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Islam and Politics

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Islam and politics: political attitudes of the elites in Muhammadiyah 1998-2010

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Abstract

This study examines the roles of political elites in the Muhammadiyah in facing the dynamics Muslim politics in post New Order regime. There are three issues discussed: the emergence of Islamic political parties, the desire to implement the Jakarta charter as a state ideology, and the rise of terrorism. The result of the study demonstrated that there are four variants of the political attitudes of the elites in Muhammadiyah in post-New Order regime: 1) transformative-idealistic; 2) moderate-idealistic, 3) realistic-critical, and 4) accommodative-pragmatic. The variations are deeply influenced by two main factors: the sociological background and organizational factor.

Penelitian ini menguji peran elit politik dalam Muhammadiyah dalam menghadapi dinamika politik Muslim pada era rezim pasca Orde Baru. Ada tiga isu yang dibahas: munculnya partai-partai politik Islam, keinginan untuk melaksanakan Piagam Jakarta sebagai ideologi negara, dan munculnya terorisme. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa ada empat varian sikap politik para elite di Muhammadiyah pada era rezim pasca-Orde Baru: 1) transformatif-idealis; 2) moderat-idealis,

3) realistik-kritis, dan 4) akomodatif-pragmatis. Variasi ini sangat dipengaruhi oleh dua faktor utama, yaitu latar belakang sosiologis dan faktor organisasi.

Keywords: *Political attitudes; Muslim politics; Elites in Muhammadiyah; Terrorism*

Introduction

Indonesia has reached its democratization at the end of the 1990s. It is part of what Huntington said as 'the third wave of democratization'.¹ The transition period began with the breakdown of authoritarianism on May 21st, 1998 and ended with the successful implementation of sufficiently free and fair elections on October 20th, 1999. Meanwhile, the consolidation of democracy was started after Abdurrahman Wahid (well known as Gus Dur) assumed the presidency in October 1999 notwithstanding his fragile backing in parliament.²

As the fourth most populous nation in the world – is also the world's largest majority-Muslim country, Islam and politics in Indonesia are also of interest, because after years of sustained economic growth, this nation ranks as one of Asia's political and economical giants.³ The collapse of New Order regime in 1998 has had a wide political impact on the dynamics of Muslim politics. It can be seen from various phenomena such as the emergence of the Islam-based political parties, the demand to revive the Jakarta charter as the state principle, and also terrorism and violent actions organized by Muslim radical-extreme groups.

¹ See, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

² Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen, "The New Order and its Legacy: Reflections on Democratization in Indonesia", in Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen (Eds.), *Democratization in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*, New York: Routledge, 2009, 12-13.

³ Max L. Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, Washington DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007, 1. See also, Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia*, The United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 2000, 6.

These have caused heated debates and controversies among Muslim elites.

Historically speaking, the dynamics Muslim politics in Indonesia has started since the beginning of the national independence in 1945, particularly in the debates between Muslim and nationalist groups on the state principle during the sessions of BPUPKI (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan*, Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence) and PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence). The Muslims-nationalist group wanted to make Indonesia an Islamic state. Meanwhile, the secular-nationalists group maintained that Indonesia is a multi-religious nation, and therefore it must be a secular state which is characterized by the separation between the politics and religion.⁴

The debates between Muslim and nationalists groups took place for the second time after the 1955 election during the Constituent Assembly sessions. In fact, the members of the Assembly failed to formulate a new constitution. It causes Soekarno issued presidential decree on June 5th 1959 to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, and reinstitution the old 1945 Constitution. The Muslims found themselves failed to promote Islamist constitution for the second time.⁵

In another case, after the independence day of 1945, the Islamic communities agreed to establish an Islamist political party. Therefore, they hold a congress in Yogyakarta, 7-8 November 1945 and unanimously agreed to establish *Masyumi* (Indonesian Muslims Consultation Council) as the only political party for Indonesian Muslim.⁶ The notion

⁴ Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah Konsensus Nasional tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945-1949*, Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997, 27-28.

⁵ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam dan Konstitusionalisme: Pengalaman Indonesia", in *Prisma*, No. Extra, 1984, 74-75.

⁶ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1962, 134-135.

was welcomed well by all of Muslim elites, including those of Muhammadiyah. Many activists of Muhammadiyah became functionaries in *Masyumi* such as Fakhri Usman, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, AR Sutan Mansur, Hamka, Ahmad Badawi, and Djindar Tamimy.⁷

In 1959, Masyumi was disbanded by Soekarno because of its alleged involvement in a rebellion of PRRI/Permesta (*Pemerintahan Revolusi Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Semesta*, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Semesta Struggle) in West Sumatra in the late 1950s. During New Order regime, former Masyumi leaders established a new Islamist party named Parmusi (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslims party). Nevertheless, it was short-lived. As a result of New Order policy, Parmusi and other Islam-based parties were fused into PPP on January 5th, 1973.

Moreover, after New Order regime, the dynamics of Muslim politics re-emerged into public spheres that were characterized, at least, by three phenomena. First is establishing a large number of Islam-based parties. To define the Islam-based party, this study divides it into two groups. On the one hand, Islam-based party is a party which adopts Islam as its ideological foundation and proposes the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic laws) in Indonesia, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), and the Star Crescent Party (PBB). On the other hand, Islam-based party is a party which selects *Pancasila*⁸ as their ideological base and introduces more secular platforms, such as

⁷ Deliar Noor, *Partai Islam dalam Pentas Nasional 1945-1965*, Jakarta: Grafiti, 1987: 102-111. See also, Tim Lembaga Pustaka dan Informasi PP Muhammadiyah, *Profil Satu Abad Muhammadiyah*. Yogyakarta: PP Muhammadiyah, 2010, 27-47.

⁸ Pancasila means five principles, which contains five grains i.e. (1) Belief in the one and only God; (2) Justice and civilized humanity; (3) The unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and (5) Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN).⁹

Second is the debate on the state principle in the parliamentary sessions. Some of Muslim communities desire to implement the Jakarta charter as the state principle of Indonesia. The charter is the source for the notion of Islamic state which contains of seven or eight words: "...dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya" (With the obligation for the professors of the Islamic faith to abide by the Islamic laws). This notion was vigorously reinforced by *Hizbut Tahrir* (Freedom Party), *Majelis Mujahidin* (the Council of Jihad Fighters), *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front), and other local Muslim movements.

Third is terrorism deeds conducted by Muslim radicals in Indonesia, following the 9/11 terror attack in America 2001. They carried out at least four major terrorist attacks—in Bali in October 2002, and in Jakarta in August 2003, September 2004 and October 2005—which together have killed approximately 220 people and wounded several hundred more. The Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, remain the most lethal single terrorist since the September 11 attacks on the US and together with the August 5th, 2003 attack on the JW. Marriott hotel in Jakarta had a devastating impact on Indonesia's economy.¹⁰

These three phenomena would be scrutinized in this study through the opinions and thoughts of the elites in Muhammadiyah. Interestingly, these issues were controversial, and the attitudes of the elites in Muhammadiyah are not on the singular pattern. Thus, the debates

⁹ Mada Sukmajadi, *How Islamic Parties Organize at the Local Level in Post-Suharto Indonesia: An Empirical Study of Six Major Islamic Parties In The Tasikmalaya District, West Java Province*, PhD Dissertation, University of Heidelberg, 2011, 10.

¹⁰ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, New York: Routledge, 2007, 5.

were not only between nationalists and Muslims, but also among Muslims particularly between essentialists group and formalist group.

Analytical framework

Islam and politics

The term of Islam cannot be separated from politics, because it is part of the way of religious propagation. On the one hand, Islam is a belief which has rapid development since seventh century. Islam became huge power of the world because of its holy teachings in al-Qur'an and al-Sunnah.¹¹ On the other hand, politics is a practical matter which correlates with power and state. In this sense, Islam and politics is one and a part of human activities to struggle power and territory.

Historically speaking, Islamic engagement in the political world was started when the Prophet of Muhammad saw. dominated Medina and Mecca. At the time, Muhammad was a symbol of power for Muslim society which succeeded to unite between *Anshor* group (Medina's indigenous inhabitants) and *Muhajirin* group (immigrants). There were no hazardous conflicts among Muslim during Muhammad leadership, because all problems can refer to his utterances. Furthermore, the clash among Muslim took place after Muhammad dead. The next Muslim leadership handled by Khulafaurrasyidin (632-661 C).¹² During this period, critical clash and blood spillage were main heritage of Muslim politics. Three of four leaders in Islam were ended by murder. They are Umar bin Khattab, Utsman bin Affan, and Ali bin Abi Thalib.¹³

¹¹ Al-Quran is the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad while al-Sunnah is the Prophet Muhammad's way of life.

¹² Khulafaurrasyidin is Arabic term simply means four leaders in Islam after the Prophet of Mohammad saw. namely Abu Bakar Ash-Shiddiq, Umar bin Khattab, Utsman bin Affan, and Ali bin Abi Thalib.

¹³ See, John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984.

The earliest form of the Islamic state was based in Medina, the next Muslim civilization moved into Damascus (Syria) under Umayyah Empire for less than one century (661-750 C). Moreover, after the failure of Umayyah Empire and the leadership was replaced by King of Abul Abbas, center of Muslim empire was shifted into Baghdad (Iraq) under Abbasiyah Empire during two centuries (750-950 C). During two these kingdoms, the main problem of Muslim society were competing to dominate the territory and power. Even during Ottoman Empire in Turkey for slightly above six centuries (1294-1924 C), the main agenda of Muslim leadership was occupying various countries through Asia, Africa as well as Europe. To sum up this section, Islamic history was taught us that the relationship between Islam and politics are the connection between power and occupying territory among itself Muslim.¹⁴

Theory on elites in Islam

The concept of the elite has some features. Firstly, elite is the chosen people which has small quantity. Secondly, elite has gigantic political power. Thirdly, elite can influence and direct social changes. Fourthly, elite is organized and structured group. Fifthly, elite can give directions to common people.¹⁵ Likewise, the elite can be defined as notable people who have titanic power and significant roles in directing social changes.¹⁶ Afterward, in the context of Indonesia, employing Path Dependence's theory on historical institutionalism, the ruling elites can be classified into four categories.¹⁷

¹⁴ Ridho Al-Hamdi, *Partai Politik Islam: Teori dan Praktek di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu, 2013, 2.

¹⁵ TB Bottomore, *Elite dan Masyarakat*, Jakarta: Akbar Tandjung Institute, 2006, 2. See also, Robert D. Putnam, "Studi Perbandingan Elit Politik" in Mochtar Mas'ood and Colin Mac Andrews, *Perbandingan Sistem Politik*, Yogyakarta: GAMA Press, 2001, 80.

¹⁶ Sartono Kartodirjo, *Elite dalam Perspektif Sejarah*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981, vii.

¹⁷ Anis Baswedan, "Siapakah Ruling Elite Indonesia?" in *Kompas*, October 31st, 2006.

Table 1. The formation and circulation of Indonesian ruling elites

Phase of Creating Elites		Phase of Maturity of the Elites	
Period	Ways of Recruitment	Period of Maturity	Ruling Elite
1990s-1930s	Modern education	1940s-1960s	Intellectual
1940s-1960s	Physical struggle	1970s-1990s	Armed forces
1960s-1990s	Mass or political organization	2000s-2020s	Activist
1990s-present	Market	2020s -?	Entrepreneur

Source: Anis Baswedan (*Kompas Daily*, October 31st, 2006).

According to Baswedan, there are two methods in producing elites. First is recruitment of young generation. Second is the national major trend. The major trend continuously will adjust with reality. Meanwhile, young generation who took part and participated in the national trend, they are potential group to become the next ruling elites.

Meanwhile, elites in Islam can refer to the classification Javanese society into three groups namely *abangan*, *santri*, *priyayi*.¹⁸ Moreover, elites in Islam can be symbolized by *kyai* (Muslim elders), *ulama* (religious scholars, jurists), *mubaligh* (Islamic missionary, propagandist), and religious/Islamic teachers.¹⁹ After the downfall of Soeharto, *ulama* are part of important elites who play vital roles in the political stage. Gus Dur from Nahdhatul Ulama and Amien Rais from Muhammadiyah are two main leaders during democratic era which became a symbol for Muslim political forces.²⁰

More specifically, *ulama* should have three characteristics. First are having comprehensive knowledge, good quality in belief and attitudes,

¹⁸ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1960, 5-6.

¹⁹ Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Perubahan Pola Perilaku dan Polarisasi Umat Islam 1965-1987*, Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1989, 17.

²⁰ Nahdhatul Ulama (NU or the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars) is the largest traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia established in Surabaya (East Java), January 31st, 1926. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia established in Yogyakarta, November 18th, 1912.

and useful charities. Second is having entire knowledge on Islamic studies such as *aqidah* (faith), moral, and Islamic laws. Third is having wide-ranging knowledge on practical and experimental sciences.²¹ Current studies stated that *ulama* can be named as Muslim scholars which, at least, have three features. First is conducting in-depth analysis on social problems and development in order to become basic data to write articles, giving speeches in public discussions and conferences. Second is promoting critical thoughts by creating models of community development. Third is writing valuable works. Besides, this group perpetually disseminates previous Muslim scholars' works both Western and Middle East.²²

To identify elites in Muhammadiyah, the study develops Putnam's three approaches. The first is positional approach. This method assumes that elites are who have highest position of organization. The second is reputational approach. They have no position in the structure, but they know organizational mechanisms. The third is decisional approach. This method stated that elites are who have power to influence and succeeded to propose, endorse or reject any opinions and suggestions.²³

Political attitudes of the elites in Islam

The term of "attitude" is way of thinking or behaving.²⁴ In this sense, the study concentrates on the political thoughts and opinions of the elites in Muhammadiyah in response to Muslim politics. To categorize political attitudes, it applies two extreme polar namely inclusive and exclusive. On the one hand, inclusive is emphasizing substance rather

²¹ PP Muhammadiyah, *Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah (BRM)*, June 1995, 14-15.

²² M. Dawan Rahardjo, *Intelektual, Intelegensia, dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa*, Bandung: Mizan, 1996, 25-26, 66.

²³ Robert D. Putnam, "Studi Perbandingan Elit Politik" in Mochtar Mas'ood and Colin Mac Andrews, *Perbandingan Sistem Politik*, Yogyakarta: GAMA Press, 2001, 91-94.

²⁴ Oxford Learner's Pocket Dictionary, 2008, 23.

than symbol and it usually in the left position. One the other hand, exclusive is stressing symbol rather than substance and it frequently in the right position. This social cleavage represents the dynamics of Muslim politics in Indonesia.

Therefore, the study attempts to categorize the political attitudes of the elites in Islam into three models. As a matter of fact, these attitudes can experience mixture one another in order to gain a relevance conclusion.

Table 2. Classification of the political attitudes of the elites in Islam

Model of Inclusive		Model of Moderate	Model of Exclusive	
Accommodative	Transformative	Idealistic	Formalistic	Totalistic
Pragmatic	Critic	Moderate	-	-
-	Realistic	Substantive	-	-

Source: Compilation by the Writer.

This study will explore the definition for each attitude in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding. The totalistic, idealistic, and formalistic attitude stress that the-Quran and al-Sunnah are the only guidance for Muslim daily activities. Solution to overcome the problems in the social, economic and political fields should be based on the two Islamic fundamental sources. Meanwhile, the attitude of moderate and substantive underline their outlooks on the substance of Islamic teachings. Islam definitely has whole doctrines and principles in order to be transformed into different problems.²⁵

²⁵ M. Syafii Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995, 144-183. See, Mansour Fakhri, *Pendidikan Populer Membangun Pendidikan Kritis*, Yogyakarta: INSIST, 2001, 35. See also, Syarifuddin Jurdi, *Muhammadiyah dalam Dinamika Politik Indonesia 1966-2006*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2010: 40. See also, Haedar Nashir, *Perilaku Politik Elit Muhammadiyah*, Yogyakarta: Tarawang, 2000, 150-151.

Furthermore, the attitude of transformative stresses its attitudes on human values. Islamic teachings should be transformed into reality in order to liberate human from ignorance, injustice, and backwardness. Besides, it should be written into scholar works to affect social changes. Afterward, the critical attitude highlights its views on problem solving by paying attention into the government system. Structural approach will help to identify injustice and misunderstanding in seeing a reality such as terrorism acts. Additionally, realistic attitude emphasizes the relationship between substantive meaning and realities. Islam should be understood into different meaning because of various cultures.²⁶

Moreover, the accommodative attitude points up cooperation with other parties although it still gives critics toward injustice deeds. This attitude is flexible in coping with political dynamics. Last but not least, the pragmatic attitude has views that Muslim people should apply practical ways in the political stage and leave idealistic outlooks. This attitude avoids personal and communal conflicts.²⁷

Influential factors

There are various factors which influence political attitudes. This study focuses into two main factors. First is sociological factor. Individual background sociologically can be identified from his age, sex, education, occupation, citizenship, ethnics, networks, religious affiliation, organizational experiences, family background, and life outlooks. In this sense, the study centers into four factors i.e. education, occupation, networks, and political orientation.²⁸

²⁶ M. Syaf'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia...*, 144-183.

²⁷ M. Syaf'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia...*, 144-183.

²⁸ Miriam Budiarto, *Dasar-dasar Ilmu Politik*, Jakarta: Gramedia, 2007: 49. See also, Ramlan Surbakti, *Memahami Ilmu Politik*, Jakarta: Grasindo, 1992, 132-133.

Second is organizational factor. More specifically, this factor has three sub-factors. First is political culture in organization i.e. system of values which has close relationship with political decision. It was usually implemented in the organization. Second is political interest in organization. It is part of organizational target as a result of political process. Third is organizational policy. Each organization has official decrees in response to various things which have significant impacts to human life and its organization. Thus, a decision definitely passed the organizational agreement which has an impact that all stakeholders should obey the decision.²⁹

Research findings and arguments

This study focuses on the political attitudes of Muhammadiyah's functionaries in response to Muslim politics. There are three issues being analyzed i.e. the Islam-based political party, the Jakarta charter, and *jihad* and terrorism. The political attitudes are political thoughts and opinions of Muhammadiyah's functionaries. Elites are minority group commands greater power and could be classified into three categories: positional (who hold official positions in organizations), decisional (who have capability to make policies), and reputational (those who have credentials as leaders).³⁰ Thus, in the case of Muhammadiyah, the elites are cadres who officially hold leadership positions in the Central Board. They, at the same time, also have capacity to formulate policies and make decisions in the organization, as well command wide respect and credentials among Muhammadiyah members and supporters.

²⁹ Miriam Budiarmo, *Dasar-dasar Ilmu Politik*. See, Firmanzah, *Mengelola Partai Politik: Komunikasi dan Positioning Ideologi Politik di Era Demokrasi*, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008: 52. See also, Haedar Nashir, *Op.Cit*: 53-54.

³⁰ Robert D. Putnam, "Studi Perbandingan Elit Politik" in Mochtar Mas'ood and Colin Mac Andrews, *Perbandingan Sistem Politik*, Yogyakarta: GAMA Press, 2001, 91-94.

Who are elites in Muhammadiyah?

From 32 names which registered as official leaders in the Central Board of Muhammadiyah during 1998-2010, there are 12 names which are not classified as elites in this study. They are Sutrisno Muhdam, Rusydi Hamka, Ramli Thaha, Lukman Harun, Bambang Sudibyo, Anhar Burhanuddin, Rosyad Sholeh, Rahimi Sutan, Dasron Hamid, Zamroni, Husni Thoyar, and Fasich. It was caused by their position are not strategic, died, short period, and not much involved in the organization's activities. Meanwhile, there are 20 names which classified as elites.

Table 3. Selected elites in Muhammadiyah in
Post-New Order Regime 1998-2010

No.	Names of Elites	Position	Period
1	Prof. Dr. HM. Amien Rais, MA	Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	1994-1999
		Counselor for the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010
2	Prof. Dr. H. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, MA	Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	1999-2005
		Counselor for the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010
3	Prof. Dr. HM. Din Syamsuddin, MA	Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
		Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010
4	Prof. Dr. H. Ismail Sunny, SH., MCL	Adviser for Department of Politics, Human Rights, and International Relation of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
5	Prof. Dr. HM. Amien Abdullah, MA	Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
6	Prof. Dr. H. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, SU	Secretary of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
7	Prof. Dr. HM Dawam Rahardjo	Adviser for Department of Economy and People Empowerment of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
8	Prof. Dr. H. Yahya A. Muhaimin	Adviser for Department of Education and Research of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
9	Prof. Dr. H. Yunahar Ilyas, Lc., M.Ag	Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010

No.	Names of Elites	Position	Period
10	Prof. Drs. H. Abdul Malik Fadjar, M.Sc	Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2010
11	Prof. Drs. H. Asjmuni Abdurrahman	Adviser for Department of Islamic Laws and Religious Affairs and Practices of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
12	Dr. dr. H. Ahmad Watik Pratiknya	Adviser for People Health and Prosperity of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
13	Dr. H. Haedar Nashir, M.Si	Secretary of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
14	dr. H. Sudibyo Markus, MBA	Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010
15	Drs. H. Syukriyanto, AR, M.Hum	vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010
16	Drs. H. Muhammad Muqoddas, Lc, M.A	Treasurer of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	1995-2000
17	Drs. H. Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, MA	Adviser for Department of Cadre and Autonomous Organization of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
18	Drs. H. Ahmad Dahlan Rais, M.Hum	Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010
19	Drs. H. Muhammad Goodwill Zubir	Secretary of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2010
20	H. Muchlas Abror	Secretary of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	1995-2000
		Advisor for Department of Organizational Empowerment of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2000-2005
		Vice Chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah	2005-2010

Source: Compilation by the Writer.

Variant of the political attitudes of the elites in Muhammadiyah³¹

Based on various references, interviews, and in-depth analysis on the political attitudes of the elites in Muhammadiyah in response to three main cases, the study eventually concludes that there are four cat-

³¹ The study conducted the interview with some informants such as Abdul Malik Fadjar, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Ahmad Dahlan Rais, Ahmad Rofiq, Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Haedar Nashir, M. Syukriyanto AR, Yahya A. Muhaimin.

egories of the attitudes. They are transformativ-idealistic, moderate-idealistic, realistic-critical, and accommodative-pragmatic.

Transformative-idealistic

This group has a number of features. Firstly, they believed that each Islam-based party must solve social problems. Secondly, they were productive writers and active in the community empowerment. Sociologically, they were academicians and social activists in several NGOs. Their thoughts occasionally became a controversial issue in public spaces. This study identifies some elites in Muhammadiyah: Syafii Maarif, Dawam Rahardjo, Munir Mul Khan, Amin Abdullah, Haedar Nashir, and Sudibyo Markus.

In the case of Islam-based party, they assume that all Islam-based parties should fight for people interest and civil rights such as solving poverty and backwardness, eradicating corruption, and reforming educational systems. Therefore, this group underlines party's performances for people rather than formalistic affairs.

Furthermore, in the case of Jakarta charter, this group obviously rejected the charter as a state principle. They believed that the plurality of Indonesian people needs a more accommodative principle. Therefore, the notion of the Islamic state should not be symbolized through the formalistic way, but it must be confined in personal domain.

Meanwhile, in the case of terrorism, this group believed that the terrorist deeds contradict with Islamic teachings. *Jihad* essentially is a committed struggle against injustice for peaceful and prosperity. This concept has noble goals than terrorist deeds. In contrast, the terrorist acts is the merely of violence movements which are not in line with humanity and democracy.

Moderate-idealistic

This group has some features. Firstly, they believed that the Islam-based party is remains necessary, but it should be based on Al-Qur'an and As-Sunnah as a main Muslim doctrine. Secondly, they were not in extreme positions either right or left. Thirdly, they fundamentally rejected any violence deeds in the name of Islam. Those in this group are Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Yunahar Ilyas, Muhammad Muqoddas, and Goodwill Zubir.

These elites sociologically work as lecturers in the college or university. They were experts in Islamic studies, and could be classified as *ulama*. This group has paid the yearning of Muhammadiyah members for the figure of *ulama*. They are typically engaging in the Council of *Tarjih* and *Tabligh* –one of commissions in Muhammadiyah which is responsible to handle religious affairs and practices.

This group also believed that Islam-based parties were still needed to channel the political interests of Muslim community. In the case of Jakarta charter, this group disagreed with the notion of reviving the charter as a state principle although they do not expressive in doing so. Likewise, in the case of terrorist deeds, this group rejected any terrorist acts in the name of Islam.

Realistic-critical

This group has some features. Firstly, they believed that minimum real contributions are better than politics of lip services. Secondly, they said that the idea of Islamic state is not suitable with the plurality of Indonesian society. This study ultimately detects some elites in Muhammadiyah: Amien Rais, Malik Fadjar, Yahya A. Muhaimin, Ismail Sunny, Watik Pratiknya, Dahlan Rais, Syukriyanto AR, and Muchlas Abror.

Sociologically, they were lecturers as well as civil servants in the state institutes. Most of them were graduates from Western colleges. This group has close relationship with various segments in the society and helps them to solve their problems. Some of them even held governmental positions both in legislative and executive such as Amien Rais, Malik Fadjar, and Yahya Muhaimin.

In the case of Jakarta charter, they believed that the idea of Islamic state is not suitable with the plurality of Indonesian society. The verdict to create the charter as a state principle will affect conflicts which will be detrimental to the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. Political Islam should be promoted in noble and more accommodative ways. This group also rejected the violence acts conducted by terrorists. They believed that the terrorist deeds contradicted with entire values of *jihad*. As a result, they prefer to disseminate prosperity oriented rather than religious symbolism. In addition, history has sounded that the political Islam is never victorious in the national politics.

Accommodative-pragmatic

This group has some features. Firstly, their attitude is cooperative and accommodative toward various interest groups. Secondly, they have inconsistent attitudes in reacting to Muslim politics. It seems that ideology is not significant for this group. It can be seen on the attitudes of Din Syamsuddin and Hajriyanto Y. Tohari.

In the various chances, Din and Tohari's statements were inconsistent. On the one hand, Din stated that PAN must become the party of Muhammadiyah.³² On the other hand, when he was elected as the top leader in Muhammadiyah, he said that Muhammadiyah has no special

³² *Jawa Pos*, July 8th, 2005: 1.

relationship with any political parties including PAN.³³ In addition, he demonstrated publicly his reinforcement to the establishment of PMB (*Partai Matahari Bangsa*, the Nation Sun Party) as Muhammadiyah's party. In the case of state principle, in one time, Din reinforced the implementation of the charter as the state principle.³⁴ In the other time, he rejected the application of the Islamic law in Indonesia.³⁵

These evidences have illustrated their accommodative attitudes. This group wraps the issues of formalistic Islam and humanism for their pragmatic goals. Din desired to show himself as a reconciliative leader. Likewise, Latif (www.islamlib.com) also concluded that Din Syamsuddin was a politician and has interest-oriented thinking ways.

Influential factors

Inasmuch as there are some factors which influence the diversity of the political attitudes of the elites in Muhammadiyah, this study supposed two main factors namely sociological background and organizational factor.

Sociological factor: There are four sociological factors which included here. First is educational factor. The difference of educational background between those who have Islamic subject and those who have secular subject causes the different attitude among elites in Muhammadiyah. Elites who study Islamic subjects tend to show moderate-idealistic attitude while elites who study secular subjects tend to realistic-critical and transformative-idealistic attitude.

Second is professional factor. Most of elites in Muhammadiyah work as civil servants. It enables them to have close relation with various

³³ *Jawa Pos*, July 7th, 2005: 2.

³⁴ *Republika*, October 19th, 2010; www.tempointeraktif.com, November 5th, 2001.

³⁵ M. Din Syamsuddin, "Usaha Pencarian Konsep Negara dalam Sejarah Pemikiran Politik Islam", in *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an*, No. 2 Vol. IV 1993, 4-9.

groups in society. Consequently, they have equally open attitudes to all groups.

Third is relational factor. As an immense network, elites in Muhammadiyah enable to have wide connections with various groups. Each group definitely has different sociological background. Elites who held position in the governmental bureaucracy tend to have realistic attitudes. Furthermore, elites who held close relation with progressive groups in Islam and other religions tend to have transformativ attitudes. Moreover, elites who held close relation with the radical-textual communities in Islam tend to have moderate attitudes while elites who have close relation with all groups tend to exploit them for their interests.

Fourth is political orientation factor. Each elite has different political orientations behind their statements. On the one hand, there are some elites purely involve in Muhammadiyah to promote religious propagation to Muslim communities. On the other hand, other elites exploit Muhammadiyah as a proxy to obtain their political interests. Still others elites take advantages to enrich their personal needs through Muhammadiyah.

Organizational factor: There are three organizational factors which included here. First is organizational platform. Muhammadiyah seeks to achieve a real Islamic society (*Masyarakat Islam yang Sebenar-benarnya or MIYS*). This platform has always become guidance for any organizational activities. And there is a common understanding that Muhammadiyah is a civil organization which active at the societal and should not involve in any political activity and power struggle.

Second is organizational rules and official decrees. Elites in Muhammadiyah are role models for their members and supporters. As role models, they have to consistently follow the rules of the organiza-

tion. They believed that the struggle for the public interests more important than struggle of power.

Third is historical lesson. History repeats it's self repetitively. Elites in Muhammadiyah agree that they should continue the roles of previous leaders in Muhammadiyah in contributing to the public good. However some elites understand that elites in Muhammadiyah have to be involving in political activities. Meanwhile, others elites maintain that Muhammadiyah is a civil organization and it should keep a distance from political activities.

Conclusion

This study found the evidences that the charismatic leadership in Muhammadiyah does not work effectively. It can be seen by proof as explained in previous parts. Thus, the attitude in this study can be classified into four categories: Transformative-idealistic i.e. political attitudes which stress on Islam thoughts and humanity values in order to solve social problems; Moderate-idealistic i.e. political attitudes which believe that political Islam is the inevitably requirement. This attitude is not in extreme positions neither right nor left; Realistic-critical i.e. political attitudes which emphasize on the substantial values. They avoid formalistic ways as the tools of propaganda; Accommodative-pragmatic i.e. political attitudes which easily cooperate to everyone. It's not in one of particular extreme attitudes. They always seek political opportunities and attract all Islamic groups' sympathy in order to gain popular supports.

All in all, the variations elite's attitudes were deeply influenced by two main factors. First is sociological background such as education, professional, personal relation, and political orientation. Second is organizational factor such as organizational platform, organizational rules and

official decrees, and historical lessons. Each factor basically has its own degree of in influencing elite's attitude related to the political issues.

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Abdul Malik Fadjar, interview in Yogyakarta.

Abdul Munir Mulkhan, interview in Yogyakarta.

Ahmad Dahlan Rais, interview in Surakarta.

Ahmad Rofiq, interview through *Blackberry*.

Asjmuni Abdurrahman, interview in Yogyakarta.

Haedar Nashir, interview in Yogyakarta.

M. Syukriyanto AR, interview in Yogyakarta.

Yahya A. Muhaimin, interview in Yogyakarta.