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LYCEUM

Reverence for Life: A Moral Value or the Moral Value?

Predrag Cicovacki

On the Concept of Personhood:

A Comparative Analysis of Three Accounts

Martin Alexander Vezér

Happiness and Freedom in Socrates and Callicles

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**A Publication of the
Philosophy Department
Saint Anselm College**

LYCEUM

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Reverence for Life A Moral Value or the Moral Value?

Predrag Cicovacki

§1.

Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer's life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems, Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics.

The task of this paper is the following: Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After a brief presentation of Schweitzer's life and moral philosophy, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value (principle)? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value (principle) in the first place? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer's position is tenable.

§2.

Before we discuss Schweitzer's ethical theory, let us briefly outline Schweitzer's work and his influence. In his late twenties, he was already an accomplished organist and the author of a book on J. S. Bach (1905). Schweitzer was also a respected philosopher and theologian, who published *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (1899), *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God* (1901), and *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (1906). At the age of thirty, he decided to study medicine, with the idea of abandoning his professorship at the

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University of Strasbourg and moving to Africa to serve as a physician there. In 1913 he and his wife opened a hospital in equatorial Africa where, with some interruptions, he lived and worked until his death.

In 1950, *Time* magazine pronounced Albert Einstein and Albert Schweitzer as the persons of the 20th century. In 1952, Schweitzer was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his humanitarian work in Africa and for his engagement against nuclear weapons. Einstein is still on the top of the list of most important persons of the 20th century, but Schweitzer seems forgotten. Yet, as his critic Werner Picht asserts, Schweitzer “remains the greatest moralist of our twentieth-century civilization.”¹

§ 3.

Let us now take a look at the central ideas of Schweitzer’s moral philosophy. In his most important philosophical book, *The Philosophy of Civilization* (1923), Schweitzer introduces the ethics of reverence for life in three steps. He first prepares the ground by arguing against Descartes:

With Descartes, philosophy starts from the dogma: “I think, therefore I exist.” With this paltry, arbitrarily chosen beginning, philosophy is landed irretrievably on the road to the abstract. It never finds the right approach to ethics, and remains entangled in a dead world- and life-view. The true philosophy must start from the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness, which says: “I am life which wills-to-live, in the midst of life which wills-to-live.”

¹ Werner Picht, *The Life and Thought of Albert Schweitzer*, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 26.

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This is not an ingenious dogmatic formula. Day by day, hour by hour, I live and move in it.²

From this realization, “I am life which wills-to-live, in the midst of life which wills-to-live,” Schweitzer then advances to reverence for life proper:

Ethics consists ... in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own. There we have given us that basic principle of the morals which is a necessity of thought. It is good to maintain and to encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it.³

This understanding of good and evil implies that life has an intrinsic value or, as Schweitzer would say, that all life is sacred. This sacredness leads to a sense of responsibility which characterizes a genuine ethical attitude: ethics is responsibility without limit toward all that lives. This brings us to the third and the culminating stage in the development of Schweitzer’s ethics:

In this generality, this determination of ethics ... does not make a very moving impression. But it is the only complete one. Compassion is too narrow to rank as the total essence of the ethical. It denotes only interest in the suffering will-to-live. But to ethics also belongs feeling of all the circumstances and all the aspirations of the will-to-live, as well as its

² Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, trans. C. T. Campion (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1987), 309.

³ *Ibid.*

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pleasure, its longing to live itself out to the full, and its urge to self-perfecting.⁴

After this brief presentation, Schweitzer outlines six defining characteristics of the ethics of reverence for life. First, this ethics is rational because it is developed as a result of thinking about life. Second, this ethics is absolute, in the sense of being contrasted to that which is practicable and achievable. Third, the ethics of reverence for life is universal insofar as it applies to all living beings: “In no instance can we say of life: ‘This has no value’.” Fourth, the ethics of reverence for life has spiritual significance insofar as it seeks to attain harmony with the mysterious Spirit of the universe. This harmony can be accomplished by the community of life, not by the community of thought, that is, by serving this Spirit of the universe rather than by understanding it. Fifth, the ethics of reverence for life is natural in the sense in which Hume claims that sympathy is natural. Sixth, Schweitzer argues that this sympathy, which lies at the bottom of reverence for life, is part of our psychological makeup. By using several examples, he tries to show that even animals display the rudiments of this sympathy. This natural disposition, however, human beings need to develop in the direction of highest spirituality.

§4.

Schweitzer’s ethical approach is quite original, and not easy to classify. Although his theory is normative, it is neither teleological nor deontological. Schweitzer was never a supporter of consequentialism. He considered Kant’s categorical imperative to be superior to any utilitarian calculus, yet he emphasized that for the exalted character of the moral law Kant pays the price of having it devoid of all content; Kant gains profundity at the cost of vitality. Schweitzer’s reasons for the shortcomings of Kant’s moral philosophy are: 1.

⁴ *Ibid*, 311.

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Kant's ethics is too narrow, limited only to the duties that human beings have toward each other, and ignoring our attitudes and actions toward other living beings. 2. Kant blocks the natural sources of morality and does not allow direct sympathy to be regarded as ethical; in opposition to direct sympathy, Kant's "pure will is an abstraction with which nothing can be set in motion." 3. Kant's ethics is based on a confusion of the ethical with the intellectual, insofar as the ethical activity is represented as dependent on the results of his epistemological (transcendental) idealism.

Schweitzer's ethical approach may appear closer to the ethics of virtue than to the ethics of conduct, yet reverence for life is not a virtue. It is primarily an attitude of responsiveness to other living beings and values in general. Schweitzer's theory is non-hedonistic, since it centers on reverence for life, but it is hard to say if this theory is monistic or pluralistic. To clarify this, consider the following question: Why believe that reverence for life is a moral value?

Our initial answer may be that it is commonplace that reverence for life is a moral value. Every civilized society forbids and punishes attacks on human life. In most countries sick persons, whether rich or poor, are entitled to medical attention. Cruelty toward human beings and animals is considered unethical, even when not forbidden by law. Why, then, even raise the question as to whether reverence for life is a moral value?

One reason for this question is the unlimited scope of Schweitzer's moral principle. We are willing to grant the validity to the principle of reverence for life when it is restricted to human beings and some higher animals, but do not usually extend it to *all* living beings. We have no reverence for the lives of flies and mosquitoes, of bacteria which transmit diseases, or of plants not used for food. In times of war, we display no reverence for the lives of enemy soldiers, or even of their civilians. Schweitzer maintains that reverence for life is a necessity of thought which arises from an inner compulsion. What happens to this compulsion in the cases described?

Schweitzer claims that our sense of responsibility for all living creatures gets obscured by psychological and pragmatic considerations. For

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example, we favor the familiar and useful and distance ourselves from what is not considered as such. If, however, we pay careful attention to the realization that “I am life which wills-to-live, in the midst of life which wills-to-live,” we notice that there is no strictly ethical ground for any limitation to reverence for life. All life displays the same drive to maintain and enhance itself. Instead of a hierarchy of various forms of life, this realization leads Schweitzer to postulate the fundamental similarity and unity of all living beings. The insight that my will-to-live is one of infinitely many wills-to-live leads me not only to overcome an egotistical point of view but also to realize that there is no properly ethical ground on which we can prefer any one life to any other.

§5.

Consider now another objection to Schweitzer’s position that reverence for life is a moral value. He admits that, despite proclaiming that all life is sacred, “life can exist only at the cost of another life.” We kill in order to get food and to protect ourselves from dangerous diseases. Thus, the greatest challenge for both teaching and practice of the ethics of reverence for life is this: How can we respect life if we need to destroy it?

There are several possible lines of response to this question. Schweitzer favors the following one: “Whenever I injure life of any sort, I must be quite clear whether it is necessary. Beyond the unavoidable, I must never go, not even with what seems insignificant.”⁵

There are plenty of cases in which the distinction on which Schweitzer insists, namely the one between necessary and unnecessary killing is clear enough. For instance, we can avoid all killing of animals for the sake of pleasure (in the form of hunting and fishing). There are, however, many examples which are problematic. The difficulty arises not only because of the complexity of

⁵ *Ibid.*, 318.

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those specific situations, but also because the very concept of necessity is not easily definable. In order to preserve one life we need to kill another; but why give preference to any one life over any other? Does not Schweitzer argue that there is no ethical distinction between living beings?

The whole issue is even more complicated when we remember the double aspect of reverence for life: good consists in preserving life and furthering it. In order to preserve one life it may be necessary to kill another. But may it not also be necessary to kill another life in order to enhance the life we favor? Or does necessity arise only with respect to the negative aspect of reverence for life? Be it as it may, when deciding whether harming and killing are necessary, must not Schweitzer at the end resort to those pragmatic and utilitarian criteria which he rejects when he defends the universality of his ethics?

Schweitzer does not think so. In order to defend his position, he first points out that no general principle could be given that would resolve all possible cases:

It is not by receiving instruction about agreement between ethical and necessary that man makes progress in ethics, but only by coming to hear more and more plainly the voice of the ethical, by becoming ruled more and more by the longing to preserve and promote life, and by becoming more and more obstinate in resistance to the necessity for destroying or injuring life.⁶

Somewhat like Gandhi, Schweitzer insists that our decision concerning when it is necessary to harm or kill another life depends not only on the universal sanctity of life, nor only on the context and its pragmatic and utilitarian considerations, but also on the level of our ethical maturity. The more we

⁶ *Ibid.*, 317.

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develop our sense of reverence for life, the more responsive and caring we will be toward other living beings. Schweitzer also hopes that, with the cultivation of our moral sensitivity, the line that separates the necessary from unnecessary killing will gradually shift, so that what appeared to be the cases of necessary harming and killing in the past do not look so any more.

Schweitzer thus not only recognizes the problem but also offers a solution which he thinks only strengthens his position further. Ordinarily we accept that we must make compromises and sacrifices. Our mistake, according to Schweitzer, consists in making virtue out of necessity, and then accepting the relativity of ethical values. My killing of another life in order to survive is commonly accepted as morally justified, but Schweitzer insists that this is not so: "All destruction of and injury to life, under whatever circumstances they take place, [the ethics of reverence for life] condemns as evil."⁷ The practicality and usefulness of our decisions to destroy another life in order to survive do not make such acts moral, nor do they absolve us of moral responsibility toward the life destroyed. A lesser of two evils is still an evil.

§6.

Like Isaiah Berlin, Schweitzer maintains that human tragedy consists in being forced to choose among incompatible values. The fact that such values are incompatible does not make them any less valuable or less morally significant.⁸ While Berlin is the pluralist with regard to values in the strictest sense of that word, Schweitzer favors a view which advocates that, among many irreducible values, there is one ultimate moral value. This ultimate value is reverence for life.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ For Berlin's view, see his two classical essays: "The Pursuit of the Ideal," and "Two Concepts of Liberty," both reprinted in Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), 1-16, 191-242.

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Can Schweitzer justify his standpoint?

One serious problem with Schweitzer's belief in one ultimate value is that his reverence for life is complex, rather than elementary. It contains two principles, rather than one: (a) do not destroy life, and (b) enhance life. (Enhancing life may be further divided in a way that resembles Robert Nozick's distinction between "ethical pull" and "ethical push."⁹) Logically speaking, (a) does not imply (b). Even if Schweitzer can convince us that this implication is moral rather than logical, can he also show that this complex value is the highest principle of ethics?

We will presumably never find one *a priori* fixed scale of values, such as the one in which Max Scheler believed when he distinguished between (i) pleasure values, (ii) vital values, (iii) spiritual values, and (iv) the values of the holy.¹⁰ Nevertheless, even more flexible and changeable comparisons of values would be most useful. I cannot discuss here what makes any value or principle the highest, whether in Schweitzer's or any other ethical theory. But I would like to point out at the end that the "basic" and the "highest" need not mean the same thing. As Nicolai Hartmann has demonstrated, we do not use one unified scale of values but two: one based on the respective strengths and one on the respective heights of considered values. The aspect of reverence for life which prohibits the destruction of life is among the strongest and most basic we can have; it is the foundation of all other higher values. The second aspect, the enhancement of life, which Schweitzer understands in terms of spiritual development and self-perfecting, is among the highest values of which we know, but it is not very basic and strong. The two scales of values work in an inverse ratio: the strongest values are the lowest, and the highest values are the weakest. If forced to choose between violating the strongest and the lowest

⁹ See Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 401-473.

¹⁰ See Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 89-100.

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value on the one hand, and fulfilling the highest and the weakest value on the other, Hartmann correctly argues that it is more important not to violate the stronger and the lower value: “When the higher value is violated, the transgression is less, not more serious; but when the stronger value is fulfilled, the meritoriousness is not greater but less.”¹¹

Schweitzer has reasons to insist on the interconnectedness of both aspects of reverence for life: the preservation of life and the enhancement of life. Yet despite their connectedness, they are separable. When we have to choose between them, we must give primacy to the first aspect rather than to the second. It is easier to establish that reverence for life is the most basic and foundational moral value, rather than that it is the highest.

This result does lead to a modification, but not to any significant devaluation of Schweitzer’s ethics. Reverence for life is not only a singular moral value, but a very central moral value. However, it is not the highest value. (So, in order to capture this special role of reverence for life, we need something between *a* value and *the* value, which the usual English does not provide.) Schweitzer emphasizes that reverence for life serves as the foundation for further higher-minded pursuits: of individual self-perfecting, of the brotherhood of all human beings, and, as Schweitzer also expected, as the foundation of a lasting peace in the world. If this is really so, Schweitzer’s ethics deserves further and more rigorous examination for it carries a promise of being more rewarding than those more often discussed ethical theories: consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. In Schweitzer’s words:

Once man begins to think about the mystery of his life and the links connecting him with the life that fills the world, he cannot but accept, for his own life and all other life that surrounds him, the principle of reverence for life. He will act according to this principle of the ethical affirmation of life in

¹¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, trans. Stanton Coit (New York: Macmillan, 1932), vol. 2, 451.

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everything he does. His life will become in every respect more difficult than if he lived for himself, but at the same time it will be richer, more beautiful, and happier. It will become, instead of mere living, a genuine experience in life.¹²

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¹² Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography*, trans. A. B. Lemke (New York: Henry Holt, 1990), 233-234.

On the Concept of Personhood A Comparative Analysis of Three Accounts

Martin Alexander Vezér

What does it mean to be a person? Is there a special set of criteria that must be met in order for one to be correctly called a ‘person’? Are all humans persons? Or can it be that some humans are not persons? What about nonhuman beings; can anything nonhuman be categorized as a person? All of these questions aim at discovering the nature of personhood and determining the kinds of entities that can properly be considered persons. When addressing these questions, however, the answers that one comes up with may vary according to the way one defines ‘personhood’. In this essay, I will focus on these questions by comparing the accounts of personhood given by three contemporary thinkers who hold contrasting positions on the issue: Harry Frankfurt, Joseph Raz and Gary Watson. The first section of this essay explains Frankfurt’s account of personhood. The second section focuses on a criticism of Frankfurt’s view waged by Raz and the alternative account of personhood that Raz advocates. Similarly, the third section focuses on a criticism of Frankfurt’s view posited by Watson and the alternative account of personhood that Watson advances. Throughout the course of this essay, I will highlight the flaws of Frankfurt’s account which I think make his theory rather problematic. Since the scope of this essay is mainly concentrated on Frankfurt’s thesis, I will mention the accounts of personhood that Raz and Watson offer only for comparative purposes, without delving into a critique of their theories as well.

1. Frankfurt’s Account of Personhood.

In his essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry Frankfurt argues that the criteria of personhood demand more than just a certain type of genetic constitution. A person is a special entity whose existence is more

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profound than one's biological happenstance. Being of the species *Homo sapiens* is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of personhood. Conceptually speaking, the philosophic notion of 'personhood' is defined in a way that neither necessarily includes all human entities nor precludes all nonhuman entities from qualifying as persons. In Frankfurt's words,

Our concept of ourselves as persons is not to be understood... as a concept of attributes that are necessarily species-specific. It is conceptually possible that members of novel or even of familiar nonhuman species should be persons; and it is also conceptually possible that some members of the human species are not persons.¹

Now, if the biological constitution of an entity does not hold the key criteria for personhood, where should we look? Frankfurt postulates that in order for an individual to be properly counted as a person, she must identify with her desires in a way that is indicative of her having a (free) will. He defines a 'person' as an agent who has the ability to identify with her desires in a way that allows her to effect and select the motivations which move her to action. A 'person' is thus one who has the power to engage herself with her will while deliberating about her motivations.

Frankfurt maintains that it just so happens that humans appear to be unique in that they constitute the only species which has the capacity to properly identify with their desires and have a will. Although "[h]uman beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices," he states, "[i]t seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans... that they are able to form... 'second-order desires' or 'desires of the second order' [which is a necessary

¹ Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *Journal of Philosophy*, Jan. 1971, p. 6.

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condition for having a will].”² A “second order-desire” is a desire which makes mention of some other desire. That is, a second-order desire is a desire to desire something. To understand this notion, consider how it contrasts against a desire of the first order: a first order desire makes no mention of any other desire. If I want to eat a chocolate bar, go to the movies, participate in political debate or design a subway system, then I have first-order desires which push me toward action. There are many degrees of wanting within the first order. These degrees of wanting range from ‘not being aware of a first-order desire but acting on it unconsciously’, to ‘being fully aware of a first-order desire and going after it at all cost’ (including death). Also, one may be ambivalent about first-order desires, such as when there are two or more competing desires. Or, one may be sure about a desire when it “univocally” pressures her to act a certain way. The hallmark of all desires of the first order, though, is that they not make mention of additional desires.³ In contrast, a desire of the second order is a desire to have a certain desire. If, for example, I want to want to eat vegetables, or I want to want to do my homework, then I have second-order desires.

Besides just wanting certain things, humans tend to want to want certain things. To be sure, humans have first-order desires such as the ones mentioned above, but sometimes they also want to be the authors of their desires. On the other hand, nonhuman animals seem at most only to have first-order wants. They want to live, eat, play, etc., but they seem indifferent as to the kinds of wants they have. According to Frankfurt, humans are the only creatures that appear “to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.”⁴

Furthermore, Frankfurt maintains that there are two types of second-order desires. The first type of second-order desire is one that *may* move a person to action by coextending to a desire of the first order. But this first type

² Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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of second-order desire might also be “truncated” if it has no coextending first-order desire which gives it the motivational push necessary to move an individual to action. For instance, if I have the second-order desire to want to do my homework (that is, I want to want to do my homework), and I also have the first-order desire to do well in school (that is, I want to do well in school), then perhaps my second-order desire to want to do my homework coextends to my first-order desire to do well in school in such a way that I am actually moved to do my homework. But this second-order desire may also be truncated if there is no coextending desire of the first order. If I want to want to do my homework, but there is no desire of the first order to boost the motivational force of my wanting to want to do my homework, then I might decide to ignore my homework and do something else instead. At any rate, according to Frankfurt this first type of second-order desire fails to meet the standard of willfulness because, although it consists of a desire to desire something, it does not consist of a desire to desire something that is accompanied by an actual desire for that second-order desire to motivate action. An individual with this kind of second-order desire does not identify with that desire independently of any first-order desire.⁵

There is also a second type of second-order desire which is independent of first-order desires and therefore indicative of an individual’s willful agency. This type of second-order desire Frankfurt calls “second-order volition.” He writes that willful agency is “not coextensive with the notion of first-order desires. It is not the notion of something that merely inclines an agent in some degree to act in a certain way. Rather, it is the notion of an *effective* desire – one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action.”⁶ Second-order volitions are second-order desires supported and encouraged by one’s self. Accordingly, ‘persons’ are agents who identify with

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.7-10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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their second-order desires and willfully decide whether those desires are worth pursuing.

A creature which has second order desires but not second-order volition Frankfurt calls a “wanton.” Essentially, a wanton does not care about willfulness. A wanton’s desires move it without it necessarily wanting to be moved by them. Creatures which Frankfurt suggests may count as wantons include nonhuman animals, very young children, and possibly some adult humans. A wanton may be rational, but it has no real concern about the desirability of its desires. It is indifferent to the way in which its desires are ranked in relation to each other and it does not identify with a second-order desire independently of its desires of the first order. A wanton acts as a sort of arena for desires to compete against each other – unlike a person who acts as an agent having control over her desires. A person not only has reason, but she uses reason to critically assess the way in which her desires are ranked, and she orders this ranking appropriately according to her will.⁷

To elucidate the distinction between persons and wantons, we should consider the following scenario which Frankfurt uses to exemplify his point. There are two men incorrigibly addicted to a drug, say cocaine. One is a person unwillingly addicted to the drug, and the other is a wanton addicted to the drug. Neither of these men can quit his habit, but they are still markedly different. The wanton addict, on the one hand, has conflicting first-order desires: (1) he desires desperately to ingest the drug so that he can feel its effects, but (2) he also desires desperately to refrain from taking the drug because he knows that it has side effects which are harmful to his wellbeing. He is also, however, indifferent about which of his competing desires move him to action. He both wants the drug and does not want the drug simultaneously, but he does not care about affecting the ranking of these desires so as to bring one desire above the other. Rather, he passively allows the desires to sort themselves out in relation to each other by letting the strongest one move him to action. His passive nature is due

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

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either to his inability to self-reflect or to his total indifference about the quality of his desires and motives.

The unwilling addict, on the other hand, is also a man with two conflicting desires of the first order: (1) he desires desperately to ingest the drug so that he can feel its effects, but, like the wanton, (2) he also desires desperately to refrain from taking the drug because he knows that it has side effects which are harmful to his wellbeing. The unwilling addict is different from the wanton, however, because (a) he has an additional desire (viz. of the second order) to refrain from taking the drug because he desires to desire to refrain from it,⁸ and (b) he has a second-order volition since he desires that his second-order desire lead him effectively to action by causing him to will against ingesting the drug.⁹ Even if the unwilling addict fails to refrain from taking the drug due to the severity of his addiction, he is still a person because he identifies his second-order desire with his will and desires that it translate into a motivation which can lead to action.

In one sense, wantons might be free to achieve the object of their desires (e.g. if the wanton addict has an ample supply of cocaine at hand), but in the sense which is relevant to personhood, wantons are not free because they are unable to recognize the desirability of their desires and they are unable to affect the motivations which led them to action.¹⁰ Thus, nonhuman animals (and even some humans at least on occasion) are not 'persons' in this sense but 'wanton', not because they lack some basic freedom to do what they want, but because they lack the freedom to engage themselves willfully with their desires.

According to Frankfurt, then, there are three possible sorts of beings: (1) animal-like or automaton-like creatures that have only first-order desires; (2) wanton creatures that may have second-order desires but no second order-

⁸ The wanton addict may also have this second-order desire to refrain from taking the drug but he would not have a second order volition that identifies this second-order desire with his will.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

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volitions;¹¹ and (3) persons who have second order-volition which attribute to them a will.

2. Raz's perspective

In “When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive,” the first chapter of his book *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*, Joseph Raz argues that Frankfurt's account of personhood overlooks the importance of reason. Contrary to Frankfurt, Raz maintains that individuals are only truly in control of their actions when they are guided by reason, and individuals are only persons when they recognize and intend to act on the values which their reason allows them to realize.¹² In this section, I will elaborate on Raz's criticisms of Frankfurt's theory, and explain Raz's own account of personhood.

As Raz sees it, Frankfurt's picture of personhood is a messy matrix of desires without any reference to an authentic mode of agency. He suggests that Frankfurt is walking on thin ice by trying to explain how an individual is the proper owner of some desires but not really the owner of other desires. As mentioned above, Frankfurt claims that an individual owns the desires which she identifies with but not the desires which encroach upon her without her ‘willful’ approval. According to Raz, this picture is obfuscated by an arbitrary and unjustifiable disassociation of some of an individual's desires from that individual's self. Raz offers the following example to demonstrate his point.

When I want a refrigerator and also want a dishwasher, but,
not able to afford both, I form the desire—using Frankfurt's

¹¹ In Frankfurt's words (pp. 10-11), “[i]t is logically possible, however unlikely, that there should be an agent with second-order desires but with no volitions of the second order.”

¹² Joseph Raz, *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*, (Oxford University Press, 2006), p.3.

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formulations—to be moved to action by, let us say, the desire for a refrigerator, and not by the desire for a dishwasher, it does not follow that the desire for the dishwasher is not really my own, that I relate to it in the way an addict relates to the craving to satisfy his addiction which he resents and tries to shake off without success.¹³

Raz's point strikes at the heart of Frankfurt's account: it stuns Frankfurt's attempt to abandon ownership of some desires (viz. those of the first order) while embracing other desires (viz. those which translate into second-order volitions). I believe Raz is correct to think it absurd to say that an agent who decides to develop a first-order desire into a second-order volition simply because 'she must make a choice' among competing first-order desires is only the owner of her second-order volition but not owner of her the first-order desires which failed to reach the status of second-order volition. Really, it seems that all of an agent's desires are hers; it is just that when not all of her desires can be satisfied, she chooses to act on one rather than the other.

Raz also points out how Frankfurt's account fails to explain how an agent can truly authenticate a desire as her own. Frankfurt's focus on second-order volitions begs the questions: How can one know that her will is authentically the cause of her motivations and her motivations are not the cause of her will? How does one authenticate her desires as her own? How does one authenticate her authentication that her desires are her own? And so on. Of course, the trouble of addressing these questions within the framework of Frankfurt's theory is that answers will invariably fall into infinite regress.

Raz's conception of personhood hinges on two important interrelated causal distinctions. These distinctions are as follows. First, there must be a separation between an individual's self and her environment. This separation is necessary because it allows an individual to concentrate on her motivations

¹³ Joseph Raz, *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*, p. 18.

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despite external pressures coming from outside her. If there is no causal border between an individual's self and her environment, there is no way for her self to be unaffected by the pressures of the outside world. Second, there must be a difference between what happens to an individual and how an individual leads her life – and it is this difference which Frankfurt's account fails to address. This difference is necessary because it allows an individual to *actively* participate in the process of deliberation as opposed to merely holding a drove of desires like a container which *passively* waits for the most pressing desires to spring into action. If an individual does not actively participate in the deliberative process, but just passively holds desires and acts on the strongest, then that individual has no real way of identifying with her will and thus no chance at qualifying as a person. According to this view, one only qualifies as a person when she personifies these two distinctions; that is, when her self is distinguishable from her environment and she governs her desires. For without these distinctions, it would be impossible to act willfully.

The question is, then, when is it clearly the case that an individual has the power to act willfully instead of just succumbing to her strongest desire? As I have alluded to earlier, Raz rejects Frankfurt's theory of second-order volitions. Raz maintains that an individual who is responsive to reason has the power to act willfully and thus count as a person. Unlike volitions of the second order, reason allows individuals to hold beliefs about what is objectively good. Further, unlike Frankfurt's description of orders of desires, reason as the criterion of personhood does not preclude an agent from owning any order of desire. As Raz puts it,

to see oneself as subject to reason is to be responsive to reason to a minimal degree. That still allows room for one to believe, mistakenly, and even irrationally, that one is responsive to reason. And this would be enough to satisfy the condition of my core account. [...] The problem with Frankfurt's account is not that it is subjective, but that it is subjective in the wrong

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way. The key to my [Raz's] account is the objective notion of proper functioning, explained in terms of responsiveness to reason.¹⁴

Although an individual may act subjectively according to reason, she still acts on what she thinks is objectively good. What matters is not that the agent *choose* to act like she has a volition of the second order, but that she *recognize* the reason for her action as objectively good (even if her recognition is mistaken).

3. Watson's perspective.

Another interesting criticism to Frankfurt's account of personhood comes from Gary Watson in his essay "Free Agency." This section begins with a review of Watson's criticism, and then moves into a discussion about the alternative account of personhood that he supports.

Watson claims that Frankfurt's theory of personhood is fatally flawed because it arbitrarily asserts that the point at which an individual authentically identifies with her desires is only reached when she holds them as second-order volitions. Contrary to Frankfurt, Watson argues that an individual's capacity to have second-order volitions is not an indicator of personhood. Frankfurt's claim that second-order volitions are indicative of personhood is arbitrary because it fails to explain why an individual's identification with her second-order volitions is more authentically governed by her will than is her following through with desires of any order at all (including first-order desires). As noted above, Frankfurt depicts a wanton as an individual who is unable to have volitions of the second order because his desires (whether of the first or second order) ultimately decide which desires are to be followed by action. Since a wanton does not decide which desires translate into action, the wanton has no

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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will. Now, the problem Watson finds in this theory is that there is no clear or absolute distinction between the action carried out by an individual who is moved by desires of the first and second order, and the action carried out by an individual who is moved by a second-order volition. That is, while Frankfurt asserts that a wanton is unfree and will-less because its process of deliberation is no more than a battle of competing desires, he fails to explain why an individual who acts on second-order desires with which she 'genuinely' wants to affect her will identifies with those desires any more genuinely than she does with desires which do not stem into second-order volitions. As Watson retorts, "Can't one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to one's second-order desires and volitions?"¹⁵

Frankfurt's description of a person is problematic because he ascribes a special function to second-order volitions when really volitions of the second order may simply be desires of so called "higher orders." Second-order volitions only arise when the number of competing second-order desires increases to the point where one must move past second-order desires to a next level (third, forth, fifth etc.) of desire. So while a first-order desire is simply 'a desire for *X*', and a second-order desire is 'a desire to desire *X*', a second-order volition is really 'a desire to desire to desire *X*'. The way Frankfurt calls 'a desire to desire to desire *X*' a "second-order volition" rather than a "third-order desire" is somewhat misleading because it fails to explain the functional difference between a desire of the second order and one of the third, forth, fifth and so on. Watson underscores this problem with the following words.

Indeed, practical judgments are connected with "second-order volitions." For the same considerations that constitute one's on-balance reasons for doing some action, *a*, are reasons for wanting the "desire" to do *a* to be effective in action, and for wanting contrary desires to be ineffective. But in general,

¹⁵ Gary Watson, "Free Agency," *Mind*, Vol. 96 No. 382, April 1987, p. 217.

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evaluations are prior and of the first order. The first-order desires that result from practical judgments generate second-order volitions because they have this special status; they do not have the special status that Frankfurt wants them to have because there is a higher-order desire concerning them.¹⁶

In effect, Frankfurt arbitrarily designates one level of desire as indicative willfulness. This arbitrary depiction of personhood is distorted because it fails to identify the functional role that the will plays in the process of a person's deliberation and evaluation of competing desires. Looking at higher and higher orders of desires fails to be a way of discovering the moment at which an individual goes beyond the state of wantonness and grabs hold of some quintessential feature of willfulness that allows her to reach the status of personhood. The question that Watson now faces is: What is the quintessential feature of willfulness?

Watson explains that Frankfurt's description of the structure of a person's will is similar to Plato's description of the structure of a person's soul insofar as they both recognize that personhood involves a division between types of motivation. These two thinkers are different, however, in the way that they describe the nature of motivational divisions. On the one hand, Frankfurt claims that there are divisions among *levels* of desire. Plato, on the other hand, maintains that there are divisions among the *sources* of desire. Watson disagrees with Frankfurt and sides with Plato by stating that the division among motivational forces that reveals the essence of personhood is not to be found in a division between levels of desire, but rather it is to be found "among independent sources of motivation."¹⁷ Namely, the independent source of motivation that is the quintessential feature of willfulness and personhood is an individual's ability to *evaluate*.

¹⁶ Gary Watson, "Free Agency," p. 219.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

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Watson holds that persons can be moved by evaluations because of their ability to use reason. In order to understand the link between reason and evaluation, it is worth while to define the meaning of reason as Watson sees it. Watson's view of reason sharply contrasts against that of Hume who considers reason to be a sort of mental instrument which humans use to determine the most efficient way to satisfy their desires. Hume considers reason to be "the slave of desire." Unlike Hume, Watson sees reason not merely as a tool for satisfying desires, but as a tool for discovering value and thus allowing value to act as a motivational force. Accordingly, this view distinguishes between values and desires and maintains that each is an independent source of motivation. Values are different from desires for two important reasons:

First, it is possible that what one desires is not *to any degree* valued, held to be worth while, or thought good; one assigns *no* value whatever to the object of one's desire. [e.g. Tonya desires to hurt Nancy because she is jealous.] Second, although one may indeed value what is desired, the strength of one's desire may not properly reflect the degree to which one values its object; that is, although the object of a desire is valuable, it may not be deemed the most valuable in the situation and yet one's desire for it may be stronger than the want for what is most valued. [e.g. Tom values celibacy more than sex, but he desires sex more than celibacy.]¹⁸

It is important to note that the process of evaluation may involve an agent's seeing the value of something without necessarily desiring it (such as being celibate); and, conversely, it may involve an agent's seeing how a desire lacks value (such as hurting someone in a jealous rage) even though one feels

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 208-9; examples mine.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

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motivated to pursue it. Both desires and values can lead an individual to action. Since, however, sometimes desires contradict values and vice versa, and each has independent motivational clout, each must be an independent source of motivation.

Motivationally, the distinction between the conception of values and the conception of desires rests in the way an individual sees each of these motivations as an independent consideration which has the power to lead one to action. Reason is crucial to the evaluation process because it causes individuals to consider certain things valuable. And since personhood is dependent upon one's ability to evaluate, and one's ability to evaluate is dependent upon reason, personhood is also dependent upon reason.

Therefore, according to this account, a 'person' is an agent who "has the capacity to translate his values into action; his actions flow from his evolutionary system."¹⁹ A person is moved not just by desires but by values which he recognizes because of his ability to reason. Personhood is achieved by individuals who move beyond the *passive* state of merely acting upon their strongest desires and into the *active* state of using reason to identify courses of action that are independently valuable and worthy of pursuit.

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Concluding remarks

Each of the three thinkers discussed in this essay has a unique view of what it means to be a person. While Frankfurt claims that a person is an individual who acts on second-order volitions, Raz and Watson reject that claim and point out faults in Frankfurt's argument. Raz's view shows how Frankfurt underestimates the importance of *reason* vis-à-vis personhood. Watson further stresses the importance of reason and outlines the necessity of discerning between *values* and *desires* as independent motivational forces. Frankfurt raises the important issue of defining criteria for personhood. Raz and Watson follow suit by scrutinizing Frankfurt's account and suggesting their own criteria. The question that is now at hand is whether Raz and Watson have successfully provided arguments which support their respective definitions of personhood without running into the kinds of problems that Frankfurt encountered.

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Happiness and Freedom in Socrates and Callicles

Kristian Urstad

Callicles holds a desire-fulfilment conception of happiness; it is something like, that is, the continual satisfaction of desires that constitutes happiness for him. He claims that leading the happy life consists in having many desires, letting them grow as strong as possible and then being able to satisfy them (e.g. 491e, 494c). For Callicles, this life of maximum pursuit of desires consists in a kind of *absolute freedom*, where there is very little practice of restraint; happiness consists of luxury, unrestraint, and freedom (492b-c). Socrates develops his objections to Callicles' life of freedom by appealing to two myths once told to him by a wise man. I draw out what I think are the two primary objections and consider to what extent they might be seen to damage Callicles' position. I conclude that Callicles' view on freedom can adequately meet one of Socrates' objections but not the other.

Socrates' Myth-Rejoinders

As mentioned, Socrates' initial response to Callicles' "life of freedom" proposal comes in the form of two myths he heard once (493a-f). The myths are introduced on the heels of a crucial discussion about temperance, an important traditional Greek virtue. Socrates has just asked Callicles whether he takes an individual "ruling himself" to mean being temperate and self-mastering over the pleasures and desires in oneself (491e), and Callicles has responded by mocking such a view; self-control or self-mastery is for stupid people, he says. He goes on to state that a man cannot be happy if he's enslaved to anyone at all, including himself (491e). Socrates clearly takes this, and the myths which follow, with the utmost seriousness, as he begs Callicles not to let up in any way, so that it may really become clear how one ought to live (492d).

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A brief description of the two myths is in order. In the first one, Socrates speaks about those uninitiated ones in Hades who carry water into a leaky jar using a leaky sieve (where the sieve is meant to be the soul). And because they leak, he likens the souls of fools to sieves (493b-c). In the second, he tells of two men, each of whom has many jars. The jars belonging to one of them are sound and full (one with honey, another with milk, *etc.*). It is also supposed that the sources of each of these things are scarce and so attainable only with much toil. Now the one man, having filled up his jars, doesn't pour anything more into them and so he can relax. As for the other man, he too has the resources that can be attained, though with difficulty, but his jars are perforated and rotten. And so he's forced to continually fill them, all day round, or else he suffers frustration and pain (493d-494a).

In these myths, Socrates might be said to be putting forward two very general warnings to the individual immersed in the licentious life, namely, that his desires are going to be 1) insatiable and 2) disruptive. Let us henceforth refer to these as Socrates' *Insatiability Warning* and *Disruption Warning* respectively. In regards to the former, he connects up the desires in the person living licentiously with leaky jars which are insatiable because they can never be filled (493b). He reiterates this in the second myth calling the jars of the intemperate man leaky (494a). Pertaining to his second Disruption Warning, Socrates likens the soul (in the first myth), which is presumed to be the agent of the licentious individual's desires, to a sieve which is unable to retain anything due to the fact that it has succumb to thoughtlessness or unreliability and forgetfulness of purpose or untrustworthiness (493c3). He says that the soul with these appetites in it is susceptible to persuasion and to swaying back and forth or general instability (493a).

Let us draw out some of the implications of Socrates' two warnings and then of Callicles' responses to them, beginning with the Insatiability Warning. Socrates paints a picture of the licentious individual as someone in a condition who is not able to procure satisfaction of his demanding desires since they are insatiable. Since immediately upon satisfaction of his desires, they

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begin anew, this individual finds himself constantly running around; he cannot keep up with his desires and so is tired and frustrated and therefore unhappy (493b-d). Socrates obviously thinks Callicles' position makes him susceptible to this condition. He probably judges that Callicles' desires are too ambitious or expansive, requiring an unfeasible or overly-demanding level of external resources to sustain them. Socrates' implicit suggestion here seems to be that, since there might be a continual element of need or lack in the life he describes, Callicles' policy of absolute freedom of desires is not able to secure self-sufficiency, nor, as a result, happiness. It seems clear that something like this is Socrates' suggestion since directly upon completion of the second myth he asks Callicles to consider instead a life that is "adequately supplied and satisfied with the things that are present on each occasion." (493c) For purposes of an important future distinction, let us call Socrates' worries here about the insatiable life the *External Self-Sufficiency Criterion*. That is, one will be externally self-sufficient to the extent that one can *adapt* one's desires to suit external goods or conditions. To be more precise, since external conditions can make one's well-being insecure, i.e. one will be in need and hence not self-sufficient, one must be prepared to adapt or reduce one's desires in ways that make their satisfaction securable.

Let us now turn to the implications of the Disruption Warning in which Socrates speaks about the bad effects on the soul which have these insatiable desires in it. These effects are characterized as a kind of disruption of stability and as a general susceptibility on the part of soul to their persuasion or control (493a-c). That Socrates means something like this when he speaks of these desires and their bad effects is perhaps reinforced by his earlier explication to Callicles about what it involves for someone, not to rule others, but to rule himself. It involves being "master of himself, ruling the pleasures and desires within (*en*) him." (491d-e) Both the pairing of pleasures with desires and the fact that they need to be ruled, seems to point not simply to desires in general but to an especially insistent and perhaps irrational set, such as those typically associated with large cravings or lusts. Socrates then may be rejecting Callicles'

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view in part because it allows freedom to *all* desires, including these potentially disruptive ones. The supposition is that the licentious individual like Callicles thinks he is free in his pursuit of such desires but once he exposes himself to them he may become subjugated to certain internal effects largely beyond his control. This, in my estimation, is a key moment in the discussion since in warning Callicles about the disruptive powers of certain desires on the soul, Socrates might be seen to be transferring the contrast between slavery and freedom from the outer into the inner world of the agent. So, slavery or, being “inadequately supplied” is not just produced from having extravagant desires dependent on all sorts of difficult external conditions –which is what the External Self-Sufficiency Criterion cautions against –but *also* from the effects on the soul of certain insatiable desires. Thus it might be said that *complete* freedom, according to Socrates, not only involves adapting or restraining desires to suit external circumstances (i.e. External Self-Sufficiency Criterion), but also avoiding the kinds of desires productive of internal disruption. Let us call the latter then the *Internal Self-Sufficiency Criterion*. That is, one will be internally self-sufficient to the extent that one abstains or is free from those desires productive of subjugating effects on the soul.

We might see a paradigmatic example in Socrates regarding this connection between freedom and avoidance of certain desires due to their bad internal effects in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*. Socrates, in speaking to Xenophon after hearing that Critobulus had kissed Alcibiades’ good-looking boy, says of sensual passion, “Avoid it resolutely: it is *not easy to control yourself* once you meddle with that sort of thing.” (1.3.8, italics added) Socrates admonishes Critobulus for his imprudence and recklessness in daring to kiss the very attractive boy. Critobulus, Socrates claims, completely undermines the *kind of power* this kiss will have *over him* -he does not realize that he will *lose his freedom* and become a *slave* and end up doing all sorts of *foolish* things that not even a *madman* would care about (1.3.9-11). Socrates’ advice to Critobulus in regards to recovering from that kiss is to *take off* and spend a year abroad

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(1.3.13). Xenophon goes on to claim that Socrates had trained himself to *avoid* the fairest and most attractive people (1.3.14).

It should be noted that Socrates' intimations here concerning the persuasive effects of certain desires are quite in line with the tradition of popular temperance at the time.¹ Part of the reason for this emphasis on the constant exercise of restraint or abstinence in the practice of pleasures had to do with their perceived power of *subjugation*; one restrained oneself so as to avoid becoming *enslaved* by the strength of one's desires and pleasures. There have been many perceived forms of this subjugation; two such forms are particularly relevant here. First, there developed, from the late sixth century onward, a group of antitheses to temperance like madness, frenzy, drunkenness, *etc.* That is, pleasures were to be regarded with much caution since if one was not temperate towards pleasures, then one was susceptible, in one form or another, to "losing oneself" to, or being "overcome" by, them -which, in turn, meant a loss of freedom. Both Socrates' reference to a soul "swaying back and forth" due to the insatiable desires in it and his warning to Critobulus about becoming a "madman" from kissing the attractive youth might be viewed as representative of this particular form of subjugation.

Second, and closely connected to this, there has been perceived a further set of antitheses to temperance like folly, foolishness and irrationality. The dichotomy is such that if one was not acting temperately or orderly, then one was acting foolishly or imprudently in some way. Now the *Gorgias* text is somewhat ambiguous on whether Socrates is specifically trying to exploit something like a lack of rational agency or prudence in Callicles' position, however, he does appear, at the end of each myth, to set up a kind of exclusive disjunction between the *orderly* life and the unrestrained or licentious one (493c4-d2, 494a). True to the antitheses presented by this tradition, he even calls the opposite of the temperate soul a senseless one (507a). Socrates then may be unconvinced of any integration between prudent, orderly living and the

¹ Helen North details this tradition in her book *Sophrosyne*, 1966.

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largely unrestrained pursuit of desires. He seems to think that his confident interlocutor's commitment to resoluteness of purpose and planning for achievements (e.g. 491b) will, in some sense, be distorted by his licentious pursuits. Socrates' reference to certain disruptive effects on the soul by certain insistent desires perhaps goes some way in explaining this distortion.² That is, he may think that these effects will at times be such as to prove obstructive to Callicles' more longer-term purposes and well-planned life.

Callicles With Regards to Socrates' Insatiability Warning and External Self-Sufficiency Criterion

What might Callicles' responses be to Socrates' Insatiability Warning and to his subsequent implicit External Self-Sufficiency Criterion? Upon first consideration, the Insatiability Warning does not really constitute pertinent counsel for Callicles since it is precisely the element of the *having* of appetitive needs, the pleasure of the *process* of satisfying a need, that Callicles ascribes positive value to. Against Socrates, Callicles does not believe that people are rightly called happy who live in a permanent state of satisfaction; his reference to stones and corpses is sufficient to show that he does not think that people who are in need of nothing live well. Instead, he is adamant that,

...living pleasantly is this –in having as much as possible
flowing in. (494b)

² Irwin, *Plato's Ethics*, 1995, 107, thinks Socrates exploits Callicles' lack of rational prudence by getting him to see that the coward may be more successful in maximizing pleasure than the brave man. As I suggest, I agree that Socrates may be cautioning Callicles about something like the importance of rational prudence, however, I do not think he does this in the way Irwin proposes. Irwin's particular interpretation is, I think, overreaching. There is nothing explicit in the text that says Callicles' objective is to maximize pleasure, nor is there any indication that Socrates, in making Callicles admit that the coward is as good a person as the brave man, is offering cowardice *as a better rational strategy* than bravery. For more on this see John Cooper's *Reason and Emotion*, 1999, Chap. 2, Sect. XIII.

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Insatiable desires then, far from producing only misery, are –due to the continual experiential element they generate –actually a primary source of pleasure and happiness. Happiness, in other words, is not some static state in which all want has been banished, but a constant process, an everlasting succession of wants and satisfactions requiring the largest possible inflow.

But Socrates might very well concede to this and yet nonetheless call attention to the aspect of pain, distress or physical hardship generally thought to accompany this continually-inflowing, insatiable life. After all, Socrates does presume that the life of the intemperate man in the myth, he who tries to keep his leaky jars full, is one which requires constant work, day and night –a sort of Sisyphean existence (493e-494a). The temperate man, on the other hand, having filled up his sound jars, needs to give no further thought to them and can relax and rest easy (493e). In effect then, Socrates probably sees the intemperate man as a fool since he has no rest from the pain of what he has foolishly set as his goal in life –to be continually winning for his desires what they require.

Now, Callicles clearly appears indifferent to this element of pain or distress Socrates is appealing to. And understandably so, since this is something he himself has *already clearly recognized and accepted* as part and parcel of his conception of the happy life. Callicles never says anywhere the happy man is he who experiences pleasures and *no pains*; rather, he knows very well that his objective of ‘having as much as possible flowing in’ demands a requisite amount of accompanying pain or distress. In fact, he explicitly acknowledges this when he tells Socrates that when one has “been filled up and experiences neither joy *nor pain*, that’s living like a stone... .” (494b, italics added) We might see Callicles here as identifying pleasure with satisfaction and pain with desire or need, since filled up, a man experiences *neither* pleasure nor pain (see also 496d). At the conceptual level of desire-satisfaction then, according to Callicles, the prospect of pleasure looks to be intimately connected to the

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experience of pain.³ Mirrored on a large scale, that is, applied to life as a whole, what Callicles appears to be saying is that if one does not live like a stone, but instead, like himself, opts for a life full of desires, then, within that life, one cannot have pleasure without pain, that they will be present in perhaps somewhat equal proportions. This sort of mix is constitutive of the ideal Calliclean life –that is, where one is continually replenishing, and not simply replenished, where one is constantly emptying and filling, and not simply filled. Socrates' calling attention to the presence of pain then is no real cause for concern according to Callicles and, *in and of itself*, constitutes no real objection to his conception of the happy life. That is, the mere fact that Callicles' large appetitive life may be laborious and somewhat difficult to satisfy is in itself no argument against having it.

However, perhaps it might constitute an objection if Socrates means to be raising it on hedonistic grounds. That is, it might be part of Socrates' point here to try to show Callicles how his remedial conception of pleasure is wrapped up with *counter-balancing* pain. That is, Socrates may think that in order to maximize his pleasure, Callicles has to maximize the pain or distress which the pleasure is to remedy. But this counter-balancing pain or distress for a hedonist is of course bad. So, Socrates might be implying, the position Callicles appears to hold is a jumbled or self-defeating one.

Yet, although Callicles holds a desire-satisfaction conception of pleasure, where he seems to identify pain with need or lack and pleasure with satisfaction, he shows absolutely *no concern* about the admixture of pain affecting the net hedonic magnitude of the pleasure overall. Of course, one need not be sensitive to the antecedent pain of each *particular* desire in order to be a hedonist concerned with maximizing pleasure considered over one's life as a whole. But even here, that is, at the more long-term level, Callicles –against the

³ Socrates, in fact, conceives of pleasure in just this way, that is, as remedial, as assuaging a pain, or filling a lack, in the first of three arguments he presents to Callicles starting at 495c3. Callicles agrees fully with Socrates' conception there –a further indication he himself holds to this view of pleasure.

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more popular interpretation of him⁴— never says anywhere that his conception of happiness is that the more pleasures a man experiences and *the fewer pains*, the happier he is. Callicles, that is, never indicates that he is in any way concerned with keeping down the pains in proportion to the pleasures. Moreover, if he were some kind of maximizing hedonist we might perhaps expect him to say something similar to what the Athenian does in the *Laws* about matters of choice. There, in a description of a life closely resembling Callicles', the Athenian says that when faced with a choice of two situations, both in which pleasures and pains come frequently and with great intensity, one must weigh them and choose the one, however little it may be, with pleasure predominating (733c). Yet, again, Callicles never talks like this. Now of course nothing here is incompatible with Callicles holding a hedonist position. Certainly the presence of pains, or a large quantity of them, or the accumulation of great, severe pains, are all consistent with a maximizing hedonism provided that the intent is for an overall surplus of pleasure over pain. However, the only point here is that this sort of pleasure-maximizing is never made pronounced by Callicles; there is no sign of any attention being paid to Bentham-like variables such as the intensity and duration of pleasures nor is there anything suggesting a maximizing model's usual accompanying weighing and measuring. And this, combined with the possibility that the happy life for him may be one which comes somewhat close to having roughly the same proportion of pain as pleasure, might suggest to us that is not pleasure *per se*, but something much broader and vaguer that stands as the ultimate ideal for Callicles. One, that is, which takes as its primary end the cultivation of a life in which there is an everlasting succession of wants and satisfactions, where no further discriminations are made.

In any case, perhaps Socrates' point about the insatiable man in the myth is not that he must be forced to experience some pain or distress or even

⁴ Santas' description is representative of this interpretation: "(Callicles') conception of happiness is that the happy man is he who experiences pleasures and no pains, and that the more pleasures a man experiences and the more intensely and frequently he experiences them, and the fewer pains, the happier he is." (*Socrates*, 1979, 257)

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counter-balancing amounts of it, but that the hard life he chooses for himself will inevitably cause him to have his desires frustrated, and so he will not be self-sufficient and thus happy. In other words, the man in the myth will not be living the kind of life where, as Socrates says, he will find himself “adequately supplied” so as to keep his desires satisfied.

However, there seems to be little reason for thinking that this kind of life would pose any real legitimate threat to the invulnerability of the Calliclean figure’s happiness. There is little reason, that is, for thinking that the Calliclean individual could not, through his planning, resolution, bravery and execution, succeed in keeping his desires satisfied and feeling little frustration.⁵ And if this is the case, and he is able to procure the external resources necessary for his continually-occurring large and extravagant desires, Callicles seems to quite adequately meet Socrates’ External Self-Sufficiency Criterion. The notable difference would be that in his case, the fulfilment of this criterion would *not* involve *lowering* desires to the conditions available for satisfying them –like it perhaps does for Socrates, but by being able to successfully acquire and *keep atop* of the resources necessary for securing and satisfying numerous and large desires.

⁵ Hobbes might be seen to lay out a similar sort of position. That is, he seems to recommend a policy of trying to gain and establish ever more power, so as to combat likely future dangers and liabilities to one’s satisfactions of one’s desires (see *Leviathan*, Chap. 11).

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Callicles With Regards to Socrates' Disruption Warning and Internal Self-Sufficiency Criterion

Socrates' Disruption Warning and his subsequent implicit Internal Self-Sufficiency Criterion poses much more of a threat, I think, to Callicles' position of absolute freedom than do his concerns about insatiability. To see why this is so we need first to get a better sense of how Callicles conceives of the notion of freedom he boasts of. As mentioned earlier, it is, to some extent, presupposed by Callicles that anyone who restrains themselves from what they want is in that sense a slave and therefore not really in complete control of getting what they want. For him, the freedom to pursue whatever desires one has *just is* to have that full control. Callicles views his largely unrestrained life as one predominantly maintained by such qualities as strength⁶ and courage and a kind of cunning intelligence (and probably also by a certain degree of external resources⁷); he thinks he can get whatever he desires by simply enforcing himself in the ways suggested by these qualities. In effect, Callicles' freedom is a sort of bully's freedom. It is entirely representative of the more popular Greek concept of freedom, *eleutheria*, defined largely as *control over others*. The tyrant is typical of this, that is, as most free (*eleutheros*), for "*eleutheria* is manifested in ruling over others and in not submitting to the rule of others oneself." (Adkins, 1972)⁸

In fact, freedom construed in this way is one of the central themes of the *Gorgias* dialogue. Not too far from the start, for example, when he is asked

⁶ Note that Callicles' examples of natural right at 483d, all involve dominance by brute strength, though it is probably more accurate to understand strength overall for him in terms of some kind of political ingenuity or wisdom. For example, at 489c6 he explicitly denies it is strength he means by those who are superior and more powerful, and instead, he suggests later at 491c6 that "wisdom of ruling" is what he really intended all along.

⁷ Note, "freedom, *if sufficiently aided*, is both virtue and happiness." (492c3-6)

⁸ *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece*, 1972, 68, see also, 112. For allusions and references to the tyrant in Callicles' discussion see, among others, 483d ff. and 492b.

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by Socrates what great good his craft is responsible for, Gorgias replies, “It is in reality the greatest good, Socrates, and is responsible for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time for rule over others in the city.” (452d)

A further sign that Callicles is thinking along these lines is the blatant confusion he shows at Socrates’ question concerning whether or not the superior man ought not only rule over others but also *rule over himself*, that is, those desires *within* him (491d). He *three* times asks Socrates what he means by this question, which is not surprising if, like suggested, it is only this more popular notion of freedom he has in mind.

Now, such a conception is, in *one* sense, no doubt sufficient to block Socrates’ appeals to potential enslavement; since he has these strong, extroverted and exploitive qualities (and conceding the relative security of certain external resources), the Calliclean strong man will likely not find himself subjugated or even deterred too often. However, there is *another* sense in which Socrates’ objections could be seen to hit their mark. This sense does not so much concern the external control that Callicles might be said to possess over others and the environment, but the *internal* control that he possesses over himself and his particular desires. In what sense is Callicles internally free from the effects of the pleasures and satisfactions involved in his excessive living? What are the inner resources by which his largely unrestrained life is maintained? Callicles’ freedom, in this case, would not be said to be jeopardized by virtue of being dependent on others or on the external objects of his desires, but by the potentially subjugating effects (e.g. madness, irrationality) of certain insistent desires and pleasures in his soul. Of course he may *believe* he is free in pursuing such desires, but the supposition here is that, without the internal resources, the infection of his soul and disruption of his agency has already begun. Some years earlier, Democritus had insisted upon the important unification or symbiosis between certain external virtues or strengths and internal ones:

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The brave man is superior not only to his enemies but also to pleasure. Some men are master of cities but slave to women.
(B214)

Callicles is clear on, and unashamedly confident about, the successful execution of these external qualities, but completely silent in showing any concern (let alone awareness) for the psychological element in this connection. But it seems he would need to say something here in order to deal adequately with Socrates' doubts about the viability of control and self-sufficiency in a life of mass indulgence filled with all sorts of (potentially) internally-subjugating pleasures. This is not to say Callicles is not right in challenging Socrates' conception of happiness as one where, like stones and corpses, nothing is needed and therefore there are no unsatisfied desires. That is, it is an entirely legitimate point to question Socrates' implicit inference from self-sufficiency and happiness to asceticism or a life of desire-restraint. However, it is not clear Callicles has thought his position fully through; apart from courage and planning, he remains silent in offering up any further conditions for the preservation of his life of "absolute freedom" of desires. In this respect then he has not really shown that he is able to meet Socrates' Internal Self-Sufficiency Criterion.

Some Final Remarks

What is the significance of Callicles' apparent silence with regards to Socrates' Disruption Warning and Internal Self-Sufficiency Criterion? The matter is perhaps not so straightforward. On the one hand, Callicles probably senses that there is *something* to what Socrates has cautioned him about. After all, evasiveness, sullenness or simply dismissal or silence seem, throughout their discussion, to be some of Callicles' characteristic ways out of dealing with Socrates' more poignant objections to his views (e.g. 494d, 501d, 505c). Thus Callicles' lack of response to (what I have taken to be) the cautionary message

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in Socrates' myths might very well be seen as a signal on Callicles' part that Socrates has hit upon a particular soft spot in the his outlook

On the other hand, there is also a sense in which Callicles does *not* really seem to be affected or persuaded by Socrates' myth-rejoinders, and his silence is due to just this –lack of conviction. This is somewhat understandable since Socrates never really expresses his objections through arguments, but instead, by means of images. We might speculate as to why Plato has Socrates do it this way. Perhaps we are to understand Socrates as appealing to Callicles on his own ground, that is, as someone who is not guided by intellect alone, and who himself employs images to express certain doctrines (e.g. 492e). A more probable explanation however is that Plato himself, during the writing of the *Gorgias*, has not yet worked out this issue in great argumentative and substantive detail; or, if he has, thinks it requires too much of a detailed discussion of complex psychological matters to include in this dialogue. If this is right, then perhaps Plato intends the cautionary message in the myths (and Callicles' silence with respect to it) as a kind of intimation only, signaling to the reader that a more full-scaled treatment of the issue is to come in a later work.

This work is almost certainly the *Republic*. After all, the indications given by Plato in the *Gorgias* point in the direction that Callicles is to become a brazen tyrant, and in Book IX of the *Republic*, Plato has Socrates spend significant time describing the state of the tyrannical man. He speaks of the tyrant as someone who is “badly governed on the inside,” (579c) with a soul “full of slavery and unfreedom,” (577d) due to the acceptance or intrusion of certain insistent desires and pleasures, and powerful erotic drives (e.g. 571b ff., 572e ff.). In effect, these desires and pleasure infect the tyrant by filling him with a kind of internal madness (573b).⁹ All this surely recalls Socrates' Disruption Warning to Callicles in the *Gorgias*. However, unlike the *Gorgias*, in the *Republic* Plato does have Socrates enter into an extremely detailed

⁹ See Aristotle's *Politics*, Bk. 5, Chap.8, for a number of instances of rulers or princes being brought down by certain of their own passions and excesses.

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discussion of complex psychological material. The upshot of all this, as every reader of Plato knows, is the development of the tripartite and harmonious soul. This development surely picks up on or answers to, and provides a strong foundation for, the Internal Self-Sufficiency Criterion (e.g. in the healthy and well-developed soul the rational part feeds the appetitive part so it will be neither in want nor in surfeit and *disturb* the rational part with its excesses) (*Rep.* 571d-572a). Had Calicles also been privy to Socrates' discussion later in the *Republic* perhaps he would have taken Socrates' counsel and recommendation a bit more seriously.

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The Being of Intentionality

Sean McGovern

My limbs moved with a positiveness and precision
With which I seemed to have
Nothing at all to do.
(Gary Snyder, from John Muir on Mt. Ritter)

The philosophical relationship between Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl is a peculiar one.¹ In the third decade of the twentieth century, Heidegger was Husserl's protégé, expected to carry on Husserl's phenomenological project. In 1927, with *Being and Time*, though a book dedicated to Husserl, Heidegger made his diverging philosophical interests clear to his mentor. Husserl conceived of his phenomenology as the *a priori* science of consciousness, the ground for the empirical sciences. Tellingly, Heidegger mentions "consciousness" only twice in his magnum opus. Some have seen this as a sharp break with Husserl, although his phenomenological influence clearly looms large. Others see Heidegger as continuing Husserl's project, however past the limits with which its originator had envisioned. The movement from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is surely a long and complicated evolution of ideas. We will specifically look at the philosophies of these two as articulated mainly in the 1920s. The current paper will attempt to orient this transition towards the revitalization and reinvigoration of the notion of intentionality. We will explore continuities and differences in terms of the methods and aims that each thinker associates with the enterprise of "philosophy."

¹ I would first like to thank the "phenomena". I would also like to thank the philosophical community at Hamilton College and at large for support and intellectual stimulation.

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Heidegger claims to be doing phenomenology, though understood in his own way. Heidegger is apparently unconcerned with many of the central concepts of Husserl's system, e.g. the *epoche*, consciousness, subjectivity, etc. He writes of Being, Dasein, Being-in-the-world, and other neologisms. An important difference is how they conceive of phenomenology. Husserl thought of phenomenology as the rigorous study of that which is given to us in phenomenological reflection, in order to arrive at the essential features of experience. For Heidegger, phenomenology is a method through which one can apprehend the Being of beings. The uniting concern for both is the problematic of intentionality. Intentionality is the impetus for the birth of transcendental philosophy as well as the key to understanding its evolution under Heidegger's influence. We will see that it is due to Heidegger's phenomenological reconception of intentionality in terms of his ontological interests which leads to a fresh understanding of human experience.

It will be necessary to first briefly explore Husserl's phenomenological development. As Husserl was trained as a mathematician, taking his PhD in mathematics at Vienna in 1883, he was philosophically concerned with the foundations of logic. Under the influence of Weierstrass and Bolzano, he initially found psychologism an attractive view. He published *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in 1891, an attempt to find a psychological grounding for arithmetic. This view was criticized by Frege and the nascent positivist movement. How could a logic based in the operations of the human subject account for the seeming ideality of mathematics and the unquestionable success it has proven to be as the language of the natural sciences? The success of the intersubjective natural sciences seems to demand an underlying philosophy of mathematics that allows mathematics more grip on the world than merely the status of product of the function of human psychology. Psychologism can never escape its own vicious circle and produce a firm foundation for the sciences (inclusive of the mathematical sciences). Husserl took this critique to heart and his project seems to be thereafter a quest for the proper ground of the sciences, aligning himself in this respect with the great modern philosophical tradition. Clearly, however,

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Husserl was to add his own understanding of the problem and the result was a powerful new turn in philosophy, namely phenomenology. Ever the innovator, Husserl's philosophy was to continue to change until his death in 1938. Husserl was a very prolific writer who produced many thousands of pages of work. Accordingly, we will limit ourselves to the (traditional) conception of phenomenology as he expounded it in the earlier parts of the 20th century, mainly in the *Logical Investigations* of 1900/1 and *Ideas* of 1913.

His professor in Vienna, Franz Brentano is credited with reviving the concept of intentionality that was to influence Husserl so heavily. Brentano was interested in descriptive psychology and used intentionality to characterize the mental in the famous following passage from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 88)

Husserl took this notion of intentionality and its consequences in a philosophic direction beyond Brentano, from the earlier stages of a descriptive psychology of consciousness to a full-fledged transcendental phenomenology. Using Brentano's characterization of the mental as that which exhibits intentionality, Husserl outlined a picture of phenomenology as the priori science of consciousness. Eager to avoid the previous mistakes of the modern

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epistemologists, Husserl produced the program and method of phenomenology to study the intentional relations that make up consciousness.

As the name indicates, phenomenology is concerned with the phenomena, specifically as it presents itself in conscious reflection. We can have a wide variety of intentional acts (e.g. perception, recollection, belief) that all have immanent intentional content. With the perception of a die, we have the perceptual content of a certain extension and shape and so forth. If we look at the die from another angle or at another time, then we are dealing with a new perception that has different perceptual content. How do these two sets of perceptual content relate? The phenomena are different in each case, but patently there is still identity of the perceived, the die remains the same. Husserl clearly distinguishes between the intentional content and the intended object. We have immanent access to the phenomenon of perceiving the die, but no access to the die itself. We posit an ideal meaning of the die that fulfills our various perceptual contents. Across different perceptions we can still know the die as die. As we look across the multiplicity of intentional acts that we can direct at the die and examine the contents, we can “see” the essence of the die. “[...] and if now the theoretical eye directs itself to the necessarily enduring invariant in the variation; then there will arise with this systematic way of proceeding a realm of its own, of the ‘a priori’.”(Husserl *EB* I.4) By painstaking attention to the phenomenon as presented to us in immanent consciousness, Husserl thinks that we can have access to an “objective” sense of the a priori fulfiller of intentional content, an ideal correlate of consciousness.

In a rigorously theoretically articulated fashion, Husserl proposes a program of transcendental phenomenology that has as its goal phenomenological descriptions of what constitutes our world. “Phenomenology as the science of all conceivable transcendental phenomena and especially the synthetic total structures in which alone they are concretely possible—those of the transcendental single subjects bound to communities of subjects is *eo ipso* the a priori science of all conceivable beings.” (Husserl *EB* III.11)

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Husserl evidently thought that he had found a method, the transcendental phenomenological method, such that he could overcome the “dogmatism” of previous epistemological and ontological theories. In a very Cartesian vein, he thought that he had found the presuppositionless method from which one can deduce secure knowledge. Husserl employs the phenomenological reduction to filter out unwanted prejudice and preconceptions that come from the “natural attitude” of the human subject. A methodological series of reductions is necessary to take the phenomenologist from the concrete ego to the pure ego, that of transcendental consciousness. He believed that Descartes had made promising steps toward this realization, but had not developed a method rigorous enough to undercut all preconceptions and dogma. In the *epoche*, we let go of our preconceived notions about what exists and what does not, our natural inclinations towards the world. Thus, having reached the transcendental ego, one simply describes the phenomenon as it appears in itself, as the being of the phenomenon will bring itself into focus for reflection. His phenomenological method eschews a natural vantage point for that of transcendental subjectivity, armed with its apodictic certitude.

It is important to stress that Husserl (and certainly Heidegger) sees the phenomenological method as giving access to beings as beings. In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl’s sixth investigation treats of knowledge as a synthesis of fulfillment and its gradations. Meanings can be filled in different ways and to different degrees. A fundamental necessity for meaning is that we are capable to recognize something as something. With a complex form of intuition called the categorial intuition, one can apprehend a being as being. The categorial intuition allows us to differentiate between modes of being. For Heidegger, this was Husserl’s greatest breakthrough and his failure to fully appreciate its possibilities, his greatest failure. The categorial intuition lets us see Being as it is only ever through beings. As Heidegger writes, “Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. *Being is the transcendens pure and simple*” (BT 62). This is the methodological breakthrough that allows Heidegger to pursue his orienting

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question of the meaning of Being. Husserl supplies the method, phenomenological analysis.

While laying bare the structure of intentionality with formidable insight, Husserl passes over what was to occupy Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being. Husserl wants to use his phenomenology with the goal of generating a body of pure ontic knowledge, straightening out the different regional ontologies of science, but with an eye towards the ontic inquiry to follow. In other words, Husserl is more interested in epistemology than ontology. Heidegger clearly inverts this position, one that he claims has been held since the days of Plato and Aristotle, namely making ontology subservient to epistemology. "Ontology can contribute only indirectly towards advancing the positive disciplines as we find them today. It has a goal of its own, if indeed, beyond the acquiring of information about entities, the question of Being is the spur for all scientific seeking." (BT 77) For Heidegger, Being is the source from which all flows, and fundamental ontology is the way to approach it. "Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object." (BT 62)

Husserl does not ask the important ontological questions. Of particular importance is that he neglects to inquire into the question of the Being of consciousness, taking the ego for granted. This can clearly be seen in his conception of the phenomenological-transcendental reduction. Heidegger makes this explicit in his lectures at Marburg in 1927, published as *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

For Husserl the phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time expressly in the *Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the

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transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. *For us* phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed). (BPP 21)

This illustrates how their understandings of the reduction, and so the method of phenomenology, is intimately linked with their goals for what phenomenological analysis is meant to apprehend.

Heidegger was interested in the ontological difference, that between *Sein* and *Seindes*, Being and beings. Husserl clearly was not. In fact his method of reduction explicitly put the ontological question to the side. Hence Heidegger's greatest critique of the tradition, inclusive of his mentor, was that they covered over the question of the meaning of Being, the *Seinsfrage*. The project of *Being and Time* was Heidegger's attempt to consider the question of Being, however he had to first inquire into the Being of Dasein, the being that possesses the capacity to ask the *Seinsfrage*. The fact that his main ontological project was not completed, that he stopped after only two thirds of the way through the first half of his projected treatise, left many to believe that he was chiefly interested in the philosophy of existence. Even Husserl thought that Heidegger was lost in philosophical anthropology, as we will see. For Heidegger, there was never any doubt that his *Daseinanalytik* was not primary but just a step on his path to Being. Even if his project of fundamental ontology was ultimately not feasible, a major contribution was to inquire into the Being of what we ourselves are.

It is this ontological difference which sits at the heart of Heideggerian philosophy. It allows Heidegger to claim that all previous analyses of humans have always been ontic investigations and so have missed the fundamental ontological properties of Dasein that make us special. He claims that ever since

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Descartes split the world into *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, Dasein has been relegated to being an extant being like all others. In Heidegger's terminology, Dasein has been considered, *vorhanden*, merely present-at-hand. This does not leave much room for the distinctiveness of Dasein's Being and so completely misses an adequate phenomenological description of Dasein. Heidegger characterizes Dasein's mode of being as "existing", he goes on to elaborate on the differences between an existent and an extant thing. Heidegger remarks that "a distinguishing feature between the existent and the extant is found precisely in intentionality." (BPP 64) We will now turn to our attention to intentionality and attempt to gain an appreciation for the role it plays for Dasein.

Heidegger claims that the structure of intentionality is "grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of Dasein" (BPP 59). In contrast to Husserl, Heidegger thinks that intentionality is a feature of Dasein, not of consciousness. It is not a one for one substitution of Dasein for Ego. The move takes a property exclusively associated with mental phenomena and broadens it to a being. This allows intentionality to not only reveal extant things, but allows for Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-world, and the discovery of the complex network and web of signification in which Dasein dwells. This marks a significant change from the consideration of intentionality in an epistemological light to an ontological one.

In the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger outlines two different misinterpretations of intentionality. The first is an "erroneous objectivizing" of intentionality and the second is an "erroneous subjectivizing" of intentionality. The first is the "characterization of intentionality as an extant relationship between two things extant" (60). The subject needs the object in order to have the intentional relationship and vice versa. If we remove one, then the intentional relationship disappears. Heidegger's problem with this is that this interpretation "takes the intentional relation to be something that at each time accrues to the subject due to the emergence of the extantness of an object." (60) In line with Husserl, he argues against this view with the example of a hallucination.

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If one is having the hallucination that there is a large pink elephant in the room, though the object of perception is not extant, the intentional relationship of perception remains. One is still directed toward the elephant, though it is in an imaginary way. Before one can have an imaginary perception, one must still have perception. So, regardless of whether or not the being of the perceptual object is extant or not, an intentional relation can exist. He reaches the conclusion that the relation of intentionality is a comportmental relationship, belonging to the sphere of the subject. We must think of intentionality as a structure that constitutes the comportmental character of Dasein's behavior. This emphasizes the practical aspect of relating, a feature that will reveal much about Dasein's world.

Now, the danger is to assume that the intentional experiences belong exclusively to some private sphere of the subject. He calls this the "erroneous subjectivizing" of intentionality. However, since Dasein's comportments are intentional, as soon as Dasein *is*, then it is always already dwelling with the extant. This is where he critiques the transcendental subjectivity of Husserl. Heidegger accuses Husserl of neglecting to ask the question of the Being of Consciousness. He maintains that Husserl stays inside the subject and mistakenly takes it as basic. For Heidegger, Being is the primary focus of philosophy, more fundamental than the subject. Since Being can only be seen manifest in beings, Heidegger sees the need for an investigation of the being that can understand Being. He wants to give an account of the Dasein since it alone has the capacity to understand itself and therefore, Being. With Being as our focus, we can no longer pass over the Being of the subject, taking it for granted as some *vorhanden* being.

For those committing the second misinterpretation of intentionality, the erroneous subjectivizing, the natural question is how the subject with its intentional experiences relates to the world of extant things. Heidegger accuses the tradition of neglecting "the requirement to align theory according to the phenomena rather than the opposite" (BPP 62) and instead doing "violence to the phenomena by a preconceived theory" (BPP 62). It is as a result of this that

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the question of transcendence is misconstrued. He claims that the intentional comportment is really directed at an object. The idea that it is merely directed at a representation within the subject's sphere is not phenomenologically accurate and is a result of putting theory in front of phenomenological experience. "Intentional comportment itself as such orients itself toward the extant" (BPP 63). He maintains that when confronted in this manner, it can be seen that transcendence consists in nothing but the intentional comportment. He rejects the misguided problem of transcendence, i.e. how the subject steps out of its private box to relate to the outside world. Heidegger elegantly makes this point in a passage from *Being and Time*.

When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of being is that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character, but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if we understand this in the proper sense; that is, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world that knows. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining and preserving the Dasein that knows *remains outside* and does so as Dasein. (BT 209)

Intentionality has a bizarre nature in that it is not something that pertains wholly to the object or wholly to the subject, as these are traditionally conceived. The previously discussed two misinterpretations, each relying too heavily on one of the aspects (subjective or objective) of intentionality, lead to the *Seinsfrage*.

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When the being of the intentional is construed as an extant thing, we cannot characterize intentionality in a satisfactory manner. Heidegger's solution is to recognize that the mode of being of Dasein is existence. Intentional comportments belong to Dasein. Unlike Husserl and the erroneous subjectivizers, the intentional relations do not belong to a "worldless subject" split from its intentional objects. The comportmental Dasein is always already dwelling in its world. "It will turn out that intentionality is founded in the Dasein's transcendence and is possible solely for this reason – that transcendence cannot conversely be explained in terms of intentionality." (BPP 162)

Heidegger's reinterpretation of intentionality has led to its dependence on the transcendence of Dasein. Instead of the intentional relation providing for the transcendence from subject to object, originary transcendence is required even for the possibility of intentionality. This transcendence is a fundamental feature of existentiality that Heidegger characterizes as fundamentally being-in-the-world. The world in which Dasein is essentially grounded is a significant "discovery" in the history of philosophy. It is the background upon which things can have significance.

Before elaborating upon the worldhood of the world, it will be instructive to examine Husserl's critique of Heidegger's Dasein centered phenomenology. For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the cornerstone of his method. It is the way through which one can move from the natural world of objects, cares and concerns to the pure transcendental subjectivity. Without it one cannot do the radical science of phenomenology. Husserl thinks that Heidegger is still trapped in the world of things and persons. His Dasein analysis and existentialism is what Husserl rejects in favor of the transcendental ego and the investigation into the correlates of consciousness. Husserl believes that Heidegger has not fully grasped the radical nature of his phenomenology of consciousness, i.e. he has not seen the breakthrough of the *epoche*. As such, Heidegger does not do phenomenology in the proper sense, but is mired in philosophical anthropology or psychology. Heidegger makes it

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clear that intentionality is possible only through Dasein, an embodied factual agent. It is incoherent to talk of and analyze the intentional relationships of the pure ego when it makes no sense to say that it has intentionality. “Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only *because* Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is.”(BT 84) It is clear that Heidegger finds Husserl’s phenomenological position untenable and Husserl finds Heidegger’s position non-philosophical. Each one thinks the other has not gone far enough in phenomenology.

We will now attempt a preliminary characterization of the world and worldly subject. Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon and is an essential feature of Dasein. The hyphenated form is meant to help convey the idea that Dasein is not ‘in’ the world, in the same way as water is ‘in’ a cup. It is not a spatial relation, but more something like the ‘in’ of involvement, as in being ‘in’ love. In our everyday comportments, when we apprehend or encounter something it is never as an atomic unit. It is always already within a context. We do not build up from nothing part by part. “What is primarily given instead – even if not in explicit and express consciousness – is a thing-*contexture* [*ein Dingzusammenhang*].” (BPP 163) Many of these things that we encounter we use as equipment. We use them with a purpose, an in-order-to, to accomplish a task. They form an equipmental contexture that surrounds us. We are not necessarily aware of this equipmental totality in our everyday dealings. In our average everydayness, we usually deal with it in a manner that Heidegger calls *circumspection*, an unobtrusive and unthought awareness, where unthought means “it is not thematically apprehended for deliberate thinking about things.” (BPP 163) When we pass through a door, we do not explicitly think about the door handle. Stairs and corridors are not apprehended thematically, getting from one room to another is the only concern. The equipment is defined by its functionality, its in-order-to. A chair is a chair if one can sit on it. We are always already in an *envirning world* [*Umwelt*] which is the presupposition for being able to apprehend anything at all.

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The world is to be distinguished from a mere collection of things. It is not the universe or nature, a collection of things extant. These are, or at least could be, intraworldly. They can only be apprehended within a world, as our understanding of these extant things presupposes a world. Heidegger explicitly says that while the world depends on Dasein, nature does not. There could be no world without Dasein, but without Dasein there could be nature. The worldhood of the world is the web of significance, the contexture of the in-order-to. The world is not something that we build up as a sum of things, but it always already exists for Dasein. “The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious to it.” (BPP 165) It is only upon this background that significance can occur. This opens up the possibility of intentionality. It is only with this originary transcendence that any ontic transcendence, any intentional act, can take place.

Heidegger describes a variety of ways in which Dasein comports itself towards entities encountered in the world. When one is involved in accomplishing a task, say hammering a nail in, one does not think about oneself. The concern is placed on the activity, the hammering in relation to the head of the nail. We use the hammer and as such it is a hammer. This absorbed coping is a non-reflective comportment. We do not relate to the hammer as a consciousness beholding its physical properties. We hammer with it. In this, Heidegger wants to give Dasein a primary role as an activity. “Heidegger even goes so far as to proclaim that, in antiquity Dasein was understood as *praxis*, ‘as genuine action’.” (Moran 59)

Dasein’s mode of comportment changes during an instance of breakdown. If the head of our hammer suddenly breaks, we must interrupt our unreflective hammering. Our absorption is broken until we can fix the tool and return to the task. At this time there is practical deliberation. This representational mode of comporting has the Dasein removed from its tool as that tool no longer functions. Dasein reorients towards its equipmental totality in order to restore functionality. Maybe we will get some duct tape and fix the

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head of the hammer or simply get a new hammer. This mode of comportment is characterized by reflective states, figuring out how to fix our broken tool, but it is still oriented toward the in-order-to of the equipment, still in relation to the task at hand. We think about fixing the hammer so that we can get that nail in.

The mode of intentionality considered by Husserl, the detached theoretical mode of apprehension, is not discarded by Heidegger. It is clear that this is one of the most powerful and seductive modes of relating to the world. In this mode we find the avenue towards claims of knowledge and theoretical facts. In fact, it is with this that ancient philosophy truly begins as wonder in face of the world. Claims of primacy, fundamentality and privilege are where Heidegger differs with the tradition. This detached mode of reflection does not have any special claim to truth. When we observe something in pure curiosity or just look at something, we have theoretical reflection. When having this kind of theoretical comportment, Dasein is not oriented towards any tasks, there are no in-order-tos involved. Practical action has ceased and theoretical apprehension alone remains. To accomplish this, the object must be severed from its context, must be rendered an extant thing. It is important to note that before it can be considered an extant thing, it must leave its given context. Before we can regard the object as *vorhanden* and catalogue its extension and mass, we are always already aware of this being as a being. This shows that knowing the world is already founded in the more basic awareness of the world, the being-in-the-world. Husserl's reductions play the role of isolator. He breaks the standard relations of things in order to look at the essential properties of the thing. While this might have merit for theory and the formulation of science, it does misconstrue the being of the entity apprehended. Heidegger acknowledges that this kind of theoretical comportment occurs and has been very important to the philosophical tradition, but at the expense of the more basic being-in-the-world. In fact, this will be the basis for much of his later critique of technology.

Heidegger argues that it is practical activity that is primary to theoretical activity. He is interested in challenging the reigning tradition handed down from the Greeks that theory is purer than practice and as such should be

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privileged. We have concerned dealings with things that disclose themselves in our world. Practical activity allows us to understand our tools. Only in hammering can we understand something as a hammer. There are so many ways that beings project themselves and disclose their Being. Recognition of this multiplicity will later lead Heidegger to expound a much more robust view of truth than that of the correspondence theory. He goes back to the Greek concept of *aletheia* as the unfolding or revealing of facets of Being. Heidegger does not want to just invert the priority of different types of knowing. He is not just saying that practical knowledge is better than theoretical knowledge. He wants to argue that it is not knowledge at all that is foundational. In order to have knowledge, one must already have an awareness of the world against which the object of knowledge can make itself apprehended. Knowing is a founded mode of being-in-the-world. Husserl, like Descartes before him, never escapes his methodological solipsism. After the bracketing of the external world, it is not clear that we are ever convincingly led back to the shared world of everyday life. For Heidegger the world (in his special sense) is what is basic. The analysis of the worldhood of the world is a major development in our understanding of the beings that we ourselves are. It provides an *existential* of Dasein and leads towards its characterization as essentially Care.

As we have seen, Heidegger examines the concept of intentionality and sees its traditional interpretations as too limited. They suffer from an inadequate investigation into the being of the intentional. Heidegger grounds intentionality in the existing subject. The intentional subject is not separate from its objects, but always already dwelling alongside them. In contrast to the Husserlian model, intentionality is not a purely mental concept dependent upon representations. By regarding intentionality as a characteristic of a mode of being instead of a characteristic of knowing, a significant portion of human experience is opened up to phenomenological investigation. A non-representational awareness of the world is discovered to be the basic condition for the possibility of intentionality. We must already have the world in order to encounter things. The major upshot of reconceiving intentionality as Heidegger

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has done is that he can account for a variety of ways of dealing with the world from practical comportment to theoretical comportment. He argues that the extant nature of things is derivative of their equipmental quality. Cognitive reflection plays a role but it is not primary, as it is in practical activity that Dasein dwells and understands Being. “To intentionality, as comportment towards *beings*, there always belongs an *understanding of the being* of those beings to which the intention refers.” (BPP 175)

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