negotiated democracy has been summarised earlier in this article. Nevertheless, the positive element of this model of governance is its semblance of inclusiveness. The Grand Coalition is curved along ethnic consideration as much as political power bargaining amongst the political elites. This situation has contributed to some modicum of stability in the otherwise fragile and weakened Kenyan state. The formation of the Grand Coalition suggests an emergent political reality that opens the opportunity that Kenya will be ruled by coalitions and thereby could eliminate the culture of the 'winner takes it all'.

Third, it led to the passage of significant pieces of legislation especially dealing with national reconciliation, though they have yet to be filled with substance through implementation. Fourth, it heightened the need for dealing with historical issues and injustices thus importing national reconciliation as strategy for governance. A Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation commission (TJRC) will be instituted in 2009 and deal with historical injustices and the culture of impunity. Lastly, the performance and weakness of government and its institution of governance has become a focus as result of the conflict. Institutions such as the disgraced ECK have since been disbanded and there is debate about the need for reforms in the security sector.

#### *Concluding remarks*

As Kenyans commemorate the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement (NARA), it is clear that the return to peace, stability, and firm foundations for democracy is yet to be obtained. The violent confrontation witnessed after the disputed presidential polls in the country echo the communal but small-scale violence that also characterised the multi-party elections of 1992, 1997, and 2002. One year after the signing of the National Accord and the subsequent formation of the Grand Coalition Government, it is obvious that the country is yet to move back in to the 'narrow path' of democratic trajectory. The 2007 violent confrontations show that there is need to establish democratic institutions capable of managing ethnic cleavages and their instrumentalisation as a tool in the quest for political power.<sup>9</sup> There is a need to enact a new constitution that will create a new model of governance and state institutions that are committed to the universal democratic principles of rule of law and respect for human rights for all.<sup>10</sup> The implementation of the recommendations of the IREC and Waki Report should equally be accelerated. The Parliament should put in place necessary legal and

<sup>9</sup> See here David Throup and Charles Hornsby, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya*, Oxford: James Currey, 1998.

<sup>10</sup> See the Draft Bomas Constitution of Kenya.

constitutional statutes that will secure the country's return to democratisation along the recommendations contained in both IREC and Waki Reports. The advancing ethnic polarization and runaway corruption can only serve to further endanger an already weakened and fragile state. Undoubtedly, the implementation of political, legal, and constitutional reforms needs a bi-partisan political will. The political class in the Grand Coalition now has the opportunity to demonstrate political maturity and visionary leadership.

*Isaack Otieno*

*is a political scientist and democratic governance expert. Mr. Otieno writes on comparative politics and governance issues in the East and Central African region. He is reachable at [iotieno@gmail.com](mailto:iotieno@gmail.com).*

## **Human rights and gender equity in the context of the churches – a reflection**

In the 20th century, humanity paid dearly for a policy of silence in the face of genocide. In 1948 the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and with it a torrent of norms, processes, and institutions to define, promote, and protect human rights. There are four main pillars of the declaration: dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The document begins by affirming that human beings, “born free and equal in dignity and rights,” are entitled to human rights “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”<sup>11</sup>

By proclaiming that all human beings should act toward one another in the spirit of brotherhood, the first article of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights invokes the perennial Biblical injunction ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’ and ‘Love the stranger as you love yourself’ (Leviticus 19:18-33). One may go further to assert that some of the basic foundations of human rights are biblical and derivable from the ten commandments, for example, thou shall not murder is the right to life, thou shall not steal is the right to property etc. If human beings are created in the image and likeness of God then the fate of human life is intrinsic to the very being of God (Genesis 9:6). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins by affirming the dignity and sanctity of the human person i.e. “the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women.”<sup>12</sup> The sanctity of the human person presupposes that any causes for the sake of restoration and sustenance of their dignity are essentially a spiritual concern.

The notion of equality of men and women before God may seem obvious, yet in many societies women are not considered to share the same personhood as the male gender. In these societies, the dominant belief is that women are inferior to men, and women must always submit. Women are also denied leadership on the basis of the assumption that a woman cannot lead men, but only other women and children. It is for this reasons that women are often treated like perpetual minors. The dangerous part is that women themselves have internalised their oppression and accepted it as coming from God. Therefore, in some cases, women oppress other women and oppose those women who seek the liberation of other women. In spite of this, the existence of church women organisations in Africa is a symbol of solidarity among women. These organisations need to transform, so that they can become a mouthpiece on women's issues in the church and the wider society.

11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1 and 2.

12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble.

The human cry for rights in Africa is essentially the cry for survival amid the struggles for the dignity of African women. Gender equity, women's rights, gender mainstreaming; these are by no means new terms, nor are the international laws, declarations, platforms and mechanisms that mandate respect, protection and fulfilment of all human rights of all women worldwide. Nevertheless, the reality is that millions of girls and women today remain in cultural exclusion, abject poverty, systemic violence and discrimination as well as other fundamental violations of their human rights. In many spheres, systems, structures and institutions of power, decision-making remains intrinsically patriarchal. Transforming the rhetoric of human rights into realities for women remains a critical issue for the churches today. Denied access to and ownership of property, sexual abuse and domestic violence, harmful traditional cultural beliefs, and discrimination in education, particularly in conflict and informal settlement areas are but a few of the pressing matters facing women. Many struggle relentlessly within the women's movement for gender equity, fighting to ensure that the voices that come from the ground are heard all over the continent. They and others engage multiple strategies to negotiate or wrest power from the powerful in order to secure women's access to and ownership of resources, services, opportunities and social, economic, political and cultural spaces. Research has yet to show how in the early days of the missionary movement the churches may, while being agents of European modernisation i.e. through the establishment of education institutions in rural Africa, also have entrenched further "gender" differentiation policies of the colonial state. Today, the issue of mainstreaming gender equity at all levels of the institutional life of the church still remains on the level of rhetoric and pulpit proclamations. Actions derived from coherent policy positions are however lacking.

Violence against women takes many different forms and can be emotional, physical, psychological and economic. In most cases, it is closely linked with gender inequalities, which deny women control over their bodies, leadership and economic power. In the HIV/AIDS era, violence against women hampers both HIV/AIDS prevention and provision of quality care to the infected. Sexual activities that are violent increase infection rates since the chance of bodily tearing is high. Further, in violent relationships women are often not able to insist on safer sex, or even abstinence. The context of HIV/AIDS in itself has increased violence against young women, since the girl child is targeted for rape by older men who believe they are less likely to be infected, and by HIV positive men who want to cleanse themselves of the virus. "Women in stable relationships often find themselves blamed for bringing HIV/AIDS home and for witchcraft after the death of their spouses. They are dispossessed at the death of their spouses, forcing some to turn to sex work. In many cultures, violence against women is tolerated in different ways. Some cultures think it is acceptable that husbands physically discipline their wives or partners. Some cultural perspectives lead friends and relatives to counsel abused women to endure and tolerate the violence. Church ministers ask abused women to forgive, make peace and submit to their abusing partners. Some countries maintain and perpetuate violence against women."<sup>13</sup> Here one recalls Dr Agnes Abuom's biblical reflection<sup>14</sup> when she shared a story about the beads she was wearing that were made by women captured in slavery. The woman in question had a name meaning "I am beautiful", but was molested and abused and then married again to one of the soldiers in a camp. The story shows how the aesthetics of gender leads to feminisation of a criminal act. And the scriptures are full of such incidences in which the rape of women is justified

13 Dube Musa (ed.), *Africa Praying. A handbook on HIV/AIDS sensitive Sermons Guidelines and Liturgy*, WCC Publication, 2004, p. 228.

14 Dr Agnes Abuom is the WCC ecumenical companion for Africa. She shared this story during the Ecumenical consultation on Human Rights and Theology at the AACC in August 2007.

on the basis of the aesthetics of the female body. The questions we therefore need to address is: How do we mainstream gender in the church with new theological insights that will transform the consciousness of the church leadership? This can only be done by transforming the decision-making institutions and governance structures within the churches based on an inclusive and well-articulated feminist theology.

*Nicholas Otieno*

*is an ecumenist with extensive work experience as a consultant for the World Council of Churches (Special Focus on Africa and the All Africa Conference of Churches). (Nicholas.otieno@aya.yale.edu or cric\_africa@yahoo.com)*

## NEWS AND EVENTS

### KENYA

#### **Religious leaders unite and criticise government on day of national prayers**

On 19 February, Kenyan religious leaders of different faiths assembled for a national prayer day at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre. The prayers were organised by the Inter-Religious Forum of Kenya, a platform bringing together several Christian denominations, the Muslim community and representatives of Hindu believers. The religious leaders – among them Abdulgafur Al-Busaidy (Chairperson of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims), Rev. Peter Karanja (General Secretary of Kenya’s National Council of Churches) and Mr. Rashim Chitnis (Hindu Council of Kenya) – criticised Kenya’s political leaders and urged them: “You must change your ways. (...) Repent and seek justice and prosperity for all people.”

Further, they called upon President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga “to take responsibility for the status of nation. We urge you to take charge and restore the dignity and unity, equity and justice for all people of Kenya. We pray that God will help you to lead Kenya to overcome the challenges facing our nation with courage and devotion.”

*Adapted from Ecumenical News International (ENI), Catholic Information Service for Africa (CISA), Inter-Religious Forum Kenya (Message from the Religious Leaders, 19 February 2009)*

### SOMALIA

#### **“Unity Government” and parliament return, fresh fighting in Mogadishu**

A new and more inclusive Somali cabinet was formed and approved by the Somali Parliament in Djibouti in February. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake as Prime Minister. He is the son of one of Somalia’s first presidents that was assassinated in 1969 and belongs to the Daarood clan. The new Prime Minister named 36 cabinet ministers distributed along Somali clans using the 4.5 power-sharing formula.

While President Sheikh Sharif, cabinet ministers and members of Parliament returned to Mogadishu, fresh fighting occurred in the Somali capital in the end of February, leading to numerous deaths and wounding many. The Hodan district of Mogadishu was at the epicenter of the clashes between Islamist forces and government soldiers. It was the most intense fighting since the withdrawal of

Ethiopian troops in January. Different Islamist factions merged earlier in February and vowed to fight Somalia's new unity government led by Sheikh Sharif. The new group's name is Hisbi Islam ("Islamic Party") and consists of four groups: the Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys faction of the Islamic Court Union, Jabhatul Islamiya ("Islamic Front"), Mu'askar Ras, and Anole.

Sheikh Bashiir Ahmed Salad, the chairman of the newly formed Council of Islamic Clerics, called on the warring parties to stop the fighting. This call was echoed by the chairmen of the Hawiye traditional elders, Mohamed Hassan Haad. The Council of Islamic Clerics also condemned the suicide bomb attacks on AMISOM on 22 February that claimed the lives of 11 Burundian peacekeepers. *Adapted from Shabelle, Garowe online, Al Jazeera*

### **Somaliland: election date postponed**

Radio Garowe reported on 23 February that Somaliland's elections have been postponed. Mr. Jama Mohamed "Sweden," the chairman of Somaliland's Election Commission, addressed Somaliland's lower house of parliament – the House of Representatives – stating that the elections would have to be postponed as the voter-registration process needed more time. The presidential elections were scheduled for 29 March. The upcoming elections are considered a major test for the democratic process in Somaliland. In 2008, President Dahir Riyale from UDUB party was widely criticized for extending the office term for the Guurti, the upper house of the bi-cameral Somaliland parliament, which in turn accepted an additional year for President Riyale in office after his five-year mandate expired in May 2008. Besides Riyale, who was confirmed as presidential candidate by his party, the two opposition parties with seats in the Somaliland Parliament have forwarded Ahmed Silanyo (Kulmiye party) and Faisal Ali Warabe (UCID) as presidential candidates.

*Adapted from Garowe online, 21 January, 4 and 23 February 2009*

## **SUDAN**

### **Local peace and reconciliation conferences taking place in South Sudan**

A two-day peace and reconciliation conference in Ulang County of Upper Nile state between the Luo-Nuer and Jikanyi-Nuer was conducted in early February. The communities pledged to keep peace between them. A number of clans or sections of the two major Nuer communities, who predominantly inhabit the two respective states of Jonglei and Upper Nile and share common borders, used to experience deadly clashes in the past that were mainly related to competition over water points and grazing areas. As the dry season is in sight, commissioners of the neighboring counties of Akobo, Nyirol, Nasir, Ulang and Baliet in addition to some members of parliament as well as traditional chiefs and elders converged in the conference to resolve their differences ahead of seasonal migrations. The conference was also attended by the vice president of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), Riek Machar Teny, who during the conference urged the two communities to abide by the administrative boundaries of 1956.

Another peace conference concluded in the end of January in Rumbek, capital of the Lakes State. The consultative peace conference brought together all three counties that are inhabited by Dinka Agaar communities in Lakes State – Rumbek East County, Rumbek North (Maper) County and Rumbek Central County. The reconciliation meetings were attended by 40 Agaar spear-masters and the GoSS Minister of Interior Affairs, Paul Mayom Akec, as well as Governor of Lakes State, Daniel Awet Akot, local chiefs of Lakes State and honorable members and advisors, including members of the Government of National Unity and key youth leaders from Khartoum and Kenya.

These conferences come after the GoSS had encouraged the respective authorities to resume intensive inter and intra-state community peace and reconciliation conferences as the dry season approaches at the beginning of the year.  
*Adapted from Sudan Tribune, 5 January, 28 January and 4 February 2009*

### **Civil Society groups call for a conference on Sudan's crisis**

A group of 47 civil society leaders, journalists and human rights activists called for a conference in Khartoum in response to Sudan's current crisis. The proposed conference titled "Seizing the final opportunity or allowing further chaos?" will seek to address Sudan's multi-dimensional political challenges, including the situation in Darfur and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). A press statement said "The conference aims to achieve broad consensus within Sudan on a course of action that will lead Sudan out of its current crisis. (...) The conference aims to build trust and foster reconciliation between communities and create a foundation for building a peaceful, free, prosperous and unified Sudan."

The initiators of the effort called for the participation of the two principal partners of the CPA, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), as well as other political forces in the country, including key actors from Darfur. In addition, a selection of civil society representatives should be attending the conference. Several international actors would be invited as observers, including representatives of the permanent UN Security Council members, AU-UN Joint Mediator for Darfur Djibril Bassolé and certain African and Arab countries.

Signatories to the proposed initiative include civil society activists, Sudanese writers, journalists, editors of newspapers, women's rights defenders, a former Darfur governor and a student leader.

*Adapted from Sudan Tribune (ST), 6 February 2009*

## **RESOURCES**

### **GENERAL**

#### **"Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control training manual for West Africa" (November 2008)**

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a major destabilising factor in fragile states. This manual seeks to help strengthening the West African region's capacity to deal with the proliferation of SALW. Primarily intended for civil society organisations (CSOs), the authors see the guide as also relevant for security services and useful for policy-makers in the region.

[www.kaiptc.org/\\_upload/general/SALW\\_october08\\_Part%201.pdf](http://www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/SALW_october08_Part%201.pdf)

#### **"If only there were a blueprint! Factors for success and failure of UN peace-building operations" (February 2009)**

Jair van der Lijn (Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' and Radboud University Nijmegen, Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM)) distils from the substantial body of literature on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations eleven clusters of factors for success and failure for UN peacekeeping operations in general and tests these on four case studies – Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador – of one particular type of UN peacekeeping operation: the UN peace-building operations.

[www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090218\\_joup\\_lijn3.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090218_joup_lijn3.pdf)

## DJIBOUTI-ERITREA

### “The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute”

In this Institute for Security Studies (ISS) situation report, Berouk Mesfib provides analysis of the backgrounds of the Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute.

[www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file\\_manager/file\\_links/SITREP150908.PDF?link\\_id=3&slink\\_id=6572&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/SITREP150908.PDF?link_id=3&slink_id=6572&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3)

## KENYA

### “Nairobi’s ‘Glass House’ experience and post-election IDPs” (February 2009)

Caroline Mose, PhD Candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, discusses the role of an alternative radio station-led initiative in Nairobi to draw attention to the plight of the country’s internally displaced persons (IDPs). Underlining the social role of Hiphop as a tool of consciousness, Mose considers the significance of Ghetto Radio FM’s ‘Glass House’ experience, a six-day event staged at Nairobi’s Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC) in which three radio MCs took turns to broadcast continuously with only a daily glass of carrot juice for sustenance. Highlighting the historical marginalisation of much of Kenya’s youth, the author emphasises the ability of the Glass House experience’s participants to force the government into direct contact with the country’s IDPs, and success in driving a conveniently-forgotten issue back into Kenya’s collective memory.

[www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/54186](http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/54186)

### “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project National Baseline Survey” (January 2009)

The baseline survey, conducted by South Consulting, in the framework of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) project comprised a sample size of 4,021 households spread across the country in all regions. The respondents in the survey were randomly sampled. The survey was conducted in December 2008.

[www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/National%20Baseline%20Survey%20report.pdf](http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/National%20Baseline%20Survey%20report.pdf)

## SOMALIA

### “Somalia after the Ethiopian occupation. First steps to end the conflict and combat extremism” (Enough Strategy Paper, February 2009)

Ken Menkhaus analyses new dangers and opportunities in 2009, develops possible scenarios for the coming months and provides some recommendations for a more effective U.S. policy.

[www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Somalia\\_Feb\\_09\\_2009.pdf](http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Somalia_Feb_09_2009.pdf)

## SUDAN

### “Livelihoods, Power, and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan” (January 2009)

The Northern Rizaygat are a group of Arabic-speaking, camel-herding nomads living in the Sudanese states of North, South, and West Darfur. They have achieved notoriety for their role in the Janjaweed. Little attention has, however, been paid to exploring how the Northern Rizaygat’s lives and livelihoods have been affected by the conflict or to their livelihood goals and hopes for future peace and security. This lack of knowledge helps to explain their relative exclusion from various forms of international action on Darfur – humanitarian programming, international peace processes, and international advocacy campaigns. Recognition of this exclusion

prompted this research, the first field-based study since the conflict started that specifically focuses on pastoralists, and the Northern Rizaygat in particular. The study was written by Helen Young, Abdal Monium Osman, Ahmed Malik Abusin, Michael Asher, and Omer Egemi for the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. [http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/21931179/Darfur\\_livelihoods.pdf?version=1](http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/21931179/Darfur_livelihoods.pdf?version=1)

### **“Perilous border: Sudanese communities affected by conflict on the Sudan-Uganda border” (November 2008)**

Mareike Schomerus studies how armed conflict by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed groups has affected Sudanese communities living along the Sudan-Uganda border. It documents local people’s views from the LRA-affected areas of Eastern and Central Equatoria on the conflicts, the current security and development situation, and on reintegration, reconciliation, accountability and cross-border relations. It also provides insight into some of the profound challenges for peacebuilding and statebuilding in southern Sudan and its border areas and suggests issues that need to be addressed.

[www.c-r.org/our-work/uganda/documents/Perilous-Border.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/uganda/documents/Perilous-Border.pdf)

## UGANDA

### **Situation update on peace process in (Northern) Uganda**

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) situation report “The (Northern) Uganda Peace Process: An update on recent developments” by David Mwaniki, Manasseh Wepundi and Harriet Morolong, analyses recent developments and provides insights into the regional dimension of the process.

[www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file\\_manager/file\\_links/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF?link\\_id=3&slink\\_id=7237&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF?link_id=3&slink_id=7237&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3)

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### **Editorial information**

The media review Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) was published by the Life & Peace Institute between 1989 and 2006. The re-formatting of HAB as an e-bulletin 2007 is done in close collaboration with the Nairobi-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). The electronic base of HAB is LPI and the editor is Charlotte Booth, [charlotte.booth@life-peace.org](mailto:charlotte.booth@life-peace.org)

For subscription matters contact: Selin Amirthalingam, [selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org](mailto:selin.amirthalingam@life-peace.org)  
For a link to HAB and more information see [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org)

### **Editorial principles**

The Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

