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Whose Imagined Community?

The Nation-State, Ethnicity and
Indigenous Minorities in Southeast Asia

Lily Zubaidah Rahim



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UNRISD, Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Tel: (41 22) 9173020

Fax: (41 22) 9170650

E-mail: info@unrisd.org

Web: <http://www.unrisd.org>

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Whose Imagined Community?

The Nation-State, Ethnicity and Indigenous Minorities in Southeast Asia

Lily Zubaidah Rahim

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Post-colonial imaginings

Southeast Asia constitutes a fascinating case-study of rapidly industrializing multi-ethnic post-colonial states beset by ethnic tension and conflict which range from militant separatism in Indonesia and Burma to the ostensibly stabilized state of ethnic tension in Singapore and Malaysia. In many of these countries, ethnic tension is often related to ethnic minority dissatisfaction with the national imaginings and its ideological underpinnings constructed by the dominant elite. The strongly top-down approach of the nation-building process is characterized by limited public debate and consensus on national cultural policies and the overlooking of contending national visions. The competing visions encompass the area of citizenship rights, territorial boundaries, cultural policies, national ideology and identity and models of political and economic development. The Southeast Asian experience clearly demonstrates that the nation-building project is a process that is influenced by colonial ideology, profoundly political, tendentiously top-down and subject to re-imagination.

One of the enduring legacies of colonialism in Southeast Asia is the ordering and engendering of ethnic identity based on the genealogical myth of common ancestryⁱ. Importantly, the conjuring of an historical homeland evokes powerful images of the natural ethnic familyⁱⁱ. Typical of the stuff that myths are made of, the myth of common ancestry does not need to be enamored with substantive content and accord with factual history so long as its ethnic members accept itⁱⁱⁱ. Recognizing the powerful appeal of the historical homeland, many if not most nationalist movements in Southeast Asia selectively incorporated aspects of genealogical mythology in the struggle against colonial rule and in the post-colonial nation-building process. Even communist nationalists were not immune from employing the myth of common descent. For example, Ho Chih Minh, father of the Vietnamese communist movement, proclaimed that, "*The North, Center and South are part and parcel of Vietnam!....We have the same ancestors, we are of the same family, we are all brothers and sisters...no one can divide the children of the same family. Likewise, no one can divide Vietnam*"^{iv}. Similarly, Mao Tse Tung in 1938 referred to the Chinese communists as "*...part of the Great Chinese nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood*"^v.

The paradoxical nature of nationalist leaders selectively appropriating aspects of the Western colonial imagination has been insightfully highlighted by Partha Chatterjee who, in extending the conceptual boundaries of Ben Anderson's^{vi} 'imagined community' discourse, posed the telling question 'whose imagined community?'^{vii}. Bearing a strong ideological and social resemblance to the colonial imagination, Asian nationalism has been described as being both imitative and hostile of western nationalism^{viii}.

With a population base of more than 200 million derived from more than 3,000 linguistic and sub-ethnic communities inhabiting hundreds of islands, Indonesia's post-colonial national boundaries have been besieged by centrifugal forces particularly from ethnic minorities in the outer regions. Inter alia, they generally perceive the unitary state to be economically exploitative and oppressively Java centered. In Malaysia, there is a growing restiveness within segments of the indigenous (bumiputera) and non-

indigenous communities against the predominance of communal style politics and the continuance of bumiputera-based affirmative action policies which have largely benefited the dominant Malay bumiputera community. After more than 30 years of bumiputera affirmative action policies, the Orang Asli bumiputera community has remained one of the most marginalized and dispossessed communities in Malaysian society. As Southeast Asia's most impressive economic performer, Singapore's multiracial ideology has long escaped critical scrutiny despite the authoritarian state's systematic attempts to maintain political power by the process of Sinification. Such attempts have begun to raise serious doubts about the state's ethnic neutrality and the propriety of its supposedly meritocratic policies in the face of the intractable marginality of the indigenous Malay community. In all three nations, ethnic minorities have exhibited high levels of relative deprivation and alienation towards the state that is dominated by the numerically dominant ethnic community.

Centrifugal tendencies and problematic ethnic tensions are also found in the authoritarian states of Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam and the democratizing states of Thailand and the Philippines. Paradoxically, Southeast Asia's entry into the 21st century bears strong parallels with the underlying ethnic tensions that characterized her entry into the colonial era of the 20th century. Without doubt, ethnic tensions have remained one of the most serious and intractable issues confronting Southeast Asian states currently mired in economic crisis.

The paper examines the post-colonial state's nation-building processes and management of ethnicity from an historical perspective so as to identify the continuities, discontinuities and emerging patterns in contemporary Southeast Asia. The extent to which colonial ideologies and experiences have shaped post-colonial national ideologies, public policies and the thinking of political elites, and impacted on citizenship rights of ethnic minority communities is investigated. Another pertinent question examined is whether Malaysia's ethnic affirmative action policies, Singapore's supposedly multiracial and meritocratic system and Indonesia's unitary state have served to maintain the hegemony of the dominant ethnic communities. Also considered is the extent to which the implementation of these policies and ideologies has stifled the nation-building process and is in serious need of reformulation?

The politicization of ethnicity in historical and comparative contexts

It is not commonly appreciated that many pre-colonial Southeast Asian states were richly textured multi-ethnic and multicultural entities that had established a tradition of assimilating Hindu, Buddhist, Arab and Chinese ideas and practices. The 'other' had historically become blended into the 'us' social fabric^{ix}. This was particularly the case in the kingdoms of archipelago Southeast Asia where extensive trading networks emerged between dynamic port cities such as Temasek (pre-colonial name for Singapore), Malacca, and Aceh and extra-regional cities in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. It was not uncommon for merchants from China, India and the Middle East to establish permanent trading bases and long-term relationships with local women in the city-ports of archipelago Southeast Asia^x. These inter-ethnic unions produced the *Baba Chinese*, *Jawi Peranakans* and Eurasian communities. By and large, ethnic identity and boundaries tended to be fluid and inter-ethnic relations were characterized by high levels of accommodation. This inter-ethnic accommodation was particularly conspicuous in the cordial working relationship between the Sultans and foreign traders who in the Malacca court were appointed to important positions in the pre-colonial bureaucracy.

With the imposition of western colonial rule, the multi-ethnic complexion of Southeast was dramatically accelerated by immigration policies geared towards meeting the labor requirements of the colonial economy that met the needs of the industrializing 'mother country'. In contrast to the pre-colonial era, the influx of extra-regional migrant labor from China and India and the internal migration of local communities into the harshly competitive and ethnically segregated colonial environment contributed to a heightening of ethnic consciousness. Chinese businesspeople were also encouraged by the colonial authorities to engage in commercial 'middleman' activities that the Europeans were not particularly

interested in. By contrast, the indigenous communities in British Malaya and the Dutch Indies were encouraged to engage in agricultural activities or forced to engage in the cultivation of cash crops. The institutionalization of ethnicity based on an ethnic division of labor, engendered the emergence of Furnivallian plural societies where the different ethnic communities ‘mix but did not combine’^{xi}.

As the scientific and technological gap between European and non-European societies widened in the nineteenth century, colonial rule was conveniently accorded with a paternalistic civilizing purpose based on the concept of the ‘white man’s burden’. This coincided with the increasing popularity of Social Darwinist ideas and notions of racial distinctions which became institutionalized in the racial classifications employed in the colonies. No doubt, racial categories served as a useful means of social control and social segregation and were integral to the colonial practice of ‘divide and rule’. In British Malaya, race-based laws were the order of the day and race categorizations were integral to the census taking process. For the first time, a large segment of indigenous inhabitants from the archipelago region in 1871 became classified as Malay, henceforth accepted as a legal category^{xii}. From 1881 to 1921, Straits-born or Peranakan Chinese in Malaya were classified as such until the 1921 census when they became subsumed into the category of Hokkien Chinese^{xiii}. Similarly, in British Burma the arbitrary census classifications of ethnic communities was demonstrated by categorizing many Buddhist Karens as ethnic Burmans^{xiv}.

The reluctance of the indigenous populace in British Malaya to become wage laborers in the rubber plantations and tin mines, as wage rates were lower than the real wage of peasants and working conditions notoriously harsh, prompted colonial administrators to propagate notions of the lazy native^{xv}. Typical of this colonialist genre, British colonial administrator Frank Swettenham pronounced in 1906 that “*Whatever the cause, the Malay of the peninsula was, and is, unquestioningly opposed to steady continuous work*”^{xvi}. By contrast, the Chinese were derided for being like “*bees who suck the honey from every profitable undertaking...It is almost hopeless to expect to make friends with the Chinaman (who)...do not understand being treated as equals; they only realize two positions – the giving and receiving of orders*”. Likewise, the Indians were ridiculed for being “*... oily in body, cringing in demeanor, maddening in speech*”^{xvii}. Writing about the local inhabitants in the Dutch Indies, John Crawford asserted that they were deficient “*...with respect to their intellectual faculties ...may be pronounced slow of comprehension...it must be confessed that an Indian islander of the best capacity is unequal, in most respects, to an individual not above mediocrity in a civilized community*”^{xviii}.

Christian subjects were often accorded favored treatment by colonial authorities because of the presumed civilizing influence of Christianity. Christian Karens in Burma enjoyed favored positions in the colonial army, police, civil service and the education system. As a significant number became wealthy landowners, barristers, teachers and traders, their relatively high status galvanized the Karen elite to imitate the British and view their community as being more modern and civilized relative to the other ethnic communities. Influenced by British racial discourse, they believed that their community was of Mongolian racial stock and civilization while the ethnic Burmans were Tibeto-Burman in racial origin^{xix}. In Malaya, the Peranakan or Straits Chinese community were generally given favored treatment and regarded as the dominant Chinese group by the colonial authorities. Proud of their status as British subjects, the Straits Chinese reform movement in 1900 enjoined their community to journey forth towards “*...the path of European advancement... identify...fully with the British...*” and become “*...true British heart and soul*”^{xx}.

Notwithstanding the dramatic changes to the socio-economic structures of Southeast Asia, the colonial authorities were careful to selectively maintain aspects of feudal society which could assist in maintaining colonial rule. In the Dutch Indies (Indonesia), the aristocratic classes such as the *bupatis* were deployed to assist in managing the system of forced labor for cash crop cultivation from 1830-1870^{xxi}. In Malaya, the Malay Sultanates were not only preserved but were bestowed with greater symbolic functions

as the British monarchical system became the model for the sultanate system^{xxii}. Elite schools such as the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar were established for the training of young aristocrats in the colonial civil service while the Malay masses were provided with the level of rudimentary education required to maintain their rural lifestyle^{xxiii}. To an important extent, the feudal orientation of Malay society under British auspices became ‘rigidified and ossified’^{xxiv}.

It is worth noting that the ethnic divisions and tensions generated during Western colonial rule were exacerbated by the relatively brief but tumultuous Japanese occupation years. In Burma, the nationalist Burma Independent Army (BIA), supported by Japanese forces, killed about 2,000 Karens loyal to the defeated British in 1942^{xxv}. The Japanese tended to treat the Chinese with brutality, due largely to their support of the Chinese resistance against Japanese military aggression in China. In West Kalimantan, they had massacred so many Chinese community leaders that it was difficult for the devastated community to rebuild after the war^{xxvi}. By contrast, indigenous nationalist leaders were generally treated with some measure of civility. In Malaya, the divergent war experiences of the Chinese and non-Chinese communities dampened ethnic relations particularly after the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP) sought retribution against Malays who had ‘collaborated’ with the Japanese. The brutalities faced by the general Chinese community during Japanese occupation years had a homogenizing effect on their identity as the distinction between Peranakan and non-Peranakan blurred. With the heightening of ethnic consciousness and tension in colonial Southeast Asia, it was thus not altogether surprising that with the attainment of political independence “...*the ghost of plural society lingered on as a historical medium*”^{xxvii}.

Importantly, the internalization of colonial racist discourses and other unflattering ethnic stereotypes - such as the lazy native, opportunistic Chinese, drunken Indian, quarrelsome Madurese, crafty Minang, were transmogrified into public policies in the post-colonial era. The controversial racial views and writings of post-colonial political elites such as Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed attest to this. In his controversial book *The Malay Dilemma*, Mahathir employed the biological and cultural deficit arguments of colonial administrators such as Swettenham and Crawford to explain the socio-economic marginality of the Malay community. Notwithstanding their projected image as champions of Malay interests, UMNO politicians in Malaysia have a long tradition of admonishing Malays for their cultural shortcomings and paternalistically advising them to reform.

From *Indonesia Raya* to Javanese *priyayi* dominance

Indonesia’s post-colonial nationalist leaders were acutely aware that the ethnically diverse unitary state located between the continents of Asia and Australia should not be centered around any ethnic or religious community so as to preserve its fragile national boundaries. Guided by this premise, the unitary state’s *Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesia) nationalist ideal resolutely emphasized the nation’s ethnic and religious diversity in the *Bhinneka Tunggal Iku* (unity in diversity) slogan. At the same time, ethnic identification was subtly de-emphasized by the post-colonial state’s refusal to apply the category of indigenous to the smaller ethnic communities and the national census to record ethnic identity until 2000^{xxviii}.

Central to the *Indonesia Raya* ideal lay the rekindling of territorial boundaries from the pre-colonial Sri Vijaya and Majapahit empires and the claim to all former Dutch colonial possessions on the basis of sovereign succession. It was thus argued that the territories of the pre-colonial empires and the colonial Dutch Indies should be included into the post-colonial Indonesian state. Furthermore, the calculated decision of Indonesia’s ‘founding fathers’ to establish a unitary rather than federal state system was strongly influenced by the Dutch attempt to exploit the colony’s ethnic diversity, manipulate the feudal elite and suppress the republican nationalist forces by proposing a federation of United States during the war of independence from 1945-1949^{xxix}. As such, the association of federalism with

colonialism, disunity and disintegration remains deeply ingrained in the psyche of many within the Indonesian political and military elite. Significantly, support for the unitary state was also quite strong in the outer regions during the war of independence. Booth has noted that dissenters to the unitary state came largely from those who had fought for the Dutch army (KNIL) and some members of the nobility who, having supported the Dutch, feared for their future^{xxx}.

Mindful that the unitary state not accord special status to any particular religion, the national ideology *Pancasila* expressed the establishment of an Indonesian state based on religion and the belief in God but did not accord special status to a particular religion, even though more than 80% of Indonesians are Muslims^{xxxi}. No doubt, early uprisings in the *santri* (religiously oriented) Muslim regions against the Javanese-dominated central government hardened the military's perception of Islamic-based movements as a destabilizing force. In 1958, the Muslim-based political party *Masjumi* was banned, and by 1971, Muslim parties were forced to coalesce under a single party structure. By the mid-1980s, Muslim-based organizations were required to renounce any intention of working towards the establishment of an Islamic state and to accept the *Pancasila* as a condition for legal association. It was only in the last decade of the New Order regime that cultural Islam was cautiously promoted even though political Islam continued to be discouraged^{xxxii}.

Moves towards greater centralization gained momentum with the rise to office of the Suharto New Order military regime after a bloody coup in 1965. Greater state centralization was integral to the New Order's consolidation against the supporters of former President Sukarno and its drive towards economic recovery^{xxxiii}. Re-centralization was also prompted by the growing oil, timber and other mineral resource revenues from the outer regions which in turn enhanced the financial power of the central government.

In tandem with the construction of Suharto's image as *Bapak Pembangunan* (father of development), economic development was touted as the New Order's main priority while politics was relegated to the background. Political party branches below the *kabupaten* (district) level were closed down and political activity was tolerated only during elections every five years^{xxxiv}. The numerous provincial *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* (Regional Peoples Representative Councils) were dominated by Golkar and appointed military personnel and supervised by a Governor appointed by Jakarta. By and large, local officials implemented the plans and budgets dictated by the central government^{xxxv}. In the authoritarian state dominated by the military and technocrats, regional dissent was barely tolerated and often harshly suppressed on the grounds of maintaining national unity. Additionally, the *dwifungsi* (dual function) powers of the military, which accorded them with military and socio-political functions, allowed it to penetrate right down to the village level.

While the earlier governments under President Sukarno were ethnically heterogeneous, with Javanese representation roughly proportional to their numerical percentage in the larger nation^{xxxvi}, Suharto's New Order regime became increasingly dominated by the secular-oriented Javanese *priyayi* elite. Constituting 66% of the military elite in 1965, the Javanese proportion increased to a sizeable 80% by 1982 as a consequence of recruitment and promotion policies^{xxxvii}. Power and legitimacy became strongly depicted in the traditional Javanese form to transform disunity into oneness from a higher centralized authority. The traditional Javanese *priyayi* ethos of paternalistically leading the masses, instilled in military schools, strengthened the power of the center and engendered suspicions of Islamists, communists and other egalitarian philosophies which appealed to the masses^{xxxviii}.

The non-Javanese perception that they had exchanged Dutch colonialism for Javanese colonialism and were subjected to a systematic process of Javanization was supported by the realities of Javanese political and economic dominance, diffusion of Javanese terminology, and the transmigration of hundreds of thousands of Javanese to the supposedly under-populated outer regions. For the non-Javanese, the

Indonesia Raya ideal of the ‘founding fathers’ had effectively internally colonized them in their traditional homelands.

Bumiputerism, Melayu Raya and the Malaysian Malaysia ideal

The modern Malay nation took shape when the community, galvanized by the aristocratic Malay elite, rose up in opposition to the 1945 Malay Union which threatened to erode the core markers of Malay identity^{xxxix} centered around *bahasa* (Malay language), *agama* (religion) and *raja* (royalty)^{xl}. The community was fiercely opposed to the Malay Union’s proposed termination of the sovereignty of Malay rulers and the granting of liberal citizenship rights to immigrant groups which threatened to diminish the community’s numerical status.

By and large, Malay nationalism movements of various ideological hues, sought to establish a Malay political roof over the structures of the modern post-colonial state^{xli}.

Even left-wing Malay nationalist groups such as Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Union of Malay Youth), Patai Kebangsaan Melayu (Malay Nationalist Party) and Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API, Conscious Youth Force) forcefully advocated that Malays and other bumiputeras had legitimate claims to special rights and championed the supremacy of Malay culture and language in the post-colonial state. Their Malay-centered nationalism, strongly fuelled by the socio-economic marginality of the community, prompted left nationalists such as Ishak Haji Muhammad from the Malay Nationalist Party to call for the termination of “...the Malays [from] being exploited by other races”^{xlii}. To an important extent, Malay nationalism was and continues to be defined in opposition to non-Malays. This is not surprising in view of the fact that other left-wing nationalist parties and movements also took on a distinctly ethnic tone. For example, the predominantly Chinese Malayan Community Party (MCP) was strongly oriented towards China, failed to initiate serious attempts to project a multiracial image and was not particularly sensitive to Malay concerns. Illustrative of this insensitivity, the MCP, in a 1956 memorandum to the Reid Commission, called for the special position of the Malays to be abolished^{xliii}.

In contrast to the aristocratic Malay nationalists from the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), left Malay nationalists did not envision a central role for the Malay royalty in the independent nation and openly criticized the Sultans and Malay chiefs for cooperating with the British^{xliv}. Inspired by republican Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno and particularly by the latter’s *Indonesia Raya* ideal, the Malay left championed the *Melayu Raya* ideal which advocated the political union between the colonial territories of the Dutch Indies and British Malaya. Significantly, Soenarno has explained the Malay left’s enthusiasm for the *Melayu Raya* ideal within the larger Pan Indonesian state as a means of countering the potential domination of the Chinese community^{xlv}.

In establishing a historical case for the *Melayu Raya* concept, the boundaries of the pre-colonial Sri Vijaya and Malaccan Empires were regaled and reclaimed. The push for the *Melayu Raya* ideal was given a boost when left Malay nationalists such as Ibrahim Yaacob convinced the retreating Japanese to grant independence to Malaya within the framework of an independent *Indonesia Raya*. Additionally, Indonesian republican nationalists preparing the Jakarta Charter of June 1945 referred to Malaya as a province of Greater Indonesia while Sukarno declared to Ibrahim Yaacob during a fleeting visit to Malaya in early August 1945, “Let us form one single motherland for all the sons of Indonesia”^{xlvi}. In reality, the *Melayu Raya* nation-of-intent was never enthusiastically received by the largely conservative and feudal oriented Malay community who were more comfortable with the vision and leadership provided by the feudal elite in UMNO^{xlvii}.

Wary of the *Melayu Raya* ideal and left Malay nationalist links with republican nationalists in Indonesia, the British were keen to ensure that the aristocratic Malay nationalists from UMNO and their ethnic coalition Alliance partners assumed the reigns of government upon independence. In the mould of

the colonial plural society model, the ethnic-based political coalition of the Alliance party was based on the assumption that the respective ethnic communities were best represented by their political elite. The conservative feudal complexion of UMNO was reinforced when Tunku Abdul Rahman, a prince from the state of Kedah, became UMNO's second President and subsequently the nation's first Prime Minister. Working on the assumption that the model left by the British was fundamentally sound, UMNO and its Alliance partners pursued policies which maintained the economic status quo and adopted the federal state system. This model rested on the premise that the Malays were satisfied with being relegated to the agrarian sectors while the Chinese and other non-Malays would continue to be the dominant actors in the modern economy. This profoundly misguided assumption was contradicted by the outbreak of the race riots in May 1969 and the subsequent implementation of the ethnic-based affirmative action programs under the aegis of the New Economic Policy (1970-1990).

Typical of most post-colonial states in Southeast Asia, the Malaysian state was to become more powerful and centralized than its colonial predecessor. Without doubt, the communist insurgency from 1948-1960 and 1969 race riots assisted in facilitating this process of state centralization. Political space was narrowed with the implementation of legislation such as the 1966 Societies Act, 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act, 1971 Sedition Act^{xlviii}, 1972 Official Secrets Act, 1988 Printing Presses and Publications Act. Draconian detention without trial laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) inherited from the British were preserved. In particular, the separation of powers principle has been severely undermined by the strengthening of the executive under Mahathir Mohammad's Prime Ministership. Facilitated by the New Economic Policy, the state has also become more interventionist in economic terms.

While non-bumiputeras were accorded citizenship upon independence, they had to contend with the constitutionally enshrined special position of Islam as the state religion, the special status of royal families^{xlix}, Malay as the national language and the special rights of the bumiputera community. The location of Malay identity as the core national identity continues to be challenged by both the non-Malay bumiputera and non-bumiputera communities. Non-Malay bumiputera grievance stems from their failure to strengthen their bumiputera rights acquired during the colonial period. Instead they experienced a diminution in status in the Malay-dominated post-colonial state. Their calls for Christianity and other 'native religions' to be granted equal status to Islam have not been seriously considered by the UMNO-dominated *Barisan Nasional* government. By contrast, radical Islamists from the Malay-based political party Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) have championed for a national identity which is more Islamic and are opposed to the secular orientation of the political and judicial system.

The more strident non-bumiputera elements from both the political left and right have long challenged the legitimacy of bumiputera rights. For example, Chinese representatives in the colonial Straits Settlements Legislative Council demanded equal treatment with the indigenous Malays and even questioned the indigenous status of Malays^l. In the post-colonial era, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP) and other Chinese-based organizations have called for the equal rights and status of all ethnic cultures under the Malaysian Malaysia slogan^{li, lii}. Non-Malay grievances have been exacerbated by the implementation of comprehensive affirmative action policies since the 1970 New Economic Policy (NEP), largely geared towards strengthening the socio-economic standing of the bumiputera communities. Importantly, the wide-ranging programs of the NEP represent a markedly new direction in nation-building and have provided bumiputerism with a meaning that extends beyond the cultural and political by venturing into the economic spheres. The Chinese community have purportedly become more culturally homogenous with the blurring of distinctions between the Peranakan and non-Peranakan Chinese in the face of perceived state discrimination^{liii} and the prospect of a diminution in Chinese cultural identity^{liiv}. Furthermore, the creeping Islamization of the state has resulted in non-Muslim communities, both indigenous and non-indigenous, feeling threatened, alienated and defensive.

A clear manifestation of the multi-pronged Chinese resistance to the NEP's cultural policies which promote the national language *Bahasa Melayu*, can be found in the dramatic increase in Chinese enrolments into independent primary and secondary Chinese schools. They have effectively served as a shadow education system. Enrolments into Chinese secondary schools increased from 18,500 in 1972 to 50,000 in 1986^{lv}. At present, 88% of Chinese children attend Chinese primary schools^{lvi}. Upon completing their Chinese secondary education, many pursue tertiary studies at universities in the West or study at the local colleges with a twinning relationship to western universities. A major factor in assisting the viability of Chinese education is the prevalent usage of Mandarin and dialects in the private sector. The Chinese language thus continues to be an important source of cultural capital because of the community's economic clout.

The lack of success of the national education system in qualitatively improving inter-ethnic relations has been demonstrated by a recent University of Malaya survey which revealed that over 95% of undergraduates interact only with students of the same ethnic group and commonly refuse to share hostel rooms with those of other ethnicities^{lvii}. In an attempt to encourage inter-ethnic mixing in the education system, the government in 2000 proposed the creation of Vision Schools. These schools would allow primary schools that teach in three different languages (Malay, Mandarin, Tamil) to share common facilities such as canteens and sports facilities but still remain independent of one another. However, this proposal has been rejected by Chinese educational bodies such as Dong Jiao Zhong on the grounds that the Vision Schools subvert the right of ethnic minorities to study in their mother tongue^{lviii}.

Taking full advantage of the ruling Barisan National government's indebtedness to the Chinese community for their electoral support in the 1999 Federal elections, the Chinese community group Suqui in 2000 boldly called for an end to bumiputera privileges and the introduction of meritocracy. The Chinese community's political clout has been enhanced further by the widening divisions within the Malay community as a result of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's sacking and imprisonment. Having lost an additional state in the 1999 elections to the opposition Parti Islam and a by-election to Keadilan in the Kedah seat of Lunas, UMNO has had to become more sensitive to the concerns of the Chinese. However, the concerns of other ethnic minorities without comparable economic resources and electoral clout, such as the Indians and non-Malay bumiputeras in Peninsula Malaysia, have remained unheard.

Multiracialism and Chinese Dominance in Singapore

Singapore's national identity has been strongly shaped by its colonial past, brief but tumultuous merger experiences and subsequent roller-coaster relationship with Malaysia and its unique status as the only country in Southeast Asia that is numerically dominated by the Chinese^{lix} and the worldview of the Peoples Action Party (PAP) that has governed the island since 1959. The Chinese-dominated island lies at the very heart of a Malay-speaking region, between the larger and densely-populated nations of Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the south. In some respects, the former British colonies of Singapore and Malaysia are mirror images of one another. Their inter-connected histories and capricious relationship has led to them being metaphorically described as inseparable twins, siblings in perpetual rivalry, a divorced couple still at odds with each other and neighbors of a semi-detached house. It is thus not possible to fully understand the island republic without placing it within the context of its neighbor to the north.

Like many colonial settler societies uncomfortable with the question of indigenous dispossession and enduring marginality, Singapore's pre-colonial identity has been downplayed while its colonial heritage is celebrated. As such, the British imperial agent Thomas Stamford Raffles is regarded as the heroic and visionary founder of modern Singapore and his arrival in 1819 commonly marks the beginning of the 'Singapore Story'. Similarly, the presence of the Chinese on the island since pre-colonial times has been highlighted by emphasizing the archaeological findings of Chinese artifacts at Fort Canning^{lx}. By contrast, Singapore's pre-colonial Malay history as a thriving trading port called Temasek when it was

part of the Sri Vijaya Empire, has been relegated to the realms of myth. Importantly, the propagation of the idea of an island virtually uninhabited and devoid of a memorable past prior to the arrival of Raffles in 1819 serves to deny any future claims by the indigenous populace or neighboring states of a primal claim to a homeland^{lxv}. Singapore's first Prime Minister and current Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly pronounced that none of the major races could claim to be more native than the others^{lxvii}.

Elected to government largely by the critical support of left-wing trade unions and organizations, the PAP under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew worked tirelessly for the merger of Singapore within the larger Malaysia federation. This goal was not only premised on the belief that Singapore as an independent entity was economically unviable but was also geared towards saving the political future of the PAP particularly when left-wing unionists and other activists defected en masse from the party in the early 1960s. Reduced to a mere skeleton in the hands of the English educated leadership, the PAP was now robbed of the pretence of being a party with mass-base support and in dire need of reinforcement

Initially lukewarm towards the idea of Singapore's inclusion into the Federation because its Chinese make-up would upset the delicate numerical balance on the mainland, the Alliance leadership finally agreed to Singapore's inclusion when the British colonial authorities included the largely bumiputera populated Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak into the proposed Federation. No doubt, the Alliance leadership's fear of the election of a left-wing government in Singapore and the prospect of a Cuba at Malaysia's doorstep helped to tip the balance in favor of merger.

Sensitive to the UMNO leadership's unease with Singapore's predominantly Chinese complexion, the PAP leadership expediently downplayed the island's Chineseness by appointing a Malay as Head of State, promoting Malay education and the Malay language as the national language of Singapore. To Malayize the Singaporean populace, all Singaporean students were required to study Malay as a second language. The first Malay secondary school named Sang Nila Utama was established in 1961 and by 1965, 13 Malay secondary schools had been built. For the first time in the island's history, Malay medium education was offered to students from primary to pre-university level^{lxviii}.

Shortly after Singapore's merger into the larger Federation of Malaysia in 1963, relations between the UMNO-dominated government in Kuala Lumpur and the PAP state government deteriorated when it became increasingly obvious that the PAP leadership harbored political ambitions that extended beyond the island. After its near disastrous performance in the 1964 Federal elections dashed any ambitions it had of replacing the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in the Alliance coalition, the PAP leadership moved to directly challenge the political dominance of the Alliance government. This was executed under the auspices of the PAP-led Malaysian Solidarity Convention which ostensibly championed the building of a multiracial Malaysian Malaysia. Having previously questioned the validity of Malay indigenous status, the PAP leadership now vociferously questioned Malay political hegemony by arguing that Malay privileges were economic and social and not political^{lxix}. Not surprisingly, many Malays saw the PAP's Malaysian Malaysia campaign as an affront to their history, culture and status.

Writers such as Tremewan have noted that the PAP's Malaysian Malaysia campaign was strongly calculated to exploit the communal sentiments and insecurities of non-Malays under the guise of multiracialism^{lxx}. This perspective has been supported by Lee's biographer Josey who wrote that Lee's emotional display at a press conference upon Singapore's expulsion from the Federation in August 1965 were tears shed for the Chinese that had been left behind in Malaysia^{lxxi}. The perspective that the PAP leadership had expertly manipulated ethnicity and ethnic politics to suit its political interests has been reinforced by the communal direction of Singapore's trajectory since 1965.

While the trauma and crisis of separation from Malaysia constitutes a defining political moment in Singapore's modern history, the ideology of multiracialism, which ostensibly accords equal rights to all

ethnic communities, has become a founding national myth in the island republic. Indeed, the national pledge categorically states that all Singaporeans regardless of race, language or religion shall be treated equally and fairly. Inter alia, the multiracial ideology allows the state to claim a neutral status that is above ethnic partisanship.

To discerning observers of Singapore's social policies, the systematic promotion of ethnic consciousness and maintenance of rigid ethnic boundaries whilst engendering a cohesive national identity appears contradictory and paradoxical. Each Singaporean is assigned to one of the four racial categories (Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others) which is inscribed in their identity cards and a 'mother tongue' which they are expected to be proficient in. Thus Sri Lankans and Pakistanis are classified as Indians and accorded Tamil as their mother tongue even though they may not speak it. Similarly, the distinctively rich and unique culture of the Peranakan or Straits Chinese community has been adulterated by subsuming their ethnic identity to the Chinese racial category even though they have traditionally integrated aspects of Malay culture ranging from language, cuisine, dress style and can often trace a Malay ancestor in the family tree. The homogenization of ethnic identity has had the effect of stalling the cultural transmission of Peranakan culture to younger generation Peranakan who appear to be more inclined to assume a Chinese identity. Based on the premise that it is both natural and desirable for each citizen to belong to one race, the situational selection of race or ethnicity is thus not encouraged by the state. This rigid concept of race contradicts the more inclusive and flexible Malay understanding of identity which is linked to Islam and *adat* (custom). As such, it is theoretically possible to *masuk Melayu* (become Malay) by embracing Islam and practicing Malay *adat*.

The tumultuous events surrounding merger and separation facilitated the systematic promotion of Lee Kuan Yew as the father of independent Singapore, and the PAP as the indispensable guardians of the nation^{lxvii}. By 1982, the PAP was elevated to the status of a national movement and the embodiment of modern Singapore. In the same year, the PAP journal *Petir* declared that "*The PAP is the vital nerve center of the entire nation...Without the PAP, there will be no Singapore as we know it today, as the Secretary General comrade Lee Kuan Yew has stated, "I make no apologies that the PAP is the government and the government is the PAP"*^{lxviii}. Without doubt, the PAP government's status has been buttressed by the transformation of the resource poor island into Southeast Asia's most successful economy that has been repeatedly ranked by agencies such as the World Economic Forum as one of the most competitive economies in the world. The legitimacy of the PAP is thus strongly performance based.

The implementation of unpopular policies has been justified by exploiting the crisis discourse. The discourse is used to continually remind Singaporeans of the island's small size, limited talent pool, lack of natural resources, economic vulnerabilities, cultural pollution from the West, and the vulnerabilities associated with being a predominantly affluent Chinese nation in a sea of less prosperous and potentially hostile Malay-Muslim nations. Periodic attacks against Chinese communities in Southeast Asia have been given prominent coverage by the government-controlled media while Malaysia's bumiputera affirmative action policies have generally been reported in a negative light. Importantly, the massaging of Singaporean Chinese insecurity serves to enhance the stature of the PAP government as the guardian of Chinese interests in a volatile Malay-Muslim region. It has also allowed the PAP government to marshal considerable public support in its periodic bouts of discord with neighboring Malay nations. In the post-Cold War era of diminishing communist bogeys, the existence of detention without trial legislation such as the Internal Security Act has been justified as a necessary tool in combating communalists and containing ethnic tension^{lxix}.

The multiracial credentials of the PAP government have been severely tested by the promotion of Mandarin and Confucianism and by the maintenance of Chinese numerical dominance, which have enhanced the Chineseness of the island republic. In particular, the 'Speak Mandarin Campaign' and the introduction of the Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools, where Mandarin would be taught as a first

language, represented a watershed in the state's multiracial and equal status approach towards cultural policy making. Instructively, while Chinese students were compelled to study Mandarin as their 'mother tongue', non-Chinese students were allowed the choice of studying their 'mother tongue' or Mandarin. The emphasis on Mandarin can be attributed to the PAP leadership's belief that it is an effective transmitter of positive Confucian values which are supposedly responsible for Singapore's economic success and social discipline^{lxx}. Fluency in Mandarin is also deemed to be instrumental in tapping into the large mainland Chinese market and a means of facilitating *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships) between Singaporean business people and Chinese officials. Additionally, the promotion of Mandarin represents an expedient means of offering symbolic cultural goods to the numerically dominant Chinese community, and of appeasing the Chinese educated after Nanyang University was integrated with the University of Singapore in 1980.

A clear example of the dereliction of the multiracial ideal is the population policy of encouraging Chinese to migrate to Singapore to make up for the low fertility rates of the Chinese community viz-a-viz the Malay and Indian communities. The PAP government's preoccupation with maintaining the numerical dominance of the Chinese was acknowledged by Lee Kuan Yew in 1988 when he identified the declining birth rate of the Chinese as one of the three pressing national problems that required redress. A believer of eugenicist and biological determinist ideas, Lee has on numerous occasions purported that Singapore's economic dynamism stems largely from the positive Chinese cultural traits of thrift and diligence. By contrast, indigenous Southeast Asians have been described as "*a jolly people, they sing, they dance*"^{lxxi}. Exposing his biological determinist assumption, Lee declared in 1992 that Malays could never perform better than the Chinese in mathematics: "*If you pretend that ...in fact (the Malays) can score as well as the Chinese in Maths, then you have created yourself an enormous myth which you are stuck with*"^{lxxii}.

A critical examination of the practice of Singapore's multiracial ideology particularly from the late 1970s, reveals startling similarities with Malaysia's overt communal based political and social policies based on Malay dominance. In Singapore, Chinese dominance has been systematically maintained by the PAP notwithstanding its claim of promoting a multiracial and meritocratic society. Arguably, the major difference between the communal practices of both nations is that the Malaysian government appears to be more open and direct about its agenda.

Marginalization of indigenous minorities in post-colonial states

Dayaks and Papuans in Indonesia

In the Javanese dominated Indonesian post-colonial state, the resource rich outer islands have produced much of the nation's export income but have remained relatively poor. As a disproportionate amount of the nation's resources have been channeled to Java, communities living in the outer islands typically possess an acute sense of relative deprivation and weak sense of belonging to the Indonesian state. Reflecting this mentality, the leader of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Tengku Hasan di Tiro has referred to the Javanese as imperialists and Indonesia as an 'imaginary state'^{lxxiii}. Overt resistance to the 'imaginary state' is manifested in the emergence of separatist movements in Aceh and Papua (until recently Irian Jaya). The acute marginality of the indigenous Papuans, from the largest and last province to be incorporated into Indonesia, typifies this problematic center-periphery relationship. Enormously rich in minerals and other natural resources, Papua has nonetheless remained one of the poorest provinces in terms of per capita consumption expenditure^{lxxiv}, with rural poverty rates higher than any other Indonesian province. It also lags behind the other provinces in infant mortality, literacy and life expectancy^{lxxv}.

Non-Muslim indigenous minorities have been particularly aggrieved by their cultural marginalization and the portrayal of their communities as uncivilized and backward. Their cultural marginalization has been reinforced by the state-sponsored transmigration of Javanese and Madurese to their supposedly under-populated islands. Importantly, the transmigration program has undermined their

economic livelihood, socio-political standing and threatens to reduce them to the status of a numerical minority in their homeland^{lxxxvi}. No doubt, the political function of the program geared towards crushing separatist movements in provinces such as Papua has only heightened grievances^{lxxxvii}. The official recognition of only five religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism) during the New Order years resulted in indigenous beliefs in Kalimantan such as the Kaharingan being treated as a form of Hinduism. As practitioners of Kaharingan, the Dayaks have been arbitrarily classified as Hindus. Like other indigenous communities, the Dayaks resent the perception that their practice of shifting cultivation has contributed to environmental degradation while logging companies have contributed to national development^{lxxxviii}.

The ethnic cleansing of Madurese in Central Kalimantan by indigenous Dayaks^{lxxxix} in 2001 and 2001 has received a fair amount of international attention and parallel's Conrad's 'Heart of Darkness' where natives resort to atavistic practices to rectify long standing grievances. At present, almost all of the 130,000 Madurese^{lxxx} have fled C. Kalimantan after the frenzied attacks on the community by the indigenous Dayaks. As the ethnic conflict in C. Kalimantan cannot be attributed to religious differences in view of the fact that 70% of Dayaks and most Madurese in C. Kalimantan are Muslim, what then were the major causes of Dayak dissent?

Land rights has long remained an issue of central concern particularly to indigenous minorities that are internally colonized. In Indonesia, national laws such as the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law No. 5 and 1967 Basic Forestry Law have effectively undermined the customary land rights of indigenous communities. In particular, Article 3 of the 1960 law states that customary land tenure only applies when it does not conflict with national and state interests^{lxxxi}. Additionally, the 1968 Mining Law allows for the over-riding of customary rights. Rapacious logging of the forests by politically connected non-Dayak companies has reduced the forest cover of C. Kalimantan from 84% in the mid-1970s to 66.9% in 1999 and thus eroded the livelihood of indigenous forest dwellers. Conflict has also erupted when Dayaks fell trees for their own use but are charged with theft of timber even though they consider the timber theirs^{lxxxii}. Other laws which have disregarded customary practices and undermined traditional village leadership include the 1979 Village Government Law No.5. As the law stipulates that candidates for the position of village head should be a high school graduate, it has thus been difficult for respected customary leaders to be elected to the position^{lxxxiii}. Furthermore, indigenous communities in the outer islands commonly believe that the predominantly Javanese police and military personnel do not carry out their duties impartially. In C. Kalimantan, this perception has been reinforced by the involvement of the security forces in protecting the logging, mining and plantation companies occupying customary Dayak lands. Furthermore, police and military corruption has allowed the economically stronger non-Dayak communities to pay off the former when they transgress the law^{lxxxiv}.

Human rights violations perpetuated by the military have been particularly harsh in the Military Operations Zone (DOM) in Papua and Aceh where per capita military and police presence is much higher than the Indonesian average^{lxxxv}. In targeting the resistance movements, brutal military campaigns such as the 1981 *Operasi Sapu Bersih* (Clean Sweep Operation) in Papua, have been commonly launched to strike fear in the minds and hearts of local communities sympathetic to the resistance movement. In the latter campaign, the families of resistance fighters were terrorized by burning of property, killing livestock, raping of women and killing of villagers. It is alleged that in the villages of Ampas-Waris and Batte-Arso near Jayapura, whole families were bayoneted^{lxxxvi}.

Since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime, ethnic tensions have intensified as the nation stumbles from one crisis to another. However, the widening of political space has allowed local politicians to turn to ethnic or religious mobilization to garner popular electoral support^{lxxxvii} in an attempt to control the newly empowered local governments which have been granted greater legislative powers in managing the natural resources in their own territory^{lxxxviii}. In C. Kalimantan, the fierce competition for votes

between Dayak-led parties has generated anti-Madurese antagonisms and attacks. This has been attributed to senior officials displaced by the central government in the decentralization process who have purposefully aroused anti-Madurese sentiment^{lxxxix}.

In Papua and Aceh, demands for outright independence have grown louder since the fall of Suharto and the success of East Timor's independence campaign in 2000. The separatist sentiment in these two most 'troublesome' provinces appears to have been energized with the granting of special autonomy powers. A Declaration of Non-Integration augmented by proclamations that Papua had never been genuinely part of Indonesia were boldly advanced by the Papuan Peoples Congress in Jayapura in May 2000^{xc}. In a similar act of defiance, one million Acehnese gathered in Banda Aceh in December 1999 to call for a referendum on independence^{xcⁱ}. However, with the appointment as President in August 2001 of Megawati Sukarnoputri, well known for her commitment to the Indonesia Raya ideal and cordial relations with the military^{xcⁱⁱ}, Papuan and Acehnese prospects for independence may have become even more problematic unless regional and international support for their independence struggle is effectively galvanized....add SMH article

Orang Asli in Malaysia

We look to the hills, we weep

We turn to the forest, its burning

Where can we live, with whom shall we sleep.... Orang Asli, Semai song^{xcⁱⁱⁱ}

Malaysia's *bumiputera* (indigenous) policies have largely benefited the dominant indigenous Malay community^{xc^{iv}} whilst minority indigenous communities such as *Orang Asli* (Original People) of Peninsula Malaysia have remained one of the most marginalized and dispossessed communities in the post-colonial state. Comprising only 0.5% of Malaysia's total population^{xc^v}, a staggering 81% of *Orang Asli*'s live below the official poverty line compared to the national average of 7.5% in 1997. Instructively, out of every 5 women who die in childbirth, 3 are Orang Asli. Additionally, malnutrition and other poverty-related diseases are prevalent within the community^{xc^{vi}}. The indigenous Orang Asli community remains the most controlled and regulated community in Malaysia as they have been deprived of land and citizenship rights and paternalistically subjected to the dictates of the non-Orang Asli run Department of Orang Asli Affairs (JHOA) in Peninsula Malaysia.

Commonly enslaved by Malays and Bataks who considered Orang Asli to be savages in the pre-colonial era, they were subsequently treated by the British as 'primitive exotica' and placed in special reserves. As such, the Aboriginal Peoples Act of 1954 was legislated to paternalistically protect the community from the ravages of modernity^{xc^{vii}}. During the colonial period, the community became subjects for anthropological research and conversion by Christian missionaries^{xc^{viii}}. Treated as a security risk during the communist emergency years (1948-1960), the JHOA was specifically created to win them over to the government side.

The greatest threat to Orang Asli culture, identity and livelihood is the dispossession of their traditional homelands and denial of land rights. Without prior consultation with the community, the state can repossess their land settlements without having to pay any compensation. While gazetted Orang Asli reserves can and have been degazetted without prior consultation, it has taken as long as 35 years for an Orang Asli application for the gazetting of a reserve to be processed. Their lack of legal claim to their traditional homelands has reduced the community to the status of squatters. By 1997, only 15% of Orang Asli villages had been gazetted as reserves. Orang Asli communities routinely lose their land to state land schemes, private plantations, mining concessions, highway and dam projects, housing projects, golf courses and other forms of development^{xc^{ix}}. The only form of compensation the state is obliged to pay is a nominal amount for fruit trees that have been destroyed.

In stark contrast to the denial of land titles for Orang Asli reserves, Malay peasants that are involved in state resettlement schemes are given individual land titles in their reserves^c. Newly relocated Orang Asli communities are encouraged to cultivate cash crops such as palm oil as a primary source of income under the Regroupment Scheme (RPS). However, the RPS schemes are commonly poorly serviced and do not provide running water or electricity. As it takes several years for the palm oil and many of the other commercial cash crops to be marketed, the relocated Orang Asli community is deprived of a steady source of income^{ci}.

The paternalistic attitude of the state towards the Orang Asli is manifested in the relationship between the predominantly non-Orang Asli JHOA bureaucracy and the Orang Asli community. The Director General of JHOA, a position that has never been filled by an Orang Asli, has the final say in all matters related to the community^{cii}. JHOA decides who can and cannot visit an Orang Asli settlement, appoints the headmen of a settlement and determines the crops that are to be grown, programs to be implemented and the religious proselytizing that occurs. The JHOA does not have to consult the community before a decision to resettle them is made. In effect, the JHOA has reduced the Orang Asli to the status of state wards^{ciii}. Working on the assumption that the Orang Asli are backward and need to be modernize, the JHOA has attempted to assimilate the community into Malay society by converting them to Islam. Between 1994-1997, US\$5 million was commitment to a program of Islamic conversion referred to by JHOA as the policy of ‘spiritual development’. Since 1991, more than 250 mosques have been built coupled with vigorous missionary activity in Orang Asli settlements^{civ}.

With the establishment of the Association of Orang Asli Peninsula Malaysia (POASM), Orang Asli concerns such as land rights have been more forcefully championed. The 15,000 strong organization has highlighted the bumiputera status of and constitutional rights of the community. POASM has called for the implementation of affirmative action for Orang Asli in economic projects such as eco-tourism, alternative agriculture, trading in forest products, job placements and educational placings. More recently, it has even called for the dissolution of JHOA or have it run and controlled by Orang Asli themselves^{cv}. An increasing number of Orang Asli have also become involved in UMNO branches at the village level in an attempt to better represent their community’s concerns. To an important extent, the concerns of the Orang Asli community have highlighted the shortcomings, contradictions and paradoxes in the state’s *bumiputera* policies. Their concerns also highlight pertinent national dilemmas associated with citizenship rights and the issue of whether Malaysia’s national identity is in need of a more inclusive re-imagination to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Malays in Singapore

‘It shall be a deliberate and conscious policy of the Government of Singapore at all times to recognize the special position of the Malays who are the indigenous people of the island and who are in most need of assistance and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government of Singapore to protect, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language’

Section 152 of the Singapore Constitution

The roots of modern Malay nationalism in colonial Malaya can be traced back to the island of Singapore where the first Malay political party, *Kesatuan Melayu Singapura* (KMS, Singapore Malay Union) was formed in 1926. Founded by Tengku Abdul Kadir and Embok Suloh, the KMS’s primary goals were to promote the economic, educational and social interests of the Malay community and to make representations on behalf of the community to the colonial government^{cvi}. It was in the British Straits Settlement of Singapore that the indigenous Malays felt the most vulnerable and unprotected. Submerged in ‘a European ruled Chinese city’^{cvi} with limited opportunities for social mobility, the

community found itself reduced to hired servants, peons and general underlings of the dominant ethnic communities.

Having denounced the special rights of the indigenous community during the merger years (1963-1965) when Singapore was part of Malaysia, the PAP leadership in independent Singapore advocated that its multiracial meritocratic philosophy would allow all Singaporeans to compete on an equal footing and offer them equal opportunities for social mobility. As such, the PAP government did not implement any concrete program to address and ameliorate the Malay community's relative socio-economic marginality in the 1960s and 1970s despite its constitutional responsibility. Even with the establishment of the state-sponsored ethnic self-help body Mendaki in 1982, geared towards strengthening the socio-economic and educational malaise of the Malay community, the relative position of the community has not improved. Thus in the opening decade of the 21st century and after nearly 40 years since Singapore's independence, the relative socio-economic and educational position of Malays has not only showed negligible signs of improvement but has in many areas deteriorated, relative to the other ethnic communities^{cviii}. For example, the performance and enrolments rates particularly the secondary and tertiary educational level between the Malay community and the national average has been widening^{ciix} (Refer to table in footnotes)

The historical, institutional and structural complexities surrounding the Malay community's persistent relative marginality have been obfuscated by the PAP government's focus on their absolute socio-economic and educational gains. Put simply, the community is expected to be content with their absolute gains even though their socio-economic and educational status relative to the dominant Chinese community has not improved and in some instances even worsened. As such, PAP leaders have repeatedly reminded the community not to partake in inter-ethnic comparisons on the grounds that it constitutes an 'unnecessary distraction' and a 'psychological trap' that would only serve to dishearten them^{cx}. Using data to highlight the absolute gains made by the Malay community in the 1990s^{cxii}, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has advised them that "*It is counter-productive to imagine yourself marginalized*"^{cxiii}.

Confronted by the Malay community's persistent relative marginalization in the ostensibly multiracial and meritocratic society, the PAP leadership has increasingly relied on the cultural deficit thesis to explain the community's intractable marginality. The cultural deficit thesis essentially posits that the socially disadvantaged community has remained marginal because of its negative cultural values and attitudes which in turn create the material conditions that reproduce their social disadvantage. As the culturally deficient community is largely responsible for their relative marginality, the onus is thus placed on them to reform their negative values and attitudes. Importantly, such a discourse absolves the state from implementing structural and institutional reforms and in actively assisting the community to narrow the socio-economic and educational disparity with the other ethnic communities. Put simply, as the problem supposedly lies with the marginal ethnic community, the solutions are expected to emanate from the community^{cxiiii}.

The PAP leadership's unwillingness to actively institute national programs to narrow the socio-economic disparity between the indigenous Malay and dominant Chinese communities can be better appreciated when contextualized within the eugenics and biological determinist beliefs of the PAP leadership such as former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew. In a 1983 National Day address, Lee purported that 80% of talent and intelligence was inherited while 20% was nurtured^{cxv}. Lee then lamented that if present population trends continued, with the poorer and less educated having larger families, the already limited talent pool in Singapore would continue to shrink and eventually endanger the island's economic prosperity^{cxvi}. Public policies such as the controversial Graduate Mothers Policy, geared towards encouraging graduate women to have more children, the early streaming of students in primary school, the immigration and population policy aimed at 'maintaining the racial balance' (a euphemism for maintaining the numerical dominance of the Chinese community) are clearly underpinned by the eugenics beliefs of the PAP leadership. Importantly, such policies clearly contravene

the state's supposed multiracial ideal. These eugenics beliefs and racially biased policies are particularly offensive to Malays because of the inference that if talent and ability is largely innate then it follows that the gene pool of the socially marginal Malay community must also be inferior.

In contrast to the alleged cultural deficiency of the Malay community, the Chinese have been commended by the PAP leadership for possessing a myriad of positive cultural traits such as diligence, discipline, industry and being communitarian and achievement oriented. The economic achievements of Japan and the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) have been attributed to the positive Confucian values of the Chinese and other Northeast Asians^{cxvi}. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has openly questioned "...whether Singapore could survive without these core values of thrift, hard work and group cohesion which are strongly identified in Chinese culture"^{cxvii}. Such perspectives have been used to justify immigration policies which actively encourage Chinese from South and Northeast Asia to settle permanently in Singapore.

It is supremely ironic that in the purportedly multiracial and meritocratic Singaporean society, discrimination at the institutional level has been perpetuated by the government. For nearly 20 years, Malays were systematically excluded from compulsory national service and continue to be restricted from 'sensitive' units in the military for 'national security' reasons. This institutionalized discrimination is premised on the PAP leadership's belief that the Malay community's loyalty to the state is dubiously divided because of their ethnic and religious affiliation with the surrounding Malay-Muslim nations. In justifying this hitherto covert discriminatory policy, Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated, "*If there is a conflict...we don't want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for the nation may come in conflict with his emotions for his religion...they will be two very strong destructive forces in opposite directions*"^{cxviii}.

The PAP leadership's doubting of Malay loyalty has prevailed despite the body of academic research on ethnic attitudes to the nation which indicate that Malay loyalty to the nation is in fact stronger than the other ethnic communities^{cxix}. It would thus appear that the PAP leadership may have mistakenly conflated Malay political alienation with the PAP government for disloyalty to the nation. Indeed, when Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965 and the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman offered land to the island's Malays to resettle in the southernmost state of Johor, few Malays took up the offer. Furthermore, it is certainly not the Malay community who have the reputation for emigrating in significant numbers to 'greener pastures' – commonly considered to be an unpatriotic act. In short, there is scant concrete evidence to support the view that Malay loyalty to the nation is suspect, yet they continue to be singled out and institutionally discriminated.

To justify the continued institutionalized discrimination against Malays in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the PAP leadership has, in the last few years, increasingly resorted to the argument that the Malay community has failed to socially integrate with the larger society. Utilizing this line of reasoning, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has advised that "...more Malays may enter the armed forces and attain high office as the Malay community becomes more integrated into Singapore society"^{cxx}. At a Malay community forum to discuss the government's discriminatory practices against Malays in the SAF in March 2001, Senior Minister Lee shrewdly placed the community on the defensive by lecturing them on their lack of national integration and pointing out that they tended to hold more activities in mosques^{cxxi}. Instead of getting a formal apology, the Malay community's temerity in seeking clarification on this embarrassing issue of government-sponsored discrimination was responded to by further recriminations about their alleged shortcomings. It is worth noting that a critical examination of the PAP leadership's statements on supposedly weak Malay national integration reveals a distinctly assimilationist attitude arising from the inferences that the Malay community should be more like 'us' - the more secular oriented ethnic Chinese majority.

The cultural deficit and eugenics perspectives purported by the PAP leadership to explain the relative marginality of Malays have arguably contributed towards negative stereotyping and discriminatory practices against Malays in the workforce. Studies by Bedlington^{cxvii} and the Association of Malay-Muslim Professions^{cxviii} have found that Malay professionals are commonly confronted with a glass ceiling when seeking employment in local firms. This may perhaps explain their stronger representation in the civil service and Western multinational corporations. As Mandarin has become an important source of cultural capital, it is not uncommon to see Mandarin proficiency requirements in job advertisements. Ethnic minorities tend to interpret the Mandarin requirement by local firms as a surreptitious device used for ethnic screening. This suspicion is fuelled by the under-representation of ethnic minorities in many local Chinese firms and banks. At a government-sponsored Feedback Unit session in early 2001, Malays complained of companies refusing to hire non-Mandarin speakers and Muslim women wearing headscarves^{cxvix}.

Complaints of the 'glass ceiling' and ethnic/gender discrimination cannot be readily addressed as the state has not established an Equal Opportunity Office, Anti-Racial Discrimination Board or Ombudsman's Office despite the rhetoric of a multiracial and meritocratic Singapore. After independence, a Presidential Council of Minorities, made up of an appointed advisory body of non-elected citizens, was created to represent ethnic minority concerns and scrutinize legislation and public policies affecting them. However, this body has failed to publicly address minority concerns such as the discriminatory SAF policy against Malays, the complaints of discrimination in the workplace, and immigration policies which favor Chinese. The moribund nature of this body and its weak community links is reflected in its annual survey reports which often indicate that it received no complaints in a particular year^{cxv}.

Concluding remarks

Post-colonial states in Southeast Asia have been strongly shaped by colonial structures, ideology and cultural forms, as well as by the national imaginings of the political elites who more often than not come from the dominant ethnic communities. In the nation-building process, competing national visions that contradict those of the political elites have been muted. Not surprisingly, the projected national imagination rests on fragile foundations and lacks genuine support particularly within marginalized ethnic communities.

In the tradition of colonial states, authoritarian post-colonial states have politicized culture, identity and ethnicity. Identity has commonly been constructed through the processes of exclusion, control or normalization of differences or in the case of Singapore by standardizing, homogenizing and re-racializing ethnicity. Importantly, the manipulation of ethnic consciousness has assisted in maintaining ethnic insecurities and divisions, inhibited the development of other forms of consciousness and disguised other fundamental tensions in society. Ethnic manipulation is particularly obvious when the political elite are under severe pressure as a consequence of economic or political crisis.

Full citizenship rights are commonly extended only to those ethnic communities that conform with the national imagination of the elite and constitute the ethnic core. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the ethnic core are the Javanese, Malay and Chinese, respectively. In such an environment, many ethnic minorities are inclined to feel alienated, excluded and deprived of their full citizenship rights. The alienation and marginalization of indigenous ethnic minorities have fuelled the emergence of separatist movements that directly challenge the legitimacy of the post-colonial state. For such movements, loyalty to the post-colonial state does not necessarily equate with loyalty to their territorial homeland. Other marginalized indigenous minorities who have been denied their citizenship rights have attempted to expose the contradictions between the rhetoric and reality of the national ideals. In a real sense, the aspirations, struggles and fears of indigenous and other ethnic minorities strike at the very heart of what is wrong with the post-colonial state in Southeast Asia.

- ⁱ In reality, there is no nation and ethnic group that is not the offspring of several ethnic strains.
- ⁱⁱ For a discussion of the myth of ethnicity and its relationship to nationalism please refer to Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Walker Connor, 'The Nation and its Myth', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 33(1-2), 1992, p.49.
- ^{iv} Cited in Walker Connor, *ibid*, p.52.
- ^v *Ibid*.
- ^{vi} Anderson asserted that Southeast Asian nation states are cultural constructs that have been collectively imagined by those sharing the same mental map of the nation which is a mixture of borrowed Western models and local imaginings. See *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1991.
- ^{vii} Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories*, Princeton Uni. Press, Princeton, 1993, p.5
- ^{viii} Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, United Nations University. Tokyo, 1986.
- ^{ix} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 'In Search of the 'Asian Way': Cultural Nationalism in Singapore and Malaysia', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 36(3), 1998, p.54.
- ^x Refer to Paul Wheatly, *The Golden Khersonese*, Uni. of Malaya Press, KL, 1961.
- ^{xi} John S. Furnival, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, University Press, NY, 1956, p.158.
- ^{xii} Charles Hirschman, 'The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology', *Sociological Forum*, Spring, 1986, p.330-361.
- ^{xiii} Nirmala PuruShotam, 'Disciplining Difference: Race in Singapore', in Joel Kahn (ed), *Southeast Asian Identities*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1998, p.71.
- ^{xiv} The first census in Burma was taken in 1872. See Mikael Gravers, 'The Karen Making of a Nation', in Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlov (eds), *Asian Forms of the Nation*, Curzon, Surrey, 1996, p.248.
- ^{xv} For an insightful analyses of the ideological function and economic rational of this myth, refer to Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native*, Frank Cass, London, 1977.
- ^{xvi} Frank Swettenham, *British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Process of British Influence in Malaya*, George Allen, London, 1955, p.139.
- ^{xvii} Frank Swettenham, *The Real Malay*, John Lane, London, 1900, p.38-40.
- ^{xviii} John Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, 2 Vol., Archibald Constable, Edinburgh, 1920, p.45-46.
- ^{xix} Mikael Graves, 'The Karen Making of a Nation', in Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlov (eds), *opcit*, p.257.
- ^{xx} Quoted in Kwok Kian Woon, *Social Transformation and the Problem of Social Coherence: Chinese Singaporeans at the Century's End*, Department of Sociology Working Papers No.124, National University of Singapore, 1994, p.1
- ^{xxi} The collaboration of the feudal elite with the colonial authorities resulted in the erosion of their credibility.
- ^{xxii} Clive Kessler, 'Archaism and Modernity', in Joel Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (eds), *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p.139.
- ^{xxiii} It was only in 1956 that the first Malay secondary school was established for the masses. See William Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Yale Uni. Press, New Haven, 1967.
- ^{xxiv} Clive Kessler, *opcit*, p.139.
- ^{xxv} The violence of the BIA has remained deeply etched in the collective memory of the Karens.
- ^{xxvi} Mary Somers Heidhues, 'Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution', in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (eds), *Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese Since World War 2*, Hong Kong Uni. Press, Hong Kong, 1988, p.117.
- ^{xxvii} *Ibid*, p.261.
- ^{xxviii} The only ethnic classifications were reserved for the Chinese, Arabs and others of 'foreign' descent. By contrast, the Dutch authorities recorded the ethnic identity of indigenous Indonesians. Refer to Robert Cribb, 'Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 53(2), 1999, p.176.
- ^{xxix} Refer to G. McTKahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Cornell Uni. Press, Ithaca, 1970.
- ^{xxx} Anne Booth, 'Can Indonesia Survive as a Unitary State', *Indonesia Circle*, No.58, June, 1992, p.34.
- ^{xxxi} The five Pancasila ideals are nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice, democracy and belief in God.
- ^{xxxii} Robert Hefner, 'State, Nation and Ethnicity in Modern Indonesia', in Uri Ra'anana et al, *State and Nation in Multi-ethnic Societies*, Manchester Uni. Press, Manchester, 1991, p.211.
- ^{xxxiii} Ichlasul Amal, 'The Dilemmas of Decentralization and Democratization', in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, p.216.
- ^{xxxiv} *Ibid*, p.218

^{xxxv}Ibid, p.291.

^{xxxvi} However, the Javanese were still over-represented in the civilian bureaucracy.

^{xxxvii} David Brown, 'The State of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of the State: Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12(1), 1989, p.54.

^{xxxviii} Burhan Magenda, 'Ethnicity in Indonesian Politics', in David Bouchier and John Legge (eds), opcit, p.227.

^{xxxix} Cheah Boon Kheng, 'Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Post-War Malay Nationalism 1945-1946', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 19(1), p.1-26.

^{xl} Careful not to antagonize the Malay community, the British came up with the 1947 Malayan Federation scheme which safeguarded Malay political and cultural rights while providing political security to the Chinese and Indian communities in the form of restricted citizenship rights. The economic opportunities of Chinese and British interests were also preserved.

^{xli} Muhammad Ikmal Said, 'Malay Nationalism and National Identity', in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds), *Malaysia: Critical Perspectives*, Malaysian Social Science Association, Petaling Jaya, 1996, p.38.

^{xlii} Cited in William Roff, opcit, p.232.

^{xliii} Quoted in Muhammad Ikmal Said, 'Ethnic Perspectives of the Left in Malaysia', in Joel Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (eds), opcit, p.268.

^{xliv} Raden Soenarno, 'Malay Nationalism 1896-1941', *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 1(1), March, 1960, p.17.

^{xlv} Ibid, p.12

^{xlvi} Yet when the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed later that month, Malaya was left out. The Indonesian nationalists were not inclined or in a position to militarily take on the Dutch as well as the British in their struggle for self-determination. Ibid, p21-22.

^{xlvii} Ibid, p.24.

^{xlviii} This Act restricted public discussion on matters relating to Malay special rights and matters relating to the Malay language, royal families and Islam.

^{xlix} The system of rotating *agongships* (kingships) among the ranks of the *Sultans* has been enshrined in the Constitution of Malaya.

¹ Lim Ching Yan, a Straits Settlement Legislative Council member, declared in 1931, "*Who said this is a Malay country... Our forefathers came here and had worked as laborers and.... They spent their money here and by these means the government was able to open this country into a civilized one*". Cited in Radin Soenarno, ibid, p.11.

ⁱⁱ More recently, DAP leaders have defensively redefined the Malaysian Malaysia concept by claiming that the DAP is not against the special rights of Malays but against the abuse of such privileges that have led to corruption, cronyism and nepotism. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 19 May, 1999.

ⁱⁱⁱ Refer to Lim Kit Siang, *Malaysia: Crisis of Identity*, Democratic Action Party, Petaling Jaya, 1986, and Kua Kia Soong, *National Culture and Democracy*, Kersani, Petaling Jaya, 1985.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ By 1975, all English primary schools had been converted to Malay medium schools and by 1982, all government schools up to the pre-university level were taught in Malay except for language classes. The official language of instruction in the local universities became Bahasa Melayu.

^{liv} Tan Chee Beng, 'Nation Building and Being Chinese in a Southeast Asian State: Malaysia', in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gung Wu (eds), opcit, p.145-151.

^{lv} Muhammad Ikmal Said, 'Nationalism and Malay Identity', in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds), opcit, 1996, p.42.

^{lvi} S. Jayasankaran, 'Malaysian: A Nation Still Divided', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), 7 Dec., 2000, p.28.

^{lvii} Ibid, p.26

^{lviii} It is worth recalling that in 1987, a government decision to appoint non-Chinese teachers as principals provoked a loud outcry from the Chinese community.

^{lix} According to the 1990 population census, Chinese, Malay and Indian communities make up approximately 77%, 14% and 7% of the total population respectively.

^{lx} Nirmala PuruShotam, opcit, p.87.

^{lxi} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *The Singapore Dilemma*, Oxford Uni. Press, KL, 2001, p.164.

^{lxii} Shaharuddin Maarof, *Malay Ideas on Development*, Times Pub., Singapore, 1988, p.121.

^{lxiii} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, opcit, 2001, p.189.

^{lxiv} Refer to Nancy Fletcher, *The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia*, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Data Paper No.73, p.1969.

^{lxv} Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, St. Martin's Press, London, 1994, p.85.

^{lxvi} Alex Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew*, Donald Moore Press, Singapore, 1971, p.608.

- ^{lxvii} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 'Singapore-Malaysia Relations: Deep-Seated Tensions and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 29(1), 1999, p.43.
- ^{lxviii} *Petir*, Editorial, December 1982, p.3
- ^{lxix} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 'Economic Crisis and the Prospects for Democratization in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 30(1), 2000, p.35.
- ^{lxx} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, opcit, 2001, p.168.
- ^{lxxi} Interview with the BBC World Service radio program, 'Peoples of the Pacific Century', BBC, 1984.
- ^{lxxii} *Straits Times* (Singapore), 26 June, 1992.
- ^{lxxiii} See Donald Emmerson, 'Will Indonesia Survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, 79(3), May/June, 2000, p.100.
- ^{lxxiv} This is a useful determinant of living standards. See Ann Booth, opcit, p.41.
- ^{lxxv} *Ibid.*
- ^{lxxvi} The state-sponsored transmigration program has been halted since the regional economic crisis.
- ^{lxxvii} Peter Hastings of the Sydney Morning Herald has asserted that "*The transmigrasi policy...is aimed primarily at creating a cordon sanitaire in areas where the Indonesian government is uncertain of local loyalties and wishes to dampen the activities of local dissidents like the OPM in Irian Jaya*". Quoted in Tapol, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, Tapol, London, 1983, p.53.
- ^{lxxviii} International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia, *Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan*, Report No.18, 27 June 2001, p.20.
- ^{lxxix} They Dayaks make up two-thirds of the total population in Central Kalimantan.
- ^{lxxx} They Madurese make up approximately 7% of the total population in C. Kalimantan.
- ^{lxxxi} ICG, opcit, p.15.
- ^{lxxxii} *Ibid.*, p.16.
- ^{lxxxiii} Stefanus Masuin, 'National Frameworks Affecting Adat governance in Indonesia and Dayak NGO Responses', in Janis Alcorn and Antoinette Royo (eds), *Indigenous Social Movements and Ecological Resilience: Lessons from the Dayak of Indonesia*, Biodiversity Support Program, Washington DC, 2000, p.20.
- ^{lxxxiv} ICG, opcit, p.19.
- ^{lxxxv} Peter King, 'Autonomy, Federalism or the Unthinkable?: Indonesian Debates and the Future of West Papua', *South Pacific Study*, 21(2), 2001, p.50.
- ^{lxxxvi} Tapol, opcit, p.74-75.
- ^{lxxxvii} For the first time since 1955, elections were held in 1999 at all provincial levels.
- ^{lxxxviii} Under the 1999 Administrative Law No. 25, the provinces are to receive 15% of their gross oil revenue, 30% for gas and 80% for mining, forestry and fishing. Previously, they received only 1% of such revenues. See King, *ibid.*, p.51.
- ^{lxxxix} ICG, opcit, p.18.
- ^{xc} King, opcit, p.48.
- ^{xcj} *Ibid.*, p.53.
- ^{xcii} In her Independence Day speech in August 2001, President Megawati apologized for past violations in Aceh and Papua and called for security forces to be "*effective, highly disciplined and under the control of the Government*". However, her government has resisted the proposal for international supervision of the ceasefire with rebel forces in Aceh because of fears that this would erode Jakarta's sovereignty. Refer to Hamish McDonald, 'Megawati's Promising Start Should be Nurtured', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 August, 2001.
- ^{xciii} Cited in Zawawi Ibrahim, 'Orang Asli Citizenry and Nationhood: Mediating the Voices of the Bumiputera 'Other' in Malaysia', *Asian Studies Review*, 21(1), 1999, p.107.
- ^{xciv} The *Bumiputera* community make up 64% of the total population of 22 million. The Chinese make up 27% and Indians 9%.
- ^{xcv} In 1997, the Orang Asli population numbered 105,000. The major Orang Asli 'tribal' communities include the Senoi, Temiar, Semelai and Negrito.
- ^{xcvi} Colin Nicolas, *SUHAKAM and the Indigenous Peoples Question*, Center for Orang Asli Concerns, Malaysia, 2001. Cited in <http://www.xlibris.de/magickriver/suhakam.htm>.
- ^{xcvii} Colin Nicholas, *The Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia*, Center for Orang Asli Concerns, Malaysia 1997, p.3. Cited in <Http://mindarakyat2.tripod.com/2000okt/i2000-2297.htm>.
- ^{xcviii} *Ibid.*, p.2.
- ^{xcix} *Ibid.*, p.7.
- ^c Zawawi Ibrahim, 'Regional Development in Rural Malaysia and the 'Tribal Question'', in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds), opcit, p.198.
- ^{ci} *Ibid.*, p.193.
- ^{cii} Colin Nicholas, opcit, 1997, p.5.
- ^{ciii} *Ibid.*, p.6.

^{civ} Kirk Endicott and Adela Baer, *The Orang Asli Assistance Fund*. Cited in <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~asli/cs.html>.

^{cv} Colin Nicholas, opcit, 1997, p.10.

^{cvi} Radin Soernarno, opcit, p.10.

^{cvi} C.M. Turnbull, *A History of Singapore 1819-1975*, Oxford Uni. Press, KL, 1977, p.100.

^{cvi} The Malay community make up approximately 15% of the total population of Singapore and the Chinese community 77%.

^{cix} Malay educational performance (in relative terms).

	1988	1997
Malay students with at least 3 'O' level passes	78.2%	75.4%
National average with at least 3 'O' level passes	89.2%	90.3%
	1988	1997
Malay primary 1 cohort entering junior college	41.8%	46%
Chinese primary 1 cohort entering junior college	71%	85.3%

Source: *Straits Times*, 13 July, 1998.

^{cx} Lily Zubaidah Rahim, opcit, 2001, p.23.

^{cx} The percentage from the primary one cohort entering university and polytechnic more than doubled from 13% to 28% from 1990 to 1999. The median Malay household income rose from S\$1,880 in 1990 to \$2,708 in 2000. See *Straits Times*, 22 January, 2001.

^{cxii} Cited in Ahmad Osman, 'Malays Have Moved Up, Says PM', *Straits Times*, 22 January, 2001.

^{cxiii} Lily Z. Rahim, opcit, 2001, p.3.

^{cxiv} *Straits Times*, 15 August, 1983.

^{cxv} *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 October, 1983.

^{cxvi} Goh Chok Tong, *Straits Times*, 29 October 1988.

^{cxvii} Cited in *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 27 July, 1991.

^{cxviii} Cited in *Straits Times*, 18 March, 1987.

^{cxix} Refer to Chew Sock Foon, *Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore*, University Center for International Studies, Ohio Uni. Press, Ohio, 1987, and a study undertaken by the Institute of Policy Studies in Singapore cited in *Straits Times*, 30 September, 1990.

^{cxix} Cited in J.D. Bernardi and C. Tarnowski, 'Managing Multicultural societies', in Armitav Archaya and Richard Stubbs, *New Challenges for ASEAN*, Uni. Of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1995, p.80.

^{cxxi} Arlina Arshad and Conrad Tan, 'Mosques to hold Inter-Ethnic Activities', *Straits Times*, 6 March, 2001.

^{cxix} Stanley Bedlington, *The Singapore Malay Community: The Politics of State Integration*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974, p.354.

^{cxix} National Conventional of Singapore Malay/Muslim Professionals (NCSMMP), *Malay/Muslims in the 21st Century Singapore: Prospects, Challenges and Directions*, Stamford Press, Singapore, 1990, p.84.

^{cxix} *Straits Times*, 2 February, 2001.

^{cxix} John Clammer, *Race and State in Independent Singapore 1965-1990*, Ashgate, London, 1998, p.55.