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LYCEUM

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Reflections on the Moral Life

Ralph McInerny

My text for these remarks is the motto of J.F. Power's novel *Morte D' Urban*, which he takes from J.M. Barrie: "The life of every man is a diary in which he means to write one story, and writes another..." What is a human life?

If moral philosophy is concerned with the moral life, which seems a fairly safe and unexciting assumption, anyone who wants to do moral philosophy will have to be able to say what the moral life is. Not, you will think, a difficulty of a high order. Not an apt project to be funded by the N.E.H..

By and large I share the notion that we all already know what the moral life is. Nonetheless, I think that this knowledge that we all have *implicitly* involves discriminations and distinctions. It is some of these latent aspects I would like to make *explicit* in what follows.

WHAT IS THE MORAL LIFE?

If we consult philosophers on the matter - always a dangerous thing to do - we may be told something like this: the moral life involves the use of the moral words. When is a word a moral word? Well, words like 'ought' and 'ought not', 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad', are moral words.

A more traditional approach would tell us that moral philosophy is concerned with moral deeds and doings and that moral actions are equivalent to human actions and that human actions in turn are the kind of actions performed by human beings.

Moral words. Moral actions. But clearly useless we know how moral words differ from other kinds and how moral actions differ from other kinds, these remarks, however true, are not helpful.

HUMAN ACTS ARE WHAT HUMANS DO

We are, of course, provided with the means for making such distinctions. At the outset, granted, we do not seem to be getting much by way of clarification. If human acts are what humans do, these could be contrasted with, say, kangaroo acts, kangaroo actions being what kangaroos do.

Exhilaratingly true as that may be, we probably expected to be told about some things that people do which would not count as human acts. But this seems excluded by the equation of human acts and what humans do, since that must mean that whatever humans do is a human act which in turn is a moral act. Thus, given our interest, we might say that *the moral life is the sum total of moral acts, that is, the sum total of human acts, that is, the sum total of what we do.*

Why not?

Consider the following situation. Jorge Graciela, the grandee of Grand Prix driving, sits behind the wheel of his souped-up Porsche. "Gentlemen," he murmurs to himself, "start your engines." He does so. There is a satisfying guttural roar from beneath the hood of his car incarnadine. He revs the motor a few times, then jams the car into gear and is off to the sound and smell of burning rubber. He circles the track at a speed 10 m.p.h. faster than the world record, guiding his car with an expertise unequaled in Formula-whatever driving. When he pulls into the pit, the judgment on his performance accordingly is A+. He has done well. He is a good driver. He is the best. (Notice the moral words.)

Jorge Graciela is a human being. He has just driven a car. Driving a car is a human action. Any human action is a moral action. Jorge must be said to have driven his car well. It seems to follow that he is a good fellow, having performed a moral act well.

Our attention is now drawn to a sack-like appendage Jorge has been dragging behind his car. We imagine it must be some aero-dynamic device. We join the crowd of journalists ringing the beaming motorist and put the question: Jorge, what is that you were dragging behind your car?" "My brother-in-law."

he replies. Nervous laughter at first, then curiosity, the sack is opened and in it is found the lifeless bloody body of Jose O Reilly, the philandering husband of Jorge's sister Rosa.

Confronted with this we may want to take back the nice things we said about Jorge.

How can we do this?

Can we say he really isn't a good driver, no matter the fact that he has just broken a record with his skill?

Surely not.

What we are likely to say is that we now view what he did as dragging poor Jose around the old brickyard in a cruel and unusual manner meant to bring about his violent death. This is what Jorge did. This is the action he performed. Not: he just broke a record on the Indianapolis speedway. Rather: he murdered his brother-in-law and deserves blame rather than praise.

And so he does. But he also drove a car excellently well. It's what he did. If it is a human action and human acts are moral acts and he did it well then it would seem that Jorge deserves both praise and blame, that he is at once good and bad.

That is the first problem. It seems that some human acts are not moral acts. We cannot, therefore, equate human acts and moral acts. But St. Thomas Aquinas for one wants to do this and he is far from being the village idiot. What to make of it?

THE LIST OF ACTIVITIES APPROACH

That human acts are more or less easily distinguished from the acts of kangaroos and other marsupials is of some help in seeing what human acts are, but we have just seen that it does not enable us to avoid problems of weight.

Take this situation. Wilbur and Orville Sinister have their law offices on the 17th floor of the modernistic Mudville Multinational Bank Building. One day, Orville, preoccupied with a brief he is reading while waiting for the elevator, hears the car door open and, his lips continuing to move as he reads,

steps forward. Alas, though the doors are open, the elevator is not there. The shaft is. Orville gets it. It takes him five and a half seconds to hit bottom.

Totally enclosed by glass and hugging the exterior of the building, the elevator shaft is visible from the sidewalk pizzeria across the street. There, seated at a table with a checkered napkin tucked into his collar, is Orville's brother Wilbur and one Fifi LaRue. "What's your brother doing?" Fifi asks.

"Falling down the elevator shaft," says the observant Wilbur, continuing to munch a pizza garnished with Italian sausage, anchovies and onions.

Let us stop here, although Orville, of course, cannot. The statement that Orville sinister is falling down the elevator shaft is true. Falling down the elevator shaft is an activity truly ascribed to Orville. Orville is a human being. Is it a human action?

We seem to have here a basis for distinguishing among activities truly ascribed to human beings, a basis for separating those which are human from those which are not. How so?

If we imagine Orville being asked, "Why are you reading that brief?" he could well answer: "The damnable Cratchett case will be heard on Tuesday and I have to be ready."

If on the other hand he were to be asked, "Why are you falling down the elevator?" his answer, or perhaps that of Wilbur speaking for his late brother, would differ. "Gravity," might suffice as an answer. In slightly altered circumstances, "He was pushed" could be the answer, or "He has been despondent since his client Cashwell was hung for embezzling."

Questions ask for responses. When we ask these questions about Orville, some of the responses suggest that he is not answerable or responsible for the activity in which he is engaged. As originally described, moving with accelerating rapidity down the elevator shaft is not explained as something Orville set out to do. Explanations can be given as to why he is falling - gravity, having been pushed, and the like - which indicate that falling down the shaft is not something Orville put his mind to.

It is the things he puts his mind to, the things he proposes to do and freely does, that are responsible actions. He has to answer for them.

Human acts = moral acts = responsible acts.

Some of the activities which are truly attributed to or ascribed to a human agent are not human actions in this sense.

Orville is reading the Cratchett Brief.

Orville is falling down the elevator shaft.

Orville is digesting his lunch.

Orville is aging

Orville's heart is beating.

Needless to say, this list could be continued to a fare thee well. You may know that St. Thomas calls the activities which can be truly attributed to a human being, but not as the result of his conscious deliberation, acts of a man rather than human acts. This is the distinction which, when made explicit, alleys our fears about the identification of human acts and moral acts. Moral acts are those we are answerable for because we deliberately initiate them.

If now we should conclude that the moral life is made up of the human acts we perform, we seem to have arrived at a somewhat clear answer to our original question. And so we have. But, as is the way of clear answers, it raises other questions.

LIFE IN A WIDER SENSE

If you are a biographer and it falls to your happy lot to write the official life of Orville Sinister, there is little doubt that you will want to dwell on that event which ended his life. There he was, at the top of his profession, on the 17th floor, full of the zest and juices of life, and within seconds he is a bloody asterisk at the bottom of the elevator shaft. Although it is the final one, it is surely one of the most significant events in Orville's life as well.

But Orville is a human being. Human beings are moral agents. Their moral life is the sum total of the human acts they perform. But we have seen that "falling down the elevator shaft" cannot count as one of Orville's human actions.

This means that it plays no part in Orville's moral life. A purist or literalist might conclude that you as a biographer have no business making a fuss over the non-human acts that pertained to Orville Sinister.

Your first impulse may be to scoff or to sound the alarm about censorship, but you are basically a reasonable fellow and you detect in the objection an opportunity to reflect on what you are doing when you set out to write up the life of another human being. As a biographer who has followed the discussion to this point, you will want to say something like the following: However important the distinction between human acts and acts of a man may be for moral philosophers, it plays no significant role in biography. A man's life is a lot more than his moral life.

The life of a human person is not exhausted by what we have called his moral life.

We can all see how true that is. And yet what a curious truth it is. Life is a book in which we set out to write one story and end by writing another. One does not have to be very old before seeing the truth of that, a truth that may be at once merry and melancholy. What an extraordinary thing it is that a human life is not the sum total of the human actions a person performs, that a human life is not identical with the moral life. But all one need do is reflect on the route he came to the present point of his life to see how true this is.

THE AMBIGUITY OF HAPPINESS

Another approach to this amazing fact about ourselves is through the uses of the term 'happiness' in speaking of the point of a human life. Aristotle thought all would agree that what they are seeking in all they do is happiness. For Snoopy happiness is a lawn without crabgrass. For Aristotle happiness was identical with the virtue or virtues which perfect our characteristic human activity. And virtue is a quality of character achievable by action, by repeated acts of a given sort. "The only way to learn how to play the harp is to play the harp."

Happiness, when taken to mean that which is achievable by action, the well-being or fulfillment that is the crown of acting well, collides with the etymology of the English word we employ to render Aristotle's *eudaimonia*. The Greek term suggests spiritual well-being; the English term 'happiness' echoes with *hap* and *perhaps*, it suggests *happenstance* and just plain *happens*. But if we should say to Aristotle that Fifi LaRue happens to be happy, as if it befell her, somewhat as she happens to be both blonde and *ravissante*, he would urge us to distinguish attributes and qualities that come our way willy-nilly from those which are intended features and results of our deliberate acts. Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author to whom Soren Kierkegaard attributes the *Philosophical Fragments* and the massive *Postscript* to it, makes this distinction in terms of the ethical and the historical. His interest is to protest against those who would equate the human good, the moral good, with results. Even worse, with historical importance. You and I are unlikely candidates for world-historical figures - at least I am. Who knows what lies in store for you? A person makes it into the history books because results of great consequence to many others follow on what he has done - usually catastrophic results. If you decide to march on Moscow, or Kabal, a lot of people will die, you will fail in your objective, but you will have achieved historical importance. The surviving members of the infantry, obscure, anonymous, numbers at best, will tell their grandchildren of the part in the great retreats, and they will thus be taken to share in the importance attached to the dictator who sent them into quixotic battle.

What Kierkegaard and his pseudonym did not like was the suggestion that such historical estimates are identical with ethical ones. Tolstoy, as you know, said that the only reason Napoleon was regarded as a great general was that his orders were never obeyed. If true, this means that Napoleon just happened to be thought of as a great general. The estimate is based not so much on what he intends as on what happened to result from his intentions. And, on the trickle down the theory of importance, all those poor soldiers thus share in an accidental glory.

As opposed to what? The ethical, Kierkegaard suggested, obeys a qualitative and not a quantitative dialectic. Fancy talk. But what he meant to protect is the truth that each and every human person has the wherewithal to act well and thus be good, to be morally successful. No matter that our chances of attaining historical importance are as good as nil. Kierkegaard wanted us to see that this ethical appraisal is quite different from that which is made in terms of the consequences, the unforseen consequences, our deeds may have.

FORTUNE GOOD AND BAD

Permit me to quote from my forthcoming *Handbook for Peeping Thomists*.

Fifi LaRue, seeking relief from the academic grind, decides to play a therapeutic round of golf. When she arrives at the first tee, she finds no one there, so she sets off alone. She bogeys the first and second holes and on the third, a par three, unwisely uses a four wood and overdrives the green by twenty-five yards, her ball disappearing into a wooded area with dense undergrowth. Not one to let a new ball go without a search, Fifi wades into the wilds, using her wedge as a makeshift machete. Ten minutes of fruitless search go by and an annoyed Fifi brings her club fiercely down, half burying its head in the ground. There is a clinking sound. Curious, Fifi scrapes away the weeds and dirt when what to her wondering eyes should appear but a steel case. She unearths it, lashes it to her golf cart, takes a double bogey, and goes on. In the privacy of her own room, she pries open the metal case. It is chock full of United States gold coins. In subsequent days, despite national coverage, no claimants come forth. Fifi is rich. How explain the sudden change from penurious to loaded?

Doesn't the narrative tell us how it came about? Fifi found a fortune because she had the good sense to play golf. Her errant shot on the third hole is the cause of her going into the brush. Her anger at loosing her ball causes her to strike the ground and thus discover the buried treasure. Those are the reasons or causes of what happened. True as all that is, we would nonetheless note that not

everyone who plays golf finds a fortune - quite the opposite; not everyone who overdrives the third green finds buried treasure; not every irate linkster strikes gold when he buries a clubhead in the turf. If these are causes of what came about - and they are - they are causes of a very peculiar kind.

Each of these deeds is aimed at some goal other than finding treasure. If Fifi had not gone golfing, had not overdriven, had not half-buried her wedge, she would not have found the gold. But the aim of golfing is not to find buried gold, nor is it the goal of any of the other acts that enter into Fifi's round. By doing what she does for the purposes she has, she *happens* to find the money. Finding money happens to Fifi when she is golfing. The discovery is related accidentally to the activity in which she is purposefully engaged. Fifi is the incidental or accidental cause of finding the money because it is a result only incidentally or accidentally related to the goal she seeks. The event is also rare. If student golfers were constantly returning from the course with caskets of gold coins strapped to their carts, we would speak differently of what happened to Fifi behind the third green. Fifi might be surprised, but regulars on the course would not be.

What is ascribed to luck or chance is accidental to what is sought; it is also rare and significant, that is, good or bad for the agent. If a cobra had fallen off a passing circus train and taken refuge in the weeds behind the third green, Fifi might have been bitten and died, her bad luck incidentally related to her golfing as was her good luck in our original story. Not even Ralph Nader would demand that the third hole be posted as dangerous to the health of golfers.

But being rare is not enough to qualify as a chance event. Fifi might have been out on the course with a Geiger counter; she might do this every evening and she has found her share of lost fountain pens, pennies and safety pins, but tonight, bonanza! Rare as the outcome might be, it is what she seeks to bring about. We would call her lucky, of course, but the difference between this story and the original one is vast.

If Kierkegaard means by the historical what happens to us, he is surely right to contrast it with the ethical. We might say that there are two senses of

"good" and "bad", a distinction suggested by the age-old question, "Why do bad things happen to good people?" We can of course turn that around - though we seldom do - and ask "Why do good things happen to bad people?" In either case, we distinguish what Aristotle would call *goods of fortune* from *moral goods*. Good things happen to us and we get no credit for them, because we did not intentionally bring them about. Bad things happen to us and we are not blamed for them because we did not intentionally bring them about. 'Good' and 'bad; in this sense must be distinguished from 'good' and 'bad' in the moral sense.

BACK TO THE MORAL LIFE

What has happened to our original question? We have seen certain distinctions emerge from our reflections.

First, we saw the need to distinguish between a technical or narrow appraisal of a human act. Jorge Graciela's driving is unsurpassed but he is a despicable human being. Our estimate of his action in terms of driving is partial. A moral appraisal sees what is being done, not in terms of the objectives of an activity that we may or may not engage in, but in terms of the inescapable objectives and goals of human action.

Second, we saw that we can distinguish between human acts and acts of a man, between the acts in which we deliberately and consciously engage and those activities which are truly attributed to us but not as projects of ours. I breathe and age and alter in various ways whether I want to or not, which is why I am neither praised nor blamed for these activities, whether they are taking place well or badly.

Third, we distinguished moral goods from the goods of fortune. The moral good is hooked up with intention and purpose; chance and fortune are hooked up to what is incidental to our intentions.

And we have seemingly conceded that, while a biography is not likely to respect these distinctions, certainly not to honor them by excising from the narrative all but moral acts, moral philosophy would seem to have to stick with moral actions, human actions, purposive acts.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED

It turns out that moral philosophy cannot just ignore everything in our lives except human actions, moral deeds. In fact, I will be suggesting that it is crucial for moral philosophy to recognize that the moral life is not identical with our biography.

Iris Murdoch, in *The Sovereignty of the Good*, drew attention to the exiguous moral agent of analytic ethics. This agent was someone who encountered puzzles from time to time but became skilled in solving them Their solution was in effect the moral life. It was all very cerebral. It was all very much like changing your mind. At first you such-and-such but later, because of these considerations you came to think so-and-so. Murdoch rightly saw this as a kind of knowledge-is-virtue view and she went on to present in a most imaginative way the moral drama involved in a mother-in-law's altering her judgement of the girl her son had married. No overt change of behavior was involved in this moral change.

Iris Murdoch as much as anyone brought back into the main current of moral philosophy the realization that moral change may involve changing your mind, but that is only a part of it, often the easier part. One must also change one's heart.

The approach Iris Murdoch was criticizing is one that could follow on an unimaginative insistence that since moral philosophy is concerned with moral acts it has no business taking up the other events that may enter into human life. The trouble with such an insistence is that it can cause us to distort what it wants us to concentrate on.

When we are young we like to hear the story of how our parents met and married. Your own children will one day want to hear your tale of woe. I jest, of course.

Reconstructing our past sometimes exhibits the kind of woodenness I suggest one interpretation of the moral life invites - particularly if things are going well for us. Self-made millionaires have a way of implying, even asserting,

that making a fortune is simply a matter of drawing up a sensible business plan and putting it into execution. How I Made A Million In The Market. Why doesn't everyone do it? When things go wrong, on the other hand, we are ready enough to see that factors other than our reason and will are at work in our lives.

It might perhaps occur to us that, if human lives are made up of these two sorts of events - human acts and chance - that we need only be careful to keep them separate when we do moral philosophy. This turns out not to be feasible. Oh, we might be able to consider an isolated human action and maintain the purity of our focus. But so soon as we ask how one got into the set of circumstances where this sort of moral action is required, we find it necessary to allow that often our circumstances are the result of chance rather than previous choice. Or perhaps what may seem a mixture of the two. You are pursuing your education at St. Anselm because you choose to. Your presence on the campus puts you in proximate danger of meeting an attractive person of the opposite sex. A few years from now you may be telling your children that you married Fifi because you chose St. Anselm. There is not, needless to say, a necessary connection between matriculating here and marrying Fifi. You signed up for animal husbandry and there she was in the next seat. If you had not come to Saint Anselm you would have not taken that class in animal husbandry and if you had not you would not have met Fifi. Clearly, as soon as we move back a bit from a single act we are confronted with an intermingling of the intended and the accidental. Our lives are woven from the warp and woof of the moral and of chance, of what we set out to do and what happens because we do what we do.

And of course human agents do not set out from the same Square One. The recognition of this has led to talk of moral luck in recent years, meaning goods of fortune that seem to make good moral choices easier. Human persons have different talents, different opportunities, often dependent on economic means; they live in different places and different times, and not all places and times are equal as being conducive to responsible human action.

One of the more important features of traditional moral philosophy is its concern with those circumstances which diminish our responsibility and

indeed may make what might have been a human action merely the act of a man. Force and ignorance, being made to do something or not knowing what it is we do, are the chief factors which can lead us to say that what looks like a human action actually is not. If Fifi passes your door at a great rate of speed, your notion of what is going varies if you find she is not jogging but has been shot out of a cannon. When Oedipus marries his mother he does not know she is his mother; he thinks she is only an eligible widowed queen. Greek tragedy has an almost eerie capacity to bring home to us the ambiguity of human life.

ENVOI

Am I suggesting that the moral philosopher should no longer take seriously the distinction between human acts and acts of a man? Am I suggesting that the distinction between a partial, technical appraisal and a full-fledged moral one - the point of my Jorge Graciela story - is otiose? Am I suggesting that the pervasive presence of chance in our lives, the role that external forces have on us, renders the ethical enterprise silly? Would I side with the Hegelian against Kierkegaard?

The answer to all these questions is no. What I have wanted to do is hold in suspension two extremely important truths. On the one hand, morally speaking, we are what we do. On the other, our lives in the broader sense of the term are not completely in our power.

Thornton Wilder, in *The Eighth Day*, which I consider his best novel, ends his story with a reflection on the kinds of events he has recounted. History is one tapestry, he notes, and

> There is much talk of a design in the arras. Some are certain they see it. Some see what they have been told to see. Some remember that they saw it once but lost it. Some are strengthened by seeing a pattern wherein the oppressed and exploited of the earth are gradually emerging from their bondage. Some find strength in the conviction that there is nothing to see. Some

That is how the book ends. Wilder might have added: Some believe there is a design but it is not given to us to see it. In any case, Wilder knows as we all do that there is a meaning to our lives far beyond the one we put there. The one we put there is the chief interest of the moral philosopher. But if he is to pursue his task in a way that remains true to his chief concern, he must retain his sense of the mystery of human life wherein our moral life, however crucially important for who we are and where we end up, is only a part.

The rest, as the old marriage ceremony had it, the rest is in the hands of God.

Notre Dame
Indiana

Wittgenstein and W.C. Fields

Daniel H. Cohen

An odd fact about the literature on the *Tractatus* is that even those commentators who lay great stress on the **dis**continuities and revolutionary aspects of the philosophy in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* feel compelled to approach or explain it only through the philosophy of others. One commentator will say that the key to understanding Wittgenstein is *Russell's* philosophical program; another will say it is really *Frege* who set the agenda for Tractarian thought; others begin their expositions by rehearsing the *Kantian* enterprise. The list is almost endless: Anscombe points to *Schopenhauer*; Griffin cites *Heinrich Hertz*; Janik and Toulmin suggest *Karl Kraus*; Russell blamed *Tolstoy* and *William James* for the parts of Wittgensteinian thought he doesn't like (the Mystical part), while David Pears credits James for the parts he does like. *Freud, Derrida, Dewey,* all make an appearance. This centenary year alone has produced works on Wittgenstein running the entire alphabetic gamut - from *Aquinas* to *Zen* - in attempts to penetrate the mystery.

The text is, to be sure, notoriously elusive and I suppose it is one mark of its greatness that it generates such an impressive and exhaustive search for the philosopher's stone of understanding. However, there is also the suspicion that the discipline does not do itself proud when the search for that key becomes an academics' game, the winning move being the most obscure but still demonstrably relevant line of thought contributing to the *Tractatus*. That particular historian's game is not mine. Of course, to be fair, the pedagogical chore requires this kind of appeal. Metaphor is essential to philosophizing, and it is essential to any kind of teaching, so it is all the more necessary for exposition of a philosophy. It is in that spirit that I offer one more figure for the Wittgenstein-is-like-X game. And because the goal is consciously heuristic, an

obscure one will not do. May I call to your attention, and not entirely for the sake of provocation, the similarities between Ludwig Wittgenstein and the film comedian *W.C. Fields*.

Now I do know that this year is also the centenary of Charlie Chaplin's birth, so I ought to use Chaplin, but it just doesn't work out that way. You see, W.C. Fields is not just an overweight and overboozed comic figure from the early days of the sound cinema. He was, when younger, the greatest juggler in the world. And I can think of no better analogy for Wittgensteinian thought than that: **Juggling** is an attempt to transcend the human condition - to keep many different objects aloft despite the, uh, ***handicap*** of only two hands. **Philosophy** is like that, too, an attempt to transcend a part of the human condition, namely, to keep many concepts in mind despite what I think is the essentially binary nature of comparison.

This might provide a way to read the last few propositions of the *Tractatus*, where Wittgenstein writes that "the proper method of philosophy" (6.53) involves providing statements of (scientific) fact (which are irrelevant to philosophy) and that the feeling of the mystical (which seems to be identified with a kind of philosophical understanding at 6.521 and 6.522) comes from experiencing the world as a whole (6.45). That is, it's all a matter of keeping more in mind than usual.

Well, maybe there is this connection between Tractarian philosophy and juggling, but admittedly it is forced and a bit tenuous at best. If anything, the comparison should be between juggling and the philosophy of the *Investigations*, not that of the *Tractatus*. After all, what is the mastery of a "family-resemblance" concept but being able to juggle several subcomponent concepts? The point made by bringing in juggling seems to be the same as that made by Gilbert Ryle with his "tea-tasting" metaphor for philosophy.

Well, if the juggling metaphor serves better than tea-tasting, then by all means apply it to the investigations and if not, don't. But more can be said. W.C. Fields started out as a phenomenal juggler, only later becoming a clown of the cinema. Wittgenstein is the logician-turned-philosopher, or maybe the

philosopher-turned-linguist, or something-else-turned-something-else-again. This is not meant to disparage the later thought as mere clowning around. Rather, it is trying to highlight an important, overlooked feature: W.C. Fields always retained his juggling talents. They became, however, a means to something else, just one way of entertaining audiences, not his only one. And, as his career developed and the curmudgeonly persona that he devised became entrenched, juggling ceased even being a favored method, to the point that his name is no longer immediately associated with what made him a star in the first place. Similarly, there is no reason to think that Wittgenstein ever lost the acute logico-analytic talents of his atomistic, Tractarian phase. Rather, he developed other styles of doing philosophy.

But another thing: Tractarian philosophy is more like "Pure Juggling" and Investigating Philosophy like "Applied Comedy," if I may be so permitted. A juggler's world is just a lot of objects in configuration, just like the world of the *Tractatus*. Also, juggling is something one can do alone, striving for ever greater mastery. Comedy is not. Comedy requires an audience in the same way the philosophy in the *Investigations* requires a dialogical context - or that psychotherapy requires a patient while psychology does not. Psychology can eschew the patient and make do with a subject. A comedian without an audience is incomplete, like a goalie without backs, forwards, or opponents. Comedy is a social phenomenon. A solipsistic comedian is as conceptually incoherent as a disembodied person. (This, of course, is the famous Wittgensteinian argument against private jokes.) The point is this: History aside, Tractarian philosophy seems like it could be the product of a solitary reflective intellect in, say, a POW camp. The philosophy of the *Investigations* does not. It responds to the problems of philosophy as social phenomena (or maybe social diseases!). Tractarian philosophizing can be done by a single individual. That of the *Investigations* cannot. Its goal is the removal of others' confusion, not a characterization of the world, an ideal language, and their relation. Tractarian philosophy is an *a priori* study of how languages must work. The *Investigations* is an *a posteriori* study of how languages in fact work.

Let me now leave the seductive and delightful realm of unrestrained metaphor and overly broad generality for something a little more specific. The point I have in mind centers on remarks in the *Tractatus* about belief attributions. It is to these that I would like to turn to apply this W.C. Fields interpretation of Wittgenstein, particularly to proposition 5.542. That rather cryptic proposition reads:

> It is clear, however, that 'A believes p,' 'A has the thought p,' and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.

The problem has to do with belief attributions, sentences of the form "A believes that p." This sort of belief-statement apparently belies the thesis of extensionality, that propositions can only occur in other propositions by truth-functional compounding. This is very near the heart of the atomist world-view. Rejecting it opens the door for belief in all sorts of "occult connections" relating the propositional atoms and their counterparts. Now, I've used the term "occult connections" precisely because this <u>is</u> so reminiscent of the so-called corpuscularians of an early century who, following Descartes, wanted to make the world safe for the clockwork view of the world now associated with Newtonian physics (but without forces). The particular "occult connections" that frightened Russell, anyway, were "Internal Relations," the admission of which leads to Monism or, even worse, Idealism. Extensionality makes the world safe for <u>atomism</u>, for <u>analysis</u>,and for <u>propositional logic</u>.

The methodological imperative to externalize all relations has an immediate consequence for how a belief-statement will be read, namely as an assertion of a <u>relation</u> between a believer and the proposition believed. G.E. Moore suggested this as early as 1899. But this way of externalizing belief conflicts with the thesis of extensionality. Since we can and do have false beliefs, the truth of the proposition believed is irrelevant too the truth of the attribution.

Better than this relational account of belief is Russell's "multi-relational" account ("On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," 1910) which treats the proposition as a logical fiction. The proposition "A believes that p" is understood as asserting a direct relation between the believing subject and the constituents of the believed proposition, not the proposition itself. Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio, to use Russell's example, is a four-place relation among Othello, Desdemona, Cassio, and loving.

The multi-relational account has the metaphysical advantage of eliminating one sort of funny, fuzzy - and complex - entity, the proposition, in favor of simpler things. In addition, it respects the thesis of extensionality: the proposition believed does not really occur in the belief attribution: "p" is not really part of "A believes p;" p's constituents are.

There are, sad to say, several objectionable features of this multi-relational account. Let me run through a few.

First, this account makes belief ambiguous as to its degree or "arity": if the proposition believed has two constituents, the belief relation is three-place; if the believed proposition has three constituents, the belief relation is four-place; and so on. An ideal language would have to have either an ambiguous belief relation, albeit a systematically ambiguous one, or else many belief relations.

Beyond that is a second cause for concern: the belief relation is of an intermediate **type**. "Believes" is a verb but what is believed also contains a verb. That is, its relata apparently have to be of different types, both objects and relations. It is "cross-type" and so very suspect. Russell and Wittgenstein were both acutely aware of the logical and semantic paradoxes and thought that logical grammar demanded more respect than that.

Third, since the relation in the believed proposition need not relate the constituents of the believed proposition - because we can and do hold false beliefs - it must be the believing relation that relates things, that relates Desdemona and Cassio in Russell's example. "Loves" doesn't. But if the verb in the proposition doesn't do anything, why have it there at all? It is redundant.

However, eliminating the relation of the believed proposition only increases the ambiguity of "believes." A separate relation of belief would be needed for every possible configuration of things, for believing that **a** loves **b** is not the same as believing that **a** hates **b** or **a** is to the right of **b** or any other two-place relation that might relate **a** and **b**.

On the other hand, retaining the relation of the believed proposition is also not without cost. The status of relations in Tractarian thought is itself suspect. That controversy will be passed over here except to note that the nominalist reading suggested by 3.1432 (and 4.22 and 4.04) would have to be taken into account were the belief relation retained in the final analysis.

Finally, the relational and multi-relational accounts of belief disagree on what to make of the proposition believed, but agree about the other object in the configuration, the believing subject. Wittgenstein seems both to deny categorically that there is any such subject yet to affirm the truth of solipsism. Whatever the ultimate status of the metaphysical or transcendental self that is supposed to be at the center of existence, I think it is safe to say that Wittgenstein rejected the knowing or empirical self of psychology and epistemology which would be relevant here.

All of this is to say that if the proposition existed, then the relational account would work, if the subject existed. If we had any bacon, we could have bacon and eggs, if we had any eggs.

The trick here is to juggle. The three things that need to be kept in mind are the subject that believes, the proposition that is believed, and that it is belief that connects them. Of course, we need to remember that none of these three things is really a thing, but neither an accomplished juggler nor a persistent philosopher need be much daunted by that.

Proposition 5.542, quoted earlier, directs us to understand belief attributions as a correlation of facts by means of a correlation of their objects. Thus, somehow, the believer and the believed have to be replaced by **facts**.

The believing subject might seem the more intractable of the two, but ultimately this is not so. A clue is provided by a letter from Wittgenstein to Russell dated August 19, 1919. Russell had written a week earlier, asking:

> A Gedanke is a tatsache; what are its constituents and components, and what is their relation to the pictured tatsache?

Wittgenstein's answer was:

> I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language.

That is, the thought is some sort of picture, hence a complex, which is to say it is a fact in its own right. It has parts and it is these that need to be related to something else. It is not so much that the subject does something in believing as much as that the believer is a certain way. The fact of belief - what we might call the "belief-state" - is one side of the equation. There is more than enough room here for mental images or brain-states, for either "software" or "hardware" elaborations of the theme.

The other side of the relation is more problematic. The obvious reading would put the state-of-affairs there. But a state-of-affairs need not be a fact. Pictures, such as thoughts or propositional signs, are all facts (as long as they exist, of course), which is not to say that they are all true. That is, there are two considerations relevant to pictures. First, if something is a picture, it exists and as a complex with parts in configuration so counts as a fact in the world. But second, there is the question of whether or not the picture accurately pictures reality, i.e., whether or not it corresponds, whether or not it is true of the world. Only one of these questions can be asked of states of affairs: do they exist? We don't ask whether existing states of affairs *correspond* to reality because their existence is reality. States of affairs cannot, therefore, be the other side of the

belief relation. There must be the possibility of false beliefs. False states of affairs, if that manner of speaking is allowed, do not exist.

However, we do not really need states of affairs for the second relata. All we need are their constituents to be the second set of relata. Why not correlate the parts of the thinker's thought (there must be such parts, the letter says) directly with the parts of the state of affairs believed? Those parts are objects in the world and they exist even if the state of affairs does not. This successfully manages to eliminate both the subject and the *tatsache* altogether, while still relating them - not a bad piece of juggling.

This is an attractive solution to the problems and has become something of a standard reading of the text (e.g., Copi 1958), but it is not a completely unproblematic interpretation. In the first place, it doesn't conform to the text. Belief is supposed to involve the correlation of the parts of facts, not possible facts, a co-ordination of tatsache, not sachverhalte. It is possible, of course, that Wittgenstein was simply not being careful enough here with what are occasionally unwieldy technical terms. There are, after all, other places in the text where technical terms get used in violation of their own principles. Still, it is a reason for some hesitation.

Regardless, there are other problems. It is not immediately clear how this explains-by-exhibiting the impossibility of nonsensical belief. That's something that Wittgenstein thought an analysis of belief ought to do. (Proposition 5.5422 is unequivocal on this.) The impossibility of believing that seven is green, or that the good is more identical than the beautiful, should be made evident. The correlation of parts-of-the-thought and parts-of-the-state-of-affairs doesn't manifestly rule that out. Since I can believe that seven is prime and I can believe that grass is green, both seven and green can be correlated with thought-constituents. Without the *tatsache*, that is, having only a *sachverhalte* (in whatever sense one can be said to have something non-existent), nonsense combinations are not ruled out. Existing *sachverhalte*, i.e., *tatsache*, are needed. (This in essence was Wittgenstein's main complaint with Russell's multi-relational account.) To be sure, the logical forms of the objects themselves

preclude certain combinations. That would bypass the fact or state of affairs altogether, giving a version of Russell's multi-relational account. But that is just what is being rejected.

The textual problem and the impossibility of nonsense beliefs can both be solved by supplying a fact for the belief. And one is available: the propositional **sign**, the written or spoken sentence. Sentence tokens are suitably concrete, much of our thought does seem to be sentential in character, and in the letter cited earlier, Wittgenstein indicates that he is willing to think of thoughts that way. Thoughts are explicitly compared with propositional signs:

> I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which *correspond* to ***the words of language***.

And in the *Tractatus*, at 3.12, we are told that a propositional sign just is the articulated expression of a thought.

This line of reasoning suggests that belief-attributions can be cashed out as a willingness to assent to certain propositional signs. Saying that Billie believes in Santa Claus, is roughly like saying that Billie would say "yes" if asked whether there were a Santa Claus, or would put down "True" on a true-false exam, or something along those lines. Lying would have to be discounted, of course, and so would whatever mistakes it might be possible to make in describing one's own belief set, but that's the general idea. But there is another significant component that needs to be included in a complete analysis of the attribution, namely, the semantic fact that the sentence in question does indeed express the proposition in mind. Thus, "A believes p" becomes on analysis:

'A utters or would assent to "p" and "p" means that p.' It makes some sense of 5.542, anyway.

This generally behavioristic sort of reading of 5.542 is almost as well entrenched in the interpretative debates on the Tractatus as the constituents-of-the-states-of-affairs reading (e.g., Urmson 1956). And it too has much that can

be said in its behalf. It does, for example, provide a truth-functional - indeed, explicitly conjunctional - analysis of the original, troublesome sentence. Since the propositional sign as a picture **in** the world is always a fact in its own right, regardless of whether or not it is true as a picture **of** the world, a correlation of actual facts by means of their constituents is attained, as directed. And that means that there is no problem arising from attributions of false beliefs.

Beyond these, this has the great virtue of showing why attributions of nonsense are nonsensical attributions. Consider the sentence "Gilbert believes that seven is green." This becomes, on the proposed analysis,

'Gilbert would assent to the sentence "Seven is green" and "Seven is green" means that seven is green.'

The first part is fine: Gilbert might well be disposed to assent to the phrase at hand. The other part of the analysis, however, is itself a bit of nonsense. Nothing can mean that seven is green, no expression can have that seven is green as its sense, because that **isn't** a sense. There is no sense here, no picture to compare with reality.

Fine. Now for the problems with this account. First, it sets up language as a *tertium quid*, a third thing, between thought and the world - just as ideas had been for so many previous generations of philosophers. Well, so much for the glorious revolution. Whether or not we wish to continue dissociating ourselves as epistemic agents from the world in that way, we should at least be aware that this presupposes an actualized language capacity for *any* belief. Of course, that is likely something that Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* wouldn't care to deny. The thinking-then-speaking model is one that solitary reflection can produce: think about it, then write it down. To be sure, however, this is precisely the sort of model that would be roundly, soundly, and rightly rejected by anyone thinking that philosophizing requires something like the comedian's audience.

Two other points need to be raised before moving on. First, while the recourse to sentences rightly allows false beliefs and rightly disallows nonsense beliefs, it also allows - but wrongly, I think - senseless beliefs. That is, on this account, it makes sense to say of someone that he or she believes a tautology or contradiction. Tautologies are senseless, but not nonsense. They are not pictures of the world but neither are they ill-formed propositional signs and this shows itself. That is, although they do not pass muster as propositions, they do as sentences. [This is obscured by Wittgenstein's use of "satz" for both proposition and sentence, except when speaking explicitly of the difference.] Anyway, I don't think that an account of the locution "A believes p" purporting to be in the Tractarian spirit of things should countenance either tautological or contradictory "p." After all, if the sentence is a tautology, there is no picture, and so no thought. And if there is no picture, there is no fact and, therefore, no parts of a fact to be correlated with those of another. (See 5.1362)

There has been another sort of objection that has been leveled against the sentential cashing out of belief-attributions concerning the second half of the analysis - the conjunct giving the semantic fact that the **sentence** uttered does in fact mean the **proposition** attributed. It is necessary that this second conjunct be present in the analysis. We certainly want to say - and say in English - that, for example, many Iranians believe Salman Rushdie's novel is profoundly blasphemous - whether or not they themselves frame that thought in colloquial English. Similar considerations can operate within a single language. Someone from Ireland who said, "There will be good crack at the party" would not be correctly described by one American to another American as believing that the crack will be good because that phrase has rather different idiomatic uses for American and Irish English. (The crack in Ireland is safer because it means something else.) And people can be simply misinformed about how the words that they themselves are using are used by the rest of the language community. "Phyllis said the dinner was fulsome, but I think she meant filling." Questions about vocabulary are not always otiose.

It is important, therefore, that the assertion of a willingness to assent to some sentence be accompanied by a statement of the meaning of that sentence if it's to count as a belief attribution. The objection alluded to is that all such statements of meaning would be examples of things that cannot properly be said according to the *Tractatus*. (One of the main goals of the *Tractatus* was distinguishing sense from nonsense. The idea was that most of philosophy is a result of linguistic confusion and so quite literally nonsense.) Thus, the proposed analysis is so much nonsense. At 4.022 Wittgenstein writes, "A proposition shows its sense" and at 4.1212 he adds, "What can be shown cannot be said." That is, the relation between a picture and what it pictures can never itself be a part of the picture. Similarly, the ultimate relation between language and the world is beyond language and trying to talk about it must end up in nonsense. Besides apparently ruling almost the whole of the semantic enterprise, this raises a problem for both the sentential and parts-of-the-states-of-affairs interpretations I've considered. It has even been taken by some as indicating that proposition 5.542 should be read as a ***reductio ad absurdum*** - that the problem of the apparently intensional character of propositions attributing beliefs is a pseudo-problem and a prime piece of nonsense. **If** "A believes p" made any sense, it would have to be explained by a sentence of the form '"p" says p.' But the latter is nonsense, so so is the former. There is no picture that can be associated with "A believes p" and therefore no reason to worry about the correct analysis of what is nonsense to begin with. [It has also been objected that '"p' says p," even if not nonsensical, is senseless in that it is tautological. It could not, therefore, contribute anything to any analysis. For the same reasons I think the semantic component important and crucial to any belief attribution, I think reading '"p' says p" as unsayable-because-tautologous as unwarranted. I think it unlikely that that is what Wittgenstein had in mind and certainly not what he should have had in mind regardless.]

Still, the *reductio* reading is not as wild as it first might seem. It recognizes how serious and essential the semantic component is in belief attributions and how serious and essential the strictures on what can be said are

for Tractarian thought. I think there is something to this, although I do not in the end find it a compelling reading of the *Tractatus*. It is true that sentences of the form "A believes p" are often, at least in part, interpretive and not just descriptive. They are, that is, outside the natural order, outside the jurisdiction of "saying," and so outside the domain of the natural sciences -- as much outside that domain as the interpretation of, say, a literary text. Even if, as Wittgenstein clearly indicates throughout the *Tractatus*, explanation of a certain sort can be eliminated in favor of description of a certain sort, that simply cannot be said for the relevant kind of interpretation.

The idea that semantic facts might be **irreducible** to statements of natural science cannot be dismissed lightly. This is, I think, at the heart of Karl-Otto Apel's reading of 5.542 as the original sin damning all analytic philosophy: it introduces an ambiguity in trying to license attempts at reducing the *Geisteswissenschaften* to the *Naturwissenschaften*. That, he concludes, makes the entire philosophy fatally flawed. All such attempts are misguided and futile.

Still, I don't think a *reductio* interpretation of this passage is tenable for a number of reasons. For one, it makes the concern with attributions of nonsense beliefs in proposition 5.5422 otiose. There is also the matter of proposition 5.5563 which asserts that the propositions of our everyday language are in perfect logical order. Belief attributions are an everyday occurrence, as are all the other propositional attitudes which presumably fall subject to this kind of analysis. Most of all, I don't think the question of the reducibility of semantic facts to natural facts - for all its philosophical moment - is a question that animated the *Tractatus*. That question can be rephrased as one of incommensurable vocabularies within one language - and there is nothing in the *Tractatus* Ruling that out. It might well be in that order to think of belief attributions as Tractarian states of affairs, i.e., as objects in configuration, recourse to a rather special class of objects to be configured is required, but that is not the same as saying the states of affairs are themselves special in a radical way that can't be countenanced by the Tractarian view of languages. That is, it is open to Tractarians to say that what distinguishes intensional sentences from

others is an irreducibility of their substance - of the objects involved - rather than of their form. The search for **the** form of the proposition, of all representation, is what animated the *Tractatus*, and that methodologically precludes any other sort of answer.

That returns us to the original avenue of enquiry: What are the objects that are to be correlated in belief attributions? We must, I think, return to the proposition, not the propositional sign and not the state of affairs. If the path has been circular, well that wouldn't bother a juggler! It was Russell, remember, who tried to turn propositions into logical fictions by a slice of the analytical sword - his new and improved version of Occam's Razor. Wittgenstein was never party to that.

It isn't at all clear what the ontological status of propositions is, according to the Tractatus. As I noted, most of the time, Wittgenstein was content to use the same word for both proposition and propositional sign (or sentence). For example, at 3.1 he writes it is in a proposition that a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. There seems to be no way to read this but as referring to the propositional sign. At 3.12, however, he makes the distinction - the proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world. Does this make propositions relations, and so just as suspect? Quite possibly, but once the distinction is made, it is immediately ignored in the subsequent discussion, and "proposition" is used freely subsequently, albeit almost always referring to the sign.

In spite of all this, I think propositions are what Wittgenstein had in mind. Neither sentences nor thoughts will do, sentences for all the reasons given earlier, thoughts because insofar as their constituents are philosophically relevant they have been taken into account as part of the subject. Beyond that, their nature is a matter for psychologists to take up. Propositions are something above and beyond both sentences and thoughts but still not yet states of affairs. The Fregean, anti-psychologistic spirit survives - and it calls for propositions.

Part of the problem may be terminological. At 3.34 and 3.341 Wittgenstein writes:

> A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the proposition could not express its sense.
>
> So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can express the same sense have in common.

The relevant element for belief attributions, then, is what Wittgenstein here calls the "sense" of the proposition. The Fregean trace is fortunate. Frege's anti-psychologism manifested itself as essentialist, Platonic, Realist and all good things like that but even so there are certain advantages to it. Wittgenstein too was anti-psychologistic, at least insofar as that doesn't interfere with solipsism! At the least, he was essentialist about the nature of propositions and distinguishing the sense of a proposition from the subjective ideas that the propositional sign might generate.

That leaves us with an interpretation of belief attributions which connects the psychological constituents of the complex that we call the believing subject, whatever they may be, with the constituents of the propositional sign in its projective relation with the world, i.e., of the sense of the sentence used to express the thought. Altogether, four different sets of components are invoked: (1) the psychological elements constituting the empirical (but not metaphysical) subject, (2) the parts of complex propositional signs, (3) the parts of propositional senses, and, (4) the represented objects in the state of affairs or fact. Is this too many? Not for a good juggler - and remember, Wittgenstein was the best.

Interestingly, there are precedents for this analysis. Frege found four elements in his account of meaning - the sign. the sense, the reference, and the subjective idea. And so did Charles Sanders Pierce - the representamen, the

interpretant, the object, and the ground. (Neither set matches up exactly.) Finally, for what it's worth, Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, when writing about Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, clearly thought his earlier self had four things in mind: "Proposition, language, thought, world stand in line one behind the other" (PI 96). Granted, Wittgenstein was not always a reliable commentator on Wittgenstein, but here, at least, I think he was.

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Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics

Hippocrates G. Apostle

Historically, the philosophy of mathematics is a strange tale of a science which initiated the scientific method, soon became the queen of the sciences by claiming philosophical supremacy, took one step backwards when its limitations were pointed out, continued spectacularly its technical advance for over 2000 years, but lately suffered a split personality because mathematicians were gradually paying less attention to the philosophy of mathematical objects and practically no attention to the contribution of the past.

It was Thales, we are told, who introduced the method of demonstrating theorems from principles in geometry. Later, the Pythagoreans advanced mathematics to a high degree and tried to define and explain all things in the universe in terms of the principles of numbers. Soon Plato followed the Pythagoreans by positing a more elaborate system of eternal and destructible objects and maintaining that all things are caused by the principles of numbers. Aristotle disagreed sharply with Plato and the Pythagoreans and tried to show that the world is infinitely more complex. He maintained that the generic theoretical sciences are three, namely, philosophy and physics and mathematics, but that the specific theoretical sciences are countless; for he thought that the differences in things are very many and irreducible, that each differentia gives rise to a new theoretical science and consequently to new properties, and that mathematics as a whole is limited to quantities and can be used only as an application to other things. Mathematicians after Aristotle were content to regard mathematics as a science of quantities and were paying less and less attention to the philosophy of the subject of mathematics. Early last century, the

great mathematician Gauss reaffirmed Aristotle's definition of mathematics in his treatise, The Foundations of Mathematics.

But soon after Gauss, things began to happen. From the latter part of the last century until today there has been a tendency away from this definition and in the direction of what is thought to be a better and more general definition; and, in the opinion of most modern mathematicians and philosophers, the old definition is too limited to cover modern mathematical research. There are reasons for such opinion. For one thing, the introduction of the so-called "non-Euclidean geometries" contributed somewhat to this tendency; for, according to the argument, if Euclid's parallel postulate does not possess the absolute truth which was attributed to it, it can have, if at all, only hypothetical truth, and today most mathematicians and philosophers take the position that mathematics is not interested in the truth or falsity of its postulates but only in consistent sets of postulates and the deduction of theorems from those postulates. Second, it is thought that the concept "quantity" is too limited to include under it much of the research which is done nowadays, such as topology and algebra; so a better definition would be one which rejects that limitation and extends the field as far as possible. Logic, of course, must be retained, for it is fundamental to mathematical investigation.

As a result of the above and other arguments against the old definition of mathematics, Peirce defined mathematics as a science which draws necessary conclusions. Russell and Whitehead went even further by claiming that logic and mathematics are the same, and they tried to deduce all mathematics from a few primitive logical postulates each of which contains two or more propositions as elements and other logical concepts. Hilbert took a different path and emphasized the symbolic nature of mathematics as primary. Others posited as fundamental such wide concepts as intuition, order, and relation.

It appears, then, that there is no agreement today as to what the nature of mathematical objects is and hence what the definition of mathematics should be. This fact, however, has no effect on the increase of good mathematical

research; for what mathematicians say that they do, and what they actually do, are not the same.

So far we have given a brief historical account of the philosophy of mathematics. Let us now turn to Aristotle's philosophy of this subject. Whether or not he wrote a work on mathematics is not known; but there are scattered statements on the subject in his major works, and a fairly accurate definition of mathematics and a discussion of the nature of mathematical objects can be given. Due to time limitations, my account here will be sketchy.

DEFINITION: Mathematics is a theoretical science which demonstrates generically, specifically, and analogically the properties of quantities and of things which belong to quantities.

The key terms in this definition are "theoretical," "science," "quantity," "generically," "specifically," "analogically," "things," "belonging," and "property;" and these terms are defined or described accurately by Aristotle in his various works. If these terms are not scientifically known, neither is the definition.

First, let us turn to the term "science." It has two main senses for Aristotle. The first and narrow sense is this: necessary knowledge of what exists through its cause, that is, through reasons. The second sense includes the principles and the demonstrated theorems from the principles. So the definition of science in the second sense would be: universal knowledge of true principles and of demonstrated properties from those principles under one genus of existing things or under one aim. Since demonstrated theorems are necessarily true and are proved through the cause, it follows that the principles, too, must be necessarily true, whether apprehended directly or indirectly through the cause. The expression "theoretical science" means a science whose aim is truth for its own sake. The other senses of the term "science" will not be considered here.

Second, the principles in a science are four in kind. They are (1) the indefinable concepts, (2) the definitions, (3) the hypotheses, and (4) the axioms. The premises come from the definitions and the hypotheses; and as for the

axioms, they are not premises but what some moderns call "directive" or "regulatory" principles which are used to demonstrate conclusions from premises; and they are necessarily true. What about rules? There are two kinds: (a) arbitrary, and (b) those which follow from truths. Arbitrary rules are posited by convention, like the rules of chess or a baseball game; and they are neither true nor false. An example of a rule which follows from a truth is the following: "One may transpose a term in an equation from one side to the other with its sign changed;" and this rule follows from the axiom "Equals subtracted from equals yield equal remainders." Mathematics may use rules of the second kind for convenience but not rules of the first kind.

Third, quantity is one of the highest genera and cannot be defined, but it can be described; and its two species are magnitude and number. By "number" Aristotle means a natural number greater than one; and we shall use this sense here. Now quantities may be either essential or accidental or indirect or derived. Essential magnitudes are either lines or surfaces or solids; and essential numbers are natural numbers greater than 1 and have as parts indivisible or undivided units which are of the same kind. What about the number 1, and 0, and negative numbers? They are included in Aristotle's scheme but he uses different terminology; and as far as operations on such entities are concerned, terminology makes no difference. Aristotle calls 1 the principle of number; he regards 0 as the principle of direction or as privation of quantity; and similarly with negative numbers and square roots and complex numbers and other such entities about which questions may be raised. The general problem is whether or not Aristotle has a philosophical apparatus which is sufficient to treat modern mathematics.

Fourth, let us consider the term "property;" it means an attribute which does not appear in the definition of a subject but which belongs to that subject and to no other subject. The reason why the definition of mathematics uses the term "property" instead of the term "attribute" is that the demonstration of a property shows the cause and uses no extraneous information, whereas a demonstration of an attribute which is not a property may use extraneous

information in the demonstration and so fail to use only the cause; and if one does not know the exact cause, one is mistaken in thinking that he has it. For example, the concurrence of the medians is demonstrated as a property of a triangle because it does not belong to a genus higher than the triangle; but it is demonstrated as an attribute of a right isosceles triangle because it belongs to other kinds of triangles also. In the latter demonstration, the right angle and the equality of the two sides are irrelevant in proving the concurrence, but in the former demonstration the definition of a triangle is both necessary and sufficient. Moreover, the demonstration of a property is the most general and has the widest applications, but the second demonstration is limited to one kind of triangle only. To take another example, the reason why the function x^2 is integrable between the limits, say, $x = 2$ and $x = 4$, is not because it is continuous, for some discontinuous functions too are integrable between such limits, but because all the points of discontinuity, if there are such, have a measure zero. Evidently, then, Aristotle's insistence on properties amounts to what mathematicians call "necessary and sufficient conditions." But Aristotle imposes a further condition, namely, that there is a difference between a definition and a property, and that one should not define a quantitative object by using a property as the definiens, for a definition has certain philosophical priorities over a property. For example, an angle in a plane is defined in terms of two lines in that plane and is so understood by thought, but a line in a plane is not defined in terms of angles in that plane. Consequently, lines are prior in existence and in definition to angles in a plane. Hence, one should define a triangle in terms of lines and not in terms of angles; and so one should define an isosceles triangle in terms of two equal lines, in which case the equality of the opposite angles turns out to be a property and not the definition or a part of the definition of an isosceles triangle.

Fifth, the term "things" in the definition of mathematics, although predicable of quantity as a subject, is itself a subject which has attributes and properties. To illustrate, in the commutative law $p + q = q + p$, in which p and q are quantities, equality is a relation and a predicate of the two sides which as a

pair are the subject. But equality itself is the subject of attributes and properties; for equality is transitive, commutative, etc., and a number of these attributes may as a unit be a property or prove a property of equality. Similarly, there are attributes and properties which belong to such quantitative relations as betweenness, separation, intersection, parallelism, inclusion, equation, correspondence, and so many others. Again, consider the three terms $x^2 + mx + n$, $2x + m$, and 2, each of which is the derivative of the preceding term. Evidently, $2x + m$ as a first derivative is a property of the first term; and 2 as a first derivative is a property of $2x + m$, but as a second derivative it is a property of $x^2 + mx + n$. But 2 as a second derivative is only an attribute but not a property of x^2, because as such a derivative it belongs also to $x^2 + 2x$ and to many other functions; and $x^2 + mx + n$ is the set and the only set of functions to which it belongs as a property. I may add that mathematicians excel practically all other scientists in seeking properties, and Aristotle insists that scientists should seek only properties if they wish to understand the causes of demonstrable things.

Sixth, the terms "specifically," "generically," and "analogically" determine the scope of mathematics and also suggest that it is impossible for mathematics to be derived from few principles, contrary to the opinion of Russell and some others. I have shown in my Commentaries of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* that Russell and Whitehead introduce thousands of irreducible postulates and other principles without mentioning this fact, but a brief indication of the reasons by the use of examples may help here. Knowledge of the properties of all polygons on the plane does not imply knowledge of the properties of a specific polygon, for example, of a triangle. Hence a property of a triangle can be demonstrated if, and only if a differentia is added to a polygon to produce the triangle, and that differentia, which is three-sidedness, is irreducible with respect to polygonality and is a new principle. Evidently, all properties or polygons are attributes of triangles but not properties of them; conversely, no property of triangles is a property or an attribute of polygons. Again, no property of x^3 is a property of x^2, and no property of x^2 is a property of x^3.

Similarly, a ring and a field are so related that no property in one of them is a property of the other. Universally, then, no property of a genus is a property of a species of it, and conversely, and from this it follows that the number of specific sciences under mathematics is interminable; for every differentia gives rise to a new science, and the differentiae are interminable in number.

The term "analogically" deserves special consideration, for much of mathematical research has a analogous character, as Aristotle has pointed out. This can be observed in the real number system, which is based on continuity in which the unit interval can take on various forms not comparable to each other but analogous in nature. For example, the proportion A:B :: C:D implies the proportion A:C :: B:D, and either the terms in both proportions are all time intervals, or all lines, or all surfaces, or all weights, etc., otherwise we have no meaningful ratios but either impossibilities or nonsense; for a weight of three pounds is neither equal nor unequal to a line 3 feet long or to a surface 3 square feet or etc., and a ratio of a line to a volume is meaningless. The philosophical principle upon which this fact is based is the nature of a unit: there is no such thing as a unit by itself, for a unit is like an attribute which is inseparable from a subject. In other words, something underlies the unit, and this something must be in some category, for example, it is a length of one foot, or a weight of one pound, or an apple, and so on; and if the underlying subject is continuous, the unit is taken by convention and is divisible as a subject; but if that subject is indivisible, as in the case of a point, the unit is absolute, for there is no such thing as one-third of a point or the square root of two horses. Other examples of statements having an analogous nature are the commutative and associative laws and the principle that equals added to equals yield equal sums. But can we not compare 3 horses with 3 dogs? Yes; not as horses or as dogs but as animals, for the unit would then be one animal, and the term "animal" as such is univocal, that is, it has only one meaning as a predicate of a horse and a dog. But, one may say, 3 lines and 3 men too can be compared in the same way, for they are things. Not quite. The term "thing" is not univocal but analogical, for if it is posited as univocal, the same thing would turn out to be equal to 1 and also to 3 and to 10

and to 1000; and what would follow would be not only falsities but also contradictions, and contradictions must be avoided at all costs.

Seventh, the terms "demonstration" and "belong" are proper to Aristotle's logic, not as narrowly conceived by many commentators, but as Aristotle himself posits the aim of that treatise. A careful reading of the first sentence of the *Prior Analytics* states that the inquiry is about demonstration, in which case the syllogism is preliminary to demonstration and not the whole of logic. Consequently, the *Posterior Analytics* should be included because it is this part which discusses demonstration. Further, the term "to belong" is wider in application than the term "to predicate," in which case not all the forms of belonging can be reduced to the form "All A is B" and the like. Finally, all those who say that Aristotle's logic is inadequate, especially for mathematical demonstration, base their claim on their knowledge of the *Prior Analytics*, without paying much attention to the *Posterior Analytics*, where the requirements for demonstration are stated. They hardly pay attention to the role of axioms, without which demonstration according to Aristotle must proceed. In my opinion, the claim of these thinkers is not only hasty, but also false.

I have given a demonstration of a geometrical theorem in the Commentaries of my translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, pages 250 to 260, using only Aristotle's principles. Various kinds of principles are necessary, and for a good reason. I will outline Aristotle's method briefly by using an example. Let S be a subject and P be a property to be demonstrated as belonging to S, and let S be a triangle for simplicity. First, S must be defined, and second, it must be demonstrated to exist. Third, the property P must be demonstrated to belong to S. The kinds of principles used to effect the demonstration have to be drawn from a number of sciences. Now let the ascending genera of the triangle be polygon, plane figure, magnitude, quantity, thing. Then all these genera belong to S, and so does the use of some or all of their principles. Now since the definition of S must be framed according to the principles of definition, such principles are proper to logic in the wide sense and to metaphysics. If equalities or other such universal attributes have to be used, the corresponding principles

will belong to universal mathematics. Similarly, the other principles which are needed for the demonstration will belong to the science of magnitudes, the science of plane figures, the science of polygons, and so on. Evidently, the demonstration will be very long and complex. Research mathematicians, of course, usually take short cuts and leave the theoretical aspects of logic and scientific method to logicians and metaphysicians to worry about. And they are right in so doing, for they get more research done by avoiding logical and metaphysical refinements which take much time. It is only when they invade the territory of another science and make statements without much preparation or study that disputes arise; for mathematics as such and the philosophy of mathematics are distinct sciences requiring distinct principles and hence distinct preparations. One such dispute is about the existence of mathematical objects and hence about the truth of mathematical principles; for existence and truth imply each other, and if the principles are true, so are the conclusions, and a science with true principles is concerned with objects which exist. But if the principles are not true, conclusions may be true or false, and a scientist will be dealing with existent and nonexistent objects without knowing which conclusion is true and which is false and why. A second dispute is about Aristotle's definition of mathematics; for, it is asserted, if that definition cannot include under it the bulk of mathematical research up to now, it must be abandoned in favor of a better definition.

Scientists for centuries regarded the aim of science as being the pursuit of truth for its own sake; and a practical and important by-product of scientific truth is its usefulness for the needs of men. Medicine uses such truths to cure disease, agriculture uses them for food, and industry in general uses them for many practical ends. Usually, truth precedes its usefulness; and honors are bestowed on scientists who discover or advance great scientific truths. So we should regard such truths as an element in a science. And if a definition of mathematics includes true principles as an element and does not fall short in any other respect, it should be the one to be adopted. Let us then consider briefly the

three modern definitions of mathematics which stand out and compare them with the old definition.

Hilbert, a great mathematician and the author of the School of Formalism, regards mathematics as the science of the formal structure of symbols and hence, indirectly, of the structure of objects. The term "formal" means without reference to meaning; and so the symbols must be treated just as marks and manipulated according to certain rules to yield conclusions. Since Hilbert uses symbols ultimately for the sake of existing objects and their properties, he seems to care for the truth of the principles and hence of the conclusions, but indirectly. However, when symbolic principles are treated as marks, they are neither true nor false, and difficulties arise as to whether the results which follow according to rules are logical conclusions. Then, again, not all of his rules follow from true principles; some are posited as conventions. A greater difficulty arises in thinking that the structure of symbols implies the corresponding structure of objects. For example, in the sentence "John has sickness," the symbol "John" is to the left of the symbol "sickness;" but it would take an impossible imagination to conceive John to the left of his sickness. There are many other difficulties.

The definition of mathematics according to the Intuitionist School may be expressed by a number of statements. Mathematics is founded on a basic intuition of the possibility of constructing a series of numbers or objects; it is thus founded on thought and not on a symbolism of a particular language, which is only a means to thought; it is not timeless or static or dogmatic but growing and dynamic and fallible and always in process, and it can never be completely symbolized; and it is the product of social activity by fallible minds and so subject to revision and development. Here, too, truth is the aim; but the objects posited for intuition are limited, and I cannot see how this description of mathematics can include much of what is considered to be mathematics. There are many other difficulties, as I have shown elsewhere.

Russell and Whitehead, the authors of the Logistic School, define mathematics as all propositions of the form "P implies Q," where P and Q are propositions containing certain logical constants; and they are not interested in

the truth or falsity of P. This is perhaps the most acceptable definition by mathematicians today; for they hold that they are not interested in the truth or falsity of a set of postulates but only in its consistency and the consequences which follow from it. If so, where is the dignity and value of such a set? Is mathematics just a game? I have shown elsewhere the impossibility of reducing mathematics to logic, the impossibility of deducing many theorems from few postulates, and many other difficulties which the Logistic School faces.

I mentioned previously that the so-called "non-Euclidean geometries" had something to do with the acceptance of the above definition. But are the so-called "non-Euclidean geometries non-Euclidean? All models or examples of such geometries which are put forward are Euclidean, and Poincare himself said that Riemannean geometry on the plane does not differ from Euclidean geometry on the surface of the sphere, except linguistically; for the term "straight line" for Riemann yields the same conclusions as the term "arc of a great circle" does for Euclid. Similar remarks apply to the other non-Euclidean geometries. It is like using the term "dog" to mean both a dog and a man and then arriving at the bizarre conclusion that many American dogs have received the Nobel Prize. In short, we are often misled my semantics, for the term "straight line" is equivocated, and there is a wholesale equivocation in non-Euclidean geometries. This fact, of course, does not lessen the discovery of new theorems or of presenting geometry more abstractly then Euclid did. In fact, Aristotle would prefer modern projective geometry to Euclid's presentation, but the term "straight line" in projective geometry would be a genus and not a species for Aristotle; and he would say that Euclid's method is easier for beginners but that the modern method is more scientific because it shows the cause.

Let us now turn to the subject of mathematics according to Aristotle. It is quantities, and these are natural numbers and magnitudes, and they exist. So the attributes of quantities, too, must exist and may be subjects of other attributes, as stated earlier. In general, then, mathematics investigates not only quantities, but also other quantitative objects. Universal mathematics will be investigating properties of quantitative objects in general. The next two

branches of mathematics are the science of natural numbers and the science of magnitudes in general. There are three kinds of magnitudes, (1) essential magnitudes, like lines and surfaces, (2) derived magnitudes, like trigonometric functions and derivatives and roots of an equation and vectors, and (3) indirect magnitudes, like time and motion and weight. The science of indirect magnitudes is not a part of mathematics but an application of it, like modern physics. The science of each of the other two kinds of magnitudes has many sub-groups. There is also a mixed mathematical science which combines natural numbers and magnitudes, but the unit of those numbers is a magnitude and hence infinitely divisible; and analytic geometry and calculus are parts of that science. The various branches of mathematics, i.e., theory of numbers, analysis, algebra, and geometry, with some exceptions, can be shown to come under mathematics as Aristotle conceives it, but with some modifications; for the kinds of definition and of existence which Aristotle would insist on require many qualifications. Since quantities are existing but existence applies to other things also, and since existence in general comes under philosophy, it follows that some principles and theorems of philosophy are presupposed by mathematics. Similarly, since knowability is an attribute of quantitative objects and in general of all things, and since logic in the wide sense which includes the nature of science deals with certain aspects of knowability, such as proofs of theorems from premises and scientific methodology, mathematics presupposes also some principles and theorems of logic in the wide sense. I may add that, although many or most mathematicians say that they are not interested in the truth or falsity of sets of postulates, almost all mathematical conclusions up to now follow from postulates which, with some modification, can be shown to be true in Aristotle's theory.

Finally we come to the problem of the manner in which quantities and hence all quantitative objects exist, for there is wide disagreement here. In the case of natural numbers there is hardly any difficulty. A natural number has units as parts, and these may be either indivisible or treated as undivided. Five men and three points are examples of natural numbers with indivisible units; for

there is no such thing as one-third of a point or one-half of a man. A length of six feet is an example of a natural number whose units are dividable but may be studied as undivided.

The problem of magnitudes is more difficult. It is evident that magnitudes exist, but it is not so evident how ideal magnitudes such as straight lined and planes and circles can exist; and, because of this fact, some mathematicians are inclined to be Platonic and say that mathematics deals with ideas. But there is no such thing as half an idea or the square root of two ideas or one idea inside another idea. Further, it is a fact that approximate straight lines and approximate circles and other such approximate ideal magnitudes do exist; and the less such magnitudes deviate from the corresponding ideals, the less their attributes deviate from the corresponding attributes which are demonstrated from those ideal magnitudes. The difficulties of constructing actual ideal magnitudes are many; but, according to Aristotle, just as a statue of a man is potentially in a stone, so an ideal magnitude is potentially in a physical body, for no void exists to impede its potential existence. Ideal magnitudes, then, exist in physical bodies potentially just as other kinds of magnitudes exist in them potentially.

Now quantities are abstracted in thought from physical bodies which have matter, and they are investigated without reference to motion; for motion can exist only in that which can be moved, and that which can be moved has physical matter. Thus only magnitudes and numbers which are attributes of substances are investigated by the mathematician, and attributes as such can have no motion except accidentally or indirectly.

The conclusions in this brief account have not been rigorously demonstrated. A demonstration in favor of the old definition and a refutation of the other definitions require hundreds of definitions and a scientific presentation if they are to have any scientific value.

Finally, in treating the philosophy of a science, one should keep in mind the following logical principle: a consistent system in a science does not loose its consistency if some of its principles are removed, but it may loose its consistency

if other principles are added. For example, if a mathematician adds to his system the principle that straight lines and other ideal magnitudes are ideas in the mind, the result is inconsistency, as I have already indicated. Likewise, such claims as that two lines segments have the same number of points, that a line is made out of points, and that there are many kinds of infinity can be shown to lead to inconsistencies if certain principles from the philosophy of mathematics are introduced to the principles of mathematics. Consequently, one who is to introduce a philosophical basis of mathematics should be adequately prepared in the principles of both mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics; and by "the philosophy of mathematics" I do not mean what Mr. Carnap or Mr. Russell meant, for these thinkers considered philosophy up to the 19th century as nonsense or inadequate without making an effort to study it.

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Ethical Values in Literature - The Classicist Position

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In the present concern for the relationship of ethical values and literary criticism - a concern that we all know is as old as the history of literary criticism itself - we shall certainly recognize a wide variety of positions regarding this relationship which contend for both our attention, as well as for our confirmation. Typically we may expect to find these positions aligned, as they have been in the past, along a continuum which extends from one extreme that completely identifies ethical and literary value, to another that makes the most radical distinction between ethical values on one hand, and purely literary values on the other, with priority in criticism being clearly centered on the latter. Most positions, whether voiced in the past or today, occupy a point somewhere in between the two extremes; furthermore, such a point tends to be variable, and, even within the thinking of a particular critic, will move back and forth along this continuum depending upon discrete problems or contexts which the critic may be confronting at a given moment. The positions at either end of the continuum, however, have rarely been endorsed, at least in any systematic or fully developed manner. That extreme which postulates the need for the most radical distinction of ethical and literary value I should like to refer to as the classicist position, though I am well aware of the semantic ambiguities which surround the terms "classicist" or "classicism." But, despite the difficulties of the terminology, I prefer this designation to describe the position I shall propound to that of "formalist" or "formalism" since these latter terms, while less ambiguous at first sight, in the long run may be even more problematic; for they can be applied equally well to any position in literary criticism, depending upon the kind of "form" the critic is interested in. Many modern "formalisms" or "structuralisms" are not classicist at all, insofar as they either identify literary form with

anthropological form, psychological form, even "ethical" form, or whatever, or else make literary form subservient to the mediation or embodiment of one of these other kinds of forms. Classicism, on the other hand, is concerned solely with literary form as such, understood as being generically neither co-identifiable with nor subservient to any other kind of formal entity, and as constituting a proper end in itself. Specifically, classicism is concerned with relationships of sound and relationships of meaning within verbal compositions purely in terms of their intrinsic qualities. In this respect, the classicist position does not refer to any concepts or persons which would act as proponents of a specific style or period of literary accomplishment. Ideally, the classicist, as defined here, should be able to appreciate any style of literature, from any period, as long as the style in question results in, or contributes to, a finished artistic structure of genuine excellence and beauty.

A truly pure classicism, as I am defining it here, rarely has been embraced totally by either individuals or schools in the history of literary criticism. It has more often been a "position" abstractly conceived as exerting a certain polar attraction, rather than as a "critical system" in the full sense of that term. And yet a slender, though strong and pervasive thread of classicist literary speculation extends from Graeco-Roman antiquity to our own time. In the last century, Gerard Manly Hopkins could write:

> Poetry is speech framed for the contemplation of the mind by the way of hearing or speech framed to be heard for its own sake and interest even over and above its interest of meaning. Some matter and meaning is essential to it, but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake.

I certainly would not want to argue that this statement is the nucleus, or even truly representative of everything that Hopkins thought about poetry. The statement is unusual, of course, if for no other reason than its explicit exclusion

of so many concepts familiar in the discussion of poetry: interpretation of life, expression of poetic insight, poetic truth, imitation of life, embodiment of social and personal (subjective) realities, and so forth. But, as unusual as the statement is, it is not eccentric, neither for Hopkins nor for the history of literary theory and criticism, for it participates in a very ancient tradition that extends from Aristotle to Dante, from Schiller to Valery. Unfortunately, except in a few cases, the classicist view is more often expressed in statements similar in form to that of Hopkins; they tend to be short, aphoristic, and uncoordinated in any truly logical way with other statements make by the same author. Hence, such statements tend to be generally misunderstood; and also, as pointed out by A.C. Bradley in his famous essay "Poetry for Poetry's Sake" ". . .the general reader. . .is outraged by them." I often think, and experience shows, that the "professional" reader is even more likely to be "outraged" by them, so that despite the assiduous, though largely unfulfilled aspirations towards a classicist criticism in American literary scholarship, the classicist at times replaces the Puritan and the Philistine as the straw-man antagonist against whom a vigorous defense of poetry must be waged. I use the phrase "straw-man antagonist" because the classicists represent the barest minority among literary scholars, and hardly constitute a wide-ranging conspiracy to repress the human relevance of great literature. In fact, the classicist position exhibits the most ardent concern for such human relevance - so ardent that it wishes to specify exactly what this relevance is, and is not, so that all human things may properly flourish in their own distinctive ways.

In understanding the classicist position regarding ethical values, it is first necessary to correct certain misconceptions of classicism that are widely held. Exponents of literary classicism, unfortunately, tend to overstate their case and thereby occasionally do the worst injustice to the position itself. Hopkins' statement, quoted above, is a good example of this tendency. Such overstatements have led readers to imagine that the classicist is interested in sheer "echolia" - a concern only for the sound of literary structures - or in style alone, or in sheer technique, regardless of whatever results technique may have in a given case, or in a poesie pure which would reduce the literary work to a set

of highly abstract relationships that have nothing to do with either sound or meaning per se. To the contrary, the literary classicist is apt to argue vigorously against a view which makes the reading of a literary work an exercise in abstraction of any kind. The work, in the classicist view, should be experienced simply and fully for what it is. Any effort at reading which would tend to block out certain aspects of the work, or to interject elements into the work which are plainly not there, or to force a quasi-reflective, analytical process upon the reader while he is undergoing the direct and spontaneous experience of the work distorts the very necessary openness to what is truly and obviously "given" by the work for immediate perception. For criticism, of course, such reflective, analytical processes exercised in conjunction with selected aspects of the work is indispensable; but critical analysis and reading for pleasure and delight are two distinct, though related, processes whose ends should not be confused. The classicist position, while insisting that "form" or "structure" is of primary importance in the appreciation, as well as analysis, of literary works, acknowledges that such structures are very complex, that they are made out of sounds and meanings, and that meanings are attached not only to single words as the smallest unit of lexical composition, but to all the ascending levels of larger and larger units into which words are gathered. For example, a character in a novel is constructed out of words, and out of the larger units of meanings which are constituted by groupings of words, and, as a composite meaning in itself is then ordered together with other composite meanings of the same type, i.e. with other characters. In other words, a literary character is not only the result of, but is in itself, a verbal artifact; the voice of which tells the story, as well as the story itself, are likewise verbal artifacts. The whole work, of course, in its entirety is a verbal artifact made of many subordinate or contributive verbal artifacts. Now, in these same terms, all ethical reference (i.e. verbal reference to values attached to actions and feelings of human figures), whether of an explicit or implicit kind, provides a singularly important stratum of meaning in any literary work. As such, it too is a verbal artifact contributing to the structure of the whole. Therefore, to appreciate a literary work and to perceive its coherence, the reader

must be both attentive and sensitive to such ethical reference presented in the work. And it follows, of course, that analysis, no matter how determinately classicist it may be, must take into account this sphere of reference in its assessment of how the work is made.

At this point what is distinctive about the classicist treatment of ethical values in literature enters in; for, from this perspective, the literary work is not seen as necessarily engendering ethical value, nor as revealing it, nor as mediating it for the sake of moral edification (though all of these things could happen incidentally), but rather as using it, as appropriating verbal reference to it for purposes which in themselves are neither ethical nor non-ethical in nature. References to ethical value as part of the structure of meaning in a given text are utilized to produce a total literary form of semantic richness and resonance. The implications of this perspective are important for the entire general relationship of ethical values and literature and may be summarized as follows:

First, ethical values in a well-consolidated literary structure are usually rather simple and easy to grasp if compared with the way in which we are confronted with ethical problems in actual experience. This is inevitable because such problems in a literary work adhere to a completed, coherent structure of meanings, and not to the dynamic, changing, incomplete, and often inscrutable realities of actual persons and their activities. The appropriation of ethical reference into a work must of necessity draw upon a fairly limited range of human experience and character in order to bring out, in a brief period of time, the contrasts, conflicts, and resolutions requisite for literary art. Thus, for example, any literary character, no matter how many-sided he or she may be, can be understood much more readily than even the closest persons we may know in our own lives, if for no other reason than that in a coherent structure, everything necessary for perceiving this coherence must ideally be "given" by the work. Life itself offers no such readily accessible "givens." This is not to say that the nature and use of ethical reference in literary works may not be very sophisticated indeed, but only to say that the critic, in coming to the evaluation of

a work, should remember that such values are presented within a highly delimited and artificial nexus of meanings.

Secondly, a reader's or critic's capacity to respond to ethical values in a literary work presupposes a prior moral seriousness, depth, and perspicacity before he comes to the text. If a reader, for example, is unable to recognize deception, and the verbal signs which indicate it, and is unable to attach morally negative responses to it, then he will be essentially unable to understand the relationship of Iago and Othello. In other words, a reader should have a mature moral dimension in his own life in order to perceive the artistic structure of the work, and thereby - and what is more important in purely literary terms - to respond to its beauty of formal design. In the classicist view, the literary work does not reveal ethical values to an audience; rather, it makes effective use of what the audience already feels about moral issues to draw it into an engaging story or lyrical utterance of some kind. To be sure, in reading the literature of past ages, we encounter ethical values sometimes quite different from those of our own culture; and it is important that literary history help us to understand these values so that as critics we may come to grips with the text as much as possible in its own terms. Moreover, the moral wisdom of past ages is sometimes preserved only in a literary text; and hence the text, besides whatever literary value it may have, aids us in the recovery and perpetuation of some very important moral insights. But in this respect the text tells us more about the general moral view of an age - what is often referred to as the "conventional wisdom" of a people - than about the special insights of the author. These latter insights may exist as well, though to recognize them as such still requires the basic predisposition of the reader to understand and to share the insight as grounded in something other than the work itself.

A third consideration then arises: how is the moral dimension of a person's life richened and deepened so that, among other things (many of which are much more important than literature itself), he may fully respond to the literary work as a work of art? The answer of the classicist is that the development of the ethical life must take place in those domains of human

experience which are most directly pertinent to the ethical: i.e. the active participation in human affairs whereby the virtue of practical wisdom and moral insight can actually be acquired; the religious dimension of life wherein ethical values are given permanence and ultimacy; and in the kind of rigorous reflecting on moral issues that is best represented by the philosophical discipline of ethics. The literary critic, as anyone else, requires just such a moral development, for by virtue of his humanity he must make ethical judgments, and make them as wisely as he can. He must also make ethical judgments about literary works, again as wisely - and I might add, as tolerantly and firmly - as he can. He must not be willing to accept every kind of ethical view he finds in literature; for then his moral responses become so amorphous as to be positively destructive of real moral value. At the same time, he must not allow negative moral judgments to impair his capacity to appreciate great literary artistry or to make him feel that it is necessary to rearrange the work through his own "interlinear" reading so that it becomes morally palatable to him. Justice to the work and justice to the real order of moral values must be sought above all other considerations.

In a broader sense, the classicist position, while proclaiming itself rigorously concerned with form in its approach to literature, in fact avoids the parochialism of many other approaches by insisting that literature is not the only thing in life that counts; that there are other things of even greater importance - things which in themselves are the proper schools of moral wisdom; that, if this is not acknowledged, then the effective incorporation of reference to them in a literary work will essentially go unrecognized; and that what counts most about the literary work is something which is true about nothing else but a literary work - beauty of verbal form. The development of the moral life, and of the capacity to make sound moral judgments, must be thought of as a singularly crucial effort for both individuals and society as a whole; but if we turn to literature to provide the basis for this effort, we shall not only fail to engage ourselves with those processes through which moral growth can truly be achieved, we shall also vitiate our capacity to appreciate works of literary art, both in terms of themselves and in terms of the ethical values they employ.

I think we can rest assured that the great authors of the past poured into their works their most serious moral views and commitments; and many of these views are preeminently worthy of the deepest consideration. And if we are to appreciate them, we must come equipped to the reading of the work even as the authors came equipped to the making of the work - with ethical perspectives shaped by something other than literature itself. If we do not, we shall constantly mistake the fruit for the tree, the beautiful work of literary art for the immense forces that may have occasioned and environed it. Ethical judgment must focus on these immense forces; literary judgment on the final, lovely artifact - so exquisite and so detached - which comes forth from these forces to adorn our lives with wonder and delight.

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Difficulty In Defining Motion

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In his Twelfth Rule for the direction of the mind, Rene Descartes ridicules Aristotle's definition of motion:

> And in truth will they not seem to prefer magic words which have an occult power beyond the grasp of the human mind, if they say that motion, a thing most perfectly known to everyone, is the act of an entity in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality? For who understands these words? Who does not know what motion is? And who does not admit that those who talk thus are busily engaged in a search for the non-existent? It must therefore be said that matters should never be explained by any definitions of this kind, lest we should conceive them as composite instead of simple.[1]

Descartes here asserts that the nature of motion is so clear to all the world that it requires no definition, or at least that any definition of motion should be clear and simple. And since everyone without exception has experienced motion all his life and has little trouble telling whether an object is moving or not, this assertion has some measure of probability.

Despite Descartes' objection, we intend to show that motion is difficult to understand, and to propose a reason for this difficulty. First, dialectically, we

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[1]. Rene Descartes, RULES FOR DIRECTION OF THE MIND, XII, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur, Macmillan Publishing co., New York, 1988, p. 200

will point out some of the difficulty involved in understanding motion, and thus the need for a definition will become clearer. Next, we will offer a brief consideration of Aristotle's definition, and finally, from this consideration we will draw out reasons for the difficulty in understanding motion's nature.

Let us begin, then, with the need for a definition. If Descartes is correct in saying that the nature of motion is obvious, and that Aristotle's definition is not only unnecessarily difficult, but perhaps even altogether superfluous, then motion should never give rise to difficulties. Yet among Aristotle's predecessors Zeno was famous for his motion paradoxes, four of which Aristotle presents in Book VI of the Physics.[2] The first of these paradoxes seems to show that a moving thing, such as a arrow, is at rest. Since there is no motion in an instant, Zeno argues, then at any given instant the moving arrow is actually at rest. But then in every instant during the motion the arrow is at rest, and so it cannot really be moving at all. Developing another paradox, Zeno argues that to reach a wall a man must first go half way, then half the remaining distance, and again and again ad infinitum. But then he must pass through an infinite multitude of halfway points in a finite time, which is impossible. Therefore he cannot reach the wall, nor can anything move at all. Parmenides, another of Aristotle's predecessors, denied the very existence of motion, calling it an illusion.[3] His argument runs as follows. Something comes to be (i.e. is moved or changed) either from being or from non-being. But nothing comes to be from non-being, since this is impossible. Yet neither can something come to be from being since it already is. Therefore nothing comes to be (i.e. nothing moves or changes). The opinions and arguments of these thinkers, then, and the difficulties they raise about motion, indicate that the nature of motion is in some way obscure, for contradictions and difficulties are signs of confusion in the mind.

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[2]. Aristotle, PHYSICS, VI, BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, ed. Richard McKeon, Random Hose, 1941, 9, 239b5 - 240a9, p. 335. All other references to English translations of Aristotle will be from this edition.

[3]. IBID., I, 9, 191b36 - 37, p. 234.

Since we cannot solve these problems with our common experience of motion alone, we require more clarity in our understanding of motion. and the tool which sharpens our understanding of a thing's nature is definition. It seems, then, that a definition of motion is required. For however vague our first knowledge of motion is, it is quite certain, as Descartes points out. But however certain this knowledge is, it is vague, as the difficulties of the ancients reveal. Now what is certain but vague in our understanding is exactly what we ought to define. Another example of something understood in a vague but certain way is given by Plato in the Meno, after Socrates baffles Meno by tying him up in problems concerning the nature of virtue. Meno is speaking to Socrates:

> My mind and lips are literally numb, and I have nothing to reply to you. Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds of times, held forth often on the subject in front of large audiences, and very well too, or so I thought. Now I can't even say what it is.[4]

Saint Augustine, in his Confessions, furnishes us with a similar example concerning time:

> For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak of it; we understand also, when we hear it spoken of by another. What then is time? If no one asks me, I know, if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not.[5]

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4. Plato, MENO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Foundation, New York, N.Y., 1961, 80b, p. 363.

5. Saint Augustine, CONFESSIONS, trans. Edward B. Pusey, Macmillan, New York, N.Y., 1961, p. 194.

Hence, such things as these which are certain but vague in our understanding need to be defined. For if we have no knowledge of a thing whatsoever, we obviously cannot work toward a definition of it; but if we already know it with precision, we do not need to define it. Accordingly, motion should be defined.

Before we look at Aristotle's definition, we should note two things. First, that Aristotle understood by 'motion' something more universal than 'locomotion' which is, both for Descartes and in common English, its synonym. Aristotle would call a change of color, for example, a motion. The second thing to note is that the following sketch of Aristotle's definition of motion is by no means complete; a full analysis could easily occupy an entire volume. This sketch is intended only to explain why motion is difficult to understand.

Aristotle defines motion as 'he tou dunamei ontos entelecheia, he toiouton,'[6] which I will translate as 'the act of an able thing as an able thing.' To understand this definition we must know the meaning of its terms, 'act' and 'ability,' and we must know what kind of act motion is. Let us begin with the meanings of 'ability' and 'act.'

Aristotle explains ability in the following passage from the Metaphysics:

> And a thing is capable of doing something if there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the capacity. I mean, for instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and it is open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible in its actually sitting; and similarly if it is capable of being moved or moving, or of standing or making to stand, or of being or coming to be, or of not being or not coming to be.[7]

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6. Aristotelis, PHYSICA, W.D. Ross, Oxford University Press, London, 1950, III, 1, 201a10.

7. ID., METAPHYSICS, IX, 3, 1047a24 - 29, p. 823.

Now this is not a definition of ability since 'nothing impossible' already has in it implicitly the notion of ability; 'impossible' means 'not able to be.' This passage is instead a manifestation of ability through examples. Aristotle explains act in a similar way:

> Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express by 'potentiality'; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we even call the man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying; the thing that stands in contrast to each of these exists actually. Or meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy, that it is as that which is building to that which is capable of building, and the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been shaped out of matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought up to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy - as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potency, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.[8]

Why does Aristotle manifest both act and ability by means of examples and proportions rather than by definitions? Saint Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the Metaphysics answers:

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[8]. IBID., IX, 1048a30 - 1048b8, p. 826.

> Nam prima simplicia definiri non possunt, cum non sit in definitionibus abire in infinitum. Actus autem est de primus simplicibus; unde definiri non potest.[9]

[For the first simple things cannot be defined, since one may not go on in definitions to infinity. But act is one of the first simple things; whence it cannot be defined.] Act and ability are simple things, i.e., they are understood in themselves. But a definition is always of something composite, i.e., of something understood through simpler things. It follows that there is no definition of act or ability. Furthermore, act and ability are analogous terms since they are found in each of the analogous categories of being (the ten highest genera which Aristotle distinguishes in the categories). But there is no definition of analogous terms as such since they have no single genus; there is only a proportion. Most fittingly, then, does Aristotle explain act and ability with examples and a proportion.

With this in mind, let us now consider what kind of act motion is. We cannot develop this question in full here - discussing in which categories motion is found, what things are required for motion and so forth - since this would involve much more than an article. It will suffice for our purpose to notice that Aristotle's definition excludes the possibilities of motion being either simply act, or simply ability. Motion is defined as something between these. If, by way of example, we adapt Aristotle's definition to locomotion in particular, we can see how this is so: Plato's motion from the agora to the Academy is his act as he is able to be in the Academy, insofar as he is able to be in the Academy. Plato's motion, then, is not his act of being in the Academy, since it is clear that he can actually be in the Academy, and yet sit still. Yet neither is his ability to be there a motion, since he is able to be in the Academy even while standing still in the agora. A motion is neither simply act, nor simply ability. But it is intimately connected to both, since if Plato is not able to be in the Academy, neither can he

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[9]. St. Thomas Aquinas, IN METAPHYSICORUM, Marietti, Rome, 1964, Book IX, Lectio V, p. 437.

move there, and even if he is able, unless he acts on his ability he will not go there. Thus motion, not only according to Aristotle's definition, but also according to common experience, is something between an act and an ability for that act. Precisely how motion is between these two is a problem separate from and more difficult than our present one.

If Aristotle's definition is a sound one, we should now be able to give some reason why motion is difficult to understand and thus to answer Descarte's objection with more clarity. We might restate Descartes' position in question form: If motion is so readily grasped by the senses, why is its definition so difficult to find and, once found, to understand? We offer two answers.

First, motion is difficult to define because of its obscure position between being and non-being. The furthest thing from complete being is sheer, absolute, nothingness. These extremes are so obvious and fundamental that the mind cannot miss them or confuse them with each other. But between these extremes lies middle ground. Within this middle ground is ability: for what is able to be in some sense is and in some sense is not, for together with ability we always find relative non-being, called privation. To illustrate, so long as it is true to say 'Socrates is able to be here,' it is also true to say 'Socrates is not here but he is someplace else.' Ability, then, is a mixture of being and non-being, and so it is less conspicuous than they are. A sign of this is that the Megaric school of thinkers denied the existence of ability,[10] much as Parmenides denied the existence of motion.

The reason for this obscurity is that ability is between being and non-being, partaking in both, and it is easier to grasp one, simple extreme than a mixture of two extremes in a particular ratio. Since this principle is important for our purposes we should clarify it with examples. For instance, virtues are often confused with the vices opposed to them, as when prodigality is taken for generosity, foolhardiness for courage, or cunning for prudence. This occurs because virtue stands in the middle between two extremes and shares something

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[10]. ID., METAPHYSICS, IX, 3, 1046b30, p. 282.

in common with each. In geometry we find more examples: the endpoints of a straight line are each more known than its midpoint, since to bisect a line its endpoints must be known. And again the midpoint is easier to know than is the division into mean and extreme ratio since one cannot so divide a line without knowing how to bisect first.[11] And the point on a line that divides it into mean and extreme ratio falls between the bisection and one endpoint.

Thus what lies between two things and shares something of each is less obvious than either one. Therefore, motion is even more obscure than ability because it stands between ability and complete being (act). Just as ability is a mixture between being and non-being, likewise motion is a further mixture between ability and act, i.e. motion is actual with respect to prior ability but still able with respect to further act. Motion generates so much trouble because it has something of both act and ability, and yet belongs to neither one of them completely. In the words of Aristotle:

This is why it is so hard to grasp what motion is. It is necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or with sheer actuality, yet none of these seems possible. There remains then the suggested mode of definition, namely that it is a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing.[12]

The first reason why motion is hard to define, then, is its obscure position between ability and act.

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[11]. Euclid, THE ELEMENTS, trans. Sir Thomas Heath, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, Book II, prop. 11, p. 402, and Book VI, prop. 29 - 30, pp. 256 - 258 (There are other constructions for division into mean and extreme ratio, but all of the ones I have encountered require bisection in some way).

[12]. ID., PHYSICS, III, 2, 201b33 - 202a2, p. 255.

Second, we answer that we should not be surprised that motion is hard to define since most natural things lack intelligibility. Induction verifies this. Time, chance, matter, place and the potentially infinite are all found in nature and each is somehow obscure. Time has an incomplete existence; it seems only to exist in the Now, but the Now is never the same. Chance is unpredictable and irrational - there is no reason as such for what happens by chance. Matter, as such, is knowable only by analogy. Place seems to be an imaginary thing, easily lost when things move, and how place can ever be the same from one minute to the next poses difficulties if a thing's container continually changes. The potentially infinite is unfathomable; it is always incomplete and never reached. No wonder that motion, another natural thing, is obscure. This is even more striking when we recall that it is through motion that we know many of the obscure things in nature, such as time and place in the examples above. Indeed motion is in the very definition of nature, showing not only the importance of understanding it, but the difficulty therein as well; it is as fundamental a thing as nature itself. So we should not be surprised that motion, like most other natural things, lacks being and therefore lacks intelligibility. In fact, this illustrates the very general principle Aristotle enunciates in the opening chapter of the Physics: that the same things are not always knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification.[13] Motion is obvious to our senses, but, having an incomplete being, its nature is largely unknowable in itself, since a thing is knowable only insofar as it is in act.[14] Hence, the second reason motion is hard to define is that motion is a natural thing, and natural things as a rule lack intelligibility.

We have seen that the nature of motion is obscure and why this is so. But we would do well once more to look to Descartes to learn what principle he ignored. Charles DeKoninck sums it up in *Three Sources of Philosophy*:

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[13]. ID., PHYSICS, I, 1, 184a19, p. 218.

[14]. ID., METAPHYSICS, IX, 9, 1051a23 - 35.

We all know how Descartes felt about Aristotle's definition of motion, place and time . . . He was not the first to confuse certainty and clarity . . ."[15]

Descartes mistook our certitude about the existence of motion for clarity in our understanding of its nature. Motion illustrates well the difference between certitude and clarity because it is at once undeniably manifest to the senses and cloudy to the understanding. Thus, while agreeing with Saint Thomas that Aristotle most appropriately defines motion,[16] one need not expect the definition to dispel all the obscurity which characterizes the nature of motion. For even the best definition cannot give a thing more intelligibility than it has. In fact, if motion is itself obscure, so should be its definition, inasmuch as a definition ought to adhere to the nature of the thing. As DeKoninck observes:

We are in fact aware with complete certitude that there is such a thing as motion, but what motion is remains accordingly obscure; and even when defined and thus known more distinctly, to grasp what it is remains difficult. All we know in the end is

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[15]. Charles DeKoninck, THREE SOURCES OF PHILOSOPHY, reprinted from "Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association", Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., 1964, p. 17.

[16]. St. Thomas Aquinas, IN PHYSICORUM, Marietti, Rome, 1954, Book III, Lectio II, p. 144.

> that motion is possible because there is motion, and here again we are back to our common conception.[17]

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[17]. ID., THREE SOURCES OF PHILOSOPHY, p. 17.

REPRESENTATION, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND APPERCEPTION IN KANT

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The principle of the unity of apperception is the linchpin of Kant's Critical philosophy, yet there is still widespread disagreement about that principle's meaning and its validity. Everyone agrees that the principle asserts a connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, but what that connection is and what warrant it carries are still debated. I begin by reviewing and analyzing a recent debate between Guyer, Ameriks, and McCann about the analyticity of the principle of the unity of apperception. These authors all miss the real function of the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness - to allow a distinction between conscious and non-conscious representations - and thus misunderstand the principle. Understanding the real reason for connecting consciousness and self-consciousness helps us get a better fix on what that important principle is and allows us to resolve the debate about whether the principle is analytic.

BEFORE FREEDOM AND DIGNITY: ON RECONCILING INTENTIONALITY AND DETERMINISM

James A. Anderson,
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It is argued that the resources of cognitive psychology provide the means whereby intentional, self-determined behavior can be understood within a physicalist ontology. By using the notion of an internal, mental self-representation, it is maintained that the conditions necessary for purposive, self-reflective and ultimately moral behavior can be met without resort to a notion of "freedom" which stands outside of, or opposed to, a natural view of human beings. The paper attempts a reconciliation between the "scientific" and the "manifest" images of human actions.

KANT'S QUALIFIED PRINCIPLE OF OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY IN THE *METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE*

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The tension between Kant's egalitarian moral principles and his political authoritarianism is familiar. I document its most pointed version, the apparent tension within Kant's *Metaphysical Elements of Justice* (*MEJ*) between his doctrine of obedience to *de facto* rulers and his principle concerning legitimate positive law, that it must accord with the Categorical Imperative. I then show that this tension is relieved by Kant's restricting dutiful obedience to obeying *legitimate* law. In conclusion, I show that Kant's sole grounds for obedience to actual, imperfect states are *conditional* grounds (not found in *MEJ*) based on the moral purposes served by membership in the state.

WITTGENSTEIN AND W.C. FIELDS

Daniel H. Cohen,
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The career of W.C. Fields, juggler and comedian, provides a helpful metaphor for Wittgensteinian philosophy. This is particularly so for the light it sheds on the cryptic remarks on propositional attitudes in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The metaphysically rich account of the semantics of belief attributions that emerges is well within the "juggling" spirit of the philosophy of the *Tractatus* - and well outside of the "comic" spirit of Wittgenstein's later *Philosophical Investigations*.

IS MATERIALISM A NECESSARY TRUTH?

Allen Stairs,
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Paul Teller has recently argued that a certain version of materialism is not only true, but necessarily so - true in all possible worlds. I am unconvinced. I begin by reviewing Teller's arguments. I agree with him that certain objections to the necessity of materialism fail. However, I argue that his positive considerations suffer from two flaws: they ignore certain obvious considerations that count against the necessity of materialism, and they rely on a notion of the physical that is so weak as to make his thesis uninteresting, if not actually trivial. Finally, I explore the way in which certain ideas from contemporary physics itself bear on the question of materialism.

THE INVOLVED SELF

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Modern philosophy conceives of the self as a mental substance, distinct from all other substances and characterized by its private qualities. This notion is incapable of accounting for the phenomena of human experience, especially moral experience. As an alternative, the self is constituted by its action in networks of interacting individuals, participating in feedback systems of responses. Individuation is in terms of action, which is inherently individuating. The social is a dynamic unity constituted by interactions, so that the individual changes society while being changed by it, and each individual makes a difference for the others. The self is thus involved in the social, not subordinated to it.

THE CONCEPT OF 'FOUNDATION' IN HUSSERL'S *THIRD LOGICAL INVESTIGATION*

Cecile Tougas,
St. Joseph's College

Edmund Husserl's concept of 'foundation' in the *Third Logical Investigation*, "On the Theory of Wholes and Parts," is a key to understanding Husserl's phenomenology. First I explain the concept in its context. One consequence is the meaning of 'whole'. Then I show, with many examples, two uses of 'foundation' in Husserl's work: "intuiting" categories and ideas, and describing the now-point in the temporal stream of consciousness. Finally I suggest how the concept can be used to clarify further problems.